

THE MARCH 2004 RIOTS IN KOSOVO: A FAILURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

THE MARCH 2004 RIOTS IN KOSOVO: A FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, by Major Egil Daltveit, 189 pages.

In June 1999, the international community, represented by KFOR and UNMIK entered Kosovo, and started one of the most costly peace-building operations ever. In March 2004 a part of the Albanian majority in Kosovo carried out riots that primarily targeted the Serb minority. The riots reversed much of the perceived progress five years of hard work by KFOR and UNMIK after the war in 1999.

KFOR and UNMIK failed to use the levers of hard power--the principled and decisive application of force--or of soft power--education, the media and the symbolic environment--to convince the vast majority of Kosovars to robustly support Kosovo's new legal and political order. UNMIK and KFOR were never able to change a situation where a sizable segment of the population pursued crime and militancy. The rule of UNMIK and KFOR created an atmosphere of impunity which directly contributed to the expectations and attitudes that led to the riots of March 2004.

Key lessons identified are the need to define an end-state, to eliminate national caveats, and to base realistic expectations on thorough study of history.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My intent with this research project is to bring about more knowledge about Kosovo, and to see if there are lessons that can be applied to international efforts at peacekeeping and –building elsewhere. I am indebted to my tireless teacher of the Albanian language, the late Rrahim Perçuku, for helping me understand Kosovo in the first place, and I am also grateful to all the friends and acquaintances I have made among people from Kosovo while serving there for all they have shared with me of tradition, knowledge, history and culture. I have chosen to use the internationally recognized form of the name Kosovo, and not the Albanian Kosova or both. Otherwise I have used Slav or Albanian names depending on context, but I have provided maps where both versions of the names are given. I have also decided to stay within the English alphabet and have not used the different letters and diacritical signs of the Albanian and Serbian languages.

I am indebted to a great number of people who have shared their valuable time and experiences with me while doing research for this thesis. My thanks go both to the many who are mentioned at the end of the bibliography, and to those who for different reasons have chosen to remain anonymous. I am further indebted to my thesis committee and I owe a particular thanks to the chair, Scott Porter, who has shared his time, experiences and friendship generously and has made this thesis better than I could have made it on my own.

On the home front I am grateful to Inger Helene. Without her patience this thesis would have been both shorter and poorer--if it had ever seen completion.

As author I have the sole responsibility for all errors of interpretation or fact.

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ACRONYMS

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
COMKFOR	Commander of Kosovo Force
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HQ	Headquarters
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
KDOM	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army. Also known by its Albanian name Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK).
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps. Also known by its Albanian name Trupat e Mbrojtese se Kosoves (TMK).
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
LKCK	Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves (The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova.)
LPK	Levizja Popullore e Kosoves (The Kosova People's Movement.)
LPRK	Levizja Popullore e Republikes se Kosoves (The People's Movement of the Republic of Kosova.)
LYC	League of Yugoslav Communist
MNB	Multinational Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NLA	National Liberation Army

OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
RTK	Public Television Channel in Kosovo
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UDB	Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti (State Security Service in Yugoslavia)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOSEK	United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UK	United Kingdom
UPSUP	Independent Union of Students of Pristina University
US	United States
WW	World War

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Figure 1. Map of the Central Balkans Region
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Map 803303AI (G01093), May 2007. Albanian names added in Kosovo and Northern Macedonia by author in addition to Serbian names on original map.




Figure 2. Map of Kosovo

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Map 802791AI (R02194), April 2001. Albanian names in Kosovo and Northern Macedonia added by author in addition to Serbian names on original map.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

In June 1999, NATO entered Kosovo and formed Kosovo Force (KFOR) with 46,000 troops from 39 countries.¹ They were responsible for security in Kosovo. Following right behind KFOR was one of the most robust nation-building missions ever assembled. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had the lead, while the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a host of other organizations contributed to make this one of the best-qualified missions of this kind ever. Five years later, on 16 March 2004, three Albanian children drowned in a northern Kosovo river swollen by water from melting snow. The Public Television Channel in Kosovo (RTK), on the evening of 16 March, published an inconclusive interview with the sole survivor, a twelve year old Albanian boy from the village of Caber. The interview was spun by “human rights” activist Halit Berani² into a story that had Serb murderers with dogs willfully chasing the children into the river. This story was broadcast to the people of Kosovo, and next morning it also dominated all major Kosovar Albanian newspapers. During 17 March, riots and inter-ethnic violence broke out all over Kosovo, and most of the gains secured by the peacekeeping and nation-building efforts of the past five years seemed lost.

Thesis

The two most important organizations in the International Community in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR, failed to defuse the conflict in Kosovo in the five years that passed

from 1999 to 2004. This was part of the reason that the Kosovo wide riots in March 2004 happened, but this was not the entire reason. The context in which Kosovo exists when it comes to geography, demography, culture, and most importantly, history has been and is contested. The complexity of the operating environment contributed to making the task that faced KFOR and UNMIK difficult to solve, especially taking into account that UNMIK and KFOR made important mistakes and wrong assessments of the situation at several key points from 1999 to 2004.

The conflict and unrest in Kosovo that preceded the international intervention in 1999 contributed to making it difficult to achieve a peaceful co-existence of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. For the purpose of this thesis, the start of recent conflict in Kosovo is determined to date from the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to power in Serbia. This rise started in earnest when he became Chairman of the Belgrade City Committee of the League of Communists in April 1986. The coverage of the conflict will be divided into two periods. The first lasts from 1986 until the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which started armed unrest in 1996, and is characterized by Kosovar Albanian passive and pacifist resistance. The second period is the armed conflict from 1996 until NATO entered Kosovo in June 1999.

The composition of the International Community in Kosovo contributed to make it difficult to reach an end state. A range of different organizations operated in Kosovo, most of which had different chains of command, and in some cases they had their own agendas. The fact that the most important document pertaining to Kosovo and the international presence there, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, left the end state to be decided at a later stage, also contributed to making it difficult to

have a clear plan about which direction the International Community should take. The focus on the international presence in Kosovo covers the period after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) entered in June 1999. In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) that operated in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999 and played an important role in the period immediately prior to NATO's military intervention against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

The real life tragedy that ignited the riots in March 2004, a media that allowed the tragedy to be used for nationalistic propaganda purposes, and a combination of frustrated and angry Albanians throughout Kosovo as well as people who were willing to use the masses to their own ends, made the riots hard to control. However, KFOR and UNMIK management of the riots illustrate that the conduct of the International Community in this moment of crisis was uneven. Parts of KFOR reacted adequately, whereas other parts of KFOR failed to do so. Almost no part of UNMIK responded adequately to the crisis.

The consequence of the riots was that Kosovo regained the attention of the major powers in the world, and in the three years that have passed the full independence of Kosovo became a bygone conclusion to the United States and the European Union. However, after Russia threatened to veto a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution giving Kosovo independence, the future status once again is uncertain. It can be argued that the lesson learnt in Kosovo from the March 2004 riots is that it often takes violence to gain the attention of the International Community. The threat of violence in Kosovo is once again high. The International Community needs to ask itself the inevitable question of "so what?" after what has happened in Kosovo. The answer to this is that some age old

principles and some new ones will have to be followed if future peacekeeping and nation-building missions are to have any chance of success.

Scope

The scope of this thesis will be to analyze the actions of the major players in the International Community and to determine to what degree they failed to address the issues needed to achieve sufficient progress in Kosovo to rule out violence arising from frustration and anger over lack of advancement of the situation. I will only look at the local actors, both on the Serb and Albanian side, to the extent necessary to put the international effort into perspective. I will address cultural and historical issues quite extensively as these are essential to understanding the conflict in Kosovo. This thesis will examine the degree of effectiveness of the nation-building efforts of the International Community in Kosovo. This will be done by examining the causes for the collapse in Kosovo in March 2004, as that collapse was not only the main symptom of possible failure by the International Community in Kosovo; it was also a turning point in the policies of the International Community regarding Kosovo.

Relevance

Since 1999 a vast amount of money and manpower has been invested in Kosovo by nations supporting UNMIK, KFOR, and other parts of the international presence in Kosovo. The International Community still has a considerable presence in Kosovo, and no real reconciliation has occurred between Serbs and Albanians. This has been perceived as a lack of success by observers as diverse as Kai Eide, Special Envoy to the UN Secretary General, the Russian government, the European Union and the US

government. It is important to examine the causes for the apparent lack of success. The resources invested alone would merit a critical look at what has been achieved, but even more importantly, future efforts at nation building should consider the experiences of the past. If mistakes were made in Kosovo, it is important to recognize these mistakes so that the course in Kosovo itself can be corrected, and future missions in other areas can be more successful.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The riots in Kosovo in March 2004 have not produced a large volume of writing. The most noteworthy exception is the International Crisis Group 22 April 2004 report “Collapse in Kosovo.” This report was published early, but in contrast to the lack of accuracy often found in reporting immediately after an event, it has proven to have few mistakes. Another valuable source is the contemporary media reports from the riots. However, interviews with persons who were involved in the riots either as peacekeepers, rioters, victims, or innocent bystanders--recorded both at the time or later--possibly are the most valuable sources of information on the riots that are currently available.

There almost is a void of literature that analyzes the course and effects of the riots in March 2004. The 2006 book, *Peace at any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo*, by Ian King and Whit Mason, provides the best analysis that is currently available. However, their writing was a project with a much broader scope, and they could not possibly be an exhaustive source of analysis on the riots. However, if looking for the effect of the riots, it is very instructive to track the actions of the International Community in general, and the United Nations in particular, to trace the effects of the riots. The reports written for the UN Secretary General by Special Envoy Kai Eide after the event point to resolving the question about Kosovo’s final status as the way to avoid reoccurrence of violence. The establishment of a UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) led Mr Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish President, was a direct result of these reports. The plan brokered by Mr Ahtisaari was submitted to the UNSC 26 March 2007. This plan

constituted the basis for the inconclusive discussions of the UNSC on independence for Kosovo in 2007.

For general literature on Kosovo, there is not a wealth of sources upon which to draw. With the exception of a productive period at the climax of the crisis and its immediate aftermath in 1998 to 2002, relatively few works have been published on Kosovo. Some of the works published in this period are marred by an apparent lack of real understanding of the region, and they seem to have been published quickly to cater to a market hungry for knowledge about a region in crisis.³ This lack of material is surprising, considering the importance of stability in the region to Europe and the size of the undertaking of the International Community in Kosovo.

The leading minority in Kosovo, the Serbs, constituted the primary victims of the riots. Almost all who participated in and organized the riots were Albanians, and therefore the majority of this thesis focuses on the role of the Albanians before, during and after the riots. This is not intended as a moral judgment; both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have been victims on numerous occasions throughout history. Nonetheless this thesis primarily is focused on the March 2004 riots and will focus on the Albanians.

Key Works

When Ian King and Whit Mason published *Peace at any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo* in 2006, this was the first book that attempted to look comprehensively at how the international community had fared in Kosovo. When it comes to UNMIK, they have sufficient sources, contacts, and insight to make the book fill a void on these issues. Regarding KFOR, their sources are sparser, and their research into KFOR seems to have less depth. An even more concerted effort to look at the perspective of the local

population would also have contributed positively to what still remains possibly the most valuable book published on developments in Kosovo after 1999. The position of King and Mason is quite clear from the title of their book: the International Community has failed Kosovo.⁴

If more detail than provided in the book by King and Mason is needed, the steady reporting of the International Crisis Group (ICG) on Kosovo from 1998 onwards provides a valuable and unbroken source of data from Kosovo that is most useful to the research of this thesis. The 22 April 2004 report, *Collapse in Kosovo*, published a little over a month after the riots erupted, provides insight into what happened in the March 2004 riots that are not found in any other unclassified reports. The ICG on numerous accounts has offered a critique of the actions of KFOR and UNMIK, particularly in how the riots in March 2004 were handled.⁵ The ICG in recent reports has recommended that Kosovo should be given independence, albeit with a number of constraints. The major arguments supporting this conclusion is that it is necessary in order to avoid renewed riots and bloodshed, that it is the right thing to do, and that it is the best option for regional stability.⁶

Another example of a valuable report in the immediate aftermath of the March 2004 riots is Human Rights Watch report *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004*. This report is predominantly built on interviews with victims of the violence, but also with other witnesses and officials from UNMIK, KFOR and from the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). This probably is the report most critical of the role UNMIK and especially KFOR played. The report at times seems to be tainted by bitterness against KFOR, and fails to take into account that even though, as the

report documents, KFOR performed inadequately in many areas, there were other areas where greatly outnumbered KFOR held the ground against rioters.⁷ This aside, the report represents a valuable collection of primary source information.

The 22 March 2004 report of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Miklós Haraszti, *The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo*, is an insightful report not only on how particularly broadcast media played a key role in instigating the riots, and provides valuable insight on how irresponsible media can influence a situation for the worse. Reporting was emotional, unsubstantiated and one-sided. It focused on the drowning of innocent children, on the unjust arrests of “liberators” by UNMIK, and on the blockade of the main roads by rebellious Serbs. It concluded that broadcast media, and in particular the public broadcast company, RTK, had a lot of the guilt in causing the riots.⁸

The United Nations has published a host of documents that are central to understanding events in Kosovo. Most important among these is UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, which instead of a clear end-state for Kosovo determines that the International Community is to: “provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”⁹ UNSCR 1244 is the legal basis for all that has been done in Kosovo since the cessation of hostilities, and it continues to be the single most important document on the status of Kosovo. Other key documents are the periodic reports of the UN Secretary-General on progress in Kosovo.¹⁰ Of these, the report of Ambassador Kai Eide written after the March 2004 riots, offers strong criticism of the performance of KFOR and UNMIK during the riots.¹¹ His 2005 report as the Special Envoy of the UN

Secretary-General was instrumental in conveying how the situation in Kosovo was untenable, and it was the first move towards lifting the impasse on the question of the final status of Kosovo, thus leading to the establishment of UNOSEK.¹² Finally the different reports, and in particular the 26 March 2007 plan for the future managed independence of Kosovo, by UNOSEK working under the supervision of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari are important.¹³

Key documents from other sources include the Draft Rambouillet Accords.¹⁴ United States (US) Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright mediated between the KLA and the Yugoslav regime in order to avoid armed intervention from NATO into Kosovo. The 9 June 1999 Military Technical Agreement, often referred to as the Kumanovo Agreement, between KFOR and the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia, marked the end of hostilities from NATO and paved the way not only for KFOR's entry into Kosovo, but also for UNSCR 1244 that came two days later.¹⁵

For historical background, three works are indispensable in trying to understand the history of Kosovo. The first is the monumental *Kosovo: A Short History* by Noel Malcolm. His work is superbly researched and maintains a high standard almost throughout the book. Of particular value is the coverage of the Illyrian descent of the Albanians, the myths of the 1389 Kosovo Polje battle, the great Serbian exodus from Kosovo, and how Kosovo never was legally annexed into Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 20th century. The coverage of the period after World War (WW) I seems to lack some of the quality of the earlier history, with the notable exception of developments during the WWII. However, this does not take away the fact that this is the single most important work on the history of Kosovo. Malcolm's greatest achievement is that he has

defused many of the myths about Kosovo and the Balkans, shown that both Serbs and Albanians have a share in Kosovo's history, and argued that the ethnic wars predominantly were a product of developments in the twentieth and latter part of the nineteenth centuries.¹⁶

The second work necessary for an understanding of the history of Kosovo is Miranda Vickers' *Kosovo: Between Serb and Albanian*. Her coverage of the early historical periods suffers from a more narrow use of sources and less in-depth coverage than Malcolm. However, from 1900 to 1990 she succeeds in finding the roots of the issues, and her writing here surpasses that of Malcolm. Particularly well done is the coverage of the tension between the Serbs and the Albanians which defined the 20th Century in Kosovo, and the sources of this tension.¹⁷

The third work is not really a book on the longer history of Kosovo; it is the saga of recent conflicts in Kosovo, written by journalist Tim Judah. His *Kosovo: War and Revenge* provides insight into the conflict in the 1990s. Judah is successful in shaping a narrative about what happened in Kosovo parallel with the international efforts to avoid large-scale conflict. The book bears marks that it is written by a journalist, in that formal sources are sparser than the two preceding historical works, but this is compensated with invaluable first-hand accounts and interviews with some of the more elusive figures in the conflict. This is the defining work on what happened in Kosovo in the decade that ended with NATO's intervention in 1999.¹⁸

However, as especially Malcolm has been criticized by some conservative Serb historians,¹⁹ a good supplementary reading is *The Serbs* by leading Serb historian Sima M. Cirkovic. This detailed and well documented work provides a counter-balance to the

many biased political histories of Serbia. Cirkovic looks beyond history merely as a tool to strengthen already established biases; he looks into how different factors have interacted to form the Serb nation that we know today. He also acknowledges that the lines between different ethnic groups have been porous in all directions, thus allowing people and culture both to cross between different groups and to develop.²⁰

A useful companion to the historical works is *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans* by Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox. The atlas allows the reader to see developments in Kosovo in the larger framework of the Balkans in a very informative and concise fashion.²¹

To look at the background in Kosovo merely as history, would be to aim too narrowly. There are other works that are important in trying to grasp the dynamics of the society there. One is *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* by Dutch anthropologist Ger Duijzings. He provides insight into how both religion and identities have fluctuated in Kosovo. He contends that in times of crisis there are clear cut lines, and in more peaceful times less absolute boundaries between ethnic groups.²²

The classical 1909 travel novel, *High Albania*, by Edith Durham possibly is the closest a non-Albanian has ever come to understanding and describing the traditional values of the Albanian society. This book provides a background of cultural understanding that is vital in order to fully grasp the culture of the Albanians and how they think and act. Additionally she provides invaluable insight into relations between Serbs and Albanians at the end of the reign of the Ottoman Empire: “the Serbs, regardless of the fact that in most places they are much in the minority, still had visions of the expulsion of all Moslems, and the reconstruction of the great Servian Empire.”²³ The

attitudes of the Albanians were comparable: “Ineradicably fixed in the breast of an Albanian . . . is the belief that the land has been his rightly for all time. The Serb conquered him, held him for a few passing centuries, was swept out and shall never return.”²⁴

Another important insight into Albanian culture is *Behind Walls of Stone*. The book is based on anthropological field studies in Western Kosovo undertaken more than 30 years ago by Norwegian anthropologist Berit Backer. She lived with traditional extended Albanian households and better than most has described the Albanian society and the values on which it rests. The study for many years was not much noticed, but since it was first published in Kosovo in 2003, it has become indispensable for understanding the traditional Albanian culture and the strain on this culture when meeting modern society and the conflict between Serbs and Albanians.²⁵

Fully understanding the culture of the Albanians in Kosovo and the values the culture rests on, however, is not possible without reading the *Kanun of Leke Dukagjini*. The Kanun is a collection of customary law that fifteenth century nobleman Leke Dukagjini is reputed to have collected. It remained oral until the end of the nineteenth century, and the most recognized version today was collected by a Catholic Albanian priest, Father Shtjefen Gejcov, in the early twentieth century. There are several different Kanuns from different regions, but today the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini gets almost all of the attention. The different Kanuns share the principle of honor that rules all aspects of life, and are important to understanding the actions of Albanians.²⁶ The Kanun is not only a part of the cultural heritage of the Albanians, it is still a part of their understanding of themselves, of society, and of their own role within society.²⁷

The Role of This Thesis

There is no literature available that has had as its primary objective to describe the relationship between the March 2004 riots in Kosovo and the actions and inactions of the International Community. This thesis will fill this void and take its place together with the few other available pieces of literature on this crucial event in Kosovo's history. First among those are the ICG report *Collapse in Kosovo* and the book *Peace at any Price: How the World failed Kosovo* by King and Mason.

The emphasis of this thesis will be to examine the actions taken and not taken by UNMIK and KFOR and analyze if these were related to the riots in Kosovo in March 2004. In order to do this, Kosovo will first be placed in historic context, and the base documents for and the organization of KFOR and UNMIK will be examined. The thesis will briefly look at some of the consequences the riots have had on the further development of events in Kosovo, but will not provide in-depth analysis of this area. There are two reasons for this. First, this would be an endeavor that is worthy of a thesis of its own. Second, as we are currently in a situation where the final status of Kosovo is still undecided, it is still too early to determine for sure exactly which influence the riots have had on events.

Research Methodology

I will use qualitative research as the methodology to examine this thesis. Qualitative research is one of the two main approaches to research methodology in social sciences. Qualitative research, in simple terms, investigates the 'why' and 'how', in contrast to the focus on the more measurable 'what, where and when' in quantitative research. The information harvested from use of qualitative research cannot be measured

or displayed easily in graphs or formulas, whereas one of the primary strengths of quantitative research is that the data it yields can be measured. Qualitative research aims at drawing conclusions by explaining, whereas quantitative research reaches conclusions by measuring data.

The information will come from a mix of primary and secondary sources. To base a thesis exclusively on primary sources would probably be possible, but would fail to take into account the results of research done by others, and as such would not have a sufficient base. On the other hand, to base information gathering only on secondary sources would fail to bring new facts to bear on the issue has less chance to produce new insight. Additionally, it is necessary to use primary sources to check on the accuracy of the secondary sources. In cases where there are no primary sources available, care will be taken to have more than one secondary source if possible, and to check as well as possible that the secondary works are not simply based on one source shared by all.

The primary sources will be of two main categories. The first is written and audiovisual material in a wide variety of forms from international treaties and resolutions to eye witness accounts and contemporary media reports. The material in this category is extensive and time consuming to examine. However, it can provide new insight.

The second category consists of interviews. Some of these are recorded, and others are emailed answers to interview questions from interview subjects. The author will also use interviews recorded in notebooks from time deployed in Kosovo for interviews with key persons it has not been possible to interview again for this thesis.

The fact that almost all key players in the events in March 2004 are not only still alive, but also are still actively involved in world and local affairs--and it is only four

years since the events--creates an abundance of available material from interviews. The major challenge in collecting this data is that it is time consuming. Additionally a large number of the key players are still in positions where they either are not allowed or do not want to speak too freely. Some sources have asked that they can be quoted only if they are not identified. To make a quotation without identifying the source is not a step that should be taken lightly, as it will weaken the ability of other researchers to reevaluate the data, and as such, might weaken the credibility of the thesis. However, there is data that will provide such an important degree of understanding that anonymous quotes will be used when no other option is available.

Analysis starts as soon as collection of information has reached a certain level. This has the benefit that a lack of information in any area is identified early, and can be rectified right away by collecting other information that would answer the outstanding questions. There is also a risk to this approach. The risk is that information collected at a later stage might upturn conclusions reached in earlier analysis. However, this is not all negative. If early hypotheses are overturned, that only means that the ones developed later will have more credibility.

Possibly the most challenging part of the job will be to integrate the results of the analysis into a conclusion, or a set of conclusions. This process, or synthesis, is one of the strengths of the qualitative research methodology. The fact that information is collected from a rich variety of sources, and the focus is on the how and why, using a broad context from history, culture, society, and others, make the conclusions reliable, even if they are not supported by quantitative data.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND

Kosovo's Early History (year 500 B.C. - 1878)

The dispute in Kosovo dates back many centuries, and at the heart of the matter is the fact that both Albanians and Serbs consider Kosovo to be their land. The Albanians claim that they were in Kosovo first; long before the first Slav immigration in the Sixth and Seventh Century, as Albanians are direct descendents from the Illyrians. However, the origin of the Albanians has been widely disputed. The two main rival theories identify the early Albanians either as Illyrians or as Thracians during the Roman period and earlier.²⁸ Albanian historians support the Illyrian theory, as they prefer a theory where the Albanians always have lived in Albania. Other scholars prefer the Thracian theory, as this helps to explain either that the Albanians did not live in Albania and Kosovo when the Serbs arrived, or because it explains what became of the Thracians in Rumania.²⁹ Either way history is clearly being used as a political tool. The only two western historians who have published full-scale histories of Kosovo relatively recently, Noel Malcolm and Miranda Vickers, both arrive at the conclusion that the theory of Illyrian origin of the Albanians most likely is correct.³⁰ Vickers arrives at this conclusion by looking at both linguistic and archaeological evidence, whereas Malcolm's argument is based almost exclusively on an exhaustive examination of available linguistic sources.³¹ By virtue of the breadth and abundance of different material Malcolm presents, the linguistic evidence presents the strongest part of the case for the origin of the Albanians from the Illyrians. Archaeologist John Wilkes, who in 1992 published what has become the leading scholarly work on the Illyrians, arrives at the same conclusion based on archaeological

data.³² However, it should be noted that with the information at hand--with written sources particularly in scarce--all efforts at trying to arrive at completely certain conclusions about events that happened between 1000 and 2500 years ago is, at best, difficult.

A group of Slav tribal people occupied parts of Central Europe north of the Danube in the 5th and 6th centuries. The Serbs and the Croats were two of these tribes. South of the Danube, the Balkans enjoyed a period of relative prosperity under the rule of Emperor Justinian (year 527 – 567). The first raids of the Slavs happened while Justinian ruled, and in 547 and 548 they invaded the territory that has become modern day Kosovo, subsequently pressing on to the coast of the Adriatic. At the same time, Serbs and Croats began to settle south of the Danube: Croats in Croatia and parts of Bosnia, and Serbs in Rascia (Sandzak), north-west of today's Kosovo.³³

The identity and territory of both Serbs and Croats in this period seems to have been quite fluid, as they were both still tribal organizations. In addition, during this period waves of Valchs, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Huns,³⁴ and Avars³⁵ crossed over Kosovo. In 1014-18 the Byzantine Empire recaptured Kosovo. Less than two hundred years later, the Serb medieval Nemanjid kingdom emerged. It was a result of a rebellion by the vassals the rulers of Dioclea (today's Montenegro) had installed to rule Rascia. King Nemanja later captured the eastern part of Kosovo, and his son Stefan took the rest in the years after his father in 1196 abdicated to become a monk.³⁶ After Kosovo was taken and Byzantine power decayed when Constantinople was ravaged by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, the center of the Nemanjid state moved to Kosovo. After the Serb Orthodox church had received autocephalous status in 1219, its center moved to Pec.³⁷

For the next few generations, the Nemanjid state continued to expand. Kosovo's role as the center of the Serbian Orthodox Church was cemented through the construction of the Patriarchate in Pec, and the monasteries in Gracanica, Decan and Prizren. The height of power of the medieval Serbian empire came during the rule of Stefan Dusan, who was crowned in 1331. Stefan Dusan rose to power after his army, which included a number of Albanians, had defeated his father Decanski's army in battle. He imprisoned his father, and soon thereafter had him strangled.³⁸ Stefan Dusan expanded the empire, primarily to the south, this with an army that consisted mainly of Albanians.³⁹ At its height, the empire stretched from the Danube and Sava in the North to the Gulf of Corinth in the South, to the modern day Greek city of Kavala in the East, and to the Adriatic coast in the West.⁴⁰ In 1346, the Serbian autocephalous archbishop was elevated to the rank of Serbian Patriarch, and he subsequently crowned Dusan as "Emperor of the Serbs and the Greeks." Dusan therefore became known as Tsar Dusan.⁴¹

After the death of Stefan Dusan, the empire broke up rapidly. In 1371, this process was accelerated when a Serbian army was routed by Ottoman Turkish forces in Marica in Bulgaria, and the last Nemanjid, Tsar Uros, died childless. The Marica victory was a considerable expansion of Turkish rule as it greatly increased the number of vassals under Turkish control, and according to Cirkovic and Malcolm it opened up the Balkans to Turkish conquest. In many ways, the Marcia battle was more significant than the Kosovo Polje battle.⁴² Two rivals, Vuk Brankovic and Prince Lazar, shared Kosovo between them. Lazar held the most land and the valuable mines, and he thus became the dominant ruler in the last decade of full Serb independence.⁴³

The Mythical Battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389

From the short discussion on the Nemanjid dynasty, it is clear that Kosovo was central in the medieval Serb kingdom. Although the kingdom did not last long, it has taken on a mythical status as the site of a covenant between past and present Serbs, and God.⁴⁴ The myth surrounding the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389 is central to the Serbs redefinition of themselves as a nation at the turn of the 18th and 19th Centuries. The definition of being Serb became the Serb orthodox faith and membership in the Serb Orthodox Church. Today the Serbian Orthodox Church and faith still are at the center of the Serbian understanding of national identity. A central part of that understanding is a perceived history of Serb suffering that had its climax at the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. It is a common misperception that this was the battle where the Turks destroyed the medieval Serbian empire, and that the Serbs immediately were placed under Ottoman rule. The truth is that the empire had started to unravel before the battle, and that Serb statehood continued for another 70 years, but as a vassal to the Ottomans.⁴⁵

Most modern historians agree that little is known with certainty about the battle.⁴⁶ What is known is that it was one of many battles in the Turkish expansion westwards, and it was not the most important in military terms or in the terms of the consequences of its outcome. It was fought close to present-day Pristina on 28 June 1389. Prince Lazar formed a coalition with his brother-in-law Vuk Brankovic and King Tvrtko of Bosnia to fight the Turks under Sultan Murat. Most historians conclude that there is sufficient evidence that the armies of Lazar included Albanians.⁴⁷ Both leaders, Lazar and Murat, died in the battle, and the Turks held the battlefield after the fighting. Murat's son

Bayezit retreated to Turkey to secure his succession, and Lazar's son Stefan Lazarevic later agreed to become a vassal to the Ottomans.⁴⁸

The myth surrounding the battle is overwhelmingly rich in detail. Elements of the myth, like the curse Prince Lazar cast on all who would not fight for Kosovo, has served as a reminder to Serbs ever since. This has had consequences for events in Kosovo over the last 20 years.⁴⁹ The key elements of the myth are that Prince Lazar had to choose between a heavenly and an earthly kingdom, and he chose the heavenly kingdom through his own death in battle, thus becoming a saint. Another key element is treason. The traitor's identity has evolved through the centuries. When the ideas of a Serb identity were formulated about 200 years ago, Vuk Brankovic was the traitor. According to the myth, the knight Milos Obilic, under a pretext of surrendering, got close to Sultan Murat and wounded him mortally before the Sultan's bodyguard could kill Milos Obilic. Finally, the myth has the Serbs fighting a holy crusade defending civilized and Christian Europe against barbaric Turkish infidels. In the end the Serbs fight alone, betrayed by all.⁵⁰

The Kosovo Polje myth over the centuries became an important part of Serbian culture, and it was central to the ideas that defined Serbia as a nation in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Failing to understand this myth was part of the reason why the international community failed to understand the grip Milosevic had on the Serbian people and the importance of Kosovo to Serbia.

Ottoman Rule

The final Serbian defeat came in 1455. Although most Serbs and Albanians today consider Ottoman rule as a yoke that was forced upon them, today's historians give a

much more positive assessment of Ottoman rule.⁵¹ In the period up to the end of the sixteenth century, Ottoman rule most likely produced as good or better conditions for people than rulers elsewhere in Europe.⁵² In 1557, a Grand-Vizier of Serb origin, Mehmed-Pasha Sokolovic, funded the rebuilding of the Patriarchate of Pec, thus leading to a Serb Orthodox religious revival.⁵³ Another aspect was that religious tolerance was greater under the Ottomans than anywhere else in Christian Europe.⁵⁴

The religious tolerance under the Ottomans did not extend to politics, legal status or economics. Christians paid higher taxes than Muslims, the testimony of Christians was not accepted against that of a Muslim in court, and members of the ruling land-owning class were all Muslims.⁵⁵ The effect was that over time people began to convert to Islam. For several reasons more Albanians than Serbs converted. One is that they predominantly were Catholics. The Turks oppressed Catholics harder than Orthodox because they feared that Catholics were connected to the Habsburg empire and the Italians. Another reason for higher conversion rates were more favorable conditions for Orthodox believers than Catholics. The lack of Catholic priests who could keep them in the fold of the church, the loose organization of the Albanians, who to a larger extent than the Serbs lived in rural areas or were nomadic, also were factors that contributed to make Albanians more susceptible to religious conversions. The conversion to Islam gave the Albanians status as Turks on the official registers of the Ottomans.⁵⁶ The speed of conversion initially was slow, and as late as 1610, there were still 10 Catholics for each Muslim in Kosovo.⁵⁷ However, it is important to note that both in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans, converts came from all ethnic groups. In today's Kosovo the Gorani are a Slav-speaking Muslim group.⁵⁸ The reason for the initial slow rate of conversions is assessed by both

Malcolm and Vickers to be the relative Ottoman tolerance of other religions than Islam and the relative prosperity compared to other places in Europe at the time.⁵⁹

One of the most important watersheds in European history is the 1683-1699 war between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. The war started with a real threat that the Ottoman army might capture Vienna in 1683. The Habsburg victory in front of Vienna was followed by the pursuit and rout of the Ottoman army. The rest of the war was devastating and ended with the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz. The treaty was unfavorable for the Ottomans, but it restored Ottoman rule south of the Danube. After this war, the Ottoman fortunes waned. The Ottoman Empire repeatedly lost territory, and was not able to uphold well organized Ottoman rule in the Balkans.⁶⁰

At this time in Kosovo, the most important events were the short Austrian invasion in 1689, and the following “Great Migration” of Serbs from Kosovo in 1689-90. The “Great Migration,” where the Patriarch of Pec, Arsenije III Cernojevic, led Serbs into central parts of Hungary, is one of the most important parts of the myth about the history of the Serbs in Kosovo and their suffering.⁶¹ Claims have been made that more than 500,000 Serbs fled out of Kosovo, thus making the case that until the great migration, the Serbs had been the majority in Kosovo.⁶² Modern historians, among them Cirkovic, have made the case that the real figure was no more than 30,000 people.⁶³ The Ottomans committed large scale massacres in Kosovo. The Serbs were the primary victims, but Albanians who had cooperated with the Austrians also were massacred.⁶⁴ Following the war, a period of increased minority oppression was initiated, and forced conversions to Islam became more frequent.⁶⁵ In many cases the men of a household converted, while

the women remained Christian, practicing Christianity for many generations after the conversion.⁶⁶

The 18th century in Kosovo was a period of decline in the quality of Ottoman rule and prosperity for the population. Corruption and abuse seems to have become more widespread, and this reflected the overall decline of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁷ The fact that the population in Pristina in 1812 was only half of what it was in the 1680s is an example of the decline.⁶⁸ In 1772 the Catholic Archbishop Mazarek described how Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims all suffered in Kosovo: “Catholics and Orthodox are suffering equally, and so do the Muslims themselves . . . all the villages . . . Catholic and Orthodox and Muslim, have indeed been exterminated and depopulated.”⁶⁹

A common view is that the 19th century in the Balkans was characterized by people struggling to be free against an illiberal and autocratic Ottoman Empire. Malcolm argues that this conception is too simplistic. Sultan Mahmut II, who reigned in 1808-39, launched a sequence of reforms designed to turn the Empire into a modern, and in many ways a westernized state. However, in order to carry out liberal reforms, it was necessary to centralize power from local lords who had usurped power throughout the Empire. The offensives launched to take this power back, even though they were part of the efforts to liberalize the Empire, at the tactical level were indistinguishable from sheer brutal oppression. As the Ottoman Empire tried to win back control over its subjects in the Balkans, people pondered whether to fight on the side of the local lords, or on the side of the Empire. Among the Christian population in the Balkans the spread of nationalist ideas at the beginning of the 19th century led to the formulation of a third way--throwing off Ottoman rule and establishing independent national states.⁷⁰

Serb National Renaissance

Following the “Great Migration” the Serbs rallied around the Orthodox Church as a unifying symbol. The location of some Serbs outside of the Ottoman Empire, and their protection from the Habsburgs, enabled the Serbs in the 18th century to establish a national identity where the Orthodox Church and faith were the central elements.⁷¹ Over time the Serbs became strong enough to take on the Ottomans, and in 1804 the Serbs rebelled, led by Djordje Petrovic. The Ottomans eventually defeated the first Serbian uprising in 1813. The Serbs did not accept defeat, and Milos Obrenovic emerged to lead the second Serbian uprising in 1815. It resulted in the establishment of the new Principality of Serbia in 1817. The Principality had autonomy and was self-governed, but was still a vassal to the Ottoman Empire. The effect of this development for Kosovo was that the Serbs for the first time had an outside champion of their cause with whom they could identify, whereas the Albanians had no such option, and therefore came to identify themselves closer with the Ottomans. The Ottomans were finally expelled from Serbia in 1867, and Serbia, de facto, secured its sovereignty.⁷²

In Kosovo there were several instances of friction between the central power and local lords, which led the Ottomans to transfer most of its territory to the Grand Vizer in 1831. There were several local revolts in the decades after this, mainly protesting taxation and conscription in the Ottoman army. The last rebellion was in Western Kosovo in 1866. After the rebellion had been suppressed, the Ottoman Empire pondered the possibility of uniting all Albanian inhabited land under one administrative unit that could serve as a bulwark against the perceived expansionist objectives of Slav nationalism. Nothing came

of this, but later the unification of all land populated by Albanians was one of the primary claims of the Albanian national movement.⁷³

When the territory of Herzegovina rebelled against the Ottoman Empire in 1875, a chain of events were set in motion that had wide-ranging consequences in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom, who were Europe's Great Powers at the time, were not willing to allow the conflict to turn into a bloodshed that might engulf all of the Balkans. They therefore imposed on the Ottomans the duty to protect Christian subjects. However, before this came into effect, a new Sultan, Abdul Hamid, appeared on the throne. He put an end to efforts to save the Ottoman Empire through modernizing, and instead tried to re-establish the legitimacy of the Ottoman state and his own dynasty upon defense of Islamic interests, values and faith. This led to a revival in the Muslim populations in the Balkans.⁷⁴ In Kosovo, the Albanian population was encouraged to settle scores with the local Orthodox Serbs.⁷⁵

In 1876, Serbia and Montenegro felt that the Ottomans were weak, and launched a joint attack towards Novi Pazar which the Ottomans repulsed. The objective of the attack was first to unite their territories and armies, and subsequently to attack south into Kosovo. However, in 1877 Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman units were withdrawn from the central Balkans to face the new threat. Serbia and Montenegro renewed their military efforts, and the Serb army in quick succession captured Kursumilja, Nis, Vranje, Podujevo, Kacanik, and Gnjilane, ending up at Gracanica in Kosovo when news of a truce between the Russians and the Ottomans halted the advance. Before retreating, time was taken to hold a service at Gracanica where the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389 was remembered.⁷⁶ The Serb army forcibly

expelled thousands of Albanians from the areas it seized in what is today's southern Serbia. In addition, many of the region's mosques were destroyed. Many Serbs fled southern Kosovo as Turkish mercenaries, or bashibazouks, took vengeance on remaining Serb inhabitants.⁷⁷

Following the truce Russia and the Ottoman Empire worked out the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. This treaty would have created a greater Bulgaria, swallowing all of Macedonia and stretching all the way into central Albania, and Serbia would have gained substantial territory in the south, including the northern parts of Kosovo. This treaty was unacceptable to the other Great Powers, and a conference was called in Berlin in order to revise the treaty. The Treaty of Berlin of July 1878 shaped the Balkans possessions of the Ottoman Empire in a way that held until the Empire's rule collapsed in WWI. Bulgaria was reduced in size, and was forced to give up Macedonia. Serbia was allowed to keep the Nis area but not any area in Kosovo itself. Bosnia-Herzegovina was handed over to Austrian administration, and the Austrians were allowed to place garrisons in the Sandzak and Novi Pazar. Montenegro gained some area, including the Gusinje area that had been part of the vilayet (Ottoman province) of Kosovo. The end result in Kosovo was that Albanians were enraged that traditional Albanian land from Kosovo towards Nis, which had recently been ethnically cleansed by the Serb army, as well as the Albanian populated Gusinje were handed over to Slav states. The Serbs were angry because they did not gain territory in Kosovo, and because Bosnia-Herzegovina had been denied them.⁷⁸ Today the Berlin Treaty is still loathed by people in Kosovo, especially by the Albanians. Many Albanian leaders refer to it as the first betrayal of Kosovo and of the Albanians by the International Community.⁷⁹ The Berlin Treaty was

the spark that lit Albanian resistance in Kosovo, first directed against the Treaty, but later against Ottoman rule itself. The feeling that the great powers had given away their land at the negotiating was part of the Albanian reluctance to accept the Rambouillet treaty. After 1999 it also made them have little faith in what the international community would do for them given the unresolved final status of Kosovo.⁸⁰

Kosovo--International Treaties and Serb Dominance (1878-1985)

Albanian National Renaissance

The Albanians call the period from the early months of 1878 until Serbia and Montenegro invaded Kosovo in late 1912 the Rilindje Kombetare, (national rebirth or national renaissance). On 10 June 1878 more than 300 representatives from all Albanian lands gathered in Prizren. They were predominantly from Kosovo and the Malesi (northern mountain areas), but the leading political force was Abdyl Frasheri from the south. Events on the international scene led to this meeting, and its outcome was the establishment of the League of Prizren. The political aims of the league were to defend the integrity of the Albanian lands, and to unite the Albanian population in one political and administrative unit. After the 1878 meeting in Prizren the league saw a conflict between forces seeking to make it a radical Muslim force and forces who wanted to unite all Albanians, regardless of religion. However, a more important line of division was between radicals who wanted immediate steps in the direction of autonomy and unification of Albanians and conservatives, led by the feudal beys, who preferred an approach of non-confrontation with Ottoman authorities. The conservative land-owners had the most to gain by maintaining the status quo. The radicals soon won control over the league, and it was their agenda that was pushed.⁸¹

In August 1878, a senior Ottoman official, Mehmet Ali pasha, came to Prizren to oversee the border commission that should take care of ceding Gusinje to Montenegro. After he was shouted down, his entourage was attacked, and after a three day firefight in which 280 people died and 300 were wounded, he was killed. His head was stuck on a pike and paraded in triumph through the streets of Prizren. This event ended the cooperation between the League of Prizren and the Ottoman government, and it might have led to a situation where it became impossible for the Ottomans to accept even the relatively moderate political aims of the Albanians, like integrity of Albanian land and unification of Albanian inhabited areas.⁸² In 1879 a young Englishman, Edward Knight, explored Montenegro and the northern areas inhabited by Albanians. He later described how the Ottoman government had lost their hold in this area:

The government is very weak here, neither feared nor respected, merely tolerated. Albania is in a state of positive anarchy, the gendarmerie is on strike, the soldiers refusing to salute their officers, neither having received pay for months, while the natives hold seditious meetings publicly and unmolested in the mosques of the garrison towns, in which rebellion against the Porte is fearlessly advocated. Nowhere is the rotten condition and utter helplessness of the Porte more apparent than here.⁸³

Unfortunately, as will be shown later, this description could have been used with some justification about Kosovo under KFOR and UNMIK rule.

As elsewhere in Europe, the Albanian national movement was accompanied by a cultural awakening. The primary object of this awakening was the Albanian language. The reasons for the central position of the Albanian language were the lack of a common religion or geographic center that could have served to unite them. Another important cultural area of unity was history. At the end of the 19th Century, German Albanologists established that the Albanians descended from the Illyrians, and this played a role in

boosting national pride and unity. A unique factor in the Albanian national awakening was that it came later than in most other European countries.⁸⁴

The importance of language caused the question of schools and education to become central. The education available in Albanian was extremely limited, and it was offered only at a few religious, and predominantly Catholic, schools. The Ottoman state only funded education in the Turkish language, and this education had the purposes of uniting the Muslim population against their Christian neighbors and making them loyal subjects of the Ottoman state. Albanian language schools faced opposition, and in 1902 the Ottoman government made it illegal to possess Albanian language books or to use the language in correspondence.⁸⁵

Relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo became worse after 1878. The primary reason for this was the mass expulsion of Muslims from the lands taken over by Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia in 1877-78. All Muslims were expelled from the Morava valley, where there had been hundreds of Albanian villages. In addition, Albanian populations in towns like Prokuplje, Leskovac and Vranje were also expelled. Malcolm cites sources that conclude that the region contained more than 110,000 Albanians. By the end of 1878, Western officials reported 60,000 families of Muslim refugees in Macedonia and 60,000-70,000 Albanian refugees in Kosovo. Albanians who tried to stay were forced out, and their property was sold at 1 percent of its value. After they had left, their houses, mills and mosques were demolished, and the masonry and wood was used elsewhere. On the other side, many Serbs left Kosovo because of the deteriorating conditions, and because there was now a Serbian state that they could call home. Malcolm estimates that a total of 60,000 Serbs left Kosovo in 1876-1912. This

further reduced the Serb share of the population in Kosovo. Austrian statistics from 1903 for the sancaks of Pristina, Pec and Prizren gave the Orthodox Serbs 25 percent of the population and Ottoman statistics of 1912 put it at 21 percent.⁸⁶

When the Young Turks seized power in the Ottoman Empire, their aims were to unify Ottoman lands and to have reforms that would allow for progress on the lines of Western Europe. This was very different from the aims of traditionalist Albanians in Kosovo, but the Young Turks succeeded in securing their support by claiming that all their aims would be met if only they supported a return to the reformist Constitution of 1876.⁸⁷ Edith Durham, travelling in Northern Albania and Kosovo in 1908 observed how local Albanians evaluated the new Constitution and Government:

It promised to give us roads, and railways, and schools, and to keep order and justice. We have had it two whole months, and it has done none of these things . . . A Government can do just as it likes, or it is not a Government.⁸⁸

The unrealistic expectations of what a government should be able to do were still present in Kosovo when KFOR and UNMIK took over in 1999.

In Kosovo dissatisfaction with the new order of things soon spread, especially with the stricter enforcement of conscription and introduction of new taxes. A series of rebellions resulted, and the Young Turks sent a military force to Kosovo to control the situation. In spite of drastic measures by the army the rebellion only spread and new forces had to be sent over the next few years. In an interesting twist, local Serbs helped Ottoman forces against rebellious Albanians. Attempts were made to disarm the Albanian population, and large numbers of guns were collected. The combined effect of these measures was that Albanians no longer supported the Ottoman government in any way.⁸⁹

In 1912, the Albanian rebellion reached a level where it could no longer be handled militarily, and the Ottomans conceded to the demands of the Albanians in September 1912. Aubrey Herbert, who visited Kosovo during these last months of rebellion summarized the complaints of the Albanians: “The real complaint, first and last, is that their honour and freedom are not sufficiently considered.”⁹⁰ When he asked Isa Boletin, one of the leaders of the rebellion if the Albanians wanted autonomy the reply was: “what they wanted was not to be interfered with.”⁹¹ Malcolm argues that Ottoman policy-makers who resisted all Albanian demands bear responsibility for the collapse of Ottoman rule. When they refused to concede to their most loyal subjects, the Muslim Albanians, they in the end turned against Ottoman rule, and more than Serbs, Bulgars or Greeks, the Albanians were the ones who defeated Ottoman rule.⁹²

Before issues could be resolved between Albanians and the Ottoman government, the First Balkan War broke out in October. Seeing that the Ottoman armies were too weak to resist the Albanians and also that the Albanians had won virtual autonomy, the Balkan states acted. On 8 October 1912, Montenegro attacked Albanian inhabited territory. Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war immediately. The Albanians at first tried to shy away from conflict and attempted to let the Slavs fight it out with the Ottomans. However, as Ottoman units disintegrated in front of the attack, they were forced to take up arms or be overrun. After only minor skirmishes with the advancing Serb army in Kosovo, the Albanian leaders withdrew their units into the mountains of northern Albania.⁹³

The Serb soldiers felt that they avenged Battle of Kosovo Polje when they entered Kosovo: “We are the generation which will realize the centuries-old dream of the whole nation: that we with the sword will regain the freedom that was lost with the sword.”⁹⁴

As the Serb army advanced, atrocities were committed against the Albanian population. One Russian reporter, Lev Brohnshtein, better known today as Leon Trotsky, concluded that: “The Serbs in Old Serbia, in their national endeavour to correct data in the ethnographic statistics that are not quite favourable to them, are engaged quite simply in systematic extermination of the Muslim population.”⁹⁵ In a report from a Catholic Archbishop, the number of killed by January 1912 is given as 25,000. Other reports in European press had estimated 20,000 killed in early September.⁹⁶ A 1914 international commission of enquiry did not estimate a number of killed, but concluded that systematic policy had been at work: “Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes and innocent populations massacred . . . such were the means which were employed by the Serb-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of the regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians.”⁹⁷

Austria-Hungary supported the creation of an Albanian state in order to deny Serbia access to the sea and to deny Serbia and Greece to divide Albania between them at the Shkumbini River. With Austrian support 83 delegates from all over Albanian populated territory gathered in Vlora and on 28 November 1912, declared Albania an independent state and hoisted the Albanian flag for the first time. The Albanians were acutely aware that the events which had led to independence had happened primarily in Kosovo, and felt that the state they had created was incomplete without Kosovo.⁹⁸

After Ottoman forces were defeated, the Great Powers convened a conference of ambassadors in London. They agreed to the principle of having an independent Albanian state. Russia, which strongly supported Serbia, secured all the territory it claimed for Serbia and Montenegro, less the city of Shkodra in Northern Albania. The end result was that Albanians in Southern Montenegro, Southern Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albanian areas in Northern Greece were all excluded from the Albanian national state. Creating Albania was an important step in uniting the Albanians who had been a splintered tribal society, but the loss of Kosovo paved the way for future conflict.⁹⁹

World War I

When WWI broke out, Kosovo initially saw fierce fighting between Serbs and Albanians, with atrocities being committed by both sides. This guerilla warfare caused Albanians to flee from Kosovo to Albania. Malcolm argues that contemporary reports that 120,000 Albanians left Kosovo in 1913-15 probably are exaggerated.¹⁰⁰ In 1915, the Serb army was faced with Austrian and Bulgarian offensives on two fronts. In October 1915, in order to survive, the Serb army, followed by a large number of civilians, had no alternative but to flee down through Kosovo and the mountains of Northern Albania. The human suffering on this retreat was of staggering proportions, but the Albanians mainly refrained from attacking the retreating Serbs even in spite of the fact that the Serb army had pillaged and looted the same areas in Northern Albania only two years earlier. Up to 100,000 might have died. Kosovo was shared between Austria and Bulgaria with the Austrians in the north and the Bulgarians in the south. Contemporary Austrian reports noted that numerous Albanians fought on their side. The Austrians set up schools that had classes in Albanian and recruited volunteer Albanians for their army. In the Bulgarian

areas, conditions were significantly worse with forced labor, requisitioning of food, and severe famine in 1916-17. Many Serbs were interned by the Austrians, but the Serbs suffered far worse under the Bulgarians. In 1918, Allied forces, including the remnants of the Serb army that had escaped through Albania in 1915, reoccupied Kosovo, which passed back under Serbian rule.¹⁰¹

On 1 December 1918, a new Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was proclaimed. In 1929, it would change its name to Yugoslavia. Malcolm argues that the inclusion of Kosovo into the new state was not legal. The reason for this was that Kosovo was never incorporated into Serbia in accordance with terms called for in its constitution and because Serbia had not recognized the London Treaty of 1913. Albanians throughout the 20th century have argued this case, but as the Great Powers decided the fate of the Balkans, the legal niceties were overcome by “realpolitik.”¹⁰²

Serb Dominance and Colonization--Albanian Resistance

The period after WWI in Kosovo was characterized by Serb consolidation of its recently gained territory. The Serbs closed the schools that the Austrians established up during occupation or converted them to Serbian-only education. In 1930, there were no institutions in Kosovo teaching in Albanian, with the exception of secret ones, and no Albanian publications. The offices of mayors in Albanian-inhabited areas had posters prohibiting any language other than Serbian being spoken.¹⁰³ In 1929 a Serb delegation to the League of Nations offered the following explanation to criticism from Albania:

Our position has always been that in our southern regions, which have been integral parts of our state or were annexed to our kingdom before 1 January 1919, there are no national minorities. That position is still our last word on the question of recognition of minorities in Southern Serbia.¹⁰⁴

This unwillingness to even acknowledge the existence of the Albanians was mirrored by events in Kosovo under Milosevic's reign.

The Albanians reacted in the same way as people in Montenegro and Macedonia. People doggedly resisted the centralist regime by all means open to them. To some that meant passive resistance, but there was widespread armed resistance as well. The Serb reaction to this was to shell villages with artillery, kill livestock, burn houses, and in many cases, kill the population. Malcolm cites detailed statistics that in January and February of 1919 alone, 6,040 people were killed and 3,873 houses destroyed. As a result, quite a number of Albanians fled to Albania. Another result was the formation of large-scale *kacak* or resistance forces. In the summer of 1919, it is estimated that around 10,000 people fought as *kacaks*. The most famous leaders were Azem Bejta and his warrior-wife Shota who fought with their band in the central Drenica area. Internal power struggles in Albania influenced what happened in Kosovo. Yugoslavia backed one of the leaders in that struggle, Ahmet Zogolli, with money and weapons, and after he was exiled from Albania Serb and White Russian troops came along with him into Albania and secured his return.¹⁰⁵ As payback to the Serbs, he cleared out the safe havens of the *kacaks* in Albania. In 1924, Yugoslav forces killed Azem Bejta in an attack on his village. Following this an amnesty was offered, and most resistance ended. The last organized *kacak* units finally gave up armed resistance in 1927, and the symbolic end was when Azem Bejta's mortally wounded widow Shota crossed into Albania and died there. To the Albanians in Kosovo, the *kacaks* were a national liberation army, and to the Serbs, they were terrorists and bandits. The *kacak* movement strengthened Albanian

national consciousness in Kosovo, and in modern time inspired the formation of the KLA.¹⁰⁶

One of the key priorities of the Serbs in this period was to increase the Serb population in Kosovo through colonization. Serb families were granted up to 50 hectares of free land in addition to free transport, building materials, and other items. The land in many cases was confiscated from Albanians who could not show written titles to the land. In a traditionalist society like Kosovo, having just come out from the rule of a declining and ineffective Ottoman Empire, most people did not have any such documentation. The colonists were not only unpopular with the Albanians, there was considerable tension from local Serbs who saw that the newcomers were getting more support from the government than them. In 1928, Djordje Krstic, an official in charge of the colonization program, noted that they formed a “united front with the Albanians against the settlers.”¹⁰⁷ He also described the colonization program as a great “success” in demographic terms as: “We were only 24 per cent of the population of Kosovo in 1919, now the figure has risen to 38 per cent.”¹⁰⁸ The scale of the efforts of the colonization program was large. In total, one third of all agricultural land in Kosovo was seized. A total of over 13,000 families, in total 70,000 people, came to Kosovo. This was more than 10 per cent of the total population of Kosovo at the time.¹⁰⁹

The demographics of Kosovo were changing, but the change was too slow for some. In 1937, Vaso Cubrilovic, a historian at Belgrade University, submitted a policy paper, to the government on how to deal with the Albanian problem where he wanted to go further than just gradual colonization, he wanted mass expulsion of Albanians, and he saw Germany’s contemporary expulsion of Jews as a model. Cubrilovic advocated

coercion, harassment by the police, economic means, even violence: “There remains one more method Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, that is, secretly razing Albanian villages and urban settlements to the ground.”¹¹⁰

From 1933 onwards there were serious discussions between the Serbian and Turkish governments about the movement of Albanians and other Muslims to Turkey. A final agreement was reached in 1938. Turkey agreed to take 40,000 families in 1939-1945. The urban population was excluded from the agreement, even though almost all Turkish speakers lived in towns. This leads to a conclusion that the expulsion was not about returning Turks to Turkey. WWII stopped this policy from being carried out to full effect. Malcolm estimates that between 90,000 and 150,000 Albanians and other Muslims left Kosovo for Turkey and to a limited degree for Albania in 1918-1941. Vickers offers a figure of between 200,000 and 300,000 that left all of Yugoslavia. It is likely that the total number is between Malcolm’s lowest and Vickers’ highest figure.¹¹¹

During the war in 1999 Milosevic executed a policy of expulsion. The Serb exodus after the war was born out of fear of retaliation in kind from the Albanians.

In Albania, the period between the wars was first characterized by political unrest, then by an increasingly tight grip on power by Ahmed Zogolli, who was crowned King Zog of the Albanians in 1928. Initially he had Yugoslavian support, but this was later replaced by Italian support. On 7 April 1939 Mussolini’s Italy, inspired by Hitler’s ‘Anschluss’ with Austria, invaded and installed a puppet government in Tirana.¹¹²

World War II

On 6 April 1941, the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia started with a severe aerial bombardment of Belgrade. Two weeks later, on 17 April 1941, an armistice was signed.

This armistice was, in effect, an unconditional surrender. Axis troops from Germany, Italy and Bulgaria shared the territory of Yugoslavia between them. They divided the occupation of Kosovo into three parts. Nominally it was the puppet regime in Albania that occupied the largest part of Kosovo, the central and western parts of the country. Additionally Albanian inhabited land in Macedonia was placed under the Albanian government. However, Italy was firmly in control of the nominally independent Albania and its policies. Bulgaria occupied a narrow strip of land in Kacanik and east of the town of Gnjilane. The Germans placed the Mitrovica region in the North under direct German rule in order to secure the vital Trepca mine complex.¹¹³

The occupiers ruled Kosovo in three different ways. Bulgaria did much as it had done in WWI; it brought in its own administrators, and Bulgarian became the only official language instead of Serbian. Italy, with the understanding of Germany, pursued a policy that was aimed at undermining the case for Albanian resistance against the Axis occupation. Serious attempts were made to join Kosovo with Albania. By decrees of December 1941 and February 1942, all inhabitants in Kosovo, including the Slav ones, became Albanian citizens. The Italians also opened a large number of Albanian language schools, the Albanian language became the administrative language, and the Albanian flag became a legal symbol. The Germans quickly set up a 1,000 man Albanian gendarmerie and 1,000 additional volunteers as auxiliary troops. Thus the Germans and Italians capitalized on the desire of the majority of Albanians for national unification.¹¹⁴

The Albanians, in addition to their German and to a certain degree Italian occupiers looked with suspicion on the local Serb population. Within days of the occupation by German and Italian troops, attacks were being made against Serb and

Montenegrin colonists. The retreating Serb army had attacked some Albanian villages, so a part of the motive was retaliation for this, but the most important motives seems to have been the return of confiscated land that had been given to settlers. The German army had an active role in supporting the return of colonists, whereas the Italian units gradually came to side with the Serbs. Still the Germans were able to stop violence in its area by forging an agreement between Serb and Albanian leaders, whereas the Italians actively took side with the Serbs in fighting in autumn of 1941. There is a difference in opinion between Vickers who claim that only colonists were attacked and Malcolm who claims that also some of the “raja,” the original Serb communities, were attacked. Malcolm estimates that in the first two to three months 10,000 houses were burnt down and 20,000 people had fled, whereas Vickers states that 10,000 families fled and that dozens of Orthodox churches were destroyed and looted.¹¹⁵

After Albania had been annexed by Italy in 1939, attempts were made to absorb the Albanian army into the Italian army. A separate Albanian group was organized, but only one battalion served in Kosovo. About 3,000 men were recruited in Kosovo to serve as auxiliaries of Italian army units. Additionally, the newly formed Albanian Fascist Party had one battalion in Prizren. These efforts failed to have the effect of stabilizing Italian occupied parts of Kosovo. The reasons were that the Albanians had signed up because they supported Albanian independence and wanted to reverse the results of colonizing and Slavicizing policies of the previous two decades. They were principally against Italian colonialism. As already mentioned, the Germans set up a Gendarmerie in Mitrovica immediately after arrival in 1941. In early 1943, they first started to recruit

Albanians to military service. These recruits were intended to strengthen forces acting against local insurgents.¹¹⁶

In Kosovo, the Partisan movement grew slower than in other parts of Yugoslavia, and Slav membership dominated it. Despite efforts to recruit Albanians, the distrust of an organization run from Serbia was too great, and Albanian membership stayed at 10-15 percent. The growth of communist insurgency in Albania started out quite slowly, but with British and Yugoslav partisan support, the Albanian Communist Party gained traction in Albania under the leadership of Enver Hoxha. However, there was very limited activity from the Albanian Communist Party in Kosovo, because this was against the wish of Tito who wanted his Yugoslav Communist Party to be the only entity operating on Yugoslav territory. In addition to the Italians and the quisling collaborators the main beneficiary of this policy was the anti-communist resistance movement in Albania, called the Balli Kombetar (National Front) that was based on the old resistance against King Zog. Its policy included the traditional Albanian nationalist claims to the whole Albanian “ethnic territory.” The leader was Midhat Frasherri, who was the son of Abdyl Frasherri, and its general political program was left of centre. In August 1943, there was a meeting in the village Mukje between the Albanian Communist Party and Balli Kombetar where an agreement was reached that included the wording: “Struggle for an independent Albania and . . . the self-determination of peoples, for an ethnic Albania.”¹¹⁷ This agreement led to condemnation from the Yugoslav envoy Miladin Popovic and subsequently from Enver Hoxha. The Communist leadership rejection of the Mukje agreement in effect was a declaration of war against Balli Kombetar, and in the end, led Balli Kombetar into a collaborationist position with the Germans.¹¹⁸

Italy's capitulation on 8 September 1943 changed the political and military situation in Kosovo and Albania. Italy tried to withdraw its troops, but quick German action not only seized the Italian High Command in Tirana, it also blocked the retreat of the Italians. The Italian Commander was forced to order the deportation of Italian troops into areas under German and Bulgarian control, and under German military law. German policy towards the newly acquired areas in Kosovo and Albania was to play on Albanian nationalism and the Albanian wish for independence. In September 1943, the Germans recognized the Albania Mussolini that had created in 1941 by adding the newly occupied territories in Kosovo and Macedonia.¹¹⁹

In mid-September 1943, a group of leading Albanian officials in Kosovo held a meeting in Prizren where with German support they proclaimed themselves to be "The Second League of Prizren." Their aim was to defend the areas liberated from Yugoslavia. It raised its own volunteers and its membership rose to between 12,000 and 15,000. It was soon engaged in fighting against Serbs and Montenegrins in Western Kosovo. The claim was that this was defensive action, but in reality this was action closely linked to a renewal of expulsions of Serbs and Montenegrins in the winter of 1943-44. The chief political officer of the German forces in Belgrade in April 1944 calculated that 40,000 Serbs and Montenegrins had been expelled from Kosovo since 1941. The German policy of soliciting support from all different Albanian groups had the consequence that when the Germans withdrew, the only credible anti-fascist group was the communists--both in Albania and in Kosovo.¹²⁰

Malcolm states that German plans in the winter of 1943-44 to mobilize the Albanian population never came to anything because of Allied bombing and because of

Red Army and partisan progress. In March 1944, the Germans formed the 21st Waffen SS Skanderbeg Division. Recruitment for this division was slow, and no more than 6,491 men joined the division. It never became a significant fighting force, and was plagued by heavy desertion. Malcolm documents that the division was involved in deportation of Jews from Kosovo, and Vickers documents that it also was involved in atrocities against Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo. When Soviet troops entered Bulgaria and the Bulgarians changed sides against the Germans in September 1944, the Germans were forced to consolidate their positions in the Balkans. In all 10,000 vehicles and 350,000 men were evacuated from Greece and Albania, the majority through Kosovo, and the Skanderbeg Division played a significant role as a covering force for the German retreat. Most of the division retreated to Bosnia, but remnants of the division fought partisan units that entered Kosovo after the Germans had left. These units disintegrated quickly. The role of the Skanderbeg Division is an area in which historians have very conflicting accounts of which Malcolm and Vickers represent the moderate position.¹²¹

During 1944, Albanian participation in partisan units increased significantly. This was probably due to statements of concessions towards the Albanians and their wish for self-determination after the war, to the lack of alternative anti-fascist groups and to the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation in Kosovo and Albania towards the end of the war. However, the communist leadership saw the Albanians as untrustworthy collaborators, and realized that if they allowed the Albanians independence in Kosovo, Serbs would never support the partisans. After the partisans had taken over Kosovo an Albanian partisan unit under Shaban Polluza learnt of massacres of Albanians in Drenica, one of these massacres being of about 250 men from Skenderaj. This, combined with

orders for Albanian units to deploy to Croatia, led Polluza to defect with 8,000 men. In total, about 20,000 local Albanians joined Polluza. In the winter of 1944-45, there was bitter fighting in the Drenica valley. It ended in March 1945 when 44 villages had been destroyed, and Polluza's unit was completely suppressed. In more isolated parts of Kosovo, resistance against the communists lasted into the 1950s, longer than anywhere else in Yugoslavia.¹²²

The Albanians started WWII with relative freedom under Axis occupation and ended it in conflict with the Partisans. They entered the new socialist state highly distrustful, and resentment of being ruled from Belgrade has been constant since.

Kosovo Under Tito

After the war was over, the new Yugoslavia took some measures to seek the support of Albanians. Most significant was the prohibition of return of Serb and Montenegrin colonists who had fled Kosovo during the war to their properties in Kosovo. In July 1945 the Communist Party in Kosovo, which at the time had 2,250 members, arranged a "Regional People's Council" of 142 members including a total of 33 Albanians. This council asked for Kosovo to be made a province in Serbia, and the presidency of the "People's Assembly of Serbia" passed a law 3 September 1945 establishing the Autonomous Region of Kosovo. The physical borders of Kosovo today were decided in the Yugoslav Constitution that was ratified 31 Jan 1946 which included the statement: "The People's Republic of Serbia includes . . . the autonomous Kosovo-Metohijan region."¹²³ It did not spell out the rights and scope of the autonomous region, instead stating that this was to be determined by the constitution of the parent republic.¹²⁴

After the new Yugoslav regime was firmly established, it set about building identification in the people with the new socialist society instead of the past identities based on ethnicity. Measures were taken to ensure that people should live a modern life, become communists and party members. The meeting between traditional values and socialism was difficult. The wife of an Albanian recalls: “My husband became a party member in 1953. He was expelled . . . because he refused to have my veil removed. He didn’t dare to because of the other men in the family.”¹²⁵ In Serbia, the Kosovo myth was replaced by myths about the partisans. The celebration of the Kosovo myth was relegated to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Church itself was relegated to an isolated place in society. The socialist society tried to counter-balance revolt and bitterness in Kosovo by gradually opening Albanian-language schools, by opening up higher education to Albanians, by taking active measures to combat the fact that three quarters of the Albanians were illiterate, and by gradually allowing some Albanian cultural groups within the framework of government control.¹²⁶

After Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, there was also a break with Albania. After this break, the Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti (UDB or State Security Service) increased its activity in Kosovo in order to counter perceived subversive activity from Albania. As an example of this, in the winter of 1955-56 a Kosovo wide operation was launched to confiscate illegal weapons, and it was carried out in a heavy-handed manner. In the 1950s, a campaign was launched to encourage Albanians to emigrate from Kosovo to Turkey. According to Vickers, 195,000 left in 1954-57, whereas Malcolm gives a figure of 100,000 from 1945-66; in either case the number is significant. Suppression of any perceived sign of Albanian nationalism was stepped up, and arrests and trials of

Albanians for subversive activity became common. An example of this is the 1958 arrest and subsequent three years in prison for the young writer Adem Demaci. Demaci had spent a total of 28 years in Yugoslav prison when he was finally released in 1990. He became the most well-known political prisoner in Yugoslavia and has been called the Mandela of the Balkans. Demaci explains: “During my first three years in prison I grew to understand that there is no life and no hope for Albanians under Serbian rule--I had to work to break free. Like the eagle should soar high and not be in a cage, we could not belong to Serbia, and therefore I dedicated my life to working for our freedom.”¹²⁷

The new Yugoslav Constitution in 1953 made subtle changes to Kosovo’s status, as autonomy was no longer a federal matter, but a matter for the People’s Republic of Serbia. The 1963 Constitution of Yugoslavia elevated Kosovo from a region to a province, but all references to autonomy at the federal level were eliminated.¹²⁸

In 1966 came a change of policy towards Kosovo where Kosovo started to receive more freedom. After Tito discovered that the second most powerful man in Yugoslavia, the Minister of the Interior, Serbian Aleksandar Rankovic, had plotted against him, Tito fired him. Rankovic had been responsible for the anti-Albanian policies of the last two decades.¹²⁹ In March 1967, Tito visited Kosovo for the first time since 1950. According to Pettifer, and contemporary sources cited by Vickers, this was his first visit to Kosovo, but this ignores an official visit in 1950. In any case, Tito made public statements that criticized conditions in Kosovo. Additionally Tito initiated a process aimed at amending the 1963 Constitution.¹³⁰

Tito removed police pressure and gave concessions to the Albanians in Kosovo in order to secure their allegiance to Yugoslavia. However, the effect was that the Albanians

became more aware of their culture and their rights. The Albanians had a strong nationalist revival, and the predominant feeling was that since they were having progress, now was the time to push for more. In 1968, Serbs were starting to complain that they were being treated badly by the Albanians, and there were several clashes after cases where Serbs tore down Albanian flags that had appeared all over Kosovo. Towards the end of 1968, there were eruptions of inter-ethnic violence. In the end of November 1968 ten policemen were injured and several Albanian students from Pristina University were seriously injured, and one student was killed in a clash that was called “riots” by the international press. This was followed by deployments of army units and tanks to the streets of the main towns in Kosovo. Then, in December 1968 Tito amended the 1963 Constitution in a way that firmly established Kosovo as a legal entity at the federal level. This was aimed at calming down the situation, as Tito felt that following the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the student riots throughout Europe, he had to have a calm situation on the home front.¹³¹ The lesson that riots lead to concessions had consequences later.

In 1974, Yugoslavia’s fourth Constitution since WWII was promulgated. Here Kosovo received almost all rights of a republic. The small, but important differences were that Albanians were defined as a nationality, not as a nation, and Kosovo was defined as autonomous province and thus not recognized as a republic. The end result was that Kosovo had the right to do anything except secede. The most important reason that Tito denied status as a republic most likely was fear of the reaction from the Serbs, who were the largest group in Yugoslavia. The 1974 Constitution caused positive discrimination of Albanians over others as bilingualism became a prerequisite for public employment, and quotas of four-fifths for Albanians had to be met for employment or for

public office. Thus, a process of what was seen as Albanianisation began in Kosovo. To many Serbs, for whom the mere existence of any autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina was an affront, this was outrageous. Already in 1968, the Serbian writer and senior communist Dobrica Covic complained about the situation for Serbs in Kosovo, and he raised an issue that would continue to dominate debate up to today--the allegations of forced expulsions of Serbs from Kosovo.¹³²

Malcolm argues that the major reason why people left Kosovo, both Serbs and Albanians, was economic.¹³³ On the economic front, Kosovo lagged behind the rest of Yugoslavia. According to James Pettifer, in 1947 the average income in Kosovo compared with the average in all of Yugoslavia was 52.4 percent. In 1962 this was down to 34 percent, and even in 1980, after more than a decade of economic aid from Belgrade was only 40 percent.¹³⁴ However, Vickers presents that average income in 1954 was 48 percent, in 1975 33 percent, and in 1980 only 27 percent of the average for Yugoslavia.¹³⁵ It is possible that Vickers' figures look at income generated in Kosovo, whereas Pettifer's take into account income generated elsewhere in Yugoslavia and by the diaspora in Western Europe. Regardless, the fact remains that Kosovo was far behind the rest of Yugoslavia.

In the 1970s, the Albanians in Kosovo faced the combined effects of increased access to education and salaried employment elsewhere in Yugoslavia and in Western Europe. The effects that this had on the traditional organization of subsistence level rural families was great. Anthropologist Berit Backer describes the changes happening in a village in Western Kosovo in the 1970s: "The values of the younger generation, who find

this aspect [traditional way of life] of their lives unimportant, are different [from the values of the elders]. For them careers and outside contacts are the important factors.”¹³⁶

As the economic gap between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia widened, tensions between Kosovars intensified. The attempts to solve problems in Kosovo by giving it almost the same constitutional rights as a republic failed. In 1979, Tito visited Kosovo for the last time: “Tito recognized the seriousness of the problem and asked the problem and asked that it be remedied ‘by all means.’ The result was ‘massive arrests of members of the Albanian minority in Kosovo in November-December 1979’.”¹³⁷ Shortly after, in May 1980, Tito died, and with him the force that had held Yugoslavia together.

“Only Tito Could Keep the Lid on the Simmering Pot”¹³⁸

On 11 March 1981 a student found a cockroach in his soup in the canteen of Pristina University. A spontaneous student demonstration demanding better food and conditions at the cramped university was met with riot police and arrests. Although this stopped the demonstration momentarily, it ultimately led to escalation. On 15 March, a building at the Patriarchate in Pec burnt down, and no one believed the investigation that concluded that an electrical failure caused the fire. On 26 March, the students were back on the streets of Pristina, and demonstrations rapidly spread to all of Kosovo. In addition to demonstrations and slogans in the streets, Serb and Montenegrins were beaten, their homes and businesses burned, and their shops looted. The seriously alarmed authorities brought in special units of police from the rest of Yugoslavia, used tanks in the streets, imposed curfews and installed a general state of emergency. The impact of the demonstrations in Yugoslavia was large, and an attempt to keep newspapers from reporting on them made the situation worse. As an example, reports of the number of

people killed varied between the official figure of nine demonstrators and one police officer and 1,000 dead. Vickers states, without giving any detailed reference to the source, that Amnesty International learned that the Central Committee of the League of Communists in Serbia was informed that over 300 had been killed.¹³⁹

At the time, reporting in the west was almost entirely limited to official sources in Yugoslavia, but these events placed Kosovo and the Albanians on the map. *The New York Times* reported this as the riots were ending: “Yugoslavia's leaders were caught off guard by the extent and the intensity of last week's rioting by ethnic Albanians in which 11 people were killed and 57 wounded, it was acknowledged today. This admission was made by a senior Communist Party official.”¹⁴⁰ Before long, Western media began to look into the reasons why this had happened: “Josip Broz Tito has not been dead a year, but the Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’ he nurtured for 35 years has already developed fissures on a sensitive flank, the mostly Albanian province of Kosovo.”¹⁴¹

The regime placed the blame for the riots on a combination of hooligans and counter-revolutionary organizations. After the riots, there were widespread arrests, and the local communist party was purged. However, a member of the Serbian Central Committee, Tihomir Vlaskalic, argued that the primary cause of the riots was long-term mismanagement of Kosovo's economy, but unfortunately this view was not taken seriously. Instead a large number of Albanians were imprisoned for their role in the riots, which hardened their opposition to the regime, and made them heroes to the Albanians. The state of emergency was lifted after a couple of months, but a large number of army units and plain-clothes police officers remained in place. This set the stage for the development of what Malcolm calls a “culture war” in the following years.¹⁴²

Albanian writers criticized Serbian history writing and argued that Kosovo had the right to secede if it wanted to. Life for the Serbs in Kosovo became difficult, both in the private and in the public sphere.¹⁴³ An Albanian government official in Kosovo at the time explains one example of the “culture war”: “In the beginning of the 1980s [in our institution] we used only Albanian both in writing and when speaking. We did not want to isolate anyone, but why should 90 % of us be forced to use the language of 10 %?”¹⁴⁴

As early as in 1982, one year after the 1981 student demonstrations, *Levizja Popullore e Kosoves*¹⁴⁵ (LPK) was founded, and *Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves*¹⁴⁶ (LKCK) and *Levizja Popullore e Republikes se Kosoves*¹⁴⁷ (LPRK) came a few years later. There were also a host of other organizations, but these three were the most important political organizations who supported armed resistance against the Serb regime. People with links to Albania, so-called enverists, played an important role in forming the nucleus of organization in the 1980s. Their Marxist ideology and organizational training made them well suited for underground work. In addition, the thousands of people who served prison terms after the 1981 demonstrations became radicalized by their time in prison and increasingly played a role.¹⁴⁸

Among the Serbs living in Kosovo, there was dissent that the Albanians took what Serbs saw as their birthright--jobs, status and rule of Kosovo. In 1981, a group that called itself the Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins, who had the support of Serb national father and writer Dobrica Cosic, formed to write a petition about the situation. It only gathered 76 signatures, but they kept repeating their simple message: “This is our land. If Kosovo and Metohija are not Serbian then we don’t have any land of our own.”¹⁴⁹ By 1986, they had 50,000 signatures and had become a force to be reckoned with.¹⁵⁰

In 1985, Dimitrije Bogdanovic published *Knjiga o Kosovu* (A Book about Kosovo) that was openly polemic and attacked the Albanians for their role not only in recent events, but it was also a highly slanted history that presented myths uncritically.

Kosovo in 1981 . . . The same methods were applied as were recorded in 19th-century documents and spoken legend: murder, rape, beatings . . . Organised Albanian terror produced an unbearable atmosphere of vulnerability and fear and compelled growing numbers of Serbs and Montenegrins to leave . . . To stress the present demographic picture in Kosovo and maintain that these regions are Albanian simply because a large number of Albanians live there today is to overlook the fact that this land is inhabited primarily by the Serbian people, as its central land and, historically speaking, its motherland, so there has never been any break in Serbia's attitude towards Kosovo as a Serbian national territory, no interruption in the struggle to liberate Kosovo's Serbs and make them part of the Serbian community in the whole country.¹⁵¹

In Serbia the book was viewed as a fair representation of history, but an escalation of the language of Bogdanovic soon surfaced. The Serbian Academy of Arts and Science in 1996 worked on a document that was never officially published, but became known as *Memorandum* from a photocopied version. The document makes some valid points about the state of affairs in Yugoslavia, but calls what was happening to Serbs in Kosovo genocide: "The expulsion of the Serbian people from Kosovo bears testimony to their historical defeat. In the spring of 1981, open and total war was declared on the Serbian people . . . we are still not looking this war in the face, nor are we calling it by its proper name."¹⁵² The document by many was seen as a step on a way that could lead to war.¹⁵³

CHAPTER 4

KOSOVO: FROM CONFLICT TO WAR AND THEN WHERE?

Kosovo in Conflict 1986-1997

The Rise of Milosevic 154

He [Milosevic] was a nationalist only in the sense that he was willing to use nationalism in his own interest and in order to secure his place in Serb history. But I don't think that he was motivated by nationalistic goals.¹⁵⁵

Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by Author,
Ft Leavenworth, 19 September 2007.

Slobodan Milosevic had studied law at Belgrade University, and served in the Ideology Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC). While at university, he befriended Ivan Stambolic who was to enable his rise in the hierarchy of the LYC and to secure him a good career as an apparatchik. Upon leaving university, Milosevic was an economic adviser to the Mayor of Belgrade, then worked from 1968-1978 in Tehnogas, and in 1978 became the head of Beobanka, one of Yugoslavia's largest banks. His political career started in earnest in April 1986 when he was elected Chairman of the Belgrade City Committee of the League of Communists, but he had been recognized by diplomats from the United States earlier as a person with whom to stay in touch.

Ambassador Richard Miles who was the US ambassador in Belgrade 1996-1999

describes his impression of Milosevic as a young diplomat:

We tended to look at him [Milosevic] as a western oriented technocrat; a pragmatic person who was not bound by ideology particularly. We were taken in by his superb command of the English language and by the fact that he had lived in New York for a while. He knew our ways, could speak our slang and understood us pretty well.¹⁵⁶

However, when Yugoslavia started to fall apart, Slobodan Milosevic would rise to power from his apparatchik position in the party by leveraging the anger of the Serbs in Kosovo. In Kosovo Polje on 24 April 1987, right after he had been elected president of the Communist Party in Serbia, Milosevic appeared to hear grievances from a group of Serbs who were planning protests in Belgrade.¹⁵⁷ His political patron, Ivan Stambolic, who by now was President of Serbia, could not go and sent Milosevic instead. While the meeting took place, police used batons to chase away crowds of angry Serbs who wanted to get in to talk to Milosevic. At this stage, he went out to the crowd and said: “No one should dare to beat you.”¹⁵⁸ The transcript from the trial against Milosevic has a slightly different version of what he said, but the difference is not of great consequence: “No one will beat you [the Serbs] again.”¹⁵⁹ Back inside of the building, Milosevic listened to angry Serbs who demanded that action be taken to protect them against the Albanian leadership in Kosovo and answered:

You should stay here, both for your ancestors and your descendents . . . But I do not suggest you stay here suffering and enduring a situation with which you are not satisfied. On the contrary! It should be changed, together with all progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia . . . Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo.¹⁶⁰

The appearance of Milosevic in Kosovo Polje was central not only in securing his position; it was also a critical moment in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The former apparatchik saw the potential power in Serb nationalism and used it to rise to power.

Back in Belgrade, his former friend Ivan Stambolic saw that things had changed:

“Following Milosevic’s speech at Kosovo Polje, the rift between us grew deeper. There were no longer two currents in one party. There were now two policies.”¹⁶¹ Milosevic had support from Radio Television Belgrade, which broadcast the speech over and over

again, and from hard-line activists in Kosovo who arranged protests in Belgrade and other cities. In September 1987, Milosevic attacked Stambolic publicly over the Kosovo issue. By the end of 1987, the Serbian League of Communists had dismissed Stambolic, and Milosevic took over as president of Serbia.¹⁶²

Milosevic moved quickly to consolidate his power through a series of mass rallies and by replacing the leadership in Vojvodina, and in Montenegro with his own supporters. In the autumn of 1988, he moved to remove the local party leadership in Kosovo, and on 17 November 1988, he dismissed the leadership of the Kosovo Party. This sparked a spontaneous protest. The miners in Trepca marched towards Pristina to protest, and Kosovo's economy soon ground to a halt as workers and students from all over Kosovo joined the protest. On 18 November, Radio Television Belgrade estimated that there were 100,000 protesters in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the Serbian leadership confirmed the changes in leadership and people loyal to Milosevic were soon in place. The next day, 19 November, Milosevic held his largest rally. At least 350,000 people gathered in Belgrade. Looking at the crowd Milosevic said: "Every nation has a love that warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia."¹⁶³ In the beginning of 1989, the Serbian assembly prepared amendments in the Serbian constitution that would give Serbia full power police, courts, civil defense, economy, education, choice of official language, and other areas. The old constitution called for these changes to be ratified by the Kosovo assembly, and by placing people loyal to him there, Milosevic had prepared the ground for these changes. Another protest by the miners in Trepca in February where they went on a hunger strike and refused to leave their mine, accompanied by strikes and demonstrations throughout Kosovo, delayed the

process. On 23 March, the Kosovo assembly met and approved the constitutional changes while tanks and armored vehicles surrounded the building. In Belgrade the Serbian assembly finally voted through the changes in a festive session on 28 March 1989. The autonomy of Kosovo was gone in all but the name.¹⁶⁴

The reaction was immediate, and it was violent. 3,000 people took part in a violent demonstration in Pristina on the day of the vote, a larger demonstration in the small town of Ferizaj was crushed by riot police, and in many towns around Kosovo there were demonstrations. By the end of March, the official death-toll was 21 demonstrators and two police officers. By the end of April, Malcolm states that the death-toll could have been as high as 100. There were large-scale arrests, in Ferizaj alone more than 1,000 workers were put on trial, and federal police arrested a large part of the Albanian elite. Waves of demonstrations and protests continued throughout the year, and in January 1990 more violent clashes resulted in at least 14 people shot dead.¹⁶⁵

Milosevic had demonstrated that he was prepared to use nationalism as a tool to hold on to power. In front of one million Serbs at the 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1989, he reaffirmed that under no circumstances was he willing to give up Kosovo, when he said: “The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history . . . Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not yet be excluded.”¹⁶⁶ The message was directed at the Serbs, but the Albanians also listened. Milosevic’s references to unity in Serbia and to armed battles were understood by all as a message that he intended to keep Kosovo--at all costs.¹⁶⁷

In 1989, the Serbian assembly passed new laws that forbid Albanians to buy or sell property without permission from the government, and in 1990 Serbian authorities introduced a whole range of provisions that intended to shore up the Serb position in Kosovo. These laws and provisions seriously curtailed the rights of Albanians, and the Serbian government dismissed thousands of state employees. Later the Serbian assembly passed a special law on “labor relations in Kosovo,” which made possible the additional expulsion of more than 80,000 Albanians from their jobs. The total thus arrived at around 100,000. However, the most drastic step was the Serbian Assembly took was to introduce a new school curriculum that was meant to standardize the schools in all of Serbia. The Assembly removed almost all Albanian language, culture and history. In December 1990, armed soldiers guarded schools to ensure that no Albanian children or teachers entered unless they agreed to follow the new unified Serbian curriculum.¹⁶⁸

Albanian Resistance--Active or Passive?

On 23 December 1989 the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was founded. It elected as its leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova who was a university professor, literature critic, and head of the Association of Writers of Kosovo. He did not want the job, but there were few other candidates, and so he was elected. His policies were divided into three parts. The first aim was to prevent violent revolt, the second to seek international political involvement in the resolution of the situation, and the third to systematically deny the legitimacy of Serb rule in Kosovo by non-participation in anything linked to the Serbian government and its rule in Kosovo. Parallel to this, he sought to build at least the outlines of state institutions for independent Albanian rule. Membership in the LDK soared, and

by spring 1991, LDK claimed an estimated membership of 700,000 and had offices in several major European cities.¹⁶⁹

In April 1990, Adem Demaci was unexpectedly released after a total of 28 years in prison. He strongly advocated non-violent resistance, and together with Ibrahim Rugova was an important reason that by the summer of 1990 violent clashes in Kosovo had almost ceased to exist. However, the two leaders did not like one another, and Demaci refused to become involved in Rugova's project.¹⁷⁰

The Albanian members of the Kosovo assembly had by and large been subdued by Serbian pressure. However, 114 of 123 Albanian members met on 2 July 1990 on the street outside of the closed assembly building and passed a resolution declaring Kosovo "an equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation." In response, the Serbian government dissolved both the assembly and the government. On 7 September, many of the same delegates met in secrecy in the small town of Kacanik. Here they proclaimed a constitutional law for the "Republic of Kosova." This included provisions for a new assembly and an elected presidency, and that all laws [Serbian and Yugoslav] that were in conflict with the new republican constitution were not valid. In September 1991 a referendum was organized to vote on a declaration of sovereignty and independence for Kosovo. It is claimed that 87 percent of the voters took part and that 99 percent voted in favor. On 24 May 1992, Kosovo-wide elections took place using private houses as polling stations. 76 percent of the Albanians voted for the LDK in the assembly election. Ibrahim Rugova was without an opposing candidate and was elected president with 99.5 percent of the votes.¹⁷¹

The shadow government evolved into a complete parallel system of society with schools, medical services and tax collection. Income for the government came primarily from a tax of three per cent on salaries and ten per cent on business profits that was collected throughout the diaspora. A high number of Albanians left Kosovo in the 1990s, but it is hard to find precise numbers of how many Kosovar Albanians were in the diaspora, as Albanians from Albania always claimed to be from Kosovo to secure asylums, and the diaspora population went back to the 1960s. Judah gives figures of between 230,000 and 350,000 Kosovar Albanians in Germany, 150,000 in Switzerland, 20,000 in Austria and another 30,000 in Sweden. Vickers gives a number of between 350,000 and 400,000 Albanian-Americans in the United States. There was considerable pressure to contribute, and failure to do so could lead to pressure against family members remaining in Kosovo, or to hints that once Kosovo became independent there would be a reckoning of who had contributed what during the struggle. Judah also claims that a part of the financing came from criminal activity without going into details about the scale.¹⁷²

Most observers argue that in the beginning of the 1990s the people of Kosovo generally supported Rugova's government and that only a few advocated or worked for armed resistance. It is however significant that Pettifer and Vickers argue differently in their latest book, *The Albanian Question*. Their claims seem to be well founded; especially important is the fact that Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi in the government-in-exile already in 1991 formed a Defense Ministry in opposition to the wishes of Rugova.¹⁷³ However, the fact that violent opposition stopped quite abruptly in 1990 speaks against their argument. The ICG Report, *Kosovo Spring*, offers an explanation for the fact that violent resistance stopped quite abruptly. It claims that clan leaders

supported the calls for pacifist resistance--which at the time came both from Rugova and Demaci--and that this made violent opposition disappear from all but minor splinter groups.¹⁷⁴ The findings of the anthropological study by Berit Backer support the idea that if the elders had decided, then the decision would be almost universally adopted in the Kosovar society.¹⁷⁵ An additional argument for the involvement of the clans is the success of the process that Adem Demaci and others undertook to end blood-feuds in 1990-1991. About 2,000 families involved in blood-feuds reconciled, and this would have been impossible without the support of clan leaders.¹⁷⁶

Economically the early 1990s were bad for Kosovo. From 1990 to 1995, Kosovo's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by an estimated 50 percent, falling to less than 400 US dollars per capita. This was even lower than Albania, Europe's poorest country at the time. As the economy got worse, people asked questions about the validity of the current policy. The poor state of the economy caused by its collapse during the reign of Milosevic contributed to instability after the international takeover in 1999.¹⁷⁷

In spite of the pacifist policies of the majority, small cells worked to organize armed resistance against Serbian rule. An important step was taken when 54 Kosovars began military training in the military academy in Tirana in 1991. This training came to an end after Western intelligence found out about the training and pressured the Albanian regime to stop it. This was not the only military training in Albania. In 1990, Adem Jashari, Sami Lushtaku, Shaban Shala and others trained at an Albanian military camp in Labinot outside of Elbasan. In general, the military training happened with at least the tacit support of the Albanian regime, but as Western pressure increased and the

relationship between President Sali Berisha and the Kosovars deteriorated, the training was taken over by military officers who conducted the training and were able to secure release from jail when they were arrested, like Adem Jashari in 1993 and Hashim Thaci in 1996. The people who went to Albania for military training in the beginning of the 1990s were a motley crew, and in fact some of them had little to do with one another. Some, like Adem Jashari, came from the kacak tradition of resistance, whereas others like Shaban Shala had a background from LPRK. Some were supporters of Bukoshi and Rugova, and yet others were Marxist.¹⁷⁸

In 1993, there was realization in LPRK that something needed to be done in order to provide the foundation for armed resistance. At a meeting in Drenica the movement considered the formation of armed forces. As a result of this meeting, a decision was made for 'further work,' the name of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was chosen in December 1993, and a group of four men was chosen to organize it.¹⁷⁹

A key element in the development of the KLA from 1993 until it became known to a larger circle in 1996 is that several small and quite different groups began to join together. This did not mean that the KLA grew into a large organization, but it started to unite into an effective network. Veteran activists living in exile linked up with the younger generation at home, and people as different as old LPRK activists like Shaban Shala and families from the kacak tradition became linked to one another. People from different regions started to cooperate; they organized a network structure that was resilient enough to withstand Serb and collaborators attempts to infiltrate, and links were established from the border areas to other areas of in Kosovo, thus enabling a logistics flow to their organization.¹⁸⁰

However, had it not been for events far away from Kosovo, in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, the KLA most likely had remained a small group in obscurity. By the summer of 1995, the war in Bosnia had been running for more than three years, and the fronts had become rather permanent. In July 1995, Bosnian Serbs took Srebrenica and massacred thousands of men and in May and August of 1995, Croatian army and police forces recaptured Western Slavonia and the Krajina region, and drove out between 170,000 and 200,000 Serbs. Western countries did nothing of substance to counter the largest single act of ethnic cleansing in the wars of former Yugoslavia up to that point. At the end of August a shell fell on a market in Sarajevo killing about 37 people. As a result of this the UNSC gave a mandate, and NATO initiated a major bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb forces. After a short time, the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed to negotiations, and appointed Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate for them. Talks commenced at Dayton under the leadership of US chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke, and an agreement on Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia was struck. 60,000 NATO troops would enforce the agreement.¹⁸¹

Albanian-American demonstrators at Dayton demanded a solution to Kosovo, and Bukoshi even went to Dayton where he held a press conference and said: “There can be no lasting peace in the Balkans without peace in Kosova.”¹⁸² However, Kosovo was not included in the talks to the disappointment of Albanians who had expected that this would be the reward for their pacifist policy. Ambassador Miles recalls Holbrooke’s position: “When we discussed this during his many visits to the region in 1998-1999 Dick [Holbrooke] always maintained that to include Kosovo at Dayton would have made it impossible to strike a deal. Tujman did not care at all about Kosovo, and Milosevic was

only willing to negotiate issues outside of Serbia.”¹⁸³ In addition, the UN embargo on Yugoslavia was lifted, and only an “outer wall” of sanctions remained, whereby Yugoslavia could not return to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Kosovar Albanians did not need another confirmation. There was a feeling in the province that the current policy had failed, and people started looking for alternatives. Politically Kosovo was ready for a change.¹⁸⁴

The next event that had a profound impact on Kosovo happened in Albania. In the winter and spring of 1996-97, Albania descended into anarchy. The conflict started out as protests against collapsing pyramid banking schemes, but soon turned into a civil war. A combination of mobs and disgruntled members of the heavily purged police and military forces gained access to army depots, and in the beginning of March 1997, took control over most of Southern Albania. Conflict soon spread to all of the country, and in the end the government of Sali Berisha was forced to go. The socialist part under Fatos Nano seized power in the struggle that followed. To Albanians in Kosovo, there were two important outcomes. First, since Berisha was a gheg from Northern Albania and Nano and the socialist party had their power base in the tosk south, Northern Albania became virtually lawless.¹⁸⁵ Second, a total of 650,000 weapons--including more than 200,000 AK-47 variants, more than 200,000 pistols, about 20,000 machine guns, and 1.6 billion rounds of ammunition¹⁸⁶--had been looted, and these weapons and ammunition became available in huge quantities and at very low prices.¹⁸⁷

In the meantime, in 1996, the KLA used the disappointment of the Albanians to gather support, and more people were involved in the plans for armed uprising. Agim Ceku recalls that representatives from the KLA contacted him in Croatia in 1996, where

he had become a brigadier general after joining the Croatian forces as a captain in 1991. He was asked for advice, and stayed in touch with the KLA as an adviser until he crossed over the border from Macedonia on the snow-covered Ljuboten Mountain in 1999 to take over as the Chief of the General staff of the KLA. Ceku also states that other people were involved in the plans in the same time-frame.¹⁸⁸ On 14 February 1996, the KLA issued a communiqué declaring that guerilla units of the KLA had “undertaken actions against Serbian colonists,” and that war was inevitable unless Serbia withdrew military and police from Kosovo and countries like the United States recognized the independent Kosovo. In addition they issued a death threat to any politician who signed an autonomy agreement with Serbia. This was quite bold for an organization that still only consisted of 150 men.¹⁸⁹

International diplomacy was active in Kosovo at the time, but did little to calm Kosovar Albanians who were frustrated by the lack of political progress. In April 1997, US Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum together with the new U.S. special envoy to former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, visited Rugova in Pristina. After the meeting Kornblum stated that: “The future of Kosovo was possible within Serbia and that would be a major contribution to peace in the region.”¹⁹⁰ These and similar statements undermined Rugova, because they made it clear that the LDK demand for independence by peaceful exit from Serbia with support from the United States was not an option.¹⁹¹

In August 1997, students in Pristina started to demonstrate, something that in itself was not new. However, when the students ignored the LDK’s and Rugova’s plea to stop the demonstrations a new situation had been created. The US Embassy in Belgrade was in touch with the students through one of the student leaders, Albin Kurti. He

informed the Americans about the demonstrations and the US Embassy had officers on the scene in an effort to calm the police down, as they would report any excessive use of violence. On 1 October 1997, about 20,000 students faced the police before violence broke out, students were beaten up by the police, and several student leaders were arrested.¹⁹²

On 28 November 1997, Halit Geci, a teacher from the Llausha village near Skenderaj who had been killed by Serbs, was buried. 20,000 people attended the funeral and witnessed the first public appearance of the KLA in uniform. Three KLA members, Rexhep Selimi, Muje Krasniqi and Daut Haradinaj, came, and one of them made a statement: “Serbia is massacring Albanians. The KLA is the only force which is fighting for the liberation and national unity of Kosovo! We shall continue to fight!”¹⁹³ The next day the story was on the front page of the leading daily newspaper in Kosovo, *Koha Ditore*. Additionally the event had been filmed and was broadcast by satellite from Tirana. The news of the defiance showed by these three fighters electrified Kosovo.¹⁹⁴

Rugova refused to see what was happening. Since 1996, he had regularly denied the existence of the KLA and claimed that they were a Serbian conspiracy. When he repeated this for the last time in February 1998, it was clear to the people in Kosovo that Rugova no longer was in touch with reality.¹⁹⁵

In the beginning of March 1998, Serbian Interior Ministry spokesman Ljubiska Cvetic, claimed that KLA had carried out 31 operations in 1996, 55 in 1997 and 66 in the first two months of 1998, and that KLA in the process had killed 10 Serbian policemen and 24 civilians. Kosovar observers at the same time calculated that the KLA had

claimed responsibility for killing 21 people, including five policemen, five Serb civilians and eleven Kosovar “collaborators.”¹⁹⁶

In what was seen locally as a last international attempt to avoid war between the KLA and Serbian security forces, Special Envoy Richard Gelbard visited Pristina 23 February 1998. He criticized the violence by the Serbian security forces, and then attacked the KLA: “We condemn strongly terrorist activity in Kosovo. The UCK (KLA) is without any questions, a terrorist group.”¹⁹⁷

The characterization of the KLA as a terrorist organization by the most powerful nation in the world had a large impact on the Albanians, especially as Serbian authorities used the statement as an excuse to start a major offensive. On 28 February, Serbian security forces launched an offensive against the KLA that would lead Kosovo from crisis to armed conflict. This is the version of events presented by Judah, and it is supported by a contemporary article by Richard Caplan who asserted that the Albanians in Kosovo were treated different by the international community than the other national minorities in the former Yugoslavia, and that this diplomatic approach helped ensure that Kosovo failed to become a major international concern until it was too late. However, Ambassador Richard Miles, who accompanied Gelbard, states: “I don’t think that whatever Bob [Gelbard] said would encourage or discourage him [Milosevic]. I don’t think that he needed an excuse to crack down on the increased violence by the KLA.”¹⁹⁸

Full-scale Insurgency in Kosovo 1998-1999

One of the first targets of the Serbian crack-down was Adem Jashari. He was wanted for murder, and he was as key leader in the KLA. An operation to seize him on 22 January failed, and on 3-5 March 1998, the Serbian security forces tried to arrest him

again, this time in a much larger operation. They ended up killing a total of 56 people; Adem Jashari, members of his extended family, and local villagers. Bashkim Jashari, a nephew of Adem Jashari who was a teenager at the time and one of two survivors of the attack explains what the worst moment was: “The women and children hid in a basement, but were all killed when a tank round penetrated the wall and exploded inside. After this uncle ordered me to flee as he wanted the world to know what had happened.”¹⁹⁹

The attack on the Jasharis was the spark that ignited Kosovo. Membership in the KLA soared, sleeper cells were activated, and ordinary villagers set about to defend their villages. Everybody called themselves KLA, and the organization therefore expanded extremely rapidly. The KLA controlled territory expanded rapidly south from northern Drenica to central Drenica and west towards the Peje-Gjakova-Prizren road, in addition to small areas in the border region with Albania.²⁰⁰

After the initial Serb attempt to crack down on the KLA, Gelbard tried to compensate for branding the KLA terrorists by playing tough against Milosevic, which had the result that Milosevic just refused to see him. The OSCE and EU appointed Felipe Gonzales to talk to Milosevic, but he just refused to see him as well. In the end, the US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright turned to Holbrooke and asked him to start working as a Special Envoy. Muddling the situation further, Milosevic on 23 April arranged a referendum where he asked the Serbian people if they wanted foreign mediation over the Kosovo issue. 94.73 percent of the people who voted were against this, but it should be noted that Albanians boycotted the poll as it was seen as a part of illegal Serbian rule over Kosovo. However, by the time Holbrooke got to Kosovo, valuable time had been lost, and the situation on the ground was changed beyond recognition.²⁰¹

Holbrooke soon made Milosevic agree to see Rugova, and after sufficient pressure had been brought to bear on Rugova, he went to meet Milosevic in Belgrade 15 May. This meeting produced no concrete results, but when Serbian television caught Rugova apparently doubling over in laughter over something Milosevic told him, that went over very poorly with the home audience. There was one more low-level meeting of negotiations on 22 May, before Rugova met President Clinton on 29 May. After this meeting, the process was halted because of a Serbian offensive in Western Kosovo.²⁰²

Clearly a different way forward had to be found, and it was time to talk to the KLA. The US administration made its first high-profile contacts with the KLA at the end of June 1998 when Holbrooke had what he presented as a “chance encounter” with KLA fighters in the village of Junik on 24 June 1998. Ambassador Miles, who took part in the meeting, states that the meeting was planned and not a chance encounter as Holbrooke maintained at the time according to ICG. The doubt about this assertion as expressed by Judah thus is justified. It was at this meeting a photographer took the famous picture of Holbrooke next to a KLA fighter; a picture that was interpreted by both Serbs and Albanians as a calculated sign of US support for the KLA.²⁰³

Serbian security forces continued the offensive in early summer, and soon captured the areas the KLA had held such as the towns of Orahovac and Malisevo. In the initial spring offensive in Drenica, Serbian forces killed a high number of Albanians. However, the approach changed, possibly due to international pressure over “ethnic cleansing.” Serbian tactics shifted to a “scorched earth” policy. This largely consisted of the destruction of real estate with a relatively low number of collateral civilian deaths. By August, an estimated 15,000 houses had been burnt. The burning and looting of houses

most often happened after the civilian population had left the region, often scared by the use of indirect fire into their areas. The KLA in a way also increased the refugee situation by asking people to leave areas where there were clashes in order to avoid reprisals. These heavy handed methods ensured that there was a flood of refugees fleeing the Serbian Security forces. UNHCR displacement figures for August 1998 state that there were 260,000 internally displaced people (IDP), and 200,000 refugees outside of Kosovo.²⁰⁴

Hectic diplomacy went on in Europe in parallel to events on the ground. After a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in June, Milosevic agreed to allow the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) to be established in July. KDOM was made up of participants from the Contact Group countries, but had a staff that was too small to be omnipresent and no real power to impose sanctions on any of the parties that could influence the course of events.²⁰⁵ Additionally the OSCE deployed monitors along Kosovo's borders.²⁰⁶

The campaign during the summer of 1998 in Kosovo was in many ways a success as seen from Serbia. The KLA had proved that as a military force it could not hold ground or protect civilians. The international response had been almost strictly limited to diplomatic measures. The only military measures were limited to air maneuvers over Albania and Macedonia.²⁰⁷

However, in July and August media broadcasts throughout the world showed horrendous pictures of the suffering of civilians, and this was what was needed to mobilize the political will to use force. In September, the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 demanding a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces “used for civilian

repression.” Following this, NATO on 13 October 1998 voted to authorize air strikes if security forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo within 96 hours. After a period of intense negotiations, Holbrooke reached an agreement with Milosevic, based on the demands in Resolution 1199, and under the threat of NATO airstrikes. General Michael Short, who was designated to be NATO’s air commander, and other US military officers accompanied Holbrooke and gave very graphic demonstrations to Milosevic and his military commanders of how NATO would carry out a bombing mission if needed. Ambassador Miles recalls that the negotiating team, in private discussions, felt there was a high probability that they would have to carry out their threats, and an evacuation of the US Embassy was planned. Milosevic agreed to pull back his forces, to allow access to aid groups, and accept the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), a team of 2000 civilian observers who would monitor the enforcement of the agreement. NATO overflights would complement the monitoring mission. NATO kept the activation order in place, permitting the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, to launch air strikes in the event of non-compliance with the agreement.²⁰⁸

During the summer, the presence of KDOM and its urge to find interlocutors who could speak for the KLA forced changes that solidified the unification of the different groups in the KLA. In Pristina, there was little KLA action, but its population, as elsewhere in Kosovo saw KLA as the only real option. Rugova seemed incapable of taking stock of the situation, and showed no signs of trying to reconcile differences with the KLA. In reality, he was faced with a difficult political dilemma--if he fully acknowledged the existence of the KLA, he could either condemn it and thus effectively commit political suicide, or support it and lose his status as the preferred intermediary of

the international community. However, Demaci had seen that the KLA had turned into what the people of Kosovo saw as their legitimate representative, and in June 1998, he went public with an offer of his services to KLA. On 13 August, the KLA appointed him as their political representative “to lead the work for the creation of the institutions of Kosovo.” Even though Rugova remained the preferred interlocutor of the international community, the KLA was now established as a political force that had to be taken seriously.²⁰⁹

As the security forces withdrew in accordance with the agreement, KLA took advantage and strengthened its own position on the ground. A report of the US Secretary-General 24 December stated that the KLA retook control over villages, and started to take control of highways and areas near urban centers. This served as a provocation to the Serbian authorities in Kosovo: “If the Kosovo Verification Mission cannot control these units, the Government will.”²¹⁰

In January 1999, Serbian authorities carried through on their threats and deployed large army forces into Kosovo. They took up positions along the Macedonian border in anticipation of a NATO ground attack and supported the police in disrupting the supply routes of the KLA. On 15 January, they assaulted the village of Racak and killed 45 Albanian civilians, and on 16 January, KVM investigated the site of the massacre. The team found “evidence of arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, and mutilation of unarmed civilians.”²¹¹ The KVM head of mission, Ambassador William Walker, joined the team at the site to observe the evidence first-hand. Directly thereafter, he publicly condemned the massacre. The world media was also present to broadcast the ghastly

scene. Serbian authorities denied that any civilians had been killed, stating that it had been action directed only against the KLA.²¹²

Upon hearing the news of Racak, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and other Western leaders became determined to end the crisis in Kosovo. Ambassador Miles describes Racak: “It was watershed and a turning point in our determination to really apply military force.” However, US Defense Secretary William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Hugh Shelton opposed an approach that would lead to US participation in another peacekeeping mission. Despite this opposition in the US government, a flurry of diplomatic activity ensued. Albright succeeded in obtaining support from Western Europe for a threat of force and tacit approval from Russia. On 29 January, it was announced that peace talks would start between the Serbian government and the Albanians in Kosovo in Rambouillet, France on 6 February.²¹³

In Kosovo, there was serious opposition to participation at Rambouillet. Adem Demaci and several of the KLA field commanders were against taking part in the negotiations, as they saw them as a trap that would stop the a point where the Albanians would get less than what they wanted--full independence. They saw Rambouillet as a probable sell-out, a modern-day echo of the 1913 Ambassador’s Conference in London. Intense pressure was brought to bear on all sides in Kosovo. Rugova stated that he saw the KLA as part of the Albanian delegation, whereas Demaci went public against it. In the end, a sixteen man delegation that was a virtual “who’s who” of Kosovar politics over the last ten years was gathered, but notably without Demaci. If a confirmation was needed that Rugova no longer was the leading political force in Kosovo, then it came when Hashim Thaci was elected leader of the Albanian delegation. The Serbian

delegation that Milosevic sent was without power to negotiate, as Milosevic forbade it to accept infringement of Yugoslav sovereignty or the presence of foreign troops on Yugoslav territory.²¹⁴

Once the negotiations got underway, there were two major obstacles. The Albanian delegation wanted a referendum on independence included in the agreement, and the Serbians were not willing to accept foreign troops in Kosovo. From the start of the negotiations, the Americans had intelligence that the Serbians were planning a new major offensive in the middle of March. When Albright called Milosevic in order to budge his position, he demonstrated that he was in a parallel universe: “Ethnic Albanians are only about eight hundred thousand of the one and a half million people in Kosovo . . . Kosovo has been the bulwark of the Christian West against Islam for five hundred years.”²¹⁵ On the other hand, the Albanian delegation had little experience on the world scene: “When Albright first stuck her head into their room, they [the Albanians] assumed she was the cleaning woman, but they soon learnt otherwise.”²¹⁶ Albright put hard pressure on the Albanian delegation to accept the agreement. In the end, Thaci and the KLA were the only ones not doing so, and intense pressure was directed against Thaci. A key advocate that the KLA should not give up its weapons for empty promises was Adem Demaci who was pressured directly by Albright. Additionally key KLA commanders on the ground in Kosovo were in touch with Thaci and told him not to accept. The negotiation process was manipulated by the Americans so Veton Surroi who had been the secretary of the delegation signed a statement that the Albanians were prepared to sign the agreement in two weeks. After being outmaneuvered Thaci finally agreed to use the next two weeks to sell the agreement to the Albanian people in Kosovo. After two weeks

the Albanians came back to Paris and signed the agreement. The Serbian delegation did not budge and together with the Russians they boycotted the final signing ceremony.²¹⁷

To the Albanian delegation, the key part of the agreement was the inclusion of “the will of the people” as a basis for the final settlement, but the final text was both confusing and significantly watered down from the Albanian demand for a referendum to determine Kosovo’s future. In three years an international meeting was to be held to determine not the final settlement for Kosovo, but a mechanism for determining it. Thus the “will of the people” was only one of the considerations together with the opinions of “relevant authorities,” and each Party’s efforts to implement the agreement.²¹⁸

To some in Kosovo this was too weak, and Adem Demaci resigned as a political representative of the KLA, as he believed that signing any agreement that did not include independence was a strategic error. Among commanders inside of the KLA there was also considerable unease and a feeling that the politicians who had spent more time traveling abroad than fighting at home might have squandered independence.²¹⁹

The OSCE’s KVM monitors were withdrawn on 20 March. Because of the reduced moral authority of the KVM, some of its observers had been attacked. Knut Vollebaek, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the Chairman of the OSCE in 1999 with the final responsibility for KVM, and he worried:

We might have a new Srebrenica where impotent international observers only were spectators to cruelty . . . My position was that we could not withdraw the KVM as long as there was hope of a political solution. When the Rambouillet negotiations collapsed it became clear that Milosevic was unwilling to accept an armed presence in Kososo. I no longer had any arguments for [KVM] presence and decided to withdraw.²²⁰

For NATO, the Serbian failure to sign meant that the alliance was on the way to war, but this was a decision that was based on lengthy and thorough negotiations both

politically and militarily.²²¹ NATO made the decision that war would start unless Milosevic backed down. The Americans received information that the Serbian spring offensive which they had received intelligence about earlier had now started. Holbrooke was sent to Belgrade for one last attempt to persuade Milosevic to see reason, and he told Milosevic: “You understand that if I leave now with no satisfactory answer from you about disengagement and establishment of a dialogue that that will be followed by military action? Milosevic said: Yes, I do understand that.”²²² Upon hearing this, Holbrooke left, but there was a hope that Milosevic would change his mind at the last moment--as he had done on some occasions in the past--and recall Holbrooke’s plane, but this did not happen. After Holbrooke had left, the staff of the US Embassy worked all night shredding documents and welding shut the crypto room before leaving Belgrade early in the morning of 23 March. In Washington, President Clinton said that hesitation would be a license to kill, and so in the evening of March 23, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana ordered General Wesley Clark to initiate air operations.²²³

In Kosovo local Serbs saw Milosevic as a hero: “Saying no to the Americans was an act that will be remembered and cherished by all Serbians for a thousand years, just as we remember how Prince Lazar also chose the heavenly kingdom rather than the kingdom of this world. When Serbian history is written in a thousand years from now, Lazar and Milosevic will be remembered as the two greatest Serbs of all times.”²²⁴ While leaving Belgrade Ambassador Miles thought that Milosevic did what he did only to terrorize the local population, and felt that diplomacy had failed: “The greatest failure of diplomacy was that we were never able to bring about a fundamental change in Milosevic’s thinking that application of increasing levels of force would destroy the

ability of the Kosovo Liberation Army to function and to gain adherence and to radicalize Kosovar Albanian society.”²²⁵ Milosevic had thought that if he just applied a little more force he could deal with the situation, instead he alienated the Albanian population in a way that had repercussions both immediately after NATO’s entry and in March 2004.

NATO’s 78 Days of War

Initially NATO’s air campaign, or operation Allied Force, did not go well. Adverse weather influenced operations, Serbian air defense was difficult for NATO to target, and an American Stealth bomber crashed; all this while Milosevic’s forces went on a rampage in Kosovo. According to Albright, the objectives of Milosevic appeared to be to exterminate the KLA, permanently reengineer the ethnic balance of Kosovo, frighten all remaining Albanians in Kosovo into submission, and to create a humanitarian crisis that would be destabilizing in the region and consume the attention of the international community. In order to reverse this, General Clark undertook several initiatives. He requested more planes and expanded target lists, he set action in motion that led to the establishment of a land component under US national command, and the liaison arrangements the United Kingdom and the United States had established with the KLA in Northern Albanian were expanded into Kosovo.²²⁶

The task of setting up a land component was given to the V Corps Commander, General Hendrix: “It was only well after the air campaign was initiated that V Corps was given the mission to activate an attack helicopter heavy force that effectively became the land component of the overall campaign. The mission was to be prepared to conduct attack helicopter attacks inside of Kosovo against the Yugoslav army, and this later expanded to fire support from artillery and rockets into Kosovo as well.”²²⁷ The force

became known as Task Force Hawk, and was under the direct command of Hendrix. Initial planning was that the force should deploy to Macedonia, but the political situation in Macedonia forced a last minute change, and the force deployed to Albania on very short notice. Deployment was achieved ahead of schedule, but not without difficulties, particularly as military lift capacity was prioritized to the mounting humanitarian crisis. Hendrix argues that planning for and inclusion of a land component from the start of the campaign most likely would have presented Yugoslav forces with more dilemmas, and thus the war most likely would have ended sooner. The Rand Corporation after the war undertook a large study of the campaign and concluded that although Allied Force was a joint operation it was not fought that way; particularly when it came to the integration of air and ground capabilities. Milosevic and his military commanders never had to cope with the threat of an air-land campaign, and there was room for doubt as to whether NATO's limited military campaign and political will could not be outlasted by Milosevic.²²⁸

The lack of will to open up a land campaign was interpreted by Serbs and Albanians as a sign that although Kosovo was important, it was not important enough to risk soldiers lives to win. This lesson was re-learnt in March 2004 when risk aversion crippled KFOR's response to the riots.

Inside Kosovo, the bombing campaign did not have a large effect on the Serbian forces initially. Expulsions of people were soon underway, with paramilitaries and local civilians as the worst perpetrators, followed by the police, whereas the army was more reluctant to revert to such methods. Father Sava describes the cleansing of Pec that he witnessed together with Bishop Artemije on a foggy day in the end of March:

I saw Albanian civilians with children and plastic bags . . . There were hundreds, thousands of people, with cars and on foot. They told us they had been given ten minutes to go . . . I saw a woman in slippers. The bishop was shocked and petrified. I said, “I can see the Serbs leaving Kosovo very soon.”²²⁹

The scale of the humanitarian crisis was massive. On 24 May 1999, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted Milosevic for his role in forcibly removing a substantial part of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo through a deliberate, widespread and systematic campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians. The US Department of Defense After Action Review to Congress states that around one million became refugees. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo estimated the number of killings to about 10,000, with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovar Albanians, and that approximately 863,000 civilians sought or were forced into refuge outside Kosovo and an additional 590,000 were internally displaced. The OSCE estimated that over 90 percent of Kosovo’s population was displaced by the end of the conflict. The UNHCR registered 848,100 Kosovo Albanians who had left Kosovo by the end of the bombing. The numbers correlate relatively well, and the natural conclusion is that Milosevic’s regime tried to commit ethnic cleansing on a scale not seen in Europe since WWII.²³⁰

The bombing campaign gradually intensified, and by the end of May, the defense ministers of key countries in NATO met to discuss a ground war. The British pledged 50,000 soldiers and initiated a call up of the Territorial Army. But before serious preparations for a ground war got underway, Milosevic capitulated. Diplomacy once more got underway, and a key point was reached when Russia agreed to terms that would withdraw all Serbian security forces from Kosovo. The task of negotiating with, or rather dictating terms to, the Serb military was given to General Sir Mike Jackson, who as the

commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was designated to be the first commander of KFOR. On 9 June, the Military Technical Agreement was signed, and NATO's war was over when air strikes were officially suspended the next day.²³¹

CHAPTER 5

STRONGER ON PAPER THAN ON THE GROUND

Emergency--June 1999 to October 2000²³²

Before Russia agreed to go along with NATO in pressuring Milosevic to capitulate, there was no definite plan for post-war Kosovo. The American plan was that NATO would maintain order in Kosovo, the UN would authorize the peacekeeping mission and take charge of civilian administration, the EU would coordinate reconstruction, and the OSCE would organize elections and train local police. The US position ultimately became the international plan for Kosovo. The weakness of the plan was that many entities shared the responsibility without a unified chain of command.²³³

On 10 June 1999, the UNSC passed resolution 1244. The resolution did not address the question at the heart of the war between Serbs and Albanians--who should rule Kosovo--and it did not determine an end-state for Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 authorized the UN Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations:

To establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo . . . Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo.²³⁴

By not deciding on final status UNSCR 1244 denied KFOR and UNMIK what would otherwise have been far and away the most compelling 'carrot' for acting responsibly. Because 1244 prohibited doing anything that would prejudge Kosovo's eventual status, KFOR and UNMIK officials were never able so much as to discuss the

one issue of overriding importance to Albanians, nor could they tell Serbs that Kosovo would be independent and that the only issue on which they could have any influence was their own place within that newborn state.²³⁵

The international community organized its presence in Kosovo along the lines of the American plan described earlier. KFOR was in NATO's Chain of Command. UNMIK was led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) who reported to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. Under the SRSG UNMIK consisted of four different functional areas or pillars as they were called. Pillar I (humanitarian assistance), was led by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Pillar II (civil administration), was under the direct leadership of the United Nations. Pillar III (democratization and institution building), was led by the OSCE. Pillar IV (Reconstruction and Economic Development), was led by the European Union (EU). In June 2000, Pillar I was phased out, and in May 2001 a new Pillar I (Police and Justice), was established under the direct leadership of the United Nations. The pillars under direct UN leadership were the responsibility of the UN, but in addition to being under the command of the SRSG had direct reporting chains to the UN. The SRSG for instance cannot decide on issues considered UN administration.²³⁶ Between KFOR and UNMIK there was no command relationship, it was all based on coordination: "We cooperated reasonably well, but it was cooperation, not unity of effort or unity of command."²³⁷

The initial deployment into Kosovo went smoothly for KFOR, but only on the surface. As KFOR was getting ready to go in, a force of about 200 Russian troops in 16 trucks and 16 armored personnel carriers, who were peacekeepers in Bosnia, left their

positions in Bosnia and drove through Sandzak to Pristina where they seized the Pristina airport. This presented the first challenge to KFOR's efforts in Kosovo. General Yevtukhovich, who arrived from Russia in July in order to be the Russian commander in Kosovo described the march this way: "Our men showed what Russian forces are capable of and conducted the fastest and longest tactical approach march in history."²³⁸ Upon getting the report from Bosnia that the Russians were leaving, General Clark gave General Jackson a warning order to seize Pristina airport. In parallel, on US channels, General Hendrix in Task Force Hawk was ordered to be prepared to seize Pristina airport: "We [Task Force Hawk] could have had forces in there in great quantity extraordinarily rapidly. In 48 hours we had the assets in place to air assault a full brigade in there, and we had the forces postured to do that."²³⁹ Clark felt that things were not moving fast enough, so he flew down to Macedonia to order Jackson to get forces into the airport to block the Russians. In order to avoid a confrontation with the Russians, and not "start World War III," Jackson obstructed obeying Clark's order and thus put his own position on the line in order to do what he saw as right. Jackson's approach allowed a diplomatic solution to the problem. An agreement with Russia, which hammered out the details of Russian participation in KFOR, was negotiated in Helsinki in Finland.²⁴⁰

Jackson recently gave his first published version of these events:

Again and again I stressed that confrontation was not the answer. Russian support had been crucial in delivering the deal with the Serbs. They were major players and must be treated as such. To alienate them would be counter-productive in the short- and the long-term. I argued for a more subtle approach, such as isolating the Russians as a prelude to obtaining their participation. Either Wes wasn't listening, or he wasn't convinced.²⁴¹

This shows that leadership was a crucial element in the operation. If Jackson had not put his career on line and Clark had been allowed to follow his course of action, the

repercussions could have been large scale confrontation. In contrast, later in the mission a lack of good leadership at a critical time proved to be crucial.

KFOR had another challenge as well. It entered Kosovo alone, or nearly alone. The first SRSG, Sergio Vieira de Mello arrived with only a few days notice with a skeleton crew of eight persons, and the UN Secretary General appointed Bernard Kouchner as the first regular SRSG 2 July. At the end of summer, UNMIK still consisted of just a couple of hundred civilians in total. Most of the time was spent setting up the mission, interacting with other internationals and writing reports back to the respective headquarters in New York, Geneva, Vienna and Brussels. By June 2000, the international civil administration had grown to 292 professional personnel out of an authorized total of 435. Staffing levels reached 86 percent of authorized levels at headquarters, 42 percent in the regions and 60 percent in the municipalities. The institution-building pillar of OCSE, with an authorized total of 751 staff, had 564 international staff members in place, UNHCR had 78, and the economic reconstruction pillar had 63. The lack of authority that first summer according to King and Mason left a lasting legacy of contempt for legally constituted power with which UNMIK would have to struggle in the years to come.²⁴²

The third challenge to KFOR when it initially entered Kosovo was that between the withdrawal of Serbian security forces and the arrival of KFOR, the KLA had moved in to fill the power vacuum. The KLA established administrative and security organizations and asserted their authority as a de facto government. KFOR was not ready to assume responsibility for governance as KFOR's responsibility under the UNSC 1244 mandate was security, and that governance was UNMIK's responsibility.²⁴³

UNSCR 1244 called for disarming the KLA. The KLA avoided this by filling the power vacuum. Scott Porter, who at the time served as a liaison from the US Army to the KLA, explains his observations from the vantage point of the KLA HQ:

There was a huge power vacuum. The KLA moved from their Mountain HQ [to Pristina] . . . a little early, but they knew they needed to rapidly become a “conventional” rather than a guerrilla force if they wanted real recognition from their people and the international community. However, once there, they were attacked on several occasions by Serb ground units . . . These resulted in casualties and even fatalities. However, this did not deter them, and they tried vigorously to become the legitimate army of Kosovo and become an “enforcement force” rather than a civil corps. The KLA saw their role as the real protectors and enforcers in Kosovo; enforcing the law, punishing wrong doers, protecting the Albanians, and wishing desperately to work side by side with KFOR in other military duties.²⁴⁴

Porter cites how Agim Ceku was unhappy with the undertaking to transform the KLA: “My men stay [in the KPC] only because every one of them believe that it [the KPC] will someday become a future Army . . . or an army will grow out of the KPC.”²⁴⁵

The last primary challenge for KFOR in Kosovo was that the job they had come to do--protect the Albanians--was not fully adequate to answer all of the problems of the situation on the ground. In the environment of Kosovo in the summer of 1999, score-settling, vengeance and plain political crime was the order of the day. Judah explains this as part of a culture of revenge codified in the old kanuns. After an initial period of inability to deal with the challenges of reprisals against Serbs, other minorities, and perceived Albanian collaborators, KFOR got the security situation relatively well under control by the end of 1999. When KFOR entered Kosovo there were about 50 murders a week, but by November this was reduced to 4 a week. However, Colonel Russell Thaden, the Chief Intelligence Officer of KFOR from October 1999 listed his security concerns as: “The first, but least likely was that Serbia would attempt to have her forces re-enter

Kosovo, the second was the internal security issue of Kosovar reprisals against and attempts to drive out the remaining Serb residents, the third security concern quickly developed from Hashim Thaci's call to liberate their Albanian brethren in "East Kosovo" as he styled it which was the heavily Albanian populated area of southern Serbia."²⁴⁶

Two out of three concerns were directed outside of Kosovo. It is possible that in light of these priorities KFOR HQ may have been preoccupied with external threats and allocated less resources and energy towards problems internal to Kosovo. When Thaden arrived in October, the primary issue for KFOR had become protecting the Serbs. Iain Cassidy, who served in KFOR from June 1999, admits that it took about a month from the entry of Kosovo until measures were in place that reduced the number of Serb casualties. Thus the first impression for the Serbs was that KFOR was unable to protect them.²⁴⁷

Another area that was problematic from the start was the area of "soft power."²⁴⁸ UNMIK failed to influence effectively the most potent levers of soft power, education the media, and the symbolic environment. The media was under no control immediately after the entry of KFOR and UNMIK, and when UNMIK initially arrived with only two press officers who shared a cell phone between them, this did not help. But when the KLA tried to take over Kosovo's state broadcasting station, RTK, in the summer of 1999, they were evicted by KFOR. But a different outcome happened when Veton Surroi published the following in his *Koha Ditore* newspaper: "Today's violence . . . is the organised and systematic intimidation of all Serbs simply because they are Serbs and therefore are being held collectively responsible for what happened in Kosovo. However, from having been victims of Europe's worst end-of-century persecution, we are ourselves becoming persecutors and have allowed the spectre of fascism to reappear."²⁴⁹ A month later

Kosovapress, which had been a mouthpiece for the KLA and was now linked to Thaci's provisional government, attacked Surroi and his editor Baton Haxhiu. They were accused of having a "Slav stink," were told that "such criminal and enslaved minds should not have a place in the free Kosovo," and they were given a very direct warning that they risked "eventual and very understandable revenge."²⁵⁰

Following the case of Surroi and Haxhiu the SRSG created the office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC), but he gave it no teeth. Only after the newspaper *Dita* accused a Serb UNMIK employee of being a war criminal and published his photo with the consequence that he was found murdered shortly thereafter, did TMC get power. However, the attempt to close *Dita* down for 8 days was countered by Surroi, who allowed *Dita* to be printed on the presses of his *Koha Ditore* in Macedonia. Thus the attempt to clamp down failed miserably, and the press was allowed to become a haven for hate speech.²⁵¹

Naturally few others in Kosovo wanted to go through the same as Surroi and Haxhiu, and threats effectively shut down freedom of the press. There had never been a free press in Kosovo; the press had always been the mouthpiece of the people in power at any given time. Kosovo had never experienced the role of the press in a free and democratic society and it is possible that the reactions by the KLA elements were caused by ignorance of the role of the press, or by a more sinister wish to just take over as the new ruling elite using the same methods as the old elite to hold on to their power.²⁵²

UNMIK's priority for education was to get the schools back to work and international donors intent on good photo opportunities pumped money into the physical infrastructure of schools. Education had been the cornerstone of parallel institutions in

Kosovo, and was in dire need of reforms, but there was no systematic effort to prevent inter-ethnic hatred from fermenting in the schools, or to correct distorted versions of history taught in the schools. On the contrary, since it was perceived that the schools had been central to pacifist Albanian resistance, they were an area that could be transferred to local authority early. Albanian members of an educational advisory group set up and closed the first year were dismayed that UNMIK made no effort to depoliticize the school system, instead leaving it in the hands of political party bosses who used it as an enormous patronage network.²⁵³

In addition to areas of soft power, a pressing issue for UNMIK was the regulation of judicial process in Kosovo. UNMIK's first Regulation in 1999 stated: "The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo . . . insofar as those laws do not conflict with internationally recognized human rights standards or other UNMIK regulations."²⁵⁴ However, to the Albanians, the applicable laws before the bombing campaign were "Serb laws," and a symbol of Serbian oppression of Albanians. A crisis ensued as Albanians protested the decision and Albanian judges refused to apply these laws. Six months after issuing Regulation 1999/1, UNMIK declared that the new applicable law in Kosovo would be the law in force on 22 March 1989, immediately before Milosevic ended Kosovo's autonomous status.²⁵⁵

International police came to Kosovo from June 1999, but their initial deployment was a slow trickle. However, local judges and prosecutors retained exclusive jurisdiction for the administration of justice. Some of these jurists--virtually all of whom were ethnic Albanians--failed to apply the law evenly for ethnic Serbians and Albanians. In an effort to establish the rule of law and mechanisms of accountability following the war in

Kosovo and rising civil disorder, UNMIK established a program of international judges and prosecutors that was the first of its kind in the world. Unfortunately UNMIK did not have the knowledge. Michael Hartmann, who arrived in Mitrovica in early 2002 as the first international prosecutor, when he wrote about his lessons learned:

Successful international intervention in the judicial arena should be immediate and bold, rather than incremental and crisis-driven. Early prosecution by internationals can ensure fair and impartial trials and a public perception that even the powerful are not immune to the rule of law, can inhibit the growth and entrenchment of criminal power structures and alliances among extremist ethnic groups, and can end impunity for war criminals and terrorists alike.²⁵⁶

The judiciary was not allowed to work independently. Christer Karphammer said that he knew directly of several cases in which UN and KFOR senior officials opposed or blocked prosecution of former KLA members, including some who had joined the KPC.²⁵⁷

General Klaus Reinhardt who took over command of KFOR from Jackson on 8 October 1999, in his book about his tour in Kosovo describes how he became very friendly with former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj, including visiting his family. It is of course imperative that a military commander establish good relations with all relevant parties in order to exert influence outside of the chain of command. However, with the luxury of hindsight it is questionable that a commander of KFOR should get that close to a man who was later indicted by the ICTY for war crimes, and as there is always more than one side to the conflict a commander needs to exercise caution over which messages he presents.²⁵⁸ The impact of Reinhardt's actions pales in comparison to the impact in Kosovo when Albright during a triumphant visit to Pristina on 15 July 1999 ostentatiously kissed Thaci on world television. Thaci not only was viewed by virtually all Serbs and many others as a war criminal, he was in a struggle with the international

authorities in Kosovo as he asserted the legitimacy of his KLA run “Provisional government.” The kiss sent a strong message that alignment with the US was more important than any other considerations.²⁵⁹ A few months later KFOR’s chief intelligence officer observed violence starting in the Presevo valley in Serbia: “We saw actions [in Presevo] follow Thaci’s call to arms.”²⁶⁰

When key leaders in the international community aligned themselves closely with former KLA leaders, this had two primary effects. The first was that it further entrenched the structures put in place by the KLA after the war by telling Albanians and Serbs alike that these were the people the international community wanted to deal with. Secondly, it opened up speculation about whether or not the international community was really committed to investigating allegations of war crimes.

As the security situation in Kosovo became better, the divided town of Mitrovica remained a source of trouble. Mitrovica had a predominantly Serb population north of the Ibar River and a predominantly Albanian population south of the river. French KFOR troops, who took control over Northern Kosovo, instead of trying to defuse tensions, just separated the two groups along the Ibar, thus speeding up ethnic cleansing on both banks of the river without any decrease in tension. All three municipalities north of the Ibar are predominantly Serb, and Serbian parallel institutions quickly established themselves there. French KFOR was unwilling to do anything about this, and the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) could not order in other nation’s troops due to national caveats and fear of alienating the French. Additionally UNMIK did not have the resources to act on its own. During the winter of 2000, Mitrovica erupted in large-scale riots, and even though KFOR imposed a semblance of order, the situation in Mitrovica continued to be a

serious security challenge. It was only in 2001 when KFOR introduced other nation's troop contingents on a more permanent basis in Mitrovica and KFOR and UNMIK drafted a joint strategy on how to address the Serb areas in northern Kosovo that the tension in the city subsided substantially and the situation came under control.²⁶¹

UNSCR 1244 demanded that KFOR should demilitarize the KLA. Taking into account that the KLA felt they had just won a war over Serbia, albeit with a little help from NATO, and had already entrenched themselves in power structures in Kosovo, this was no small task. However, KFOR was able to successfully negotiate and implement the transformation of the KLA into a civil response organization, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). This did not happen without serious friction as involvement of individual members of the KLA in criminal activity, and some weapons that were not turned in to KFOR or accounted for, but considering the situation when KFOR entered, this was a relative success. However, the KPC did not give up its ambition to be the future army of Kosovo, and this proved to be a constant issue of contention with KFOR.²⁶²

There had been accusations from the Serbian government and media that the KLA was an Islamic terrorist organization. However, Scott Porter, a liaison officer who lived with the KLA and the KPC saw no signs of this: "The KLA refused to fight with the Mujahidin when they showed up on the battlefield. The KLA was not a religious organization by any stretch of the word, and I never saw anyone pray and most told me that they did not believe in any god."²⁶³ After the war the KPC turned down an offer for full financing from Islamic sources that could have had wide-ranging consequences had it been accepted. Scott Porter witnessed:

A member from the Saudi Royal family visited Ceku in late 99. I was not in the meeting that ensued, but Ceku told me that the Saudi proposed to fully fund the KPC if they all (everyone in the KPC) converted to Islam. Ceku told me that he turned down the offer.²⁶⁴

The flow of refugees back into Kosovo went faster and smoother than anyone in the international community had expected. Within three weeks of KFOR entry, more than half a million out of those who had left during the bombing were back in Kosovo. By the end of November UNHCR reported that 808,913 out of 848,100 refugees were back in Kosovo.²⁶⁵ Humanitarian assistance to the people who had recently returned also went remarkably well, and the combined efforts of KFOR, UNMIK and a large number of NGOs made sure that most people got what they needed to survive, if not in comfort, then at least not totally destitute during the first winter. There was however a gap between expectations and what the international community managed to deliver.²⁶⁶

On 24 September 2000, there were presidential elections in Yugoslavia. When the results of the first round were announced, the primary opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, received 48.96 percent, whereas Slobodan Milosevic received 38.62 percent. The Federal Electoral Commission declared the elections to have been fair and called for a new round 8 November. The opposition was soon able to document widespread election fraud, and after a tense period of demonstrations and clashes, Milosevic was forced to concede defeat. His exit from office ended Belgrade's status as an international pariah. To the international community it looked as if dialogue with Belgrade was possible.²⁶⁷

In October 2000, municipal elections were arranged in Kosovo. The elections in and of themselves went relatively smoothly, but the results were different than many had expected. In spite of the entrenchment of KLA in positions of power and the many observers who saw Rugova and LDK as a spent cause politically, the LDK won a

landslide victory with 58 percent of the votes. Thaci, whose Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) had the support of KLA cadres entrenched in positions of power was infuriated. He found himself in the uncomfortable role as underdog and accused the LDK of rigging the elections and a PDK spokesman accused LDK of intimidating voters.²⁶⁸

Consolidation--November 2000 to September 2002

With Milosevic removed from power in Belgrade and more moderate forces in political control of the municipalities in Kosovo, it would seem that the period of emergency was over. Hans Haekkerup, a determined and quiet Dane replaced the flamboyant Kouchner as SRSG. Haekkerup quickly set about to establish a good relationship with KFOR. When General Thorstein Skiaker took over as COMKFOR a month after Haekkerup arrived, Skiaker told Haekkerup on the first day in office that KFOR was not in the lead in Kosovo, that he as commander would do everything possible to support the SRSG, and that he saw KFOR and himself as a subordinate to UNMIK and the SRSG. "I saw political and economic development as key to success. In order to succeed we had to support UNMIK."²⁶⁹ When General Valentin took over from Skiaker in the autumn of 2001, the cooperation continued to be close, and this continued when the new SRSG, Michael Steiner arrived in January 2002.²⁷⁰

The security situation in Kosovo had improved substantially since the summer of 1999, but in 2001 there were two external conflicts that threatened to destabilize Kosovo. In the Presevo valley, the insurgency that had started after Thaci's call to arms had reached a critical size. Insurgents were operating with impunity in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the administrative boundary line with Serbia. The solution to this was that on the one hand Serbia was allowed to reintroduce security forces in the DMZ, and on the

other hand KFOR increased presence along the boundary and aggressively used COMKFOR's right to under UNSCR 1244 to detain persons who were a threat to the safe and secure environment in Kosovo. This paved the way for signing of a "Demilitarization Statement" in Konculj on 20 May 2001. In this way, the insurgency was broken through a combination of political and military measures.²⁷¹

The other external conflict that threatened stability in Kosovo at the time was the conflict between ethnic Albanian minority and the Slav majority in Macedonia. During the spring of 2001 a significant amount of refugees came into Kosovo, and weapons and fighters flowed both ways. There was significant support from former KLA members in Kosovo, and as an example, Gezim Ostreni went directly from a position as Chief of Staff of the KPC to lead the National Liberation Army (NLA) in Macedonia. To KFOR and UNMIK, the situation was extremely worrisome. The only supply route into Kosovo with substantial capacity runs through Macedonia, and if it was cut both the international presence and the local community would have suffered. KFOR deployed units along the border with Macedonia to monitor the situation and obstruct fighters and weapons from crossing the border. The conflict was solved through international mediation, but it showed clear weaknesses in KFOR's command structure. National caveats restricted COMKFOR's ability to deploy forces to carry out missions along the border, and this had to be overcome by negotiations with the different countries represented in KFOR. Also, COMKFOR had an unexpected experience: "All of a sudden I discovered that one of my brigade commanders had left his area of operations and was operating outside of Kosovo in an operation to extract NLA fighters from the village Aracinovo just outside of Skopje. When I raised the issue it was clarified that the order to do so had come from SACEUR

through the parallel “US” chain of command in Brussels and Naples to the US Commander of Multinational Brigade (MNB) East.”²⁷² Regardless of challenges in the command and control chain in NATO, measures employed by KFOR inside of Kosovo contributed to calm the situation down and was part of what prepared the ground for a political solution to the crisis.²⁷³

The relatively effective way KFOR dealt with the situation and the results achieved are quite extraordinary given the constraints national caveats and agendas had on COMKFOR’s ability to command. However, this is an example that good leadership can overcome weakness in formal command relationships.

On the political front, several important events happened during this period. Haekkerup hammered out a constitutional framework for the provisional institutions of self-government, arranged Kosovo-wide parliamentary elections, and he forged a working relationship with Belgrade. Steiner on 24 April 2002 introduced “Standards for Kosovo” in a speech to the UNSC. The “Standards” was a list of eight areas of policy where Kosovo had to change in order to become a functional society in harmony with contemporary European values. First and foremost the Standards were intended to provide a sense of direction for Kosovo to locals and internationals alike. However, the driving force that could have accelerated the Standards process, the lure of independence, was not available, and could Kosovo’s government be held accountable for lack of progress in Standards areas under UNMIK’s competency? And who could measure Standards objectively? The Standards process, like many other international initiatives in Kosovo, had serious flaws.²⁷⁴

Politics in Kosovo according to King and Mason, had three major divisions. These were local--international, Serb--Albanian, and LDK--PDK. Up to 2001, Kosovo had an ad hoc government structure where these divisions had been played out. Haekkerup decided that a constitutional framework, where the arrangements could become more formal, was needed. It took four months of drafting to arrive at the framework, and it was a difficult process. The Serbs did not take part as they saw it as a stepping stone to independence, but the final result still had strong measures of positive discrimination in favor of minorities. The Albanian side pushed hard for competencies to be given to locals, and KFOR played a role in the negotiations behind the scene with advice and support to UNMIK, and through influencing local leaders. UNMIK did its utmost to avoid anything that would prejudge the final status of Kosovo.²⁷⁵

UNMIK arranged parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 17 November 2001. The political parties all campaigned on promises that the constitutional framework would not allow them to fulfill, in other words they all took slightly different positions on how to arrive at independence. Haekkerup and Serb minister Nebosa Covic signed in “Common Document” on 5 November. The document only reaffirmed what was already outlined in UNSCR 1244, but this could be presented as a Serb victory and thus paved the way for Serb participation in the elections. The LDK became the largest party in the assembly with 47 out of 120 seats, PDK took 24, and Haradinaj’s Alliance for the future of Kosovo took eight seats. The Serbian Coalition Return won eight seats and was awarded another ten that was set aside for minorities, thus bringing its total to 18.²⁷⁶

The fact that two elections had been arranged without major incidents was reported as a sign of major progress in Kosovo. However, a closer look at the political

parties in Kosovo would have revealed that all was not as well as it looked on the outside. The LDK was a one man show run by an inert Rugova out of touch with the electorate, and the party had not developed institutions inside of the party that were geared towards functioning in a democracy. PDK and AAK were both parties born out of the KLA, and as such very new organizations. The short time period after the war before municipal elections and before parliamentary elections left insufficient time to develop party apparatuses fit for democracies. All three major Albanian parties functioned more on a patron client model than a democratic model.²⁷⁷

Apparently Kosovo was enjoying success. In Pristina, a great number of cafes and restaurants were opened, petrol stations sprung up at short intervals along all major roads, and shops catering to a luxury market opened in the most unlikely places. On the other hand there were still people in the hills of Drenica who had not yet had roofs fitted to their houses after their wartime destruction, houses were built everywhere in seeming total disrespect for legal titles to the land or preservation of agricultural land, a great percentage of the houses were left half-built, and the production of electricity was too low to keep up with demand, thus producing power cuts that complicated the people's life and eroded public confidence.²⁷⁸ One of the primary reasons for trouble was that the economy existed on a bubble. In 2001 international assistance provided 70 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Kosovo, and after this a sharp decline started as the local economy was unable to compensate as international assistance was reduced. As international assistance peaked in 2001 the GDP in Kosovo grew 16.6 percent, but the GDP sunk 2.9 percent in 2002 and 1.1 percent in 2003. To the people of Kosovo, the lack of economic growth became a serious issue, and many struggled to make the ends meet.

In this context, media reports of internationals involved in scams and receiving monthly salaries that were ten times higher than the annual salary of an average Kosovar was a source of discontent and anger.²⁷⁹

The good cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK enabled the two organizations to agree on a KFOR/UNMIK Security Transition Strategy on 15 May 2002. As a part of this COMKFOR ordered that commanders should conduct joint training with UNMIK Police personnel in order to better prepare for coherent and appropriate responses to given security threats.²⁸⁰ The coherent approach that came out of this time of cooperation could, had it been sustained have created conditions for KFOR and UNMIK to respond appropriately to the violence on 17-19 March 2004, and possibly have avoided the violence in the first place.

Confrontation and Stagnation--October 2002 to July 2003

On 4 October 2002, General Fabio Mini from Italy took over command of KFOR. Within a month, he had initiated a whole range of initiatives that would seriously hamper the effectiveness of KFOR and the cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK. The morning after he took command he told the assembled staff: "I believe that the most energy is found in a staff that operates on the verge of chaos and anarchy."²⁸¹ Within a couple of weeks, the command group meetings where the generals of KFOR HQ discussed sensitive issues and built consensus for decisions were abolished: "In very short time the structure and routines that had been established [in the staff] were destroyed."²⁸² The cooperation with UNMIK also suffered. Ambassador Harnish, who at the time was the head of the US Office in Pristina said: "With the arrival of Mini there was a complete breakdown of relations between commander KFOR and the SRSG who

had worked very well with the former commander. From my point of view as US ambassador and from the ambassadors of the other quint countries (France, Germany, Italy, US, UK) we saw the situation as so serious that we both collectively and individually tried to talk to him about it, but we were not successful.”²⁸³ Relations with the KPC went the same way. Major General Andrew Cumming was the KPC Coordinator in UNMIK: “Mini was not following anyone’s instructions and no amount of persuasion from UNMIK would change his mind. He was going to alienate and then destroy the KPC. A hopeless policy particularly when you have as your target the country’s favourite group, led by the “man of the year” for the third year running--Ceku.”²⁸⁴ On the relationship between Steiner and Mini, Major General Cumming made this observation: “Steiner did his best but, in Mini, he was having to work with an enigma who--and I am trying to be kind--was a self-obsessed lunatic who was determined that, as he had “put down the Mafia” [in Italy], so he would do the same to the KPC and, as an extension of that, to all Albanians.”²⁸⁵

During the year that Mini commanded KFOR, the number of troops serving in KFOR was reduced from about 40,000 to about 20,000 troops. Combat troops were reduced more than support troops. KFOR tried to deal with this by transferring tasks to UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), but UNMIK was also reducing its number of international police, and KPS were not numerous enough or competent enough to take over from KFOR. However, the troop reductions were driven by national considerations in the sending nations, and did not change as a result of considerations on the ground as expressed in KFOR’s periodic mission reviews.²⁸⁶

The failure of leadership in KFOR came at a crucial time in Kosovo's post conflict development. The lack of respect for the KPC irked the Albanians more than most international observers understood. The KPC had become a symbol of the fight for independence, and an attack on it, was seen as an attack on Kosovo's freedom.²⁸⁷

The overriding priority of Kosovo's Albanian population and politicians was independence. The tension in this area mounted as the three year term that had been stipulated in the Rambouillet Agreement passed without any action taken. Ambassador Harnish found a volatile situation when he arrived in Kosovo in 2002: "The pressure to engage the question of final status understandably was becoming very high and in order to defuse the situation a change in policy was needed. On behalf of the US, I spoke out in support of independence for Kosovo, both in private conversations with leading politicians and in public."²⁸⁸

The frustration with the lack of economic progress was mounting. The flow of donor money had peaked and was rapidly declining. Remittances from Albanians living abroad to some degree compensated, but in a report to a donor conference in November 2002, UNMIK showed that the situation was serious: "The key question for policy makers and donors is to what extent the decline of these various inflows will be smooth and manageable, or to which degree it will be abrupt, potentially causing an unmanageable shock to the economy . . . not to mention the broader economic and political stability of Kosovo and therefore of the region."²⁸⁹

The moral authority of the international community in Kosovo stemming from the 1999 war eroded. UNMIK had never been particularly popular in Kosovo, and now it became the primary victim of criticism and mockery from local politicians and

increasingly hostile local media. In June 2002, a Kosovo government had finally been sworn in after the 2001 parliamentary elections, and this government took an increasingly confrontational approach with UNMIK. The departure of the hard-working SRSG, Steiner, in the summer of 2003, followed by the “old, weak and absentminded” Harri Holkeri as SRSG did not help. King and Mason argue that an era of “confrontation and stagnation” had begun with the swearing in of the new government that ended with the March 2004 riots. However, the shift of perception of KFOR that came as a result of its change of leadership and the new KFOR leadership’s crack-down on the KPC most likely had greater impact on the perceptions of the population in Kosovo, and thus the period can be said to have started in October 2002.²⁹⁰

The International Crisis group listed the challenges facing Holkeri when he arrived:

Frustration is growing with the poor state of the economy and the delay of the international community in addressing status. In the midst of these challenges, the crucial relationship between UNMIK and the PISG [Provisional Institutions of Self-Government] has become dangerously strained. Holkeri will need to come quickly to terms with the legacy of confrontation and tension left by his predecessor, Michael Steiner, and instill in his team a new attitude of respect for PISG and a reflex for consultation rather than unilateral action.²⁹¹

Dark Clouds on the Horizon--August 2003 to February 2004

General Mini who commanded KFOR from October 2002 to October 2003 considered the KLA, its successor organization KPC, traditional Albanian social structures in Kosovo and organized crime networks as virtually the same structures.²⁹² Major General Andrew Cumming served as UNMIK’s KPC coordinator and thus was the person responsible for oversight of the most popular institution in Kosovo, led by the nation’s most popular person, Agim Ceku. The guidance he received when he arrived

from SRSG Steiner was not exactly watertight: “Just control the KPC and keep them off my back.”²⁹³ The policy of not engaging the KPC was seen as dangerous by US ambassador Harnish: “The KPC was one of the most challenging issues in Kosovo and could easily become extremely disruptive.”²⁹⁴ Major General Cumming averted this:

Mini said that all the KPC were criminals and that he would now, without evidence (which he said he had but could not disclose for security reasons--even to the SRSG), arrest a large number of KPC commanders. He did arrest 3 . . . and said that he would not bother to charge them, just discharge them. I persuaded SRSG, after I had spent 7 hours with Ceku and all his commanders persuading them not to take action, that he could not do this and that he certainly could not behave in a heavy handed manner like some third world dictator but would have to produce evidence and charge them or release them.²⁹⁵

To the Albanians, the methods Mini represented were the same as they had experienced under the regime of Milosevic. Seen in context with the widespread sacking of Albanians in government service in 1989-1990 the processes initiated against KPC leaders were particularly sensitive to the population. An intelligence brief from MNB Center to KFOR HQ in November 2003 had the telling title: “Are we the new Serbs?”²⁹⁶

When the German Holger Kammerhoff, took over as COMKFOR in October 2003, he took command over a KFOR that not only had been halved over the last year; it also faced further draw-downs. The effort that had started in 2002 to hand over tasks to UNMIK and KPS was continued with renewed energy, and the primary planning effort of KFOR HQ became its transition to a smaller organization with a drastically reduced footprint in Kosovo. This was presented to the public in Kosovo as “normalization,” but the Serbs in Kosovo felt less secure as a result of this.²⁹⁷

On 13 November 2003, Austrian KFOR troops escorted a group of Serbs who had been living as refugees in Serbia since 1999 on a visit to go and see their home village of Mushtishte. The convoy was stoned and someone detonated explosive devices in nearby

abandoned houses. The reaction of the KFOR troops, in addition to firing ineffectually in the air was to abort the visit and pull back, thus leaving the perpetrators as victors on the disputed ground and the refugees without even a glimpse of the houses they had come to see. Both observers and officers serving in KFOR at the time viewed the incident as a final sign that the one entity in the international community that had been seen as liberators and thus as untouchables no longer had the protection from violence in the local community. There was no longer a taboo on violence against KFOR, and this would prove to be significant during the riots.²⁹⁸

In spite of the disappearance of the taboo on violence against KFOR, the outward signs of the security in Kosovo looked rather promising. The number of murders in Kosovo in 2003 was 131.²⁹⁹ A UNDP study from June 2003 concluded that violent crime rates (homicide, robbery, and assault) in Kosovo were analogous to or even lower than its neighbors, that inter-ethnic violence had dropped sharply, and that the majority of murders were committed with Albanian men as both the perpetrators and victims.³⁰⁰ However, this report does not take into account that the instances of inter-ethnic violence each were particularly disturbing and only a few months elapsed between each occurrence of a spectacular murder of Serbs. In early June 2003, an elderly Serb couple and their son were hacked to death in Obilic, in August 2003 assailants fired on Serb children bathing in a river in Western Kosovo killing two and wounding four, and on 19 February two Serbs were shot dead when about 50 rounds were emptied into their car near Lipljan. KFOR and UNMIK both committed large resources to solving these cases, but were unable to find the perpetrators, thus creating both a feeling of being victims among the Serbs and of being untouchable among the perpetrators.³⁰¹

Politically the situation was becoming very tense. Even one of the most moderate and statesmanlike figures in the Kosovo Albanian political spectrum, Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi, warned that violence was a serious threat: “I would not like the summer of 2005 to be a hot one. I wish for the promises that have been made, that there is a willingness on the part of the international community to say “yes” to starting to define final status.”³⁰² This warning was not taken seriously enough, something that contributed to increase the tension further.

The economy continued to perform poorly, basic services were still irregular at best, and unemployment continued to be high. A key issue that concerned people was what would happen with the former about 400 socially owned enterprises in Kosovo. UNMIK hoped that they could privatize these enterprises. Then investors would create new companies from the assets and hopefully start providing jobs and producing goods that would bring Kosovo sorely needed income. However, in October 2003 the process was suspended due to lack of legal sustainability as Serbia threatened to sue anyone in UNMIK responsible for privatizing the enterprises. UN HQ in New York refused to extend its own legal immunity to the staff involved in the privatization, and it declined to declare invalid Serbian laws from Milosevic’s era that obstructed progress on privatization. Prime Minister Rexhepi gave one of the most measured responses to what he saw as not only economic impact, but also the risk that Kosovo Albanians could: “find ourselves as refugees in our own country among the property of Serbia.”³⁰³

The Serb dominated area in northern Mitrovica and the three northernmost municipalities had been bastions of Serbian parallel administration from 1999. French KFOR troops never tried wholeheartedly to break the structures, and they never gave full

support to UNMIK's attempts to do so. The way various COMKFORs had been forced to solve problems in Mitrovica, had been to send in troops from other countries to do the job.³⁰⁴ The year 2003 saw large-scale expansion of the Serbian parallel structures throughout the areas inhabited by Serbs in Kosovo. In March 2003, Momir Stojanovic, a Serb born and raised in Kosovo and fluent Albanian speaker who had headed the Military Security Agency in Kosovo for four years during the 1990s, was appointed head of the Serbian Military Security Agency. This caused anger and fear among the Albanians in Kosovo, as on 9 May 2002 during the trial of Milosevic a witness had pointed out Stojanovic as having given the order for a massacre of more than 100 Albanians.³⁰⁵ Stojanovic in January and February reinforced the Albanians' fear by claiming that during the previous year his agency had reestablished its network of agents in Kosovo. UNMIK proved incapable of dealing with the Serbian networks, thus angering the Albanians further.³⁰⁶

Among Kosovo Albanians, a perception grew that the independence they had felt Kosovo had won in 1999 was now slipping out of their hands. One of the reactions to this was very strong support for the KPC and for the political forces that had emerged out of the KLA. Any move to prosecute or bring a veteran of KLA before justice was seen as an attack on the legitimacy of the war the KLA had fought for independence. The crack-down on the KPC initiated by Mini had come very close to sending the situation out of control. On 22 October 2003, Ceku was briefly detained in Ljubljana airport on a Milosevic era indictment, and he was again briefly detained in Budapest airport on 29 February 2004 on the same indictment. Kosovo Albanians took the detentions of their

most popular leader as a humiliation, and in each case demonstrations were took place up in Pristina that could easily have gotten violent.³⁰⁷

On 16 February 2004, the Kosovo parliament opened up its newly redecorated building in Pristina.³⁰⁸ While this happened, all Kosovar Albanian political leaders were gathered there. Simultaneously the KPC commander in Prizren, Selim Krasniqi and three other KPC members were arrested on an UNMIK indictment for war-crimes. The politicians who had come for a festive occasion could be seen hurrying off in several directions frantically speaking on their cell phones as news of the arrests spread. Demonstrations followed throughout Kosovo, and people were angry.³⁰⁹

Riots--March 2004

Colonel Nils Hanheide, who in March 2004 had been a national contingent commander in Kosovo for almost one and a half years, and had one of the largest intelligence units in KFOR under his command states that his intelligence unit reported to KFOR HQ that something was about to happen, but without any response.³¹⁰ The chief intelligence officer of KFOR HQ, Colonel Peter Zwack, says that he and his staff were thinking that significant violence was quite possible but would be more localized. "We felt heavy tensions--roadblocks, shootings, grenades, threats--in the weeks [and] days before the riots but few imagined the scale, scope, breadth, organization and virulence of the riots."³¹¹

Some officers in KFOR and UNMIK did see volatility of the situation, but the warnings of what could happen stopped before they reached higher levels of command, and certainly did not reach the decision makers in NATO's and the UN's chain of command above KFOR and UNMIK in a way that made them seriously concerned. What

happened to the warnings is not possible to assess fully without access to classified documents, but it seems that the KFOR and UNMIK missions had lost the sense of urgency that had characterized the early parts of the mission. The staff morale dropped, and so did the quality and intensity of work. King and Mason describe staff attitudes in UNMIK this way: “Some began to see their duties in Kosovo as periods of penance between weekends in Greece.”³¹² In KFOR, Colonel Zwack despaired that the intelligence branch had less than two thirds of its positions filled up with personnel with a background in intelligence, and that he was losing scarce and valuable intelligence collection assets like P3 planes and field human intelligence operators.³¹³ Major Ingvar Seland arrived 16 March to serve in KFOR HQ and was thrown into the crisis: “The HQ was not ready, it was not trained for crisis, people did not know what to do, plans were outdated, and the MNBs had been given the full responsibility for the situation. One word can characterize the situation in KFOR HQ--complacency.”³¹⁴

The erosion of quality in the international mission happened simultaneously with serious indicators of decline in the local situation. It is possible that higher quality of leadership or staffs could have averted the crisis, but UNMIK and KFOR in the spring 2004 were stronger on paper than on the ground. On top of this COMKFOR and the SRSG failed to recognize the weakness or report it to their superiors.

In the last week before violence in Kosovo erupted on 17 March 2004, two very important international visitors came to Kosovo, as they were the next higher level of command to COMKFOR and to the SRSG. On 13 March 2004, the immediate superior of the SRSG in the UN chain of command, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, visited Kosovo. In a very positive

and upbeat press release he described that he had seen significant changes in the security situation in Northern Kosovo: “Mitrovica is a more peaceful place.”³¹⁵ On 15 March 2004, the immediate superior of COMKFOR, Admiral Gregory Johnson, NATO’s Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, in a dress uniform instead of fatigues, “because the situation is so calm here,” stated that KFOR had made great progress in the five years since its deployment in Kosovo, and that the crime rate in Kosovo was normal for a region of two million people. He underlined that the situation remained “satisfactory,” and stressed that “NATO will not tolerate violence, because it is a threat to the future of Kosovo.”³¹⁶

On the evening of 15 March a Kosovo Serb teenager was shot and seriously wounded. This happened in the village of Caglavica which is located a couple of kilometers south of Pristina and straddles both sides of the main highway to Skopje. The Serbs in Caglavica responded by blocking the road, and the village leaders in Caglavica were significantly more upset than they had been during similar instances earlier.³¹⁷ As a precaution, the commander of Multinational Brigade (MNB) Center reinforced the Swedish battalion in this area of operation with one company from his brigade reserve about one hour after the incident. UNMIK Police from the start was the lead agency for dealing with the situation, and KFOR agreed to this. KFOR and UNMIK Police had significant experience with roadblocks in the Serb communities south of Pristina, and the next day in a discussion between COMKFOR and the commander of MNB Center it was decided that instead of removing the roadblocks forcibly, negotiations and time should be given a chance to work. Negotiating with people who put up roadblocks was KFOR

policy from the start, but Gen Reinhardt refused to allow any block to remain overnight.³¹⁸

On 16 March, the roadblock was in place, and local Serbs in the enclave of Gracanica a couple of kilometers to the east in sympathy blocked the road leading to Gjilan. Albanian drivers who tried to run the blockade were beaten by Serb villagers and rocks were thrown at their cars. In Cagalvica, the Serbs set fire to a police car. Lt Sindre Solberg and his partner witnessed how a crowd of Serb teenagers threw rocks at Albanian houses south of Cagalvica. When Solberg and his partner tried to intervene in order to save an elderly Serb woman who was married to an Albanian from attack by the Serb teenagers, the crowd fell upon them. Solberg's partner was thrown to the ground and kicked. Only a warning shot in the air gave him the space needed to withdraw.³¹⁹

On 16 February, there were protests arranged by an association of groups of KLA veterans protesting against the arrests of Selim Krasniqi and other KPC officers in Pristina, Prizren and Peja and in all other major towns in a total of 27 municipalities with an estimated total of 18,000 protesters. In Peja the protestors marched under: "UNMIK watch your step, the KLA has gunpowder for you too!"³²⁰ But even though the tone was aggressive, there were no violent clashes on 16 March. Images from the roadblocks and from the demonstrations were shown on all of Kosovo's three TV stations. Reporters displayed a high degree of sympathy with the Albanian demonstrators and their demands, while at no time were the views of the institutions challenged by the demonstrators presented, and the Serb roadblocks were condemned. In Kosovo Albanians' eyes, the events showed that even if the Serbs were only a 5 percent minority in Kosovo, they still managed to remain the dominant and favored group in Kosovo.³²¹

At around 1600 hours on 16 March in the Albanian village of Caber on the northern bank of the Ibar River, an event happened that provided the spark that ignited Kosovo. Six Albanian children were playing near the house of some Serbs. Something happened that caused the children to flee--some accounts claim that Serbs with a dog chased them; other versions claim that a feral dog or dogs chased them, and some claim it was the children's imagination. Whichever version is true, two of the children ran away, while four jumped into the Ibar River, which due to snow melting from unseasonably warm weather was running high. One boy, Fitim Veseli, made it across the swollen river, whereas the three others went missing. Two bodies have since been recovered.³²²

TV broadcasters began running the story in the early evening and at 2200 hours an RTV21 introduced the news in the following way:

“Two Serbs chased four Albanian children today around 16:00 in the village of Caber and, while trying to escape from them, the Albanian children jumped into the Iber river. To learn more details we have our correspondent in Mitrovica.” The correspondent from Mitrovica on the phone: “As 13-year-old Fitim Cerkin Veseli recalls, he and five other children around his age were walking along the bank of the Iber river. Then, two persons came out of a Serb house who had a dog and started chasing the children. From fear, four of the children jumped into the river hoping to make it to the other side by swimming. But, since the current was too strong, only Fitim Veseli made it to the other side, whereas nothing is known about the fate of Egzon Deliu, 12, Avni Veseli, 11, and Florent Veseli, 9.”³²³

At 2300 hours the public television channel in Kosovo (RTK) news broadcast: “The police, KFOR and TMK have not yet found the bodies of the three children missing in the river Iber, having fallen in after being chased by a group of Serbs.”³²⁴ A police spokeswoman saying that there was no evidence yet supporting the claim that this was ethnically motivated was given 12 seconds of time on the air. An interview with Fitim Veseli followed:

Yes, we, some cousins of mine and some friends of mine, and myself were walking and we went close to the river when some Serbs with a dog swore at us from the house. We looked at them, I can identify them if I see them, and I know their house, and we tried to escape but we couldn't as we were close to the river. My brother, Florent Veseli, 9 years old, was with me, he can't swim. I put him on my back, I swam 15 metres, I could not swim more than that. He fell from my back, I don't know anything more about him, and the other two swam in front of me, I don't know anything about them either.³²⁵

After this interview, which does not explicitly say that the Serbs chased the children into the river, local "human rights" activist Halit Berani was interviewed as an "expert witness:"

Today around 16:00 in the village of Caber, Zubin Potok municipality, while six children from the above mentioned village were playing, a group of Serb bandits attacked these children, the Serb bandits also had a dog, and swearing at their Albanian mother they forced the Albanian children to run away. We think that is in revenge for what happened in Caglavica, the case that showed what the Serbs are willing to do when the situation is getting calm in Kosova.³²⁶

If KFOR and UNMIK had not understood the seriousness of the situation before, the language and tone of these reports together with an understanding of the value of children in any culture, should have made them understand that this was serious. However, the complacency had gone so far that KFOR and UNMIK were unable to react adequately to contain what happened the next day before it got out of hand.

The next morning at around 0900 hours, there were several smaller demonstrations in Mitrovica, and also one in Pristina. UNMIK Police and KPS stopped an organized demonstration south of the bridge dividing Mitrovica in two, but soon a second crowd of about a thousand strong moved through and forced the police lines. KFOR, who since 1999 had always been a last line of defense on the bridge dividing Mitrovica, were nowhere to be seen, and the crowd moved over to the northern side where it started to exchange stones with the Serbs. However, a few police used the pause

caused by the stone throwing to impose themselves between the demonstrators. When the main route was blocked, a group of Albanians crossed over a footbridge a few hundred meters away, and when they reached the other side Molotov cocktails and shots were exchanged with the Serbs. Soon there were dead on both sides.³²⁷

In Pristina, people began getting the word about events in Mitrovica at about 1200 hours, and as a ready-made target to vent their anger and frustration on already existed, a few thousand people started heading south towards the Serb roadblock at Caglavica. A demonstration protesting a bomb attack on the residence of President Rugova was scheduled at 1200 hours in the center of Pristina. At this demonstration, several thousand people were whipped into an almost feverish anger at the Serbs by a highly emotional condemnation of the Serb child killers. As the demonstration drew towards an end, the crowd turned south and it appeared that most walked towards Caglavica.³²⁸

The police still had the responsibility for the situation in Caglavica and had formed a roadblock on the highway leading south from Pristina. However, as the flanks were not secured, the crowd just walked around on both sides of the police towards Caglavica and the Serb roadblock. When the police failed to hold back the masses, the Swedish battalion deployed its troops into a hasty riot control line in the northern outskirts of Caglavica, and stopped the demonstrators just short of the Serb village. But as the crowd grew rapidly the Swedes were soon pushed back, and some of the northernmost houses of Caglavica were set on fire by the attacking Albanians. The commander of MNB Center tried twice to get COMKFOR to allocate KFOR's reserve, a Norwegian battalion. MNB Center saw Caglavica as the center of gravity of the rapidly spreading conflict, believing that its fall would make it near to impossible to defend the

Serb enclave in Gracanica, which includes a monastery that is central to the Serbian Orthodox Church. King and Mason claims that it was assessed that an attack on Gracanica could lead to action by the Serbian government. Whatever the reason, after the second call COMKFOR ordered his reserve to support MNB Center.³²⁹

The Independent Union of Students of Pristina University (UPSUP) has a history of nationalist mobilization, having organized the protests in 1997 against the will of Rugova, and the student leaders saw themselves as being leaders in a tradition leading back to the 1981 demonstrations. However, from the late autumn of 2003 a new and more radical organization, Tjeterqysh (Something different), had challenged the traditional student leadership. 4,000 out of the 20,000 students at the University live in dormitories. The dormitory students predominantly are from rural backgrounds and are more radical and militant than their city-born counterparts. In the afternoon, the students at the University found pamphlets from in their dormitories calling for them to take part in the protests, and telephone calls and text messages mobilized students to participate and threatened reprisals against those who would not take part. On the university campus an “organizing council” summoned students to take part in protests through a megaphone, telling students they would be traitors if they refused. Gani Morina, who was the leader of UPSUP at the time claimed after the events that he had tried to contact the organizing council to no avail, but an anonymous student points at Morina as the organizer, and this claim is made more valid by the fact that Morina spoke to 3,000-5,000 students at an improvised rally before they marched towards Caglavica as “an aggressive mob.”³³⁰

KFOR and UNMIK failed to see the radicalizing effect on students of the lack of progress towards Kosovo’s final status. Given the role student demonstrations had played

in 1997, in 1981, and in 1968, this speaks of a lack of understanding of the historical, political and cultural context of Kosovo in both KFOR and UNMIK.

In Obilic, a crowd of about a thousand people stopped the Norwegian battalion on its way to reinforce MNB Center at Cagalvica. A platoon commander explained:

A very hostile crowd stopped the progress of our convoy as we passed through Obilic, and immediately the windows of the unarmored vehicles like the one I sat in were crashed by a barrage of stones, and people swarmed under our SISUs (armored personnel carriers) trying to get at the brake lines and other exposed parts. A few flash-bangs dispersed the crowd a little so we could start moving again, but some of the people under the SISUs were driven over.³³¹

In Caglavica, the situation was getting desperate. As the reinforcements arrived they were met by a battle scene. A large number of wounded soldiers were being brought to the back, and the situation seemed almost out of control. KFOR troops held a line together with some international and local police officers. Local Serbs armed with rifles held the flanks. The weapons used varied from rocks, clubs, iron rods and Molotov cocktails to small arms. In the front line the situation was serious:

On one occasion the crowd opened up and an Albanian tried to ram a truck into our lines. Two of our officers shot the driver dead when we saw that it was about to plow into our line, potentially killing and maiming soldiers and breaking our line, thus giving the rioters free way into the village we defended.³³²

As MNB Center concentrated more than 75 percent of its combat power in Cagalvica and Gracanica, most of the rest of central Kosovo was left to rioters, and several Serb enclaves were attacked, Serbs were evicted and their houses burnt. According to King and Mason, “thugocrats” activated local networks in some places. In Lipljan rioters were for instance directed by Shukri Buja, a former KLA Commander, who also was seen in Ferizaj. In Lipljan Serbs and Albanians lived intermixed, and word was spread to local Albanians to mark the entrances to their houses with red paint, so

their marked houses could be spared. In Obilic, the agitators behind the riots were “just the dregs” according to an unidentified source in *Peace at any Price*.³³³

The synchronized manner in which the KFOR forces were engaged, the attack on the reinforcements going to Caglavica, and the ease in which organizers moved from one location to another, are indicators that there was some organization behind the riots. The riots started due to the distorted reports of drowned children, but opportunistic thugocrats used the anger caused by the tragedy to spur the exodus of Serbs and warn the international community of what can happen if Kosovo is denied independence.

Late at night the “YU” building complex housing Serbs in the center of Pristina came under attack. As there were now no uncommitted KFOR reserves, MNB Center HQ rapidly organized an improvised group of Irish, Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian HQ personnel. This group made three runs through a gauntlet of small arms fire, Molotov cocktails, and rocks into Pristina to rescue the lives of between 130 and 150 people.³³⁴

In Prizren, there were about 3,600 German troops from MNB Southwest. In the afternoon, about one thousand demonstrators marched through the city center chanting “UCK, UCK” (KLA, KLA) and “UNMIK--armik” (Unmik is the enemy). Some houses in the old center and the Serbian seminary were set on fire, and stones started flying. A German army unit led by master sergeant Udo Wambach guarded the narrow and steep approach road to the 14th Century Monastery of Holy Archangels:

About 200 demonstrators sent a delegation under a white flag to the Germans and ensured them that nothing bad would happen to them, that “we only want to burn down the monastery.” The KFOR protectors evacuated six monks and their two visitors. The monastery was then burned down. Master sergeant Wambach was expressly commended for his “outstanding act” in mid-April by the deputy defense minister, Walter Kolbow . . . The sergeant avoided “by his prudent

behavior and courageous action, an escalation of violence, preventing bloodshed and protecting the human lives entrusted to him.”³³⁵

The next day German UNMIK police tried to get reinforcements from the nearby camp of the German KFOR troops as the Albanian rioters turned against UNMIK after all the Serb targets had been razed the day before. The German KFOR Commander sent no reinforcements in spite of the fact that almost all German troops were concentrated in the camp. Colonel Dieter Hintelmann, the commander of the German KFOR contingent in Prizren, explained in an interview in April 2004: “We acted exactly according to our regulations. Protection of buildings is not the task of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo. It is allowed to fire only in self-defense.”³³⁶ No German soldier was injured during the riots, in contrast to what happened in some other contingents. Whit Mason, co-author of *Peace at any Price*, describes the reason for the German KFOR inaction this way: “The German case was clear-cut--crippling risk aversion.”³³⁷

All over Kosovo, there were similar instances. Serb communities were the primary targets, but the UNMIK administration also faced attacks. Media reported from the riots: “What dominated the screens on 17 March, was a mixture of dramatic and often disturbing footage from the scenes of violence, the repetition of the story about the tragic death of the children and interviews with individuals and personalities who expressed understanding for the riots, condemned the “barbaric Serb” killing of the children and criticized the conduct of the security forces engaged by the protesters.”³³⁸ An example of this is a statement from PDK Member of Parliament, Mr. Arsim Bajrami: “The barbaric act of the killing of the children . . . has provoked a legitimate revolt by the Albanian population. This should be a lesson for the international community.”³³⁹

On 18 March, the Commander of MNB Center expected 20,000 to 40,000 demonstrators and among them a considerable number of active rioters to come towards Cagalvica, and decided to defend Cagalvica by creating a strong defensive line on the military crest of Veternik Ridge which is located between Pristina and Cagalvica.³⁴⁰ To the troops involved the task at hand was easier than the day before:

When the rioters came they were better organized than the day before, but we had built a barbed wire obstacle, across the road and out on each flank and anchored the flanks with snipers. Some adults kept sending children and teenagers forward to throw rocks, but they were largely inconsequential as we had placed the cordon at their extreme range. My commander decided to incapacitate the most notorious agitator, and a sniper placed a bullet in his leg. The only excitement was when a rioter threw a hand grenade that landed in our midst--luckily it was a dud.³⁴¹

In Prizren, there was another day of large scale violence, and teachers incited or led their students in the riots. The rioters attacked UNMIK and the LDK led local administration. The attackers used stones, petrol bombs and gunfire.³⁴²

In Mitrovica, security forces prevented groups of demonstrators from converging on the center of town. Throughout the day, there were minor clashes and stoning of vehicles, and Albanian sniper fire caused casualties both among KFOR troops and Serbs. A group of Albanians attacked a Serb Orthodox church in South Mitrovica that is located next to a French KFOR camp. The Moroccan soldiers guarding the church gave up, and it was burnt. In the afternoon, the same mob attacked the Serb village of Svinjare about ten kilometers south of Mitrovica. Svinjare is located just outside a large French KFOR base. After the mob had set fire to some houses, reinforcements arrived and the mob was repulsed. However, the reinforcements told the inhabitants that they would not stay and just evacuated them. The mob returned once the police and KFOR had left and looted and burnt every Serb house in the village.³⁴³

The personnel at KFOR HQ tried to mount a response to the crisis: “In effect it was the MNBs fight with some KFOR reserve back-up. The command was coping with multiple, far flung events and had limited reserves to deal with them.”³⁴⁴ A veteran KFOR officer who was now an augmentee from Joint Forces Command Naples describes the staff and its leadership:

HQ KFOR had lost the plot at all levels. OPLANS had been in place for years without needing revision, the staff were working peace-time hours and the whole place had become very inward looking . . . There were very few native speakers [of English] left in the HQ and no-one communicated internally or externally very well. However, in my opinion, the biggest problem and the root cause of leadership failure was the COS, an American Brigadier General called Stephen Schook . . . He controlled all information upwards and downwards, effectively isolating COMKFOR from his staff. Furthermore, because he was such a bully, he had cowed the staff so much [that] they were frightened to give him bad news or offer advice, which meant that there was never a gradual escalation of trouble that could be nipped in the bud. The staff just lurched from one crisis to another.³⁴⁵

Seen from UNMIK Major General Cumming worked closely with KFOR and describes the KFOR and UNMIK leadership leading up to the crisis:

Kammerhoff was hopeless and mindless and had almost no initiative at all so could only do things by rote and rehearsal. He was dealing with a weak and absent minded SRSG [Holkeri] and he sought to isolate KFOR and to hold it in reserve against any probable threat. Consequently KFOR did nothing.³⁴⁶

The lack of updated plans or adequate leadership in KFOR HQ made it unable to carry out operational maneuver in order to influence the situation in Kosovo. When COMKFOR used his reserve to influence the fight at Caglavica no attempt was made to reconstitute a reserve in KFOR. The HQ let the MNBs carry out the fight and refrained from influencing it. The isolation Cumming mentioned was caused by KFOR handing over tasks to UNMIK, and thus gradually being out of touch with the local community.

However, the staff carried out one of its primary functions on the operational level. On 17 March 2004, KFOR HQ took steps to activate NATO’s contingency plan

for reinforcing KFOR. Early in the morning of 18 March NATO issued an activation order for its operational reserve, and the British government responded by sending the battalion it had on stand-by for the reserve as reinforcement to KFOR. In the evening of 18 March, the first plane with British soldiers landed in Pristina. KFOR made the arrival into a media event, and both local and international media reported the arrival of NATO reinforcements. In the early afternoon of 19 March, the first British soldiers were patrolling Kosovo Polje. NATO deployed its tactical reserve from Bosnia, its operational reserve, and parts of its strategic reserve to Kosovo, in all about four battalions with soldiers from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.³⁴⁷

Aftermath

The arrival of reinforcements to KFOR and a gradual awakening by leaders and ordinary citizens in Kosovo to an understanding of what had happened, and how dangerous the forces unleashed could be to Kosovo itself and to its dream of independence combined to stop the violence by the end of 18 March. During the two days of rioting, the whole security system in Kosovo came close to collapsing. KFOR only made one stand, at Caglavica, and it was made at the cost of emptying the rest of MNB Center's area of responsibility of troops. The International Crisis Group report *Collapse in Kosovo* offers scathing criticism to the performance of both KFOR and UNMIK.³⁴⁸

A few days after the riots MNB Center detained Shukri Buja for his role in instigating riots in Lipljan, and a few of the thugs responsible for violence in Obilic. The MNB commander had a right under KFOR's rules of engagement to detain a person up to 96 hours, but only COMKFOR could authorize further detention. However, much to the surprise of the Commander of MNB Center, COMKFOR decided to let all the detainees

go in spite of very solid intelligence on their involvement in the riots. He demanded that if he had no evidence that could be used in a court, in which case the detainees should be handed over to UNMIK anyway, he would not hold anyone. In doing this COMKFOR refused to use what had been one of the most important tools of COMKFOR in 2001 in order to break the insurgency in the Presevo valley. The end result was that thugocrats had the power to intimidate potential witnesses and thus act with impunity.³⁴⁹

By June 2004, UNMIK had arrested over 270 persons for a wide range of offences related to the riots including murder, attempted murder, and arson, but predominantly under minor charges. In a report in June 2004 UNMIK claimed some arrests for leading and inciting riots, but the number was negligible.³⁵⁰

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were highly concerned about what had happened, and concluded that KFOR and UNMIK had not been able to protect the minority population. Amnesty International also called for the governments, NATO and KFOR to investigate thoroughly the role and actions of French KFOR in the violence in Svinjare and the actions of German KFOR in the violence in Prizren.³⁵¹ Human Right Watch characterized what happened:

The security organizations in Kosovo--KFOR, UNMIK international police, and the KPS--failed catastrophically in their mandate to protect minority communities during the March 2004 violence . . . In Svinjare, French KFOR troops failed . . . the ethnic Albanian crowd had walked right past the [French KFOR] base on its way to burning down the [Serb] village. In Prizren, German KFOR troops failed to deploy to protect the Serb population and the many historic Serbian Orthodox churches.³⁵²

After the riots had died down, an uneasy clam descended on Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK understood that they had failed to understand the mood of the majority

Albanians, and the potential for mobilization of support for ethnic violence by extremists.

Additionally they had failed to understand how vulnerable the Serb minority was.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

Conclusions

UNMIK and KFOR were far more powerful on paper than on the ground, where it really mattered. They failed to apply the levers of hard power--the principled and decisive application of force--or of soft power--education, the media and the symbolic environment--to convince the vast majority of Kosovars to robustly support Kosovo's new legal and political order. UNMIK and KFOR never used the chance they had to change a situation where a sizable segment of the population pursued violent political action, crime and militancy. The rule of UNMIK and KFOR, according to Whit Mason: "Created an atmosphere of impunity which directly contributed to the expectations and attitudes that led to the riots of March 2004."³⁵³

The instructions given to KFOR and UNMIK by the international community in the form of UNSCR 1244 were deliberately vague. The unresolved end-state and divided chain of command was the best compromise the permanent members of the UNSC were able to make. If one looks only at the unclear instructions UNSCR 1244 gave to KFOR and UNMIK, it is close to impossible to assess whether the missions have been overall successes. UNSCR 1244 does not specify which level of organized crime and ethnic persecution is acceptable, or the acceptable content of provisional institutions of self-government. The unclear mandate influenced the performance of KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo. Lacking clear guidance on what to do, both KFOR and UNMIK decided doing as little as possible within the mandate, especially at the crucial start of the mission in 1999 when UNMIK had next to no personnel and KFOR was not ready to deal with

violence against Serbs. Within about a month KFOR had understood what was happening to the Serb population, and managed to clamp down on inter-ethnic violence, but by then it was too late to make a new first impression.

Faced with failure in Kosovo, the international community needed to find a way forward. The UN Secretary General tasked Ambassador Kai Eide to write a report on the causes of what had happened in Kosovo. Eide concluded that Kosovo was characterized by growing dissatisfaction and frustration: “Seen from the Kosovo Albanian majority, the main cause is not of an inter-ethnic nature, but stems from what is rightly seen as a serious lack of economic opportunities and an absence of a clear political perspective. . . . The Kosovo Serbs believe--also rightly--that they are victims of a campaign to reduce their presence in Kosovo to a scattered rural population.”³⁵⁴

After this report, the Secretary General asked Eide to conduct a study on how the international community should address Kosovo. Eide concluded that what was needed was to start a process that would determine the final status of Kosovo, but offered warnings that: “The international community must do the utmost to ensure that, whatever the eventual status, it does not become a failed status. Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage of the international presence.”³⁵⁵

The Secretary General made former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status. Ahtisaari initiated a period of intense negotiations with the governments of Kosovo and Serbia. In the end it was not possible to make Serbia agree, so Ahtisaari went ahead and recommended that the UNSC should vote to make Kosovo independent, but that the independence should be under the supervision of the international community for the foreseeable future.³⁵⁶

In 2007, the Ahtisaari plan has been discussed by states that are members of the UNSC, but the UNSC never voted on the plan. The reason was that Russia has promised to veto any resolutions on the future status of Kosovo that the Serbian government does not agree with. Right now the major powers face a 10 December 2007 deadline set by the UN Secretary General for deciding Kosovo's future. If the international community does not take action, the government of Kosovo possibly will declare independence unilaterally.³⁵⁷

The Albanians in Kosovo have used different strategies to deal with Serbian and, in the last few years, international rule in Kosovo. Most of the time, peaceful means have been the way. Notable exceptions have been the demonstrations in 1968 which led to increased autonomy, the 1981 demonstrations that led nowhere, the 1997-1999 war that led to the exodus of the Serbian government, and lastly the March 2004 riots which got the final status of Kosovo back on the international agenda. A natural conclusion is that the use of violence is an effective way to further nationalist political aims. However, the majority of the time resistance has been measured and it has been peaceful. When Bosnia exploded into a nightmare of inter-ethnic violence in the early 1990s, Kosovo, which had been where most foreign observers expected violence, stayed calm due to an exceptional policy of non-violent resistance. After the war was over in 1999, most of Kosovo's population supported the LDK, which had been against violence. The failure of the international community to address the core issue of independence for Kosovo, the failure to act decisively in the application of soft and hard power, and the failure to sustain the necessary quantity and quality of troops for long enough, were the most important causes for the March 2004 riots in Kosovo.

Recommendations

Define an end-state. UNSCR 1244 did not provide clarity about the final status of Kosovo and made political progress nearly impossible. To Belgrade, the unresolved final status was an opportunity to reverse the results of a war they lost after having attempted ethnic cleansing on a major scale. To the Albanians there was no reason or incentive to work constructively for a multi-ethnic Kosovo and militant Albanians saw the absence of Serbs as the only guarantee that Serbian rule would not come back. The international community should have provided a combination of coercion, alternatives and persuasion to create a safe and secure environment. Instead it was more or less assumed that peace and good will across ethnic boundaries would break out spontaneously. It was not understood that differences between ethnicities had been further entrenched by the recent conflict.

Eliminate national caveats. To all nations, it is a difficult political decision to deploy troops for any mission, and it is especially difficult to give up national control to a commander on the ground. It is unrealistic that any nation will ever give up all national control of its troops, but a commander on the ground must be free to use the troops within the boundaries of the rules of engagement of the mission and within the physical boundaries of his mission area. Nations should not monopolize use of their troops to a small sector or second-guess orders. This denies the commander the ability to exercise operational maneuver and undermines his or her authority and effectiveness. At a time when a mission is reduced in size like KFOR in 2002 to 2004, caveats become an even more pressing issue. Reduced force ratios demand higher flexibility in order to be able to deal adequately with contingencies, and this could be done by eliminating caveats.

Transition from military to civilian authority and maintain one chain of command.

Post conflict there must be a defining moment when the war is won and when a transfer of power to a civilian government takes place. The military must become distinctly subordinate to the government. All must answer to one single authority. This did not happen in Bosnia, nor did it happen in Kosovo. There will always be separate agendas from two or more powerful and willful organizations, especially if they are not subordinate to one another and represent different international and national authorities.

Assert authority from day one. In the immediate period after entry into Kosovo in June 1999, KFOR was not poised to deal with the reality on the ground--reversed ethnic cleansing, widespread Serb exodus, and a KLA power grab. UNMIK was not even present in sufficient numbers to become a factor until well into the autumn of 1999. If a perception, real or imagined, of impunity from the rule of law is allowed to settle, it is extremely difficult to enforce the law later. Unwillingness to prosecute individuals due to fear of reprisals, as demonstrated in Kosovo, is unacceptable and will only lead to greater problems in the long run. The failure to assert authority right from the start was crippling to the mission, and there was never a chance to make a new first impression.

Have realistic expectations based on history and culture. If KFOR had awareness of historical and cultural issues, it would have been obvious that nationalist and militant movements willing to use violence to meet political ends would be a factor in Kosovo at any stage of the political process, and that society was not ready for multi-ethnicity. Research of all available material, including history and anthropology, is necessary in order to create realistic expectations of what awaits in an area of operations. In Kosovo this was not done sufficiently, or the conclusions reached were not heeded.

Deploy military forces ready and able to deal with violence. When some KFOR units proved to be unwilling or unable to confront mobs in Kosovo in March 2004, they failed to meet the rationale behind their very existence. A military unit in an area of operations must always be ready to deal with violence decisively.

Choose key leaders carefully. In spite of the weak mandate and difficult situation on the ground, the leaders of KFOR and UNMIK in 2000 and 2001 dealt with an explosive situation in Mitrovica, and with armed conflict in both in the Presevo valley and in Macedonia. Weak leaders in KFOR and UNMIK had a strong detrimental effect on the mission. Looking back on military history, it has been quite normal that ineffective commanders have been relieved of command. Only the very best are fit for the extremely demanding job of commanding multinational forces, and commanders who prove to be unfit or not to be effective should be relieved even with the inherent political challenges this would be in a multinational force.

Delay democracy until the situation is ready. The political parties functioned as patron and client networks. As political institutions they were not ready for participation in democratic elections in 2000 and 2001. The international community should not have allowed the KLA structures that seized power in the vacuum after the Serbian exit in 1999 to keep a monopoly of power; instead the international community should have selected the initial local leadership. Only when security, rule of law, and institutions ready to participate in democracy are in place should elections be arranged.

Promote economic progress. With the influx of massive economic aid immediately after a conflict has ended, societies can develop dependency on outside economic assistance. Long-term sustainable economic growth must be the aim of the

economic policy. The lead agency, in this case UNMIK and its EU pillar, must work hard to ensure that all the different international, governmental and non-governmental organizations contribute towards a common goal and not only pursue their own agendas. In addition to this, projects that are essential to public confidence, like delivery of electrical power, sewage systems, etc must be an immediate priority as an enabler both of economic growth and general public confidence.

Apply the levers of soft power. Even if unacceptable local attitudes are seen as traditional and rooted in culture, the international presence should challenge them and take active part in changing them. In most cultures unacceptable practices like hate speech and harassment of minorities are not that traditional or representative, they are results of conflict and confrontation, and most citizens will not miss them. The destructive power of nationalistic media without restraints was demonstrated in Kosovo in March 2004. The freedom and independence of the press are important, but the press also has responsibility. Institutions that advise the press, monitor its performance, and hold it accountable are essential. Professional training of journalists and editors and internal development and enforcement of ethical rules for the press is a vital part of this. Reform of education is a key to long-term change in any society. The decision of UNMIK early in the mission to transfer all authority to local hands for an educational sector that was in dire need of reform proved to have large consequences during the riots in March 2004. The impact of schools with “inter-ethnic hatred fermenting” and “distorted versions of history being taught” will probably continue to haunt Kosovo for many years to come.³⁵⁸ For a peace-building mission, it is essential to control the institutions responsible for the formation of the next generations.

APPENDIX A

THE GEOGRAPHY OF KOSOVO³⁵⁹

As much as Kosovo is a political entity, it is also defined by its geography. Kosovo is a relatively small area of 10,887 square kilometers (4,203 square miles),³⁶⁰ which makes it smaller than Connecticut, but larger than Delaware. Kosovo is situated in the central part of the Balkan Peninsula, is landlocked, and is surrounded by mountain ranges and hills varying in size in different areas. Political instability was not the only factor that kept Kosovo one of the most isolated places in Europe until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; the mountains also provided an obstacle to any potential traveler or invader. These mountains are found along most of Kosovo's borders. In the southwest, Kosovo is bordered by Albania, in the northwest by Montenegro, in the east by Serbia, and in the south by Macedonia.³⁶¹

Most of Kosovo's southern border with Macedonia is made up by the Sar mountain range, which is an extension of the mountain complexes in Northern Albania. The highest peak is 2,565 meters, which is also the highest in Kosovo. The mountains are Alpine, and are used primarily as summer pastures by the local farmers, while other parts are covered in permanent snow. Moving clockwise around Kosovo, another mountain range, the "Accursed Mountains", stretches north from Kosovo's southwestern corner, forms its western border with Albania, and the short northwestern border with Montenegro. The range is made up of limestone. Rivers and streams have sliced through these mountains to create a labyrinth of vertical sided valleys and gorges. The name stems from the inaccessibility of these mountains.

The border of Kosovo continues with another mountain range that moves up to the northernmost corner of Kosovo, where it crosses the Kopaonik range. On the other side of the border is Serbia. The border with Serbia continues along all of Kosovo's eastern side, but the mountains soften into lower hills and highland, and are less imposing than the other borders, while still being a clear dividing feature. As the border with Serbia reaches the southeastern corner and starts to edge west again, the hills get more rugged. As the full circle of Kosovo nears its conclusion and Macedonia again is on the other side, the Alpine mountains of the southern border are back and the circle complete.

Geographically the interior of Kosovo can be divided into two large plains. The one to the east is the Kosovo Plain, and the Albanians call the one in the southwest the Dukagjini Plain, whereas Serbs call it the Methohia Plain. Between them runs a range of hills that reaches above 1,000 meters. In addition, valleys and small plains constitute this rugged region of the country, the central part of which is known as Drenica.

The climate in Kosovo is continental with warm summers and cold winters. There are notable local variances in climate. These stem primarily from different elevations. The hills of central Kosovo separate the western parts of the country that are to some extent influenced by weather from the Adriatic from the eastern parts that have a more truly continental climate.³⁶² There are numerous rivers and streams in Kosovo, and they flow toward the Adriatic, the Black, and the Aegean Seas. The two most important rivers in Kosovo are the White Drin in the southern part of Kosovo that flows into the Adriatic Sea, and the Ibar River in the northwest that flows into the Morava and Danube Rivers and ends up in the Black Sea.³⁶³

Transportation routes into Kosovo are limited. The main artery into Kosovo goes through the narrow Kacanik Gorge in the south. The road and railroad through the gorge connects Kosovo with Skopje and links further to the port of Thessaloniki in Greece. In the west, the roads leading through Albania wind through mountainous areas and are of low quality. The one road into Montenegro snakes its way up steep mountains, and also has limited capacity. There are several roads into Serbia, both in the north and in the east, and the quality of some of these roads is such that it can take heavy traffic. The Albanians in Kosovo will not buy goods made in Serbia if they have an alternative, and there is a feeling that too intensive contacts with Serbia will lead to a reassertion of Serb authority in Kosovo. For these reasons the routes through Serbia are not the preferred avenue for goods and people going into or out of Kosovo. When NATO invaded in 1999, the roads through Serbia and Montenegro obviously could not be used, and only light wheeled vehicles could use the Albanian roads. This left the Kacanik Gorge as the only avenue of approach of useful quality.

APPENDIX B

THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF KOSOVO

The ethnography of Kosovo is highly disputed, and it is difficult to find information that is not contested. However, the overall trend is that the Albanian population is growing and the Serb population is shrinking.³⁶⁴ The last census was held in 1991. It was widely boycotted by Albanians and therefore was done as a statistical projection. This rendered the data open to speculation about accuracy.³⁶⁵ Today the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates that out of a total population of 2.1 million people, 92 percent are Albanian and 5.3 percent are Serbs.³⁶⁶

Almost all Serbs belong to the Orthodox faith. However in 1991 there were 50,000 strong Slav speaking Gorani in the Dragash and Prizren areas in southern Kosovo are Muslim, as well as the 40,000 Muhadjir, or Muslim Serbs and Montenegrins from the Sandjak region, living in the Pec and Istok areas.³⁶⁷ The Albanians are predominantly Muslims, but about 60,000 are Catholics.³⁶⁸ From the outside this could look like the Albanian Catholics would be a troubled minority. But since the Albanian national identity is built on the Albanian language as the common denominator, religion does not serve as a criterion for division between people. The Prime Minister in Kosovo, Agim Ceku, for instance is a Catholic.³⁶⁹ The idea that ethnic and religious identities in Kosovo are clear-cut is something that is largely a product of the conflict of the latest period. Traditionally identity has been ambiguous because of religious conversions, dissimulations and other forms of manipulation of identity. Ger Duijzings' *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* documents how people have changed their ethnic identity or converted to another religion, but have not fully abandoned the cultural

legacies of their former identities. Thus the segregated Kosovo society of today with Christian Orthodox Serbs on one side and predominantly Muslim--and to some degree Catholic--Albanians on the other side is a modern invention, whereas there is a history of coexistence and movement across boundaries of religion and ethnicity.³⁷⁰

APPENDIX C

PERSONS IN KEY POSITIONS IN KOSOVO FROM 1999

SRSGs³⁷¹

1. Sérgio Vieira de Mello, Brazil, June 1999 to July 1999
2. Bernard Kouchner, France, July 1999 to January 2001
3. Hans Haekkerup, Denmark, January 2001 to December 2001
4. Michael Steiner, Germany, February 2002 to July 2003
5. Harri H. Holkeri, Finland, August 2003 to June 2004
6. Søren Jessen-Petersen, Denmark, August 2004 to June 2006
7. Joachim Rücker, Germany, assumed position in September 2006.

Presidents of Kosovo³⁷²

1. Ibrahim Rugova, LDK, March 2002 to January 2006
2. Fatmir Sejdiu, LDK, assumed position in February 2006.

Prime Ministers of Kosovo³⁷³

1. Bajram Rexhepi, PDK, March 2002 to December 2004
2. Ramush Haradinaj, AAK, December 2004 to March 2005
3. Bajram Kosumi, AAK, March 2005 to March 2006
4. Agim Ceku, AAK, assumed position March 2006.

COMKFORs³⁷⁴

1. Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson, United Kingdom, June 1999 to October 1999
2. General Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Germany, October 1999 to April 2000

3. Lieutenant General Juan Ortuño, Spain, April 2000 to October 2000
4. Lieutenant General Carlo Cabigiosu, Italy, October 2000 to April 2001
5. Lieutenant General Thorstein Skiaker, Norway, April 2001 to October 2001
6. Lieutenant General Marcel M. Valentin, France, October 2001 to October 2002
7. Lieutenant General Fabio Mini, Italy, October 2002 to October 2003
8. Lieutenant General Holger Kammerhoff, Germany, October 2003 to August 2004
9. Lieutenant General Yves de Kermabon, France, September 2004 to August 2005
10. Lieutenant General Guiseppe Valotto, Italy, September 2005 to August 2006
11. Lieutenant General Roland Kather, Germany, September 2006 to August 2007
12. Lieutenant General Xavier de Marnhac, France, assumed command 31 August 2007.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

¹ NATO Homepage, *NATO's role in Kosovo*, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm> (accessed 20 April 2007).

² Halit Berani, writing in the Kosovo Albanian newspaper *Bota Sot*, on 8 April 2004 claimed that: "Serbs are talented, and even in the 1980s they disinterred their dead children and raped their old Serb women, trying to blame Albanians." Quoted in: International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 11.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

³ As a good example serves David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields*, New York: The Free Press, 1999. It has a limited bibliography, few notes, and contains little information about Kosovo.

⁴ Iain King and Whit Mason, *Peace at any Price, How the World failed Kosovo*. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006.) *Part II. Why the World Failed to Transform Kosovo*. 233-264. This part of the book gives a detailed description of the position of King and Mason, and of the reasoning behind it.

⁵ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report N°155*, Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 22 April 2004, i-1, 19-24, 36-43, provides detail on ICGs evaluation of the Riots and of the role of the International Community.

⁶ Several reports outline this position. Of particular note are the following: International Crisis Group, *Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe's Responsibility, Europe Report N°185*, Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 Aug 2007; *Kosovo's Status: Difficult Months Ahead, Europe Briefing No 45*, Pristina/ Brussels: International Crisis Group, 20 Dec 2006; *Kosovo Status: Delay is Risky, Europe Report N°177*, Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 10 Nov 2006; and *Kosovo toward final Status, Europe Report N°161*, Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 Jan 2005. The position of the ICG over the last three years has evolved into a clear stance that Kosovo's independence is long overdue, and that to wait any longer potentially has dire consequences. Another example of how seriously the ICG views the situation can be found in: Chris Patten, "A Ticking Clock on Kosovo," *The Boston Globe*, 10 August 2007. Patten is a former European commissioner for external relations, and is currently the chairman of the board of the ICG.

⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004*, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16 No. 6 (D), July 2004. 4-6; 23.

⁸ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Representative on Freedom of the Media, Miklós Haraszti. *The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo*. Vienna: 22 April 2004. 14-18.

⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999): On the Situation in Kosovo*, New York: 10 June 1999. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 18 March 2007).

¹⁰ All of these reports, dating back to 1999, can be accessed at <http://www.un.org/documents/repsec.htm> (accessed 18 March 2007).

¹¹ Ambassador Kai Eide in United Nations Secretary-General, *S/2004/932, Report on the Situation in Kosovo*, New York: 30 Nov 2004.

¹² Special Envoy Kai Eide in United Nations Secretary-General Special Envoy, *S/2005/635: A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo*, New York: 7 Oct 2005. <http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

¹³ United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo, *S/2007/168. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status*. New York: 26 March 2007.

¹⁴ *Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government In Kosovo*, Rambouillet, France: February 23, 1999. <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm> (accessed 16 Sept 2006). The fact that only the Kosovar side was prepared to sign influenced NATO's decision to go to war.

¹⁵ *Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia*, Kumanovo: 9 June 1999. <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

¹⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo. A short History*. London: Papermac, 1998. xxvii-xxxvi.

¹⁷ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. xi-xvii.

¹⁸ Tim Judah, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.

¹⁹ For an example of this critique see Prof. Djordje Janković, Ph.D, "Middle Ages in Noel Malcolm's "Kosovo. A Short History" And Real Facts," *Institute of History of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts*, Belgrade University, 8 October 1999.

²⁰ Cirkovic, Sima M., *The Serbs*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004, xvi-xxix.

²¹ Hupchick, Dennis P. and Harold E. Cox. *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans*. New York and Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001.

²² Ger Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*. London: Hurst & Company, 2000. ix-xii.

²³ Edith Durham, *High Albania: A Victorian Traveller's Balkans Odyssey*. Phoenix Press, 2000. 263.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 294.

²⁵ Berit Backer, *Behind Stone Walls*. Pejë: Dukagjini Publishing House, 2003.

²⁶ This is a view counter to that being presented by some, like Besnik Pula, "Is it true that Kosova is a clannish society still regulated by the Kanun, or the customary law, and does not belong to the West?" in Anna Di Lellio, Ed., *The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence*, London and New York: Anthem Press, 2006. 179-183. Pula's argument mixes several components, but he admits that the Kanun still is important in rural areas in Kosovo. And as a majority of city-dwellers in Kosovo have lived less than a generation in an urban environment and retain strong links to rural society, it is fair to assess that the Kanun practices still play a role in Kosovo today. For details on how the Kanun still interfere with everyday life in Kosovo confer Jeton Musliu and Bajram Lani, "Feuds Hold Kosovo Families in Thrall," *Balkan Crisis Report N°565*, Pristina: Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 14 July 2005.

²⁷ *Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit, The Code of Lekë Dukagjini*, New York: Gjonlekaj Publishing Co., 1989.

CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND

²⁸ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 28.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 22 – 40. Vickers. *Between Serb and Albanian*. 1 – 6.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² John Wilkes, *The Illyrians*. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992. 27, 267 – 280.

³³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 22 – 24.

³⁴ King and Mason, 26.

³⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 24.

³⁶ Ibid. 43. King and Mason. *Peace at any Price*, 26. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 6 – 7.

³⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 43 – 44, Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 8.

³⁸ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 48.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 65.

⁴¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 48.

⁴² Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 82; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 58.

⁴³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 49.

⁴⁴ King and Mason. *Peace at any Price*. 25.

⁴⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 58-59; Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 85.

⁴⁶ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 61; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 27; Cirkovic, 82-85.

⁴⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 62-64; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 13; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 27.

⁴⁸ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 61.

⁴⁹ Kostovicova, D., *Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996*, Keele University Research Centre, 1997, 7.

⁵⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 58-80, Cirkovic, 82-85, Vickers, 12-16.

⁵¹ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 140; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 93-94

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 110-111; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 20-21. Sokolovic was also responsible for rebuilding the bridge over the Drina River at Visegrad. This has been described by author Ivo Andric in his 1945 masterpiece, *Na Drini Cuparija*. (The Bridge on the Drina). Because of this book, Ivo Andric became a Nobel laureate.

⁵⁴ Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1999, 33-36.

⁵⁵ Noel Malcolm, “Is the Muslim conversion of Albanians the main cause of estrangement between Slavs and Albanians?” in Di Lellio, Anna, Ed., *The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence*, London and New York: Anthem Press, 2006, 24.

⁵⁶ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 28.

⁵⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 22.

⁵⁸ The Gorani predominantly live in Dragas in southern Kosovo, but also have a portion of its population in Pristina. Gorani community leaders the author has talked to in Dragas have a distinct feeling of Slav heritage, but feel even more alienated by Orthodox Serbs than by Muslim and Catholic Albanians. The groups they claim to have the closest links to – and this was evident to the author because of the traffic of mule and horse caravans with different trading goods through the mountains he witnessed – are Slav speaking Muslim groups in Macedonia.

⁵⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 116-138; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 22-26.

⁶⁰ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 143-145; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 139-162.

⁶¹ For a more comprehensive account of the Austrian invasion and the Serb migration refer to Malcolm, 139-162.

⁶² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 140. Claims made in: Belgrade TV broadcast, 1982, cited in Rizaj, “Mbi te ashtuquajturen dyndje”, 85; Picot, *Les Serbes de Hongrie*, 75; Gopcevic, *Makedonien*, 223.

⁶³ Cirkovic, 144, states 30,000 and denounces 40,000 as an obvious exaggeration. Malcolm, 161, supports this position and gives several sources to support this claim, among those two original sources from 1690 and 1696.

⁶⁴ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 139.

⁶⁵ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 24.

⁶⁶ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 131; 164-165; 173-174.

⁶⁷ For details on this period confer Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 163-180.

⁶⁸ Lleshi, *Prizren, Pristina i Kosovska Mitrovica*, part 1, 103.

⁶⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 178.

⁷⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 181-182.

⁷¹ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 146-157.

⁷² Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 179-183, 190.

- ⁷³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 183-192.
- ⁷⁴ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 223-224; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 42.
- ⁷⁵ M. Dogo, "National Truths and Disinformation in Albanian-Kosovar Historiography," in Ger Duijzings, Dusan Janjic and Shkelzen Maliqi, eds., *Kosovo - Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence*, Nijmegen: Peace Research Centre, University of Nijmegen, 1996. 45.
- ⁷⁶ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 224-225; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 199-200; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 42-43.
- ⁷⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 200; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 43.
- ⁷⁸ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 225; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 201; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 44-45.
- ⁷⁹ President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, interview by author October 2003; Adem Demaci, interview by author, March 2003; Murat Jashari, interview by author, Oct 2007.
- ⁸⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 201.
- ⁸¹ Charles Jevlavic and Barbara Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920: A History of East and Central Europe: Volume VIII*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977. 223-225; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 220-222; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 43-45.
- ⁸² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 223.
- ⁸³ Edward F Knight, *Albania: A Narrative of Recent Travel*, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1880. 117.
- ⁸⁴ Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 225.
- ⁸⁵ Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 227; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 56-58.
- ⁸⁶ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 228-230; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 47.
- ⁸⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 237-238.
- ⁸⁸ Edith Durham, *High Albania*, 327.
- ⁸⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 239-242.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 249.

- ⁹¹ Ibid.
- ⁹² Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 229; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 246-249.
- ⁹³ Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 229; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 250-252; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 75-78.
- ⁹⁴ T.A. Emmert, "The Kosovo Legacy," *Serbian Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989, 20.
- ⁹⁵ Leon Trotsky, *The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky: The Balkan Wars 1912-13*, New York: Pathfinder Pr., 1981. 120.
- ⁹⁶ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 253-255; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 77-78.
- ⁹⁷ Quoted in Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 254.
- ⁹⁸ Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 229-230; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 252, 256; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 78-80.
- ⁹⁹ Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 229-234; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 256-257; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 80-81, 83-85.
- ¹⁰⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 258; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 88-89.
- ¹⁰¹ Cirkovic, *The Serbs*, 248-249; Jevlavic and Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 284-288; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 258-263; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 87-92.
- ¹⁰² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 264-265.
- ¹⁰³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 266-268.
- ¹⁰⁴ M. Pirraku, "Kulturno-pokretni pokret Albanaca u Jugoslaviji (1919-1941)," *JIC*, 1978, nos. 1-4, 356-370.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ahmet Zogolli was from a beylik family with feudal authority over the Mati region in the mountains of Northern Albania. He later became King Zog I.
- ¹⁰⁶ Adem Demaci, Interview with author; Murat Jashari, Interview with author; Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804 – 1999*, New York, London, Victoria, Toronto and Auckland: Penguin Books, 2001. 367; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 273-278; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 93-95, 99-102.
- ¹⁰⁷ Djordje Krstic, *Kolonizacija u Juznoj Srbiji* Sarajevo: 1928. 81.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

- ¹⁰⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 278-283; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 105-108.
- ¹¹⁰ Dr Vaso Cubrilovic, *I seljavanje Arnauta*. Belgrade, 7 March 1937. Manuscript in the Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav People's Army (Vojno Istorijski Institut JNA). Archives of the former Yugoslav Army (Arhiv Bivše Jugoslovenske Vojske), No. 2, Fasc. 4, Box 69, 19 pp. Retranslated from the Serbo-Croatian by Robert Elsie, on the basis of an existing English version. Published in R. Elsie, *Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia*, Peja: Dukagjini Balkan Books, 2002. 97-130. The author of the memorandum attaches to the document a detailed map of the region to be cleared.
- ¹¹¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 283-287; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 116-120.
- ¹¹² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 287-288; Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1995. 117-140. Vicker's account offers a detailed and insightful account of Albania between the wars, and is required reading for understanding of the wider context of the region.
- ¹¹³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 289-291; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 121.
- ¹¹⁴ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 291-294; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 121-123.
- ¹¹⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 292-294; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 121-123.
- ¹¹⁶ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 294-296.
- ¹¹⁷ Plasari, N., and L. Malltezi, *Politike Antikombetare e Enver Hoxhes: Plenumi i 2te i KQ te PKSH, Berat, 23-27 Nentor 1944* (The Anti-national Policy of Enver Hoxha: The Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, Berat, 23-27 November 1944). Tirana: 1996. 220, 226. This book and other material published by these two authors has led to complete revision of the history of the Albanian Communist Party in WWII, as almost all that had been written about it earlier had been heavily edited by Enver Hoxha, and a lot of material just had not been published.
- ¹¹⁸ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 298-304; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 123-133.
- ¹¹⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 304-305; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 132-133.
- ¹²⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 305-306; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 133-135; Bernd J. Fischer, "The Germans in Albania During the Second World War and After," Lecture held in Hamburg 28 Nov 2003.
- ¹²¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 309-311; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 134, 140. A very critical account of the Skanderbeg Division is found in Carl Kosta Savich, "Eyewitness to Genocide in Kosovo: Kosovo-Metohija and the Skanderbeg Division," *Projektat Rastko Gracanica Pec*. A version that treats the Skanderbeg Division and other forces the Germans recruited in Kosovo and Albanian with little criticism is the otherwise

valuable accounts of Bernd J. Fischer in *Albania at War: 1939-45*, London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd., 1999. and in “The Germans in Albania During the Second World War and After,” Lecture held in Hamburg 28 Nov 2003. A significant omission from Fischer is that while his lecture looks into how some Jews were sheltered in Albania, no mention is made of the ones that were rounded up by the Skanderbeg Division and sent to Bergen-Belsen for extermination.

¹²² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 311-313; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 141-143.

¹²³ *Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, Presidium of the Constituent Assembly of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Official Gazette of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Belgrade: 1946.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 314-318; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 144-148.

¹²⁵ Berit Backer, *Behind Stone Walls*, 243.

¹²⁶ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 151-154.

¹²⁷ Adem Demaci. Interview with author April 2003; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 319-323; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 154-160.

¹²⁸ *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade: Secretariat of Information of the Federal Executive Council, 1963; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 323-324; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 155-56, 160-162.

¹²⁹ Slobodan Stankovic, “Aleksandar Rankovic--Political Profile of a Yugoslav ‘Stalinist.’” *Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report/205 (Yugoslavia)*, 1 September 1983.

¹³⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 324-325; James Pettifer, “Kosovo Economy & Society After 1945--Some Observations,” *Conflict Studies Research Centre*, Camberley, January 2002, 4; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 162-165, 192.

¹³¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 325-326; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 165-168.

¹³² *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade: Sluzbeni List, 1974, No. 9., 21 February 1974; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 327-329; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 178-181.

¹³³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 329-331.

¹³⁴ James Pettifer, “Kosovo Economy & Society After 1945,” 4.

¹³⁵ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 190.

- ¹³⁶ Berit Backer, *Behind Stone Walls*, 239.
- ¹³⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 188.
- ¹³⁸ Adem Demaci. Interview with author April 2003.
- ¹³⁹ Kjell Magnusson, "Nationalitetsproblem i Jugoslavien: Krisen i Kosovo" (Problems of nationality in Yugoslavia: The Crisis in Kosovo). *Bidrag till öststatsforskningen: Contributions to Soviet and East European Research*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1981. Uppsala, Sweden: 1981, 70; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 334-336; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 197-201.
- ¹⁴⁰ Marvine Howe, "Yugoslav Official Calls Riots A Surprise," *The New York Times*, 7 April 1981, Section A, Page 3.
- ¹⁴¹ David Binder, "One Storm Has Passed But Others Are Gathering In Yugoslavia," *The New York Times*, 19 April 1981, Section 4, Page 4.
- ¹⁴² Interview with Rrahim Percuku, Professor at the University of Pristina in the 1980s, May 2002, On file with author; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 335-338; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 198-201.
- ¹⁴³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 337-338; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 204-208.
- ¹⁴⁴ Interview with former Government Official by author August 2007. The person has asked no to be named.
- ¹⁴⁵ The Kosova People's Movement. Judah, *War and Revenge*, 115, claims that LPK was formed in 1993 as a splinter group of LPRK. This is contradictory to Pettifer and Vickers and to accounts the author has had from a person who was involved at the time, but wants to be anonymous.
- ¹⁴⁶ The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova. Judah, *War and Revenge*, 115, claims that LKCK was formed in 1993 as a splinter group of LPRK. This is contradictory to Pettifer and Vickers and to accounts the author has had from a person who was involved at the time, but wants to be anonymous.
- ¹⁴⁷ The People's Movement of the Republic of Kosova.
- ¹⁴⁸ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 102-109; Pettifer and Vickers. *The Albanian Question*, 97-101.
- ¹⁴⁹ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia: Accompanies the major BBC Television Series*, Rev. Ed., London: Penguin Group and BBC Worldwide Ltd., 1996. 35.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 34-35; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 209.

¹⁵¹ Bogdanovic, Dimitrije, *Knjiga o Kosovu* (A Book about Kosovo), Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Arts and Science), 1985. http://www.rastko.org.yu/kosovo/istorija/knjiga_o_kosovu/bogdanovic-kosovo_question.html (accessed 31 October 2007).

¹⁵² *Memorandum*, Srpske Akademije Znanosti i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Arts and Science), Belgrade: 24 September 1986. 127.

¹⁵³ Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. 47-50.

CHAPTER 4 KOSOVO: FROM CONFLICT TO WAR AND THEN WHERE?

¹⁵⁴ Chapter 1 and 2 of Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, together with transcripts from the trial of Milosevic provide comprehensive in-dept accounts of Milosevic's rise to power.

¹⁵⁵ Ambassador Richard Miles, US Ambassador in Belgrade 1996-99 and junior diplomat in Belgrade 1983-86, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

¹⁵⁶ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

¹⁵⁷ The group was by and large what the Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins had evolved into from its modest start in 1981. One of the leaders of the group was Kosta Bulatovic who had been one of the three leaders of the Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins, and who had been arrested in 1986.

¹⁵⁸ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 2nd Ed., New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000, 162; King and Mason. *Peace at any Price*, 36; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 341-342; Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 37-38; Ivan Stambolic, *Put u Bespuce: Odgovori Ivana Stambolica na Pitanja Slobodana Inica*, Belgrade: Radio B92, 1995, 165.

¹⁵⁹ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), *Transcript from trial against Slobodan Milosevic*, 9 Feb 2005, 35937-35956. <http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050209IT.htm> (accessed 8 May 2007).

¹⁶⁰ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 53.

¹⁶¹ Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 39.

¹⁶² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 342; Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 41-47; Stambolic, *Put u Bespuce*, 181-185.

¹⁶³ Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 63.

¹⁶⁴ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 342-344; Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 58-69; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 231-235.

- ¹⁶⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 344-345.
- ¹⁶⁶ Slobodan Milosevic, *Kosovo Polje Speech*, June 28, 1989, <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/smilos01.html> (accessed 9 May 2007).
- ¹⁶⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 344; Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 71-73; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 238-240.
- ¹⁶⁸ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 345-347; Ibrahim Rugova, Interview with author Nov 2003; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 244-248.
- ¹⁶⁹ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 66-68; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 345-348; Ibrahim Rugova, Interview with author, Nov 2003; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 249. Malcolm describes the claim of 700,000 members as implausible. Ibrahim Rugova in his interview maintained that the statement of 700,000 LDK members was correct, but admitted that accurate membership files did not exist.
- ¹⁷⁰ Adem Demaci, Interview with author, March 2003; Ibrahim Rugova, Interview with author, Nov 2003.
- ¹⁷¹ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 67-68; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 346-347; Ibrahim Rugova, Interview with author Nov 2003; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 244-245, 251-252.
- ¹⁷² Judah, *War and Revenge*, 69-70; Rrahim Percuku, Interview with author May 2002; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 256.
- ¹⁷³ Pettifer, James and Miranda Vickers. *The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007. 97.
- ¹⁷⁴ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo Spring, Europe Report*, Pristina and Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 20 March 1998. 11.
- ¹⁷⁵ Berit Backer, *Behind Stone Walls*, 223-227.
- ¹⁷⁶ Adem Demaci, Interview with author March 2003; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 248.
- ¹⁷⁷ "Reviving Kosovo: A Complicated Challenge Lies Ahead for International Community," *The World Bank*, News Release No:2000/005/ECA, Brussels: 12 June 1999.
- ¹⁷⁸ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 110-112; Pettifer and Vickers. *The Albanian Question*, 98-99.
- ¹⁷⁹ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 115-116.

¹⁸⁰ Bardh Hamzaj, *A Narrative about War and Freedom: Dialog with the commander Ramush Haradinaj*, Prishtina: Zëri, 2000, 21-28; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 117-118.

¹⁸¹ Amnesty International, "Croatia: Operation "Storm" - still no justice ten years on," AI Index: EUR 64/002/2005 (Public), News Service No: 204, 4 August 2005. <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engneur640022005> (accessed 4 November 2007); Holbrooke, Richard. *To end a War*. New York and Toronto: Random House, Inc., 1998. 231-312; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 120-121. Holbrooke's account of the negotiations gives a very valuable insight into the personalities of the Balkan leaders who were central in the conflict in the 1990s.

¹⁸² Kosova Communication, Bulletin of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Kosova, 4th year, No. 242 , 20 November 1995. <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/koscom/1995/95-11-20.koscom.html> (accessed 4 Nov 2007).

¹⁸³ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

¹⁸⁴ Adem Demaci, Interview by author, March 2003; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 123-126.

¹⁸⁵ Albanians are divided in two major groups, ghegs and tosk. They both speak the Albanian language, but two significantly different dialects. The differences in culture, temperament and appearances are significant. The split goes back to the time when the border between the Eastern and Western Roman Empire ran along the Shkumbin River in Central Albania. The population in Kosovo and in Northern Albania is gheg, and the population in Southern Albania is tosk.

¹⁸⁶ According to Albanian Army report printed in the newspaper Shekulli in Tirana, March 2002. A high-ranking retired Albanian officer who wants to remain anonymous confirmed the accuracy of the report to the author in an interview in Tirana, March 2002.

¹⁸⁷ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 127-129; Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 3-64. The account by Pettifer and Vickers is thorough and enlightening on the complexities of the 1997 crisis in Albania.

¹⁸⁸ Agim Ceku, Interview by author, March 2003.

¹⁸⁹ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 115, 129-131.

¹⁹⁰ *Rilindja*, Tirana, 13 April 1997. Quoted in Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 104.

¹⁹¹ Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 104.

¹⁹² Albin Kurti, Interview by author, 28 October 2007; Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 15 October 2007; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 135-136.

¹⁹³ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 136-137 (quote); Official webpage of Kosovo Protection Corps. <http://www.tmk-ks.org/new/tmk/historiku/historiku.php> (names of participants) (accessed 4 November 2007).

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Adem Demaci, Interview by author, March 2003; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 137.

¹⁹⁶ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo Spring*, 29-30.

¹⁹⁷ *Agence France Presse*, 23 February 1998. Quoted in Judah, *War and Revenge*, 138.

¹⁹⁸ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 15 October; Richard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), 745-761; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 138.

¹⁹⁹ Bashkim Jashari, Interview by author on the scene of the fighting in Prekaz, April 2003. For other accounts see: Emin Halimi and Ajnishahe Shala, *The Jasharis: The Story of a Resistance*, Pristina: Rilindja, 2000; Bardh Hamzaj and Faik Hoti, *Jasharet: Histori e Rrefyer nga Rifat, Besarta, Bashkim, Murat dhe Lulzim Jashari* (The Jasharis: History Narrated from Rifat, Besarta, Bashkim, Murat and Lulzim Jashari), Pristina: Zeri, 2003; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 139-140; or Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 112-113. A good account of how Adem Jashari has been turned into a national icon for the Albanians is found in: Anna Di Lellio and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, "The Legendary Commander: the Construction of an Albanian Master-narrative in Post-war Kosovo," *Nations and Nationalism*, 12 (3), 2006, 513-529.

²⁰⁰ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 140-141; Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 114-115.

²⁰¹ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 143-145; Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 124.

²⁰² Judah, *War and Revenge*, 154-155.

²⁰³ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007; International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Long Hot Summer*, 13; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 156.

²⁰⁴ Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*. Oxford: Oxford University, 2000, 74;

International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Long Hot Summer*, 8-9; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 156; Sylejman Selimi, Interview by author, Feb 2003.

²⁰⁵ Ad hoc group comprised of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

²⁰⁶ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 177; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 43; Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²⁰⁷ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 165-168.

²⁰⁸ Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*. Oxford: Oxford University, 2000, 79; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 178-187; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 43; Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²⁰⁹ Adem Demaci, Interview by author, March 2003; Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report*, 75; International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Long Hot Summer*, 3-7, 10-11.

²¹⁰ Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report*, 79; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 189-192.

²¹¹ Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report*, 81.

²¹² Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report*, 81; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 193-194; Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 188.

²¹³ Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: a Memoir*, New York: Miramax Books, 2003. 393-397; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 194-196.

²¹⁴ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 197-201; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 45; Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 188-200.

²¹⁵ Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 400-401.

²¹⁶ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²¹⁷ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 397-405; Adem Demaci, Interview with author, March 2003; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 201-226; Pettifer and Vickers, *The Albanian Question*, 201-208; Sylejman Selimi, Interview with author, February 2003.

²¹⁸ *Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo*. Rambouillet, France: February 23, 1999. Ch. 8, Art 1, (3). <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm> (accessed 16 Sept 2006).

²¹⁹ Adem Demaci, Interview with author, March 2003; Sylejman Selimi, Interview with author, February 2003.

²²⁰ Knut Vollebaek, Interview by author, 11 November 2007.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²²³ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 406-407; Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York: Public Affairs, 2001, 179-181; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 227-228; Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²²⁴ Serb farmer south of Pristina who wants to remain anonymous, Interview by author, November 2003.

²²⁵ Ambassador Richard Miles, Interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²²⁶ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 408-409; Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 179-181; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 227-228; Gen John Hendrix, Interview by author, 25 October 2007. Several key players, both internationals and Albanians the author has talked to has confirmed the presence of liaison elements from the British and Americans with the KLA in Northern Albania, and as the air campaign got underway liaison elements were established inside of Kosovo, specifically at the Headquarters of the KLA.

²²⁷ Gen John Hendrix, Interview by author, 25 October 2007.

²²⁸ Gen John Hendrix, Interview by author, 25 October 2007; Bruce R. Nardulli, Et al., *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999, MR-1406-A*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2002, xi-xv. The Rand Corporation study in its entirety is a most instructive study of the challenges of joint operations, and to some extent multinational operations. For additional information see: John Gordon IV, Bruce Nardulli and Walter L. Perry. "The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 2001-2002 (29): 52 - 57. Institute for National Strategic Studies. For a highly critical account of Task Force Hawk see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Task Force Hawk," *Air Force Magazine*, (February 2002), 85 (02): 78 – 83, Air Force Association.

²²⁹ Father Sava, quoted in: Judah, *War and Revenge*, 243.

²³⁰ Department of Defense, United States of America. *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report: Report to Congress*. Washington D.C.: 31 Jan 2000; Human Rights Watch, *Weighing the Evidence: Lessons from the Slobodan Milosevic Trial*, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, No. 10(D), December 2006; Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report*; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 250; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OHDIR). *Kosovo/Kosova, As Seen, As Told: An analysis of the*

human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999, Warsaw: OSCE, ODIHR, 1999, ix.

²³¹ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 345-370; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 270-279.

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²³² The division of the first years of international rule in “Emergency,” “Consolidation,” and Confrontation and Stagnation” was first done by King and Mason in *Peace at any Price*. The author has made minor adjustments of the exact timing of the different phases, but find King and Mason’s division well suited to describe the environment in which the international community in Kosovo worked.

²³³ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 420-421.

²³⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999): On the Situation in Kosovo*. New York: 10 June 1999.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 18 March 2007).

²³⁵ Whit Mason, Interview by author, 8 November 2007.

²³⁶ UNMIK at a Glance, UNMIK. <http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm> (accessed 9 November 2007).

²³⁷ Col Russell Thaden, Interview by author, 2 November 2007.

²³⁸ Lt Gen Valeriy Yevtukhovich, Interview by author, August 2000.

²³⁹ Gen John Hendrix, Interview by author, 25 October 2007.

²⁴⁰ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 375-403; Gen Sir Mike Jackson, “My clash with NATO chief,” *Telegraph*, 5 Sept 2007; Lt Gen Valeriy Yevtukhovich, Interview by author, August 2000.

²⁴¹ Gen Sir Mike Jackson, “My clash with NATO chief,” *Telegraph*, 5 Sept 2007.

²⁴² Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report*, 117; King and Mason, *How the World Failed Kosovo*, 49-52.

²⁴³ Scott Porter, Interview with author, 23 October 2007; King and Mason, *How the World Failed Kosovo*, 49-52; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 286-287.

²⁴⁴ Scott Porter, Interview by author, 23 October 2007.

²⁴⁵ Scott Porter, Email sent to author, 16 November 2007.

²⁴⁶ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 287-296; King and Mason, *How the World Failed Kosovo*, 52-55; Whit Mason, Interview by author, 8 November 2007; Russell Thaden, Interview by author, 2 November 2007.

²⁴⁷ Iain Cassidy, Interview by author, 17 June 2007; Whit Mason, Interview by author, 8 November 2007; Russell Thaden, Interviews by author, 2 and 22 November 2007.

²⁴⁸ Harvard University professor Joseph Nye in a 1990 book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* coined the term “soft power.” The term is used in international relations theory to describe the ability of a political body, such as a state, to indirectly influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies through cultural or ideological means.

²⁴⁹ Veton Surroi, “Kosovo Fascism, Albanians’ Shame,” Published first in *Koha Ditore*, referred by *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, Balkan Crisis Report 69, 25 August 1999.

²⁵⁰ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 294.

²⁵¹ Baton Haxhiu, Interview by author, June 2003; King and Mason, *How the World Failed Kosovo*, 81-82.

²⁵² Baton Haxhiu, Interview by author, June 2003; Judah, *War and Revenge*, 293-295; King and Mason, *How the World Failed Kosovo*, 82-83.

²⁵³ King and Mason, *How the World Failed Kosovo*, 85-86; Whit Mason, interview by author, 8 November 2007.

²⁵⁴ United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, *Regulation No. 1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo*, Pristina: July 25, 1999.

²⁵⁵ James Dobbins, Et al, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007, 80.

²⁵⁶ Michael E. Hartmann, “International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post-Conflict Peacekeeping,” *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 112, October 2003.

²⁵⁷ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 59-60.

²⁵⁸ Klaus Reinhardt, *KFOR. Streitkräfte für den Frieden: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen als Deutscher Kommandeur in Kosovo* (KFOR. Force for Peace: Diary of the German Commander in Kosovo), Frankfurt: Verlag der Universitätsbuchhandlung Blazek und Bergmann seit 1891, 2001. 526-527.

²⁵⁹ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 83-84.

- ²⁶⁰ Russell Thaden, Interview with author, 2 November 2007.
- ²⁶¹ Lt Gen Thorstein Skiaker, Interview by author, 29 August 2007; Col Russell Thaden, Interview by author, 2 November 2007.
- ²⁶² Scott Porter, Interview by author, 23 October 2007.
- ²⁶³ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁵ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 286.
- ²⁶⁶ International Crisis Group, *Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon Is Over*, ICG Balkans Report N° 83, Pristina: International Crisis Group, 10 December 1999, 1, 5-6; Whit Mason, Interview by author, 8 November 2007.
- ²⁶⁷ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 52; “Final results of presidential election,” *SerbiaInfo*, 28 September 2000. <http://www.serbia-info.com/news/2000-09/28/20737.html> (accessed 8 November 2007).
- ²⁶⁸ CNN, “Kosovo election “irregular” says defeated Thaci,” *CNN*, 31 October 2000. <http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/10/30/kosovo.rugova.03/> (accessed 8 November 2007); OSCE Mission in Kosovo, *Final Results*, 8 Nov 2000. http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2000/11/20458_en.pdf (accessed 8 Nov 2007).
- ²⁶⁹ Lt Gen Thorstein Skiaker, Interview with author, 29 August 2007.
- ²⁷⁰ Maj Gen Arne Dahlberg, Interview by author, July 2007. The author served both in HQ KFOR under Gen Valentin and in UNMIK under SRSG Steiner and observed the good relationships.
- ²⁷¹ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 105- 107; Lt Gen Thorstein Skiaker, Interview with author, 29 August 2007.
- ²⁷² Thorstein Skiaker, Interview by author, 29 August 2007.
- ²⁷³ International Crisis Group, *Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace*, ICG Balkans Report N° 113, 20 June 2001, 1-6; Sylejman Selimi, Interview by author, February 2003; Thorstein Skiaker, Interview by author, 29 August 2007.
- ²⁷⁴ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 93, 173-175.
- ²⁷⁵ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 116-119; Thorstein Skiaker, Interview by author, 29 August 2007.

²⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo: Landmark Election. Balkans Report N° 120*, Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 November 2001, i-iii; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 119-124.

²⁷⁷ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo: Landmark Election*, 8-11. Interviews with two senior politicians, one from LDK and one from PDK in May and June 2003. Both want to remain anonymous.

²⁷⁸ Baton Haxhiu, Interview with author, June 2003; Observations of author in July to September 2002. As an example the author in June 2003 met an Albanian who had moved back to Kosovo from abroad and opened up an exclusive shop for Italian men's shoes in Ferizaj. After more than a year in operation his capital was spent and the shop still had not sold ten pairs of shoes.

²⁷⁹ James Dobbins, Et al, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, 241; Murat Jashari, Interview by author, 03 Oct 2007; UNMIK, Aide Memoire of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) Staff Mission to Kosovo, April 20 – May 4, 2005, 3 May 2004.

²⁸⁰ KFOR/UNMIK Security Transition Strategy, 29 May 2002, annex B to KFOR FRAGO 1285; HQKFOR COMKFOR Directive 25: Cooperation with UNMIK Police, 15 May 2002.

²⁸¹ Lt Col Tore S. Bade, Interview with author, 26 October 2007.

²⁸² Interview with a general officer who served in HQ KFOR under both Valentin and Mini. Other members of KFOR HQ command group at the time in conversations with the author have concurred with the version given above, but all want to remain anonymous.

²⁸³ Ambassador Reno Harnish, Interview by author, 27 September 2007.

²⁸⁴ Maj Gen Andrew AJR Cumming CBE, Interview by author, 22 October 2007.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Lt Col Tore S. Bade, Interview by author, 26 October 2007.

²⁸⁷ Maj Gen Andrew AJR Cumming CBE, Interview by author, 22 October 2007.

²⁸⁸ Ambassador Reno Harnish, Interview by author, 27 September 2007.

²⁸⁹ UNMIK report to donor conference, November 2002. Quoted in King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 184.

²⁹⁰ Maj Gen Andrew AJR Cumming CBE, Interview by author, 22 October 2007; International Crisis Group, *Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, ICG*

Europe Report N°148. Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 3 September 2003, i-8; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 137-141.

²⁹¹ International Crisis Group, *Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, ICG Europe Report N°148*. Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 3 September 2003, i.

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²⁹² Fabio Mini, *La Guerra dopo la Guerra: Soldati, Burocrati e Mercenari Nell'epoca della Pace Virtuale*, Italy: Einaudi, 2003. For details on Mini's views a reading of the book, which he published immediately after stepping down as commander, is recommended. Details and excerpts from the book were published by several media in Kosovo in late 2003 and early 2004 and enraged Kosovo Albanians.

²⁹³ Maj Gen Andrew AJR Cumming CBE, Interview by author, 22 October 2007.

²⁹⁴ Ambassador Reno Harnish, Interview by author, 27 September 2007.

²⁹⁵ Maj Gen Andrew AJR Cumming CBE, Interview by author, 22 October 2007.

²⁹⁶ The author was the author of the estimate.

²⁹⁷ Tore S. Bade, Interview by author, 26 October 2007; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 10-12; Planning priorities observed by author from October 2003 onwards.

²⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 11-12.

²⁹⁹ UNMIK Fact Sheet, April 2007. http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2007/Fact_Sheet_apr_2007.pdf (accessed 10 November 2007).

³⁰⁰ Anna Khake and Nicolas Florquin, *Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo*, United Nations Development Programme, June 2003. ix, 7.

³⁰¹ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 10-11; Lt Sindre Solberg, Interview by author, 7 October 2007, (Solberg was seconded from KFOR to support the UNMIK Police murder investigation after the Lipljan murder).

³⁰² International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 5.

³⁰³ *Ibid.* 6.

³⁰⁴ Lt Gen Thorstein Skiaker, Interview by author, 29 August 2007.

³⁰⁵ International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Transcript from trial against Slobodan Milosevic, 9 May 2002. <http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020509IT.htm> (accessed 11 November 2007).

³⁰⁶ Hugh Griffiths, “Humanitarian or War Criminal?” *Balkan Reconstruction Report*, 06 Oct 2003; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 7-8; Lt Sindre Solberg, Interview by author, 7 October 2007.

³⁰⁷ The author witnessed these detentions and the demonstrations that followed in Pristina. See also International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 9.

³⁰⁸ The décor presented Albanian culture and history exclusively.

³⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 9.

³¹⁰ Col Nils Hanheide, Interview by author, 13 August 2007.

³¹¹ Col Peter Zwack, Interview by author, 9 November 2007.

³¹² King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 140.

³¹³ Col Peter Zwack, Interview by author, 9 November 2007.

³¹⁴ Major Ingvar Seland, Interview by author, 18 November 2007.

³¹⁵ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General, Leader of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *UNMIK/Press Release/1138*, Pristina, 13 March 2004. <http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/pressr/pr1138.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2007).

³¹⁶ Admiral Gregory Johnson, Pristina 15 March. Quoted in UNMIK, Division of Public Information, *Media Monitoring 16 March 2004*. <http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/mon/mar/lmm160304.pdf> (accessed 10 November 2004).

³¹⁷ Lt Sindre Solberg, Interview by author, 7 October 2007.

³¹⁸ Brig Gen Anders Brannstrom, Interview by author, 17 October 2007; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 13-14; Col Russell Thaden, Interview by author, 22 November 2007.

³¹⁹ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 13-14; Lt Sindre Solberg, Interview by author, 7 October 2007.

³²⁰ Slogan of demonstrators against arrests of “war heroes” in Peja reproduced as headline in pro-KLA newspaper *Epoka e Re* 17 March 2007. Quoted in International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 14.

³²¹ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 14; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Representative on Freedom of the Media, Miklós Haraszti, *The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo*, Vienna: 22 April 2004, 5-6, 11.

³²² KFOR source who interviewed families and local villagers in both Serb and Albanian communities 20-25 March 2004, Interview by author, April 2004; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 14; Murat Jashari, Interview by author, 5 October 2007; Albin Kurti, Interview by author, 28 October 2007; OSCE, *The Role of the Media*, 7.

³²³ OSCE, *The Role of the Media*, 7-8.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 10. It is a common claim of both Serb and Albanians in Kosovo that the other side is willing and able to resort to violence against their own children in order to be able to blame this on the other side.

³²⁷ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 44-45; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 11.

³²⁸ The author witnessed the demonstration in Pristina at 1200 hours; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 44; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 12.

³²⁹ Brig Gen Anders Brannstrom, Interview by author, 17 Oct 2007; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 44-45; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 12-13.

³³⁰ Student at Pristina University, Interviews by author 17, 18 and 19 March 2004; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 45.

³³¹ Lt Hans Olav Kalsveen, Interview by author, 16 October 2007.

³³² Lt Hans Olav Kalsveen, Interview by author, 16 October 2007.

³³³ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 45-48; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 12.

³³⁴ Brig Gen Anders Brannstrom, Interview by author, 17 Oct 2007; Lt Sindre Solberg, Interview by author, 7 Oct 2007. The King of Norway later awarded Lt Solberg a medal for valor for his part of the rescue operation.

³³⁵ Renate Flottau et al., "Deutsche Soldaten: Die Hasen Vom Amselfeld" (German Soldiers: The Cowards from the Blackbird Field), *Der Spiegel*, 3 May 2004.

³³⁶ Renate Flottau et al., “Deutsche Soldaten: Die Hasen Vom Amselfeld”; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 46-47. The author has approached German military officers who served in Kosovo in March 2004, but none have been willing to talk about what happened, including the German COMKFOR, Lt Gen Holger Kammerhoff. One German officer stated off the record that the reports of the performance of the German KFOR in Prizren were wrong and false propaganda against the Bundeswehr written by journalists who were openly hostile to the German military. He did not, however, contradict the fact that not one German soldier was injured. In comparison the Swedish and Norwegian contingents, each at less than one fifth of the size of the German contingent, both had 20 or more injured from Cagalvica. the French contingent also had a high number of wounded in Mitrovica.

³³⁷ Whit Mason, Interview by author, 8 November 2007.

³³⁸ OSCE, *The Role of the Media*, 12.

³³⁹ Ibid, 12-13. The PDK later put out a statement that was read by a reporter: “The killing of the children is a well-planned act by Belgrade, executed by its agents in Kosova.”

³⁴⁰ Brig Gen Anders Brannstrom, Interview by author, 17 October 2007.

³⁴¹ Lt Hans Olav Kalsveen, Interview by author, 16 October 2007.

³⁴² International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 50-51.

³⁴³ Ibid., 51; Nicholas Wood, “Kosovo Smoulders After Mob Violence,” *The New York Times*, 24 March 2004.

³⁴⁴ Col Peter Zwack, Interview by author, 9 Nov 2007.

³⁴⁵ Lt Col Iain Cassidy, Interview by author, 3 June 2007. The author has other accounts of the same problem from other officers who served in KFOR HQ at the time. Brig Gen Schook has retired and is now employed in UNMIK as the Principal Deputy SRSG. At a press conference on 26 September 2007 Steven Schook announced: “I have learned that the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services has begun an investigation into allegations concerning my personal conduct . . . The information against me include the following: that I have demonstrated aggressive behaviour; that I have demonstrated an unprofessionally close relationship with Minister Ethem Çeku and with former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj; that I have had personal relationships with international and Kosovar women here in the mission.” UNMIK staff member the author has talked to have corroborated the nature of the accusations. Steven Schook has refused to be interviewed for the purpose of this paper.

³⁴⁶ Maj Gen Andrew AJR Cumming CBE, Interview by author, 22 October 2007.

³⁴⁷ Lt Col John Rochelle, Interview by author, 15 Oct 2007; NATO, “NATO’s Strategic Reserve Forces Deploy to Kosovo,” *SHAPE Press Release*, 19 March 2004. <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2004/03/i040319.htm> (accessed 12 Nov 2007).

³⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 19-24.

³⁴⁹ Brig Gen Anders Brannstrom, Interview by author, 17 October 2007; King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 195.

³⁵⁰ UNMIK, “UNMIK Pillar I Presentation Paper,” *UNMIK*, June 2004. http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/PillarI_Report_June04.pdf (Accessed 18 November).

³⁵¹ Amnesty International, *Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo/Kosova). The March Violence: KFOR and UNMIK’s failure to protect the rights of the minority communities*, AI Index: EUR 70/016/2004, 8 July 2004, 31.

³⁵² Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004*, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16 No. 6 (D), July 2004, 2.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

³⁵³ Whit Mason, Interview by author, 8 November 2007.

³⁵⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, *S/2004/932, Report on the Situation in Kosovo by Ambassador Kai Eide*, New York: 30 Nov 2004, 3. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/632/22/PDF/N0463222.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

³⁵⁵ United Nations Secretary-General Special Envoy, *S/2005/635: A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo*, (The “Kai Eide report”), New York: 7 Oct 2005, 5. <http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

³⁵⁶ United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo. *S/2007/168. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status*. New York: 26 March 2007. <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

³⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, *Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility, Europe Report N°185*, Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 Aug 2007; “Sovereignty and Limits for Kosovo,” *The New York Times*, Editorial, 5 Oct 2007, A26.

³⁵⁸ King and Mason, *Peace at any Price*, 85.

APPENDIX A THE GEOGRAPHY OF KOSOVO

³⁵⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*. Chapter 1; *Orientation: places, names and people*. 1-21, offers more in-depth information on this topic.

³⁶⁰ The website of the Independent Commission on Mining and Minerals offers an accurate and brief overlook on data on Kosovo. <http://www.kosovomining.org/kosovoweb/en/kosovo/brief.html> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

³⁶¹ Of all NATO countries only Turkey has recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name. The official name in international bodies like the United Nation is FYROM (“The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”). In this thesis the name Macedonia will be used of reasons of practicality, and because it is the name the Macedonians use for their own country.

³⁶² The author has skied in Brezovica in the south of Kosovo in the last half of May, and later on the same day was served freshly harvested vegetables by a local family in the Prizren area in the southwest corner of Kosovo.

³⁶³ Independent Commission on Mining and Minerals Website. <http://www.kosovo-mining.org/kosovoweb/en/kosovo/hydrology.html> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

APPENDIX B THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF KOSOVO

³⁶⁴ Judah, *War and Revenge*, 313. The table presented in “Appendix One: Population of Kosovo,” is a very good representation of the data available about what happened to the population in Kosovo from 1948 to 1991. The Albanian’s share increased from 68.5 percent to 82.2 percent, and the Serbs’ share decreased from 23.6 percent to 9.9 percent. Regardless of the disputed accuracy of these statistical data, this in demographic terms is no less than an earthquake.

³⁶⁵ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, xvi.

³⁶⁶ Statistical Office of Kosovo, Website: <http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/> (accessed 16 Sept 2007).

³⁶⁷ Vickers. *Between Serb and Albanian*. 260.

³⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, *Religion in Kosovo, Europe Report N°105*, Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 31 January 2001. ii.

³⁶⁹ Agim Ceku has stated this several in conversations with Scott Porter, Iain Cassidy and the author about ethnic identity and religion.

³⁷⁰ Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*. 1-22.

APPENDIX C PERSONS IN KEY POSITIONS IN KOSOVO FROM 1999

³⁷¹ UNMIK homepage, <http://www.unmikonline.org/> (accessed 22 November 2007).

³⁷² Homepage of President of Kosovo, <http://www.president-ks.gov.net/> (accessed 22 November 2007).

³⁷³ Homepage of Prime Minister of Kosovo, <http://www.ks-gov.net/pm/> (accessed 22 November 2007).

³⁷⁴ KFOR official homepage, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/> (accessed 22 November 2007).

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Wilkes, John. *The Illyrians*. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992.

Woodward, Susan L. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995.

List of People Interviewed by Author for this Thesis:

Bade, Lt Col Tore Sterling. Norwegian Army. Deputy Chief of KFOR HQ J-3 Contingency Operations Planning Cell Sept 2002 to Oct 2003. Interview by author, Phone conversation. 26 October 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.

- Brafman, Wendy. Staff member of American Bar Association's Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative in Kosovo from 2002 to 2004. Interview by author, 11 November 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Brannstrom, Brig Gen Anders. Swedish Army. Battalion Commander in KFOR in 2000 and Commander of Multinational Brigade Centre 2003-2004. Currently he is the Land Component Commander of Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. Interview by author, 17 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Cassidy, Lt Col Iain. UK Army. Served in HQ KFOR in 1999 and was part of team that oversaw establishment of the KPC. Served as KFOR's liaison officer to the KPC in 2002-2003. In March 2004 served in AFSOUTH and was in HQ KFOR to assess situation. Interview by author. 17 June 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Cumming CBE, Maj Gen Andrew AJR. UK Army. Served as KPC Coordinator in UNMIK from Oct 2002 to Jan 2004. Had overall responsibility for dealing with the KPC and for formulation of policy for it. Interview by author. 22 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Dahlberg, Maj Gen Arne. Norwegian Army. Chief Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) in HQ KFOR 2002-2003. Responsible for all KFOR contact with the KPC and with the armed forces in Serbia/Montenegro. Interview by author. 28 August 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Di Lellio, Anna. Temporary Media Commissioner in Kosovo 2001-2003. Political Advisor to the UNMIK KPC Coordinator 2003-2004. Interview by author, 17 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Hanheide, Col Nils. Norwegian Contingent Commander in KFOR 2002-2004. Interview by author. 13 August 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Harnish, Ambassador Reno. Head of US Office in Pristina 2002-2003. Experienced American career diplomat. Interview by author, Washington D.C., 27 September 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Hendrix, Gen John W. US Army. Commander V Corps from July 1997 to November 1999. Commanding General, Task Force Hawk, 1999. Interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, 25 October 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Hoxha, Naim. Albanian Kosovo Police Service officer on duty in Cagavica and Pristina during the riots. Interview by author. 18 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Jashari, Murat. Law student. He is the scion and spokesperson of the Jashari family and carries significant influence in Kosovo, especially with the more traditional part

- of the Albanians. Interview by author. Phone Conversation. 3 October 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Kalsveen, Lt Hans Olav. Norwegian Army. Platoon Commander Norwegian Task Force in KFOR 2003-2004. Interview by author, Phone Conversation. 16 October 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Kurti, Albin. Student leader and organizer of demonstrations in Pristina in 1997-98. Served as assistant to Adem Demaci 1998-99. In jail in Serbia 1999-2001. Leader of the “Vetevendosje” (Self-determination) movement. Imprisoned by UNMIK after organizing demonstrations in February 2007. In house arrest at time of interview. Interview by author. Phone Conversation. 28 Oct 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Mason, Whit. Journalist writing about Kosovo in 2000. Analyst for ICG in Kosovo in 2001. Speech writer and public policy adviser in UNMIK 2002-2004. Later in 2004 was consultant to the Kosovo government. Together with Iain King the author of *Peace at any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo*. Interview by author 8 November 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Miles, Ambassador Richard. US Ambassador in Belgrade 1996-99 and junior diplomat in Belgrade 1983-86. Interview 1 by author. Fort Leavenworth. 19 September 2007. Tape recording. On file with author. Interview 2 by author. Phone Conversation 15 October 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Mood, Maj Gen Robert. Chief of Staff Norwegian Army. Served as battalion commander in KFOR in 1999-2000, and as Chief Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) in HQ KFOR 2001-2002. Was responsible for all KFOR contact with the KPC and with the armed forces of Serbia/Montenegro. Interview by author. 25 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Naegele, Jolyon. Head of UNMIK’s Office of Political Affairs. Worked as journalist in Balkans and Central Europe from early 1980s. From 2003 served as a senior political officer in UNMIK. Took over as Head of Office of Political Affairs in summer of 2007. Interview by author. Phone conversation. 11 November 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Porter, Lt Col Scott. US Army LNO to the KLA/KPC senior leadership 1999-2000. Lived amongst the KLA for the better part of a year with a close protection team. Served a tour at HQ SFOR prior to Kosovo, and was directly involved in the developing situation in Kosovo. Interview by author, 23 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Rochelle, Lt Col John. UK Army. Served in 2004 in the Balkans J3 Operations Team at the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters. His team had responsibility for planning and oversight of UK operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Interview by author. 15 October 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.

- Seland, Maj Ingvar. Norwegian Army. Chief of Land desk, KFOR HQ Joint Operations Center in 2004. Interview by author 18 November 2007. Phone conversation. Notes on file with author.
- Skiaker, Lt Gen Thorstein. Norwegian Army. Commander KFOR in 2001. Interview by author. Phone conversation. 29 August 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Solberg, Lt Sindre. Norwegian Army. Served in HQ of Multinational Brigade Centre in 2003-2004. Speaks fluent Serbian and worked closely with the Serb community. Interview by author. Phone conversation. 7 October 2007. Tape recording. On file with author.
- Thaden, Col Russell. US Army. Chief Intelligence officer of KFOR from 1999-2000. Interview by author. 2 November 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Vollebæk, Ambassador Knut. Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1997-2000. Chairman of the OSCE in 1999. Norwegian Ambassador to the United States 2001-2007. From summer 2007 serves as the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Interview by author, 11 November 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.
- Zwack, Col Peter. US Army. Chief Intelligence officer of KFOR from 2003-2004. Commanding officer of 66 Military Intelligence Group 2004-2006, currently Chief Intelligence officer of US Army Europe. Interview by author, 10 November 2007. Written answers, electronic mail. On file with author.

Other Interviews by Author Used in this Thesis:

- Ceku, Agim. Kosovar Albanian officer in the Yugoslav national army who joined the Croatian armed forces as a captain in 1991. He rose to the rank of brigadier general in the Croatian army. In 1999 he became the Chief of the General staff of the KLA. After the war he oversaw the demilitarization of the KLA and its transformation into KPC. He commanded the KPC from 1999-2006. From 2006 until today he serves as the Prime Minister of Kosovo. Interviews with author in Kosovo 2002-2004. On file with author.
- Demaci, Adem. Kosovar Albanian writer. Spent a total of 28 years in jail in Yugoslavia. Known as the “Mandela of the Balkans.” Political spokesman of the KLA in 1998-99. Since 1999 has reverted to writing while keeping involved in political affairs. Ideological father of “Vetevendosje” (Self-determination). Interviews with author in Kosovo 2002-2004. On file with author.
- Haxhiu, Baton. Kosovar Albanian journalist and editor. Interview by author in Kosovo in June 2003. On file with author.

Jashari, Bashkim. Nephew of Adem Jashari. One of two survivors of the attack on the Jashari compound in March 1998. KLA fighter during the war. Quickly rose to rank of brigadier in KPC after war. Interviews with author in Kosovo in 2002-2003. On file with author.

Llushtaku, Nuredin. Commander in KLA during the war. Commander of the KPC Guard. Interviews with author in Kosovo in 2002-2003. On file with author.

Percuku, Rrahim. Albanian Professor at the University of Pristina in the 1980s, from 1987 in political asylum in Norway. Interview with author in Oslo in May 2002. On file with author.

Rugova, Ibrahim. Leader of Democratic League of Kosova 1989-2006. Elected President of shadow government in Kosovo in 1992. President of Kosovo from 2002-2006. Interview with author in Kosovo in Nov 2003. On file with author.

Sava, Father. Archdeacon of the Decani Monastery in Kosovo. Became known during the Kosovo war as the “cyber monk.” Provided shelter to refugees during the war, both Albanian and Serbian. Interview with author in Kosovo in Dec 2003. On file with author.

Selimi, Sylejman. Senior Commander in KLA during the war. Deputy Commander of KPC 1999-2006. Commander of KPC 2006-. Interviews with author in Kosovo in 2002-2003. On file with author.

Yevtukhovich, Lt Gen Valeriy. Commander Russian Military Contingent in Kosovo July 1999 to November 2000. Interview by author in Kosovo in August 2000. On file with author.

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