

Strategy Research Project

Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the United States Army

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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Success in war is dependent on the collection of accurate and actionable intelligence. Although there are myriad intelligence disciplines, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is one of the most inexpensive and effective means of intelligence collection. HUMINT collectors are an integral part of the collection process, which spans from the tactical to the national level, which sometimes answers national level collection requirements. What the HUMINT professional lacks with technology, he or she makes up for with training and innate skills. Currently, the United States Army is not effectively recruiting or retaining quality overt HUMINT Soldiers. This paper will explore methods used by the Department of Defense (DoD) HUMINT Enterprise and service components to identify, select, and retain talent within HUMINT. Recommendations in this paper will address current procedures to assess talent in HUMINT and identify ways to improve upon current selection and retention procedures within the United States Army.

Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the United States Army

The fundamentals of human intelligence (HUMINT) transcend global technological advances. Warfare and the use of HUMINT date as far back as biblical times when the Christian Bible states, “Moses picks a man from each of the 12 tribes and sends them on a mission into the Promised Land of Canaan. He gives them explicit orders to see whether the Canaanites are strong or weak, few or many.”¹ Moving forward to the late 1700s, General George Washington employed HUMINT methods during the Revolutionary War to deceive British forces and collect intelligence of their intentions.² Following the success of HUMINT collection on British intentions, “the Continental Congress created the Committee of Secret Correspondence to gather foreign intelligence from people in England, Ireland, and elsewhere...to help in the prosecution of the war.”³ Regardless of technological advances and the transcending threat environment, HUMINT remains the most reliable and economical collection asset to determine “a nation’s objectives and motivations.”⁴

Collection capabilities such as Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) provide today’s organizations and units the ability to receive intelligence through use of signal collection and satellite imagery. Although these methods of collection are effective and necessary, they do not replace the efficacy of human interface or discern hostile intent.

In light of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), and with the unparalleled need for quality HUMINT collectors, it is essential that the Department of Defense (DoD) HUMINT Enterprise establishes criteria for the service components to recruit and retain the most qualified personnel to counter the new and emerging hybrid

threats. This paper will explore methods used by the service components to identify, recruit, and retain talent for baseline entrants within HUMINT.

Without getting into classified sources and methods, it is none the less necessary to emphasize the vital role that HUMINT plays in tipping off and supporting the technical collection disciplines. By way of context, the technical collection disciplines are vacuum cleaners and contrast to the precision of HUMINT, and suffer further from lacking the processing power to detect – in real time – the most important conversations.⁵

The purpose of the DoD HUMINT Enterprise is to provide standardization and oversight of the training, funding and career guidance for the HUMINT intelligence discipline.⁶ Due to similarities between counterintelligence and HUMINT functions, both which work with human sources, the enterprise established the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC).⁷ Although the DoD HUMINT Enterprise and DCHC provide oversight, training, and funding, this organization does not standardize entry requirements for HUMINT collectors in the service components.

Throughout the DoD HUMINT Enterprise, HUMINT collectors share similar core functions such as source operations, interrogations, debriefing, and conducting occasional Document and Material Exploitation (DOMEX). Elements within this enterprise are responsible for identifying and answering service requirements based on intelligence gaps and consolidated to satisfy national collection requirements. Individual service components are included as part of the DoD HUMINT Enterprise, but only the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps designate a specific Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for HUMINT as a 35M HUMINT collector, and the HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET), MOS 0211, respectively. In the United States Air

Force and Navy, intelligence personnel conduct HUMINT, but it is not a standalone specialty with career progression.

Conducted from the tactical to the strategic level, HUMINT always has potential strategic implications. Gathered intelligence answers tactical requirements and often shapes national collection requirements. The tactical HUMINT collector supports a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) by conducting source operations, interrogations, and debriefings. The collected intelligence facilitates force protection for the supported commands, and may also have a parallel effect at the national level. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), HUMINT collection teams conducted source operations and interrogations that led to the capture of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Although conducted at the tactical level, this operation answered national collection requirements.

Acknowledged throughout history, the value of HUMINT continues in present day. Military theorist Sun Tzu addressed the importance of intelligence in the “*The Art of War*”. The roles and responsibilities of HUMINT as an intelligence discipline are a common thread throughout his admonitions.

Generally in the case of armies you wish to strike, cities you wish to attack, and people you wish to assassinate, you must know the names of the garrison commander, the staff officer, the ushers, the gatekeepers, and the bodyguards. You must instruct your agents to inquire into these matters in minute detail.⁸

Throughout the American Civil War, Union forces employed HUMINT techniques to gather intelligence information on the Confederate Army. Early in the war while unaware of Confederate force disposition, location, and plans, “Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac, directed Col. George V. Sharpe of the 120th New York Volunteer Infantry to set up a bureau of information.”⁹ The purpose of

this newly established bureau was to develop a common operating picture of the enemy through the use of HUMINT collection, interrogation, and debriefings.¹⁰

The United States consistently employs HUMINT methods through times of war and peace. Examples include the United States military members working with French Resistance to provide intelligence during World War II on German defenses along the Atlantic Wall. Additionally, during the Cold War, the United States HUMINT collectors gathered intelligence on Soviet Union intentions, composition, and disposition of its Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) forces. Throughout this period, the service components created and disbanded HUMINT organizations “to recruit spies and debrief individuals of interest in order to gather information about foreign weapons systems, doctrine, and other matters of interest to military officials.”¹¹

In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever. As employed during the Cold War, a significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and GEOINT alone. Unlike other intelligence collection disciplines, environmental conditions such as weather or terrain do not hinder HUMINT collectors.¹²

HUMINT collection played a key role during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months of conventional conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of insurgents, employed asymmetrical warfare. The continuation of conventional warfare paired with the asymmetric threat created a hybrid threat.¹³ HUMINT is effective when countering a conventional threat that consists of large

signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However, it becomes invaluable when presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a smaller signature, such as focusing on groups of insurgents, which other intelligence collection disciplines cannot solely collect on.

Identifying Talent and Recruiting for HUMINT

Today, technological advances in the military require soldiers with higher aptitudes, “who receive lengthy and costly training and who must be retained in the force for considerable terms of service if the return on expenditures for recruiting and training is to be economically viable.”¹⁴ Although technological skills and higher aptitudes are necessary qualities in a HUMINT collector, the presence of interpersonal and critical thinking skills, as well as the ability to operate independently, embodies talent in the HUMINT field.

A HUMINT collector must thrive on interpersonal interaction. Success for a HUMINT collector hinges upon the ability to interact with human beings. A talented HUMINT collector therefore “cannot be a wallflower”, and must possess the ability to engage in conversation to extract intelligence information.¹⁵ To extract pertinent information from sources, the HUMINT collector must be able to maintain control of a conversation at all times and be “socially commanding, endearing, and warm.”¹⁶ The skills necessary to maintain control of human interaction include understanding when to be assertive and when to exercise constraint. These skills may be innate for some individuals and taught to others.

Critical thinking skills are not an innate talent, but are essential for a successful HUMINT collector. If an individual does not possess basic problem solving skills, he or she must have the cognitive ability to develop them. During interrogations and working

source operations, HUMINT collectors must possess the ability to assess the situation, make decisions, and develop immediate alternative courses of action. Well-developed critical thinking skills allow the collector to develop follow-on question based upon the answers extracted during an interrogation. This is especially a crucial skill when it involves time sensitive, actionable intelligence.

HUMINT operations often require HUMINT collectors to function independently in an austere environment. HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) usually consist of four HUMINT personnel tasked to collect intelligence information in support of force protection. When working with sources that provide this information, the individuals are more apt to interact with small teams rather than large conventional forces. During interrogation operations, the HUMINT collector is traditionally in a room accompanied only by an interpreter and the subject. These interactions require the HUMINT collector to possess the talent to “operate independently with minimal guidance.”¹⁷

Although invaluable, there are no tools in place to assess or validate the aforementioned indicators of talent prior to entering the HUMINT specialty through enlistment. Currently, to enter the service components, there is a specific set of criteria required as presented in Table 1. Potential applicants must be free of all felony law violations, attain a branch-specific score on certain portions of the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), pass physical screening requirements and drug testing, and have the ability to attain a Top Secret Sensitive Compartment Information (TS/SCI) clearance and submit to a Counterintelligence (CI) scope polygraph.¹⁸ Furthermore, each service component evaluates different portions of ASVAB placing emphasis on certain categories. There are ten different testable subjects within the

ASVAB including: General Sciences (GS), Arithmetic Reasoning (AR), Word Knowledge (WK), Paragraph Comprehension (PC), Numerical Operations (NO), Coding Speed (CS), Auto Shop (AS), Mathematics Knowledge (MK), Mechanical Comprehension (MC), and Electronics Information (EI). A combination of two or more categories test combined knowledge and aptitude. For instance, the sum of WK and PC combined determine a Verbal Expression (VE) score, which determines eligibility to enlist in HUMINT.¹⁹

Table 1. Basic Entry Level Requirements for DoD HUMINT Enterprise²⁰

Basic entry requirements	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps
U.S. Citizen	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ASVAB	GS + VE + MK + MC (ST score) = 101	WK +PC + AR = 107	WK+PC and AR = 33	VE + AR = 110 waiver based on performance
Age	18 years old	21 years old	21 years old	21 years old
Years experience	Specific HUMINT MOS selected upon enlistment	No specific HUMINT MOS, assigned HUMINT duties after enlistment	No specific HUMINT MOS, assigned HUMINT duties after enlistment	CPL or SGT with 1 year time in grade; selected from other MOS; selection based on interview
Language requirement	DLAB	DLAB	DLAB	DLAB
Clearance (TS/SCI)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Polygraph	Submit	Submit	Submit	Submit

The service components require enlistment and adherence to the basic qualifications. The differences noted in Table 1 depict the selection criteria required for the DoD HUMINT Enterprise and depend on the varying roles and responsibilities of each component. HUMINT collectors in the United States Army and Marine Corps focus on supporting land based operations, whereas the United States Navy and Air Force primarily focus on port or airfield security, force, protection, and limited support to special operation units. Regardless of the mission requirements, each component conducts varying levels of HUMINT operations.

The DoD HUMINT Enterprise does not standardize entry requirements for HUMINT collectors throughout the service components. Due to the lack of centralized selection and screening, it is not possible to measure entry level talent required to enter the profession. For instance, the basic entry level requirements throughout the DoD HUMINT Enterprise do not determine if the applicant possesses the required talents of critical thinking, interpersonal skills, and the ability to function independently. There is no formal mechanism in place when dealing with service component HUMINT collectors that evaluates the current recruiting pool and provides feedback to the HUMINT Enterprise on writing, reading comprehension, and other basic skills tested on the ASVAB.

Each component within the DoD HUMINT Enterprise provides incentives to entice and recruit personnel. The purpose of these benefits is to appeal to the civilian population and recruit for entry within DoD. Accordingly, “the central question is how to attract qualified youth to serve their country and, if necessary, be willing to put themselves in harm’s way.”²¹ Due to this perceived risk, which is not appealing to all potential candidates, “the services have many types of enlistment incentive programs in operation today, most of which are aimed at what the service components deem as highly qualified recruits. Current incentives include education benefits as well as enlistment bonuses for various types of jobs.”²² Specific benefits afforded throughout DoD include:²³

- Housing and food allowance
- Health care
- Educational benefits (loan repayment and tuition assistance)

- Promotion potential and bonuses
- Life insurance
- Retirement

These proposed incentives do not guarantee the recruitment of talented and qualified individuals capable of performing the roles of a HUMINT collector. Instead, they attract potential candidates to merely fill vacancies:

The sole question is not, or should not be, whether we can recruit enough bodies to fill the boxes in the organization charts of a peace-time standing force through voluntary means. The question of whether a force so recruited can fulfill America's national-security needs by winning battles and wars in need be should also be addressed.²⁴

Environmental conditions affect recruitment into DoD and greatly impact the number and quality of candidates in the DoD HUMINT Enterprise. The external environmental conditions that affect recruiting talent include world and economic situations.²⁵ Recruiting and retention reflect the trend of civilian unemployment. For instance, historical data shows a low civilian unemployment rate will decrease an individual's propensity to enlist in the Armed Forces.²⁶

The internal conditions affecting recruitment of talent include personal preference and family influence. "There are three intermediate determinants of a person's intention to enlist..."²⁷ that include how the person feels about enlisting and the military in general, peer pressure and family support or lack thereof to enlist, and "self-efficacy."²⁸ A youth's social structure including parents, friends, and family have a huge influence on their view of the military and their desire to enlist, and most teenagers' opinions are formed by age 15.²⁹

Retaining Talent in HUMINT

There is an ongoing trend of increased enlistment following the initiating events of a conflict. For instance, after Operation DESERT STORM and the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, statistics reflect a spike in the propensity to enlist in service components.³⁰ Although this appears to be a recruiting success story, these numbers do not guarantee retention of HUMINT talent. Additionally, the annual retention statistics are misleading. For instance, the service components reported an average of 99% reenlistment for first term service personnel for FY2012 and FY2011; the numbers capture the aggregate and are not broken down into each specific MOS.³¹ An example is found by exploring the FY2012 retention rate for the U.S. Army. Even though the U.S. Army reported achieving 100% of their reenlistment goal, only 13.7% of HUMINT Soldiers reenlisted after their initial term.³² Similar statistics are unavailable for the Air Force and Navy, since these service components do not have a HUMINT career field and therefore do not track such retention.

In 2005, the service components spent over one billion dollars in reenlistment bonuses.³³ The factors influencing the propensity to reenlist include, but are not limited to, compensation, career advancement, job security, and quality of life. Unlike the civilian sector, “the military has traditionally placed paramount importance on institutional values...rather than on the utilitarian matrices of compensation.”³⁴ Throughout DoD, monetary compensation is generally dictated by a promotion schedule. For instance, regardless of exemplary performance, a HUMINT collector must wait until they are promotion eligible, based on time and grade, to receive appropriate monetary recognition. Furthermore, “the civilian economy affects recruiting and retention in at least two ways: through the availability of civilian employment, as

measured by the civilian unemployment rate, and by the potential earnings offered by the civilian sector, as measured by average civilian earnings.”³⁵

Career advancement opportunities provide yet another obstacle to retaining qualified HUMINT personnel. Throughout DoD, career advancement is constrained by authorized strength, vacancies and limited promotion opportunities. In the service components, service-related duties often preclude career enhancement within HUMINT. Within the U.S. Army, the majority of HUMINT collectors remain at the tactical level supporting a company intelligence support team (CoIST), Brigade Combat Team (BCT), or Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB), limiting their opportunity to advance in their career field. The career path is similar within the Marine Corps, where the HUMINT professional is limited to operations at the tactical and operational level. Conversely, within the Air Force and Navy, with the lack of a HUMINT career field there is no chance for career advancement within HUMINT.

Reduced quality of life can significantly impact retention potential. Due to the events of September 11, 2001, “as thousands of deployed military service members return to the US from Iraq and Afghanistan, many will seek employment in the civilian job market. Whatever the reason for leaving military service, the troops are a diverse talent pool for the public sector.”³⁶ The two major conflicts over the past decade greatly reduced quality of life for service members and their families through a series of deployments resulting in potential hardship of family separation. This hardship can contribute to professionals seeking career opportunities outside of DoD.

To appeal to the civilian job market, individuals must be energetic, mature, flexible, and possess the appropriate communication and critical thinking skills. These

crucial skills are developed and refined throughout service with DoD, which makes these professionals appealing to the civilian sector. Furthermore, the very benefits, such as training and education, designed to recruit and retain professionals within DoD, “may also induce them to leave to use those benefits” in the civilian sector.³⁷ The leadership traits and interpersonal and critical thinking skills that a HUMINT collector develops are transferable to myriad positions in the civilian sector ranging from sales to management. Additionally, other government organizations are luring service members away from DoD to perform the same roles and functions at a much higher compensation. For instance, a generic HUMINT civilian position on USA Jobs currently offers between 75,000 to 100,000 dollars annually for four year experience and a TS/SCI clearance.³⁸ According to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) FY2012 pay chart, an individual serving in the Armed Forces with the same experience and clearance averages 29,000 dollars annually, not including benefits, such as housing and cost of living allowance, which are location dependent.³⁹

Assessing the Needs of the Current Generation

Generational gaps continue to challenge employers within and outside of DoD to recruit and retain talent. People born between 1977 and 1997 comprise 27% of the current workforce and are referred to as “the Echo of the Baby Boom, Net Generation, Gen Y, or Millennials.”⁴⁰ Most frequently referred to as the Net Generation, they “can be generally characterized as the most demanding generation in history, demanding challenge, meaningful work with impact, committed co-workers, and the ability to reach persona and financial goals.”⁴¹

The Net Generation has an impressive set of skills including the ability to multitask, is technologically savvy, and exposed to a plethora of information such as,

“access to 200-plus cable television networks, 5,500 magazines, 10,500 radio stations, and 40 billion Web pages.”⁴² This generation is smart and getting smarter, as evidenced by the increase in average Intelligence Quotient (IQ) score.⁴³ For instance, the average IQ score in 1980 was 101, in 2008 it was 110.⁴⁴ Therefore, “to win the war for talent, companies will have to completely rethink the way they handle the net Geners [sic].”⁴⁵ The previous management model of, “recruit, train, supervise and retain is outdated,” and has been replaced with, “initiate, engage, collaborate, and evolve.”⁴⁶

The Net Generation centers on three individual desires that primarily focus on family, technology, and success. Foremost for this generation is success, “in a January 2007 report from the Pew Research Center, 81% of 18 to 25 year olds polled said that getting rich is their generation’s most, or second most important life goal; 51% said the same about becoming famous.”⁴⁷ Although not equally important, technology holds a significant role as this generation is turning towards Twitter, Facebook, and other social media outlets for networking.⁴⁸ Another defining characteristic of this generation is the importance of family. Unlike the Baby Boomer generation, the Net Generation places a high value on their parent’s opinions “on everything from college selection to financial planning.”⁴⁹

Common motives for enlisting in the U.S. Armed Forces include factors such as, “money for college, technical training, and security of steady employment, travel, patriotism, discipline, [and] pride.”⁵⁰ Offered for generations, these opportunities within the service components are not new. They are not always appealing to the general population, and are not effective recruiting tools unless supported by family, community and complemented with a positive perception of the military. The propensity to enlist for

this generation greatly hinges upon their perception of and interaction with, “someone who wore a uniform and spoke positively about the experience.”⁵¹ However, the multiple deployments experienced by service members within this decade might negatively influence their likelihood to speak positively about their experiences.⁵²

Improving U.S. Army HUMINT Recruiting and Retention of Talent

The DoD HUMINT Enterprise focuses on the oversight of training, funding, and career guidance for the higher echelon HUMINT professionals and does not apply to all overt HUMINT collectors throughout DoD working at the tactical and operational level. The mission of the enterprise is not to synchronize practices for recruiting and retaining talent throughout the entire HUMINT community, nor are they responsible for establishing selection criteria. With a lack of standardization, each component with the enterprise selects, retains and employs HUMINT collectors differently. To standardize this process, the DoD HUMINT Enterprise must be empowered to manage HUMINT collectors at all levels. This oversight would allow for a broad spectrum standardization of HUMINT, encompassing everything from selection and recruitment to training and retention. This standardization would ensure that all HUMINT collectors throughout the DoD HUMINT Enterprise possess similar skill sets and be interchangeable in the joint environment.

The U.S. Army recruits personnel based on current demands, which fluctuate depending on vacancies. The qualifying requirements differ greatly based on the MOS. For instance, the three qualifying factors for an individual to enlist in the U.S. Army as a HUMINT collector include passing a physical exam, obtaining a ST score of 101 on the ASVAB, and passing security screening. The factors merely quantify an individual’s capability to read, write, and pass a physical and security screening. Passing these

screening criteria does not guarantee that the candidate possesses the required talents of critical thinking, interpersonal skills, and can operate independently required to be a successful HUMINT collector.

Given myriad environmental challenges faced by recruiters, there is still no formal system in place to properly screen potential HUMINT applicants for talent. The recruiting process revolves around filling vacancies. According to a veteran HUMINT collector, quantity does not equal quality.⁵³ Until the DoD HUMINT Enterprise develops a way to standardize and recruit for the imperative skill sets in a HUMINT collector, the enterprise will continue to fail to recruit quality candidates in sufficient numbers.

In 2003 there were approximately 2,000 HUMINT collectors in the Army.⁵⁴ As a result of two ongoing conflicts, the need for HUMINT collectors escalated, resulting in an increase in over 4,500 collectors, totaling 6,500 HUMINT collectors.⁵⁵ In an attempt to meet a growing demand, the Army lowered the ST score to 95 and removed the language requirement. Although this filled vacancies to meet Army requirements, the focus was on quantity and not quality. This change in requirements precluded the force from receiving HUMINT collectors capable of conducting full spectrum operations. For instance, by waiving the language requirement, and attendance at Defense Language Institute (DLI), HUMINT collectors were no longer capable of interrogating in native languages. This had a secondary impact on the collector's cultural awareness and savvy, and a tertiary effect of potential misinterpretation through the necessity of using a translator.⁵⁶ Although the current U.S. Army regulation states individuals must take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) and score a 95 or better, it is currently not being enforced based on accession requirements.⁵⁷ To reverse the quantity over quality

issue, the Army must maintain the ST requirement of 101 and enforce DLAB testing. Additionally, coding a portion of HUMINT position as language capable positions affords candidates the opportunity to attend DLI and learn a foreign language.

Recruiters sell the Army and the Military Entrance Processing station (MEPs) guidance counselors encourage specific MOS choices based on current Army requirements. The Army has approximately 150 MOSs to offer; the guidance counselor's understanding of each MOS depends on training received while attending the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) Guidance Counselor Course, which is frequently refreshed through training. A qualified applicant may only learn of HUMINT collector opportunities if the guidance counselor introduces the topic. More importantly, the guidance counselor is not equipped to identify, screen, and enlist talented HUMINT collectors.

USAREC recruits personnel based on Army requirements and is neither designed nor intended to recruit for talent in the HUMINT profession. The current system lacks the ability to evaluate if an applicant can perform independently and possess the critical thinking and interpersonal skills required to be an effective HUMINT collector. Additional testing and evaluation prior to enlistment is required to properly evaluate these skills.

Accordingly, there are several ways to effectively evaluate interpersonal skills. Beginning with the least invasive, the applicant could be assessed using tools such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI determines four basic but enlightening preferences including, "where you focus your attention, the way you take in information, the way you make decision, [and] how you deal with the outer world."⁵⁸

Although there are no right answers when it comes to personalities in HUMINT, an operational psychologist can use the MBTI results as an assessment tool during evaluation. To thoroughly assess interpersonal skills, an operational psychologist should screen every potential HUMINT applicant. Specific MOSs throughout the service components, such as Special Forces Units and Submariners in the Navy, already administer similar assessment to evaluate capabilities prior to enlistment.

Well-developed critical thinking skills are an indicator of talent in the HUMINT profession. However, military applicants are not tested or evaluated on critical thinking skills prior to enlisting in the Army. The initial HUMINT Soldiers exposure to critical thinking instruction is during Initial Entry Training (IET). IET teaches critical thinking skills and integrates these skills throughout training, but this does not guarantee that the individual Soldier can demonstrate critical thinking skills upon completion of training. Whether the Soldier comprehends it or not, they are a HUMINT collector. Instead of waiting until after enlistment to determine a Soldier's critical thinking capabilities, applicants must complete critical thinking tests prior to enlistment in the HUMINT field. This testing should include a variety of critical thinking skill determinants administered through computer-based practical exercises, such as the International Critical Thinking Basic Concepts and Understanding test.⁵⁹ Furthermore, an operational psychologist can further evaluate the applicant's skills prior to enlistment and should review the results of these practical exercises.

It is imperative that a HUMINT collector can operate independently in the field. This skill is cultivated over time after the Soldier gains the confidence, knowledge, and self-containment necessary to operate independently. This trait is difficult to test prior to

enlistment; therefore, it is essential to test the potential for independent functioning prior to enlistment. Following the assessment of a potential applicants interpersonal and critical thinking skills, a psychologist could evaluate their potential for independent functioning.

Although the Net Generation only encompasses 27% of the current workforce, this is the ideal recruiting pool based on the age, needs, and inherent talent of this generation.⁶⁰ The Army currently tailors advertisements to this generation through recruiting chat rooms, online recruiters, Facebook and other social media outlets. This type of advertisement focuses on showcasing Army life, benefits, and provides a brief overview of job opportunities. The Net Generation spends time online researching and looking for answers in one specific place before taking action.⁶¹ Currently during such research, the Net Generation will only find a broad overview of the roles and responsibilities of a HUMINT collector. The Army must provide more detailed information regarding the HUMINT intelligence discipline through social media outlets. This will pique the interest of this generation to the challenges inherent to HUMINT. An example of a better strategy is the recruiting methods used to entice potential recruits into the special operations community by focusing on the challenges and adventures associated with the field.

Although recruiting those with the potential to be good HUMINT collectors is essential, it is equally important to retain talent based on the investment required to recruit and train these collectors. The current retention process to retain HUMINT collectors includes bonuses, occasional assignment of choice, schooling, and promotion based on performance and time in grade. Certain facets of retention are difficult to

modify based on the culture of the Army, such as the promotion, rank structure, and job opportunities. For instance, there are limited career enhancing positions for a HUMINT collector outside of the tactical level. The Army must focus on modifiable facets of retention including career enhancement through job opportunities, empowering the DoD HUMINT Enterprise to manage all levels of HUMINT, and provide an environment conducive to retention based on organizational culture and strong leadership.

Currently there are limited HUMINT positions throughout the Army. As HUMINT collectors progress up the ranks and are placed in various leadership positions, the missions performed by the HUMINT collectors remain similar. Regardless of their rank, the collectors conduct interrogations and source operations at the tactical level. The Army must ascertain the need to create additional HUMINT positions at the strategic level. For instance, the Army Operation Group (AOG) conducts strategic level HUMINT. The organization consists of 129 HUMINT billets; of those positions only five are active duty military personnel positions, the remainder are civilian billets.⁶² A more balanced distribution is obtainable by reducing the number of civilian billets, however, a thorough assessment of qualifications and expertise is required prior to converting to military positions.

The lack of understanding about the roles and responsibilities of a HUMINT collector greatly impacts retention. When all levels of leadership fail to understand the roles, responsibilities, and training requirements for a HUMINT collector, the individual is often underutilized and may miss out on training opportunities. This underutilization negatively impacts the Soldier in many ways. Job dissatisfaction and a lack of training opportunities frequently result when Soldiers do not work within their MOS, which

ultimately impacts retention. Centralizing all levels of HUMINT collectors under the DoD HUMINT Enterprise empowers the enterprise to properly manage the career path, training, and employment of all HUMINT collectors. This would require the DoD HUMINT Enterprise to draft a change in policy for Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) approval. The enterprise would then have the power to engage the joint community to create career opportunities, such as requesting Defense Attaché Office (DAO) positions for HUMINT collectors. Currently, the service components fill the enlisted DAO positions, which are branch immaterial.⁶³

Conclusion

HUMINT is one of the least expensive and most effective means of intelligence collection. It provides strategic leaders with intelligence on disposition, composition, and intent of foreign adversaries. HUMINT collectors operate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, all of which may support national collection requirement, but might potentially have strategic implications. HUMINT collection is largely conducted by the service components through DoD; however, HUMINT is not recognized as a dedicated job specialty within the Navy and Air Force.

This research has discovered that there is no centralized HUMINT management program throughout DoD. Designed to provide standardization and oversight of the training, funding, and career guidance for the HUMINT field, the DoD HUMINT Enterprise has minimal impact on service component HUMINT programs.⁶⁴ Although the enterprise is extremely beneficial for the senior echelon level HUMINT collection programs, it is not adequate to support and manage the full spectrum of HUMINT collection operations. Based on this lack of oversight, the service components independently structured their HUMINT programs based on institutional needs. As a

result, HUMINT throughout DoD is not synchronized, which adversely affects the standardization, training, professional development and career enhancement throughout the profession.

Due to the proposed force reductions and technological advances, there is a need for talent in every MOS throughout the U.S. Army. The DoD HUMINT Enterprise is one of the many organizations that must develop and implement ways to identify, recruit and retain talent in light of these proposed force reductions. There must be an effective system in place to screen applicants for their actual or potential capabilities as an effective HUMINT collector. It is imperative to capitalize on the full potential of HUMINT collection operations and alter the recruiting focus from quantity to quality because the proposed reductions could minimize the pool of talented applicants for all MOSs. Furthermore, as the hybrid threat increases and resources become more constrained, paired with competing needs for various intelligence assets, the need for talented HUMINT collectors is more essential now than ever.

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