

# *Studies in Intelligence*

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*Journal of the American Intelligence Professional*

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(December 2013)*

**Rethinking the President's Daily Intelligence Brief**

**Needed: More Thinking about Conceptual Frameworks  
for Analysis—The Case of Influence**

**Iraqi Human Intelligence Collection on  
Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1980–2003**

**Reviewed**

*Spying in America: Espionage from the Revolutionary  
War to the Dawn of the Cold War*

*American Spies: Espionage against the United States from the Cold  
War to the Present*

*The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a  
Global War on Tribal Islam*

*The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends  
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*The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin  
Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*

**Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf**

**Books Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence*, 2013**



Center for the Study of Intelligence

# Report Documentation Page

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# Studies in Intelligence

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## Rethinking the President's Daily Intelligence Brief

C. Lawrence Meador and Vinton G. Cerf

“  
**The expanded use of [tablet-like, visualization, and other new] technologies has dramatic implications for those who create, deliver, and use the PDB, with exciting possibilities for the establishment of even more intimate and effective IC engagement with top-level leaders.**  
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### Introduction

A primary function of the Intelligence Community (IC) is to support the president, the National Security Council, and other top government leaders. The most well-known example of this support is the *President's Daily Briefing (PDB)*. The *PDB*—as reflected in actual printed products and the person-to-person interactions between *PDB* recipients and intelligence briefers—has evolved over the decades into an exquisitely choreographed effort. The recent limited and experimental use for this purpose of an electronic tablet and the potential to leverage advances in visualization and other powerful hardware and software applications presents a potential new chapter for the *PDB*.<sup>1</sup> The expanded use of these technologies has dramatic implications for those who create, deliver, and use the *PDB*, with exciting possibilities for the establishment of even more intimate and effective IC engagement with top-level leaders.

A small panel of interested professionals that we were part of explored the implications of the use of new

technologies in order to inform discussion of adaptations to the *PDB*, both as a product and a process. Of particular interest to those of us on the panel were

- possible changes in the interaction of information providers and recipients;
- changes in the kinds of information provided and its display using the new technologies;
- specialized software capabilities to yield the highest levels of satisfaction; and
- complementarities with other media of information exchange and interaction.

Additionally, the panel was interested in other forms of visual display or information transmission and collaboration that are on the horizon, and how all these changes may affect the IC's operating model.

We took a four-pronged approach to our task:

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<sup>1</sup> Nothing in this paper should be interpreted to suggest that we believe a tablet is the only relevant computer-based device that has a role to play in providing access to and use of intelligence information for the *PDB* or any other purpose.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

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- We observed the current *PDB* process, to include how the tablet is used.
- We considered the insights of practitioners and the literature on decision support and executive information systems.
- We interviewed or received briefings from more than 90 individuals in government, private industry and in nonprofit and academic sectors.
- A panel of senior external experts also advised us and reviewed our findings and recommendations.

While we make several observations about the current *PDB* process, the focus of this article is on a future environment in which tablets and other platforms are the principal mechanisms for presenting and visualizing intelligence to senior leaders. And while this article mainly treats the *PDB*, the experience with the *PDB* promises to set standards and conventions for IC support to other senior leaders as well.

We will not advocate here the targeting of the *PDB* to a larger audience—we think it should continue to be disseminated as the president desires and that briefers continue personally to deliver the *PDB* to presidentially approved recipients. We will suggest that using currently available technology to improve dissemination of intelligence information to other US leaders (especially in the IC) is an idea worth discussing.

Here we will outline how the *PDB*, when considered as a decision-support and executive-information sys-

tem, can be tailored to the relatively unstructured problem environment that top government leaders often face and expect the IC to help address.

We concluded that the *PDB* should evolve around five design principles. It should be

- focused squarely on policymakers' problems;
- adaptable to a variety of needs and styles;
- capable of providing increasingly "curatorial" versus strictly editorial functions;
- able to embrace a risk-management approach to security concerns; and
- extensible to a leader's broader information and communications ecosystem.

The visualization, data-manipulation, and data-exploitation capabilities inherent in a tablet computer and similar platforms provide opportunities to reshape the structure and dynamics of top-level support.

We recommend the inclusion of several capabilities in the following areas:

- architecture
- annotation and feedback mechanisms
- access
- search
- security

- the *PDB* as a full-featured information support device.

Advancements in these areas are technically feasible and can be delivered with effective security. Used together, improvements could form the basis for dramatic shifts in current IC processes. They could

- support greater access to amplifying sources, visuals, and multimedia;
- provide continuously updated information and analysis—accessible 24/7—instead of a single 15–30 minute briefing session;
- make possible connectivity to other communications capabilities, e.g., e-mail; and
- simplify the *PDB* recipient's day.

The largest challenges to implementing such shifts will be making adjustments to the *PDB* process and the culture that now governs the relationship between intelligence officials and senior leaders. In making these changes, the IC has the potential to move from a model of providing primarily finished analytic products—in relatively staged, controlled interactions—to a new model of engaging in dynamic relationships between policymaker and intelligence officer, a model in which sources are referred to, key insights continuously updated, and feedback provided more comprehensively. Such a transformation in the *PDB* would also be likely to require alteration of many processes across the Intelligence Community as a whole.

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### *The Evolving PDB*

The provision of current intelligence to presidents has a deep tradition, dating to 1946, but it has never been a static effort. The appearance, content, and delivery approaches have evolved to reflect the attitudes of presidents toward intelligence; their varied cognitive styles and preferred means of receiving information—through a national security advisor, a mid-ranking or senior intelligence officer, or from the head of the Intelligence Community; and advances in technological capabilities.

The daily face-to-face briefings of presidents, which began in the mid-1970s, revolutionized the *PDB*, even if not all presidents since received such briefings. In that time, the *PDB* has been seen as a means for the IC and its leaders to earn the confidence of presidents and their administrations and to offer a mechanism for presidents to provide feedback and tasking. As a result, the experience that the *PDB* creates is of central importance to the president and the IC.<sup>2</sup>

The president has always had the last word on how his version of the *PDB* is crafted in content and format and the way it is delivered. However, at least in recent years, designated principals and other presidentially approved recipients of the *PDB* have in many cases put their own fingerprints on content, format and delivery, thus tailoring the *PDB* to their own unique needs.

### *Enter Tablet Computing*

Advances in information technology during recent years are on the cusp of radically altering the *PDB* both as a published product and as a personally delivered briefing. High-powered computing, advanced encryption and security, broadband, wireless and global Internet connectivity, along with the proliferation of fixed and mobile platforms, are creating new opportunities for delivering intelligence support as well as receiving feedback and tasking from recipients. The recent limited and experimental introduction of the tablet computer to convey the *PDB* reflects this shift.

Like all technological innovations, the tablet offers new capabilities, but it also has the potential to affect the relationships and experiences of the individuals and organizations involved in its use. When combined with other information and communications technologies, the tablet foretells a different user experience, marked by, among other things, dramatically increased demands for all sorts of information by “power users,” greater expectations for intelligence responsiveness, and the desire to reach the frontline intelligence officer directly—in some cases without the filter of a briefer or *PDB* production team.

The prevalence of a connected-information environment in professional and personal lives, coupled with changes the IC is making in

product development, display, and access, is producing an expectation of greater insights, more compelling visualizations, and almost instant updates on the most important and critical matters. IT devices are verging on being “tethered minds” that provide continuous analytical support. A more radical future vision is thus eminently plausible: a shift in the *PDB* from a once-a-day production-and-brief-engagement model, to continuous, near real-time, virtual support, punctuated by periodic physical interactions, some regularly scheduled and some when called for by urgent situations.

The use of tablets also implies important shifts in process, style, and influence in the relationship between *PDB* recipients and intelligence officers who provide the *PDB*. For example, a tablet could offer more direct access to detailed information, a shift that could affect a briefer’s role as intermediary. Or, a tablet device could give intelligence officers greater access and influence because of the ubiquity of these devices in the lives of today’s and future leaders.

Tablet devices thus have the potential to create new levels of intimacy between leader and intelligence officer. In addition, the production cycle for the *PDB* might assume a higher tempo (and thus consume greater resources or require a fundamentally different process), with greater emphasis on providing incremental insights.

<sup>2</sup> For detailed discussion of the approaches presidents up to 2004 have had toward the *PDB*, see John L. Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004* (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2012). An free audio version is available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CIA-GettingToKnowThePresident>

In our judgment, these challenges have kept leaders and intelligence officers who would provide the new technology from universally and immediately embracing it. “Early adopters” see wide adoption of the tablet as inevitable because of the opportunities it will afford and they will tolerate (or embrace) shifts in interaction styles as part and parcel of innovation.

A “wait-and-see” group finds the tablet appealing and potentially valuable, but its members are frustrated by limitations in the functionality of current tablets, anticipate security concerns that will limit the

tablet’s effectiveness, and generally embrace incrementalism to avoid major changes in current relationships.

“Late adopters” believe the tablet may not displace the intangible dynamic of the combined book and oral briefing and find the more arm’s-length relationship useful for maintaining institutional independence. But the introduction of new technological capabilities does not have to be forced on any reluctant principals. It should be voluntary and if it is done well, the early adopters will serve as models for emulation by others. But principals

who want to continue with the hard copy version of the *PDB* should not be prevented from having it.

The pace and form by which the tablet is incorporated into the president’s daily intelligence effort will reflect how the concerns of these three groups are addressed throughout the *PDB* life cycle. This paper principally deals with the *PDB* as a presidential document and briefing interaction. But the experience with the *PDB* promises to set standards and conventions for how the IC supports other policymaker sets and its own leaders.



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### ***PDB as a Decision-Support and Executive-Information System***

During our inquiry, we came to think of the *PDB* process in terms of a decision-support and executive-information system. Such systems first emerged to assist top corporate executives carry out strategic and tactical planning, acquire competitive and market intelligence, and conduct operations and finance functions. Thinking about such systems has since come to the medical, civilian government, military, and—increasingly—intelligence professions.

These applications are sometimes referred to as “executive support systems” or “dashboards.” Their development and increased sophistication have been propelled by ever-increasing processor performance, memory capacity, high-resolution visualization, and wireless connectivity. (See table for a list of repre-

sentative entities in corporate, medical, and government domains.)

Successful decision-support and executive-information systems are tailored to their problem environments; the cognitive, communica-

tions, leadership, and interaction styles of users; and the larger information ecosystem in which they operate. Problem environments facing senior leaders can be generally placed into a range of structured and unstructured environments. Struc-

#### ***Representative Users of Decision-Support Systems***

##### ***Business***

Abbott Laboratories, American Airlines, American Express, Cigna, Citibank, DuPont, IBM, Johnson Controls, Motorola, Nationwide Insurance Company, Pfizer, Sprint Nextel, Transamerica, United Airlines, Verizon, and Walmart.

##### ***Medical institutions***

Aetna Health Care, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Geisinger Health System, Harvard Medical School, Kaiser Permanente, Mayo Clinic, MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab, Stanford Medical School, United Healthcare, and Vanderbilt University Medical Center.

##### ***US government***

Department of Agriculture’s National Institute of Food & Agriculture, Department of Defense (Defense Knowledge Online), Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of State, Census Bureau, Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, National Library of Medicine, National Science Foundation, Small Business Administration, Smithsonian Institution, USAID, US General Services Administration, US Navy, US Army (Army Knowledge Online), US Air Force, US Marines, and US Coast Guard. There are many more.

tured environments typically are well known and well understood, with clear methodologies (and in some cases algorithms) for assessing data (or the absence of it). These environments generally invoke pre-programmed decision processes.

In contrast, unstructured environments have highly variable parameters: data can be ambiguous, misleading, or even deceptive and come in many forms and dimensions. For such environments, decision processes are nonprogrammed, i.e., subject to interpretation, debate, and ultimately individual judgment. It is in addressing these unstructured problems that senior leaders most often look to intelligence for help.

In unstructured problem environments, decisionmakers tend to gen-

eralize problems into more broadly understood categories and they seek more data. An effective decision-support and executive-information system provides an alternative, first by helping leaders identify narrower sub-problems and then by organizing, sorting, culling, utilizing, and making sense of existing data more effectively. In short, these systems provide context for officials to face complex policy and operational choices with greater understanding and confidence. From this perspective, the tablet and other technologies provide opportunities to use the *PDB* to provide better and more relevant information to senior officials.

In today's corporate world, decision-support systems reflect a few common principles:

- Sharing of corporate knowledge and data with and among other senior leaders within the enterprise is a given.
- Good decision-support systems will be constructed so that they can easily deliver information displays constructed to the specific needs of an organization's diverse senior leaders.
- Corporate systems acknowledging the variety of cognitive and communications styles within their leadership teams tailor their system to individuals as much as possible.
- The best decision-support and executive-information systems reflect communication and feedback within their communities.



### ***Future PDB Design Principles***

The unique characteristics of the *PDB* as a decision-support and executive-information system should be reflected in a number of implicit and explicit White House user requirements:

- The tablet should be *problem-focused*, guiding leaders toward issues and questions they can address by acquiring context and a clearer understanding of implications (the “so-whats”). Flooding *PDB* users with analyses of complex and inexplicable (or incomprehensible) phenomena will distract them and overwhelm their decisionmaking capacity.
- It must be *adaptive* and tailored to differing substantive needs and personal styles of its recipients. This adaptability includes choices in preferred platform (the tablet, or perhaps something else), periodicity of updates, affinity for certain visualization methods, and forms of interaction.
- The model should expand from an editorial function—in which intelligence officers determine which insights are most salient—to a more *curatorial* function—whereby recipients enter a structured interaction to generate insight and knowledge.
- The system should leverage all available data and information—continuously updated in near real-time, across security levels— assembled into usable composites through active engagement with *PDB* recipients.
- The system should rest on a *risk-management* framework to address legitimate security concerns. Rigorous identity and access-management protocols will be needed to ensure proper dissemination of intelligence.
- The support system must be *extensible* to multiple functions. If the system provides only for briefer-principal interactions, recipients

may well lose faith (or interest) in it. We should avoid a scenario in which senior leaders are driven to carry multiple tablets.

- The *PDB* tablet should support ancillary communication functions. It should enable feedback and tasking back to the IC and

connectivity to e-mail. It could—potentially, even should—be a platform through which other information feeds from intelligence leaders, commanding generals, diplomats, and others are delivered. The tablet could even feature an “alert” function so that

critical intelligence could be rapidly disseminated when appropriate. Cloud computing concepts may provide some of this indispensable flexibility in an exceptionally high security environment.



### *Implications of Current and Evolving Technology Developments*

IT advances offer profound opportunities to *fuse, visualize, animate, and interact* with information and data. Such methods were once possible only through high-end workstations after significant effort and time and technical assistance. Now, they are readily available by simply importing commercially available technology; applying a few basic Cloud-computing concepts to efficiently and securely deploy substantial computing power, large memory, and significant storage; and adopting certain World Wide Web protocols and mechanisms (e.g., HTML5, data tagging, CSS formatting language, JavaScript). The result will be superior intelligence that has greater impact and breeds more robust engagement.

At least three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories of visualization hold particular value for the IC to help show the existence and meaning of relationships, correlate disparate information to shed insight, and provide deeper context by referencing time and space.

The first includes *charts and graphics*, which show relationships among complex data and statistics.

Examples include annotated trend or event lines (the classic being Charles Joseph Minard’s rendering of losses suffered by Napoleon’s army in the Russian campaign of 1812), “bubble” or “spider” charts, and social network analyses.

The second category includes *tools that augment reality* by layering many types of relevant information including data and unstructured text or graphics onto an organizing reference plane such as a map or a globe. Such tools enable the fusion of items such as imagery, video, sound tracks, statistics, charts, and map representations in a single view. Many use electronic maps or other geospatial representations to display geotagged data on a singular spatio-temporal plane to highlight geographic coincidence of people, objects, and events and desired layers can be turned on or off as needed.



The third category is *animation*, which rolls across datasets to show change with graphic precision. These tools are particularly useful for yielding insights on time-series data (weather, people movements, etc.), where changes in quantity or location

can be tracked and analyzed (Gap-Minder’s application is one example).


Software applications that employ these visualization techniques have proliferated. Social media, such as Facebook and LinkedIn, provide methods to gauge roles and strengths in relationships within people’s networks. Data and economics firms, such as Bloomberg and Hoover’s, use elaborate data displays to inform investment, business, and trading opportunities. The security, emergency management, and public health sectors use mobile applications to help identify, track, and respond to incidents of public hazard. The transportation sector monitors the movement of a significant amount of cargo and people to ensure safe and efficient passage over land and sea and through the air. Marketing firms and major retailers use social networking applications to identify customer attitudes and anticipate (or influence) future trends. The IC is using similar applications, and many would be powerful on a *PDB* tablet.

Innovations in *interactive user interfaces* have greatly enhanced the impact of these visualization techniques and software applications, per-

## Which African Regions Face Similar Challenges?



Data provided by The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law



The maps above are taken from an integrated geospatial platform (ArcGIS) that allows user to interact with maps and investigate the underlying analytic methods and supporting data. They also permit the display of data in different time periods. In these ways, a map can serve as a powerful foundation for analysis and decisionmaking. The map of Africa (top) communicates the results of statistical clustering analysis to identify African political entities with similar vulnerability characteristics. This Web map illustrates Internet users as a share of country populations in 2001. Map symbols are dynamically derived from open-source tabular data served by the World Bank, illustrating the use of federated Web services. Users can also interrogate underlying data and retrieve thousands of other datasets. (Used with permission.)



mitting far more direct and intimate interaction with users. These interfaces take advantage of Cloud technologies to reveal novel insights about large sets of current and historical data. For example, GapMinder software illustrates and animates up to five pieces of multidimensional, time-series information simultaneously. Tools such as Google Maps and Google Earth collate independent sources of geographically indexed information to create strong context-building environments. Interactive zoom and pan interfaces expose different levels of detail to provide the context and orientation that different users may require. Other interfaces mine and illustrate dynamics of social networks to expose otherwise unappreciated facets of relationships among key actors.

Palantir offers a suite of software applications for integrating, visualizing and analyzing many kinds of data, including structured, unstructured, relational, temporal and geospatial, in a collaborative environment. It has shown value in disparate domains, from intelligence to defense to law enforcement to financial services. TouchTable has developed a hardware and software platform for col-

laboration in small group environments that allows users to seamlessly share on-screen visualizations and interactions over a distributed network in a common workspace. It structures discussion geospatially and can be deployed to remote locations, including forward operating bases, command centers, and mobile field units.

The tablet is not the only device to exploit these capabilities, but for the next few years, its mobility, size, and wireless capabilities will offer more unique attributes for *PDB* recipients. Tablets are likely to retain value in at least two areas. One is in providing a first-order review of graphically intensive materials, leaving subsequent, more detailed review to experts using more powerful computing platforms. A second area is in readily establishing connectivity through text-messaging, e-mail, or video communications to pass along information quickly. In this way, the tablet can serve as a medium for passing along sufficient data to provide early warning.

Over the next decade, however, a tablet-sized platform may encroach on the role of larger and smaller

platforms. Industry is investing billions of dollars in research and industrial solid-state manufacturing capabilities to generate a hybrid platform with a tablet's size but with capabilities even more powerful than today's conventional desktop computers.

Another promising area of development lies in secure communications. Commercially available, though not yet in wide use, quantum key distribution (QKD), a subset of quantum cryptography, uses quantum communications to securely exchange a key between two or more parties or devices in which there is a known risk of eavesdropping. Because quantum mechanics guarantees that measuring quantum data disturbs the data, QKD can establish a shared key between two parties without a third party surreptitiously learning anything about the key being exchanged. Therefore, if a third party attempts to learn the bits that make up the key, it will disturb the quantum data that makes up the key and be detectable, allowing the communicating parties to retry or resort to alternative means.



### ***Findings and Recommendations***

The design principles and technology developments noted above led the group to recommendations regarding the *PDB* tablet's general architecture, ability to store or access materials, search features and visualization capabilities, note-taking features, and security.

***The chosen architecture should enable flexibility, commonality, and reliability.***

*Wired and wireless devices and networks.* Key elements of the *PDB* should be accessible and deliverable on a range of platforms (smart phones, tablets, desktops, etc.),

whether connected via Ethernet cable or a secure and encrypted wireless network.

*Synchronizing.* *PDB* content should be synchronized across platforms to ensure version control, even if certain principals may see a different view as a result of their respective

roles. The current version should note wherever possible how it may deviate significantly from previous reports.

*Remote display.* Content should display uniformly across various platforms, e.g., from a handheld to a wall-mounted display.

*Paired relationship.* To facilitate a shared experience, the software underlying the PDB should allow either the principal or the briefer to “drive” the interaction, maintaining one screen view for both (and any other authorized attendees as well).

*Private Cloud and metadata tagging.* The PDB’s primary content should be housed on a private Cloud network that allows the production staff and principals to use a single repository. All PDB items should have extensive metadata tagging to facilitate use as well as control access. This Cloud should be connected to most intelligence sources via one-way tunnels or pipes.

*Government-owned software.* The underlying software should be government owned but constructed with as much functionality as possible from commercial or open sources. It should allow for continuous and seamless upgrades.

*24/7 Ownership.* Principals should “own” and store their own PDB device where practicable, rather than have it bestowed on them by the IC for a short time.

### **PDB Tablet Wish List**

The PDB should be loaded up with referential material including CIA’s *The World Factbook*, the *WIRE*, MEDIA highlights, *NCTC Terrorism Situation Report*, maps, imagery, SIGINT, GEOINT, HUMINT, OSINT, key historical Intelligence, and more.—Several current PDB recipients

The PDB needs a search capability.—Several current PDB recipients

To summarize the critical success factors for the PDB [electronic tablet]—it must be authoritative, useful, complete, and easy to use. —Senior Leader, PDB staff

Wireless access is key to our success. —Senior Leader, PDB Staff

I think we need to mesh e-mail, 24 hour updates, PDB and all other classified information electronically. —Senior White House official

Open source is often highly relevant and it should be in the PDB device for access during the briefing and for later reference but it may not be the entire picture and it is often biased one way or another (e.g., the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*). —Current PDB recipient

Why can’t the PDB device have a secure docking station at the recipient’s location so that it can be charged with intelligence each morning before the briefer arrives and then updated for later reference during the day? —Senior White House official

Access to original source Intelligence is the most frequently asked question by principals who receive the PDB. —Senior Leader, PDB staff

The interactive displays and simulations are a great way to communicate effectively and quickly. —Senior White House official

Human factors and individual differences in cognitive style and interaction style need to be considered to achieve the flexibility, adaptability and agility needed for a suitable PDB technical platform. —Senior White House official

It would be neat to have a variety of [video] news feeds on subjects you are interested in so that you could multitask in the office during the day—to include potentially the TED series, summaries, key facts, depending on the interests of the specific principal. —Current PDB recipient

***Annotation and Feedback. The PDB device should be more than just a stuffed briefcase; it is a vehicle for engagement.***

*Notetaking.* Briefers should be able to conveniently make electronic notes in real time, noting where principals pause, make comments, or otherwise react.

*Feedback.* Principals should be able to provide direct electronic feedback and receive direct responses in return.

*Follow-on action.* Principals should be able to make notes to themselves and share an article or piece of infor-

mation (and their reactions) with authorized staff or fellow senior officials.

*Tasking.* Principals should be able to task the IC—or even a specific IC element—directly and immediately.

***Access. The PDB device should have access to a broad range of materials to support and provide context for finished analysis.***

*Classified/sensitive sources.* The PDB should allow principals to link to as much standard finished intelligence information as possible and to include biographical information on individuals cited; empirical data on organizations and states; and eco-

nomic and financial data. It should tailor access to more specific resources, e.g., recent NIEs or relevant collection reports. Where a *PDB* piece relies on finished analysis or formal collection reports, hotlinks should be available. Providing principals and other designated leaders with access to raw collection data should be avoided in most cases as the potential hazards will often far outweigh benefits.<sup>3</sup> Also, there is value to giving the *PDB* Staff the ability to customize answers to questions that come back from principals about daily *PDB* issues.

*Open sources.* The *PDB* device should have robust access to open sources so that principals and briefers can share common contexts. Sources should range from major media to other open-source (and Open Source Center) products, again potentially positioning the tablet as the IT device of choice for senior officials. But the *PDB* should not become an alternative portal to open-source information that is easily available from other channels such as television, newspapers or magazines.

*Previous PDB briefs.* Briefers and principals should be able to pull up previous briefs to see what has changed or remained constant on an issue, or how it might relate to other issues.

*IC experts.* Briefers and principals should be able to connect with a relevant IC officer to pose more specific questions and engage more deeply, especially in time-critical circumstances.

***Search. The PDB software should provide robust discovery capabilities that let users make additional connections and generate further insights.***

*Full-text.* The *PDB* software should allow full-text searches on key terms or phrases to allow recipients to readily find items of interest.

*Commercial algorithm-based.* The *PDB* software should make use of commercial search algorithms on sources cited to indicate popularity, e.g., “People who consulted this item, also consulted, a, b, and c.”

*Limited natural language query.* *PDB* software should allow natural language queries typical in commercial search engines so that relevant data are discoverable.

***Security. The PDB system must adopt a more robust security apparatus that can work in a portable, wireless, multi-security-level environment.***

*Biometrics.* Access to a *PDB* device should be granted through biometric signatures or mobile device tokens, not just physical handling and passwords (if feasible among this challenging user community).

*Access control and authorization.* *PDB* users accessing online content should have rigorous authentication procedures to verify their credentials. This is especially important when the tablet is used to share or engage on tablet content with others.

*Encryption.* All communication via a *PDB* platform should be encrypted

to TOP SECRET standards but without unnecessary user distraction or inconvenience.

*Multilevel access.* The *PDB* network should be able to readily and securely “stare down” into networks of lower classification and securely bring content up to networks of higher classification. It should also be cognizant of compartmented programs—even if security may prevent accessing the information on the tablet—so that recipients can see that content of interest exists and may be available using other means.

*Discretionary access control.* *PDB* items should have the equivalent of “tear-lines” so that principals can benefit from certain content, even if classification constraints do not permit access to further details or sources.

*Kill/self-destruct feature.* *PDB* devices should have software that allows certain information to be wiped from the device upon principal or briever direction or have a device to self-destruct if it is thought to be compromised or in danger of capture. If extreme acceleration is detected by the tablet or platform’s accelerometers, for instance in the event of a car crash, the self-destruct feature should automatically activate.

*Updating Securely.* The *PDB* must be in a highly secure location whenever *PDB* contents are being displayed or updated. Further it must be connected to the *PDB* updating network (or Cloud) through a special hardwired, photonic, or RF mecha-

<sup>3</sup> Hazards include principals lacking the context to properly interpret the data; principals getting consumed or frustrated in perusing voluminous traffic; principals not understanding how to request the right data; and the ever present risks of security and handling violations.

nism to assure secure operations for the update.

***PDB Tablet as a Full Featured Information Support Device.*** *The device should evolve from a single-purposed platform usable only for a short window of the day (as it is for the current PDB experiment) to an information-support device that principals incorporate into the range of their daily routines.*

*E-mail.* The PDB tablet should have government e-mail functionality (potentially unclassified as well as

classified) so that principals can send messages based on insights from the intelligence support they receive. But outgoing PDB content should not be allowed unless there is a guarantee that the recipient has authorized PDB information access (as in a principal to principal communication).

*Calendar.* Principals should have access to their calendars and to those of others, along with reminder and note-taking functions.

*Web.* Principals should be able to access Internet services (potentially unclassified as well as classified). Access to Intelink would be of tremendous value.

*Live Connection.* Principals should be able to achieve secure connection with peers by video or live-chat.



### ***Impact on Process and Culture***

The combination of the tablet, visualization techniques, robust and accessible knowledge bases, and sophisticated applications makes possible dramatic change in the relationships between PDB recipients and the intelligence officers who produce and deliver intelligence. Such a shift would lead to major changes in IC processes and culture.

A major shift would be movement from the provision of “finished” analytic products in relatively staged, controlled interactions to the creation of more dynamic relationships between producer and recipient of intelligence. With fully capable tablets, PDB recipients could have access to numerous amplifying sources, visuals, and multimedia; receive continuous updates; provide feedback more readily and comprehensively; and extend their reach via other communication capabilities almost immediately.

The impact on process would also be palpable. The daily rhythm of intelligence analysis and production would no longer resemble old-fashioned newsrooms that surge before “print” time. Instead, there would be a continuous drumbeat of activity around creating material in various media: hard copy, mp3, video, web, etc. The 24/7-level of required staffing for such an operation would certainly increase demand for resources.

Using a visually intensive technology requires significant changes to the analytic process. The technology would place a premium on the creation of substantive visualizations, especially in the early development of analytic products, and multimedia manipulation. The IT infrastructure will have to support queries for both analytic products and collection reports. Quality control methods must morph to allow continuous, 24/7 improvement to reflect ongoing streams of reporting.

In the course of our research, we observed that the PDB process and content vary considerably from one recipient to another (we interviewed 15 of the current 30 or so PDB recipients—principals and other senior leaders), and the amount of time principals spend on the PDB on a given day will vary based on the interest in the topics of the day, and how busy they feel.

CEOs who use decision-support capabilities in the private sector typically want all or most of their senior leadership (direct reports and sometimes the next layer) to be well informed on issues the CEOs care about so that the next level or two can actively participate in an informed way if the CEO invites a discussion or debate. We have never seen a situation where the CEO is the only user of their corporate decision-support capability. It seems to us that the same logic should very well apply to the president and to his or her senior leadership team as well as to the PDB.

The cultural transformation is equally significant. The *PDB* is among the most tightly controlled processes in the US national security establishment. The tablet and other related visualization technologies challenge this premise by allowing *PDB* recipients and IC officers to engage more directly and more frequently in more interactive and dynamic partnerships. An important task for the IC will be to keep the content lively and fresh.

Regardless, the DNI and the briefers should retain regular face-to-face interaction with *PDB* recipients to ensure the IC is duly supporting senior leaders and to avoid the loss of the valuable and critical human element provided by the interaction of briefers and principals.

### *The Future of the Briefer*

A panel of past and present *PDB* briefers was asked to discuss the future of briefers in the decision-support environment. In general, panelists were confident that fears of radical changes in the personal interaction between *PDB* recipients were

unfounded and that the relationship would endure. They also felt there would be no change in the core features of today's *PDB* briefer. Mutual trust, knowledge of subjects, ability to anticipate needs and questions, and ability to quickly get answers to questions would remain bedrocks of the relationship.

The panelists also dismissed concerns that failed past efforts to introduce similar technological shifts would be a factor today. Indeed, most panelists felt the recipients of

the today's *PDB* are ready for radical changes. They also dismissed concerns that briefers would become obsolete because of technological developments.

Finally, the panelists did concede that briefers would have to develop some new skills to work in the environment. These are mainly in the area of learning to work more effectively with visualizations and other graphics and multimedia products. (See table below for a selection of comments.)

### PDB Briefers: Success Factors Unique to Tablet Environment

#### **Skills Likely to be Needed**

- The ability to think in words and pictures and explain issues using graphics and visualization tools
- Ability to recognize and plan effective visualizations for upcoming briefings
- Storyboarding skills using words, pictures, video and other multi-media tools
- Ability to locate and store reference and source material of potential interest
- Ability to work with technical experts in producing and displaying multi-media
- Ability to think of self as curator of vast quantities of relevant intelligence knowledge and information
- Skill in helping principals become more proficient in their use of the tablet

#### **Downside Fears:**

- Principals will make flawed decisions based on non-authoritative or inadequately vetted information available on a tablet.
- Principals will become frustrated, overloaded or overwhelmed by too much data.
- The tablet would negatively affect the quality of the briefer/principal relationship.
- Previous attempts to introduce similar technologies portend another failure.
- Briefers will become obsolete.

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### *Next Steps*

To follow up on these findings, we recommend the IC leadership consider six actions.

*Establish a point of contact, supported by a small IC-wide working group, to mine emergent visualization capabilities and their utility for PDB and other IC applications.*

External experts such as those interviewed for this project would be ideal sources of insights about current practices, hardware and soft-

ware developments, and cutting-edge R&D initiatives. This working group should also assess the impact of visualization techniques on the production process in each IC element and the IC as a whole. This POC would be responsible for the next three actions.

*Develop a high-level strategic roadmap and implementation plan.*

These recommended changes in the *PDB* are complex and interdependent. They require an integrated approach and leadership commitment to ensure technologies are inserted and accompanied by appropriate changes in processes. (In contrast, the operational planning, control, and rollout process is expected to be an evolutionary learn-

ing and prototyping approach that would exploit insights from the experimentation and working group activities and over time from the R&D program mentioned below).

*Conduct a series of experiments to test emergent capabilities and their implications for the user experience, the production model, and IC culture.* The experiments should be conducted in the context of a rapid evolutionary prototyping lab using the best available commercial-quality software and hardware test beds so that capabilities can be properly tested, evaluated, and red-teamed. IARPA, CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology, and/or NSA's Technology and Research Director-

ates may be well suited to assist in these experiments.

*Develop technology insertion tactical plans for each major phase or cycle of new capability development.* These plans should be vetted by the IC working group described above. They should describe in detail how to accomplish needed improvements and estimated implementation costs. These project-level plans will be derived in part from ongoing learning processes.

*Establish and develop an R&D program of record.* Given the dynamic nature of computing, communication, analytic, and visualization tech-

nologies, the DNI should create an IC-wide R&D effort that continuously plumbs emergent ideas that would benefit the PDB and perhaps many other potential user sets in IC leadership positions. This need not be a large effort, but it should draw from across the IC.

*Consider extending the findings of the above efforts to other senior users of intelligence.* The ideas generated in this paper have applicability beyond the PDB and deserve attention for how they can enhance intelligence support to other officials across the US government.



## Conclusion

Implementing these recommendations will not be easy or free and should not be underestimated, but in our judgment conversion of the current PDB system into one that more closely resembles an advanced decision-support and executive-information system will provide opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the production process itself, opportunities that should not be passed up.

The ethos of the PDB rests in its heritage as a compilation of largely finished analysis for a dedicated senior reader, delivered on a schedule, by a skilled intelligence briefer, who serves as the gateway to the rest of the IC. An elaborate production process and supporting analytic cadre have institutionalized that model and the culture in which it is

produced. It has fostered a highly regulated production scheme for producing serial, fixed outputs controlled by the IC.

The use of electronic tablet technologies used to their fullest capabilities portends a process of shared discovery between the principal and the broader IC, a model that is nothing short of a paradigm shift, a shift likely to meet considerable resistance.

To reduce potential resistance, it is critical that new capabilities not invade the "personal space" of PDB recipients and that the option to retain a paper product remains. In addition past efforts to introduce new technology to the process of informing policymakers should be examined to draw applicable lessons from those experiences.

If the PDB is to evolve in this direction, it must be done systematically and deliberately, with fierce intent and courageous patience to overcome challenges from those unsettled by the changes and the complexity of the technology and the service it is intended to perform.

A strategic plan will be necessary to identify how desired functions will be introduced and how challenges will be met. The changes, however, do not have to be implemented all at once and can be phased in over time, and there is time to adapt approaches to many potential PDB users.

Failure to begin the journey outlined in this paper in a timely way—with some noticeable degree of urgency and focus—may jeopardize the progress made so far with the

## ***Rethinking the PDB***

current *PDB* tablet experiment, which we judge to be successfully providing insights into what will be needed in the future. *PDB* recipients (especially principals) appear to want more than they are currently

getting, and they may revolt against the tablet and other forms of new technology if they perceive that they are not reaping the technology's potential benefits. The lost momentum could cause the *PDB* to retreat

to the "business as usual" status of the last 40 years. Such a development would represent a significant missed opportunity.

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## Needed: More Thinking about Conceptual Frameworks for Analysis—The Case of Influence

*Jason U. Manosevitz*

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***The concept of influence is fundamental to policymakers trying to shape events, but it is only one of many conceptual frameworks that analysts could usefully develop and incorporate in their analysis.***  
”

US policymakers want intelligence that helps them avoid surprise, understand evolving developments, and identify opportunities to advance US objectives or avoid risks to national security interests. How is China’s power in Asia evolving? How can the United States influence political developments in Egypt? What can be done to shape Iranian and North Korean leaders’ decisions about their nuclear programs? What public diplomacy efforts might overcome the appeal of terrorist ideologies? How can stability be brought to tumultuous regions in Africa?

Policymakers who must answer these kinds of questions expect Intelligence Community (IC) analysis to help tackle them. Many structured analytic techniques (SATs) that IC analysts use are well suited to exposing assumptions and to carrying out an analyst’s first duty—which is to warn. The IC’s overwhelming focus on SATs since 9/11 however has crowded out attention to conceptual frameworks that analysts and policymakers need in order to

address many of our national security questions, such as those above.

This article reviews a framework for thinking about the concept of influence and suggests that conceptual frameworks can complement SATs to strengthen analytic tradecraft. The application of influence is fundamental to policymakers trying to shape events, but it is only one of many conceptual frameworks that analysts could usefully develop and incorporate in their analysis.<sup>1</sup> My goal in this discussion is to spark more attention to core conceptual frameworks in the course of IC analysis and generate debate about how to continue developing analytic tradecraft.

### ***The Problem***

SATs are simply methods for conducting analysis. Attention to them is understandable in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq WMD debacle. In the postmortems of those events it has become common to speak of failure to “connect dots” or of inattention to basic assumptions as mistakes that would have been avoided had SATs been applied. Indeed,

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<sup>1</sup> This article focuses on influence among states. The principles discussed here, however, can be applied to a wide range of actors, including international organizations, political parties, nonstate organizations, groups, and individuals.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

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***At the same time, single-minded attention to technique runs the risk of reducing analyses to mechanical processes.***

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many SATs are focused on rooting out flawed thinking or challenging existing analysis. SATs, such as Key Assumption Checks, What If Analysis, Red Team Analysis, and A Team/B Team exercises, focus on discrete questions, and many are tilted toward warning policymakers of dangers and threats to national security.<sup>2</sup>

The problem is that many SATs stunt broad thinking and the kind of analysis that busy policymakers want. At the same time, single-minded attention to technique runs the risk of reducing analyses to mechanical processes that require only the crunching of the “right” data to address policymaker needs. Diagnostic, Contrarian, and Imaginative Thinking SATs are useful for addressing specific questions but they do not go far enough in aiding policymakers make sense of world events or alert them to opportunities for advancing US priorities.

I contend that developing conceptual frameworks along side SATs—including the identification of the key components of the framework—will enhance analytic tradecraft. Without consideration of key concepts, SATs are unlikely to come to terms with bigger picture issues and the results will fail to provide poli-

cymakers with the tools they need to cope with their most bedeviling problems. Moreover since many policymakers receive raw intelligence reports on a daily basis and act as analysts themselves, IC analysts can add value by crafting conceptual frameworks that enable policymakers to make sense of daily reports, thereby reducing potential misperceptions as they try to understand unfolding events.<sup>3</sup>

With that preface, let me work through the key elements of a conceptual framework in which policymakers constantly work—*influence*. Academic work on the subject provides a useful starting point and helps bound the issue. Mainly I borrow from David A. Baldwin, a senior political scientist at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Baldwin summarized the concept of influence in his contribution to the *Handbook of International Relations*, “Power and International Relations.”<sup>4</sup>

### ***What Is Influence?***

Three days after 9/11, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf agreed to a list of US demands. These included closing Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan, providing a base of

operations for US troops, and sharing intelligence to help defeat al-Qa’ida. Musharraf would not have agreed to these steps of his own accord.<sup>5</sup> Instead he was offered political and economic incentives to agree. In other words, US officials “influenced” Pakistan’s actions. In this example, it may be easy to see influence at work, but defining it as a concept is less so.

Baldwin points out that there are many ways to convey the meaning of influence: persuasion, sway, manipulation, leverage, and pressure. All of these words share common elements of the core meaning of influence. Fundamentally, influence is getting people or organizations to do something they would not otherwise do.<sup>6</sup> This describes a *causal* relationship among at least two actors. In statecraft, this means state A takes some action to *cause* state B to act for A’s benefit.

This is a broad but bounded definition of influence. The concept sets up a dynamic between A and B intended to work to A’s advantage. The outcome could be anything from B’s buying a specific weapons system to agreeing to preferential trade terms to its leader arriving at an international conference early for a photo shoot to show unity. In some instances, A may simply want B to take no action that would harm A’s interests. In other cases B may

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<sup>2</sup> See, *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis* (US Government, 2009), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/publications-rss-updates/tradecraft-primer-may-4-2009.html>, accessed on 27 December 2013,

<sup>3</sup> It is worth recalling that the “balance of power” was a key conceptual framework that policymakers used during the Cold War to interpret world events and inform decisions.

<sup>4</sup> David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations” in *Handbook of International Relations* (2004): 177–91. Baldwin has also made the case for conceptual frameworks, writing in “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy” that “The field of foreign policy analysis needs a common set of concepts and analytical frameworks to facilitate comparison of alternative policy options” (in *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> Oren Harari, *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell* (McGraw Hill, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science* 2 (1957): 201–15.

choose a course of action without prodding or specific incentives from A simply because it fears possible reprisal.<sup>7</sup>

Influence as defined here does not necessarily mean getting one state to completely reverse its policies, act against its own interests, or change its core preferences. It also does not mean one state controlling another. If A truly controlled B, then B lacks free will, cannot form its own policies, and is unable to act independently of A, which thus has no need to exert influence over B's choices.

Looking at influence as a "relationship" is significantly different from seeing it in terms of capabilities actors possess, e.g., large militaries, nuclear weapons, oil, or other resources. As Baldwin points out, seeing influence in terms of relationships avoids ascribing influence to actors simply because they possess such capabilities.<sup>8</sup> This approach also alerts us to the fact that the capabilities actors possess may have little to do with their ability to influence. That is, "size" does not always matter because major powers do not always get their way, their capabilities notwithstanding. For IC analysts wishing to assess influence, this means addressing intelligence questions in terms of how, when, in what ways, and with what success actors attempt to use influence, not simply whether an actor possesses influence with others or not.

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*These examples show simple truths. Major powers are not always the most influential simply because they possess some resource.*

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Clean, neat examples of the successful use of influence in the real world are hard to find, but a few examples help illustrate the idea.

- In 1953, the British persuaded the Eisenhower administration to topple Iranian leader Mohammad Mossadegh and restore the shah because Mossadegh had nationalized Iran's oil sector at great loss to the British. US officials were initially not interested in removing Mossadegh, but UK officials persuaded their US counterparts by casting Mossadegh as a rabid communist, thus tapping into underlying American fears about the spread of communism.<sup>9</sup>
- During 1973–74, members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), angry with the United States, Europe, and Japan for supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, imposed an oil embargo against these states to force them to isolate Israel. In response, Japan renounced its recognition of Israel, and the United Kingdom and France refused to allow the United States to ship arms through their states to Israel. While the sanctions created significant economic problems for the United States, they did little to change Washington's foreign policy. The

differing effects on different states, however, did demonstrate the significant differences in OAPEC's influence.<sup>10</sup>

- In the 1980s, the United States was unable to convince Japan to open its domestic markets even though Tokyo was militarily dependent on Washington. This left US officials scratching their heads trying to understand why they had so little influence over Japan.<sup>11</sup>
- In 1991, Washington convinced Israel not to respond to Iraqi Scud missile attacks, a clear threat to Israel's security, by telling Israeli officials it would undo the international coalition aligned against Saddam and by providing Tel Aviv additional military equipment to counter Iraq's rocket attacks.<sup>12</sup>

These examples show simple truths. Major powers are not always the most influential simply because they possess some resource. Different actors are able to influence others with varying effects across a range of diplomatic, military, and economic issues.

Naturally, these examples of influence do not tell the whole story. Analysts must recognize that in any situation a wide variety of actors

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<sup>7</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966).

<sup>8</sup> Baldwin, "Power and International Relations."

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Kinzer, *All The Shah's Men: An American Coup And The Roots of Middle East Terror* (Wiley, 2003); Andres Etges, "All That Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup Against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran," *Intelligence and National Security* 26, no. 4 (August 2011): 495–508.

<sup>10</sup> Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs: A History* (Penguin Books, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: US-Japanese Relations Throughout History* (W.W. Norton and Company, 1997); Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (eds.) *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

<sup>12</sup> Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present* (W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), 566.

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*With this framework, analysts can detect when influence is at play and how it is being used.*

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may simultaneously try to influence actor B—and each other—and that how B responds thus may be the result of the actions of some combination of actors in addition to A's actions. In the case of states and organizations, this includes domestic factors and internal deliberations. Some academics have specifically pointed to the importance of focusing on domestic or substate actors to influence state policies.<sup>13</sup>

It is important to recognize that influence may take days or years to achieve desired outcomes, a consideration analysts should always bear in mind. In the Pakistan example above, the US exercise of influence took hold within days and arguably has been fraying ever since. US naval action against Iran during 1987–88 was a factor in compelling Iran to accept UN terms for ending the bloody Iran-Iraq War (1980–88),<sup>14</sup> but it took months for US action, gradually stepped up over that period, to influence Iran's actions.

Analysts must also be wary of prematurely concluding that actor A's attempts to influence B have been successful just because they have seen what appears to be a direct response by B. Put another way, analysts must keep in mind the distinction between *causation* and *correlation*. Simply because B took the action that A wanted does not necessarily mean that A *caused* B to

act. Analysts should be ruthless in making sure they don't mistake correlation as causation, a mistake made all too often by the media and policymakers.

### ***The Dimensions of Influence***

Influence is not monolithic. It has several dimensions that define *in what way* and *with whom* an actor has influence as well as the *costs* of its application. A framework that includes *domain*, *scope*, and *costs* will help analysts sort out these issues.<sup>15</sup>

- *Domain* refers to the issue areas in which one actor may be able to influence others.
- *Scope* defines the number of others an actor may be able to influence or the range of issues over which an actor might be able to exert influence.
- *Cost* addresses the fact that successful or not, attempts to influence others are not free either of tangible or intangible expenses.

Specifying the domain in which influence is exerted and the scope of that influence shows that actions that influence actors in one issue area may not be as effective in other issue areas or with other actors. The framework also sensitizes analysts to the idea that an actor's influence in one issue area may grow even while it remains unchanged or decreases in others. The framework also helps

analysts alert policymakers to the *costs* of efforts to influence others and point out the risks that other states are taking through their own influence efforts.

With this framework, analysts can detect when influence is at play and how it is being used among actors. It can also enable them to show policymakers how to think about a problem they are confronting. For example, analysts can use it to highlight specific opportunities US policymakers might have to shape events, or analysts might, when necessary, use it to deliver the unwelcome news that policymakers have few means with which to affect developments in a given instance.

### ***The Means of Applying Influence***

Influence can be applied in multiple ways that can roughly be divided into positive and negative inducements—the familiar “carrot and stick” approaches. The actors involved and the context in which they are operating will determine whether rewards are more effective than punishments. Intelligence analysts can provide tremendous value to policymakers by laying out this context and its variables and by assessing how target states and their leaders are likely to react to US influence efforts. This approach helps avoid the demon of “policy prescriptive” analysis because it focuses on how target states might react to US influence efforts, even as analysts highlight opportunities for the advancement of US goals.

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<sup>13</sup> Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988).

<sup>14</sup> Steven Hurst, *The United States and Iraq Since 1979* (Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> This framework is adapted from Baldwin.

### *A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Influence*

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#### **Domain**

*Issue areas in which A can affect B's behavior ... answers questions "In what way or on what kinds of issues can A influence others?"*

A's ability to influence one aspect of B's behavior does not mean A can direct other aspects of B's behavior, however. Domain helps specify and quantify A's influence by drawing attention to the possibility that A's influence varies from issue to issue.

*Common Domains:* Politics, diplomacy, economics, and security. Domains can be subdivided, e.g., within the economic domain into trade, finance, labor, etc.

#### *Examples:*

- Japan in the 1980s held tremendous economic influence over world finance and trade markets but it had virtually no influence on security issues.
  - Israel has significant military capability with which to influence Middle East regional security but it has few direct diplomatic and economic resources with which to change regional states' attitudes or oil production.
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#### **Scope**

*The magnitude of A's influence in a particular domain or number of actors it can influence ... answers the questions "How many actors can A affect?" and "How big an effect can A have?"*

Scope shows the range of A's influence and reveals that A's actions may not have an equal effect on all actors with a specific domain or sub-domain.

#### *Examples:*

- China and Iran are capable of exerting significant naval control of key ocean routes near them, Taiwan and Malacca Straits and the Hormuz Strait, respectively, but they have little naval influence beyond these areas. Thus they may be able to affect states that depend on these strategic waterways in economic and security domains, but the effect will vary according to the degrees other states depend on the waterways.
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#### **Costs**

*Answers the questions "What are the consequences of A attempting to influence B?"... and "Is it easy or hard for B to comply with A's demands?"*

Costs can be tangible or intangible, and measuring them requires understanding of context and multiple other factors. It helps reveal trade-offs A and B must make in dealing with each other. \*

#### *Examples*

- US provision of missile batteries to Israel during the first Gulf War to ensure Israel did not respond to Iraqi provocations could be calculated. The cost to Israel for not responding to provocations, however, is more elusive.
- Russia needed to expend little diplomatic or material resources to get Egypt to condemn US policy in the region in the 1970s because Cairo was predisposed to denouncing "Western" interference in the region. In complying with Russian requests, however, Egypt was probably able to extract handsome military and economic benefits.

\* For a detailed analysis of the costs of influence, see Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966).

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***Understanding where to focus influence efforts, whatever the means, is critical for analysts if they are to provide context in their analysis and highlight opportunities for policymakers.***

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The means by which influence is applied are central to assessing its effect. Baldwin outlines four means of influence: symbolic, economic, military, and diplomatic. In most cases, it is clear what these mechanisms are, although the symbolic and diplomatic means seem to overlap. It is relatively easy to identify economic and military means of influence because these means are often tangible and quantifiable. Diplomatic and symbolic means, however, generally are less quantifiable and share a great deal in common with idea of “soft power,” making them more difficult to identify and assess.

***Symbolic.*** This form of influence appeals to normative symbols or the provision of information. For example, Arab states may attempt to dissuade one another from engaging with Western states by warning of the dangers of imperialism or the presence of foreign troops. Similarly, states may attempt to influence one another by emphasizing obligations under international agreements and treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, or the Chemical Weapons Convention. They also may appeal to what is “just” or to other culturally specific norms, such as religion or ethnic identity.

***Diplomatic.*** These means of influence include such actions as formal

recognition of states, negotiations, and representation. But it has a heavy symbolic component. For example, negotiating parties often appeal to international norms, and if one party can suggest that another is failing to negotiate or is failing to do so in good faith, the accuser has introduced a kind of symbolic shaming effect. Similarly, when states employ public diplomacy to shape the preferences and perceptions of other states, they often aim to use or define international norms to achieve their ends or offer “symbolic” gestures they hope will induce target states to take the action they desire.

***Military.*** The threat or actual use of military force is an obvious means of exercising influence. In addition to these, analysts should also consider the provision of arms and intelligence, joint military training, and the creation of formal alliances, e.g., NATO, the US-Japan Alliance, and the US-South Korea Alliance. And, as with all the other means, these devices can be used as positive or negative inducements.

***Economic.*** Altering the flow of goods and services is an example of an economic measure to exert influence. Well-known examples include oil embargoes, sanctions, foreign direct investment, low-cost loans, trade barriers, or other special investments. Exclusive trade deals—such as the ASEAN-Japan Free Trade

Agreement (FTA) and the North American FTA—and adoption of common currencies also serve to influence economic decision making and the actions of participant states, particularly over the long term.

***Additional Influence Mechanism.*** Understanding where to focus influence efforts, whatever the means, is critical for analysts if they are to provide context in their analysis and highlight opportunities for policymakers. Analysts should have little difficulty seeing where influence efforts can be applied directly and in straightforward ways, movement of military forces toward a nation threatening a military attack on another, for example.

Identifying indirect ways and the opportunities for applying such means requires more thought, but they can be extremely powerful. For example, in 1986 the US deftly defeated proposed European Community (EC) import barriers against feed grains, championed by France, by targeting the specific major farm products of EC members. Rather than take on the EC and directly attempting to influence all EC members in the same way, Washington tailored its approaches by hitting Italy on olives, France on cognac, Britain on whisky and gin, and the Netherlands on cheese. Efforts by the European Commission to support Paris quickly faded because of internal pressure from members who were worried about the effect of US countermeasures.<sup>16</sup>

Academics, such as Robert Putman, describe this as a “two-level”

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<sup>16</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining,” in Peter Evans, Harold Jackson, and Robert Putnam eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy* (University of California Press, 1993).

game, arguing that one way to influence an actor is “from below” by focusing on an actor’s internal sub-components. In the case of states, Putnam and others have explained this by looking at how one state can target another state’s domestic population to influence the state’s leaders.<sup>17</sup> This is a sophisticated framework that analysts can use to aid policymakers. It requires the ability to identify the people and organizations through which policymakers can operate when attempting to influence the actions of another state and its leaders.

Another indirect but powerful form of diplomatic influence is agenda-setting. In this case a state can attempt to circumscribe another’s actions by narrowing issues under discussion or the options available through negotiation.<sup>18</sup> For example, North Korea has had some success influencing outcomes of negotiations over its nuclear program in the 1990s and 2000s by limiting talks about its nuclear program to specific nuclear facilities, while excluding discussion of its right to develop nuclear power generally or construction of other reactors.<sup>19</sup>

### ***Other Instances of Influence***

***Inspirational.*** Some academics have argued that the actions of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel

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### ***Another indirect but powerful form of diplomatic influence is agenda-setting.***

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Nasser in 1958 imbued young Iraqis with a new sense of Arab nationalism and led them to overthrow Iraq’s British-controlled monarchy. In his actions and speeches Nasser undoubtedly wanted to cultivate Arab nationalism, but it is hard to say he consciously sought to have the British expelled from Iraq.<sup>20</sup>

Still, analysts should always consider the potential effect of outside events or seemingly unrelated actions of leaders or the writings of distant luminaries on decisions in other places. Policymakers often see this kind of influence at work, and intelligence analysts should be ready to check their thinking when there is no causation apparent. For example, during the Cold War US policymakers were inclined to imagine a “domino effect” of countries in Southeast Asia falling to communism. Arguably a similar kind of thinking has taken place with respect to the Arab Spring.

Specifying the domain and scope of this form of “inspirational” influence might be useful for assessing its meaning and significance. A weak test for determining whether or not inspiration has provoked action is to ask counterfactual questions: Would the action being observed happen without the inspirational object? If the

answer is yes, inspiration may only be a factor. If the answer is no, then the inspirational object is significant in causing the events being witnessed.

***Analogy as Influence.*** Historical events and perceptions carried forward from those events can continue to affect behavior for decades and even centuries. For example, as insurgents became a particularly troublesome problem for the United States in Iraq, analogies with the US experience in Vietnam were quickly drawn to imply that the United States was falling into a quagmire and on the verge of failure in Iraq.<sup>21</sup>

Academics have argued that state leaders recall historical events that seemingly fit with current dilemmas and take action based on the lessons supposedly learned from the earlier experience.<sup>22</sup> Analysts can help policymakers by debunking inappropriate corollaries between past circumstance and present problems. Conversely, analysts with deep cultural knowledge can also offer policymakers options for influencing foreign actors or their people by explaining how culturally and historically appropriate analogies might fit with current circumstances and how drawing parallels to those analogies could be useful to achieving US goals.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” *American Political Science Review*, No. 56: 947–52

<sup>19</sup> Ralph Cossa, *The US-DPRK Agreed Framework: Is it Still Viable? Is It Enough?* Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 July 1999; International Atomic Energy Agency, “Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Information Circular, 2 November 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami’s *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 91–115.

<sup>21</sup> Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill, *Iraq And Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights* (Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004).

<sup>22</sup> Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War* (Princeton University, 1992).

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*Work is needed to identify and flesh out other key concepts that should be routinely considered in intelligence analysis.*

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***The Case for Conceptual Frameworks to Supplement SATs***

Structured analytic techniques are useful for organizing data and warning policymakers of dangers ahead, but they are not enough. Conceptual frameworks such as the one described here complement SATs. They enable analysts to better think through complex problems, to focus on difficult intelligence issues, and to provide additional value for policymakers trying to make sense of the world. By helping analysts to think beyond specific substantive issues, conceptual frameworks probably will help them offer policymakers more robust means to understand

the problems they face and to see and judge among opportunities to advance national security interests.

Conceptual frameworks and SATs both sensitize analysts to the underlying assumptions in their analysis. By understanding the components of key concepts, such as influence, intelligence analysts will be better able to discover, assess, and explain the complexities of situations. Conceptual frameworks that use relevant examples, expose drivers, give context, show causal relationships, and use sound logic will be most useful because they will give specificity to abstract ideas and crystal-

lize them in the minds of analysts and policymakers.

Work is needed to identify and flesh out other key concepts that should be routinely considered in intelligence analysis. A common set of conceptual frameworks would increase analyst and policymaker understanding of the world generally. They can then apply a framework to specific substantive issues of interest. Candidate frameworks are concepts of stability, alternatively governed spaces, and ideology. I believe that these and other frameworks not yet considered will help achieve a new level of analytic tradecraft, the kind needed to address today's dizzying problems.

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## **Iraqi Human Intelligence Collection on Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1980–2003**

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**Well before the United States and the Western world first questioned Iran's nuclear goals, members of Iraq's intelligence services had recruited high-level Iranian officials and individuals involved in Tehran's nuclear program.**  
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### *Introduction*

Under the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi intelligence was a complex, interconnected network of five government agencies responsible for ensuring Saddam's security and safeguarding his life. The jobs of intelligence officers from the Special Security, General Security, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and Military Security Services often required blind loyalty and devotion to the Iraqi dictator's intelligence-related impulses and intrigues. In addition to protecting the president, the five organizations maintained internal domestic security and conducted foreign intelligence operations. Of particular importance to Saddam, strategically and personally, were the General Intelligence (IIS) and Military Intelligence (GMID) services, the agencies responsible for the majority of international espionage.

The IIS was created in 1964. As Saddam amassed power in the late 1960s and 1970s, he began to ensure he had the organization's allegiance by installing individuals close to and loyal to the presidency, typically close relatives or members of Saddam's Tikriti tribe.

While IIS activities following the 1991 Gulf War concentrated primarily on domestic security espionage, a small cohort of IIS agents maintained an extensive network of overseas informants.

The GMID was established in 1932, the year Iraq gained independence from British rule. Unlike the IIS, the leadership of the GMID alternated between Tikritis and non-Tikritis. However, GMID officers were similarly conscious of remaining in Saddam's favor after he came to power, lest they be removed from their positions or killed.

GMID operations focused primarily on gathering military intelligence and ensuring the loyalty of the armed services as well as conducting overseas operations and maintaining networks of informants throughout the Arab states and in Iran.<sup>1</sup>

This article draws on captured IIS and GMID records held at the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Until US forces entered Iraq in 2003, most research on Saddam's regime had relied on secondary sources or “the occasional memoir or defector's account.”<sup>2</sup> This is no longer the

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case. From the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, US troops and their allies captured millions of Iraqi state records. The records, many of which are available to scholars today, offer a variety of primary sources relating to the inner-workings of Saddam's Ba'athist state. The records also reveal much about Iraq's foreign human intelligence (HUMINT) collection discipline, and it is upon these records that this account is largely based.

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### ***Iraq Turns its Eyes to Iran, 1980***

Well before the United States and the Western world first questioned Iran's nuclear goals, members of Iraq's intelligence services had recruited high-level Iranian officials and individuals involved in Tehran's nuclear program.<sup>3</sup> By the time the National Council of Resistance of Iran—an umbrella group of organizations formed in Europe in 1981 to oppose the Islamist regime in Iran—publicly revealed the location of two Iranian nuclear sites in 2002, Iraqi intelligence had been monitoring the nuclear capabilities of Arak, Bushahr, and Natanz for more than a decade.<sup>4</sup> And even before the UN Security Council issued its first resolution targeting Iran's nuclear developments, Iraqi intelligence had gathered extensive intelligence on Iran's nuclear activities.

Iraq began collecting intelligence on Iran at the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the year after the Islamist regime of Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Iran. The effort began small. According to Iraqi Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi (General Tarfa), a

senior officer and section leader of Iraq's military intelligence directorate dealing with Iran during the conflict, "In 1980, shortly before the outbreak of the war, those responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence on Iran numbered three individuals—only one of whom had studied Farsi."<sup>5</sup> But by the war's end in 1988, over 2,500 individuals were producing intelligence on Iran's capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

With the end of overt hostilities, Iraq's intelligence services turned their attention from analyzing Iranian military strengths and weaknesses to spying on Iran's quest for the ultimate weapon: the nuclear bomb. According to Iraqi intelligence, Iranian interest in developing a nuclear weapons program "started seriously when its war with our country [Iraq] came to an end" in 1988.<sup>7</sup> As Iran's interest increased, so did Iraq's intelligence on Iran's nuclear activities.

### ***Iraqi HUMINT—Global and Targeted on the Nuclear Issue...***

The captured reports from the IIS and GMID bring to light the qualities of Iraq's HUMINT collection against Iran, in particular concerning its nuclear program and demonstrate that, while the Iraqis obtained detailed insights into the plans and intentions of their adversary, the collection process itself was rife with stumbling blocks.<sup>8</sup>

With respect to Iranian nuclear activities Iraq's HUMINT services appear to have effectively obtained information by recruiting numerous high-level Iranian government officials and individuals involved or acquainted with the nuclear

program.<sup>9</sup> While it does not appear that any Iraqi officer infiltrated the inner circles of the Iranian regime, the members of Iraq's intelligence services reported that they were able to recruit sources possessing detailed information concerning the motivations underlying Iran's nuclear aspirations and the development of the country's nuclear program.

Through their sources, Iraqi intelligence officers concluded that Iran had three motives for acquiring a nuclear weapons capability: to prevent American interference in the region, to challenge Israel, and to protect the religious integrity and demonstrate the strength of Islam.<sup>10</sup>

The view of the American threat grew out of the Iranian expectation that "a huge crisis will occur when the United States interferes to prevent the emergence of the Islamic world." According to Iranian sources, the "*majority of religious men in the Iranian leadership believe that confrontation with the United States is certain and imminent...*" (text highlighted in original document) and that obtaining nuclear technology would deter US threats.<sup>11</sup>

When it came to dealing with Israel, the Iraqi's Iranian sources disclosed that, in October of 1991, the Iranian vice president

*... emphasized the necessity for developing nuclear weapons in Iran, so that Muslims can confront Israel. He also emphasized to all Muslims, including [those in] Iran, that they must reach an advanced level [of technological sophistication] in the nuclear*

*field in order to confront the Israeli nuclear challenge”* (text highlighted in original document).<sup>12</sup>

One month later, Islamic unity was one of the issues that arose in a meeting between Iranian President Rafsanjani and the National Security Council and High Military Command, sources disclosed to Iraqi intelligence officers.<sup>13</sup> Present at this meeting were Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei, Defense Minister Ali Akbar Tarkan, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohsin Rida'i, Intelligence Director Ali Falahi, and Ahmed Khomeini. At the end of their discussions, President Rafsanjani announced that *“Iran must have nuclear weapons for the benefit of the region ... because the Arabs proved that they are incapable of doing so. Such weapons will be necessary for [Islamic] solidarity and to refresh Islamic unity”* (text highlighted in original document).<sup>14</sup>

Iraqi records tend to suggest that Iran's quest for nuclear power was ultimately more for deterrence rather than for actual, or intended, use. Nowhere is it apparent that Saddam Hussein believed Iran intended to use nuclear weapons, Iraqi HUMINT records show: Iran was motivated more by national prestige and the ability to “depend on their [own] capabilities and power” rather than for any offensive purposes.<sup>15</sup>

Iraqi HUMINT records also provide detailed descriptions of the early stages of Iran's nuclear program and ensuing efforts with other nations to obtain their own nuclear weapons. The majority of the

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*Iraqi HUMINT records also provide detailed descriptions of the early stages of Iran's nuclear program and ensuing efforts with other nations to obtain their own nuclear weapons.*

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HUMINT came from contact with Iranian nationals, contacts that were arranged and coordinated through intelligence officers serving as military attachés in Iraq's embassies abroad.

According to Iraqi intelligence reports, Iran lacked the technology and materials to achieve nuclear power during the initial stages of its nuclear program.<sup>16</sup> As a result, Tehran reached out to as many countries and organizations as possible to expand and develop their nuclear operations. The captured Iraqi records show that Iraqi officers collected intelligence from Argentine, Chinese, French, German, Mexican, North Korean, Pakistani, and Swiss agents in addition to their Iranian contacts.<sup>17</sup>

From 1988 to 1989, Iraqi military attachés in Bonn, Istanbul, London, and Rome worked together to recruit and develop an unidentified Iranian source who was “educated, from Esfahan and is an employee in the Agricultural Department and has wide relations; in that, he ascertained his ability to collect information concerning chemical and nuclear targets through his relations...”<sup>18</sup>

This source confirmed the Iraqi belief that the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center was “one of the most well-equipped Iranian research centers which Iran could resort to, should they decide to set in motion the sensitive series of any nuclear program ... or could alternatively specialize in research and develop-

ment in order to attain the required technology.”<sup>19</sup> Additionally, the source provided information concerning Iran's attempts to “obtain as much contracts as they can with specialized companies; especially, German and Swiss companies in order to expand and develop the Center's operations.”<sup>20</sup>

Iraqi officers also documented the increasing number of Chinese, North Korean, and Russian scientists working in Iran's nuclear centers, along with Iran's exploits in Central Asia.<sup>21</sup> By following the activities of two Iranian weapons of mass destruction experts during the 1990s—the first codenamed “Qambiz” and the second an Iranian scientist with “master's degree in nuclear physics from the University of California”—Iraqi officers acquired intelligence concerning Iranian conversations with, for example, “a high-level official from Kazakhstan who had a detailed offer for supplying Iran with nuclear weapons from the Soviet inventory. The [Kazakhstan] official stated that he has close contacts with Kurchatov Institute in Moscow and [Semipalatinsk] Establishment” (text highlighted in original document).<sup>22</sup>

Similar intelligence was collected concerning Iranian-Soviet (later Russian) relations and the development of Iran's nuclear bomb. Records from various Iraqi sources indicate high levels of cooperation between the two countries. In 1992, a source recruited by an Iraqi intelligence officer in Moscow “con-

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*As vast and productive as Iraq's HUMINT collection effort appeared to be, there is plenty of reason to expect serious problems in the reporting.*

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firmed ... that Iran has obtained three nuclear bombs..." and that a "number of Soviet specialists and experts in Iran al-Kubra area [Greater Iran area]" were working with Tehran to obtain "an active nuclear weapon."<sup>23</sup>

Based on the information provided by this source, as well as information obtained from unnamed "other sources," "Iran will own operational nuclear weapons between February and April 1992."<sup>24</sup> A letter from the IIS to Saddam in 2000 entitled "Bushehr Nuclear Station," summarizes the "most important information" IIS officers obtained through their "reliable resources."<sup>25</sup> This intelligence includes the details of technical exchanges between the two countries in 1999, various meetings held between Russian and Iran concerning the development of nuclear reactors, and the status of the Bushehr nuclear reactor.<sup>26</sup>

In sum, the documentation indicates that Iraq had developed a vast network of contacts and ability to recruit individuals close to the Iranian regime as well as experts participating in the Iranian nuclear program.

### **...But How Reliable?**

As vast and productive as Iraq's HUMINT collection effort appeared to be, there is plenty of reason to expect serious problems in the reporting. Some of these issues stem from the nature of Iraqi society

under Saddam Hussein and the HUMINT collection discipline itself.

During Saddam's reign, the main purpose of Iraqi intelligence was to ensure his survival and increase the power of the presidency.<sup>27</sup> Saddam commanded absolute control of Iraqi society and demanded absolute loyalty from his intelligence and security services. According to Lt. Gen. Ra'ad Hamdani, a former Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commander,

*Saddam had a number of personality traits. Sometimes he was intelligent, other times he could be as naïve as an illiterate farmer. One moment he would be extremely affectionate, the next moment he would be extremely hostile and cruel. Even Satan was better than Saddam at those times. One minute he could be overly generous, the next he could be extremely stingy. He had a great ability to listen, but then he would not allow you to say anything or he would refuse to listen to what you said.<sup>28</sup>*

Saddam was unpredictable and had a proclivity to take impulsive actions that could end an officer's career or life. In order to ensure his survival, Saddam used "carrot-and-stick methods" to secure his power.<sup>29</sup> Members who displayed signs of disloyalty or who fell out of favor with Saddam, were punished by torture or death. On the other hand, members who pleased Saddam and

fulfilled their duties were lavished with gifts, such as luxury cars and houses.<sup>30</sup>

Such tactics may have secured Saddam's position as ruler, but they would also have caused intelligence officers to distort their reporting. Iraqi intelligence services reported directly to the Presidential Palace, and, afraid of being wrong or of upsetting Saddam, officers commonly generalized assessments to avoid upsetting superiors or to "save face." For example, in one GMID report an intelligence officer was asked to assess the date when Iran "would obtain an active nuclear weapon."<sup>31</sup> The following are the various responses recorded in the same GMID account:

- A "nuclear bomb already exist[s]" in Iran;
- "A highly reliable Iranian official source confirmed in late January 1992 that Iran had obtained three nuclear bombs";
- "Iran will own operational nuclear weapons between February and April 1992";
- "Iran is expected to develop nuclear weapons before the end of the current decade"; and
- "We do not believe that Iran can finish producing nuclear weapons through the program, on which Iran is working with the assistance of China, Pakistan, and other countries, before the end of the current decade."

The conflicting nature of these responses and the failure of the report to clearly address the posited question is a reflection of the incon-

sistent and unclear nature of many of Iraq's HUMINT accounts. Furthermore, apparently out of caution, many intelligence officers did not report their findings, or, if they did, made sure to "not overstep the boundaries delineated by truths held by Saddam or to criticize Saddam's actions."<sup>32</sup>

The importance of collected intelligence was often inflated. An IIS memoranda from 1996 detailing information obtained from "three different sources (one from Moscow and two from Cairo), which makes the information valuable..." highlights two deals made between Eduard Akopyan, director of the Russian Industrial Association Zarubezhatomenergostroy (part of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry) and the Iranian government regarding the construction of Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Reactor.<sup>33</sup> These deals, which the IIS reported as "top secret," were, in fact, readily available in open source intelligence at the time.<sup>34</sup>

A second weakness of Iraqi HUMINT on Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons concerns the structure of the Iraqi intelligence service itself. The duties and jurisdictions of Iraq's intelligence agencies were designed to overlap, which resulted in duplication of information and an excessive inter- and intra-agency rivalry competing to win Saddam's favor.<sup>35</sup> For example, two General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID) reports from 1989, one dated 8 June and the other 27 July, each recount a failed deal between Iran and an unidentified British company to develop and complete projects at Esfahan's Nuclear Technology Center.<sup>36</sup>

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*Another weakness of Iraqi HUMINT presented in this case study is the quality of the tradecraft—or lack thereof.*

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Both reports use information provided by the same source and are addressed to the same directorate, yet they were authored by two different intelligence officers. With no framework to ensure coordination between the various agencies on intelligence-related matters, it is difficult to assess and analyze all the information on a particular topic. Further, there was no standard in place for intelligence collection and dissemination within the Iraqi intelligence service.

The third weakness of Iraqi HUMINT presented in this case study is the quality of the tradecraft—or lack thereof. The available captured records highlight that Iraqi officers tasked with reporting on Iran's nuclear aspirations were generally not thorough in their paperwork and frequently made mistakes. In one GMID record, the reporting HUMINT officer incorrectly cites Iran as signing the United Nations Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1998—they became party to the treaty in 1968.<sup>37</sup> In a different GMID report, an Iranian named "Mahjarani" is identified as a deputy president and as one of the authorities emboldening Iranians to continue their nuclear aspirations in 1991.<sup>38</sup> In 1991, Hassan Ebrahim Habibi was Iran's deputy president; it is not clear who "Mahjarani" was.

The captured records show that officers rarely documented assessments of their sources' motivations to disclose secret information. Intelligence reports on Iran's acquisition

of the material necessary to produce a nuclear bomb are potentially valuable, but the reports make no mention of how, why, or from whom, the intelligence was collected.

- A GMID report in the 1990s claims that Pakistan established a reactor in Rasht, a city northwest of Tehran, which was used in the "treatment and enrichment of uranium."<sup>39</sup>
- A 1992 report claims "Iran was seriously exploring the possibility of working with China to develop its nuclear facilities and produce nuclear weapons, and [working] with China and North Korea to obtain missiles, develop them, and produce them in Iran."<sup>40</sup>
- The same report states that "all available evidence strongly indicates that Iran has obtained all it needs to assemble three tactical nuclear weapons by the end of 1991."
- At the beginning of January 1992, there was an indication that an assembly process started for three nuclear weapons in Iran, from parts that were obtained from Kazakhstan.<sup>41</sup>

The credibility of such intelligence is diminished considerably in the absence of an understanding of the identities or motivations of the sources. This type of additional insight into why Iranian sources divulged privileged information to Iraqi intelligence officers would have been especially interesting, given the virulence of Iraq's anti-Shia and anti-Persian sentiments.

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*When the many factors that influence reporting—the political, the structural, and the inherent credibility of sources—are taken into account, Iraqi reporting must be evaluated guardedly.*

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General Tarfa stated that he would rather have relations with Tel Aviv than Tehran,<sup>42</sup> and, while not exactly the same view that Saddam held, Saddam did reissue a book written by his uncle entitled, *Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies*.<sup>43</sup> Why Iranian officials disclosed information to their neighboring adversaries is something Iraqi intelligence records fail to indicate.

All of these qualitative issues—poorly written or researched material, inadequately contextualized work, and insubstantial sourcing—make assessing the reliability of the information difficult.<sup>44</sup> But further muddying the waters is the failure of the records to provide a history of what a given source had previously disclosed, which prevents recipients of the reports from being able to

compare and determine the accuracy of the reporting.

When source reporting does occur, the source is often characterized as “reliable,”<sup>45</sup> “highly reliable,”<sup>46</sup> or a “high-ranking official,” with no additional quantifiable or substantial definitions of the source included. In his interview, General Tarfa disclosed that in recruiting an Iranian air force commander, “We provided him with money, took pictures, did some recordings, and told him our future information needs...”<sup>47</sup> However, none of this information exists in any of the IIS or GMID intelligence records.

### **Conclusions**

The ancient Chinese military sage Sun Tzu instructed readers of his *Art of War* to “know your enemy” before

going into battle. During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s knowledge and understanding of Iran greatly increased. As the war progressed and then beyond, Iraq became well positioned to assess Iran’s nuclear ambitions as its intelligence officers were able to get close to high-level Iranian officials and collect classified information, but when the many factors that influence reporting—the political, the structural, and the inherent credibility of sources—are taken into account, Iraqi reporting must be evaluated guardedly.

On balance, it appears that careful reading of Iraqi reports on the early development of Iran’s nuclear program can provide insight into Iran’s nuclear aspirations. At the same time, for students of intelligence the material offers many opportunities to study the human intelligence collection discipline and the many factors that make it valuable or dubious.



## Endnotes

1. For a comprehensive understanding of the background, responsibilities, divisions, and operations of the five primary Iraqi intelligence agencies see Ibrahim al-Murashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6, no. 3 (2002). Also, see Sean Boyne, "Inside Iraq's Security Network, Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 9, no. 7 (1997); Dilip Hiro, *Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars* (London: Routledge, 2001); and Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998).
2. Hal Brands and David Palkki, "Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?" *International Security* 36, no. 1 (2011):133-166.
3. While Iraqi intelligence records start referencing Iran's nuclear developments in the early 1980s, the majority of reporting begins in the late 1980s and continues throughout the 1990s. According to Jeffery Richelson, the United States' intelligence community first addressed Iran's nuclear potential in a draft version of a national intelligence estimate on Iran in the fall of 1991. See Jeffrey Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006:503-17).
4. "General Military Intelligence Directorate Reports on Iranian Chemical Weapons and the Iraqi Attack on Chemical Factories," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-GMID-D-000-863).
5. Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth Nathan, Laila Sabara, and Ana Venagas, *Saddam's Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War* (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011).
6. Ibid.
7. "A 1992 Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons After the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
8. For a table comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the different intelligence disciplines, see Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington: CQ Press, 2000:72); see also Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington: Potomac Books 2002:11-21).
9. According to General Tarfa, by the late 1980s, Iraq had "10,000 mujahideen in Tehran. These Iranian opponents of the regime called their families and those helping them from Europe and the Gulf. Iranians were free to move to Europe and the Gulf region. For example, in September 1986, I went with General Wafiq al-Samarra'i to Ankara to recruit a senior Iranian air force commander. He was on vacation in Turkey with his family. We coordinated with him through the Iraqi military attaché in Ankara." See Woods, et al., *Saddam's Generals*, 98.
10. No Iraqi HUMINT report accessed in researching this study identifies combatting, deterring, or competing with Iraq as a motivating factor for Iran's desire to acquire a nuclear bomb.
11. "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
12. Ibid.
13. In the original Arabic, the author of this report describes this meeting using attributes not given in normal circumstances, indicating the importance of the meeting and the level of seriousness in the affairs that they were discussing. See SH-MODX-D-001-291.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. Quote attributed to President Rafsanjani in November 1991.
16. For example, see "General Military Intelligence Directorate Assessments of Iranian Chemical and Nuclear Capabilities, Locations, Structures, and Readiness," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-GMID-D-000-579).
17. Ibid.
18. "Intelligence Reports and Memoranda Regarding Early Stages of Iran's Nuclear Program and Activities, Including Development of Iran's Nuclear Energy Centers (particularly the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center)," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-GMID-D-000-587).
19. Ibid.
20. A July 19, 1989, letter from Staff Brigadier General Issmat Judi Muhammad, Military Attaché in Bonn, to the GMID (19th Section) verifying and following-up on information. See SH-GMID-D-000-587.
21. See, for example, "Correspondence between the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service regarding Russian-Iranian relations," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-IISX-D-000-148); "Various Iraqi Intelligence Service Memoranda Regarding Israeli Officials (Rabin) Visit to Russia and Russian-Israeli Relations," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-IISX-D-000-691); and "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
22. "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

## ***Iraqi HUMINT on Iran***

25. "Iraqi Intelligence Service Report on Iran Sending Bushehr Nuclear Station Technicians to Russia for Training," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-IISX-D-001-296).
26. Ibid.
27. Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Apparatus," *Conflict, Security, & Development* 1, no. 2 (2006).
28. Woods, et al., *Saddam's Generals*, 60.
29. Baram, 114.
30. Ibid.
31. "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
32. Woods, et al., *Saddam's Generals*, 15.
33. "Various Iraqi Intelligence Service Memoranda Regarding Israeli Officials (Rabin) Visit to Russia and Russian-Israeli Relations," Conflict Records Research Center (SH-IISX-D-000-691).
34. A chronology compiled by the advocacy organization Nuclear Threat Initiative records references to Akopyan's dealmaking with the Iranian government. See *Nuclear Threat: Iran: 1957-1985*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed 21 November 2013, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iran-nuclear-chronology/>.
35. al-Murashi, 2.
36. "Intelligence Reports and Memoranda Regarding Early Stages of Iran's Nuclear Program" (SH-GMID-D-000-587).
37. "General Military Intelligence Directorate" (SH-GMID-D-000-579).
38. "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
39. "General Military Intelligence Directorate" (SH-GMID-D-000-579).
40. "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, 108-9.
43. Kevin Woods, David Palkki, and Mark Stout, eds., *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001* (New York: Cambridge, 2011:61).
44. For an account of Iraqi intelligence at the tactical level, see Nick Padlo, "Iraqi Intelligence at the Brigade/Division Level: Systemic Deficiencies and Training Solutions," *Small Wars Journal*, February 7, 2009. Accessed 18 November 2013 at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iraqi-intelligence-at-the-brigadedivision-level>.
45. For example, see "Iraqi Intelligence Service Report" (SH-IISX-D-001-296).
46. "Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons" (SH-MODX-D-001-291).
47. Woods, et al., *Saddam's Generals*, 98.

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## *Spying in America: Espionage from the Revolutionary War to the Dawn of the Cold War*

Michael J. Sulick (Georgetown University Press, 2012), 320 pp.

## *American Spies: Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the Present*

Michael J. Sulick (Georgetown University Press, 2013), 320 pp.

**Reviewed by Clayton Laurie**

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Faced with teaching courses on intelligence history without adequate textbooks, Michael J. Sulick decided to write his own—two, in fact. And unlike many who claim to have written authoritative accounts of what intelligence agencies do or have done, Sulick—a retired 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who had served as its chief of counterintelligence and director of the National Clandestine Service—is, in fact, an authority. In these books, he has examined a broad expanse of espionage history as one who has been involved in modern cases, many of which bear striking resemblances to episodes of the past. Together, these two volumes provide a wonderful survey of the history of spying as practiced by the United States, penned by an engaging author who knows of what he writes.

*Spying in America* covers the 180 years from the Revolutionary War to the early years of the Cold War, ending around the time of CIA's founding in 1947. It treats some 40 cases, "based on importance...or relevance to a host of issues regarding espionage in American history." (ix) *American Spies* describes 60 cases between the early Cold War and the Wikileaks exposures of 2010. Although Sulick recognizes that these works "can serve as little more than an introduction to the history of espionage," (xi) his selections cover all eras and the most notorious spy cases in each—and some more obscure episodes as well.

Sulick's treatment of the 100 cases in both books will leave readers with the disturbing realization that

espionage against the United States—by friend and foe alike—has always occurred and will always remain, whether in war or in peace. Indeed, as he notes near the end of *American Spies*, some 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an estimated 140 foreign intelligence services still spy on the United States.

All of the names familiar to intelligence historians are here. In the first volume are Arnold and Andre; Pinkerton, Van Lew, and Greenhow; Hiss and Chambers; and Bentley, Coplion, Philby, and Rosenberg. The Walkers, Montes, Ames, and Hanssen appear in the second. Lesser-known spies and traitors covered are long-forgotten individuals like Karl Boy-Ed, Franz von Papen, Tyler Kent, Sarah Emma Edmonds, and William Sebold. Also treated are spies in private firms, military enlisted men, and intelligence officers who committed treason during the Cold War on behalf of the USSR and Eastern Bloc services. Throughout, Sulick shows that every military service and intelligence agency in each era has fallen victim to spies of both sexes.

Sulick has done more than just compile vignettes. He has used these histories to explore and categorize motives for treason: money, ego, revenge, romance, ideological sympathy, dual loyalties, or just simple thrill. In each story, Sulick identifies the key elements: nationality of spy and sponsor, motivations, recruitment and handling, secrets stolen, damage done, and exposure and punishment.

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Sulick demonstrates that prime motivations for spying have changed over time. During the “Golden Age” of Soviet espionage in America in the 1930s and 1940s, for example, many spies committed treason for ideological reasons, seeing the USSR as a true worker’s paradise and communism as the wave of the future. Spies so motivated seem to be harder to detect, as was the case with a more modern example of this type, Ana Montes of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who evaded detection for a long time because, Sulick maintains, she accepted no money for the secrets she divulged to Cuba. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, most Americans spied simply for money—John Walker laughed at his Soviet handler when he explained that his treachery would help advance world communism for the betterment of mankind and world peace. Indeed, while greed and venality seem to mark most Cold War cases, the spies for Cuba—Montes, as well as the State Department’s Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn—demonstrate that ideology still motivates.

Sulick shows that Americans have always been vulnerable to recruitment and targeting, even though most consider committing espionage distasteful to a democracy and alien to the values of the New World. Worse, Americans tend to assume that others share their views. Sulick makes this point by quoting former CIA counterintelligence officer Paul Redmond, who has asserted that Americans seem to have a “national capacity for naiveté” (1:2) towards espionage whether it occurred two centuries ago or is ongoing today.

One effect of such attitudes, Sulick suggests, is that stealing secrets in an open society has always been easy because espionage threats are recognized too late. In the vast majority of the cases Sulick recounts, political and military leaders and former coworkers of spies are typically as surprised as the public and react in utter disbelief when known and trusted individuals turn out to be traitors. Sulick shows, however, that in each case, “red flags” were present. Also contributing to the surprise is the feast-or-famine nature of threats, which has led to leaders and counterintelligence officials taking their “eyes off the ball” until a war or crisis erupts or treason is exposed.

Sulick suggests another contributor to this innate lack of public awareness: geography. Unlike the old world the colonists left, the United States remained an

isolated continental power until the early 20th century, secured by vast oceans.

Sulick also believes that Americans are vulnerable due to the very qualities that make them unique—they enjoy and expect a high degree of personal liberty and view themselves and their place in the world much differently from any other people. Foreign stereotyping of Americans as open, trusting, unassuming, gregarious, and prone to view all as potential friends rather than foes, Sulick maintains, makes Americans attractive to those hoping to exploit them. The openness and independence Americans enjoy not only make them targets, Sulick explains, but also make them slow to recognize or act against dangers in their midst. Traditionally distrustful of measures that threaten personal liberty, privacy, and freedom, Americans, Sulick suggests, frequently react negatively to government moves against those deemed potentially disloyal or to perceived heavy-handedness or intrusiveness in uncovering conspiracies. He makes his case by pointing to such reactions in almost all periods between the American Revolution and the Vietnam War.

Counterintelligence specialists have always known that a delicate balance exists between security measures and civil liberties. They also know they will always face disbelievers, even long after a traitor is exposed, prosecuted, and convicted. Indeed, Sulick shows how recent scholarship has proven that many of those whose guilt has been hotly debated were, in fact, guilty and the evidence so compelling that only the most obtuse or ideologically biased could continue to question the allegations. The USSR did indeed enlist Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs, Harry Dexter White, Harry Gold, and many others to spy on the United States. The Communist Party USA, in spite of leader Gus Hall’s repeated denials, did receive funds directly from the Soviet Union. Yet as Sulick claims, the post-World War I Palmer raids, which became synonymous in the minds of many with political and racial persecution, were the reason it took until 1939 for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to assign counterespionage activities to the FBI—160 years after the nation’s founding. Later Cold War efforts to act against those deemed a threat encountered similar naysayers and political opposition.

The 60 cases since 1947 covered in *American Spies* seem dark and sinister in comparison to the quaint epi-

sodes covered in *Spying in America*. This is perhaps attributable to the fact that the cases in *American Spies* were all Americans, most of whom had utterly venal motives and long careers in espionage at the behest of still-existent nations and regimes. Former KGB officer Oleg Kalugin's observation that the Cold War was not just an espionage war, but a deadly struggle of irreconcilable ideologies, makes the revelation that Americans betrayed their country in pay of those seeking to destroy it all the more chilling and detestable. American traitors such as the Walker ring that compromised US Navy codes and secrets for 18 years, and NSA's Ronald Pelton and the Army's Clyde Conrad, who divulged NATO secrets, endangered all Americans, especially those in the military, had a war broken out with the USSR.

Although not revealing defense secrets, CIA turncoats Edward Lee Howard and Aldrich Ames destroyed the Agency's clandestine networks in the Soviet Union, blinding American intelligence services and the policymakers they served—and those two were outdone by Robert Hanssen of the FBI. As much damage as they did, Sulick notes, most spies during this era fell victim to their own greed, sloppy tradecraft, and carelessness—often talking too much to the wrong people—or were betrayed by our spies in the communist world. Before his exposure and execution by the Soviets, the GRU's Dmitri Polyakov exposed four US military spies, while later Soviet defectors Yuriy Nosenko and Vitaly Yurchenko revealed four more several years later.

Written exclusively from published and easily accessible online sources—as one would hope and expect for a textbook aimed at undergraduates—both volumes contain large and good bibliographies. Given the large number of works listed, however, Sulick confines his cited research to only a few selected and overworked sources, especially in *American Spies*.

The bibliography and notes in *American Spies* do include references to many publicly available court indictments and documents that many will find interesting and good supplements to more established works. Sulick's information-laden discursive endnotes are particularly interesting and helpful to those wanting more detail on the episodes he describes.

As is usual in such works, some minor editorial errors (1:139, 2:93, and 2:349) exist that Georgetown University Press should have caught before going to print. Factual errors exist, too, and while perhaps unnoticed by the general reader—and not too serious in a survey history—professional historians will quibble. In the chapter on Civil War espionage, for example, Ambrose Burnside replaced George McClellan as the commander of the Army of the Potomac in November 1862, not Joseph Hooker (1:73), who replaced Burnside in January 1863 as correctly implied later (1:96). The last Civil War battlefield use of balloons by the US Army took place at Fredericksburg in November 1862, and Hooker's intelligence chief, George C. Sharpe, did not use this technology at all in 1863 or later—the North's chief aeronaut, Thaddeus Lowe had resigned in disgust that April, and the corps itself disbanded that August.

In the chapter on Japanese espionage during World War II, Sulick correctly states that cryptologist William Friedman broke Japanese diplomatic and naval codes in 1940 (the latter but briefly), but neither he nor any other American had a role in breaking “Nazi codes with the help of Polish allies,” (1:161) a feat accomplished under deep secrecy by the British. The author refers several times to the post-1969 government of North Vietnam as “Ho Chi Minh's government” even though the leader was deceased by then, and readers will note that the 1975 takeover of South Vietnam resulted from a military campaign by the Communist North Vietnamese Army, not by “Ho Chi Minh's forces.” Spy Andrew Dalton Lee's father may well have been a decorated World War II pilot, (2:78) but he was not flying a B-52, an aircraft that did not appear until at least seven years beyond V-J Day. Early reconnaissance satellites dropped film capsules or “buckets,” not their cameras. (2:85) Israeli intelligence services apprehended Nazi Adolf Eichmann in 1961, not 1971, and in a small village some 12 miles north of Buenos Aires, not in the city itself. (2:213)

Such errors do not significantly detract from the overall quality of the history described, and Sulick's *Spying in America* and *American Spies* are very readable books that are highly recommended for every intelligence officer and student of intelligence studies. It is this historian's hope that Sulick's books will become standard in all university intelligence courses.



***The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam***

Akbar Ahmed (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 424 pp.

***The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth***

Mark Mazzetti (Penguin Press, 2013), 381pp.

**Reviewed by J.R. Seeger**

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In the 13 years since 9/11, many dozens of books have been written about the war on terror. Regardless of their individual quality, these books tend to fall into one or more of the following three categories: descriptive histories, polemics, and autobiographic diaries by participants in the conflicts since 9/11. The two works reviewed here fall into the first two categories. They are well-written descriptive accounts of the worldwide conflict, albeit from very different positions within the world community.

*The Thistle and the Drone* reminds the intelligence professional of the importance of understanding local culture and history as the start point for any successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operation. In the case of *The Way of the Knife*, the lesson focuses on the complexities of collaboration and competition among US government organizations, both within the Intelligence Community (IC) as well as between the IC and the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Gratefully, both authors caveat their authoritative research with clear and early statements of personal bias that allow readers to separate fact from opinion throughout the text.

*The Thistle and the Drone* is but the latest offering by Akbar Ahmed, a PhD in anthropology. Ahmed first applied his academic training to real-world problem solving in Pakistan as a political agent in the South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and later as a senior administrator in the Pakistani state of Baluchistan. His earlier works, *Millennium and Charisma among the Pathans* (1976) and *Pukhtun Economy and Society* (1980), are essential

reading for anyone headed into the complex world of tribal politics on either side of the Durand Line. Ahmed subsequently served as the senior Pakistani diplomat to the United Kingdom. He currently holds the Ibn Khaldun Chair for Islamic Studies at American University and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

In *The Thistle and the Drone*, Ahmed provides an exhaustive survey of tribal cultures across North and East Africa, Yemen, Southwest and Southeast Asia. Ahmed describes for each region the importance of tribe, clan, and local cultural traits related to leadership, personal honor and respect, and tribal decision-making. According to Ahmed, these are the people described in Leo Tolstoy's *Haji Murad* as resembling "the thistle"—hard to eliminate from the natural habitat and painful to touch. Ahmed laments the fact that most Western leaders make decisions in the ungoverned spaces of the Islamic world based on input from "the center" (that is, the capital city of a country). In Ahmed's view, the "center" is nearly always in direct conflict with the traditional societies in which the order of tribe and clan is far more important than the laws enforced by the central government.

Thus aligned with the "center" view, Western powers tend to pick fights with tribals who live in remote areas and conduct warfare on their own terms in their own territory. Frustrated by the lack of success of on-the-ground combat operations, Western powers have resorted to technology (in this case, the drone) to conduct punitive operations against these remote and dangerous peoples. This further alienates the tribal society

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and intensifies the conflict by creating “the accidental guerrilla” described in David Kilcullen’s book of the same name. His accidental guerrilla is simply a tribal caught up in the local conflict and often forced to choose between siding with a local resistance organization or with a foreign military force working with the central government.<sup>1</sup>

While most intelligence professionals will grasp Ahmed’s major point within the first few chapters, by far the greater value of this book lies in the detailed examples Ahmed provides of various tribal communities around the world. Avoiding the esoteric, he provides data useful to the diplomat, intelligence officer, or warrior engaged in political actions or operations in nearly every part of the Islamic world.

There is no doubt that Ahmed is disappointed in the West’s efforts in the war on terror and how this has become, in his opinion, a “war on tribal Islam.” With arguments based on a large data set meticulously accumulated over the first 250 pages of text, his closing chapters provide exceptionally clear recommendations for the way forward. It remains for current IC professionals to determine if this advice can or should be followed.

*The Way of the Knife*, a detailed account of the same war on terror, speaks from the perspective of the military and IC leadership working in Washington, and world capitals, described in Ahmed’s books. Mazzetti is a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist who has worked as a war reporter and covered the national security beat for the *New York Times* since 9/11. His writing style is clear and concise, and his access to senior officials in the US government is obvious from the number of “insider” vignettes provided.

From this optic, Mazzetti zooms in on the natural tension that exists within the IC between the CIA and other intelligence collectors. Nowhere is this tension more marked than between the CIA and the Department of Defense regarding the post-9/11 transformation of the CIA from an organization with a primary focus on Cold War intelligence collection to one directly involved in warfighting. Clearly, Mazzetti shares the opinion expressed in this book by former Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis

Blair: “Going back to the history of CIA covert operations, I think you can make the argument that if we had done none of them we would probably be better off, and certainly no worse off than we are today...” While there is much room for reasonable debate of this statement, Mazzetti selects his research material on intelligence operations from 1979 to 2013 in large part to support Blair’s viewpoint.

Mazzetti works to remind the reader that he is building a story from multiple sources. While he does a credible job, as is the case with many unclassified accounts of sensitive national security operations, Mazzetti’s information tends to be based on a small number of sources with direct access. These sources would appear to have been authorized by their respective organizations to discuss the operations, or they fall into the category of retired individuals who chose to discuss sensitive information without authorization. This leaves the author with the difficult challenge of sorting out what information is fact, what is a controlled press placement, and what is a tale provided to settle an old score with a bureaucratic rival.

However, in the last case, when focusing on Washington bureaucratic rivalries, Mazzetti becomes more selective in his description of the antagonism among elements of the IC, the Department of Defense, and the Special Operations community. His sources describe a world that supports his own view that the CIA should not have been encouraged to follow “the way of the knife” and should remain a strategic intelligence collection and analysis organization. The bias in this view is highlighted by the abundance of examples of turf wars that resulted in failure on the global battlefield. After 12 years of war, there are certainly more than enough negative outcomes to point to, and many of Mazzetti’s chapters dive deep into the diverse types of failures. Few of Mazzetti’s sources dwelled on successful, cooperative operations.

For the intelligence professional, this narrative remains useful; the stories Mazzetti outlines are clear and concise and provide essential lessons that future IC leaders could apply in the next conflict. However, for anyone outside the IC, the book simply reads like a list of failures in Washington and in the field. Unfortunately, this litany of failures tends to obscure other sto-

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<sup>1</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

ries—discussed but covered less thoroughly in *The Way of the Knife*—that underscore that fact that good leaders can cooperate to resolve bureaucratic conflict. These stories do not receive equal treatment within Mazzetti’s discussion of failures and bureaucratic conflict.<sup>2</sup>

Both of these titles belong on the bookshelf of any intelligence professional who wants to understand how the IC and the Special Operations community changed when the United States went to war after 9/11. The information is current, and the authors are excellent

writers and researchers who describe intelligence and special operations across a transnational battlefield.

No one who has lived through the fight since 9/11 can pretend to be neutral on how the United States has conducted operations to defeat al-Qa‘ida, and although neither author might be said to have provided a totally unbiased view, they are clear in their perspective from the onset. For the informed reader, the data can largely speak for itself.

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<sup>2</sup> For another perspective on *The Way of the Knife*, see Richard Willing, *Studies in Intelligence* 57, no. 3 (September 2013).



***The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin***

Masha Gessen (Riverhead, 2012), 314 pp.

***Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin***

Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 390 pp.

**Reviewed by John Ehrman**

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Late in the administration of George W. Bush, a senior policymaker concerned with developments in Russia sent a query through his intelligence briefer to CIA's analysts. Did we know of any case, he asked, in which a country's intelligence services had taken over the government? A small group of us convened to consider an answer and, momentarily setting aside the question of whether this had happened in Russia under President Vladimir Putin, found no such case.

There are good reasons for this. Intelligence services generally are led by career bureaucrats rather than ambitious politicians and, in any case, are too small and lacking in weapons to carry out a coup. In countries with large, powerful services—China, Cuba, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union—the political leadership watches the organizations closely or pits them against one another to prevent plotting. However, when we began to discuss the situation in Russia—where former intelligence officers, including Putin himself, filled a large number of senior government positions and the services appeared to hold a great deal of power—a lively debate ensued as to whether the services actually had taken over.

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Reading Russian journalist Masha Gessen's *The Man Without a Face* reminded me of that debate, now some six or seven years past. The book actually is two—a biography of Putin and a memoir of the clos-

ing of public life in Russia since Putin first came to national power in 1999. As a biography it is satisfactory, but no more than that. Gessen goes over well-worn ground, recounting Putin's background as a poor and poorly educated young tough in Leningrad and then as a KGB officer whose career could be described, at best, as mediocre. She then sketches his meteoric rise from city politics in St. Petersburg to national power. This is useful but does not tell readers anything about Putin that most do not already know.<sup>1</sup>

Gessen does somewhat better in her recounting of the collapse of Russia's civic life. She reviews the best-known episodes of the Putin years—the bombings of apartment buildings in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgograd in 1999, quite possibly by the FSB itself; the sinking of the submarine *Kursk* in 2000; the hideously botched responses to the Moscow theater and Beslan school terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2004, respectively; and the murders of prominent Putin critics, like journalist Anna Politkovskaya—as well as Putin and his cronies' use of trumped-up criminal charges to destroy political opponents and seize the country's wealth. As with the biographical portion of this book, journalists and scholars already have gone over this material, and little of what Gessen has to say is new. Her lively and passionate prose, however, gives a sense of the combination of disappointment and rage that must be simmering among politically engaged Russian liberals and intellectuals.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For other books on Putin's background and rise, see Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution* (Scribner, 2005); Anna Politkovskaya, *Putin's Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy* (Owl, 2007); and Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> For the deterioration of Russian public and political life since 1999 see, for example, Marie Mendras, *Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State* (Columbia University Press, 2012).

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The core of what Gessen has to say about Putin and his impact on Russia comes in two passages. In the first, she notes that the young Putin had “loved the Soviet Union, and he loved its KGB, and when he had power of his own, effectively running [St. Petersburg] he wanted to build a system just like them. It would be a closed system, a system built on total control—especially control over the flow of information and the flow of money.” (134) In the second, near the end of the book, Gessen describes the nature and power of Putin’s astonishing corruption and concludes that he has “claimed his place as the godfather of a mafia clan ruling the country. Like all mafia bosses, Putin barely distinguished between his personal property, the property of his clan, and the property of those beholden to his clan...he amassed wealth...by placing his cronies wherever there was money or assets to be siphoned off.” (254) In other words, Gessen argues, Putin has established himself as the chieftain of what is, literally, a gangster state. In this system, any independent actors who refuse to knuckle under become targets and, indeed, many of Putin’s opponents have had their careers ruined, had assets seized, or been forced into exile.

Gessen’s analysis of Putin certainly has its attraction. It supports the consensus in academic and popular media analyses that, after 13 years, Putin’s chief accomplishment has been to create a privileged elite that has systematically enriched itself by stripping Russia of just about any asset that can be stolen. While Gessen’s metaphor oversimplifies—a Mafia don, after all, does not have to oversee the administration of a country or deal with the intricacies of international politics—it is easy to grasp and enables her readers to understand her point in an instant. The image of Putin making offers no Russian can refuse is exactly what Gessen wants us to see and is effective as anti-Putin propaganda.

In contrast to Gessen’s passion and simplification, Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy in *Mr. Putin* use cool, analytical, and heavily footnoted prose to examine the subtleties of Putin’s background and behavior. This befits their backgrounds—Hill was formerly a National Intelligence Officer for Russia, and both she and Gaddy are scholars at the Brookings Institution. Their book provides a sophisticated analysis and, even though it reaches essentially the same conclusions as *The Man Without a Face*—Hill and Gaddy also use

the mafia model to describe Putin’s style of governing—it is the more satisfying work.

Hill and Gaddy explain Putin by looking at him through six different identities, divided into two groups. The first basket includes identities they label “Statist,” “History Man,” and “Survivalist.” These are labels that Hill and Gaddy believe reflect the views and values of many ordinary Russians. Putin’s statist persona, for example, appeals to the Russian political tradition of the strong state and allows Putin to portray himself as a figure above the political fray, “selected...to serve the country on a permanent basis and [believing] only in the state itself.” (36) Similarly, Putin in his history man identity makes appeals to Russia’s heritage and Russians’ sense of the country’s greatness to build support for his policies. In his Survivalist mode, he reminds the country that “Russia constantly battles for survival against a hostile outside world...Russia is always put to the test by God, fate, or history” and so must always be prepared for the worst. (79) In Russian political culture, each of these identities reinforces the others. Putin draws on them as needed to gain the support of various constituencies for his centralized and authoritarian economic and sociopolitical domestic policies, and his neo-imperialist, strong anti-American positions abroad. In this analysis, Hill and Gaddy show Putin to be a very clever politician, indeed.

In their second set of identities, Hill and Gaddy examine Putin as an “outsider,” “Free Marketer,” and “Case Officer.” The idea of Putin as an outsider may be their most intriguing. In Hill’s and Gaddy’s view, Putin has been an outsider during every phase of his life—as a native Leningrader in a country run from Moscow, as a KGB officer assigned to East Germany and Leningrad rather than outside the Bloc or at Moscow Center, and then as the man who came from the provinces to Moscow. Even after 14 years in power, Putin still manages to use populist language and cultural references to portray himself as apart from Russia’s corrupt elites.

It is an image Putin cultivates with care and, as when he promised to pursue terrorists into their outhouses, combines effectively with his survivalist persona. In contrast, Hill and Gaddy use their free marketer analysis to show that Putin is a dismally ignorant student of economics. Even though Putin has not reversed the

basic market reforms of the early post-Soviet years, they note that he received his formal education in economics during the Soviet era and learned practical business methods in the corrupt, lawless environment of the early 1990s. Consequently, Putin has no true conception of how modern economies and businesses operate. “Capitalism, in Putin’s understanding, is not production, management, and marketing. It is wheeling and dealing...personal connections with regulators...finding and using loopholes in the law, or creating loopholes.” (163-64) In other words, his view of capitalism is simply that it provides an excuse for looting the country. Whatever prosperity Russia has enjoyed in the 2000s, Hill and Gaddy note, is almost entirely the happy result of high global oil prices, not smart or effective policymaking.

Hill and Gaddy’s chapter on Putin’s case officer identity is the longest and richest in the book. Here they place Putin in context as part of the so-called Andropov levy, a generation of KGB officers recruited during the long (1967–82) chairmanship of Yuriy Andropov. According to Hill and Gaddy, Andropov saw himself as an enlightened, liberal secret policeman who emphasized the need to “work with people”—that is, to try persuade dissidents to change their minds and support the Soviet regime, but with obvious coercive threats looming in the background. They see Putin as adapting this approach to Russian politics today, trying to win through persuasion, but always ready to bring the full force of the state to bear on any opponent who does not see the wisdom of agreeing.

Most notably, Putin used this method to bring the oligarchs to heel. Putin made it clear they would be allowed to make their fortunes but had to become apolitical, pay their taxes, and follow Putin’s policy line. He made it clear that their “property rights were ultimately dependent on the good will of the Kremlin,” with former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkhovskiy’s fate—a long jail term and seizure of his assets—serving as an example of what would happen to anyone who stepped out of line. It is the same method that Andropov used with dissidents, who knew that psychiatric hospitals and labor camps awaited anyone who failed to be persuaded by the KGB’s arguments.

Hill and Gaddy wrap up their analysis of Putin with chapters describing how he has structured the Russian political system and the challenges he now faces. Hav-

ing cowed all meaningful opposition, Putin now sits at the center of Russian politics. He maintains a fine balance of forces by, on the one hand, protecting oligarchs and elites from having their properties confiscated by the state or one another, and on the other hand, enforcing loyalty to him by overlooking corruption among politicians while maintaining enormous files of compromising information (*kompromat*) that could be used for legal blackmail. While this is fine for controlling Russia, Hill and Gaddy point out the obvious truth—it is not a system for governing a country. “It is piecemeal and ad hoc” as well as personalized, they note, and relies completely on Putin, not any coherent structure or ideology. (213) Under this ramshackle system, they conclude with great understatement, “Russia cannot make the transition to a modern, economically competitive, democratic society without large disruptions.” (272)

Hill and Gaddy, therefore, arrive at the same point as Gessen, albeit by a different road. Both books describe how Putin’s rule has been disastrous for Russia and, in a sense, for the rest of the world. They show Putin to be a narrow-minded man schooled mainly in the ways of the thug, lacking any concept of how to run a 21st century country. At home, he sees politics not as a contest for influence, but rather as a primeval struggle for survival in which the threat of force is all that matters. With Putin preoccupied with continuing the balancing act that maintains his personal power and wealth, Russia drifts along without coherent social or economic policies, plundered by its elites, and its political and governmental institutions hollowed out. Given that Putin’s only significant experience abroad was as a KGB officer in East Germany—hardly the place to develop an understanding of international politics—it is not surprising that his foreign policies are driven by an urge to maintain the status quo rather than by a willingness to accommodate or take advantage of change.

Indeed, this fear of change leads Putin to react to events rather than to shape them. Abroad, he works to preserve the Syrian regime and, closer to home, his government publicly threatens the use of oil and gas exports as weapons to cow other states rather than to strengthen Russia’s economy and alliances. These policies have hardly proven to be prescriptions for helping Russia to recover from the catastrophes of the Soviet period; the costs of the lost opportunities of the

Putin years can be seen, however, through simple comparisons with what Poland or the Czech Republic have achieved since 1989.

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As valuable as *The Man Without a Face* and *Mr. Putin* are in incorporating Putin's intelligence background into analyses of his political performance, both books underestimate the continuing influence of his KGB service on his performance as president and prime minister. Becoming rich and powerful were the result of opportunities that came to Putin in middle age. From childhood, however, Putin wanted to be an intelligence officer, and it was this ambition that did the most to shape his adult outlook.<sup>3</sup>

That Putin wanted to work for the KGB is, in a sense, no surprise. The Soviet regime in the 1960s tried to make popular culture more appealing to young people and, as part of this effort, sought to make the KGB an attractive career option. Beyond the effort to emphasize persuasion over naked coercion, Moscow copied the West by glamorizing espionage work in films, television, and novels. The vision of glory and adventure no doubt appealed to a young man growing up poor in postwar Leningrad. As Gessen reminds us, moreover, Putin was a street tough—a young man who never walked away from a fight or allowed himself to show any weakness—which must have increased the KGB's allure. Fighting the enemies of the socialist state provided an acceptable outlet for what Putin liked to do best.<sup>4</sup>

The KGB that Putin joined, however, was not necessarily the organization he thought he was joining. There were, in fact, several KGBs by the late 1970s. One was the mythic KGB—the brave Chekist defenders of the revolution—that Putin may have told himself he was entering. This was the brutal internal security service, which monitored the population and squashed dissent. The internal service coexisted with another side of the KGB, the foreign intelligence service, which had declined from its glory days in the

1930s and 1940s into a poorly performing organization whose ideological rigidity left it unable to provide political leaders with accurate information about events abroad. Uniting them was the third KGB, a sclerotic and corrupt bureaucracy that was typical of state agencies during the late Soviet period.

Putin, as Gessen notes, turned in an entirely undistinguished performance in foreign intelligence. Trained in German, he was assigned to Directorate S, which was responsible for the illegals program, and sent to Dresden, which was as much of a backwater as the KGB had. There Putin's job was to find candidates to become illegals, but serving the KGB had no attraction to the foreign students he tried to recruit, and by all accounts, including Gessen's, he accomplished nothing in East Germany. On his return to the Soviet Union, Putin's performance earned him an assignment to Leningrad, rather than Moscow Center, and Putin seemed destined to be a second-rate KGB officer stuck in second-rate postings.

One thing about Putin that has become clear is that, despite experiences that might have caused others to question their choice of profession or service, he absorbed the ethos of Soviet intelligence without question. He has made no secret of his nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, Putin's longing for the good old days extends to the KGB—Putin made it a priority, as Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have ably described, to restore the roles and powers of the security services, and many of his appointees to high positions have KGB or post-Soviet security service backgrounds. Given this, it is not surprising that Putin has done much to recreate the Soviet counterintelligence state. Such a state, as John Dziak pointed out 25 years ago in his history of the KGB, is marked by an “overarching concern with ‘enemies,’ both internal and external,” and creates a security service that “penetrates and permeates all societal institutions” and is preoccupied with conspiracies. The growth of the FSB's power during the Putin years, as described by Soldatov and Borogan, along with new laws expanding the definition of treason and reining in the so-per-

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<sup>3</sup> Gessen's title, it is worth noting, mirrors that of the memoir of Markus Wolf, the East German spymaster (Markus Wolf, *Man Without a Face* [Times Books, 1997]). I do not know if this was intentional, but the similarities between the two men—both were intelligence officers who served communist states and, judging by Wolf's book and Putin's statements, were quite comfortable doing so. Neither has expressed any reservation about the system he served.

<sup>4</sup> For the glorification of the KGB in the 1950s and 1960s, see Julie Fedor, *Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, from Lenin to Putin* (Routledge, 2011), chaps. 2-4.

ceived threatening activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations, provides ample evidence of Putin's internalization of the KGB way.<sup>5</sup>

As these accounts indicate, moreover, when Putin adopted the political methods that the KGB and its predecessors employed, he did not limit himself only to the Andropov-era tactics that Hill and Gaddy describe. Rather, he uses methods that harken to the Cheka and, in fact, to the Tsarist Okhrana. These include assassinating opponents at home and abroad and—if Gessen's and Soldatov and Borogan's analyses are correct—staging provocations such as the apartment bombings to provide a pretext for renewing the war in Chechnya and solidifying his grip on power, much as Stalin had Kirov killed so he could begin the Terror. Political and public trials reminiscent of Soviet-era show trials come at regular intervals, against targets as diverse as Khodorkovskiy, blogger Aleksey Navalny, and the young women of Pussy Riot. Putin also made clear his continuing view of himself as a KGB officer when he greeted the returning illegals after the spy swap in July 2010. In so doing, he showed that he still identified as a Directorate S officer and, in praising the heroism of the illegals, no doubt hoped that some of their glory would rub off on himself as well.

While Gessen sees Putin as driven primarily by a hunger for power and wealth, and Hill and Gaddy view him as a vestige of Andropov's half-hearted liberalism, the truth is more disturbing. Putin remains a Soviet intelligence officer, proud of his Chekist heritage and all that goes with it. Had the USSR not collapsed, he would have continued to serve it loyally. It disappeared, however, and now this cunning and ruthless man dominates Russia, ruling with the ethos he absorbed in the KGB.

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We ultimately ended our Bush-era debate by concluding that the intelligence services had not taken over Russia. To be sure, a former intelligence officer was—and again is—ruling Russia, and had staffed the top levels of the government with men sharing his background. Still, even without the benefits of having read *The Man Without a Face* and *Mr. Putin*, we decided that the services answered to Putin rather than the other way around. This conclusion seems as correct today as it did then, especially as *Mr. Putin* has expanded our insight into how he uses the skills he learned as a KGB officer. Still, as these books demonstrate without any doubt, no one controls Putin. Whatever Russia's fate in the years ahead, he will be the man who is responsible.

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<sup>5</sup> John Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (Lexington Books, 1988), 1–2. For the rise of the FSB's power, see Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, *The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB* (Public Affairs, 2010).



## Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

*Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake*

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### **Current Topics**

***Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace Are Challenging America and Changing the World***, by Paul Rosenzweig.

***Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry***, by Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady.

***Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield***, by Jeremy Scahill.

***The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method Out of Mayhem***, by Adam D.M. Svendsen.

### **Historical**

***Conspiracy of One: Tyler Kent's Secret Plot against FDR, Churchill, and the Allied War Effort***, by Peter Rand.

***The Coup: 1953, the CIA and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations***, by Ervand Abrahamian.

***Dead Drop: The True Story of Oleg Penkovsky and the Cold War's Most Dangerous Operation***, by Jeremy Duns.

***The Great Game in Cuba: How the CIA Sabotaged its Own Plot to Unseat Fidel Castro***, by Joan Mel-  
len.

***The Greatest Traitor: The Secret Lives of Agent George Blake***, by Roger Hermiston.

***It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past***, by David Satter.

***Patton's Oracle: Gen. Oscar Koch, as I Knew Him-A Biographical Memoir***, by Robert Hays.

***Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839–42***, by William Dalrymple.

***Spy Sites of New York City: Two Centuries of Espionage in Gotham***, by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace with Henry R. Schlesinger.

***Spy Sites of Philadelphia: Two and Half Centuries of Espionage in the City of Brotherly Love***, by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace with Henry Schlesinger.

***A Spy Like No Other: The Cuban Missile Crisis, The KGB and the Kennedy Assassination***, by Robert Holmes.

### **Memoir**

***Born Under an Assumed Name: The Memoir of a Cold War Spy's Daughter***, by Sara Mansfield Taber.

***Harbor Knight: From Harbor Hoodlum to Honored CIA Agent***, by Ralph A. Garcia.

***Stories from the Secret War: CIA Special Ops in Laos***, by Terrence Burke.

***Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda***, by Philip Mudd.

***Uncovered: My Half-Century with the CIA***, by John Sager.

***The Wolf and the Watchman: A Father, A Son, and the CIA***, by Scott C. Johnson.

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### Current

***Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace Are Challenging America and Changing the World***, by Paul Rosenzweig (Praeger, 2013), 290 pp., endnotes, bibliography, glossary, index.

Since 9/11, the topic of securing and sharing information has received much attention in the media and from various government organizations. *Cyber Warfare* examines the problems that result when other nations and unfriendly organizations seek unauthorized access to cyberinformation. While no specific technical solutions are recommended, author Paul Rosenzweig, a former assistant secretary at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has suggested some general guidelines. As to who should be responsible for the cybermission, Rosenzweig candidly advises against those who favor civilian control of cybersecurity because DHS does not yet have the requisite expertise. For the time being, he writes, “NSA does it better.” (226)

Rosenzweig describes the nature of the problem by discussing the many attacks US cyberspace networks have and are experiencing. He discusses the inherent vulnerabilities of commercial and government networks, the Internet itself, privacy issues, and the legal issues that must be a part of potential solutions. In a section on “Intelligence or War?” (53ff) he examines the conflicts that have arisen between the military and intelligence agencies in cybersecurity operations that involve overlapping responsibilities. The search for Usama bin Laden is one example.

*Cyber Warfare* outlines the immensity of the problem and what is likely to happen if it is not addressed.

***Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry***, by Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 323 pp., endnotes, index.

Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady write that their book is about “government secrets—how they are created, why they are leaked, and what the government is currently hiding.” They suggest that “whether driven by politics, paranoia, or cynicism, every citizen has wondered at some point, what terrible thing is the government hiding from us today?” This work represents something of an answer to the question. They describe the customary bureaucratic reasons for creating secrets and provide some general comments on why they are leaked. (3)

Regarding secrets and the steps—sometimes excessive—taken to protect them, the authors make the point that “there are more people with security clearances than ever before” and thus more potential leakers. (6) Ambinder and Grady do not address how limited access and compartmentalization work to severely restrict the number of personnel with knowledge of secrets. On these issues, too, the authors provide examples of secrecy properly and improperly applied, from Bradley Manning to various military organizations and installations—Area 51—to operations like the hunt for Usama bin Laden.

*Deep State*—the term is never defined—attempts to clarify various aspects of leaks, secrets, and security practices. As to “leaks,” the authors assert that “eventually all secrets leak.” (5) Of course this is impossible to know. In any case, one key point in their discussion is that in the end, the decision to publish a leak rests with journalists—a somewhat disturbing thought. They also point out that there are good and bad leaks. The former include secrets revealed by whistleblowers doing what they consider is necessary for justice. The latter concern leaking for personal gain. Many examples are given in each category.

Several additional points are worth attention. First are the book’s factual errors. For example, in a section intended to provide a historical setting for government secrecy, the authors promote Herbert Yardley to colonel, a rank he never held. Then when discussing President Truman’s contribution to intelligence, they claim that he compared the FBI and the OSS to the Gestapo, something he never did. A second point to be considered is that there is little new in *Deep State*. Even the security problems associated with social networks and cyberspace have been much discussed in the media. Finally, few can argue with the authors’ view that the government has yet to find a way of “allowing people

uncomfortable with certain secrets to protest them *without* leaking to the public.” (284)

But the conclusion that “the only way for the government to keep secrets from being stolen is to proactively

give them away” is questionable on its face. *Deep State* serves mainly to promote the authors’ view that the media is best qualified to decide what government secrets are published.

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***Dirty Wars: The World Is A Battlefield***, by Jeremy Scahill (Nation Books, 2013), 642 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In his book *Blackwater*,<sup>1</sup> journalist Jeremy Scahill conveyed his antipathy to private security firms—Blackwater in particular—performing tasks normally assigned to the military in support of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In *Dirty Wars* he takes a broader view of the war on terror—from before 9/11 to the present—and argues that neither the military nor the civilian leadership with all their internecine bureaucratic conflicts is doing much right.

His working premise is that the post 9/11 situation amounts to an “expansion of covert US wars, the abuse of executive privilege and state secrets, [and] the embrace of unaccountable elite military units that answer only to the White House.” (xxiii) The last of these conditions may be dismissed as muddled analysis since any unit answering to the White House is accountable.

The balance of the book questions the designation of those “deemed to be enemies of America” and the methods used to deal with them. The book also looks at who authorizes using such tactics, the organizations that undertake them—mainly DOD, CIA, and the Joint Special Operations Command—and the sometimes contradictory official explanations of ensuing events. While few leaders or operations escape detailed exami-

nation, the story of Anwar Awlaki—including his family—is used throughout the book to emphasize Scahill’s opposition to “targeted assassination,” drones, and the term “high value targets.”

Scahill provides over 80 pages of source notes to support his accusations. Many document well-known events. Many others are from secondary sources that share his views. But neither the sources nor the author comment on three topics missing from the entire account. The first is any consideration of the fact that combating the kind of terrorism advocated by al-Qaeda and its affiliates necessitates new approaches to war and that these are intended to prevent another 9/11 while minimizing loss of life by those fighting it. The second is any suggestion of more suitable alternatives to fighting this type of terrorism. Finally, Scahill does not recognize that all wars are dirty and result in mistakes and civilian casualties on both sides.

*Dirty Wars* is a good if unbalanced summary of the war on terror and, in hindsight, what might have been done differently in specific instances. But overall, it fails to make the case that the current approach should be abandoned, and it does not emphasize the point that none of the events discussed would have occurred had Usama bin Laden not attacked on 9/11.

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***The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method Out of Mayhem***, by Adam D.M. Svendsen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 244 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Adam Svendsen is an educator and researcher in intelligence studies at the University of Copenhagen. In an earlier book on intelligence cooperation, Svendsen focused on some of the problems he observed in the UK-US relationship.<sup>2</sup> In this latest work, he expands his

scope to include intelligence relationships globally. Early on, he equates the term “cooperation” with “liaison” and thus does not restrict the latter to counterintelligence relationships, as do some intelligence services.

<sup>1</sup> Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army* (MJF Books, 2008), fully revised and updated.

<sup>2</sup> Adam D. M. Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11* (Routledge, 2010). See a review in “The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf,” *Studies in Intelligence* 55, no. 1, available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-1/the-intelligence-officers-bookshelf.html>.



Svendsen employs the *Oxford English Dictionary* definition of “professionalism,” but when it comes to the specifics of intelligence cooperation and liaison, he is less precise. Liaison, he acknowledges, is difficult to study because it is surrounded by secrecy. A companion complication is what he terms the “poacher-gamekeeper” (43ff) challenge: some intelligence services like to find out answers secretly, and others put obstacles in their way even though, quoting the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “it is our duty to work together as an integrated team.” (135) Thus in *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation*, Svendsen analyzes ways to create “method out of [the] mayhem [of] liaison.” (5-6)

Two impediments inhibit easy understanding of the substance of Svendsen’s approach. First, he never makes quite clear what factors will improve cooperation—or whether it is even reasonable to assume there are any that can be applied generally. The chapter on “professionalization of intelligence cooperation in ac-

tion” quotes from a series of CIA documents from which, Svendsen claims, “many noteworthy insights can be extracted,” but he does not say what those are. (112) He does conclude that “optimum outreach” is the “holy grail of intelligence liaison,” but just what that means in practice remains obscure. (148) Likewise, platitudes such as “optimizing intelligence initiatives and enterprises while simultaneously addressing conditions of complacency [must be taken]” and “greater leadership and creativity of vision remain essential” leave readers with no ideas of just what to do next.

The second impediment is that Svendsen’s academic, sometimes pedantic style—coupled with the frequent, serially listed citations included in the text—can be bewildering and complicate understanding. The Palgrave editor should have stepped in.

Still, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation* is the product of intense research and deserves serious attention.

### Historical

***Conspiracy of One: Tyler Kent’s Secret Plot against FDR, Churchill, and the Allied War Effort***, by Peter Rand (Lyons Press, 2013), 254 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Tyler Kent was born in 1911 in China, where his father, a member of Virginia’s gentry, was serving in the Foreign Service. After Kent’s early education in several European countries, where he acquired a taste for the diplomatic lifestyle, the family returned to Washington, DC, where Kent, by then a handsome young man, attended St. Albans School. From there he went to Princeton. Leaving after three years, he continued his education in Madrid and Paris, graduating from the Sorbonne skilled in six languages. Kent returned to Washington in 1932. By then he was self-centered, arrogant, anti-Semitic, socially inept, and egotistical. He applied in the middle of the Great Depression for the Foreign Service, only to learn that there were no openings. Eventually, thanks to Ambassador William Bullitt—making a decision he would regret—Kent was given a clerical position in the Moscow embassy, becoming the only clerk clothed by Brooks Brothers. Another attempt to become a Foreign Service Officer faltered when Kent failed the oral examination.

*Conspiracy of One* tells of Kent’s progress from ordinary clerk to code clerk during the mid- to late 1930s.

Despite his boring, low-level job and the restrictions of Stalinist Moscow, Kent acquired a gun and a car, lived on the economy, and maintained a studio where he photographed his Soviet-furnished mistress in the buff. Kent also began keeping copies of official messages for “historical purposes.” While these facts might suggest that Kent was working for the NKVD, his State Department superiors, if they were aware of his activities, never pursued the issue. In 1939, Kent was transferred to London to be the code clerk in the US embassy there. He arrived in London with a suspected German agent MI5 was expecting, and both were put under surveillance. Kent was subsequently seen having an affair with the Russian émigré wife of a British soldier and meeting with another suspected German agent, the Baroness Anna Wolkoff.

In 1940, MI5 suspected that Wolkoff had given Kent evidence of her fifth column activities for safekeeping, and approval was obtained from the American embassy to search Kent’s flat. Kent was caught in bed with his mistress, and the search yielded evidence against the Baroness. But to everyone’s surprise, except Kent’s, the

searchers also discovered hundreds of classified US embassy cables, many of which were private exchanges between Churchill—not yet prime minister—and President Roosevelt. Churchill was pressing for US war support, which was then illegal in the United States, and Roosevelt was shown to be sympathetic while running for a third term. Kent, an anti-interventionist, planned to use the cables to thwart Roosevelt's reelection. Author Peter Rand explains how the British kept the fact of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence quiet while persuading Ambassador Kennedy to waive Kent's dip-

lomatic immunity so that he and Wolkoff could be tried *in camera*; both were convicted.

This is not the first book about the Kent affair,<sup>3</sup> but it is the first based on Kent's personal papers and on interviews with some of the participants and their descendants. Thus Rand has added details about MI5's role and suspicions that Kent's Russian émigré mistress was a Soviet agent. Rand concludes with a summary of Kent's life after his release from prison at the end of the war—he married a wealthy lady, publicly defended his actions, and ended his days in a trailer park in Arizona.

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***The Coup: 1953, the CIA and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations***, by Ervand Abrahamian (The New Press, 2013), 277 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

In 1951, Iran's newly elected premier, Muhammad Mossadeq, nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, putting Britain's investment and oil supply at risk. US-brokered attempts to reach a compromise failed. Britain considered a military invasion and then severed diplomatic relations. The crisis was resolved after a coup orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence in August 1953 removed Mossadeq and restored the shah as Iran's leader. Many books have been written about the underlying motivations for this covert action.

In *The Coup*, City University of New York history professor Ervand Abrahamian, challenges the two principal explanations for the coup and presents a third version. The first explanation asserts that the British and Americans tried to reach a good faith allocation of assets but that the quirky Mossadeq was intransigent. The

second common explanation for the coup views it as a consequence of Cold War politics and the danger of communist influence over Iran. Professor Abrahamian analyzes both of these theories in terms of the players, politics, economics, and military factors. He finds that Mossadeq was anything but inflexible, and the threat of communist influence cited by the United States lacked substance, though it fit with US foreign policy objectives. A third explanation, he argues, was the importance of maintaining control over oil production.

*The Coup* concludes with a review of the coup's short- and long-term consequences. It produced a period of relative stability until 1979, when the Iranian revolution finally nationalized Iranian oil production. Professor Abrahamian leaves the impression that dealing with Mossadeq at the time would have avoided the problematic Islamic state of today.

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***Dead Drop: The True Story of Oleg Penkovsky and the Cold War's Most Dangerous Operation***, by Jeremy Duns (Simon & Schuster, 2013), 358 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

After 50 years, the event that put the KGB on the trail of CIA/MI6 agent Col. Oleg Penkovsky, is still uncertain, although several authors have suggested answers. British novelist Jeremy Duns is the latest to do so. He begins his account with a description—in italics—of how Penkovsky was lured to his arrest. Then, after asking, "Is this how it happened?" he replies "I have imagined many of the details in the above scenario." This is followed by several more pages of imagined dialogue describing what happened after his arrest. (1–13) At the end of *Dead Drop*, Duns presents another imagined sce-

nario that "reveals" how the KGB could have learned of Penkovsky's treachery and the key player involved.

In between, he reviews the familiar details of the case and gradually amplifies the role of journalist Jeremy Wolfenden, before concluding he was "absurdly qualified" to have betrayed Penkovsky. (236–52) In an author's note, Duns lists the books and documents he consulted for *Dead Drop*, but none of them directly support his conclusion. There are also endnotes—some very lengthy—but their format is awkward, and not all

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<sup>3</sup> Ray Bearse and Anthony Read, *Conspirator: The Untold Story of Tyler Kent* (Doubleday, 1991).

dialogue and facts presented in the narrative are accounted for.

In the end, Duns' candid speculation has only fortune-cookie plausibility and fails to illuminate this

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***The Great Game in Cuba: How the CIA Sabotaged its Own Plot to Unseat Fidel Castro***, by Joan Mellen (Skyhorse Publishing, 2013), 332 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Joan Mellen is a professor of creative writing at Temple University. She begins her book with a curious discussion about her decision to refer to CIA without employing the definite article "the," which she explains is in keeping with "the Agency's own practice both in written and spoken form. No one with more than a passing acquaintance with CIA is likely to affix the definite article 'the' before 'CIA.'" (ix) A visit to [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov), or a reading of Allen Dulles' *The Craft of Intelligence*, John Ranelagh's *The Agency*, Robert Gates' *From the Shadows*, or Richard Helms' *A Look Over My Shoulder*, to cite a few examples, refute this claim and raise doubts about Mellen's grasp of the subject of her book. Other qualms arise on the first page of *The Great Game in Cuba*. There, Mellen asserts, "Within CIA, the Agency comes before the nation. CIA uses 'United States' and 'CIA' interchangeably." She continues on page 2, "CIA's first illegality was to violate its own charter." A final example, but not the final absurdity, occurs on page 4, where Mellen claims "CIA rendered into law in the form of a National Security Directive...its freedom to commit acts of murder, terrorism and sabotage,

dark corner of counterintelligence history. Readers interested in the Penkovsky case would be better informed by reading another account, *The Spy Who Saved the World*.<sup>4</sup>

crimes that CIA had already embraced in the year of its birth." No sources are provided for any of these allegations, though they set the tone of the book.

*The Great Game in Cuba* purports to tell the story of CIA's attempts to overthrow Castro with the help of a large and complex cast of characters from the King Ranch in Texas, commercial firms, and various patriotic Cubans. The book also briefly discusses operations associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis but adds nothing new. Mellen asserts that "CIA Cuban operations were a game with no apparent objective, or at least no serious intention of unseating Fidel Castro." (205) Two chapters tell the story of individual Cuban agents, one of whom survived time in a Cuban jail and decided to publish his story. Mellen concludes that his attempts "revealed CIA to have infiltrated *Reader's Digest* at the highest levels." (229) Here, as in most of the book, the facts cited are less than proof. In sum, *The Great Game in Cuba* recounts a confusing story, and there is no way to tell what is right and what is not. The only issue Mellen makes absolutely clear is her less-than-positive opinion of CIA.

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***The Greatest Traitor: The Secret Lives of Agent George Blake***, by Roger Hermiston (Aurum Press, 2013), 362 pp., bibliography, photos, index.

In 1966, onetime MI6 officer and KGB agent George Blake made a spectacular escape from Wormwood Scrubs Prison in London and made his way to Moscow, where he still enjoys a quiet retirement. A number of books about his case, including Blake's memoir in 1990, have been published.<sup>5</sup> So the surprising publication of another biography, *The Greatest Traitor*, suggests there is something new to learn, which is what biographer Roger Hermiston contends. He does not, however, contest the basic facts and reviews them in detail. They include Blake's Dutch origins, his WW II ser-

vice in the Dutch resistance, his recruitment by MI6, his capture in June 1950 by invading North Korean forces while he was in Seoul serving in the British Embassy, his recruitment by the KGB, and the "confession" in which he gratuitously expressed remorse over those who died because of his revelations while he was a KGB mole in the British service.

What Hermiston adds comes mostly from sources not available to previous writers, including Blake. For example, he found taped interviews Blake made for a

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<sup>4</sup> Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, *The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War* (Scribners, 1992).

<sup>5</sup> George Blake, *No Other Choice: An Autobiography* (Jonathan Cape, 1990).

BBC documentary, legal files and trial transcripts, an autobiographical paper Blake wrote for his lawyers, and government documents released in 2008. In addition, there were letters and interviews with various participants, including Blake's Dutch resistance colleagues, his lawyers, his first wife, and those who aided his escape. A book by an American POW who was held in the same camp in North Korea as Blake was also helpful.<sup>6</sup> Hermiston did contact Blake, and they exchanged e-mails, though those are not reproduced in the book.

With one exception, the information from the added sources doesn't change the facts of the case, merely adding background on Blake's family, personal relationships, and the specifics of his legal defense. The exception is the claim that "the decisive move to bring Blake into the KGB ranks" was made by Nikolai Loen-

ko, a name not mentioned in other accounts. But while Hermiston provides details about Loenko's techniques, he does not identify his source for this important information. (131)

The one important topic that Hermiston does not bring up is the assertion by former CIA case officer William Hood that Blake played a key role in the exposure of Peter Popov, a GRU officer and CIA agent.<sup>7</sup> Since Blake denied the claim, some uncertainty remains.

*The Greatest Traitor* is the most complete and well-written account of the Blake case. But since Hermiston fails to make any comparison with other KGB agents—for example, Philby or Maclean—the claim that Blake was the greatest remains unproven.

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***It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past***, by David Satter (Yale University Press, 2013), 383 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

The Solovetsky Stone sits just off the sidewalk at about three o'clock, on the right side of Lubyanka Square, facing the old KGB headquarters building. Named for the Solovetsky Islands, the site of the first Soviet political prisoner camps, it was dedicated in 1990—during the Gorbachev era—as a monument to the victims of the camps there. In the post-Soviet Union days, however, "Russia has neither a national monument to the victims of Communist terror nor a museum," only locally sponsored memorials. (3) The current Russian government, analyst David Satter argues, chooses instead to ignore selected physical and social facts linked to the terror, and to emphasize different elements of the Soviet past.

Examples of current emphasis include the importance of centralized control, Stalin the great war leader, adoption of the melody of the Soviet national anthem, implicit support for the restoration of Dzershinsky's statue in Lubyanka Square—though not yet done—and especially the policy of placing the needs of the state over those of the individual. *It Was A Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway* examines the social, economic, and political impact of these policies.

Of particular interest to intelligence history is the chapter titled the "Odyssey of Andrei Poleschuk." Codenamed WEIGH, he was one of the KGB officers exposed by Aldrich Ames as a CIA agent. Satter uses this case to explain life in the KGB era and to compare the Soviet and contemporary Russian bureaucracies, both with respect to traitors and their families. Using American and Russian sources, Satter describes Poleschuk, the father, in terms of the effect his case had on son Andrei. Satter explains how, after his father's arrest while servicing a dead drop in Moscow, Andrei was repeatedly frustrated in trying to visit him in prison. Satter also discusses the shocking way Andrei learned of his father's trial and execution. The promises made and broken by the KGB, and the FSB response to Andrei's persistent and varied efforts to learn where his father was buried, are understandable by Soviet standards. Despite individual expressions of sympathy from serving officers, Andrei learned only that his father had been cremated. After Andrei became a journalist, he was allowed to study in the United States, where he contacted the CIA. He and his wife now live in Virginia.

Satter concludes that the Russian effort to ignore the country's horrendous past and to keep future genera-

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<sup>6</sup> Larry Zellers, *In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea* (University Press of Kentucky, 1991; second edition, 2000).

<sup>7</sup> William Hood, *MOLE* (Norton, 1982), 223–24.

tions from learning of it sets a dangerous precedent. He is convinced that only when the individual is recog-

nized over the state's ambitions will there be hope for a better future in Russia.

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***Patton's Oracle: Gen. Oscar Koch, as I Knew Him—A Biographical Memoir***, by Robert Hays (Lucidus Books, 2013), 263 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In the late 1960s, while Robert Hays was helping Brig. Gen. Oscar Koch—pronounced “kotch”—polish his memoir,<sup>8</sup> Koch received a letter from Frank McCarthy, the Hollywood producer getting ready to make the movie *Patton*. McCarthy included portions of the script with lines attributed to Koch, Patton's G2. Koch said they made him out to be a fool and refused to cooperate. McCarthy created a fictitious G-2—Col. Gaston Bell—and ignored Koch. The film won an Oscar, but Koch never regretted his decision. He had suffered the bad reputation of intelligence officers and often quoted General Omar Bradley on the subject: “Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties.” (15) Koch was the exception. *Patton's Oracle* explains why.

Koch's service with Patton began before the war at Ft. Riley, Kansas. Since Patton had been an intelligence officer, he knew what he wanted and arranged for Koch—then a 42-year-old lieutenant colonel—to join his staff,

which at the time was planning Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa. Koch admired Patton, who had warned in 1937 that the Japanese were capable of attacking Pearl Harbor. Few paid any attention. Koch would later have a similar experience, when he warned that Hitler was preparing for a surprise attack in the Ardennes—the Battle of the Bulge. Koch remained Patton's G-2 throughout the war.

Hays includes many stories from the general's memoir, published just after his death in 1970, and adds new material—for example, how Koch used the ULTRA decrypts, still classified when the memoir was written—about Koch's service under Patton and as a division commander in Korea. And he goes on to tell of Koch's life in retirement.

*Patton's Oracle* reveals the story of a modest man who never—well, almost never—let his commander down. It is the only biography of a WWII G-2.

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***Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42***, by William Dalrymple (Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 515 pp., endnotes, bibliography, glossary, photos, 12 maps, index.

Millennial followers of modern rock and roll may instantly recognize the phrase “graveyard of empires” as the title of a 2012 album by the Canadian rock band Evans Blues. Earlier generations may be reminded of Seth Jones' book, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, which reviews the origins of the phrase.<sup>9</sup> In *Return of a King*, historian William Dalrymple presents an exhaustive study of one episode in Afghanistan's history, Britain's first Afghan war (1839–42). In his analysis of the geopolitical, military, and cultural factors of that disaster, Dalrymple suggests the phrase has contemporary relevance.

*Return of a King* is not the first book on the subject,<sup>10</sup> but it is the first to include Afghan sources and to con-

sider in great depth their viewpoints as affected by tribal jealousies and competing allegiances. Furthermore, Dalrymple examines closely the role of intelligence and the principals involved in what would become known as the Great Game that had the British seeking to protect colonial India from imagined Russian encroachment.

The king to which the book's title refers is Shah Shuja, who, overthrown by his half-brother, was eventually offered asylum in Ludhiana, India, by the British in 1816. After three failed attempts to regain his throne in Kabul, he was still in India in 1837, in western Afghanistan, Lt. Henry Rawlinson, a member of the intelligence corps, encountered a party of Russian Cossacks.

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<sup>8</sup> Brig. Gen. Oscar W. Koch with Robert G. Hays, *G-2: Intelligence for Patton* (Army Times Publishing Company, 1971).

<sup>9</sup> Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (W. W. Norton, 2009).

<sup>10</sup> John William Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan* (Richard Bentley, 1857), in three volumes, revised and corrected.

Leading the group was Captain Ivan Vitkevitch—the first Russian player of the Great Game (xxiv)—who explained his presence by saying he was on a diplomatic mission to Persia. For various reasons, Rawlinson doubted Vitkevitch's story and reported his presence to headquarters.

Rawlinson's concerns were justified when Vitkevitch later appeared in Kabul seeking an alliance with the then ruler, Dost Mohammad. The British agent in Kabul at the time, Alexander Burnes, favored a British alliance with Mohammad. He was opposed by Major Claude Wade, whom Dalrymple calls "one of the first two spymasters of the Great Game" (48), who favored the restoration of Shah Shuja. Wade won the day with the British government. Thus in October 1838, the British declared war on Afghanistan in order to restore Shah Shuja to power and provide a friendly state as a barrier to Russian desires—false as it turned out—to invade India.

*Return of a King* describes the successful invasion of Afghanistan, the return of Shah Shuja in 1839, and the

escape of Dost Mohammad. Everything went downhill from there. Gross mismanagement by the British political governor, Sir William Macnaghten, led to the gradual deterioration of Shah Shuja's power, a rebellion by Afghan tribes, the assassination of Burnes and Macnaghten, and the tragic retreat of the British Army to India. Except for the commanding general and a few others taken hostage, only the army surgeon survived the retreat. The "Army of Retribution" was eventually dispatched to Kabul and wreaked a brutal revenge while freeing some captives before it returned to India. But a permanent British presence was at an end, and Dost Mohammad returned to power.

Dalrymple does a magnificent job of describing the intricacies of 19th century Afghan tribal politics and what would today be called their insurgency approach to warfare. He demonstrates what can happen when these factors are ignored by politicians. In the end, Dalrymple suggests some obvious lessons for contemporary Afghan events. He has told a wonderful story that justifies his conclusion that Afghan wars are fought for no wise purpose.

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***Spy Sites of New York City: Two Centuries of Espionage in Gotham***, by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace with Henry R. Schlesinger (Foreign Excellent Trenchcoat Society, Inc., 2012), 160 pp., photos, maps, glossary, index.

***Spy Sites of Philadelphia: Two and a Half Centuries of Espionage in the City of Brotherly Love***, by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace with Henry Schlesinger (Foreign Excellent Trenchcoat Society, Inc., 2013), 118 pp., photos, maps, glossary, index.

Since the Revolutionary War, spies have lived and operated in New York and Philadelphia. Intelligence historian Keith Melton and retired CIA officer Robert Wallace have located the sites associated with many of those spies' operations and the monuments that honor participants. The *Spy Sites* books provide descriptions of operations, photographs of the sites as they appear today, and maps to aid visitors.

For example, in New York City, one can see a replica of the Samuel Fraunces Tavern, where George Washington actually slept. It is also where Fraunces' daughter helped uncover the Hickey plot to assassinate the general and where he said farewell to his officers after the war. The authors also found the memorial plaque that honors Mary Elizabeth Bowser, the freed slave who was part of Union agent Elizabeth van Lew's Civil War network. Other sites include the apartment house in

which Julia Child lived, the residence of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the locations where Russian illegal Anna Chapman conducted espionage with her Russian masters, the place where the blind Sheikh conspired to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993, and the home of the FBI double agent Katrina Leung ("Parlor Maid").

The authors begin the Philadelphia tour with Independence Hall, where Benjamin Franklin and the Secret Committee met to make contracts with the French to help supply the revolutionaries. The home of little-known Washington agent John Clark, who ran a network of agents, and the Isaac Potts house, which served as Washington's headquarters while his army was encamped at nearby Valley Forge, are also included. Civil War entries include the self-promoting Lafayette Baker, and the safe house—now a museum—for the Underground Railroad. The home of WW II Soviet agent Har-

ry Gold and the workplace of Soviet agent George Koval are also described. Perhaps the most unusual entry concerns “Jihad Jane,” Colleen LaRose, who confessed to attempting to recruit Islamic terrorists and threatening to kill a Swedish artist.

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*A Spy Like No Other: The Cuban Missile Crisis, The KGB and the Kennedy Assassination*, by Robert Holmes (Biteback Publishing Ltd., 2013), 325 pp., footnotes, appendices, photos, index.

According to author and former British diplomat Robert Holmes, this book began as a volume about Col. Oleg Penkovsky, his relationship with the CIA and MI6, and the part they played in the Cuban Missile Crisis. As his research progressed, he discovered “a chain of intrigue, betrayal, and revenge that suggested a group of maverick Soviet intelligence officers had plotted the crime of the century,” the assassination of John F. Kennedy. And that is what the book attempts to reveal.

The principal “mavericks” are General Ivan Serov, Yuri Andropov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov. Holmes reviews their post-WW II careers, giving primary attention to Serov and his rise to power in SMERSH, the KGB, and the GRU. With a single exception, Holmes presents nothing new about the Penkovsky case. Only

The *Spy Sites* books provide a worthwhile introduction to our espionage history and a convenient guide to travelers interested in the subject in Philadelphia and New York City.

the story that the mavericks led by Serov arranged Kennedy’s assassination is new, and Holmes doesn’t support his contention with source notes. Holmes does admit in a comment on Serov that “one can only speculate on these matters.”

To make matters worse, his comments about the mavericks’ plot itself are riddled with speculative qualifications like, “it would have been natural,” “it seems likely,” and “who may have rejoiced when.” (236-7) Returning to the subject later, Holmes continues in the same vein with, “he may have,” “the possibility,” “one of them could well have mentioned,” “it would be reasonable,” (270-71) and so on.

*A Spy Like No Other* amounts to semantic spam. Not recommended.

### Memoir

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*Born Under an Assumed Name: The Memoir of a Cold War Spy’s Daughter*, by Sara Mansfield Taber (Potomac Books, 2012), 361 pp., photos, no index.

Sara Taber was born in 1954 in Japan, where her father, Charles Taber, served under cover as a CIA case officer. In general, her memoir is the very candid story of a young girl growing up in the countries—in Asia, Europe, and America—where her father served. The central, underlying theme of the book is her relationship with her father, his work, and the impact both had on her social and political views. These she makes crystal clear.

A tipping point in her life occurred during the Vietnam War when her father revealed that he was a CIA officer. Her younger brother was not surprised. But she knew “the CIA was one of the prime enemies of the peace movement,” and yet she writes, “I should be outraged at Pop but I was intrigued instead of aghast.” (243) She struggled unsuccessfully to resolve the con-

flict of her love for her father and the intense sympathy she felt for the antiwar movement. This, she said, led to her experimenting with alcohol and drugs, and a period of hospitalization. And when her father experienced some major career disappointments, her antagonism with the “crass, ruthless and demeaning” Agency only increased. (342)

Charles Taber’s last tour of duty was in Vietnam. It ended in April 1975, when he helped evacuate hundreds of Vietnamese who had served America loyally. He would later successfully battle the CIA to write a book about the experience, and this further skewed his daughter’s view of the Agency.<sup>11</sup> But in the end Taber wrote in his memoir that Sara’s “mobile” life (358) left her with some positive attributes. *Born Under An Assumed Name* is good reading for those interested in Agency life.

***Harbor Knight: From Harbor Hoodlum to Honored CIA Agent***, by Ralph A. Garcia, with a foreword by Michael Sulick (iUniverse, Inc., 2013), 234 pp., photos, index.

Ever since the CIA was created in 1947, a college degree has usually been a prerequisite for a professional position. Ralph Garcia was accepted without this credential, but he had some other important qualifications. *Harbor Knight* tells what they were, how he acquired them, and how he used them to craft a career as a case officer.

Garcia grew up in a section of East Chicago, Indiana, called “Da Harbor” by locals. Home life was difficult and “clubs” were more fun than school, so he dropped out. The only goal in his life was to avoid working in the steel mills. Married and a father in his teens, he joined the Marines in 1959, and his professional life began its upward climb. He discovered an aptitude for foreign languages while in Vietnam and decided he would pursue a career in the CIA. By the time he left the Marines and entered on duty with the CIA in the early 1970s, he was a multilingual NCO who had served in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

*Harbor Knight* provides a typical, if occasionally wide-eyed, description of Garcia’s first impressions of CIA headquarters. He discusses his tradecraft training and assignments to Latin America and Europe. In be-

tween, there were exciting “flying squad”—emergency quick duty—trips throughout the world. Then came a challenging tour with the Drug Enforcement Administration. But Garcia preferred the CIA and returned several years later. After assignments in Africa and other locations, Garcia returned to Washington for advanced management training and advancement to GS-15, an achievement he equated with a “Knighthood” when he reflected on his origins.

In 1992, Garcia retired from the CIA and formed a security company. He later served on congressional panels and participated in several National Hispanic Leadership Summits in Washington, DC. These duties brought him to the attention of the Navy, and he was appointed as the information officer for the US Naval Academy, where he also served on the Academy Nominations Panel.

*Harbor Knight* is not just the story of Garcia’s professional career. Throughout, he tells of the often difficult strains on home and family life and how he dealt with them. For those wondering what a CIA career is like and what one can do when motivated to serve his country, Garcia’s story is a fine model.

***Stories from the Secret War: CIA Special Ops in Laos***, by Terrence Burke (La Plata Books, 2012), 150 pp., photos, no index.

Terrence Burke began his 30 years of government service as a Marine in the 1950s. It was a time of relative peace, and his duties as a “BAR Man” (he carried a Browning Automatic Rifle) offered little excitement, so he applied and was accepted into the elite Embassy Security Guard program. His class began with 110 candidates; 36 finished, and he was one of the top three. This meant Burke could have his choice of three assignments. He listed Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid, but he was sent to Rome. It was there that he became friends with a number of CIA officers, and the idea of a CIA career was planted. At the end of his tour, Burke began college at Georgetown and contacted the Agency in 1959. *Stories from the Secret War* tells of his 10-year ca-

reer, first in CIA’s Office of Security, then as a paramilitary officer in Laos, and later as an operations officer in Vietnam.

Burke’s initial CIA duties involved security assignments dealing with war protestors and making sure safes were locked each night. A break came when he was placed on the security detail of Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles. On one occasion, Burke accompanied the director to Capitol Hill for a committee session on Russian ballistic missiles. During a lunch break, he was assigned to guard the classified material in the hearing room. He never did get his lunch, but he did use the time to examine the notes each congressman

<sup>11</sup> Charles Eugene Taber, *Get Out Any Way You Can: The Story of the Evacuation of House Eleven, The CIA Propaganda Force in Vietnam April 1975* (Infinity Publishing Company, 2003).



left at his desk as well as the materials to be used by DoD participants. After making notes on what the congressmen planned to ask and what the DoD materials revealed, he informed the director of what was coming. Back at headquarters, Burke was reprimanded by the director of security. It seems that Dulles wanted him to know that his actions were contrary to the CIA charter. Then he was offered the director's personal thanks.

Burke's demonstration of initiative led to his posting to the Agency training center ("the Farm") as assistant director of security. There he found that the mess hall and motor pool still had signs "designating 'colored' and 'white' toilets and water fountains." From then on, he used the "colored" facilities. While enjoying the less-than-demanding life at the Farm, Burke was attracted to the paramilitary program, and when the Special Operations Division (SOD) was formed, he applied and was accepted. Burke describes the extensive—with many humorous incidents—training that set him on the path to Laos with his wife and two children.

During his two years working alongside the Meo tribesmen in the fight against the communist Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese, Burke experienced the com-

bat that did not come his way in the Marines. The daily routine included establishing communications, arranging for supplies, supporting roadwatch teams, handling informants, weapons training, and flying from base to base to monitor operations. Planes and helicopters were shot down so often that Burke formed an ad hoc rescue group. The most dramatic, frustrating, and finally rewarding rescue concerned Navy pilot Lt. Charles Klussman, who was shot down over the Mekong river; Burke tells the story well.

On returning to CIA headquarters in 1965, Burke received the Intelligence Star for Valor and was accepted for the case officer program. After language school, it was back to Southeast Asia for three more years. When personnel reductions in the clandestine service began in 1977, and the demand for paramilitary specialists diminished, Burke decided to move to the Drug Enforcement Agency. After serving all over the world, he ended his government career as the deputy administrator of DEA.

*Stories from the Secret War* is the tale of a genuine risk-taker who overcame a low tolerance for bureaucratic niggling and achieved high office. It will serve as a model.

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**Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda**, by Philip Mudd (The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 200 pp., index.

One hundred years before Philip Mudd applied to the CIA, his ancestor, Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, was convicted of aiding John Wilkes Booth after he shot President Lincoln. What would the CIA say about that? It never came up, Mudd writes, and he accepted an entry-level analyst position. He would resign 25 years later as the FBI's senior intelligence adviser (after having served for several years as the deputy director of the Bureau's National Security Branch). *Takedown*, tells about the years in between, with the focus on the post-9/11 era.

Mudd was serving at the National Security Council on 9/11. He quickly became the CIA member of a State Department team that went to Afghanistan to aid in setting up the new government. When he returned to CIA headquarters, he was assigned to manage analysts in the rapidly expanding counterterrorist effort in the Directorate of intelligence (DI). Much of this book is devoted to how Mudd and the DI adapted to the demands that resulted from the war in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. He

provides an analyst's view of training new personnel, including managing analysts who did not want to become managers. He also provides insights into the bureaucratic battles with other elements of the Intelligence Community. Within the CIA, his analysts wrote for the *President's Daily Brief*, and he explains in detail how this tasking was met. With regard to the war in Iraq, Mudd describes the support given to Secretary of State Powell in preparation for his UN speech and the management shakeup that resulted when it became apparent there was no WMD threat.

It was then that Mudd was appointed deputy director of the CIA Counterterrorist Center. His new duties involved frequent, often difficult contact with the media. But more important was his support to the White House and the congressional committees concerning the growing threats from al-Qaeda, its developing affiliates in the Middle East, and Taliban operations from Pakistan.

In 2005, when the FBI created the National Security Branch, Mudd became its CIA representative and deputy director, and he tells how that group functioned under the close supervision of Director Robert Mueller. One of the issues Mudd dealt with during this time was a proposal that the United States form a new security organization similar to Britain's MI5. Mudd discounts this idea in his book, making the very practical point that whatever advantages it might have had, it would have taken "at least ten years to get on its feet." (179)

Mudd's final career opportunity in government came in 2009, when he was nominated to become deputy under secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. But it was not to be. His association with the Counterterrorist Center and its controversial role in extraordinary rendition programs meant his chances of confirmation were poor, and he withdrew his name.

After 24 years with CIA, Mudd decided it was time to move on, and he resigned. In *Takedown*, he has left an absorbing account, from a senior analyst's point of view, of the CIA and its efforts to combat al-Qaeda and conduct the war on terror.

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***Uncovered: My Half-Century with the CIA***, by John Sager (WestBow Press, 2013), 387 pp., photos, appendix, no index.

Careers in the CIA BTI (Before The Internet) and the *Beatles* can only be imagined by many reading about the Agency today. Those reading this memoir by octogenarian John Sager will not have to imagine. A long-retired operations officer, Sager has gotten around to telling his story at long last. He begins with a summary of his early life and education at the University of Washington, where he graduated in 1951. There he learned Russian and survived attempts by a communist-inspired teacher to convince him that Stalin was a great man. He also volunteered for the American Junior Red Cross and gained valuable experience traveling throughout the United States, speaking about the European relief program for displaced children.

Inspired in part by Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in 1946, he applied to the CIA and joined the after graduation. Sager describes the junior officer training (JOT)

experience that prepared him for overseas duty. He served first in Iran, where he and others monitored Soviet missile launches and recruited agents. After Tehran, he returned to CIA headquarters, where laid the groundwork for a visit by Oleg Penkovsky to Seattle. Penkovsky was arrested before he could be exfiltrated. Sager served in Moscow in the early 1960s. He was there during the Cherepanov affair—an attempt to pass KGB documents that went awry—and the US Embassy bugging revelations exposed by Yuri Nosenko. Sager's final years in the Agency—he retired in 1991—were spent in the United States, working mainly on foreign student matters. The concluding chapters of *Uncovered* are devoted to life in retirement with his fourth wife—a high school sweetheart. Finally he was able indulge his passion for fly fishing and his devotion to religion. Sager provides a useful glimpse of a valuable career.

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***The Wolf and the Watchman: A Father, A Son, and the CIA***, by Scott C. Johnson (W.W. Norton, 2013), 304 pp., no index.

Scott Johnson is a freelance journalist and former foreign correspondent for Newsweek in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was born in India, where his father worked in the US embassy, and the family traveled from time to time over much of the world. In 1987, after his parents divorced and his father remarried, he was living in Michigan when his Dad confessed, "I'm a spy." (48) Nothing was the same for young Johnson from that moment on. *The Wolf and the Watchman* looks at the emotional impact the revelation had on Scott and the influence it had on the relationship with his father.

Although initially surprised when he learned his dad's secret, Johnson realized there had been clues, especially the tour of duty in Virginia in his early teens. Asked by his father not to disclose the location, which meant helping keep his cover, he "struggled with the idea that there was something fundamentally illusionary and maybe even shameful" about their life, a feeling that would persist. (59)

In the early 1990s, after he had finished college and his father had retired, Scott roamed the world, eventu-

ally ending up in Paris, where he secured a job as a journalist. He would later serve tours in Afghanistan and Iraq. On one assignment, he had a clandestine meeting with a terrorist leader for a story and gained insight to how the other side thought and worked. Whether in the field or between assignments and even during bouts of depression, he maintained frequent contact with this dad. Their contact grew closer when his father was called back to the CIA after 9/11 and they both worked in the Middle East. It was during this period that John-

son realized their work had much in common, though it is uncertain whether this eased his persistent doubts.

*The Wolf and the Watchman* is the story of an extraordinarily close relationship between a CIA father and his son, one that is dominated by the son's continuing struggle to understand the clandestine world and its morality. It is probably not a typical story, but it will be of interest to families whose members have chosen or are contemplating careers in intelligence.



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## Books Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 2013

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### Current Topics

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Reviews can be reached at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/index.html>.

*The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television* by Tricia Jenkins (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace Are Challenging America and Changing the World* by Paul Rosenzweig (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry* by Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Dirty Wars: The World Is A Battlefield* by Jeremy Scahill (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method Out of Mayhem* by Adam D.M. Svendsen (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda* by Philip Mudd (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: Examining the Performance of Financial Intelligence Units* by Jayesh D'Souza (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam* by Akbar Ahmed (57 4 [December], J.R. Seeger)

*Trading Secrets: Spies and Intelligence in an Age of Terror* by Mark Huband (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth* by Mark Mazzetti (57 3 [September], Richard T. Willing, and 57 4 [December], J.R. Seeger)

### General

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*Counterintelligence Theory and Practice* by Hank Prunckun (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organization Studies* by Christopher Grey (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Collection: How To Plan and Execute Intelligence Collection in Complex Environments* by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Tradecraft: Secrets of Spy Warfare* by Maloy Krishna Dhar (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Introduction to Intelligence Studies* by Carl J. Jensen, III, David H. McElreath, and Melissa Graves (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Spy the Lie: Former CIA Officers Teach You How To Detect Deception* by Philip Houston, Michael Floyd, and Susan Carnicero, with Don Tennant (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis* by David R. Gibson (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

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*The US Intelligence Community - 6th Edition* by Jeffrey T. Richelson (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Work Like a Spy: Business Tips from a Former CIA Officer* by J.C. Carleson (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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## Historical

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*American Spies: Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the Present* by Michael J. Sulick (57 4 [December], Clayton Laurie)

*Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004* by John L. Helgeson (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis* by David M. Barrett and Max Holland (57 2 [June], Thomas Coffey)

*The Great Game in Cuba: How the CIA Sabotaged its Own Plot to Unseat Fidel Castro* by Joan Mellen (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Boots on the Ground: The Fight to Liberate Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 2001–2002* by Dick Camp (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Hiding in Plain Sight: Felix A. Sommerfeld, Spymaster in Mexico, 1908 to 1914* by Heribert von Feilitzsch (57 3 [September], Mark Benbow)

*A Brief History of the Spy: Modern Spying from the Cold War to the War on Terror* by Paul Simpson (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Historical Dictionary of Signals Intelligence* by Nigel West (57 2 [June], Gary K.)

*Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men He Betrayed* by Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*The Houseguests: A Memoir of Canadian Courage and CIA Sorcery* by Mark Lijek (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Conspiracy of One: Tyler Kent's Secret Plot against FDR, Churchill, and the Allied War Effort* by Peter Rand (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did It Make?* edited by Michael Herman and Gwilym Hughes (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Coup: 1953, the CIA and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations* by Ervand Abrahamian (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Operation SNOW: How A Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor* by John Koster (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Dead Drop: The True Story of Oleg Penkovsky and the Cold War's Most Dangerous Operation* by Jeremy Duns (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Pinkerton's War: The Civil War's Greatest Spy and the Birth of the U. S. Secret Service* by Jay Bonansinga (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated al-Qaeda* by Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board* by Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk (57 1 [March], Samuel Cooper-Wall and Bookshelf)

*The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden* by Mark Bowden (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Rice Paddy Navy: U. S. Sailors Undercover in China-Espionage and Sabotage Behind Enemy Lines in China During World War II* by Linda Kush (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Fourteenth Day: JFK and the Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis* by David Coleman (57 2 [June], Thomas Coffey)

*Saul Steinberg: A Biography* by Deirdre Bair (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*A Spy Like No Other: The Cuban Missile Crisis, The KGB and the Kennedy Assassination* by Robert Holmes (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Spy Sites of New York City: Two Centuries of Espionage in Gotham* by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace with Henry R. Schlesinger (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Spy Sites of Philadelphia: Two and Half Centuries of Espionage in the City of Brotherly Love* by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace with Henry Schlesinger (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Spying in America: Espionage from the Revolutionary War to the Dawn of the Cold War* by Michael J. Sulick (57 4 [December], Clayton Laurie)

*Stalin's Secret Agents: The Subversion of Roosevelt's Government* by M. Stanton Evans and Herbert Romerstein (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Stories from the Secret War: CIA Special Ops in Laos* by Terrence Burke (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran* by David Crist (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence* by James L. Gilbert (57 1 [March], Terrence J. Finnegan)

*The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I* by Thomas Boghardt (57 2 [June], John Ehrman)

## Memoir

*Born Under an Assumed Name: The Memoir of a Cold War Spy's Daughter* by Sara Mansfield Taber (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Formative Years of an African-American Spy: A Memoir* by Odell Bennett Lee (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Good-bye Dracula!: The Story of a Transylvanian Defector* by Traian Nicola (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Harbor Knight: From Harbor Hoodlum to Honored CIA Agent* by Ralph A. Garcia (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*An Intriguing Life: A Memoir of War, Washington, and Marriage to an American Spymaster* by Cynthia Helms with Chris Black (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Patton's Oracle: Gen. Oscar Koch, as I Knew Him-A Biographical Memoir* by Robert Hays (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Uncovered: My Half-Century with the CIA* by John Sager (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Wolf and the Watchman: A Father, A Son, and the CIA* by Scott C. Johnson (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

## Intelligence Abroad-Current

*Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain* by Christopher Moran (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*India's Spy Agencies: Shaken Not Stirred* by Lt. Col. Sunil S. Parihar (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Indian Intelligence: Missing In Action* edited by M.K. Singh (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Analyst Guide: A Digest for Junior Intelligence Analysts* edited by Ionel Nitu (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin* by Masha Gessen (57 4 [December], John Ehrman)

*Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin* by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (57 4 [December], John Ehrman)

*Other People's Wars: New Zealand in Afghanistan, Iraq and the War on Terror* by Nicky Hager (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars* by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba* by Stephen Tankel (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker* by Timothy L. Thomas (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

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### Intelligence Abroad—Historical

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*Agent Garbo: The Brilliant, Eccentric Secret Agent Who Tricked Hitler and Saved D-Day* by Stephan Talty (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Boei Chuzai-kan to iu Ninmu: 38-dosen no Gunji Interijensu* [Duties of a Defense Attaché: Military Intelligence of the 38th Parallel] by Fukuyama Takashi (57 1 [March], Stephen C. Mercado)

*A Brilliant Little Operation: The Cockleshell Heroes and the Most Courageous Raid of WW II* by Paddy Ashdown (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire* by Calder Walton (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il: Notes from His Former Mentor* by John H. Cha with K. J. Sohn (57 1 [March], Soo Kim)

*Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad*, Second Edition by Gordon Thomas (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*The Greatest Traitor: The Secret Lives of Agent George Blake* by Roger Hermiston (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Guy Burgess: Revolutionary in an Old School Tie* by Michael Holzman (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Ian Fleming and SOE's Operation Postmaster: The Untold Top Secret Story Behind 007* by Brian Lett (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia* by James Hevia (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past* by David Satter (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Man of War: The Secret Life of Captain Alan Hillgarth Officer, Adventurer, Agent* by Duff Hart-Davis (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Man Who Was George Smiley: The Life of John Bingham* by Michael Jago (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*MOSSAD: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service* by Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I* by John Cooper (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839–42* by William Dalrymple (57 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, from Lenin to Putin* by Julie Fedor (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Secret Listeners: How the Wartime Y Service Intercepted the Secret German Codes for Bletchley Park* by Sinclair McKay (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*The Spy Who Loved: The Secrets and Lives of Christine Granville, Britain's First Female Special Agent of World War II* by Clare Mulley (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Spying for the People: Mao's Secret Agents, 1949-1967* by Michael Schoenhals (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Under Every Leaf: How Britain Played the Greater Game from Afghanistan to Africa* by William Beaver (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I* by Stephen Alford (57 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Women of Intelligence: Winning the Second World War with Air Photos* by Christine Halsall (57 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Young Kim Philby: Soviet Spy & British Intelligence Officer* by Edward Harrison (57 1 [March], Bookshelf)

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