

PEOPLE FIRST, MISSION ALWAYS: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE NEED
TO FIND THE BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTING THE FORCE
AND ACHIEVING THE MISSION

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PEOPLE FIRST, MISSION ALWAYS: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE NEED TO FIND THE BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTING THE FORCE AND ACHIEVING THE MISSION, by Major Gareth Prendergast, 105 pages.

When should force protection take precedence over achieving the mission? Historically, a relationship has developed between these two concepts. From the development of fortifications to modern combat outposts, force protection has now become the overriding concept when a nation is deploying its military forces. The security of a nation's soldiers has become a priority, with unwarranted pressure on commanders to avoid casualties when deployed on a mission. This prioritization of force protection has become a modern day reality, except when a quick decisive victory is assured, or the conflict is deemed to be of vital national importance.

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ACRONYMS

EU	European Union
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NBG	Nordic Battlegroup
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
OHQ	Operational Headquarters Level
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
ROK	Republic of Korea
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

My primary mission is to bring everyone home alive.

— Anonymous

For many years, Irish commanders departing on United Nations (UN) missions have uttered the above sentiments. They believe that in order to be a successful leader, the safety of their troops is of paramount importance. Most military leaders and their political masters, especially when troops are deployed on a UN or humanitarian mission, believe the same. Politicians envision that the domestic population is completely casualty averse. These politicians believe that their military's participation in international missions is dependent on the ability to avoid casualties, in order to placate the population, and electorate at home.

Commanders must not be reckless with the lives of their troops, but equally they must not disregard the overall mission that they have been deployed on to achieve. A balance needs to be struck, that will ensure the protection of the soldiers, along with mission success. The necessity for military leadership to ensure the protection of their troops during conflict has always been important, and sometimes decisive. Force protection as a concept entails “measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to

mission success.”¹ Force protection is an all-encompassing concept, that’s ultimate goal is to ensure the safety and security of military personnel and their equipment.

Military forces, while winning every tactical battle, can still lose the war at the strategic level. As a campaign becomes protracted, or a military expedition is not considered to be of national importance, excessive casualties can diminish the domestic will of the people. This can be the deciding factor in the prosecution of a war. A casualty averse nation is one where military casualties could undermine the domestic support of the population, for a particular mission. This is due to an unrealistic perception of the ability to avoid casualties, a lack of faith in the prosecution of the campaign, and what type of operation is being conducted.

Thesis

What is the correct balance, a commander should have between force protection and mission accomplishment? Which one should be the overriding concept? Force protection will always take precedence over achieving the mission, except when a quick decisive victory is assured or the mission is of vital national importance.

A force protection policy must balance the competing interests of the state in order to allow for mission success, while still maintaining the combat effectiveness of a force. An overly cautious force that prioritizes protection and security over an offensive mindset, will ultimately extend the mission, and lose the initiative to the opposing side. This inability to take the initiative because of an overly cautious approach could in due course jeopardize the mission.

¹NATO, *Generic Force Protection Handbook* (New York: NATO Publications, 2008), 5.

This thesis will examine how the domestic population perceives casualties in comparison to the duration, and national importance of the mission. Force protection as a concept should not be the overriding factor but rather be equal to, and an enabler of mission accomplishment. The public or domestic population, prefers victory rather than defeat but at what cost?² If an operation is not obviously successful then the domestic population is understandably less tolerant of casualties. The key challenge for the political leadership of a country is not simply to minimize casualties but also to frame casualties as part of the necessary cost of success.³ If casualties are perceived as a necessary evil, then the public will more likely be more accepting and willing to pay the price for victory. This public acceptance is conditional on convincing them as to the importance of the conflict to national security.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose and scope of this thesis is to find an acceptable balance for military operations, between the conflicting demands and motives of the domestic population and their political masters. In book one of *On War*; Clausewitz advocated “our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies.”⁴ These tendencies are the three parts of his paradoxical trinity. The relationships between the

²Benjamin C. Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention: Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994).

³Cori Dauber, “The Practice of Argument: Reading the conditions of Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998).

⁴Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Parat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

people, the government and the army.⁵ Clausewitz identified that the interplay among the trinity is a good place for any contemporary strategic thinker to begin.⁶

The modern concept of force protection and how it relates to this Clausewitzian interplay has developed historically alongside fortification theory. This historical development will be analyzed in chapter 3. If balanced correctly, could a correct force protection theory provide the harmonizing philosophy for the paradoxical trinity? The consequences of this would enable governments to effectively conduct warfare in the future, once they understand what type of war they wish to participate in.⁷ This will optimize the support from the military leadership, because the mission is being achieved, and more importantly the support of the people will be garnered, by reducing casualties.

The historical consequences of force protection, casualty aversion, and how these concepts have developed alongside fortifications theory will be defined, and then analyzed using three historical case studies. The Clausewitzian paradoxical trinity will also be used in order to help interpret the relationship that has been established between force protection, and achieving the mission, within these case studies.

Personal Relevance

As a young platoon commander, with the United Nations (UN), operating on the border between Lebanon and Israel, I had first-hand experience of force protection as a

⁵Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1981).

⁶Michael Howard, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 56.

⁷Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

concept. Upon deployment I was met by my older brother who was rotating out after his tour of duty. While pointing at his blue beret, his parting words were “don’t get yourself killed for this thing . . . it’s not Ireland.” This advice stuck with me for the remainder of my tour of duty. When examining this advice, two aspects are prevalent. The first, being the importance of preservation of oneself, and more importantly, of the platoon that I was responsible for. Secondly, the person giving the advice was my brother, and hence could talk to me directly, cutting through all the outside interference, to let me know where my priorities should be.

This advice struck home when my UN platoon outpost took a direct hit from a South Lebanese Army tank round. As the smoke evaporated and the radio chatter erupted, I grabbed the field phone and contacted the Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) whose area of our compound, took the direct hit. After contact was established, I asked “are you all alright down there.” At that moment, it struck us both, that my overriding concern was not mission accomplishment but rather, the safety of the platoon. It was a UN mission, and this was a defining moment in our tour of duty. Were we willing to sacrifice ourselves for the achievement of a mission that had not been achieved over the previous fifteen years? Miraculously everyone survived, but now they knew where their platoon commander’s priorities lay. My main concern was with my men. I was not willing to needlessly sacrifice the lives of my soldiers for a complex mission that could only be solved at the diplomatic level. For me the overriding goal was to actually bring everyone home safely.

In January 2011, as my career progressed, I was appointed the Force Protection Staff Officer, for a European Union Battlegroup. I was operating at the Operational

Headquarters Level (OHQ), where we functioned as a conduit between political necessities and tactical realities. In April 2011, a proposed European Union (EU) Mission into Libya (EUFOR LIBYA) was established after the situation in Libya deteriorated. Prior to this proposed deployment, I had trained with the OHQ of the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) and developed a keen interest in force protection. Upon activation of the OHQ, my mind definitely focused on the possible consequences of my appointment. This was further highlighted by the inclusion of the following sentence into the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the NBG, “any unrealistic expectation to avoid any risk may impact adversely on the accomplishment of the mission and might, if casualties should occur, undermine political and military resolve.”⁸ The mission and the avoidance of casualties (protection of force) are mentioned concurrently in this operating procedure. These SOPs identify the necessity in achieving a balance between these two concepts in order for the Nordic Battlegroup to be effective on any future missions.

On a personal basis, as the force protection staff officer, what was essential for me was that excessive casualties and a poor force protection policy could possibly undermine the political and military resolve of the European Union. On reviewing the SOPs of the EU OHQ from this period, I have actually underlined the sentence about undermining political resolve, and notated ‘the domestic will of the people’. This will of the people is commonly selected in campaign planning for a possible strategic center of gravity. According to Clausewitz the strategic center of gravity is the “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”⁹ This “hub of all power” or the domestic will

⁸Nordic Battle Group SOP 03740, 2010: 1

⁹Clausewitz, *On War*, 242.

of the people, can be equated to the possible effects of force protection on the success of the mission. Political and military resolve encapsulates two parts of the Clausewitzian trinity, and the domestic will of the people completes the trinity. The necessity for an EU Battlegroup to avoid unnecessary casualties, reaffirmed my previous beliefs and led me down a path of discovery. This path will further analyze the relationship between mission accomplishment, and force protection, within this thesis.

Conclusion

Throughout history, the assembling and maintenance of an army has proven to be a costly matter. The actual preservation of this force can be as important as actually achieving the mission. The needless sacrificing of soldiers in achieving a mission can undermine the overall combat effectiveness of an army, and thus threaten the very existence of the state. Sovereigns and political rulers have needed to construct fortifications, and adopt force protection measures in order to preserve the force. This conservation of a standing army by the avoidance of casualties, and use of force protection, ensures the maintenance of power for these rulers.

This chapter introduced the aim and scope of my thesis. Force protection is a vital component in modern military operations; politically, domestically and militarily. The linkage between force protection, and mission accomplishment, will be further examined in the remainder of this thesis. Chapter 2 will examine the methodology used to analyze this thesis. Chapter 3 will examine the literature involved with force protection and how historical theorists have established the relationship between preserving a force, and the necessity to achieving the mission. The remaining chapters will consist of three historical case studies followed by a concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In this chapter the rationale behind my research philosophy, epistemological stance and methodological framework is provided, so that the reader can understand the role they played in writing this thesis. A number of themes worthy of additional exploration were brought forward, and this thesis will find answers using a methodological framework which is based on the principle of research themes. These themes will be outlined at the end of chapter 3, the review of literature.

Research Philosophy-Ontology

For the research process to be effective, I explored the realities perceived both historically and internationally. Since I am a serving military officer of 24 years' experience, and four deployments on United Nations and European Union missions, I am well placed to conduct this research. I am also very much aware that my military experience has impacted on my ontology.

In analyzing the events surrounding the siege of Jadotville¹⁰, I must be cognizant of my own epistemology. As a child I grew up in Mullingar, a garrison town in the center of Ireland. Many of the troops involved in Jadotville came from Mullingar and were later serving alongside my father in the town's military barracks. For example Gunner Tom

¹⁰Jadotville will be further described in chapter 4. It is located in the Congo and involved a siege of Irish United Nations troops by mercenaries and local militia in 1961.

Cunningham was a survivor of Jadotville,¹¹ and I sat beside his children in school. Comdt Johnny Kane who led both attempts to relieve Jadotville was once my father's Commanding Officer in Mullingar. I grew up living close by his house, and played golf with him in my youth. Tom Quinlan retired as a Brigadier General and was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal for his actions while serving with the 35th Infantry Battalion in the Congo. Brigadier General Quinlan, was not in Jadotville, but rather received his medal for his meritorious actions leading his platoon into action in Elizabethville. He was my first Cadet Master when I entered the Irish Army as a young Cadet. His medal for bravery was a constant fascination for me, throughout my period of training in the Irish Cadet School.

I entered the Defence Forces in 1988, at 19 years of age having completed my first year in third level education. To date my career has been successful and I have an expectation of further advancement. My civilian education and my military education at home and overseas, has given me frequent exposure to different cultures, and provided me with a wide range of experiences. These have in turn created philosophical assumptions within me regarding human behavior.¹²

An active researcher must be aware of their epistemology. To create a coherent investigation the researcher must understand their underlying assumptions about legitimate knowledge.¹³ My epistemology has been the result of my upbringing in a

¹¹Gunner Cunningham survived the Siege of Jadotville and lives in Mullingar my home town.

¹²John Gill and Phil Johnson, *Research Methods for Managers* (London: Sage Publications, 2010).

¹³Ibid.

military town and family, and my service as an officer in the Irish Defence Forces. My father was an army officer; my two brothers are army officers, and I also have an undergraduate degree in economics. Therefore it could be assumed that my worldview is positivist, because of my scientific outlook and military upbringing. Positivism requires the researcher to be independent of what is being observed. The positivist seeks out the facts or causes of social phenomena, and not the subjective states of the individual.¹⁴

Case Study

A case study is a strategy that provides insight into how something works in life, over time. The use of a case study can also spot patterns and aid in understanding the differences between the ideal and the real.¹⁵ The research of a particular case study can provide a detailed insight that is both unique and simultaneously general.¹⁶

The review of literature in chapter 3 will be followed by three historical case studies. The first is on the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and the development of blockhouse tactics by the British Army in order to secure key infrastructure, and terrain in South Africa. The second case study will focus on a particular engagement during the UN mission to the Congo in the 1960s. Previously classified documentation, released to me by Irish Military Achieves, will give a first-hand account of an Irish unit that was isolated and encircled by Katangan separatists, but yet managed to preserve itself as a

¹⁴Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* (California: Sage Publications Inc, 2002), 69.

¹⁵Eileen Kane and Mary O'Reilly-de Brún, *Doing your Own Research* (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 2001), 117.

¹⁶Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research, Design and Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 18.

force in the face of insurmountable odds. The third case study is pitched at the strategic level and will examine the Korean War and how, as the war progressed, the proportional relationship between force protection and a risk adverse population and government became more prevalent. This relationship will be examined using correspondence and primary research material made available by the Truman Library.

Conclusion

The theory and literature surrounding the historical development of force protection, and how it relates to mission accomplishment will now be examined in chapter 3. This theory and its outcomes or common themes, will then be tested using three historical case studies. These historical studies will be mainly based on primary research material, made available so as to give historical and practical examples of the above mentioned theory.

CHAPTER 3

LITERARY REVIEW

Force Protection is not a helpful term. It inevitably connotes bunkers and barbed wire. Instead of confining itself to such a narrow conception of the problem, the task force focused on ways to maximize mission effectiveness, while minimizing casualties.¹⁷

— Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

Introduction

The United States Under Secretary of Defense, designated a Defense Science Board Task Force, in order to examine force protection in the future. Force protection should no longer compel a commander to be overly protective of his force. This does not advocate recklessness, but rather the exposure to calculated risks can actually increase the force protection of a deployed unit. Protection is an element of combat power, along with firepower, maneuver, and leadership. Protection or force protection consists of all measures taken to conserve fighting potential. Actions that reduce the losses from enemy fire are a component of protection, and as such fortifications are part of an overall protection policy.¹⁸

This chapter will examine the historical development of force protection alongside fortification theory. It will also define and analyze the literature surrounding force protection, fortifications and how they relate to mission accomplishment. By

¹⁷Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 5.

¹⁸US Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 2-10.

analyzing the current and historical literature associated with these concepts, a relationship between force protection and mission success will be examined and established. Politicians and political leaders care about public attitudes toward specific military operations, because they believe that those attitudes are linked to their overall public support.¹⁹ Their overall public support and popularity is what keeps them in employment.

This chapter will also identify a number of key themes that are evident through my review of the relevant literature. These will be carried forward into the remainder of the thesis, in order to form the basis for the case study research of subsequent chapters.

The Historical Development of Fortifications as a Method of Force Protection

Throughout history, fortifications have been used to defend key terrain, and to protect the force defending from within. A defender in a fortress has a marked advantage over an attacker, because the defenses provide physical protection, allowing the defender to secure key terrain with considerably less troops, and more physical protection than the attacker.

Following the Italian Wars (1494-1498), the science of military architecture underwent a radical revolution. The French artillery using the first really effective siege cannon had battered down with ridiculous ease the high-walled medieval fortifications of the Italian towns. The Italians' reply was the invention of a new model enceinte-the main

¹⁹Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 140.

enclosure of a fortress.²⁰ This new style became known as the *Trace Italienne*, or Star Forts.

The appearance of the *Trace Italienne* in the 1520s brought about the end of the brief period of dominance for the wall-shattering cannons. This made fortifications, and force protection, the dominant aspect on the battlefield. They provided incredible protection to the defender. Capturing or reducing to rubble these ‘Star Forts’ was next to impossible and thus they also acted as deterrence to the empire building ambitions of the Bourbons and Habsburgs.²¹

During the reign of Louis XIV of France (1661-1715), Sébastien Le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban, and later Marquis de Vauban (1633-1707), commonly referred to as Vauban, was an engineer who specialized in fortifications. His specialized publications on siege-craft and the defence of fortresses made him one of the most influential writers of his era.²² It was characteristic of Vauban’s dislike of unnecessary bloodshed, as much as of the new spirit of moderation in warfare that was beginning to prevail in his day.²³ Rulers realized the significance of avoiding mass casualties, not only to preserve their armies, but also their power and influence over their subjects. Vauban’s legacy was that of a ring of fortresses, guarding the assembled armies, and kingdom of France. Armies were expensive commodities for a king to assemble. “Each soldier represented heavy

²⁰Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 69.

²¹Dennis E. Showalter and William J. Astore, *Soldiers’ Lives Through History: The Early Modern World* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 2007).

²²Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 73.

²³*Ibid.*, 79.

investment in time and money . . . had to be kept near the expected scenes of action, needed protection . . . the net result was to concentrate armies in chains of heavily fortified positions.”²⁴

Fortifications allowed a monarch to both protect and preserve his force. The very existence of this fact helped to achieve the overarching concept, and mission of protecting the sovereign territories. Louis XIV and other monarchs during this period recognized the need for fortifications to defend their territories, and soldiers. Large scale pitched battles became a rarity. Masters of siege craft and fortress engineers became vital to a country’s army. These masters of fortifications, such as Vauban, provided the balancing act of preserving the expensively assembled force, while still achieving the mission of protecting a kingdom. The protection and survivability of the monarch’s army, was as important as the mission of defending the frontiers, and territorial integrity of the state. In fact the very survivability of this force, due to the development of fortifications allowed monarchs to protect their sovereign territories, and their own rule within the region. A defensive mindset was predominant in this era, thus developing a relationship between force protection and mission accomplishment. This relationship was developed in order to avoid the destruction of the sovereign’s army and achieve the mission of protecting his territories and his ability to rule. Protection and defence were the overriding concepts, becoming dominant over an offensive mindset.

A form of fortification advanced in medieval times, and still in use today is the stronghold. This is a place not merely for protection from attack but also of active defense. A stronghold is a center where the defenders are secure from surprise or superior

²⁴Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 94.

numbers, and also a base from which they sally forth to hold predators at bay and to impose military control over the area in which their interests lie.²⁵ Strongholds allow a force to project its will into the surrounding area. This will, can be projected from the relative safety of the protection of a strongpoint or fortification. However, the success of this power projection is inversely proportional to the ability of a force to sally forth on a regular and effective basis from the conceived and relative security of their base. A force that is overly dependent on the security provided by its fortified strongpoint, may be neglectful in actually achieving its overriding mission in the surrounding area. This force can then become too casualty sensitive, and will have the constraining sentiments of its political elite to avoid casualties. This perception of protecting the force, to the detriment of the overall mission is facilitated by the relative security and safety received from a fortification or strongpoint. This theory will be further examined in chapter 4, when the use of blockhouses by the British Army, in the Second Boer War (1899-1902) will be examined.

Field Fortifications and Force Protection

There are two general classes of field fortifications, hasty and deliberate. Hasty fortifications are those initially constructed when in contact with the enemy or when contact is imminent. Deliberate fortifications are constructed out of contact with the enemy, or developed gradually from hasty fortifications. Field fortifications increase the combat efficiency of troops. They must be used skillfully to further the mission of a unit,

²⁵John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 139.

and must not be allowed to lead to a passive or static defence.²⁶ Prior to the Napoleonic Wars, the governments of the ‘*Old Regime*’ with limited resources pursued the strategy of passive and static defence. “Magazines of munitions and foodstuffs . . . had to be kept near the expected scenes of action, needed protection . . . Armies, and fragments of armies, were immobilized near their bases, from which they were not supposed to depart by more than five day’s march.”²⁷ Protection of the force now took precedence over achieving the mission, within these monarchies and sovereign territories. The maintenance of the combat effectiveness of the force was perceived as being good enough to impose the will and edicts of the incumbent ruler. The strength of the force rather than the missions it accomplished, was the barometer measuring the overall power of a ruler. Preservation of a force, or army took precedence over its effectiveness in achieving missions. Thus the power of the force was directly related to its preservation, and ability to support the ruler bankrolling it.

Historical Fortification Theory

Running parallel to the construction of fortifications, is the theory associated with them and the reason for their construction. An overarching theme prevalent in the majority of these theorists’ opinions is the need for the preservation of expensively assembled military forces. This need takes precedence over the achievement of the actual mission. Another prevailing area, is that in order to achieve the mission, active defense is the better option. Passive defense though initially beneficial will in the long run, have

²⁶War Department, Field Manual (FM) 5-15, *Field Fortifications*; Training Circular No. 96 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943).

²⁷Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 94.

detrimental consequences to the mission. The theories of a number of key military philosophers have been selected to outline these various concepts associated with fortifications, and force protection.

Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu as a master theorist did recognize the futility of attacking fortifications. “The worst Policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.”²⁸ Sun Tzu fully recognized the protection afforded to a force occupying defenses. Fortified cities provided this protection. When an army is weak or needs to be preserved, fortifications or defenses allow for the maintenance of a force. This maintenance is especially true when facing a superior army. “Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack.”²⁹ Sun Tzu advocated that in order to protect your force, defense is the best choice. “One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.”³⁰ A ruler, whose survival is dependent on the maintenance of an army, needs to preserve his army. Occupying defended positions is the optimum approach. A fortification increases the survivability of the force allowing a ruler to maintain power within his own territories while also providing a degree of physical protection to his frontiers. As time progressed, armies became more mobile, and the value of this strategy became less important.

²⁸Sun Tzu, *The Art Of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 78.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 85.

³⁰*Ibid.*

Jomini

Jomini states that war will be confined primarily to a series of combats in which the possession of fortified areas will be imperative.³¹ Jomini, though a keen advocate of the offensive, did see the relevance of conducting the defense using fortifications. He stated that a defensive war can be either passive or active. He further states that the defensive battle is always pernicious with the object being to retard the progress of the enemy without compromising one's own army.³² While on the defensive, Jomini advocated that the defending general should have the good sense not to be too passive in defense. "He must not remain in his position to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary"³³ but rather remain active and operate outside the perceived safety of the fortification. A passive defense which in the short term appears to increase survivability, may in fact prolong a campaign, thus increasing the overall chance of receiving greater casualties. Jomini ascribed to a basic fundamental of defense, which is to maintain an offensive mind-set. Short term gains, will be negated by the threats to a force in the pursuit of its overriding mission. The ability to achieve the mission in the shortest possible time has typically the overall effect of reducing a forces casualties, and risk.

Clausewitz

In Book Six of *On War*, Clausewitz describes the strategic importance of fortresses and fortification. "Their significance was felt beyond their walls; it contributed

³¹A.H. Jomini, *Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1992).

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*, 74.

to the conquest or retention of the country . . . fortresses attained a strategic significance that for a time was considered so important that they formed the basis of strategic plans.”³⁴ A defensive mindset can prevail especially when facing an asymmetric enemy. The Israelis in South Lebanon and NATO in Afghanistan utilized the concept of combat outposts (COPs) so as to protect themselves from a not easily identifiable enemy. They projected power by active patrolling, and protected their force, using field fortifications or COPs. However, this power projection was directly related to how often the force left the relative protection of its fortification to go out and patrol the surrounding environs. The intelligence gathered on these patrols, provides valuable situational awareness. But at what cost to the security and protection of the force. The primary reason for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from Lebanon in 2000 was the lack of support from the Israeli population for their occupation of South Lebanon. The constant infliction of IDF casualties by Hezbollah reinforced this sentiment amongst the domestic population.³⁵

Clausewitz espoused that in order for a fortification to be effective it needed an active force occupying it. This force needs to project itself into the surrounding environs. “Strictly speaking, even the most passive function of a fortress, defence against assault, cannot, after all, be imagined without this active element.”³⁶ If however a force does not have the capacity to project itself beyond the walls of a fortification, Clausewitz

³⁴Clausewitz, *On War*, 393.

³⁵Daniel Isaac Helmer, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 21, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursions Between 1982-2000* (Fort Leavenworth KS: CSI Press, 2007), 72.

³⁶Clausewitz, *On War*, 394.

advocates that these units “can find safety and cover there. From time to time they can make a sortie against the enemy collect intelligence, or attack his rear.”³⁷ Today, even with all the developments in weaponry, and technology, modern armies have to rely on fortifications in order to occupy or have an effective footprint in an area of operation. The effectiveness of this method and its ability to achieve the mission is inversely related to the force’s ability to patrol and operate outside of the fortification or defensive position.

Clausewitz defines a defensive position as “any position in which one accepts battle and makes use of terrain to protect oneself . . . it makes no difference whether one’s general attitude is mainly passive or mainly active.”³⁸ The construction of field fortifications or modern day patrol bases is inherently transient in nature. They are normally constructed by an army of occupation that is trying to subjugate an armed insurgency.

Staying inside the relative safety of the fortification may save lives in the short run, but through time this will lead to mission creep and mission extensions. This could jeopardize and elongate the overall mission, with the possible effect of endangering the safety of the force in the long run.

³⁷Ibid., 398.

³⁸Ibid.,404.

The Clausewitzian Trinity

The Clausewitzian trinity examines the relationship that exists between what Clausewitz espouses as the instrument of policy (the government), the play of chance (the military) and the primordial violence (the people).³⁹

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject, and yet variable in their relationship to one another. Christopher Bassford a preeminent Clausewitzian scholar argues that a theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.⁴⁰

In his trinity, Clausewitz outlines which one of these tendencies is a rational or irrational force. The government is considered a rational force of calculation or policy which is driven by reason. This is questionable at times because policy could be subservient to the irrational interests of those in power.⁴¹ However Clausewitz deems that of the three subsets to his trinity the government is the most constant in its approach.

The people are paired mainly with irrational forces, the primordial violence of hatred and enmity. This would suggest a fickle nature that needs to be controlled or steadied by the other two aspects of the trinity. The people in a democracy are responsible for electing their government. The optimum government should be stable or

³⁹Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1981), 2.

⁴⁰Christopher Bassford, "The Clausewitzian Trinity," 2007, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm> (accessed 28 October 2012).

⁴¹Christopher Bassford and Edward Villacres, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," *Parameters* (Autumn 1995).

rational so as to best represent the people in the most consistent manner. By acting in an irrational manner that jeopardizes the country, a government can lose its popular support or mandate, and loose power. This loss of power could be as a result of domestic unrest, and lack of confidence among the electorate.

Force protection, as a theory does seek to rationalize war, and fix an arbitrary relationship among the points or aspects of the Clausewitzian trinity.⁴² But rather it is a stabilizing influence that not only protects the military forces but also protects the government from the irrational nuances of the people.

Force Protection versus Mission Success:
Which is more important?

The Clausewitzian trinity is an extremely useful tool in aiding the understanding of how force protection interacts with mission accomplishment. Forces can stay within the safety of their fortresses, not venturing outside the confines of the protective walls. However the overall benefit of this is questionable because it undermines situational awareness, and control over the surrounding environs. The political masters and the domestic population will question the overall value of hunkering down behind the protection offered by a combat outpost. This will prevent casualties but is it the best use of resources, and tax payer's money. Is staying within the base and not patrolling, fulfilling the initial mission that the force was originally deployed or achieving the overall purpose of deploying the force in the first place? This purpose relates directly to the mission, and how successful it can be achieved. The success of this mission is of utmost importance in satisfying the needs of the political hierarchy and their masters, the

⁴²Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

electorate. The academics, Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, in their book, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, advocate that the support of the domestic population is directly related to whether a country has vital national interests at stake.⁴³ The acceptance of casualties is thus directly related to how important the domestic population perceives the war or mission to be. The domestic population will tolerate casualties as an acceptable risk, once they recognize the mission to be of great importance to their nation. They will however have a lower tolerance for casualties if they do not fully understand or believe the mission is not of vital national importance.

As outlined in chapter 1, NATO defines force protection as using all measures and means available to minimize a force's vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities are exploitable weaknesses that must be protected so as to ensure "freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success."⁴⁴ According to Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, concerns about casualties not only drive a country's foreign policy, and its subsequent electoral campaigns, but they also drive the behavior of a country's most determined foes.⁴⁵ They argue that a direct relationship between protecting a force while still achieving mission success, and the support of the domestic population can be further established. A country whose population is casualty adverse to the detriment of achieving the mission, can be very vulnerable to a resolute enemy, intent on inflicting casualties. This will seriously hamper mission accomplishment, and allow a determined

⁴³Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 35.

⁴⁴NATO, *Generic Force Protection Handbook* (New York: NATO Publications, 2008), 5.

⁴⁵Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 24.

foe to achieve its own mission. The prominent political scientist, James L. Ray from Vanderbilt University, argues “implicit in the argument that democracies behave differently with regard to the use of force is the belief that democracies are sensitive to public opinion and public opinion is sensitive to the human cost of war.”⁴⁶ Feaver and Gelpi advocate that the American people compare casualties to the value of the objective and make judgments because of this, as to whether to support the prosecution of a particular conflict.⁴⁷ As a conflict grinds on, and casualties start to increase, popular support and the domestic will of the people will begin to waver. This was the case in point in Vietnam, where tactical successes on the battlefield did not reflect strategically, or on the home front. This lack of public support along with a myriad of other political and strategic failures ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the United States military from Vietnam. After the 1968 Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, casualties had a much more corrosive effect on presidential approval.⁴⁸ As U.S. casualties mounted, public support for the Vietnam War declined to below 30 percent.⁴⁹ Thus the preservation of the force in Vietnam and the avoidance of casualties began to take priority over accomplishing the mission.

As already stated, strongholds or COPs allow a force to project its will and intentions into the surrounding area. The success of this power projection is inversely

⁴⁶James L. Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evolution of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 22.

⁴⁷Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles*, 100.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 138.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

proportional to the ability of a force to sally forth on a regular and effective basis from the conceived and relative security of their base or stronghold. A force that becomes overly dependent on the security provided by its fortified strongpoint or COP may be neglectful of actually achieving its overall mission in its area of responsibility. Such a force may become too casualty averse, or it may have the constraints of its political elite and national caveats in order to avoid casualties. Such a perception of protecting the force, to the detriment of the overall mission is facilitated by the relative security and safety received from a fortification or strongpoint. In the long run, a commander who accepts and mitigates the risks associated with patrolling, providing security, and interacting with the locals will have better odds, and a better chance of achieving his mission. However if he incorrectly perceives force protection to mean staying inside the COP, and not risking his troops by patrolling, then he will ultimately endanger his mission, hand the initiative to the enemy, risking not only his soldiers' lives but the lives of all subsequent soldiers serving in his area of responsibility.

Weinberger Doctrine

In 1984, as a result of the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. administration published the Weinberger Doctrine. It set out conditions that should be met for the U.S. to become involved in future military conflicts. One of the main conditions was that “the vital interests of the U.S. or its allies must be at stake.”⁵⁰ Point six of this doctrine states that “a combat role should only be undertaken as a last resort.”⁵¹ This enshrined the view that

⁵⁰Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” *Defense* 85 (January 1985): 2-11.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

public support for military operations was a scarce resource, difficult to mobilize and easy to lose.⁵² Research by Benjamin Schwarz, has indicated that there was a direct link between mounting casualties, anti-war protests, and subsequent changes in United States Government policies in Vietnam.⁵³ As a result of the consequences of the Vietnam War, the Weinberger Doctrine tried to clearly calibrate political and military objectives coinciding with home support. The 1994 U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, after the death of eighteen U.S. soldiers bares testament to this doctrine. The protection of the force could no longer be guaranteed, and hence the lack of public support. This resulted in a drawdown of U.S. troops.⁵⁴ However Feaver and Gelpi argue that the American public is more discerning than most policy makers expect. American foreign policy is not as constrained as conventional wisdom implies. They argue that casualties do not produce a reflexive collapse of support by the domestic population, but rather under the correct conditions, the public appears to take a reasonably thought out cost-benefit approach in forming attitudes toward military missions. The more vital the mission is to national interests, the more willing the domestic population is to support the subsequent costs associated with it.⁵⁵

⁵²Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 37.

⁵³Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention*.

⁵⁴John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope; Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

⁵⁵Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 37.

The Fallacy of Total Force Protection

Total force protection is unachievable, unless you never leave barracks and wrap your soldiers up in cotton wool. NATO doctrine advocates that “force protection must therefore, be based upon effective risk management . . . an unrealistic expectation to avoid risk may impact adversely on the accomplishment of the mission and, if casualties should ensue, undermine political and military resolve.”⁵⁶ This definition underlines how poorly executed force protection, can have ramifications on a much wider scale. It could challenge a country’s resolve and hence negate mission accomplishment and undermine mission success. This expectation puts tremendous pressure on military leaders on the ground to focus on force protection instead of primary mission success.⁵⁷ A cautious commander with career ambitions and overwhelming political constraints may be swayed in choosing an overly protective force protection policy, rather than focusing on the achievement of the mission. This cautiousness and reliance on force protection will have ramifications for the deployed troops, and the future credibility of the force and mission.

Prior to the United States involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American attitude towards force protection can largely be explained by what was called the ‘Desert Storm Syndrome.’ That is an unjustified perception that the military can operate casualty free.⁵⁸ Previous U.S. deployments to Vietnam and Lebanon⁵⁹ had shaken the political and

⁵⁶NATO, *Generic Force Protection Handbook* (New York: NATO Publications, 2008), 3.

⁵⁷Michael W. Alvis, “Dying for Peace: Understanding the Role of Casualties in Peace Operations” (Strategic Research Project, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 1998).

⁵⁸Walter E. Kretchik, “Force Protection Disparities,” *Military Review* (July-August 1997): 73-78.

domestic resolve of the U.S., resulting in a public aversion to casualties. A tolerance for casualties by the general populace requires them to trust and have confidence in how its government will prosecute the war to a successful outcome.⁶⁰ Operation Desert Storm in 1991, not only restored Kuwaiti sovereignty; it also restored the confidence of the United States in its army. This short sharp war ratified a new belief within the U.S. establishment that foreign expeditionary warfare could now be done at a minimal casualty cost, and with maximum effect. Overwhelming force brings about victory sooner rather than later. This use of an overwhelming force produces fewer casualties than a gradual escalation alternative. This alternative can mire a country into mission creep, an elongated war, and dwindling domestic support.⁶¹ The disadvantage of this is “it can lull the public and civilian leaders into thinking the use of military forces is risk-free and without consequences.”⁶² This was the situation in Kosovo in 1999 where General Wesley Clark, NATO’s supreme commander ordered his planners to prepare for the use of force, that would result in no NATO casualties or loss of aircraft.⁶³ This was an extreme situation that was as a direct result of his higher commander’s sensitivities, and the perceived political direction from the U.S Government, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO. The USA and its NATO allies believed that after the lack of casualties in Desert

⁵⁹On 23 October 1983, a US Marine barracks in Beirut was blown up by a car bomb resulting in 241 deaths. This resulted in the ultimate withdrawal of US Forces from Lebanon.

⁶⁰Feaver and Gelpi, 162.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²E. Blazer, “Confused by Success,” *The Washington Times*, December 1997.

⁶³Feaver and Gelpi, 95.

Storm, and the public backlash after Somalia, the public tolerance for casualties would be low. This was especially true in the case of Kosovo, which had connotations of being a UN sponsored humanitarian mission.

The Battle of Mogadishu, in 1994 reversed the illusion of the Powell Doctrine⁶⁴ and the success of Desert Storm. The deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers seriously undermined the success and previous achievements of this multinational peace support operation. It was also a major deciding factor in the withdrawal of the U.S. contingent from Somalia. Six months after the incident the Clinton Administration released Presidential Directive 25.⁶⁵ A document that was vulnerable to criticism because of its preoccupation with casualties, this resulted in overly cautious planning for such operations as the NATO involvement in Kosovo. An over sensitivity to casualties could encourage local leaders to be obstinate, knowing that they can outlast an embattled peacekeeping force.⁶⁶ This was especially true of the interventionist missions of peace, and humanitarian operations that were prevalent between the end of the cold war and 11th September 2001.⁶⁷

Walter E. Kretchik, in his article, 'Force Protection Disparities' outlines the discrepancies associated with force protection, during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.

⁶⁴The Powell Doctrine advocated that the United States should only get involved in conflicts that have clear objectives, an exit strategy, and domestic and international support.

⁶⁵The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace operations.

⁶⁶Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 1996), 310.

⁶⁷Feaver and Gelpi, 96.

He advocated that a commander who fails to examine force protection requirements exposes his force to hazards that can cause his units attrition over time. A thoroughly analyzed force protection policy, integrated throughout the operation, is an essential element for mission success.⁶⁸ This success will be achieved through finding a balance between protecting your force, and the risks associated with achieving the mission. The optimum result for the commander is to achieve his mission with the minimal amount of casualties. Mission success through carnage does not taste so sweet. If the casualty figures are excessive then the achievement of the mission is questionable. As Colonel Michael W. Alvis, the former U.S. Army Senior Fellow to Harvard espouses, commanders have problems balancing mission requirements, and the need to protect their troops. The intolerance for casualties places a disproportionate premium on force protection.⁶⁹

Casualty Sensitivities

The overall willingness of the public to accept casualties and support a military operation can be designated as casualty tolerance, casualty sensitivity or casualty shyness. This designation can be measured as absolute, high, moderate, limited or non-existent. Thus the claim that the public is casualty tolerant is a claim that casualties do not undermine the domestic support of the population for a particular mission.⁷⁰ The academic Edward N. Luttwark, in his article *Where are the Great Powers*, espouses “a

⁶⁸Kretchik, “Force Protection Disparities,” 73-78.

⁶⁹Alvis, “Dying for Peace.”

⁷⁰Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2.

related claim is that over time the American public has become so sensitive to casualties that it is essentially casualty phobic: even very low casualties are considered intolerable.”⁷¹ A perceived casualty phobia can result in abrupt withdrawals from such missions as Lebanon and Somalia in the wake of gruesome and intolerable casualties. A phobia often cited by Osama Bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein as to their overriding tactic on how they would have defeated America.⁷² Feaver and Gelpi rebukes this sentiment by these former enemies of the United States, by stating that the American public is in fact defeat phobic, not casualty phobic. He also states that politicians and policymakers are more fearful of public perceptions to casualties than the actual reality.⁷³ “The general public is not demanding casualty free uses of military force.”⁷⁴ But rather, it demands victory, especially in conflicts of national vital importance—“so long as American soldiers are not losing their lives in the pursuit of interests not considered vital.”⁷⁵ Policy makers, military leadership and the general public all have a vested interest in avoiding casualties. A clear delineation between wars of national importance, and peace support humanitarian operations, also exists, especially in the realm of where a domestic population is willing to accrue casualties. Clausewitz in his paradoxical trinity examines this relationship and how it affects policymakers.

⁷¹Edward N. Luttwark, “Where are the Great Powers?” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 23-29.

⁷²Louis Klarevas, “Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 523-40.

⁷³Feaver and Gelpi, 97.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 36.

Feaver and Gelpi argue that if policymakers can make the case that the operation is important, then the public would show a willingness to shoulder greater costs.⁷⁶ These costs can be directly related to the relationship between force protection and mission accomplishment. This relationship that can thus be examined, and analyzed using the Clausewitzian trinity.

Force Protection and Mission Success Analyzed Through
the Clausewitzian Trinity

“Force Protection will find itself inextricably linked to a combination of political, economic and strategic factor.”⁷⁷

The perception that casualties are an unacceptable consequence of military operations has influenced the way peace and humanitarian operations have been conducted. Major Perry D. Rearick, in his Master’s Thesis on “Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment in Bosnia, 2001” argued that avoiding casualties was more important than the mission, for U.S. forces conducting peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷⁸

A recurring theme that is very evident in the review literature for this thesis is that there is a relationship between force protection and mission success. Kretchik even avers

⁷⁶Feaver and Gelpi, 146.

⁷⁷Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 2.

⁷⁸Perry D. Rearick, “Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment in Bosnia, 2001” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2001), <http://dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2012).

that minimal casualties are an essential element for the success of a mission.⁷⁹ Feaver and Gelpi rebuke this sentiment by stating that “in reality policymakers can count on sizable public support for military operations, provided that the leaders will carry them through to victory.”⁸⁰ If the mission is a success and victory is achieved than casualties are more palatable than in defeat. The domestic population as previously discussed are more defeat averse than casualty phobic. This mission success or lack of therein establishes a number of different relationships between force protection and the trinity as espoused by Clausewitz.

The Balancing Relationship Within the Clausewitzian Trinity

As previously demonstrated, there is a direct correlation between the avoidance of casualties and the ability to achieve mission success. It has also been established that mission success leads to domestic support from the people or the primordial violence as advocated by Clausewitz. It leads to the ‘feel good factor’ that was very evident in the United States after ‘Operation Desert Storm’. The military or army were happy, the population or the people were also happy and because of this the Bush administration (1988-1992) or the instrument of policy were vindicated as victors awaiting their political spoils. The advantage of finding this balancing relationship is that an optimum relationship between the three facets of the trinity will be discovered. This will allow the military and the government to pursue their policies successfully.

⁷⁹Kretchik, “Force Protection Disparities,” 73-78.

⁸⁰Feaver and Gelpi, 19.

The Unbalanced Relationship Within the Clausewitzian Trinity

There is a significant analytical benefit to be gained by recognizing the relationship between the people, army and government. Ignoring any of these elements or distorting their relationship undermines a society's war effort.⁸¹ If the people or primordial violence is dissatisfied with the government as an instrument of policy how does this affects the army? Spontaneous or ill-conceived military ventures that result in defeat and high casualties do have direct consequences for each of the aspects of the Clausewitzian trinity. This is especially true if the mission or campaign was not deemed to be of national importance by the domestic population. Force protection, helps to ensure mission success, because of its ability to reduce casualties. This prevents a culmination of the mission, and assists in its overall achievement.

The security and protection of US military personnel is an overriding concern for the U.S. Government as this recent United States official document from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, states;

The safety of its men and women in uniform will remain a primary concern of a democratic state . . . moreover, casualties suffered in longer endeavors when the mission is more open-ended and the enemy more elusive can have a greater political impact than casualties suffered in those operations where the U.S. military is pursuing a defined mission and clear opponent.⁸²

The above quotation once more highlights the relationship between force protection and mission success. A lack of casualties, while achieving a clearly defined mission is the optimum outcome. However units can be too risk averse, resulting in them hunkering down in their posts, reducing their situational awareness and overall

⁸¹Bassford and Villacres.

⁸²Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2006, 3.

effectiveness. This aversion to risk as the academics, John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley argue, was very evident in Somalia. Without a coherent mission and plan, commanders were reluctant to send troops to engage the warring factions, and increase the possibility of U.S. casualties.⁸³ This over reliance on strict force protection measures actually robbed the “U.S. forces of the ability to shape their battle space and understand how the enemy is operating.”⁸⁴ This short term aversion to casualties can actually protract the campaign leading to higher casualties in the long-term. This ultimately can lead to failure in completing the mission and ultimate withdrawal. An overly protective force can actually affect the Clausewitzian trinity by leading to mission creep and lack of decisive action. Throughout history this expectation has put, and still puts tremendous pressure on the military leaders on the ground to overly focus on force protection instead of the primary mission. This undermines an otherwise sound policy from the government and military planners.⁸⁵ Feaver and Gelpi support this statement by espousing that “the public is willing to take casualties if the national security interest at stake is high, but as the security interest declines so too does the willingness to pay a human cost in defense of it.”⁸⁶ The defense of the United States from attacks such as those at Pearl Harbor and the Twin Towers resulted in a higher tolerance for casualties than was the case for humanitarian or peace support missions such as Somalia or the Balkans.

⁸³John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope; Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

⁸⁴Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2006, 4.

⁸⁵E. Blazer, “Confused by Success,” *The Washington Times*, December 1997.

⁸⁶Feaver and Gelpi, 156.

Properly managed force protection can give the army greater latitude to conduct all of its missions, even where decisive victory is not clearly apparent. Major Tim W. Quillin, in his Monograph, for the School of Advanced Military Studies Leavenworth, “Force Protection in Support and Stability Operations (SASO),” reinforces this assertion that force protection should never restrict freedom of action but rather force protection should be used as an enabling facet in overall mission success.⁸⁷

Conclusion

Force protection, mission success and the tolerance of the domestic population are all key aspects influencing the geometry of the Clausewitzian trinity. For military planners the most advantageous combination of mission success coupled with force protection is what should drive the planning and overall end-states envisioned. “Changes in the perceptions of the likelihood of success appear to have an important influence on the public’s sensitivity to casualties.”⁸⁸ If the mission appears to be failing or unachievable, the acceptance and support of the domestic population becomes severely tested. Equally so if the mission is not perceived to be of vital national importance, then the tolerance of the people for casualties received, whilst on military operations abroad can be seriously undermined. This discontent amongst the population, especially the electorate can force a government to question the deployment of its military forces, with withdrawal becoming an inevitable option.

⁸⁷Tim W. Quillin, “Force Protection in Support and Stability Operations (SASO)” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2000).

⁸⁸Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 65.

Throughout history, fortification theory has developed parallel to mission accomplishment. Fortifications enabled the sovereign to protect his territories while still preserving his expensively assembled army. The degree of mission accomplishment is inversely proportional to the force protection and projection measures adopted. History has proven that a leader who is overly concerned with the protection of his military forces, sacrifices the ability to successfully accomplish the overall mission, within an acceptable timeframe. This compares with research that suggests the public are more supportive of casualties if the mission is being actively pushed by the leadership of a nation.⁸⁹ Thus short, sharp aggressive military campaigns are more tolerable to the domestic population than drawn out inconclusive campaigns.

The Clausewitzian trinity is a complex but valuable analytical tool. It allows us to link the relationships required between government policy, the military and what the domestic support wants and expects. Mission success is a key facet in allowing for equilibrium to be established among the trinity. Protecting the force is not only about defensive measures. Instead, force protection in future missions will depend on the defensive measures in co-ordination with an offensive mind-set. This mind-set must take account of all aspects of the trinity.

This chapter, through my review of literature, defined force protection and analyzed the progression of fortifications throughout history. The accompanying theory developed alongside these fortifications was also examined and related with force protection and its relationship with mission accomplishment. The various aspects associated with the relationship between force protection and mission accomplishment

⁸⁹Feaver and Gelpi, 146.

was evaluated using the Clausewitzian trinity. This relationship and analysis, introduced a number of key themes. These themes will be carried forward and form the basis for my primary research in the remaining chapters, and will be used to analyze three historical case studies.

These themes are listed as follows; does an overly protective force that concentrates solely on defense, lead to a protracted campaign, more casualties, and mission creep in the long run?

What is the relationship between force protection and mission success? Which are more important, avoiding casualties and the destruction of an expensively assembled army or achieving the mission regardless of the consequences?

Ultimately what is the proportional relationship between force protection and a risk averse population and government? How is this relationship altered in times of threat to national security or when a mission is no longer or not perceived as a threat to national security?

Bassford and Villacres advocated that an approach to a theory which denies or minimizes the role of the forces inherent in the Clausewitzian trinity or the interaction between them is wrong.⁹⁰ The themes which have been identified during this review of literature have analyzed this relationship and will form the basis for the research in the subsequent chapters. Through this research, the link between force protection and mission accomplishment will be further analyzed using the already mentioned historical case studies.

⁹⁰Bassford and Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity.”

CHAPTER 4

THEME ONE: THE SECOND BOER WAR (1899-1902)⁹¹

THE BLOCKHOUSE SYSTEM

Introduction

This chapter will use the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) as a prism through which the theme relating to the question, does an overly protective force that concentrates solely on defense lead to a protracted campaign, more casualties, and mission creep in the long run?

At the end of the 19th Century, the British Army was attempting to subdue an insurgent Boer population in South Africa. Mobility was at the very core of the Boer way of war, and impeding their mobility and their way of life was a major priority for the British counterinsurgency campaign. Lord General Horatio Herbert Kitchener, who became the overall British commander in theatre, eventually adopted the policy of confinement so as to subdue the Boers. This confinement was achieved through the construction of an extensive blockhouse system, in order to restrict the mobility of the Boers.⁹² An added benefit of these blockhouse lines was the protection it afforded to the defender. However, did the protection afforded by the blockhouses have a major affect on British tactics? Or were they a by product of an overall British strategy? Did these

⁹¹Nicholas Murray, *The Rocky Road to the Great War: the Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), chapter 3. Nicholas Murray provided this chapter 3 from an unpublished manuscript.

⁹²Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), 569.

blockhouses compel the British forces not to actively patrol, thus surrendering the initiative? Was the campaign prolonged as a result of this tactical change?

Background

In 1806, Britain gained possession from the Dutch, Cape Colony in South Africa. Hostilities quickly developed between the British and the original Dutch settlers, the Boers. To flee from British control, some of the Boers escaped North and established two new republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. A relative period of calm followed, but the uneasy status quo was disrupted in the late 19th century, with the discovery of gold and diamonds in the Boer republics. This triggered a rush of British immigrants into the Boer homelands, leading to rising tensions and, ultimately to war in 1899. The Boer republics formed an alliance together in an attempt to maintain their independence from British rule, and the threatened annexation.⁹³

At the start of the war, the Boers initiated conventional attacks across the border, achieving initial successes. The Boers inflicted three consecutive defeats on British forces at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso in December 1899. The British media labeled these defeats “Black Week.”⁹⁴ The British suffered further humiliating defeats most famously at Spion Kop, receiving over 1,000 casualties.

The news of the ‘sickening fiasco’, as Joseph Chamberlain called the defeat at Spion Kop, struck Britain like a thunderbolt. Accusations of muddle and

⁹³T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 68-87.

⁹⁴Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 257.

incompetence multiplied . . . David Llyod George and countless other ‘pro-Boers’ redoubled their criticisms of the war.⁹⁵

During the early part of the war, the Boers laid siege to three towns under British control; Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley. Even though the Boers did not capture these towns, these sieges proved to be a painful and humiliating spectacle for the British Army.⁹⁶ “The people of Britain had war on the cheap for half a century. Small wars against savages: the big game rifle against the spear and the rawhide shield. Small casualties-for the British.”⁹⁷ The type of warfare fought against the Boers was different. New tactics had to be formulated, so as to placate the unease, and dissention of the domestic British population. These new tactics would also be required in order to defeat the Boers.

By early 1900, after dramatic increases in their force levels in theatre, the British deployed what was at the time, the largest expeditionary army, in their history.⁹⁸ The British now had enough combat power to regain the initiative and the Boers were eventually defeated conventionally.

In the latter half of 1900, after the loss of the conventional fight, the Boers began to use insurgent tactics, and the guerrilla phase of the war began. During the same time period in December 1900, Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, took charge of the British Army in the South Africa. He initially attempted to defeat the Boer guerrillas using

⁹⁵D. Judd and K. Surridge, *The Boer War: A History* (London: Tauris and Co., 2013), 134.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 258.

⁹⁸Ibid.

mobile columns that scoured the countryside. However after a number of months of indecisive activities, and also because of the shortage in-theatre of British cavalry units, Kitchener realized that this tactic would not end the war quickly. He along with the British leadership understood the need to change doctrine, and tactics in order to bring the war to a favorable conclusion. The blockhouse system was developed as a means to defeat the Boer insurgency.⁹⁹ The Boers when they took to the veldt in late 1900 proved elusive and were very difficult to bring to battle. The new strategy employed was to extend the blockhouses away from the railways across the veldt.¹⁰⁰ These new blockhouses were connected by wires or ditches, and the idea was to literally fence in the Boers by constructing an obstacle against which pursuing British columns could trap them.¹⁰¹ A scorched earth policy accompanied the coordinated drive and entrapment using the blockhouse system. This coordinated strategy denied the Boers freedom of movement, resupply and the ability to forage from the countryside. It degraded their military capabilities forcing them to the negotiating table in 1902.

Blockhouses

The British constructed the first blockhouses in January 1901. Their original purpose was simply to protect the railways, bridges, and British lines of communications from the Boer guerillas. The elongated lines of communication in South Africa meant the

⁹⁹Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 527-529.

¹⁰⁰Blockhouses were originally developed in the Boer War as a form of protecting the railways and British lines of communications from the Boer guerillas.

¹⁰¹J. F. C. Fuller, *The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 107.

railway lines were vulnerable to Boer insurgent attacks and disruption.¹⁰² These railways were vital for the logistical resupply, and as lines of communications for the British Army. Lord Kitchener foresaw a greater possibility for these blockhouses. They would continue to be used to protect the railway lines, but now additionally the blockhouses were used as an extended line of mutually supporting fortifications. The British would now divide the South African countryside into manageable pieces of real estate to enable British control of the region. These fortified lines would work defensively by protecting areas that had been previously cleared of Boer guerrillas. They would also act offensively, by forming a line against which the British mobile columns could drive the enemy, and cage the Boer guerrillas.¹⁰³ At the peak of its commitment to the blockhouses, more than 50,000 troops, representing twenty five percent of the field force in South Africa, were deployed, manning blockhouse lines.¹⁰⁴

Lord Kitchener tasked Major S. R. Rice, 23rd Field Company, Royal Engineers, to design a cheap, easily constructed blockhouse based upon the corrugated iron type first built at Nelspruit in South Africa. Major Rice's new blockhouse design maintained the basic plan and construction principles of the original blockhouses; double skin corrugated iron loop-holed walls filled with rubble. To speed up construction and reduce costs the blockhouses were normally circular not rectangular. The circular design provided good all-round visibility, and the lack of corners did away with the need for wooden

¹⁰²Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 569.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 537.

supports.¹⁰⁵ The blockhouses were normally constructed 1,000 to 2,000 yards apart, so as to afford mutual support and observation. This was dependent on the terrain, and blockhouse lines stretched for miles long into the South African interior. The most common blockhouses as already stated were circular structures twelve feet in diameter, with sheet metal forming the inner and outer circular walls. These walls of corrugated steel were normally set about a foot apart. Gravel was then used to fill the space between the inner and outer walls. This gave the blockhouses great protection from small arms fire. Firing ports in the walls allowed the defender to fire out in all directions, thus facilitating good fields of fire and all around protection. A trench for sentries, ditches, and wire obstacles surrounded each blockhouse in order to provide additional protection. These lines of blockhouses often stretched for long distances into the South African countryside, with the longest line reaching over 300 miles.¹⁰⁶

The first line of blockhouses was built in the eastern Transvaal, from Kaapmuiden to Komati Port in January 1901. Between July and August 1901 there was a major extension of the blockhouse system across South Africa. By the end of the war in May 1902, over 8,000 blockhouses had been constructed, stretching over 3,700 miles. An average of one blockhouse every half mile.¹⁰⁷ For the seventeen months from January

¹⁰⁵R. M. Holden, "The Blockhouse System in South Africa," *The RUSI Journal* 46, no. 290 (1902): 479-489.

¹⁰⁶J. F. C. Fuller, *The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 107-110.

¹⁰⁷Alan Krell *The Devil's Rope: A Cultural History of Barbed Wire* (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 49.

1901 until the war ended in May 1902 blockhouses were erected, along with the fences and ditches that dissected the open spaces of the Transvaal and Orange Free State.¹⁰⁸

Each blockhouse was connected to the next in line by strong barbed wire fences and ditches, providing a measure of mutual fire support. Blockhouses were typically garrisoned by a non-commissioned officer (NCO) and between six to twelve men. Communications between each blockhouse was by field phone, and in addition they employed the services of native scouts as watchmen and for night patrols.¹⁰⁹

Tactical employment of Blockhouses

The original purpose of blockhouses was to protect the railways and lines of communication. This was transformed into a new tactic by Lord Kitchener in order to defeat the Boer insurgency. With the railways secured by the blockhouse system, the British Army moved troops and logistics with relative security, thus enhancing their freedom of movement. Secure telegraph lines also enhanced the command and control capabilities available to Lord Kitchener and his military leadership.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 580-581.



South Africa in 1899

Figure 1. South Africa (Boer War 1899-1902)

Source: Boer War Memorial, www.bwm.org.au (accessed 14 May 2013).

The first blockhouses had been constructed in relative isolation with a view to pacifying the surrounding countryside by protecting the railway lines and bridges. However the original large stone ones were vulnerable to enemy attack. It was only after a series of connected blockhouses were established, affording mutual support that the benefits of this system became obvious. As the blockhouse system spread, it effectively

allowed the control of key terrain across the Boer republics.¹¹⁰ This was a very substantial undertaking and by early 1902, 5,000 blockhouses had been constructed with about 50,000 soldiers, manning them.¹¹¹ In order to alleviate the heavy demand on manpower the British recruited native Africans, as guards for the blockhouse lines. This allowed the British to free up manpower for the mobile columns.¹¹²

This freeing up of manpower for mobile columns, facilitated a coordinated system where the garrisons occupying the blockhouses provided the confinement measures which operated in tandem with the tactical drives or sweeps, which were achieved by the mobile reserves. The sweeps consisted of massive amounts of manpower moving through zones divided by the blockhouse system in a deliberate and planned fashion. These drives covered miles of territory using thousands of mounted and dismounted soldiers.¹¹³ The sweeps kept the guerillas moving depriving them of rest, time to refit, and rearm. The drives also provided the British with timely intelligence on Boer movements. These drives would push the Boers off the land and entrap them within the confinement provided by the blockhouses and their connecting fences. The British envisioned a gigantic grid of interlocking obstacles of blockhouses and wire to counter the Boer

¹¹⁰R. M. Holden, "The Blockhouse System in South Africa," *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* 46 (April 1902), 483.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 482-485.

¹¹²Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 580-581.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 578.

guerillas mobility and speed. Thus the blockhouse system protected the railroad, impeded commando movement, and also provided intelligence.¹¹⁴

Major General J.F.C Fuller, in his recollections on the Boer War, *The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars*, espouses that the blockhouse lines effectively split the insurgent regions into smaller pieces of land. This facilitated the clearance of these enemy forces. He also observed that the even though small groups did get through the blockhouse lines; the Boers could not normally cross the blockhouse lines with their supply columns thus inhibiting Boer mobility and logistical resupply.¹¹⁵

Analysis of Blockhouse System

Major General J. F. C. Fuller describes life on a blockhouse line as “monotonous in the extreme. . . . The worst feature of blockhouse life was its demoralizing influence on the soldier. Apart from sentry duty and minor fatigue work there was absolutely nothing to do except talk.”¹¹⁶ The blockhouse lines absorbed large numbers of British troops and bred a defensive mindset amongst the soldiers. Fuller captured the attitude of many of the British junior leadership who despaired at how occupying the blockhouses, yielded the initiative to the Boers. “The troops I command are now so disposed that I cannot do anything by way of aggressive action . . . so it will remain unless the Boers close in and attack us.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Ibid., 580.

¹¹⁵J. F. C. Fuller, *The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 262.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 111.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

By handing over the initiative to the Boers, the blockhouses helped to foster a self-protective existence, mindset amongst their British occupiers. Active patrolling with an offensive mindset was stifled by the blockhouse system. The lack of patrolling was counter to the Clausewitzian dictum that “even the most passive function of a fortress, defence against assault, cannot, after all, be imagined without this active element.”¹¹⁸

Lord Kitchener realized the utility of the blockhouses in protecting his lines of communications and holding key terrain. Clausewitz in *On War* discussed the importance of this policy by stating “that fortresses are secure staging areas and refuges on friendly lines of communication for transiting units and supply convoys.”¹¹⁹ Lord Kitchener capitalized on the protection afforded by the blockhouses to British lines of communication. The addition of fencing and ditches combined with the fact that each blockhouse was mutually supporting, successfully hindered Boer mobility and disrupted their logistics. An added advantage of this policy was that it also secured the British continuity of sustainment, protecting it from attempted sabotage by the Boer insurgents.

A definite disadvantage of the blockhouse system was that the duty was “monotonous and sapped the morale of a unit. Leaders needed to constantly take care of their soldiers, ensuring that they maintained their fighting condition.”¹²⁰ Fuller did also note however that the blockhouse system did reduce the need for escort work. The fact that each blockhouse had line of sight to its neighboring positions meant that escorts and convoys travelled the countryside hand railing the blockhouse lines for security, and only

¹¹⁸Clausewitz, *On War*, 394.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 342.

¹²⁰Fuller, *The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars*, 107.

needing a minimal amount of British soldiers on the actual escort detail. This was a major factor in helping to reduce the overall British casualties, and also assisting in achieving the overall mission of containing, and suppressing the Boer insurgency.

The blockhouses did have a major impact on the Boers and assisted in stifling the insurgency. The Boer commander Louis Botha in May 1902, cited by De Wet, delivered the following assessment of the British blockhouse system.

A year ago there were no blockhouses. We could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the enemy at every turn. But now things wear a different aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos.¹²¹

With their freedom of movement and logistical resupply severely curtailed, The Boer insurgency began to falter. The blockhouses were actually a major factor in bringing the Boer War to a favorable conclusion for the British. The combination and coordination of the tactics of driving the Boers from the countryside into the confinement of the blockhouse lines forced the Boers to accept peace terms in May 1902.

Conclusion

The blockhouses though initially developed to protect British lines of communications, transformed into a very effective tactic. A major factor in their success was the fact that they observed the fundamentals of defensive tactics. Whether this was intentional or not cannot take away from their overall utility. The overriding fundamentals that the blockhouses adhered to were that of mutual support, all-round

¹²¹De Wet, *Three Year's War*, 321-322.

defense, co-ordination and integration.¹²² These maxims prevented the Boer insurgents from acting efficiently in order to counter the effectiveness of the blockhouse system. However the very fact that active patrolling was not pursued by the occupiers of the blockhouses, subdued the fundamental of offensive action. But within two years of their inception, the blockhouses successfully contained the Boer insurgency, whilst also protecting British lines of communications and freedom of movement.

The adoption of a defensive mindset was as a result of the initial failures by British forces at the start of the Boer War. British public opinion was horrified by the British casualties sustained during ‘Black Week’ and in Spion Kop.¹²³ The casualties inflicted on the British by the Boer settlers, had a detrimental effect and spurred the British on to adopt a more defensive mindset.¹²⁴ The blockhouses not only protected the British soldier, but also the vulnerable lines of communication. The morale of the soldiers did suffer because of the occupation of these defensive positions. However the tactic did work, and did not overly prolong the campaign. This did not result in excessive casualties and allowed Lord Kitchener and his British forces to achieve the overall mission of subduing the Boer and insurgency, forcing them to accept a peace treaty in May 1902.

The British were lucky that this campaign was not a prolonged one. The lack of offensive patrolling from the blockhouses was offset by the effective use of mobile columns in an offensive capacity. The Boer War did lead to an overly protective force

¹²²The Land Component Handbook, The Command and Staff School, The Military College Ireland, 76.

¹²³D. Judd, and K. Surridge, *The Boer War: A History* (London: Tauris and Co., 2013), 134.

¹²⁴Lord Carver, “The Boer War,” *The RUSI Journal* 144, no. 6 (1999): 78-82.

manning the blockhouses; however the overall campaign was not solely concentrated on defense. The use of mobile columns in conjunction with the blockhouses did offset the lack of patrolling from these blockhouses, and the possibility of a purely defensive mindset. The tactic of sweeping the South African countryside by the British mobile columns dislocated the Boer insurgents and this tactic combined with the blockhouses, curtailed the Boer freedom of movement. This combined tactic of offensive sweeps and defensive blockhouses prevented a protracted campaign, reducing casualties, and brought the war to a favorable conclusion for the British Army.

CHAPTER 5

THEME TWO: THE CONGO EXPERIENCE

THE BATTLE OF JADOTVILLE (13-17 September 1961)

Introduction

This case study will deal with the theme relating to the relationship between force protection and mission success. Which are more important, avoiding casualties and the destruction of an expensively assembled army or achieving the mission regardless of the consequences?

On Sunday morning 13th September 1961, 'A' Company of the 35th Irish Battalion on United Nations (UN) duty in the Republic of the Congo was attacked by Katangese forces as the Irish attended mass. 'A' Company along with an attached armored car section withstood a five day siege by an estimated 2,000 gendarmerie and white mercenaries.¹²⁵ Two attempts were made to relieve 'A' Company, but both failed to pass the line of the heavily defended Lufira river.¹²⁶ After expending the majority of its ammunition, and with no food or water left, 'A' Company was forced to surrender to the besieging Katangese forces. After the siege over 400 soldiers lay dead, but none of them were Irish UN soldiers.¹²⁷ During the month of September 1961, the entire 35th Irish Battalion was involved in numerous actions including the siege of Jadotville. This Irish

¹²⁵Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Infantry Battalion In The Congo, Section 3 Operation, 18.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Declan Power, *Siege at Jadotville* (Dunboyne, Meath, Ireland: Maverick House Publishers, 2009).

UN Battalion had fired over 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, nearly 1,000 mortar rounds, over 1,000 grenades and nearly 150 Anti-Tank rounds in this period.¹²⁸ To date the most amount of ammunition fired by any Irish Army unit in combat.

Given the lack of casualties why was the surrender of this Irish Company necessary? Was the unit commander prioritizing the protection and security of his troops over the achievement of his mission? This chapter will examine and investigate this theory, using official documentation and reports as primary research material

Background

Following nationalist riots against their Belgian rulers, on 1 July 1960, the people of the Congo declared an independent republic. Within a few days, the province of Katanga, a mineral rich area in the South of the country, attempted to secede from the nascent Republic of the Congo, thus threatening anarchy to prevail. The Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for help and as a result the UN Security Council directed Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to recruit a military force to restore order and to re-establish the integrity of the country. This force was to be known as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), lasting from July 1960 to June 1964.

There was a prevailing fear among the international community that the Congo would become a battleground of the Cold War. Ireland was asked by the United Nations to contribute troops, and in reply the first Irish peacekeeping force began to assemble during July 1960, when 689 men were selected to form the 32nd Irish Infantry Battalion.

¹²⁸Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Infantry Battalion In The Congo, Section 10, Equipment, 50.

This formation was destined to become the first battalion of the Irish Army to serve outside the state of Ireland since its foundation.¹²⁹ The weight of expectations upon these soldiers and their leadership was great. The fledgling nation of the newly independent Republic of Ireland, wanted to perform to the best of its abilities on the international stage. During the course of the mission from 1960 until 1964, over 6,000 Irish troops participated and twenty six soldiers were killed. The 32nd Irish Battalion was followed very quickly by the 33rd Irish Battalion, bringing the total Irish contingent in the Congo to more than 1,400 men.¹³⁰ This constituted approximately sixteen percent of the entire Irish Army. If support units are excluded, this amounted to almost all of the available infantry within the Irish Army.¹³¹ A significant contribution from a small island nation, any serious losses of manpower in the Congo would have a detrimental effect on the overall Irish Army.

Initially Katanga province was an area of relative calm compared to the rest of the Congo, during the early period of the United Nations involvement. The main concentration area of Katangese forces was around the Union Minière owning mines at Kolwezi, at the Kamina airbase, and along the road and rail routes that linked the mines with export points to Portuguese Angola, and to Northern Rhodesia.¹³² The Anglo-

¹²⁹ Archie Raeside, *The Congo-1960: The First Irish United Nations Peacekeepers* (Co Laois, 2004), 7.

¹³⁰ *Irish Times*, 8 December 1960.

¹³¹ “The Battle of Jadotville: Congo-1961,” in A Case Study by Students of the 50th Commanding Officers’ Course 1993. Defence Forces Library.

¹³² *Ibid.*

Belgian Union Minière du Haut Katanga¹³³ supplied much of the world's copper, cobalt as well as large quantities of uranium. It was a vital asset for Belgium, France, Britain and the United States.

Using company money, Belgian officers recruited, trained and equipped a large private army for Union Minière, and the Katangan gendarmerie,¹³⁴ using it to protect its uninterrupted production and to enforce order in South Katanga.¹³⁵

While stationed in Katanga, on 8 November 1960, prior to the siege at Jadotville, an Irish UN patrol in Niemba, was impeded by a road block manned by 35 to 40 Balubas¹³⁶ who confronted the Irish soldiers.¹³⁷ Nine of the eleven man patrol was killed, including the Officer in Charge of the patrol Lt Kevin Gleeson.¹³⁸ The Niemba Ambush caused great shock throughout Ireland. In previous decades, Irishmen had fought and died in many domestic and foreign wars.¹³⁹ The Irish people had witnessed much carnage particularly in World War One and their own fight for independence, but in all previous cases, these were wars with a high expectancy of death. These wars were not United

¹³³This was a Belgian mining company, once operating in Katanga, in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

¹³⁴This private army consisted of white mercenaries and a local African militia known as the gendarmerie.

¹³⁵Raymond Smith, *The Fighting Irish in the Congo* (Dublin, 1962), 71-83.

¹³⁶The Baluba is a indigenous tribe, native to the Congo.

¹³⁷Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 32nd Infantry Battalion In The Congo, Chapter 5, Niemba, Section 178.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, Section 178.

¹³⁹Large numbers of Irish soldiers had fought and died for foreign armies. The main recruiters of Irish soldiers being Britain, France and the USA.

Nations operations, where soldiers were being deployed in a peace keeping and humanitarian role.

The Niemba Ambush was an unprovoked attack where Irishmen died in brutal circumstances. Prior to this incident, the Irish troops had fostered a good relationship with the Baluba tribe. The reaction of the domestic population of Ireland was one of astonishment and horror. There was a public outpouring of grief with thousands lining the routes of the funeral corteges. The Irish public felt justifiably proud of those who fell in Niemba. This was a significant moment in Irish military history, and it remains to this day the largest single loss of life in the Irish Army. However it brought home the realization among the population that Irish soldiers could become casualties, even when deployed on so called peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations with the United Nations. The reaction from the Irish population did have consequences on the subsequent actions of Irish soldiers in the Congo. Whether deliberate or subconsciously, the mindset of the Irish military leadership was affected by the casualties received in Niemba. This mindset would become prevalent for all future deployments of Irish troops in the Congo.

Operations Rumpunch and Morthor (August-September 1961)

Initially Irish soldiers deployed with ONUC in a peace-keeping role, this changed to peace-enforcement after a short period of time.¹⁴⁰ On the morning of 28 August 1961, United Nations forces from Ireland, India and Sweden, began Operation Rumpunch, which had as its mission the primary tasks the disarming of Katangan gendarmes and repatriation of foreign mercenaries. Despite initial success, the operation failed because it

¹⁴⁰Peace-keeping operations attempt to keep an already established peace, whereas peace-enforcement operations enforce a peace between warring factions.

could not completely repatriate all the foreign mercenaries. Mercenaries with previous experience in Rhodesia, Algeria and even with the German SS, managed to return to Katanga, due to the non-compliance of the Katangan and Belgian Governments.¹⁴¹ These mercenaries continued to de-stabilize the region and hinder the UN mission. The UN HQ put together another plan codenamed Operation Morthor, the Hindu word for smash. This plan had the same mission as Operation Rumpunch but on a larger scale.

Information about Operation Morthor got leaked and on 11th September, groups of white mercenaries were observed organizing Africans in the Jadotville Area.¹⁴² By 0400hrs on the 12th September, the 35th Irish Battalion achieved all its objectives in the area of Elizabethville, after strong resistance, numerous casualties on both sides and heavy fighting.¹⁴³ United Nations peace enforcement operations continued throughout the country for the next eight days.¹⁴⁴

The Battle of Jadotville (13th-17th September 1961)

On 3rd September 1961, 'A' Company of 35th Irish Battalion established a company base near a main road, one and a half miles East of Jadotville in the Province of Katanga. Jadotville was located 90 miles from the remainder of the 35th Irish Battalion in

¹⁴¹Con Cremim, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Irish Initiative 1961-1968," in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, published by the *R.I.A.* 1, no. 4 (Dublin, 1984), 79-84.

¹⁴²Tom McGuire, ed., "The Siege at Jadotville 1961," RTE Radio 1, 20 January 2004.

¹⁴³Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961.

¹⁴⁴*Irish Times*, 21 September 1961.

Elizabethville. An Irish Armored Car Section with Ford Mk VI armored cars¹⁴⁵ was attached to 'A' Company. The Irish also shared the camp and received support from a small Swedish contingent.¹⁴⁶ Comdt Pat Quinlan, the company commander of 'A' Company, along with the remainder of the Irish leadership realized the deficiencies in Irish training when it came to defense and field fortifications. The unit history of the 35th Irish Battalion noted that when it came to digging entrenchments;

our men at home do not get enough of this. There is not enough emphasis in this most important aspect of training. 'Dig or Die' they found was still a sound saying. Offrs and NCO's were brought to see the superb digging of Indian units and soon copied their standards.¹⁴⁷

'A' Company took these lessons to heart and Comdt Patrick Quinlan set about establishing field fortifications and entrenchments around his company position.

Prior to the attack, patrolling in the area was limited due to the imminent dangers associated with the previous operations conducted by Irish UN soldiers in August and September. This tactic, though initially preserving safety, actually failed to give the leadership significant operational awareness. This lack of information threatened the overall security of the 'A' Company base. Circumstances dictated that the Clausewitzian dictum that "even the most passive function of a fortress, defense against assault, cannot, after all, be imagined without this active element,"¹⁴⁸ could not be adhered to. Local

¹⁴⁵Built in Ireland in 1941 on an armored Ford truck chassis, the turret was armed with a Vickers .303 machinegun.

¹⁴⁶Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Clausewitz, *On War*, 394.

informers warned the Irish about an attack, and the Irish troops made attempted provisions to stockpile water supplies in every available container.¹⁴⁹

On 13th September, as the remainder of the 35th Irish Battalion partook in Operation Morthor, in the city of Elizabetville, the majority of Irish Soldiers from 'A' Company in Jadotville attended mass. At 1130hrs the first Katangan attack opened on Jadotville with very heavy mortar and small arms fire. This initial fire was followed by a number of assaults which were repulsed and broken up at long ranges by the Irish defenders.¹⁵⁰ As night approached on the first night, Comdt Quinlan believed his forward positions to be "untenable if the enemy attacked in strength or infiltrated at night."¹⁵¹ He decided to pull his forward positions back into a new defensive position on high ground measuring roughly 250 yards by 120 yards. Every man that night dug trenches to strengthen the new position. The Irish position centered on an old colonial property, was surrounded by thick bush at ranges from 600 to 1500 yards. The plan was to break up attacks at long ranges using support weapons and machineguns located in trenches and fortified villas within the Irish compound.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹Irish Military Archives, Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961, Appx 'B' report by OIC 'A' Company, Comdt P Quinlan.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Ibid.




Figure 2. Hand drawn Map of 'A' Company Positions
-Jadotville(13-17 September 1961)

Source: Irish Military Archives, Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo, 1961.

Throughout the next week the attacks intensified on the Irish base with the enemy firing 81mm medium and 4.2” heavy mortars. The mercenaries and the Katangan Gendarmerie, even had close air support from a Fouga Magister jet aircraft, which attacked Irish positions on a daily basis. But every attack was broken up by “devastating fire from Irish armored cars, MMGs, LAs¹⁵³ and mortars.”¹⁵⁴ The situation inside the Irish compound was becoming dire. Water supplies which had been stockpiled soon ran out and other supplies such as food and ammunition were becoming scarce. Sickness and disease started to become a serious concern for the Company Commander.

The excitement, fighting and lack of sleep consumed a lot of water. By Friday the water we had was stale. By Saturday it was almost putrid and on Sunday what was left made the men sick. There was a grave danger of disease due to burst sewers from bombed buildings and flies swarming everywhere.¹⁵⁵

Two relief attempts were made by the HQ of the main body of the 35th Irish Battalion. However both failed to breach the heavy Katangan defenses along the Lufira Bridge and River, which were located on the eastern outskirts of Jadotville, on the main route from Elizabethville. It should be noted that the first Irish attempt to relieve Jadotville on 13th-14th September, suffered no casualties. The second attempt to relieve Jadotville on 16th September consisted of two infantry companies, one Irish and one from the Indian UN Battalion, supported by armored cars and engineers. This also met heavy resistance at Lufira Bridge, including close air support from the Katangan Fouga jet plane. Three Indian soldiers from the attached company were killed during the attempt

¹⁵³Bren Guns.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., Appx ‘B’ report by OIC ‘A’ Company, Comdt P Quinlan.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

to force the river crossing.¹⁵⁶ Additionally five Irish soldiers were injured during this second attempt and it was noted in the subsequent report that an Irish medical NCO “bore his wounds manfully and was evacuated to E/VILLE.”¹⁵⁷ The relief force withdrew because an “attack to force the crossing without air support was NOT possible without serious loss.”¹⁵⁸

On day five of the siege (17th September), with no sign of relief and with water and other supplies running low, Comdt Quinlan called a meeting of his officers and Senior NCOs.

We estimated that there was little or no hope of ground assistance for at least some days and even without fighting we could not hold out another day without water. If we were attacked at this stage it would turn into a massacre. . . . There was no doubt that our surrender would be demanded any time. We were all agreed that if we could get acceptable guarantees of our safety we would have no choice but to accept, as there was absolutely no hope of help arriving in time. We also knew of the ‘high level’ cease-fire talks in progress and in view of that further fighting with the resultant heavy loss of life would be unjustified . . . if we could not get acceptable guarantees from the Burgomaster¹⁵⁹ or some other responsible person, we decided to fight to the last.¹⁶⁰

At 1700 hours on 17 September 1961, on the fifth day of the siege, an agreement for a ceasefire was ratified between the UN forces and the besieging Katangans. Conditions were brokered and an agreement was reached. However this agreement was broken by

¹⁵⁶Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961, Unit History 1961.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., Appx ‘C’ report by OIC Relief Operations, Comdt J Kane.

¹⁵⁹Chief magistrate, comparable to a mayor, of a city or town/Jadotville in this case.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., Appx ‘B’ report by OIC A Company, Comdt P Quinlan.

the Katangans within a few days and ultimately led to the surrender of the Irish UN forces. Comdt Quinlan discusses in his subsequent report on the capitulation of his forces. “We decided at this stage that the only road open to us was to accept this surrender as further action would have resulted in the complete annihilation of our men.”¹⁶¹ After a gallant stand for five days without relief, Comdt Quinlan prioritized the safety and protection of the troops under his command, when he realized his mission was untenable.

Aftermath of the Siege

The strength of the besieging Katangan forces is not clear. A review of literature lists anywhere between 2,000 to 5,000 gendarmerie, white mercenaries and locals involved in the siege of the UN force. Between 200 to 400 of these were killed by the United Nations forces, many more were injured. Jadotville was occupied by less than 200 United Nations soldiers, the vast majority of whom were Irish. The following quotation from Comdt Quinlan’s report best sums up the incredible fact that no Irish or UN soldiers were killed.

The morale of the men was very high throughout. . . . I would like to record here that every man had a deep religious feeling because our emergence from the battle with only five wounded was considered by all to be a miracle. The enemy still does not believe that we had no dead. On several occasions, even up to the day before our final release, we were approached on this subject by doctors, priests and others. All insisted that we had 50 dead and they wanted to know where we had buried them. We have been told that they dug up likely burial places in our defensive localities.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹Ibid., Appx ‘B’ report by OIC A Company, Comdt P Quinlan.

¹⁶²Ibid.

After mixed treatment as prisoners of war, where some of the captors were excessively harsh on the Irish soldiers, the besieged troops of Jadotville were released after over a month of captivity on 25th October 1961.

Analysis

In analyzing the events surrounding the siege of Jadotville, I must be cognizant of my own epistemology. As stated earlier in chapter 2, I grew up in Mullingar, a garrison town in the center of Ireland. Many of the troops involved in Jadotville came from Mullingar and later served along-side my father in the town's military barracks. With this in mind I will attempt to critically analyze the events surrounding the siege of Jadotville and relate them to the theme of the relationship between force protection and mission success. Which are more important, avoiding casualties and the destruction of an expensively assembled army or achieving the mission regardless of the consequences?

The Irish battalions sent to the Congo to serve with the United Nations were the first time Irish Army troops were engaged in combat, serving outside of Ireland. At the time the preponderance of Irish infantry soldiers were either serving, just home or getting ready to serve in the Congo. Numerous infantry, cavalry and artillery soldiers served multiple tours, during the four years of Irish involvement. Heavy or mass casualties during the Irish involvement in Congo would have had a very detrimental effect on not only the Irish Army, but also the mindset of the Irish people. The Niemba Ambush which took place on 8 November 1960, had a substantial effect on the population of Ireland. The state funeral of the nine soldiers who returned home in coffins, killed by tribesmen, in a country they were trying to pacify, did have ramifications on the psyche of the Irish

population. Whether it was direct or indirect, the consequences of Niemba would affect subsequent deployments of Irish troops to the Congo.

Comdt Quinlan's report along with the report of Comdt Kane, the commander of the failed relief operations, bare testament to this fact. Both mention or allude to the necessity to avoid unnecessary casualties, and annihilation. This would suggest that the safety of the Irish soldiers took precedence over the United Nations mission. As previously stated Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, in their book; *Paying the Human Costs of War*, advocate that the support of the domestic population is directly related to whether a country has vital national interests at stake. The acceptance of casualties is thus directly related to how important the domestic population perceives the war to be.¹⁶³ The Congo had strategic implications on the world stage, but did it affect Irish national interests. The reaction of the Irish population to the massacre at Niemba would suggest where Irish priorities lay.

Prior to the attack by an overwhelming force of mercenaries and gendarmeries, the unit history of the 35th Irish Battalion notes deficiencies which the Irish leadership tried to rectify.

Our men were not adequately security conscious. They were not suspicious enough as sentries, on patrol or off duty. This fault prevailed right through. They were inclined to be 'cushy' and easygoing lot that accept all comers to the main gate, posts, etc. as honest to God humans.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, Jason and Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 36.

¹⁶⁴Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961, Intelligence Officers Report.

The necessity for patrolling and the collection of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) was also commented on in the 35th Irish Battalion's Unit History. This would suggest that the Irish military leadership was aware that staying in your posts was not allowable and patrolling should be a priority. The unit Intelligence Officer in his After Action Report (AAR), suggests that "a pers allowance to an I.O.¹⁶⁵ is a must. One cannot sit and talk and sip without buying an odd round."¹⁶⁶ The battalion intelligence officer realized the importance of intelligence and situational awareness. He also realized that information and subsequent intelligence was best obtained by actively pursuing it, whether by patrolling or meeting sources in various locations, including the local public houses.

However as previously stated, the Irish Company in Jadotville could not follow the Clausewitzian dictum of active patrolling being the best form of defense and protection. Circumstances and the leadership dictated against patrolling, the consequences of which was felt during the siege. 'A' Company failed to get an accurate picture and situational awareness prior to the siege. This was particularly true at Lufira Bridge, where a substantial unknown force prevented both attempts to relieve the situation.

The unit history portrays that morale and resilience were of the highest standard throughout the tour of duty of the 35th Irish Battalion. This was evident in every action according to the report of the Battalion Commander, Lt Col Aodh McNamee.

¹⁶⁵Intelligence Officer.

¹⁶⁶Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961, Intelligence.

In every Op in which this unit has participated I've experienced the highest standards of enthusiastic cooperation from all ranks. Certain people had to be restrained from action above the call of duty.¹⁶⁷

This restraining would suggest that the Irish soldiers were willing to fight, whether their sacrifice was deemed necessary by senior leadership in order to achieve a United Nations mission is debatable. The Battalion Commanders concludes his report by stating that the unit Medical Officer and Chaplin "both assure me that the moral standards of the men are of a high order."¹⁶⁸

The case study on the Siege of Jadotville, pays tribute to the bravery of all Irish soldiers that were deployed and fought in the Congo. The heavy casualties incurred in the Niamba ambush, combined with the fact that the situation in the Congo was not a threat to Irish national security, did impact on the mindset of Irish politicians and military leadership. Official reports indicate the necessity to avoid annihilation and excessive casualties. Force protection did take priority over the prevention of Katangan secession from the Congo, because an avoidance of Irish UN casualties had a deeper resonance with the Irish people than the political situation in the Congo. This casualty aversion is understandable and strengthens the arguments of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler. The support of the domestic population is directly related to whether a country has vital national interests at stake.¹⁶⁹ The acceptance of casualties is thus directly related to how important the domestic population perceives the importance of the mission to national security.

¹⁶⁷Irish Military Archives (IMA), Unit History 35th Irish Infantry Battalion Congo 1961, Appx J, Commanding Officers Report.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

¹⁶⁹Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 37.

CHAPTER 6

THEME THREE: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE THE KOREAN WAR (1950-1953)

Introduction

This chapter will deal with the theme, what is the proportional relationship between force protection and a risk averse population and government? How is this relationship altered in times of threat to national security or when a mission is no longer perceived to be a threat to national security?

Korea, had a population numbering 30 million people in 1950, it lies at the point where three great Asian powers meet- Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union.¹⁷⁰ The United States decided to fight for a draw in the Korean War, rather than insist on a clear victory. This was due to the fact that the initial American purpose in going to war was not to conquer North Korea, but to prevent it from conquering South Korea; this was a part of the then United States policy of Containment.¹⁷¹ In 1953, after three bloody years of conflict, the United States fighting for the United Nations agreed to a cease fire re-establishing a dividing line between North and South Korea, along the 38th Parallel.

Background

The origins of the Korean War began long before fighting broke out at Ongjin on 24 June 1950. The roots of conflict date back to 1905, when Korea was made a

¹⁷⁰William J. Webb, *Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June to 15 September 1950* (Government Printing Office, 2000), 3.

¹⁷¹Richard J. Bernstein, "The Korean War: An Exchange," *New York Review of Books*, 22 November 2007.

protectorate by Japan. The Japanese proved to be oppressive rulers and in the 1930s, it is estimated that approximately 200,000 Koreans, suspected of being communist guerillas were killed.¹⁷² At the end of World War Two, the Koreans were delighted when the Japanese were defeated and forced to withdraw from their country. However, within weeks of the war ending, the United States and the Soviet Union drew an artificial line dividing the country along the 38th parallel and effectively split the peninsula into two separate countries. This infuriated the Koreans, who feared a continuation of the oppression that they had struggled against for 40 years.¹⁷³

After 1946, the Soviet Union sent military aid and advisers to help build up the army of Kim II Sung , the leader of North Korea. The United States which had withdrawn its troops from the South of the peninsula in 1948-1949, after a three year period of occupation, provided military and economic aid to Syngman Rhee, the ruler of the Republic of Korea (ROK).¹⁷⁴ On 25th June 1950 the communist North Koreans invaded South Korea. Communist forces followed three routes of invasion, along the east, center and to the west, where they advanced on the ROK capital Seoul, seizing it on 29th June 1950. The attack caught the South's forces and their United States ally's off-guard.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷²Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 444-445.

¹⁷³James, Irving Matray and George John Mitchell, *Korea Divided: 38th Parallel And The Demilitarized Zone* (Chelsea House Pub, 2004).

¹⁷⁴Howard S. Levie, "How it all started-and how it ended: A legal study of the Korean War," *Akron L. Rev.* 35 (2001): 205.

¹⁷⁵Stanley Sandler, *The Korean War: An Interpretative History* (Routledge, 2002), 47.

The United States President, Harry S. Truman secured the passage of United Nations resolutions 82 and 83, at the end of June and early July 1950, condemning North Korea for its aggression and calling on United Nations members to assist South Korea.¹⁷⁶ These UN resolutions allowed for the build-up of UN forces in the Korean peninsula. Beginning with the arrival of an understrength United States battalion, and ending with the employment of three divisions from Japan, a division from the United States, and other forces, the U.S. Army began a build-up of troops into South Korea. The initial objective was to delay, then stop, the North Korean forces in their efforts to reach the strategically vital southern port city of Pusan.¹⁷⁷ After Pusan was secured, a counteroffensive began on 15th September 1950, when UN forces made a daring landing at Incheon (Inchon) on the west coast of the Republic of Korea, South of Seoul, turning the North Korean forces and forcing them to fall back with the UN forces in pursuit.¹⁷⁸ The UN eventually deployed a multi-national force of nearly one million soldiers from twenty two countries. This force consisted of soldiers from Britain, Canada, Turkey, France and Australia, to name a few.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶James I. Matray, "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," *The Journal of American History* 66, no. 2 (1979): 314-333.

¹⁷⁷Um Sub Il, ed., *The Korean War* (Seoul: Korea: Institute for Military History, 1998), 116.

¹⁷⁸Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War* (McGraw-Hill Companies, 1986).

¹⁷⁹Gordon L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953* (Praeger Publishers, 2002), 117.

On 19th October 1950, the North Korean capital of Pyongyang was captured by UN forces. The U.S. 8th Army, under Lieutenant General Walton Walker, and X Corp, under Major General Edward Almond drove the North Korean forces back to almost the Yalu River, which marked the border with Communist China. On 26th November 1950, as General Douglas MacArthur, the overall United Nations Supreme Commander, prepared for a final offensive, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China, joined with the North Koreans to launch a successful counterattack. The UN troops were forced back, and in January 1951, the Communists advanced into the South, recapturing Seoul, the South Korean capital.¹⁸⁰

After months of heavy fighting, the epicenter of the conflict was returned to the area of the 38th parallel, where it remained for the rest of the war.

The unpopularity of the Korean War played an important role in the presidential victory of Dwight D. Eisenhower in November 1952, who had campaigned to end the conflict. Negotiations between the North and the UN, broke down on four occasions, but after much difficulty an armistice agreement was signed on 27 July 1953. The United States incurred heavy casualties in the war, with U.S. losses placed at over 54,000 fatalities and 103,000 wounded. Other UN forces suffered 3,200 fatalities and 11,500 wounded, while Chinese and Korean casualties were at least ten times this number.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰John J. McGrath, *The Korean War: Restoring the Balance, 5 January-8 July 1951* (Government Printing Office, 1998), 3-7; Gov Burton Ira Kaufman, *The Korean War* (McGraw-Hill Companies, 1986).

¹⁸¹Kaufman, *The Korean War*.




Figure 3. Map of the Korean War (1950-1953).

Source: Huntingdon College Website, www.huntingdon.edu (accessed 14 May 2013).

Stalemate and Standoff

By the start of 1951, fighting between the United Nations forces and Communist forces to the North tapered off into a monotonous routine of patrol clashes, and bitter small-unit struggles for key outpost positions, in order to hold key terrain and provide protection to the main defensive positions. By the end of 1951, fighting became sporadic, with opposing sides, deployed along defensive lines, spanning the breadth of the peninsula.¹⁸² This respite in fighting resulted in General Matthew Ridgeway, the new United States and United Nations Commander, since April 1951, formulating the decision to halt offensive ground operations in Korea. Two major factors played a part in this decision; the first was the fact that any further casualties resulting from any future assaults on enemy defenses could not be justified with the American population. Feaver and Gelpi state that the American public is defeat phobic, not casualty phobic. Politicians and policymakers are actually more fearful of public perceptions to casualties than the actual reality. Hence the suspension of offensive operations.¹⁸³ Secondly the possibility that peace might come out of the recently reopened armistice talks, ruled out the mounting of any costly large-scale offensive by either side.¹⁸⁴ Because of the attempts to diplomatically solve the conflict, UN attacks were to be limited to those necessary for strengthening the main defensive line and for establishing an outpost line, 3,000-5,000

¹⁸²John Miller, Owen. J, Carroll, and Margaret. E. Tackley, *Korea 1951-1953* (Office of the Chief of Staff of Military History, Department of the Army), 205.

¹⁸³Feaver and Gelpi, 97.

¹⁸⁴Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea 1951-1953*, 205.

yards forward of the main positions.¹⁸⁵ Throughout 1952, ground and air actions waned along the area of conflict, with only sporadic artillery barrages from both sides, breaking the cycle. As the year progressed, the UN forces waged a war of containment, parrying any enemy thrusts.¹⁸⁶ For the twelve months of 1952, a stalemate existed in the Korean conflict. ROK forces were now better equipped and trained by their U.S. allies and now provided eleven of the sixteen divisions manning the United Nations defensive line.¹⁸⁷ The South Korean forces were being enabled by U.S. and UN in order to allow them provide for the defense of ROK and also to pave the way for a drawdown of UN forces.

The opposing sides of the Korean conflict had constructed defensive lines that were so powerful that their reduction could only be accomplished at a prohibitive cost. Full scale offensive assaults would have resulted in large-scale casualties on both sides. The Sun Tzu dictum that “invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of victory in the attack,”¹⁸⁸ was only partially adhered too, the invincibility of both defensive lines leading to the stalemate. The U.S. Eighth Army conducted a vigorous defense of its outpost positions so as to deny the enemy any marked advantage.¹⁸⁹ However all offensive actions by UN forces were suspended after the PLA entered the war.

During the spring of 1953, the snows melted, and the mindset of the Chinese and North Koreans changed. In order to put pressure on the ongoing peace talks, the

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 210.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 274.

¹⁸⁸Sun Tzu, *The Art Of War*, 85.

¹⁸⁹Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea 1951-1953*, 274.

Communist forces increased the intensity of their attacks, capturing a number of key terrain features and outposts throughout the UN defensive lines. The UN inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese and North Korean forces, with estimates that the Chinese received over 70,000 casualties in July, 25,000 of these were killed in action.¹⁹⁰

As these offensives were being launched the peace negotiations continued unabated, and on 27th July 1953, an armistice agreement was signed by both sides in order to end the conflict.¹⁹¹

Reactions on the Home Front

At the start of the Korean War, the American people had commended President Truman's decisive action. Indeed, between 80 to 90 percent of the American public supported the choice to intervene in Korea.¹⁹² However, by January 1951, five and half months after the war had begun, two thirds of the American public now wanted their troops to be brought home from the Korean peninsula. Additionally 50 percent of the population believed that President Truman had made a mistake when he decided to go to war in Korea.¹⁹³

When Truman had made the initial decision to deploy U.S. forces to the Korean peninsula, the domestic population in the United States expected the war to be over quickly, and for it to be an easy victory. The U.S. administration had assured the people

¹⁹⁰Ibid., 283.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 35-36.

¹⁹³George Gallup, "The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971," 961.

that the Soviet Union and China would not intervene in Korea. The policy makers in the Truman administration carefully assessed the possibility of a Soviet and Chinese intervention before they decided to send troops to the peninsula. The U.S. administration evaluated that the tie between Pyongyang and Peking was “weak and superficial.”¹⁹⁴

In June 1950, at the start of the conflict, when General MacArthur first recommended the deployment of U.S. combat forces to North Korea, he estimated that the task would require only two divisions, with some air and naval assets. The U.S. administration concurred with this assessment. Both General MacArthur and his political masters assessed that the U.S. involvement would only last several months.¹⁹⁵

On 26 November 1950, the intervention of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China immediately dispelled the U.S. population of its illusion that the conflict would only last for a couple of months. Americans began to seriously rethink their involvement in Asia, and after the bitter memories of World War Two; they wanted to avoid another full-scale conflict on this continent. The situation was certainly not popular among the American public, especially when they had to consider both the monetary and human costs that they would have to pay. In addition the media, which in the early part of the war could not bring any live news from Korea now had the ability to send war correspondents to the peninsula to bring more accurate film footage and photographs of the war. An article in the 2nd December 1950, edition of the *New York Herald Tribune*, highlighted this fact. It reported that “masses of Chinese are still pouring southward down

¹⁹⁴Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 55.

¹⁹⁵William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A new diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 87.

the center of the Korean peninsula and already are closer to Seoul. . . . It appeared that the supreme crisis was near.”¹⁹⁶ A true reflection of the crisis was now been conveyed, and news reports of this nature directly from Korea now began to influence the U.S. general public to have negative views about the country’s involvement in the war. Thus the calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops became louder. Feaver and Gelpi espouse that the main reason for the growing unpopularity of the Korean War, was because American casualties were suffered in battlefield defeats, not in victories. There was an unwillingness to take casualties in a losing cause.¹⁹⁷ America’s attempts to roll back communism was not succeeding, hence public support remained low.¹⁹⁸

Analysis of the Korean War

After the UN managed to stabilize, and contain the situation, after the initial entry of the PLA into the war, how did the situation become a stalemate? Why did General Ridgeway, the United States and United Nations Commander, formulate the decision to halt offensive ground operations in Korea in 1951? Which became more important the mission, or the preservation of the force? Feaver and Gelpi as stated in chapter 3 espoused that the general public is not demanding casualty free uses of military force. But rather, demands victory, especially in conflicts of national vital importance.¹⁹⁹ After the entry of China into the Korean War, a U.S. or UN victory could no longer be

¹⁹⁶New York Tribune Wire, “Many Chinese Closer to Seoul than Yanks,” *Washington Post*, 2 December 1950, 1.

¹⁹⁷Feaver and Gelpi, 137-138.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 156.

guaranteed. Superior numbers of Chinese troops, and their push South to Seoul, took the initiative away from the UN. The initial popularity of the war among the American population changed dramatically when the PLA crossed the Yalu River, on 26th November 1950. The U.S. National Security Council report on 15th January 1951 establishes that the preservation of the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces is the overriding consideration, if the situation in Korea could not be stabilized then an evacuation to Japan if forced out of Korea was to be planned for.²⁰⁰ This statement divulges that when the war stalemated along the 38th Parallel, force protection took precedence over achieving the mission of unifying Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the United States Military in a memorandum to the U.S. Secretary of Defense state that “any course of action in Korea had to be cognizant of the need to delay a general war with Russia until the United States had achieved the requisite degree of military and industrial mobilization.”²⁰¹

In chapter 3, I stated that the preservation of a force can be as important as actually achieving the mission. The above quotation from the JCS reinforces this statement. The needless sacrificing of soldiers in achieving a next to impossible mission in Korea would certainly undermine the overall combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army and thus threaten the very existence of the United States. Though this is a very dramatic statement to make now, President Truman’s letter to General MacArthur on 13 January

²⁰⁰United States Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression, National Security Council Report 101/1, 15 January 1951, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, 1.

²⁰¹Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea, National Security Council Report 101, 12 January 1951. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, 1.

1951, a few weeks after the intervention of China, clearly outlined that the preservation of the U.S. forces in Korea and Asia took precedence over its effectiveness in achieving the mission. Force protection became the prevailing concept, overriding the necessity to achieve the mission in Korea. The U.S. military had to be preserved for a possible war with the Soviet Union, a war of vital national importance. This took precedence over military assistance to South Korea.

Further, pending the build-up of our national strength, we must set with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or western Europe in large-scale hostilities. . . . Further in the present world situation, your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defence of Japan and elsewhere. . . . In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this danger.²⁰²

The war in Korea was important, but it was not of vital national importance to the United States. Once a quick victory became unlikely, the perceptions about the war among the general public changed dramatically, with support for the war dropping among the U.S. population. The preservation of the combat effectiveness of the U.S. military took priority over the original mission of countering North Korean aggression.

Conclusion

Force protection of troops does take precedence over achieving the mission, when the conflict is not deemed to be of vital national importance. The needless sacrifice of military forces on foreign interventions is not acceptable to the political and military leadership of a country. More importantly it is not acceptable to the domestic population.

²⁰²Harry S. Truman to Douglas MacArthur, 13 January 1951, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, 3.

When a conflict is not deemed to be of national importance, or a quick and decisive victory cannot be guaranteed, then the equilibrium or balance swings in favor of force protection, over achieving the mission. The Korean War provides a perfect case in point. Once the PLA crossed the border and become actively involved in the conflict, the once sought after quick and decisive victory, entered the realms of fantasy, and a cold hard reality set in amongst the American and western populations. Popular opinion changed dramatically and support for the war fell. This fall in support, coinciding with the realities of fighting the Chinese, focused the attentions of the politicians of the United States, the military leadership and its population. The priority now switched and became containing the war in Korea, preserving the combat effectiveness of the U.S. military in order to prepare for a possible war of national importance against the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis argued that force protection will always take precedence over achieving the mission, except when a quick decisive victory is assured, or the conflict is deemed to be of vital national importance.

Historically, a relationship has developed between preserving a country's standing army, and actually conducting campaigns to achieve the mission. The maintenance and preservation of an expensively assembled army can become more important than actually fighting a battle. To lose or seriously degrade the combat effectiveness of a country's military force, could ultimately prove disastrous for a country and its political leadership. Without a properly functioning standing army, the sovereignty of a country is called into question. History has proven that a country with a weak or ineffective military is vulnerable to the ambitious advances of other more powerful nations.

The three historical case studies examined herein, all had a common theme. In each of these examples, the tactics adopted were as a direct result of previous heavy casualties received. During the Boer War, 'Black Week' and the defeat at Spion Kop, had a dramatic effect on the British population, and provoked a search for new tactics that would help reduce casualties. The tactical use of blockhouses to protect the lines of communications, and also the British soldiers occupying them, was partially a consequence of the initial heavy casualties inflicted on the British by the Boers.

Likewise, the horror of the Niamba massacre in the Congo, and the subsequent outpouring of grief in Ireland, did have a substantial effect on the mindset of the Irish military leadership, and their UN operations in the Congo. This was especially true of the

attempts by the relief column to save the besieged Irish company in Jadotville. The threat of receiving casualties at Lufira Bridge prohibited the Irish commander from conducting his relief mission. Also prevalent in the Irish mindset, was the fact that this was a UN mission, and not an operation of vital national importance to Ireland. This widespread outlook was a major factor in the decision making of Ireland's political and military leadership.

The initial support for the U.S. intervention in Korea quickly disappeared on the entry of the Chinese People's Liberation Army into the war. The American public realized a decisive victory was no longer possible and as such, support for the war began to diminish, as the realities of warfare hit home. Politicians decided that the conflict was not of vital national importance, and as such, offensive operations were suspended and the preservation of the force became the priority. Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler in chapter 3 stated that the more vital the mission is to national interests, the more willing the domestic population is to support the subsequent costs associated with it.²⁰³

Case Study Findings

Using the three themes listed at the end of my literature review in chapter 3, the following conclusions can be annotated as a result of my research into the three historical case studies. The Boer War case study did not prove that an overly protective force that concentrates solely on defense, leads to a protracted campaign, more casualties, and mission creep in the long run. The use of blockhouses was a defensive measure that did afford extra protection to the British soldiers, and their lines of communications.

²⁰³Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 37.

However, the British never lost sight of the necessity to preserve an offensive mindset. The use of mobile columns preserved the initiative for the British, dislocating the Boer insurgents. This dislocation combined with the containment measures provided by the blockhouses, and their connecting wiring, prevented the freedom of movement of the Boers, and ultimately helped bring the war to a conclusion. The Boer War was not protracted by the use of blockhouse tactics adopted by the British Army.

The historical case study on the Congo did prove that there is a relationship between force protection and mission success. It also supported Feaver and Gelpi in their assertions that on UN or humanitarian missions, avoiding casualties and the destruction of an expensively assembled army is more important than achieving the mission, regardless of the consequences. The Irish UN soldiers fought bravely in the Battle of Jadotville. They inflicted heavy casualties on the Katangan gendarmerie, and white mercenaries who were attacking them for five days, non-stop. The heavy loss of life suffered by the Irish UN troops in the Niamba Ambush prior to the Battle at Jadotville, did affect the mindset of the Irish military leadership. This combined, with the fact that the mission was in support of the United Nations, and not of vital importance to the Irish nation, meant that the relief convoy prioritized the protection of its own force over achieving the mission of relieving Jadotville. This is true also of Jadotville, where the company commander after running low on ammunition, water and supplies, chose a ceasefire and ultimately surrender, over the potential massacre of his troops.

The Korean War, after the decisive intervention of the Chinese PLA into the conflict, demonstrates that the relationship between force protection and achieving the mission can be altered. This is the case in times when a quick or decisive victory is no

longer possible, or when a mission is no longer or not perceived as a threat to national security. Once China entered the fray, the Truman Administration wisely decided to suspend all U.S. and subsequent UN offensive actions. They were content to accept the status quo and stalemate along the 38th parallel. Once the chance of unifying Korea disappeared, and a quick and decisive victory was no longer feasible, U.S. intentions turned towards matters of vital national importance such as the defense of Japan and Europe, and a possible major war with the Soviet Union. The presidential documentation cited, along with U.S. Army histories of the war, all indicate a dramatic change in mindset from early 1951 up until the peace treaty was signed in 1953. The U.S. priorities now lay in the protection and preservation of the force. The balance shifted dramatically away from achieving the mission.

A Look to the Future

Recent history has seen many examples where an overly defensive mindset has been adopted because of a publicly unacceptable tolerance for casualties. During my time in South Lebanon in 1993, 1995, 1998 and 1999, I witnessed the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), adopting an ever increasing defensive attitude, because of the casualties inflicted on them by Hezbollah, the Lebanese resistance movement. The IDF's freedom of movement was severely curtailed because of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), resulting in the construction of defensive compounds in order to form a buffer or security zone to the North of the Israeli border. The Israelis adopted these defensive positions along the border between Israel and Lebanon, from their initial invasion in 1982, until their withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The primary reason for withdrawal was the lack of support from the Israeli population for their occupation of South Lebanon. The

constant infliction of IDF casualties by Hezbollah reinforced this sentiment amongst the domestic Israeli population.²⁰⁴ Nearly twenty years of occupation, proved to be an elongated mission that became consistently unpopular in Israel, as time passed.

NATO's and the United States' activities in Afghanistan are also subject to a planned withdrawal due to dwindling support on the home fronts. This lack of support, has forced many NATO countries to become overly protective and defensive in their mindset. The domestic population will tolerate casualties as an acceptable risk, once they recognize the mission to be of great importance to their nation. They will however have a lower tolerance for casualties if they do not fully understand or believe the mission to be of national importance, and the chances of success appear remote. Clausewitz in his paradoxical trinity fully understood the necessity of achieving a balance. His balance was between the three facets of his trinity. The instrument of policy (the government), the play of chance (the military), and the primordial violence (the people). These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. To be successful in military campaigning a balance needs to be attained between these three facets. This balance directly correlates to the equilibrium needed to be reached between force protection and mission accomplishment. Without the support of the people, the balance will favor force protection over achieving the mission.

²⁰⁴Daniel Isaac Helmer, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 21, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursions Between 1982-2000* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2007), 72.

Recommendations

The following recommendations arise from this thesis:

1. To paraphrase Clausewitz, politicians and military commanders need to establish, what type of war or conflict they are embarking on. This should be the first strategic question that they discuss and ask themselves prior to deploying troops.²⁰⁵ If it is a war of national vital importance, then the military commanders should know that the domestic population will support getting decisively engaged, in order to protect the homeland. Casualties and force protection, though significant, should not be the overriding concept. Achieving the mission should be the priority.

2. If a country is deploying its military on a peacekeeping or humanitarian mission, then the politicians need to clearly articulate the left and right boundaries. These boundaries should not be constrained by national caveats that restrict the interoperability and freedom to operate, of the deploying force. But rather it means what is acceptable, and what is not. The rules of engagement should be clearly articulated, and priority should be given to force protection. The military commander needs to be cognizant of this fact. He must also be aware that the domestic population will not tolerate excessive casualties for a mission, they do not deem to be of vital national importance.

3. The Clausewitzian trinity consists of three interdependent factors. All three act in unison, and achieving the balance between the three is key. The politicians need the support of the people; as such military ventures will be dependent on this domestic support, or will of the people. Force protection is the use of all available means and measures to protect the force. These means should not establish a complete defensive

²⁰⁵Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

mindset, one where venturing out on patrol or outside the combat outpost becomes a rarity. This defensive mindset, will hand the initiative over to opposition forces, thus endangering the overall mission. A balance needs to be established between these two concepts. How important the mission is to a country's national interests, or how quickly a decisive victory can be attained, will dictate which will get the priority, force protection or achieving the mission.

4. Finally, a major fundamental of defense is having an offensive mindset.²⁰⁶ The main reason that the blockhouse tactics employed by the British Army did not elongate the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), was because the British maintained an offensive mindset. Staying inside a combat outpost protecting the force will in the long-run elongate the conflict, resulting in more casualties. Commanders need to maintain the initiative and preserve an offensive mindset in order to be successful. Patrolling and taking the fight to the enemy while maintaining situational awareness are vital components in protecting the overall force and achieving the mission.

Epilogue

The recommendations outlined in this thesis should be used as a guiding principle for future operational deployments. Military leaders and their political masters need to establish what type of war they are embarking on. These leaders also need to be adaptive in their mindset due to the uncertainty and friction involved in warfare.²⁰⁷ As a conflict transitions, and develops, so to can the necessity for force protection. The lessons learnt

²⁰⁶Land component Handbook, 76.

²⁰⁷Clausewitz, *On War*, 119.

in Iraq, and the ongoing lessons being learnt in Afghanistan, indicate that force protection though important, cannot be the overriding concept. A force that surrenders the initiative is in danger of becoming ineffective. The initiative cannot be handed over to the opposition forces, in order to protect the force in the short run. The mission cannot be ignored. Should it be the priority is debatable, hence the necessity to find the balance between achieving the mission and protecting the force.

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