

CAN THE JAMAICAN SECURITY FORCES SUCCESSFULLY
REDUCE THE VIOLENT IMPACT OF GANGS?

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

CAN THE JAMAICAN SECURITY FORCES SUCCESSFULLY REDUCE THE VIOLENT IMPACT OF GANGS? by Major Mahatma E. Williams, 125 pages.

This research discusses the high murder rate in Jamaica as a consequence of gang activity. It highlights the negative impact of gangs in regard to national security. The complexity of the gang problem is identified by describing the gangs' connection to political parties and society overall. Further, endemic corruption, a weak justice system, an unreformed security sector and limited social intervention are identified as part of the complexity and facilitates the gang phenomenon. A case study comparison was done with Jamaica, Brazil and Guatemala to try to identify workable approaches to the gang problem. Although various preconditions were identified which are required for countergang operations to work in a country, the research tried to address the security defense aspect. Various operations were reviewed and an assessment made to the level of effectiveness. Overall the study identified the reason for Jamaica's failure to address gangs as a national security issue. The paper concluded by identifying the preconditions for successful operations, recommending social programs to be a part of any countergang operations, advocating the establishment of a Joint-Interagency Task Force and a doctrinal shift in an attempt at bringing a new philosophy and practice to countergang approaches within Jamaica.

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ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
ADA	Amigos dos Amigos
AO	Area of Operations
CDL	Comite da Liberdade
CHDR	Caribbean Human Development Report
CICIG	International Committee against Impunity in Guatemala
CMU	Crime Management Unit
COG	Center of Gravity
CRBC	Comando Revolucionario Brasileiro da Criminalidade
CV	Comando Vermelho
CVJC	Comando Vermelho Joven da Criminalidade
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IS	Internal Security
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF	Jamaica Defense Force
JFT	Joint Task Force
JOPC	Joint Operational Command
MNS	Ministry of National Security
OCG	Organized Crime Group
PCC	Primeiro Comando Da Capital
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act

PSOJ	Private Sector Organization of Jamaica
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACTF	Special Anti-Crime Task Force
TCC	Terciero Comando da Capital
TCO	Transnational Crime Organization
TCP	Terceiro Comando Puro
TTP	Tactics Techniques and Procedures
UNDOC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UPP	Urban Pacification Police
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHEMSAC	Western Hemispheric Security Analysis Center

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Task Force found that numerous studies have been done on crime and violence in Jamaica. Several reports have been written. . . What has been lacking is the political will to implement the recommendations of previous Task Forces.

— Hon. Mr. Justice Wolfe,
“Report of the National Task Force on Crime”

This research is not another study on the complex crime epidemic which has crippled Jamaica for the last two decades. It is a study about the Jamaican gang, the primary proponent of the ghastly violence which personifies Jamaica’s crime landscape. Jamaican gangs are the main perpetrators of crime in the nation, and have been cited by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) for most of Jamaica’s violence.¹

¹European External Action Service, “2011 Symposium,” http://eeas.europa.eu/us/events/symposium2011/docs/paula_llewellyn_public_prosecutions_jamaica_en.pdf (accessed 24 March 2012).




Figure 1. High Murder Rate

Source: Created by author from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012). The chart depicts countries with high murder rates. The lines show the trend in the number of murders per 100,000 persons over a 15-year period. Similar to Jamaica, these countries are known to have a gang related problem.

With the exception of Mexico, countries with notorious gang problems have murder rates that are consistently above 20 per 100,000. Over the period 2000 to 2009, the murder rates in those countries more than tripled the international average of six per 100,000. Jamaica’s average murder rate for the period 2000 to 2009 was 62 murders per 100,000 inhabitants (62/100,000) making it the third most murderous country in the world for that period, behind Honduras (67/100,000) and El Salvador (71/100,000). In 2007 and 2008, Jamaica had the world’s highest annual murder rate. In 2009, the probability of a Jamaican dying in a homicide was 1:1486. A “Daily Gleaner” Anderson

Poll of April 2009 reported that 70 percent of Jamaicans view crime and violence as the “most pressing” problem facing the country.²




Figure 2. Annual Total Murder Trend–Jamaica, 1995-2010

Source: Created by author. Figure 2 shows the murder trend in Jamaica over the 15-year period of 1995-2010.

Over the period 1995 to 2010 a total of 19,389 murders were committed in Jamaica. In Northern Ireland for example; 1,781 persons were killed in the insurgency from 1969 to 1997 (28 years). In almost half the time span, 10 times more people were killed in Jamaica when compared to a country fighting a terrorist insurgency within its borders. The country is experiencing a crisis in homicidal violence, which is causing insecurity for citizens.³

²Standing Committee on National Security, “National Security Policy Paper: Improving National Security in Jamaica,” Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ), 2010, 8.

³Ibid., 4.

Overview

Gangs in Jamaica came into being concurrently with the birth and rise of the two main political parties; the Peoples National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP).⁴ They blended into political activism and have evolved over time into various types of criminal groups.⁵ According to the Jamaican police statistics, gangs are now responsible for most of the country's violence. Despite the efforts of the government and various crime reduction operations gangs are still active in Jamaica.

Background on Jamaican Gangs

The gangs' development and ties with politics spawned the development and institutionalization of political garrisons. In the 1940s, political parties struggled to win the popular vote, especially in marginalized poor communities in the capital of Kingston. The belligerent political strategies employed by both political parties continued to encourage hostility between their supporters in the 1960s and 1970s.⁶ In the 1980 general elections, the hostility morphed into an armed ideological struggle. The hostilities were carried out by armed gangs that supported both political parties. These conflicts entrenched the practice, where political gangs de-mark and defend poor residential

⁴Amanda Sives, "The Historical Roots of Violence in Jamaica," in *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, ed. Anthony Harriott (West Indies: University of the West Indies Press, 2003), 50.

⁵Anthony Harriott, "The Jamaican Crime Problem," in *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy* (West Indies: University of the West Indies Press, 2003), 6.

⁶*Ibid.*, 8.

enclaves in the city as exclusive voting blocs. The voting blocs are now labeled as “political garrisons” and remain entrenched in Jamaican life.⁷

Background on Political Garrisons

The “political garrisons” in Jamaica are poorer inner city communities which are zones of political exclusion where the gang and its leader exercise exclusive authority over the residents. In many instances, they emerge as power brokers, rivaling state institutions in varied degrees. A garrison is characterized as an area in which criminal and political activity is tightly controlled by politically affiliated gang leaders.⁸ There are between 12 and 18 political garrisons constituencies of the 61 electoral constituencies in Jamaica. Sixty percent of those political garrisons are in urban areas.⁹ Several reports have alluded to political parties in government using large-scale public housing projects to reward and further geographically concentrate their supporters in garrison communities from the 1960s onwards.¹⁰ The gangs enforce the principle of political exclusion by preventing infiltration by rivals and ensuring orderly voting during election for one political party. Homogenous voting in favor of the patron politician is the outcome,

⁷Jamaica Gleaner Website, “Will Golding’s Tivoli Heir...Mash down GarrisonPolitics?” www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111002/focus/focus51.html (accessed 13 December 2012).

⁸Mark Figueroa and Amanda Sives, “Garrison Politics and Criminality in Jamaica,” in *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, ed. Anthony Harriott (West Indies: University of the West Indies Press, 2003), 66; The Jamaica Observer Website, “The Cancer that is Garrison Politics,” www.jamaicaobserver.com/letters/The-cancer-that-is-garrison-politics# (accessed 13 December 2012).

⁹Anthony Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus* (West Indies: University of the West Indies, 2008), 20.

¹⁰Figueroa and Sives, 65.

giving way to a mutually beneficial relationship between gangs and the political representative for that area. In return for managing the delivery of votes, the gang leader and members are rewarded with state contracts, and indirect control of state social and work programs.¹¹

The Gang Stages of Development

Gangs have matured and grown well beyond traditional political activities and influence of the 1980s.¹² After the 1990s, in addition to exerting political control of garrisons, gangs have created a social structure in their enclave which supports their criminal enterprise and independence.¹³ The gangs got involved in the illicit drugs and arms trade, extortion, kidnapping and all the associated atrocities that accompany those crimes.¹⁴

The Jamaican gangs pass through stages of development. The stages define their level of interaction with the political system and politicians. The first stage in the gangs' development is where they act as community gangs. Community gangs are primarily designed to protect a political enclave. These gangs are community focused and have allegiance to the political leader. The second stage of development happens when community gangs are mentored by more established gangs. The community gang

¹¹Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 12-22; Standing Committee on National Security, 13.

¹²Glaister Leslie, "Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica," Occasional Paper, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, Switzerland, 2010; Figueroa and Sives, 83.

¹³Figueroa and Sives, 83.

¹⁴Harriott, *Understanding Crime in Jamaica*, 7.

expands its role from the community level political control and defense, to crimes for economic gain. The gangs continue to exercise control over the garrison but not only for political exclusion but also to secure it as a base for criminal activities. The outcome is antisocial, but the politicians accede and turn a blind eye to ensure that they continue to get the support of the community gang during election time. The third stage of gang development is where the gang becomes completely independent of the political leaders. Even though some of the gangs in stage three have roots in certain garrisons, they become super gangs; a very high profile leader which is feared or revered, is referred to as the “Don” emerges at this stage. In this stage, the gang is also internationally connected, and participates in organized crimes, like drug and arms trafficking and other high level crimes. It usually employs other gangs and helps to drive community gangs toward stage-two development making them more independent of politicians.¹⁵

Currently, gangs of various stages of maturity carry out all levels of crime inside and outside of their controlled zones, with little regard for the state’s crime fighting apparatus.¹⁶ Some agencies of the state are intimidated and have been rendered ineffective due to the power that gangs assert, and due to their close ties to the legitimate political power base in the country.¹⁷

¹⁵Leslie, 12-14.

¹⁶Harriott, *Understanding Crime in Jamaica*, 6.

¹⁷Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 24.

The Violent Impact of Jamaican Gangs

Director of Public Prosecution, Paula Llewellyn, Queen's Council, speaking at the Trans-Atlantic Symposium on Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks, May 17-19, 2011 in Lisbon, Portugal; stated that in the last 10 years, 12,954 murders were committed in Jamaica; 9,231 with the use of illegal guns. During that same period 21,800, other serious crimes were committed with illegal guns. She reported that over 80 percent of murders, shootings and other serious crimes, is attributed to criminal gangs which is among the transnational illicit networks that exist throughout the Caribbean and by extension, the world.¹⁸ The gangs are said to be responsible for 80 percent of the violence overall and over 50 percent of the murders. Official statistics suggest that gang-related murders increased from three percent of murders in 1983 to 52 percent in 2009.¹⁹

Law Enforcement

The police force, which is the state's primary counter balance to gang activity, is viewed by most citizens as inefficient and corrupt.²⁰ Some of the reasons leading to this mistrust are the perceived police abuse and inefficiency in responding to the security needs of Jamaicans. In 2007, of all the murders committed, arrests were made for only 34 percent, while only 10 percent of those murders were eventually solved. In seven years (2000-2007) the Jamaican police killed 1,422 people and injured 1,115. The police

¹⁸EU European External Action Service.

¹⁹Leslie, 9.

²⁰Ibid., 24.

account for 15 percent of the total number of people killed in Jamaica in 2007.²¹ The residents' lack of confidence also extends to the wider criminal justice system, and according to Glaiser Leslie, consultant researcher for the *Small Arms Journal*, such feelings appear justified.²²

The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) supports the JCF by conducting Joint JDF/JCF internal security operations. This support is allowed by the Defense Act of 1962 and executed on the authority of the Prime Minister, where it states that:

(2) . . . Provided that the Prime Minister may give to the Chief of Staff such directions with respect to the operational use of the Jamaica Defence Force in Jamaica for the purpose of maintaining and securing public safety and public order, notwithstanding that the directions of the Cabinet have not been obtained, and the Chief of Staff shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied with. (3) Where any member of the Jamaica Defence Force is acting pursuant to directions referred to in the proviso to the subsection such member shall, while *so* acting, enjoy all such immunities, privileges and protection as are enjoyed by a member of the Jamaica Constabulary Force Defense Act of Jamaica.²³

When called upon, the mission of the JDF is to assist the JCF in maintaining law and order. The JDF operates in support of police strategy which essentially is policing within geographic boundaries and has no direct responsibility or legal authority for law enforcement outside of this provision. Deployment of military personnel for crime fighting operational activities is based on the needs of 19 localized police divisions across

²¹Amnesty International Website, "Jamaica Public Security Inner Cities Facts and Figures," www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/jamaica-public-security-inner-cities-facts-and-figures-20080325 (accessed 2 November 2012).

²²Leslie, 63.

²³Government of Jamaica, "Defense Act of 1962," Kingston, Jamaica, <http://www.moj.gov.jm/...DA%20Officers%201962%20LN%2024662.pdf> (accessed 13 December 2012).

the island. When both groups work together, they are referred to as Security Forces. Together they have carried out multiple joint operations. They have recovered illegal arms and ammunition, drugs and other contraband, detained thousands of persons and killed hundreds of alleged gunmen. Despite all the tactical successes, gangs continue to operate with relative freedom and the manner of violence remains unabated.

The Problem

Is this a Complex Problem?

The state and security forces in Jamaica are presented with a gang phenomenon which is still ill-defined. The Jamaican gangs are resilient and they are a part of the social fabric in Jamaica. They victimize the entire population (to include women and children), facilitate umbilical ties with political parties, entrench garrisonization and facilitate corruption. They will not be eliminated with a “silver bullet” nor are they expected to be phased out with time. They are a complex social movement from which violence is one bi-product.

The gang problem exudes all the characteristics of a complex environment as defined by the “Cynefin Framework.” The “Cynefin framework” draws on research into complex adaptive systems theory, cognitive science, anthropology and narrative patterns, as well as evolutionary psychology, and explores the relationship between man, experience and context.



Figure 3. Cynefin Framework

Source: David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” *Harvard Business Review* (November 2007), in *L200 Book of Readings* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, December 2011), 4.

Can it be Fixed by the Security Forces?

Killing and imprisoning individual gang members and their leaders as the main effort has not worked. By itself, such a crime fighting method has isolated the law abiding public and fuelled distrust for the police and the military. The absence of a working anti-gang strategy to directly address gangs’ contribution to the country’s high murder rate still remains a challenge to Jamaica’s security. There was a short lived success in reducing the murder rate in 2010 when gang activity was disrupted with the detention of key gang members during a state of emergency joint police military operation. The operation in May of that year was specifically targeting a highly sought after transnational gang; the “Shower Posse,” whose leader Christopher “Dudus” Coke

was ordered extradited to the United States (U.S.) by the government.²⁴ During the operation, there were heightened violent clashes with the security forces which led to the detention of several gang members. However, there were legal constraints which precluded the extended detention of the captured gangsters.²⁵

The disruption temporarily reduced the incidence of murders, evidenced by a decline in 2010 and 2011 over 2009. In 2009, 1,682 murders were recorded in the country; compared to 1,428 in 2010 and 1,124 in 2011, representing a 21 percent decrease over the prior year, and 33 percent decline when compared to 2009. While the celebrated decline in 2010 and 2011 was attributed to the May 2010 operation, the “post operation dividend” effect quickly wore off with 272 murders recorded in the first quarter of 2012. This represented a murder total of 12 percent higher than the same period in 2011.

Does the Military have a Viable Role in the Anti-Gang Strategy?

The May 2010 joint operation demonstrated the capacity of the security forces as a joint team to utilize its resources and expertise to successfully counter heightened levels of violent gang conflict. Conducting the operation required skillful planning and coordination, drawing heavily on the military’s rigorous intelligence preparation of the battle space, detailed planning using the Operational Planning Process and efficient large-

²⁴Fox News Website, “Jamaica Declares Emergency as Gunfire Erupts in Barricaded Stronghold of Alleged Drug Lord,” <http://www.foxnews.mobi/quickPage.html?page=22995&content=38779231&pageNum=-1> (accessed 24 November 2012).

²⁵Jamaica Gleaner Website, “Lawyers Express Concern for Young Detainees in Tivoli,” www.jamaica-gleaner.com/latest/article.php?id=19629 (accessed 3 November 2012).

scale deployment in urban areas. While the objective of the operation was the capture of a gang leader, there was an unplanned positive effect of a reduction in murders, as the security forces were actively engaged with a number of gangsters.

The approach of the security forces and government policy toward crime and gang activity remain relatively unchanged from pre-2010. The threat to Jamaica's security by gang activity still remains with high murder rates and violence. The gains of 2010 were lost.

The Research Question

Can the Jamaican Security Forces successfully reduce the violent impact of gangs?

Secondary Questions

In order to address the research question it is important to answer some secondary questions:

1. Why is the game problem so complex?
2. What should the role of the military be in anti-gang strategy?

Key Terms

Area of Operations (AO): Geographic boundaries for operational activity.

Internal Security operations (IS): Operations conducted in an environment less defined than that of war, aimed at quelling any internal civil unrest which poses a threat to the stability within a country, and is normally in support of the civil power.

Joint Police Military Operations: Operations conducted jointly by the JDF and the JCF, where the role of the JDF is to make the environment permissible for the police to

carry out law enforcement activities. All deployments conducted require the presence of the police in order to make the operation lawful. In a state of emergency, the JDF may deploy without the police but this is not traditionally done even in such a state of emergency. On all operations the police are the lead and are supported by the JDF.

Political Garrison: “The most vulgar and dysfunctional manifestation of the process of political tribalism has been the development of ‘the garrison’ within constituencies.”²⁶ These have evolved from the same process of partisan scarce benefit distribution. At one level a garrison community can be described as one in which anyone who seeks to oppose, raise opposition to, or organize against the dominant political party would definitely be in danger of suffering serious damage to their possessions or person thus making continued residence in the area extremely difficult if not impossible. A garrison, as the name suggests, is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by a political party. Any significant social, political, economic or cultural development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit approval of the leadership (whether local or national) of the dominant party or its proxy, normally a gang and its leader.²⁷

State of Emergency: The State of Emergency allows the security forces to restrict the carrying of firearms or other weapons; impose curfews and require persons to stay indoors, unless given permission to do otherwise; search premises or vehicles, where

²⁶Hon. Justice James Kerr, “Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism,” Government of Jamaica, 23 July 1997, 5.

²⁷Figuerola and Sives, 65.

persons are suspected or are likely to endanger public safety or where the vehicle is suspected of being used in a manner prejudicial to public safety.

The State of Emergency also allows the arrest and detention of persons whose behavior gives reasonable grounds for suspecting that they are acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety or have committed an offense. Such persons can be detained up to a period not exceeding 24 hours, and power to detain for a further five days on the authority of a Resident Magistrate or a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent.²⁸

Clear up Rate: A term used by the JCF meaning that someone was at least identified as a critical suspect in a case although there might have been no conviction.²⁹

Limitations

This paper is restricted to discussing the security related efforts in addressing the problem of gang violence. The study will not recommend government policy nor critique social intervention strategies, rather; it will recommend approaches that may become an instrument in policy formulation. The recommended approaches will focus on military/security issues and the expansion of the of the military's role in security.

Another limitation of this study stems from the difficulty in accessing military plans or orders for those countries which use their military to conduct internal or

²⁸Jamaica Observer Website, "State of Emergency Laws," www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/State-of-Emergency-laws-explained#ixzz27b8oxlta (accessed 13 December 2012).

²⁹Jamaica Observer Website, "Police Woo Retired Detectives," www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/78578_Police-woo-retired-detectives#ixzz2BCC6ek5V (accessed 3 November 2012).

homeland security. Military units doing counter-gang operations do not publicize their exact strategy. Very little information is available beyond the actual after action report of the operations. Details of the strategy, staff, supporting headquarters, system of planning and the exact resources was limited.

Significance of this Study

This study is expected to raise awareness of how much of Jamaica's economic growth potential is sacrificed by gang violence. It is expected to give tactical commanders a better understanding of the threat posed by gangs and provide some additional tools. The study will ultimately provide best practices that may inform strategy and perhaps influence policy and doctrine.

Having a high murder rate retards human development and the economic growth of a country or region. Jamaica's high murder rate places the country among the most unsafe places in the world. The annual number of violent deaths in the country fits the traditional definition of a conflict zone.³⁰ The United Nations (UN) recognizes a conflict zone as an area where there is armed conflict resulting in over 1,000 deaths per year.³¹ Jamaica has surpassed this every year since 2004. In effect, it may be inferred that Jamaica has experienced armed conflict for almost a decade. The McMillan Commission

³⁰Tara Cooper, Sebastian Merz, and Mila Shah, "A More Violent World? Global Trends in Organized Violence," http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/cooper_etal_handbook.pdf (accessed 13 December 2012).

³¹Wordpress.com, "Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)," <http://uppsalaconflictdataprogram.wordpress.com/ucdp-links/> (accessed 13 December 2012).

of 2006 noted that Jamaica's murder rate of 60/100,000 was greater than the war torn countries of Iraq and Afghanistan.³²

A World Bank study in 2003 done by Professor Alfred Francis showed that the annual economic cost of crime to Jamaica was over 3.7 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or \$12.4 billion Jamaican in 2001. Another World Bank study done in 2007, using cross-country regression analysis to assess some long-term costs, estimated that if Jamaica reduced its murder rate to 8.1/100,000, then the country would grow by an additional 5.8 percent per year. Compounded, it means that Jamaica's economy would double in 12 years.³³

Gang Impact on Potential GDP Growth




Figure 4. Gang Impact on Potential GDP Growth
Source: Created by author.

³²Standing Committee on National Security, 5.

³³Ibid., 8.

The diagram shows Jamaica's murder rate per 100,000 persons and the relationship to annual real GDP growth. The curve depicts that there is a negative relationship between the murder rate and the country's annual real GDP growth. When the murder rate is at 60/100,000 the real GDP growth rate is Y_1 . If the murder rate is reduced to 8.1/100,000 then the expected outcome is Y_2 an improvement in the real GDP. Therefore, $Y_1 - Y_2$ represents the growth potential of Jamaica and equals 5.8 percent of real GDP growth in one year; according to the World Bank. Using the percentage of gang related murders, which is 59.1 percent of total murders in 2007; Y_3 represents the 35/100,000 murder rate of the national rate 60/100,000. Therefore, $Y_3 - Y_2$ is the growth potential being sacrificed to the gang phenomenon. The exact values would be instructive but the idea should be sufficiently conveyed by $Y_3 - Y_2$ gap which attributes unrealized economic growth by gangs.

This study will provide insights for government policy and future direction. Overall, the study will highlight the successful strategies and lessons learned from the countries, allowing the incorporation of relevant lessons into the planning and execution of internal security operations by the Jamaica military and police force. These approaches may further strengthen policy support at the national level, allow government to better identify working strategies, and to allocate resources accordingly.

This study is intended to benefit members of the security forces in Jamaica, especially the military community. It will act as a framework for defining and describing gangs within the complex operational and political environment within Areas of Operation (AO). The work will also present tactical and operational approaches that may

be leveraged in the fight against gangs. Finally, it should enhance the understanding of operational commanders in regard to gangs that operate in their AO.

Initial Understanding of the Gang

There is no one universally accepted definition for a gang. None of the varied definitions captures the true character of every movement, or every group or gathering. The term gang is often used broadly to cover a variety of groups including youth gangs, street gangs, racist groups, biker gangs, and other type of organizations such as drug cartels and Organized Crime Groups (OCGs). One useful definition for this study is criteria based and it defines a gang as:

A self-formed association of peers, bound together by mutual interests, with identifiable leadership, well developed line of authority, and other organizational features, who act in concert to achieve a specific purpose or purposes, which generally include the conduct of illegal activity and control over a particular territory, facility, or type of enterprise.³⁴

This definition does not capture some of the movements that are described as gangs. Some movements may not exhibit strong leadership and organizational features, and may not even control territory. It allows the comparison of like groups, such as youth gangs and street gangs. The definition can also facilitate the description of two extreme opposite cases. At the two extremes of the definition are OCGs and criminal gangs. OCGs can be identified as drug cartels and other armed non-state actors like militias and terrorist groups. Criminal gangs are viewed as social movements in the form of local gangs, youth gangs and juvenile delinquents. In between these two extremes are other gangs of varied forms, composition and motivation.

³⁴Walter Miller, quoted in Lamm-Weiss, *Contemporary Gangs: An Organizational Analysis* (El Paso, TX: Scholarly Publishers, 2002), 35.

Walter Miller is a Professor of Anthropology at Harvard and MIT. From an academic perspective, his definition is adequate since it allows for the incorporation of various forms of gangs, but it may be problematic for law enforcement and policy makers, since it would be left to them to classify gangs within this definition. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created five gang definitions for the various forms of gangs it operates against. These gangs are; “street gangs,” “prison gangs,” “outlaw motorcycle gangs,” “one-percenter outlaw motor cycle gangs,” and “neighborhood gangs.” The definitions of these gangs are limited and fall short of describing OCGs. Even if the FBI recognized OCGs to be gangs, it has not officially described them as such and this may be so because it is not their policy deal with OCGs. The groups identified by the FBI may be viewed in the context of Frederic Thrasher’s (1927) definition where he described gangs as:

An interstitial group, originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict and planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, *esprit de corps*, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to local territory.³⁵

Contrary to the view of the FBI, there is criminal neutrality in Thrasher's definition which would suggest that he did not make an automatic link between gangs and criminality. If there are non-criminal gangs within a state, such groups may not merit much attention by law enforcement and security policy makers.

There is an obvious dilemma created by trying to use one definition for all types of gangs. Some policy makers and law enforcement agencies overcome this challenge by

³⁵Todd Negola, quoted in Jodi Vittori, “The Gangs All Here: Globalization of Gang Activity,” *The Journal of Gang Research* 14, no. 3 (2006): 4.

over simplifying the definition of a gang. However, conflating gang types undermines the effectiveness of the state's response to reduce gang violence.³⁶ On the other hand, some policy makers define gangs differently to suit agenda, but such proclivity toward equivocation is one of the causes for not being able to arrive at one acceptable definition for a gang.³⁷

Since the definition of gangs is so problematic, it is perhaps a more useful method if the definition of a gang is based on its latent characteristics. The characteristics will include sociological, economic and geographical variables. The diagram below represents the variables that may be used to define the characteristics of a gang or the general characteristics or typology of a given country's gang phenomenon.

³⁶Leslie, 3.

³⁷Michel Amiot and Raymond E. Foster, "Three-Year Anti-gang Strategic Plan 2011," Jamaica Constabulary Force, 4 November 2011, 7; Leslie, 14.



Figure 5. Anthropology of Jamaican Gangs

Source: Created by author. The diagram is the author's impression of the main characteristics that are widely written about and forms the core defining individual gang typology.

The diagram shows that gangs embed themselves into a given community. This could be a geographical space for local or street gangs and an ideological space for armed non-state actors like terrorist organizations. This depiction is useful to help the process of at least defining the characteristics of the gang and the gang phenomenon in question. So even though it is hard to agree on an academic definition of gang, this tool will supplement the heuristics of practitioners.

In using this method to define gangs, facts pertaining to each variable may differ from one gang to the next. Understanding the context of each variable as shown in figure

5 is important to describe the gang or gang typology in question and for the remainder of the research.

Conclusion

It is evident that gangs in Jamaica have generated violence. Their history and apparent ties to the political parties give them protection at various levels. They have thus risen to supplement and even replace state institutions and control territory especially in the political garrisons. Some gangs have also grown independent of politicians and have become powerful transnational drug trafficking organizations. As gangs flourish, they further undermine the security of State and the peace within a community. The institutionalized gangs continue to sponsor violence. The problems presented by gangs have not been addressed so far with a discernible and unified anti-gang strategy in Jamaica.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The definition of gangs in academia and homeland security studies has varied over time and continues to include the fact that gangs are a youth phenomenon at one extreme or an organized crime group at the other. A number of the sources focused their discussion on Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) operating within Latin America and the Caribbean. Media coverage arising from the barbaric methods employed by DTOs, especially the drug cartels, tend to overshadow the problem of the other localized community based gangs. Therefore, there is a large amount of recent literature on organized gangs rather than on youth and neighborhood type gangs. Traditional studies on gangs highlight neighborhood gangs as the base of gang research.

The literature was explored to find acceptable definitions and classification of gangs, useful disaggregation of the gang phenomenon to identify the reason why the gang problem is so complex, and examples of how some countries used their military in anti-gang strategy. Ultimately the literature provides enough data to answer the primary research question and the two secondary questions.

The sources of literature examined were government documents, reports by international organizations, media publications, and specific statistical and country data which included essays, studies, journals, books, newspaper and military doctrine.

Question: Why is the Gang Problem so Complex?

Various Definitions and Themes of the Gang Phenomenon

John Hagedorn, a noted youth gang specialist, defines gangs as mainly a youth phenomenon.³⁸ He believes that the gang phenomenon is worldwide and it is the voice of millions of members marginalized by the process of globalization. It was observed in the context of the explosion of urbanization, globalization and the retreat of the state, the loss of social control and identity crisis, the underground economy, and the institutionalization of gangs. The conclusion he drew was that policy makers should treat gangs as a social movement and recognize that especially institutionalized gangs are unlikely either to gradually die out or be eliminated by force. He submits that repression should not be the only solution; a relation may exist in policies that humanize the marginalized peoples from which these gangs spring. Hagedorn declared that government should bring gangs and the underclass into the polity or run the risk of living in a permanent fortress society.³⁹ He refused to strictly equate gangs to terrorism and insurgencies, but agrees that Al Qaeda is like gangs in the U.S. or other social protest movements throughout the world.⁴⁰

Max Manwaring is a Professor of Military Strategy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a contemporary gang scholar. He identified the development of gangs through stages which he called generations, debunking

³⁸John Hagedorn, "Global Impact of Gangs," *University of Illinois Chicago, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 21, no. 2 (2005): 156-158.

³⁹John Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gansta Culture* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2008), xxxi.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 24.

thrashers emphasis on natural forming groups attached to terrain. According to Manwaring, gangs range from first to third generation. The first generation or traditional street gangs are primarily turf-oriented. Second generation gangs have a more centralized leadership and its members tend to focus on drug trafficking and market protection. Third generation gangs continue first and second generation actions as they expand their geographical parameters, as well as their commercial and political objectives. They develop into more seasoned organizations with broader drug related markets, as well as very sophisticated transnational criminal organizations with ambitious political and economic agendas. In this vein, they inevitably begin to control ungoverned territory within a nation-state and/or begin to acquire political power in poorly governed space.⁴¹ The author also lamented the weakening of the state as a facilitator for the growth of gangs. The author also addressed the importance of socio-economic factors. He recommended to strategic leaders that in their search for solutions, two important strategic level imperatives must be considered: first, the unity of effort among multiple agencies; and secondly, that military leader development facilitate civil military relations required for performing internal security operations.⁴²

The UN Development Program, *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*, Chapter three, titled “Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence,” described the scope and nature of the gang problem. It addressed the causes and did an assessment of some of the strategies pursued by the respective States in the

⁴¹Max Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Insurgency” (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2005), 9-12.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 35-40.

Caribbean. The report established that street gangs and OCGs have become increasingly perceived as major problems which undermine civil development in many regions. The report defined both gang types as being at the two extremes of the gang continuum with many combinations in between the two. Differentiation between the groups was established based on the level of organization, motive and age cohort. The reasons given for youth joining gangs were community cohesion and social cohesion issues as well as certain risk factors. The risk factors were traditional socio-economic conditions like they:

(1) have parents with attitudes that favor antisocial behavior, (2) live in neighborhoods that are characterized by high mobility, (3) live in neighborhoods in which handguns are widely available, (4) have been involved in antisocial behavior from an early age, (5) have the intention to use drugs, (6) have antisocial peers, and (7) have peers who use drugs.⁴³

The report holds the relationship between these variables and the gang problem as anecdotal, as there is no significant empirical study in the Caribbean establishing a statistical link. The study lamented the dearth of research done on the gang problem and the danger of oversimplification in the classification of gangs as either “out-and-out criminal groups or innocent youth clubs.”⁴⁴ The report stated that the effects of the gang problem are being understated by government statistics. It also highlighted the main strategy of suppression being used by Caribbean governments to deal with the gang problem. Suppression is seen as a useful tool if properly used but it cannot prevent individuals from joining street gangs and organized crime groups. Five broad approaches to addressing the gang problem were identified: (1) suppression; (2) the provision of

⁴³United Nations Development Program, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to better Citizen Security,” New York, NY, 2012.

⁴⁴Ibid., 68.

academic, economic and social opportunities; (3) social intervention; (4) community mobilization; and (5) organizational change and development. The report demonstrated that Caribbean governments have not come to understand and correctly report on the gang phenomenon. It addressed the danger in misdefining gangs since definitions have a profound impact on the choice of solutions which are employed.

There were attempts to bring the definition and the classifications of gangs closer to an acceptable middle ground.⁴⁵ The effort was skewed by the new thrust in likening the gang phenomenon to insurgencies and terrorism. Manwaring compared gangs and other Transnational Crime Organizations (TCO) to insurgencies and concluded that they are all similar by the effects that they create. Gangs and their various allies take national territory in what he calls, *coup de streets*, similar to insurgent groups taking control of territory.⁴⁶ Even though he concentrated on the effects, he did compare their motives and concluded that the specific motive is irrelevant, since the putative objective is to neutralize, control or depose governments to ensure self-determined (non-democratic) ends.⁴⁷ It raised the question of when does this cease to be purely a law enforcement matter and requires military intervention? Michael Boulton's writing in the *Global Journal on Crime and Criminal Law* stated that gangs, OCGs and DTOs have blended

⁴⁵Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gansta Culture*.

⁴⁶Max Manwaring, "Gangs, 'Coups D' Streets, and the New War in Central America" (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2005), 2.

⁴⁷Max Manwaring, "Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil" (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007), 2.

criminality with tactics generally associated with terrorism and warfare. He also concludes that crime groups' motives differ from traditional insurgents but their objective is the same, which is to impose their power and undermine the operational capacity and authority of legitimate state actors.⁴⁸ John Hagedorn refutes the stereotypical link which extends the definition of gangs to linking them to insurgent terrorist type groups. He believes that U.S. federally funded studies will continue to make the insurgent terrorist link while more independent studies will continue to stress local conditions. He believes a more realistic and productive future for gang research should combine sociological and anthropological orientations with urban political economy. Gangs he contends "cannot be understood outside its global context, nor reduced to epiphenomenon of globalization or cogs in an international terrorism conspiracy."⁴⁹

The anthropology literature on gangs, especially in urban spaces, sought to explain the social conditions, that are conducive to the creation of gangs. Jodi Vitorri and Max Manwaring jointly covered the reasons why gangs are attractive to new recruits; poverty, hopelessness, injustice, broken families and rapid urbanization were the most significant reasons.⁵⁰ Vittori, from the University of Denver, conducted statistical analyses on predominant sociological factors which could predict the probability and intensity of gang activity in a country. The variables she used were:

⁴⁸Michael Boulton, "Living in a World of Violence: An Introduction to the Gang Phenomenon," *Global Journal on Crime and Criminal Law* 16, no. 2 (2011): 11.

⁴⁹Hagedorn, "Global Impact of Gangs," 163.

⁵⁰Jodi Vittori, "The Gangs All Here: Globalization of Gang Activity," *The Journal of Gang Research* (2006): 11.

(1) US department of Homeland Security criminal deportations: numbers to the target countries. (2) States with high incidence of drug use or who are transit points for drug smuggling (3) States with large population of the primary cohort: adolescent and young adult males (4) States with high poverty rates (5) States with a high number of their population in jail or have criminal records (6) States with large school drop-out rates (7) States with high levels of mother led households (8) States with large urban areas.⁵¹

The data identified 13 critical states for gang activity; eight of which are in the Americas and the Caribbean. The critical states in the region were; Mexico, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. This method is unorthodox because instead of looking at countries with reported gang problems and working backwards to identify the possible factors that caused it, the study looked at countries displaying the fundamental factors known to facilitate gangs; and then by establishing a ranking, the author could identify the vulnerable countries.

Vittori, in the *The Journal of Gang Research 2006*, addresses the evolution of gangs into transnational crime organizations. She identified globalization as the driving force for evolving gangs to a transnational nature. Hagedorn credited globalization for refining the transnational nature of highly organized gangs. Maxwaring saw these gangs as a precursor to the systematic erosion of the state and its institutions.⁵² This global perspective is identified within the context of gangs becoming more than a local phenomenon or a local problem, but a global enterprise.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center (WHEMSAC), wrote about the law enforcement lessons learned in the Latin American and Caribbean region. He addressed overarching operational and tactical principles which

⁵¹Vittori, 11.

⁵²Hagedorn, "Global Impact of Gangs," 154-155.

can guide counter-gang activities. The strategic solution is to retake territory and while doing so, not to alienate the population. He also recommended that operations to take back territory should not further empower the gang members by traditional telegraphing of upcoming operational and tactical maneuvers.⁵³ His assertions blur the line between law enforcement and war fighting, as he, like Manwaring, uses the principles of counter insurgencies to guide the fight against gangs. His recommendations resembled the principles of war integrated into the law enforcement context, which is to reassure, serve and protect. The inference of Brown is that the gang problem is not purely a law enforcement issue nor purely a military defense issue.

Is the Jamaica Gang Phenomenon Complex?

Indeed the government struggles to contain gangs that, along with their various allies, appear better armed, better resourced, and more effective. Remarkably, however, understanding of gang characteristics and dynamics remains comparatively limited.⁵⁴

The Jamaican gang phenomenon is best described by examining the political antecedents. Other variables which will help to describe Jamaica's gang phenomenon are: the types of gangs which have been identified (typology), the structure and disposition of gangs, their leadership, the motivation for membership, their activities, their resources, their links with the drug trade and international connectedness, the impact of U.S. deportation, the level of violence they generate and the pervasiveness of gangs in society.

⁵³V. Felbab-Brown, "Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons From Latin America," Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, University of Concepcion, Concepcion, Chile, September 2011.

⁵⁴Leslie, 2.

Anthony Harriott, Amanda Sive and Mark Figueroa, and Leslie all address the history and nature of Jamaican gangs. The Jamaican gangs trace their roots back to the 1940s at the formation of the country's two most institutionalized political parties, the PNP and the Jamaica Labor Party.⁵⁵ Over time these gangs, along with the political parties, created political enclaves where the gangs rival the state especially as law enforcement and managers of social programs. This was the beginning of 20 years of violent politically controlled public housing divisions that became labeled as "political garrisons."⁵⁶ The gang boss, normally called the "Don," is the middleman between the people and the government. In some cases, the gang infrastructure replaces the state, not by force, but by ascension. The gangs in Jamaica have also resisted the government trying to take back those communities by undermining the success of government institutions seeking to replace their authority.

To illustrate the longstanding nexus between political parties and gang violence in Jamaica, two events separated by 50 years are revisited. In the run up to the 1944 elections in Jamaica, the JLP was accused of preventing the younger break away party, the PNP from holding any political meetings. The PNP responded by forming its own protection groups. The most notable and eventually battle hardened was "Group 69" from Matthews Lane in West Kingston. They apparently fought the so called "Bustamante thugs" with distinction on the streets of the corporate area during the labor riots of 1947, earning them the name "Fighting 69." They also participated in the Gordon Town

⁵⁵Figueroa and Sives, 66

⁵⁶Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 53; Leslie, 12.

violence in the 1949 election campaign. This incident was the catalyst for the Hearne Commission appointed by the Governor to investigate political violence in Jamaica.⁵⁷

Fifty years later, in 1999, the PNP government faced opposition led by mass riots across the country over an anticipated increase in gas prices. Pro-government organized gang members attacked and cleared some demonstrators from the streets in downtown Kingston. The gang was known as the “spanglers gang.” The gang came from the same Matthews Lane, where “Gang 69” originated.

In the last decade political parties and individual politicians have been reprimanded in the court of public opinion for attending the funerals of notable gang leaders; giving lucrative government contracts to the gang leaders and providing a buffer against justice when they are called upon to answer for various crimes.⁵⁸ According to Antony Harriott, the development of the political garrison and nationalized garrison politics is the albatross of the Westminster style democracy practiced in Jamaica. The gangs have become the major beneficiaries at the expense of the people in a seemingly democratic state.⁵⁹

Anthony Harriott, in the 2003 book, *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, in the editor's overview of "elite-mass criminality in electoral fraud," raises the issue of the political parties being criminal organizations.

They are, of course, not criminal organizations in the same sense as organized-crime networks, that is, their *raison d'être* is not criminal engagement. On the contrary, their primary objective is to form the government of the country,

⁵⁷Sives and Figueroa, 51.

⁵⁸Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 53.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 130.

and both major political parties have a record of developmental achievements. Nevertheless, they resort to criminal means of gaining office, and the alliances with criminals that are used for this purpose, give criminal networks considerable leverage on the parties, and lead to the use of criminal means to systematically plunder the resources of the state once office is acquired. These activities of the political elite have profound implications for ordinary criminality, especially the normalization of crime, which is reflected in the view that criminality has become conformist behavior.⁶⁰

The Ministry of National Security (MNS) in Jamaica defined a gang as a formal or informal group, association or organization consisting of three or more persons who conduct various types of activities some of which are not criminal. Therefore, the MNS considers groups who are not criminally involved as gangs. The Small Arms Survey, studying various authors and sources described six typologies used to describe Jamaican gangs. They are:

Typology 1

These gangs are differentiated and classified by: (1) the degree of threat that they pose; (2) the longevity of the gang; and (3) its ability to proliferate. Three gang types were identified by this method. Therefore, a gang with an identifiable leadership, a formal hierarchy, assigned roles, specific-territory, activities that increase cohesiveness and formalized rituals is called a Highly Organized Gang (HOG). A gang with no identifiable leadership or consistent leader; little cohesive activities; no clear hierarchical or specified roles is called a Loosely Organized Gang (LOG). A gang which has high levels of cohesion and at least two other characteristics of a HOG is defined as a Moderately Organized Gang (MOG) and falls between the HOG and the LOG.

⁶⁰Harriott, *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*.

Typology 2

This typology separates highly OCGs like the “Yardies” and the “Shower Posse” from Youth Gangs like the “Jungle Trails Gang” in August Town, Jamaica. Youth Gangs are defined as small, local and loosely organized groups, in which intangibles such as turf and respect are more important. The OCGs are viewed as being heavily involved in international drug trafficking. They actively seek to corrupt public institutions, attempt to establish exclusive hegemony in communities where they operate, and have an entrepreneurial intent.

Typology 3

This typology separates the Area Gangs from Corner Gangs. Area Gangs are said to dominate entire communities. They are well established and rooted in political patronage and political violence which form the historical context of gangs in Jamaica. The Corner Gangs are more informal groups of youth drifting together by virtue of living in the same community. They may not be politically connected or perform political violence but the neighborhood they are from may be controlled by an Area Gang.

Typology 4

In this typology, the gangs are distinguished as first generation, second generation or third generation. The first-generation, or traditional, street gangs are primarily turf-oriented. They have loose and unsophisticated leadership that focuses on turf protection to gain petty cash and on gang loyalty within their immediate environs. This generation is organized for business and commercial gain. Second generation gangs have a more centralized leadership that tends to focus on drug trafficking and market protection. At

the same time, they operate in a broader spatial or geographic area that may include neighboring towns and possibly countries. Second-generation gangs use violence necessary to protect their markets and as political interference to undermine enforcement efforts directed against them by police and other security organizations. In doing this they incapacitate state security institutions and begin to dominate vulnerable community life within large areas of the nation-state. In this environment, second-generation gangs almost have to link with and provide mercenary services to TCOs and insurgents. Third generation gangs inevitably begin to take over territory within a nation state and begin to acquire political power in poorly governed space. This political action is intended to provide security and freedom of movement and freedom of action for gang activities. As a consequence, the third-generation gang and its leadership challenge the legitimate state monopoly on the exercise of political and social control and the use of violence within a given geographical area. Here, gang objectives are possibly to neutralize, control, depose, or replace an incumbent government; control parts of a targeted country or sub-regions within a country in order to create autonomous enclaves that are sometimes called criminal free-states or para states. They radically change the authoritative allocation of values in the society to those of the criminal leaders.

Typology 5

The distinction between Criminal Gangs and Community Gangs in this typology is as important as the individual definitions. It highlights the fluidity of most gangs that are rooted in various communities. Both gangs exist in the same place but when differences arise between communities over political issues, competition for land or issues of honor or disrespect then everyone comes to the defense of the community.

Some, who take part, may not be a member of the gang but they feel they have no choice, by virtue of living in that community. Community Gangs organize themselves to protect the community while Criminal Gangs organize themselves to profit from their endeavors. The fifth typology represents situational gangs that have a fluid character by virtue of the membership. The gang comes together from need and some of the participants do not view themselves as gang members.

The conclusion drawn by Leslie is that First Generation Gangs resemble Community Gangs, Corner Gangs, Youth Gangs, and LOGs, while Second Generation Gangs and Third Generation Gangs look like Criminal Gangs, OCG, Area Gangs and HOG. Two clear types are obvious when typologizing Jamaican gangs; one is community focused and the other is crime focused. The Community Gang is centered in a defined neighborhood, with loose organization, flat leadership structure, and though not free of criminal intent is not organized to profit from crime. The next gang type is the OCG which will be labeled as OCG. This gang controls large areas, it is internationally connected, have a highly organized division of labor, rigid leadership structure and is generally organized to profit from crime. Therefore, this study will use these two definitions for Jamaican gangs: Community Gang and Organized Crime Gang.

The prevalence and distribution of the Jamaican gangs are not exactly known, but Leslie estimated prevalence and spread of the gangs may be inference from crime statistics and academic research. There are 268 active gangs in Jamaica, a five-fold increase in the prevalence when compared to the 49 active gangs in 1998.⁶¹ Most academic estimates put gang membership to between 10,000 and 20,000. The

⁶¹Leslie.

Government of Jamaica estimates that there are approximately 3,900 gang members across the country. This disparity is the result of a general lack of knowledge about gangs. The current Police Commissioner, Owen Ellington, said that 60 percent of the gangs in Jamaica are operating in the capital city of Kingston.

Table 1. Murder Motive Reported and Cleared Up for 2008

Murder Motive Reported and Cleared Up by Divisions														
For Period 2008/01/01 to 2008/12/14														
	Murder	Motives												
		Domestic		Drug Related		Gang Related		Other Criminal Act		Not Yet Established		Total		
Divisions	Amt.	Rep	C/Up	Rep	C/Up	Rep	C/Up	Rep	C/Up	Rep	C/Up	Rep	C/Up	%C/Up
Kingston Central	69	3	0	0	0	36	7	24	7	6	0	69	14	20%
Kingston Eastern	59	2	1	0	0	22	4	25	13	10	0	59	18	31%
Kingston Western	51	0	0	0	0	30	5	9	5	12	0	51	10	20%
St. Andrew Central	135	3	3	1	0	65	6	51	14	15	0	135	23	17%
St. Andrew North	90	7	3	4	0	35	14	30	8	14	0	90	25	28%
St. Andrew South	215	1	0	3	0	144	27	47	20	20	0	215	47	22%
St. Catherine North	178	8	3	1	0	79	9	83	23	7	0	178	35	20%
St. Catherine South	111	4	3	0	0	52	5	52	9	3	0	111	17	15%
Sub Total Metro	908	28	13	9	0	463	77	321	99	87	0	908	189	21%
St. James	206	6	6	0	0	91	7	99	18	10	0	206	31	15%
Trelawny	29	3	2	0	0	6	1	12	10	8	0	29	13	45%
Westmoreland	49	1	0	1	0	8	4	32	7	7	0	49	11	22%
Hanover	31	2	1	0	0	3	0	20	7	6	0	31	8	26%
St. Mary	28	2	2	2	0	4	0	16	9	4	0	28	11	39%
St. Ann	27	3	3	0	0	4	0	20	8	0	0	27	11	41%
Portland	10	2	2	0	0	1	0	6	1	1	0	10	3	30%
Manchester	51	4	4	0	0	6	1	35	11	6	0	51	16	31%
Clarendon	158	4	3	2	0	90	6	53	15	9	0	158	24	15%
St. Elizabeth	20	1	0	2	0	3	0	11	6	3	0	20	6	30%
St. Thomas	40	2	0	0	0	10	1	22	9	6	0	40	10	25%
Sub Total Rural	649	30	23	7	0	226	20	326	101	60	0	649	144	22%
Grand Total	1557	58	36	16	0	689	97	647	200	147	0	1557	333	21%

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), “Crime Review Period January 2008 to December 2008,” JCF Statistics Department, Kingston, Jamaica, 2012. The table shows murders in 2008 by Police Divisions according to motive.

The JCF Statistic Department, shows a preponderance of gang violence in two major cities; Kingston (combining the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew) and Montego Bay (in the parish of St. James); and two other parishes, St. Catherine and

Clarendon. Out of all 13 parishes, the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew, St. Catherine, St. James and Clarendon account for 93.47 percent of gang related murders.⁶²

Gang members were young men ages 12 to 30, but older men remain loosely connected to especially the Community Gangs. Young men in Jamaica apparently gravitate to gangs since they have become social institutions and provide welfare and social services in socially excluded communities.⁶³ This age cohort also experiences high unemployment and high exposure to crime making them easy recruits for gangs (see appendix A).

Anthony Harriott, Professor of Criminology at the University of the West Indies, described the gang leader or the “Don” in the community as the main benefactor of the community. This position is secured by delivering various welfare and social services, like buying school books and school uniforms, organizing senior citizen and family fun days, providing food, employment and criminal justice. The “Don” is normally linked to politics or drugs; sometimes both. They have even negotiated peace treaties between warring communities.⁶⁴ Many “Dons” are either feared or revered in their communities and this is how control is exercised over the people. The “Dons” have tight control of some communities and can in fact affect the outcome of government strategies to bring back those communities under the control of formal governance.

⁶²Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), “Crime Review Period January 2008 to December 2008,” JCF Statistics Department, Kingston, Jamaica, 2012, 1.

⁶³Leslie, 64.

⁶⁴Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 12-26.

The motivations for membership in the gangs vary widely. The general reasons identified by researchers are: personal protection, the garrison culture of protecting the community when it is at war, a desire for respect, the need for socialization, and typical socio-economic factors. The socio-economic factors include poverty, widespread unemployment and absence of educational opportunities, lack of community support and counseling, pop culture which glorifies violence and early and persistent exposure to environments with prevalent gang activity.⁶⁵

Harriott addressed organized crime gangs showing that they are well resourced with human capital and in some cases significant financial capital.⁶⁶ The Jamaican gangs do not find it difficult to attract recruits from what seems to be an abundant human resource pool. The transnational and well organized gangs dominate the informal sectors; they establish seemingly legitimate businesses then use violence and coercion, co-option of state actors to unfairly compete with legitimate businesses and further their criminal ends. The community gangs rely on remittances and low level crime for resources, while the criminal gangs use their income to perpetuate their criminal enterprise by corrupting institutions within the country like the police, elements of the state administration and the political parties.⁶⁷

Closely tied to the resources that gangs have is the illicit drugs and arms trade. The drug trade dates back to the 1970s and have grown. OCGs are more involved in the

⁶⁵Michael Mogensen, "Corner and Area Gangs of Inner-City Jamaica," Viva Rio/COAV, 2005, www.helpjamaica.org/downloads/reports/COAV_report.pdf (accessed 13 December 2012).

⁶⁶Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 12-26.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 12-22.

international drug trade as opposed to Community Gangs.⁶⁸ Professor Harriot suggested that the rise in the murder rate in Jamaica coincided with the expansion of drug trafficking, extortion and protection rackets along with the associated gang warfare.⁶⁹ Studies have also shown that the major source of income for feuding gangs is the drug trade, surpassing the role of merchants and politicians who are also involved in arming youths.⁷⁰ An accepted view in Jamaica is that one of the greatest threats to national security and stability as a democratic country today comes from drug trafficking.⁷¹

The impact of deportees on gangs, especially from the U.S., United Kingdom and Canada, is still a hotly debated topic with no general agreement. Between 1996 and 2007 approximately 40,000 persons (most from the U.S.) were deported to Jamaica, making Jamaica the country with the highest ratio of deportees to overall population in the world.⁷² In 2003 the Jamaican police estimated that deportees formed the backbone of approximately one-third of the gangs operating across the country. The *Associated Press* also reported that the large number of deportees from the U.S. could have been directly responsible for a large portion of Jamaica's spike in homicide rates in the preceding five

⁶⁸Leslie, 15.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Leslie, 15.

⁷¹Trevor Leckie, "Enhancing the Jamaica Defense Force Military Intelligence Unit's Effectiveness to Conduct Counter Drug Missions (Master's Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2006), 5.

⁷²Bernard Headley, "Case Study: Criminal Deportations and Jamaica" (University of the West Indies, West Indies, 2008), 3-5.

years.⁷³ However, a study commissioned by the U.S. government in 2004 concluded that a minimal amount of murders can be attributed to deportees.

Leslie addressed the character of gang violence as being varied. Sometimes the violence is community versus community with heavy political undertones. At other times the violence is caused by turf wars, reprisals, intra-gang feuds, crimes for financial gains and attacks on the state and security forces.⁷⁴ He declared that the gangs are the main instigators of violence in Jamaica.

The Caribbean Human Development Report 2012, suggest that the pervasiveness of gangs in Jamaica is positively related to youth crime. A study on school aged youth, showed that gang members compared with non-gang members are; 11 times more likely to be involved in drug sales, seven times more likely to be involved in violence, five times more likely to be involved in property crime and three times more likely to be arrested.⁷⁵ In the “2007 National School Gang Survey,” 70 percent of students indicated that gangs were present in their schools, while 44 percent of the principals admitted that gangs were in their schools. Additionally, 66 percent of students and 30 percent of principals reported that school gangs were related to criminal gangs outside the school.⁷⁶

⁷³Jamaica Gleaner Website, Book Review, “Deported Absolves the US,” <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20051120/arts/arts3.html> (accessed 5 November 2012).

⁷⁴Leslie, 29-32.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., 32.

Is the Brazilian Gang Phenomenon Complex?

Brazilian Armed Forces Retired Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro addressed the history and nature of Brazil's gang problem. Brazil's military government ruled from 1964 to 1985 and successfully suppressed leftist insurgent groups. The insurgency created a doctrine, tactics, techniques and practice of armed resistance in both rural and urban terrain.⁷⁷ These lessons were retained by political prisoners who eventually indoctrinated young men in Brazilian prisons. The young men were not only imbued with the philosophy of Marxism but also with the means of resistance. The publication of the "Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla" in 1969 by leftist revolutionary, Carlos Marighella, is a relevant window into how Brazilian gangs organized to fight.

Between 1969 and 1975 the intermingling of political prisoners, some with guerilla warfare training and some common criminals in the *Candido Mendez* prison resulted in the formation of a criminal organization with political connotations, called the *Falange Vermelha* or the "Red Phalanx." This materialized when released and escaped prisoners went back to the depressed *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro and organized criminal enterprises on the foundation of the doctrine of the urban guerilla. Out of the Red Phalanx came Brazil's first real organized crime syndicate based in Rio; the *Comando Vermelho* (CV) or the "Red Command".⁷⁸

In the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, the *Primeiro Comando Da Capital* (PCC) formed in the prison system to protect the rights of prisoners. It allied itself to CV. From

⁷⁷A. S. Pinheiro, Report 09-08, *Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight against Criminal Urban Guerillas* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, September 2009).

⁷⁸Pinheiro, 2-16.

prison, the PCC became the most powerful crime organization in Brazil and runs a network of extortion, kidnapping and drug trafficking. In addition to the 140,000 prisoners inside São Paulo state prisons, about half a million Brazilians support the PCC, serving as informants, lawyers, drug dealers, and the like.⁷⁹

The gangs of Brazil are rooted in the political struggles of the cold war. Even though they have transformed to more criminal enterprises they have signaled their intention to have a foray into politics by direct involvement or by creating political issues around prisoner rights. The most notable feature of the gangs is that they are capable of organizing spontaneous protest across the penal system and to execute coordinated armed attacks on the state institutions and infrastructure. This was demonstrated by the PCC in 2001 prison riots, 2002 bomb attacks on public buildings, and the two-day assault on the state and police in Sao Paulo in May 2006.⁸⁰

Pinheiro and Dominguez addressed the significance of the drug trade to the gangs. The gangs have taken control of the drug trade in Brazil and CV, ADA and TCP negotiate the dealing of about 1,320 kg of refined cocaine in the local market.⁸¹ The local drug retail business is larger than transshipment in Brazil. Most of the drugs which find its way into Brazil are consumed locally.⁸² There is great dispersion from retail activity.

⁷⁹Samuel Logan Website, "Security, Politics and Energy in Latin America," <http://www.samuellogan.com/articles/brazils-pcc-true-power-behind-the-violence.html> (accessed 5 November 2012).

⁸⁰Pinheiro, 3.

⁸¹Ibid., 18.

⁸²Manuel J. Dominguez, "The Institutionalization of Drug Trafficking Organizations: Comparing Colombia and Brazil" (Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010), 16.

Brazil's homicide rate is not statistically linked to its gangs, but was framed by the literature to be a consequence of the *favelas* which is home to gang activity. Joarez Alves Pereira Junior, a Fellow at the U.S. Army War College, believes the murder rate is directly related to the slow and inefficient justice system, the drug trade and other socio-economic factors. Some of the murders are blamed on entrepreneurial police and other security agents of the state, who form vigilante militias, conducting similar acts as the gangs they operate against in their daily jobs.⁸³

To illustrate this point, Perreira addressed youth involvement in gang activity. In 1995, 75.64 percent of the deaths of males, 15 to 19 years were violent. The concern is that those young people involved in criminal acts are not in the job market and are usually out of the educational system. For them, illicit revenue creates the false premise of easy money and makes it unlikely that they will ever return to (or live long enough for) legality and a normal life.⁸⁴ While there is a lack of concrete statistics, an estimation model of DTO recruitment showed incoming DTO recruits are mainly youths (age 12-17) from the *favelas*. In 2008, a sampling of 325 incarcerated youth, age 12 to 17, in Brazil showed that 44 percent of males and 53 percent of females had been involved in the drug trade in some way.⁸⁵ Possession of major weapons accounts for 68 percent of the murders in Brazil.

⁸³Joarez Alves Pereira Jr., "Violence in Brazil and its Connection with Transnational Crime" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2003), 6-12.

⁸⁴Pereira, 8.

⁸⁵Dominguez, 47.

The gangs are a powerful social force in Brazil. While the state loses touch with the *favelas* the criminal gangs get the support of the people. This support came naturally in places where people feel excluded from the process of development which seem to benefit politicians and corrupt officials.⁸⁶ The *Donos* presents an alternative for the delivery of leadership, social services and patronage. The *Donos* are leaders of local gangs that are mainly in control of drug distribution in a *favela*.⁸⁷

Gang participation and influence in political matters is present but is not a national problem at this stage. The Legislative Committee of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking (*Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito do Narco-tráfico*) (CPI), established by the National Congress in 2000, proved the involvement of politicians, judges, policemen, lawyers and various entrepreneurs with organized gangs, particularly in the states of Acre, Maranhão, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The CPI implicated 824 people for supposedly being involved with the crimes of drug trafficking, robbery and hijackings, money laundering, fiscal withholding, corruption, unjust enrichment, perjury and forfeiture. Among those are two former-governors, two federal deputies and 15 state deputies.⁸⁸

The Brazilian armed forces, as described by Major Generals Alvaro De Souza Pinheiro, played a significant part in anti-gang operations, where it was employed for a specific role with limited objectives. This provided a brief look at the experience of

⁸⁶Ibid., 50.

⁸⁷Dominguez, 43-53.

⁸⁸Pereira, 31-33.

employing the armed forces in a complex environment with narrow legal framework, but with command and planning responsibility for other security agencies.⁸⁹

Is the Guatemalan Gang Phenomenon Complex?

After three decades of civil war which ended in 1996, Guatemala had to contend with more violence from the actions of DTOs, *Poderes Ocultos* and street gangs.⁹⁰ Hal Brands addressed the complexities that international drug trafficking groups add to Guatemala. He attributes the level of violence to their incorporation into the Guatemalan gang landscape. During the 1980s, Colombian cartels dominated the Guatemalan drug trade, by cooperating with corrupt military officials to move drugs through the country. The *Calí* and *Medellín* cartels were prominent at this time but were dismantled in the early 1990s. The Mexican *Sinaloa* cartel stepped into the void and dominated until 2005. *Los Zetas*, another Mexican DTO began to assert their own claim to the Guatemalan drug trade, directly competing with the *Sinaloa* cartel. These two DTOs went to war. The war extended to the local officials, the people and other gangs in Guatemala. Military style raids and attacks became common place and the cartels used extreme violence such as beheadings as warnings to their rivals and supporters.⁹¹ The DTOs used drug mules, boats and illegal air strips to traffic drugs, incorporating large segments of the population. These large operations required some official protection or assistance and this was

⁸⁹Pinheiro, 27-33.

⁹⁰Hal Brands, "Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State" (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010), 14-28.

⁹¹You Tube, "On the Trail of Guatemala's Drug Gangs," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XKYJ0r2LrM&feature=related> (accessed 13 December 2012).

secured by the corrupting of officials and institutions in Guatemala. Those officials who refused or resisted were often assassinated.

There was a significant influence in the political process from DTOs. In the run-up to the vote, for the 2007 election, for example, seven congressional deputies and dozens of other candidates and their supporters were murdered. The purpose of this bloodshed was to eliminate politicians thought to be hostile to a certain DTO. This was a demonstration to the political class of the price of opposing the drug trade.⁹²

The *Poderes Ocultos* or hidden powers is deeply rooted in the political system in Guatemala. This is normally a network of powerful individuals who hold prominent positions in society, such as businessmen, current and former military officers, politicians, law enforcement officials, and civil servants. These individuals use their positions to carve out shares in the illicit networks of drug trafficking, bribery, protection, kickbacks, diversion of custom duties, illegal contracting, illicit resource extraction, extortion and kidnapping.⁹³

Street gangs are the third element on the gang continuum which began to flourish in the 1990s in Guatemala. It is believed that the street gangs vary in structure and size, but range between the two identified extremes; the *Pandillas* and the *Maras*. *Pandillas* are small unsophisticated gangs, with a flat hierarchical structure. They operate in a single neighborhood and have a few dozen members who are normally young men. *Maras* are larger, more sophisticated groups that can have tens or even thousands of

⁹²New York Time Website, "Drug Gangs Use Violence to Sway Guatemala Vote," www.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/world/americas/04guatemala.html?page_wanted=all (accessed 5 November 2012).

⁹³Brands, 19-23.

members spread across several different countries. They are organized hierarchically, with several national cells, or *clicas*, that report to a centralized gang leadership. The two dominant *Maras* in Guatemala are the *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS 13) and the *Barrio 18* (18th Street) gangs.⁹⁴ The structure of the street gangs in Guatemala is fairly uniformed. MS-13 contains roughly 80 percent of gang members in Guatemala, while 18th Street commands the loyalties of another 15 percent.⁹⁵

The literature on the number of gang members was varied. Brands concluded that the two *Maras* have tens of thousands of members in the U.S., where they were originally formed. UNDOC reported in 2007, that there were an estimated 14,000 gang members in Guatemala. The average gang membership was 32 per gang, indicating that there could be approximately 437 gangs in the country.⁹⁶ The UNDOC and United States Agency for International Development estimates obviously differ. Robert Walker, gang training consultant, estimates that Guatemala has some 100,000 gang members, including MS13 and Barrio18 and is only second in numerical size to Honduras.⁹⁷

While it is generally accepted that more organized gangs are comprised of older men, there is no exclusive age for the three gang types identified in Guatemala. However, the top level leaders in the *Maras* are often experienced criminals in their 30s to 40s, but

⁹⁴Brands, 23-27.

⁹⁵U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment* (Washington, DC: Office of Regional Sustainable Development, April 2006), 6.

⁹⁶UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Crime and Development in Central America* (New York, NY: United Nations, May 2007), 25-38.

⁹⁷Robert Walker, "Mara Salvatrucha - MS-13," Gangs Or Us Website, www.gangsorus.com/background.htm (accessed 5 November 2012).

rank and file members are from a younger age cohort. Most gang members are between 12 and 24 years old, but there are some cases of older members still being active. Overall, 90 percent of all gang members in Guatemala are males.⁹⁸

Brands addressed the general reasons for joining the gangs as being related to socio-economic factors. Most *mareros* join the gangs for various reasons. The most commonly identified reasons are that most of these young men suffer from extreme poverty and they originate from unstable family backgrounds. There is also lack of educational, social or professional outlets. The *Maras* and *Pandillas* offer them a place in a social movement outside of the mainstream of society which has left them behind. The gang role models present themselves as having money and access to women which is an alluring character of the street gangs. The gangs allow young men to develop a distinct identity, fulfilling an “important -if perverse- social function.”⁹⁹

The effects of drug trafficking in Guatemala may be seen in the country’s murder rate. UNODC showed that there is a strong correlation between DTO activity and increasing levels of homicides in the country. Based on 2002 data, Guatemala murder rate per 100,000 people was 37, placing it among the top 10 most murderous countries. The murder rate steadily increased from 26/100,000 in 2001 to as high as 47/100,000 in 2006. However, the highest murder rates did not occur in Guatemala City. The highest murder rates occurred in Escuintla, Petén, and Izabel, where drug trafficking activity is

⁹⁸Walker, 25.

⁹⁹Ibid.

prevalent.¹⁰⁰ This data undermines the assertion that youth gangs are exercising a significant role in the drug trade. However, street gangs exist in predominantly urban areas; Izabal and Petén are mostly rural.¹⁰¹ Most of the other killings are political in nature and range from DTOs sending a message to political rivals of their favored politicians or the use of militias to eliminate political rivals directly.

Mass deportation in the early 1990s from the U.S. back to Guatemala and other countries in the region sparked a wild spread of gangs across the Latin American region. In 2006, Guatemala received 3,600 criminal deportees.¹⁰² The continuous deportations coincided with increased drug trafficking and increased violence. The impact of the deportation policy is evident from the composition of gang membership in the country. It is very easy to identify the deportees with their distinct gang markings. Deported *mareros* contributed to the escalating gang violence in Guatemala.¹⁰³

Question: What should be the Role of the Military in Anti-Gang Strategy?

Role of the Armed Forces in Jamaica

In order to identify the best practices for the armed forces, this section will describe the roles played by the armed forces in fighting gang strategy. The role of the

¹⁰⁰United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Development and Crime in Latin America,” 2007. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html> (accessed 13 December 2012).

¹⁰¹Patrick Moran, “El Salvador and Guatemala: Security Sector Reform and Political Party System Effects on Organized Crime” (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2009), 26.

¹⁰²Brands, 27.

¹⁰³Moran, 4.

armed forces in dealing with the gang problem is mostly to support civil organizations in maintaining law and order.

Role of the Armed Forces in Jamaica: Special Police Squads

Joint police-military operations and special police squads are generally relied on from time to time address spikes in crime in Jamaica. In 1992, a joint police-military campaign called "Operation Ardent," established rapid response units in three locations to combat increasing violent crime.¹⁰⁴ By mid-1993, the Anti-Crime Investigation Detachment (ACID), a special police squad, replaced Operation Ardent as the anti-crime initiative. ACID members were almost immediately linked to reports of summary executions. ACID was replaced by the Special Anti-Crime Task Force (SACTF) and then the Crime Management Unit (CMU). The CMU also fell under suspicion for extrajudicial killings. Eventually its commander, Senior Superintendent of Police Renato Valentino DeCardova Adams and some of the team members, faced prosecution from which they were exonerated. Special squads tend to have short lives and now conjure images of abuse in Jamaica. The JDF continued to support the JCF by conducting joint deployments despite the presence of the special police squads.

Role of the Armed Forces in Jamaica: Joint Multi-Agency Task Force

The recently terminated, but the most successful joint multi-agency police led operation which targeted gang leaders in Jamaica was "Operation Kingfish." This operation was jointly funded by international partners and the Jamaican government.

¹⁰⁴Stuart W. Twemlow and Frank C. Sacco, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Conceptual Foundations of a Plan to Reduce Violence and Improve the Quality of Life in a Midsized Community in Jamaica," *Journal of Psychiatry* 59 (May 1996): 156-174.

Operation Kingfish was a multinational task force (Jamaica, U.S., United Kingdom, and Canada) designed for driving the intelligence process and coordinating investigations leading to the arrest of major criminals. From its October 2004 inception through December 2006, Operation Kingfish launched 1,378 operations resulting in the seizure of 56 vehicles, 57 boats, one aircraft, 206 firearms, and two containers conveying drugs. Operation Kingfish was also responsible for the seizure of over 13 metric tons of cocaine (mostly outside of Jamaica) and over 27,390 pounds of compressed marijuana. In 2006 for example, Operation Kingfish mounted 870 operations, compared to 607 in 2005. In 2006, through cargo scanning, the Jamaican Customs Contraband Enforcement Team seized over 3,000 pounds of marijuana, 10 kilograms of cocaine, and approximately \$500,000 at Jamaican air and seaports. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Glenmore Hinds, who headed the task force, raised concerns that a missing link in the strategy was a central coordinating body to coordinate the various programs to fill the void left by the gang leaders which are removed. The void extends from security to social services, and welfare issues.

A classified operation was also a part of the joint interagency strategy under “Operation Kingfish.” It comprised a significant part of the military operational element. The aim of the operation was to stem the flow of illegal arms into Jamaica and support counter narcotics tasks. It also addressed other important national matters like the JDF Coast Guard, fisheries and cooperation between the ATF and other U.S. agencies.

There is another classified operation with international partners. Essentially it is a U.S.-led joint maritime operation, done with the JDF Coastguard, with the view of

stemming illicit maritime activities. It connects and sometimes overlaps with the intent of Operation Kingfish.

Role of the Armed Forces in Jamaica: Joint Police/Military Deployments

In 2006, three operational approaches, designed to aid the civil power, were pursued. These ongoing operations are called, “Operation Intrepid Curtail,” “Operation Holdfast,” and “Operation Buccaneer.” They were all designed for the JDF to assist civil agencies in maintaining law and order. The operations are named contingency operations designed as aids to the civil power. Operation Intrepid Curtail was an Internal Security Operation which intended to provide assistance to the police in maintaining law and order. It required deployment of soldiers to various police divisions (a geographic area), to reinforce their efforts in maintaining law and order. Most deployments were to urban centers. The operations were directed by the police but tactically managed by the battalion which is assigned the mission. The police select the ground, the targets and in most cases the type of tactical maneuver to be conducted. The operations were often in the form of patrols, deployed to “hotspots,” identified by the police division commanders. Operations such as raids, cordons and searches and curfews were also conducted and largely driven by intelligence from the local police. An additional arrangement to this operation was a staff and command meeting called the Joint Operational Command (JOPC) which met once a week to hear reports and assign intelligence casings to operational units for execution. This body can assign intelligence casings to the units conducting Operation Intrepid Curtail or the recently formed Joint Task Force (JTF).

The Joint Task Force was established by combining an infantry company with elements from the JCF Mobile Reserve. The infantry company was normally taken from

the battalion responsible for Operation Intrepid Curtail. The difference with the JTF and Operation Intrepid Curtail was that the police and military units operated together for longer periods in the JTF. Generally, the sub unit commanders and police teams did not change with troop rotation and so longer term goals were able to be established at the JTF. The most unique characteristic of this approach was that the JTF was not tied to a police division and operated in support of all police divisions. Care was also taken that the program of operational deployment (Operational Matrix) was not broadcasted until immediately prior to deployment. The deployments did not follow the patrol pattern established by other units typically deploying in support of individual police divisions. The JTF was not properly resourced because the original task organization plan required a staff, a facility to house the staff, additional equipment and vehicles. Additional tasking would also arise from various incidents or ceremonial duties. There was a lack of adequate forces to conduct the various operations required. Another obvious concern with this multi-operational approach was a lack of unity of command. The JDF did not have operational command of its units during these multi-operational deployments and so whatever police formation headquarters they fell under for operations, exercised de facto command of the operations.

Operation Buccaneer was a marijuana eradication operation. This operation was also supported with funding through the U.S. Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and executed by an infantry battalion. Operation Buccaneer is a low threat operation to gangs and organized crime when viewed on its own, but was a powerful tool for tracking production and possible distribution networks.

When compared to other military operations in 2007 the newly formed Joint Task Force (JTF) clearly had an increasing level of success in interdicting criminal gang members and recovering illegal firearms than the routine operations being conducted jointly with the police.




Figure 6. Weapons Recovered by JDF, December 2007 to March 2008

Source: Created by author. The graph shows the number of weapons recovered from the three operational approaches being pursued over the period of December 2007 to March 2008.

They denied freedom of movement to gangs since they followed the same patterns used by the gangs. They move in the most unlikely places at the most unlikely times and whereby getting into the decision cycle of the gangs. The concept of the JTF produced quick results. Intrepid Curtail was more predictable and created very little dilemma to gang members. A combination of Operation Kingfish and the JTF would combine two very successful approaches in Jamaica. This kind of operation could be accomplished in a multi-agency task force with one unified command.

Role of the Armed Forces in Jamaica: Innovation and Security Sector Reform

The JCF and JDF strategic review and implementation are at various stages. The military continues to focus on capacity building and efficiency, while the police focus is on anti-corruption and community policing. Despite the implementation of two corporate strategies which did in fact accomplish some modernization in training and improvement in technology, confidence in police performance has not improved.¹⁰⁵ The implementation of the JDF Strategic Defense Review has changed the force structure but it still is not complete. Even though the change is incomplete the JDF's ability to counter serious and organized crime was enhanced by the creation of a new battalion which has a Special Operations Detachment, suitable for countering terrorism, insurgencies and organized crime.

Role of the Armed Forces in Jamaica: JDF as Law Enforcement

Many legislative solutions have been pursued that indirectly disrupt gang-related activity in Jamaica. The JDF is indirectly responsible for the enforcement of some of these laws when it supports the police. The Dangerous Drugs Act (1974), stipulated harsher penalties for narcotics offences. The Gun Court Act (1974) removed the right to trial by jury for most gun-related offences (except murder) and introduced possible life imprisonment for firearm offences. Some less popular legislation includes the Juveniles Act (1974), in which gun use offenders as young as 14 are subjected to criminal justice processes similar to those faced by adults. The Suppression of Crimes Act (1974), which provided the legal justification for police to search without warrants, arrest without

¹⁰⁵Standing Committee on National Security, 2010, 16.

reason, and detainment without charge was highly controversial. The government eventually repealed this Act in 1993. Some more recent Bills that have been passed such as the Proceeds of Crime Act, or POCA (2007), the Corruption Prevention Act (2005), and the Money Laundering Act (1996). The intention of these Acts was to control drug trafficking by attacking the source of its strength.¹⁰⁶ POCA was enacted in 2007 and its main purpose was to deprive offenders of the profits received from crime and remove illicit proceeds from use in future criminal enterprise. Since this statute's enactment the government's Financial Investigations Division (FID) has seized approximately \$450 million Jamaican (U.S. \$5.4 million) from criminal hands. Criminal laws have mostly kept pace with the development of crime. Currently, gang legislation is being drafted. The enforcement of the laws and the system of justice again is the weak link requiring strengthening. The JDF does not have a mechanism which significantly influences the preparation of cases for criminals it has assisted the police in capturing. Justice not being served is outside of the influence of the JDF, but impacts the morale of soldiers who conduct the operations to capture or interdict criminals and gangsters. Again the need for an efficient justice system is a pre-condition for successful counter-gang operations.

Role of the Armed Forces in Brazil

Role of the Armed Forces in Brazil: Limited to Emergencies and Presidential Discretion

From time to time the Brazilian armed forces have been called out on the President's mandate to address issues of public order and outbreak of crime.¹⁰⁷ The

¹⁰⁶Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*.

¹⁰⁷Constituent Assemble of Brazil, "Constitution of Brazil," 1988.

federal police institutions also assist the state law enforcement agencies (generally the military police). The policy in Brazil is that the deployment of the armed forces will always be a last resort to be determined by the President.¹⁰⁸ In 2006 CV attacked a military depot and took 11 weapons. The Army deployed two brigades under a Division Headquarters in Operation Abafa (Stifle) to recover the weapons. The operations lasted for 12 days and the Army did more than just recover the stolen weapons. At the end of the 12 days, only one person was killed by the Army and all 11 weapons were recovered. Significantly, the law enforcement agencies estimated that the 12 day operation cost the drug dealers almost U.S. \$2.5 million. The Army has also deployed in major events like the Pan American games, the visit of U.S. president George Bush and Pope Benedict XVI. The skills possessed by the Army increasingly is seen as valuable for law enforcement in times of emergencies in Brazil.

Role of the Armed Forces in Brazil: Conducting Law Enforcement from within the Military

The Public Security National Force was created in 2004, from 7,000 military policemen recruited from the states within the country. This force is subordinated to the Minister of Justice, while the civilian police and the military firemen corps are controlled locally. The firemen have lately been restricted to responding to non-security and accident-fire related emergencies. These groups form the first and second level responses before the armed forces are deployed.

When the military deploys, it is with the clear understanding that the law enforcement agencies are not able to deal with the particular situation and a clear hand

¹⁰⁸Pereira, 35.

over of security responsibilities to the Armed Forces is required. Deployments that require repressive actions are done for very specific objectives in a clearly defined geographic space for a limited but specified time. Unity of effort is also accomplished because all the law enforcement agencies and other military units come under command of the senior command which is usually the army unit commander. However, when the military stabilizes the area, the newly formed UPP (Urban Pacification Police) units establish a permanent presence in the urban areas formerly not under control of the government. The UPP was formed from the state Military Police. In this approach, arms of the state deliver some basic services, reasonably expected to be available to every citizen. Public safety and facilitation of social intervention programs are enabled through the presence of the UPP (this is only now just happening in Rio de Janeiro).

The operations that are conducted in the *Favelas* do not seem to focus on the gangs per se. The deployments in the *Favelas* were as a result of the violence that occurs generally rather than an attempt to secure the citizens from gangs. However, the military seems to have brought back a number of *Favelas* which they operate under the control of the state. The lessons learned were outlined by General Pinheiro's study; "Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight against Criminal Urban Guerillas":

1. The human dimension must be fully understood and law enforcement agencies must be willing to meet with informal leaders,
2. Understand the threats' TTPs and their ability to manipulate the population.
3. Small unit tactics are the primary means of success as well as a defined ROE,
4. Strict guidelines to protect the citizenry from unnecessary aggressiveness,
5. A deliberate planning process must precede operations,

6. A dedicated command and control infrastructure established close to the operational area,
7. Joint planning and execution correctly incorporating other military services and agencies,
8. Using information tools to inform the population on procedures to follow during operations,
9. Keeping the nation informed through controlled media, and
10. Fully integrated justice system in enabling the carriage of justice throughout.

Role of Armed Forces in Guatemala

Hal Brands described the most celebrated gang counter measure in Guatemala, Plan Escoba (Clean Sweep), launched in 2003-2004. Plan Escoba was directed at gang members. With the assistance of the armed force over 1,000 *mareros* were locked up in this anti-gang strategy. The plan was not indiscriminate in the policies of imprisonment and classification of gang membership. However, it helped to fuel the gang culture by putting hundreds of young unemployed men together in a situation where they had to become a gang member in order to survive. Plan Escoba was credited, as one of the actions which slightly slowed the murder rate in Guatemala.

Role of Armed Forces in Guatemala: Law Enforcement Support to the Police

The PNC (Policia Nacional Civil) was bolstered by the hiring of 3,000 army veterans in 2007. This was necessary because the police reform of 1996 failed to exclude previously corrupt police and did not increase the academic requirements for promotion in the new police organization. Despite the reform, the PNC is still largely corrupt,

outgunned, outnumbered and does not possess the technology and training it requires to be successful.¹⁰⁹

Role of Armed Forces in Guatemala: Special Operations to Retake Territory and Establish Control

The government has also employed the military in trying to establish control over ungoverned rural areas especially in the Peten region. The activities are comprised of Special Operations units dropping into the jungle to seek out and destroy clandestine airstrips. Small bases were also established in these regions from which control of territory was established by patrolling and maintaining a visible government presence. The tactical commanders in these operations were given great latitude in these operations.¹¹⁰ There is no evidence to suggest that there is a unified structure outside of the strict armed forces chain of command that exercise planning and command responsibilities and that integrates the other agencies operating against the gangs.

Role of Armed Forces in Guatemala: Logistic Support

The military is also tasked to provide back up and logistical support to the police, who have the constitutional authority to make arrests. According to Greco these joint task forces have yielded few tangible results.¹¹¹ The concepts are workable on the drawing

¹⁰⁹Roberto J. Atha, "Transitions to Peace: Effects on Internal Security Forces in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala" (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008), 30-36.

¹¹⁰You Tube, "Guatemala's Army Takes on Mexican Drug Gang," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vE0b1SwuDYI&feature=relmfu> (accessed 13 December 2012).

¹¹¹Matthew B. Greco, "Ungoverned Spaces in Guatemala and U.S. National Security" (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2009), 8

board, but the implementation has not been backed up with funds. The military is evidently already stretched to the limit and is unable to successfully undertake new responsibilities without commensurate funding. These operations have also been plagued by human rights concerns especially since the Army is used to enforce government evictions of indigenous and farming communities. The Army has a very low level of legitimacy since it has a corrupt and cruel past and continues to be used to suppress various sections of the population. Guatemalan soldiers and various elements of the military have also been implicated in drug trafficking.¹¹²

Role of Armed Forces in Guatemala: Anti-Corruption

There was an eventual acceptance by government about the high level of corruption in the police group and to a lesser extent the Army. In 2007, the Guatemalan Congress agreed to the creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). This is a UN sponsored body charged to combat corruption and crime. By mandate, the CICIG is supposed to “support, strengthen, and assist institutions of the State of Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations.”¹¹³ It is one of the few instances of an international commitment mechanism deployed to help a state deal with gang-related and criminal violence. The CICIG was an attempt to restore trust in a system with continuous and mounting stresses

¹¹²Atha, 37.

¹¹³United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 63/19, “The Situation in Central America: Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy, and Development,” 61st Session, www.un.org/en/ga/63/resolutions.shtml (accessed 12 December 2012).

of gang-related violence, and police and judicial corruption. CICIG utilizes independent international and local investigative expertise and sends cases to Guatemalan prosecutors in the domestic judicial system. A Special Prosecutor's Office for CICIG was established in the Public Prosecutor's office as part of the agreement. CICIG also provided technical assistance and capacity building to the National Civilian Police, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Public Prosecutor Office. As of March 2010, CICIG mounted 1,544 judicial proceedings and arrested 135 individuals, including former President Alfonso Portillo, accused of embezzling funds.¹¹⁴

Even though over 1,000 corrupt police were dismissed, acres of poppy destroyed, arms recovered, one notable drug trafficker arrested and hundreds of *mareros* arrested, there has been little improvement in the violence in Guatemala. The military has been most successful in retaking territory by employing special operations forces with limited objectives in the Peten region.¹¹⁵

Conclusion

It is clear from the literature that even though there are various definitions and classification of gangs, it is widely accepted that they are groups of persons who come together under an evolving fluid structure in order to identify with a common purpose. These gangs range from youth gangs with very loose structures to TCOs which have well defined organizational structures and division of labor. The literature highlights a

¹¹⁴Brands, 37-38.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 37.

dichotomy between scholars who group gangs and their effects with insurgency and terrorism and those who stress the local sociological factors.

Most of the literature showed that the gang phenomenon in Jamaica, like Guatemala and Brazil, is complex because of the various definitions and themes that are used to identify and characterize the problem. For Jamaica, the problem is further complicated by the fact that the Jamaican gangs have become institutionalized, they have close ties to political parties, they are supported by the people in their communities and command resources to compete with the state.

The literature also demonstrated the examples of Jamaica, Guatemala and Brazil using their armed forces in various operations. These operations gave an insight into best possible practices for the role that the Jamaican military could adopt in the fight against gangs. The most successful were Special Operations, intelligence support, planning, centralized command and control, creating law enforcement support groups and supplementing police operations with joint police/military deployments.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This research was conducted to observe how different countries used their various efforts to counteract the impact of gang violence. In this study, two research methods were adopted, namely, a comparative case study analysis, and a qualitative narrative analysis. Each method sought to address specific research questions.

Case Study Analysis

According to researcher, Robert K. Yin (1994), the case study research method is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.”¹¹⁶ Further discussion by Yin was cited by Sarah McGloin, where he referred to case studies as useful in addressing how and why questions, and in situations where the researcher has little control over the events. McGloin also cited Rachel Corcoran who sees the usefulness of case studies to provide a critical analysis of practice which can influence the transformation of practice by others. By being able to identify multiple case examples with similar variables, a comparative analysis was done. In comparing country examples, variables such as high murder rates, institutionalized violent gangs, prevalent gun use, rampant drug trafficking and large marginal groups were classic elements in identifying the gang phenomenon. The intention was to select cases with different perspectives on the same problem. Purposeful maximal sampling was used to select the most suitable countries for comparison.

¹¹⁶Sarah McGloin, "The Trustworthiness of Case Study Methodology," *Nurse Researcher* 16, no. 1 (2008):45-54. EBSCOhost services.exeter.ac.uk/eml/booklists/Intenscarenursing.doc (accessed 7 December 2012), 1.

The primary research question, “Can the Jamaican Security Forces successfully reduce the violent impact of gangs”? was addressing different variables in a Case Study Analysis approach. The problem examined was related to the internal security issues of Jamaica, as a country in particular, a case study analysis was useful to assess a single identifiable case. The gang phenomenon impacted internal security of the populations of other countries under study; thereby presenting additional cases for comparison. By using some commonly cited effects of gang activity on a country, such as depletion of human capital by murder, lost investments, reduced economic growth, and overall increased feeling of fear within the population, this allows the ability to categorize and compare the experiences in different countries. For the study, a country is viewed as an individual specimen and presents a single unit for comparison to others.

Qualitative Narrative Analysis

The second research method was a narrative analysis of literature from various sources. It included countries’ policies and government documents, reports by international organizations, media publications, sources of statistical country specific data. This literature provided perspectives on policy, actual examples and approaches by countries and agencies, which were assessed toward addressing the two secondary research questions, “Why is the gang problem so complex”? and “What should be the role of the military in anti-gang strategy?”

The research design consisted of data comparisons of three countries which have recently made efforts at disrupting gangs responsible for internal security problems. The countries used in the comparison were: Brazil, Guatemala and Jamaica. While other countries such as Mexico and South Africa face similar gang challenges, extreme social,

economic or political conditions prevented a reasonable comparison of the gang phenomena across those countries

In doing the case study comparison, the countries were first defined in terms of basic country data as per yearly measurements provided by the World Bank. Within the parameters of selected variables, the gang problem was discussed in these countries, supported by illustration of facts and data in narrative, graphic and table form. This data served as a reference point in establishing major inherent similarities or differences within a wider context of that country's gang phenomenon.

The second comparison was a narrative describing the gang phenomenon in each country. The following variables served as a guide for selecting the elements of the gang phenomenon which were further discussed in the comparison:

1. The motive/nature of gangs
2. Gang murder rate
3. The primary reason for murder
4. Key identifier of members' race, social status, etc.
5. Age cohort of the members
6. Recruitment process
7. Typical size of gangs
8. Financing
9. Key strength (center of gravity)
10. Key weakness (critical vulnerability)
11. Political connectedness

12. Level of globalization

13. Pervasiveness of gangs

The third comparison outlined the key elements of the various solutions that were adopted by the countries in the study in the form of a narrative description and analysis of the anti-gang approaches. Comparison of the following variables provided some insight into how the military was injected into the overall framework for reducing gang activity.

To this end, facts about the following factors were analyzed for each country:

1. Collective effort to understand the nature of the gang problem
2. Resources dedicated to the command, planning and execution of anti-gang operations
3. Roles of the military
4. Roles of the police
5. Human rights concerns
6. Nature and scope of multi-agency cooperation
7. Was the general population protected
8. Were the forces prepared: training and equipment
9. Was there continuous and responsive assessment at all levels
10. Was there doctrinal innovation to facilitate the counter-gang operations
11. Change in laws and other intuitions of state to support the operations
12. Did anti-gang operations exacerbate the situation in favor of the gangs

The researcher observed the above issues to deduct positive and negative lessons learned in other countries. These observations are aimed at providing feasible and valid recommendations for both strategic and operational approaches toward addressing the

gang phenomenon in Jamaica. The solution which will be recommended will address some of the pitfalls previously identified in Jamaica's effort to defeat gangs. At a minimum, such recommendations should help to establish a foundation for developing more effective strategies and policies.

The study sought to identify systematic processes and institutions incorporated by the selected countries to establish anti-gang programs. This included international assistance programs, long-term management committees planning groups, think tanks, amongst others, which contribute to the revision tactics techniques and procedures (TTP's), changes to force structure or other relevant policies.

Summary

The researcher employed two research methods; a case study comparison and a qualitative narrative assessment, drawing on pre-existing research and other secondary data. A case study approach assessed countries with a best fit in terms of socio-economic and political considerations, in gang characteristics and activity theories. It answered the research question to show if the Jamaican security forces could reduce the violent impact of gangs. By doing a qualitative narrative assessment, it allowed the researcher to gather different perspectives and to analyze scholars' works specifically focused on the role of the military and the complexity of the environment of which gangs operate in.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Case Study Comparison Analysis

The purpose of conducting an analysis on the case presented by Jamaica, Guatemala and Brazil is to answer the primary research question: “Can the Jamaican security forces reduce the violent impact of gangs?” The data on all three countries in appendix A did not identify any uniform similarities of factors that impact the gang phenomenon.

Comparison of Gangs

Conceptually, a fair amount of work has been done on the gang phenomenon in these three countries and some reasonable comparisons can be made. The key similarities and differences that exist in the three countries make their gang problem unique to the country’s history and recent political and socio-economic developments.

Comparison of Gangs: Legacy of the Cold War

Fundamentally, the countries under study experienced violent ideological struggles; the legacy of which is still present in the political, social and economic spheres of life. Like the civil war and insurgency in Guatemala and Brazil, Jamaica had its strife in the 1980s. Even though the cold war ended, justice for those who suffered extreme and systematic violence is illusive. The state agents, gangs and groups conducting the struggles have not all been properly demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated into their various societies. Their legacy is still alive. Therefore, the populations are still conditioned for violence because they were never deprogrammed. So, with a population

poised for violence, with the availability of weapons and an abundant supply of uneducated young men who are marginalized and repressed; gangs are easy to form.

Comparison of Gangs: Large Human Resource Pool

The gangs in all three states demonstrate a reality that new members are not difficult to find. Major social institutions like schools, depressed communities and prisons provide recruits of all ages for membership in gangs. It is evident that human resource is among the easiest means of gang perpetration in all three countries. In each case, the human resources forming the core of the gang are groups who exist on the margins of society and are easy to recruit. The main socio-economic signals of the recruits relate mostly to low education, lack of economic opportunity and social exclusion from mainstream. First, this situation requires social intervention with specific social policy to target those vulnerable to gang membership. Second, security forces must avail themselves of measures to address the potential outcomes of failed social interventions or the impact of no social intervention. Internal security forces now have to operate outside of their traditional intelligence pattern of only concentrating on direct and immediate threats. They must develop a doctrine of focusing on future plans and strategy, by estimating the security and defense outcome of various national policies or unique national phenomenon, like the gang phenomenon. The military especially must understand that despite its distance from active politics it must be aware of the country's political economy. A proper civil military relation is very important to dispel fear and suspicion of the military's interest outside strict defense and security matters. The military must be interested and ready to understand the political context within which it operates in order to predict the outcome of policies that will have implications on the

deployment of the armed forces. In all three countries studied, the gang phenomenon had political undertones, but the military strategy and plans were not entirely ready to address gangs, when law enforcement failed. This could be seen as a failure of the military in correctly identifying and assessing future threats to internal security and defense. This may be corrected by the establishment of an integrated and joint headquarters with the correct staff to conduct future planning among other basic roles of such a staff.

Comparison of Gangs: Socio-economic Reasons for Joining Gangs

The socio economic reasons for joining gangs are similar. Young men join gangs because of social inequality, the need for social identity, protection and economic survival. The common theme is that the allure of money, power, acceptance and access to women is compelling motivation for young men across countries. This gap in economic and social actualization requires non-military intervention in democratic countries. The security force cannot truly divorce itself from interacting with the organizations and recipients of the social programs. Some social programs can in fact have unintended consequences that may have to be addressed by the security apparatus. This should suggest to policy makers that interagency implementation and monitoring may be an optimal way to keep all stakeholders in the information loop of anti-gang policy implementation. Compartmentalization may not be the ideal for the various international and local agencies who are involved in addressing the different characteristic components of the gang phenomenon. Government must also consider preparing communities for anti-gang operations by shaping the social space and the legislative framework. The public must buy in or at least trust the efforts of the government. Anti-gang laws would

also provide the basis for conducting operations that may tread on the general freedom of citizens.

Comparison of Gangs: Gang Leadership

In both Guatemala and Jamaica the leadership age in gangs ranges between 30 and 40 years old while the low level members of gangs are between the ages of 12 to 25 years old. It is also notable that in all three countries most of the gang members are young males. This is clearly a social dynamic that again requires social policy to keep those youth out of the human resource pool for gang recruitment. Ironically military organizations are best designed for absorbing this age cohort. National military and other uniformed services can absorb unemployed young men in the short term. Education and training and job opportunities are the long-term solution. Counter-gang operations should not arbitrarily detain young unemployed males but this data gives an insight for possible targeting when there is a spike in gang warfare.

Comparison of Gangs: Drug Trade

In all three cases gangs were heavily involved in drug trafficking. The larger OCGs in the countries are more involved and their effects are very violent. In a more perverse way, they also corrupt officials and institutions, eventually undermining the state with the vast resource which they command. The lower level, less organized street gangs carry out a wider variety of crime like extortion, robbery, kidnapping and contract killing. They are nonetheless integrated into the drug trade by carrying out sales, being couriers, lookouts and becoming users as well. The common thread which connects the more organized gangs and the less organized and localized gangs are illicit drugs and

arms to protect said drug trade. Denying the supply of drugs by cutting off the supplies from indigenous and external sources should be a key role for internal security and defense. Counter-narcotics operations could be done jointly by the police force and armed forces. The armed forces could focus on eradication and importation. Intrinsic to this, is border control and defense. The police forces could focus on the internal movement, trade and use. Such counter-narcotics operations could be integrated into the larger anti-gang strategy through a unified command structure. The intent would be to deny gangs access to illicit drugs. Where drugs manage to get into the hands of gangs and they manage to control territory, the task could be given to the military to retake and stabilize. The main role of the military overall would be to improve internal security within a geographic area by retaking territory and defending the borders and coastline. So, where the local law enforcement fails to ensure internal security, then there should be a mechanism which deploys the military in specific geographic areas, with clear timelines, a well-defined mission, unity of command, clear Rules of Engagement to ensure proper safeguards for the citizen and proper legal status to enable the military to conduct operations.

Comparison of Gangs: Gun Use

The main tool of gang violence is the gun. In all cases the cold war has left the countries strewn with weapons especially in the case of Guatemala. In 2002 UNDOC estimated that there are 1.8 million illegal fire arms in circulation in Guatemala. Porous boundaries in the countries studied make illicit arms import permissible. There is also a culture that emphasizes the gun as the preferred tool for gangs. It is the source of strength. The full capacity of the gun is perhaps not realized by most gangs since they

have not integrated a structured tactic with the weapons available in order to maximize their combat power. The exceptions are the Mexican Zetas who primarily hire ex-special forces soldiers in order to use Special Forces tactics techniques and procedures. The Brazilian PCC, to a lesser extent uses storm tactics to create mayhem rather than attacking a particular strong point. The trend suggests that over time more sophisticated TTPs will be incorporated into the use of modern weapons making it more unlikely for law enforcement agencies to prevail in tactical fights. This will draw the military more into the anti-gang fight. Their role would be to disarm para-military type gangs and secure porous borders from arms traffickers.

Comparison of Gangs: Murder and Other Violent Crimes

The murder rates in the countries have remained. Even when gang members are in prison they still order the execution of persons, effectively exercising control of gang members while in prison. Competition among gangs generates heinous violence. The population remains the main victims of gangs in all three countries. This would seem to suggest that any strategy employed to defeat gangs should be equally focused on securing and protecting the general population most affected. This task cannot be overstated as it is among the most important duty of the state and its security and defense forces. The local security forces are often augmented by the armed forces to hunt down gangs and clear communities of gangs if gangs are well armed. Such operations should really have as their main mission the security of the people. Clear lines of accountability should also be established under a unified command for ensuring the peoples' security.

The nature of crimes committed by gangs is similar but not unique. They include extortion, robbery, kidnappings, drug sale and trafficking. Contract killings, money

laundering, financial crimes and corruption are becoming more common. Certain crimes are concentrated in one group or another, but none is exclusive. Financial crimes, drug trafficking and corruption are concentrated more in the OCGs or DTOs. Lower level crimes like robbery, extortion, kidnapping, contract killing and drug sales are concentrated in street gangs. Even though the patterns of some crimes seem universal, the method of extorting business and public transport operators in Guatemala and Jamaica bear remarkable similarities. This could be the function of media; but many scholars have highlighted the fact that the surge in violence and gang problems in both countries coincide with the U.S. deportation policy. None of these crimes are new and there are available approaches, techniques and technology that can successfully disrupt gangs carrying out these crimes. The security infrastructure is required to have a robust and technologically advanced system. Specialized investigating teams tracking the source, support and control the various complex crimes and criminals would give a security forces a marked advantage. In fact it would be efficient to have departments which specialize in the investigation and monitoring of certain types of criminals. Giving the security forces the ability not only to investigate and prosecute crime but also to pre-empt gangs. Specialist departments being alluded to are costly and will require commitment from policy makers for funding. This is where the opportunity for multi-lateral cooperation with security services in other countries arise, since the benefit would be universal and burden of cost could be shared.

Comparison of Gangs: Rise of Vigilantism

The gang phenomenon overall, has raised the concern that the state can no longer secure its people. The level of murders and the proliferation of the private security

industry are obvious indicators. Vigilantism is a counter-gang measure which is now common in Guatemala and Brazil. It may also be happening in Jamaica but perpetrated more by communities rather than rogue agents of the state. The state must take back the role of securing the people especially in ungoverned territory. It cannot be left up to disparate groups which often exacerbate the situation with vigilantism. Reclaiming territory overtaken by violence and/or controlled by gangs requires an efficient armed force which is able to hold and conduct clear operations. Such operations could be focused on a defined geographic space. The operation should be preceded by intensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The execution must maximize speed, concentrate force and conduct extensive intelligence/evidence gathering. One precondition for this to work is a functioning and well monitored justice system.

Comparison of Gangs: Powerful Leaders Will Emerge

The concept and operations of the *poderes ocultos* (hidden powers) is similar to the concept of the “Don” in Jamaica and the *Donos* in Brazil. These are normally men who lead gangs and/or have political influence. They use gangs to carry out illicit and sometimes violent activities. The level of violence they demand is sometimes extreme in order to create a psychological effect. Any solution to these influential criminals must include a policy that will strip the political safeguards that these persons generally have. Not only should the gang members be punished, but their leaders who order the violence should be prosecuted. Policy must precede a joint interagency task force to target gangs. The policy should ensure the task force is free from political interference, free of parochial bias and empowered with unhindered ability to investigate and prosecute. The task force must be prepared for the legal and judicial aspects of dealing with rich and

highly connected criminal bosses. Unity of command, centralized planning and efficient execution are key principles to such a task force, since disagreement and disunity can have negative legal consequences to ongoing cases. The military's role in this task force could be to command it. Aside from commanding such a group the military could be a key player, providing technical support, tactical guidance and logistic support to less capable security services. An interagency task force should also have an international integrity commission to ensure human rights, discourage corruption and report on political interference.

Comparison of Gangs: Violent and Coordinated Attacks on the State

In Jamaica and Brazil organized crime gangs have carried out violent assaults on the state, driving fear in the citizenry. The extensive use of communication technology enables gang leaders to exercise a very wide span of control during these attacks. Command and control of gangs in these actions are well coordinated suggesting that the gang leadership is maximizing communication in order to influence gang activities on multiple fronts. Communication technology is also used to conduct planning and disseminate completed plans. This technology is highly vulnerable to manipulation by the intelligence community. Any security or defense organization operating against gangs must be able to use the most advanced technology to interdict, track and record gang related communication within the law. Information technology must also be used to sort, store and analyze the data which is captured for both immediate and future planning, as well as for academic study. Even though the majority of this effort will be driven by the intelligence community; security forces must also consider establishing an institute in

partnership with reputable institutions of learning to study the available data and also to conduct its own social research with a view of better understanding the problem.

Comparison of Gangs: Institutionalization of Gangs

It is evident that some gangs in three countries have been institutionalized. The “Shower Posse,” “One Order,” “Clansman,” and “Bibow Posse” in Jamaica; the MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Guatemala; and the *Comando Vermelho* (CV) and the *Primeiro Comando Da Capital* (PCC) in Brazil; seem to represent social movement which provides indispensable service in some communities. This again needs social policy that should not isolate security and defense agencies. Rather the state agencies must themselves strive to become permanent features within gang strongholds. The legal infrastructure also has a part to play since the inability to prosecute gang members over time makes their gangs more institutionalized. Many of the high crime gang neighborhoods are small and it makes reporting crime and giving evidence against gang members difficult. The traditional ways of giving evidence in person must be addressed in order to allow victims and witnesses to give reports and evidence in camera or by other means. It must also protect investigators and arresting officers from being targeted as a means of usurping the process of justice in the courts. A proper functioning justice system within a country is a precondition to successfully target gang members.

Institutionalized gangs in the three countries tend to have social capital and can use the populace in their area to swing public opinion to the side of gangs. At the same time they can use information about security force actions to discredit operations aimed at recovering territory. Security or military forces conducting clear and hold operations must at least use the information spectrum to discredit gangs and their leaders and

establish some doubt in the minds of the people who support them in their neighborhood. Information operation must form a part of the operations directed at taking back territory from institutionalized gangs. In the May 2010 operations in Jamaica to capture Christopher “Dudus” Coke, little or no information operations were directed at the gang or Mr. Coke. The gang went on the information offensive by organizing a protest of mainly women and children admonishing the U.S. government for seeking Coke’s extradition and pressuring the Jamaican government not to accede to the request. The people facilitated the gang while they fortified the community and subsequently launched an attack on the state.



Figure 7. Demonstration Against Extradition Request for Christopher Coke

Source: Accessed from Chris McGreal “The battle for Kingston, Jamaica,” *The Guardian*, 27 May 2010. Google Images, “Tivoli Gardens Residents Demonstrate,” <http://www.google.com/imgres?q=tivoli+gardens+residents+demonstrate+extradition+incursion&> (accessed 12 December 2012). The images were used extensively in the Jamaica media, showing the overwhelming support being given to the main the people referred to as Christopher “Dudus” Coke.

The prominent sign on the left reads: “Dudus is a better Security Officer, Give him his Props.” The second sign in the photograph on the right reads: “Jesus die for us,

we will die for Dudus!!!” Christopher Coke and his gang executed an effective information operation. The security forces did not provide their narrative. Despite containing the mayhem which preceded the security force incursion into the gang stronghold the gang narrative prevailed. The desperate call for the state to act was quickly replaced by a sustained erosion of trust for the conduct of the operations which tactically defeated the “Shower Posse” in a limited space over a short period of time. The JDF lost some of its high approval rating from civilian society and the media as a result of the operation. Military operations against gangs, like insurgents, must seek to prevent the gang narrative from reaching and taking hold with the public.

Comparison of Gangs: Weakening the State

Perhaps the most deleterious effect of organized criminal groups is their acceleration of the process of weakening the state. As the states become weaker, more people have been placed on the margins by the liberal economic policies of the international system in the 1990s. Those owning resources, increasingly gain influence over the state sometimes without regard for how the capital was earned. In Guatemala and Jamaica the political process has been largely captured by the resources which are used to fund political parties directly or to influence violent confrontations in support of political parties. In fact, concerns regarding gangs’ political influence have been publicly articulated in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, and Jamaica. These are countries where crime networks and groups are well established and fairly powerful.¹¹⁷ This is an area in which policy must seek to reduce the impact of illicit funds on the political

¹¹⁷Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica*, 143.

process. Laws regarding campaign financing, awarding of contracts and corruption must be created and the penalties must be a disincentive to gangs and their associates. The police force may not be the best mechanism to enforce such laws and a special joint interagency task force may be charged with this activity. A special investigating body and prosecutor under the cognizance of an international body like the UN or a regional body would give such an effort greater legitimacy. The low level of trust in the countries requires independent arbiters especially as it relates to the political process which gangs have generally infiltrated and corrupted with funds.

Comparison of Gangs: Security Forces Outnumbered

The gangs and their affiliates outnumber the police in the three countries. The highest estimate of gang members in Jamaica is 20,000.¹¹⁸ This exceeds the strength of the police force of 8,441 members as of 2011. The 25,000 members of the PNC are exceeded by the highest estimate of 100,000 *mareros* and a few other thousands, DTO and group clandestine affiliates in Guatemala.¹¹⁹ In Brazil, the Federal Police, the Military Police and the various State Police are also outnumbered by the estimated half million members and affiliates of only the PCC. Operations conducted against gangs may have to rely on the concentration of force at a particular place at a particular time in order to maximize limited combat power. These operations must have significant intelligence preparation and national support. Commanders must ensure that when operations are launched they are supported by the best intelligence and logistics in order to avoid waste

¹¹⁸Leslie, 18.

¹¹⁹Walker.

from unsuccessful or compromised deployments. Again centralizing this type of effort through a unified command system is necessary. A robust joint intelligence infrastructure, which can leverage all intelligence units and sensors locally and internationally, is also important.

Comparison of Gangs: Diverse in Nature and Composition across Countries

The composition and number of named gangs differ in the countries. In Guatemala, two umbrella gangs, MS-13 and 18th Street, account for 95 percent of gang membership, while in Jamaica there are approximately 268 gangs accounting for general gang membership.¹²⁰ The gang structures in Jamaica may likely be less homogenous based on the sheer number and diversity in the typology. In Brazil, there are three to four super gangs and a growing number of affiliates. Therefore in all three cases the operational element of the solution must spend enough effort at understanding the unique characteristics of gangs within their AO. It is important for military and security forces to identify the umbrella gangs which pose an immediate threat, as opposed to others that are based on youth delinquency. Certainly, an operational unit by itself would not have the time during an ongoing operation to begin the process of trying to understand gangs. National security and defense departments or ministries may need to dedicate not only an operational, but also an academic effort at trying to create a complete understanding of gangs. The output of such studies could be used to supplement the intelligence community and shared with operational units and training establishment. The security and military forces working in this anti-gang environment must expand their doctrine and

¹²⁰U.S. Agency for International Development, 6.

improve their curriculum which should strive to teach military and security professionals about the gang phenomenon. In Jamaica for example, a manual on the Jamaican gang phenomenon could be written and used to teach mid-level and junior level officers and Non-commissioned Officers about gangs. This could be taught as part of the internal security portions of counter insurgency based training within the tactical portion of various courses at the Military Training Wing.

Comparison of Gangs: Summary

In this comparison analysis the following was observed:

1. The government must recognize the distinction between the role of security and defense forces from social and basic services, in order to task the correct agencies within an overall national policy of dealing with gangs. The operational forces have to clearly outline their capability and the goals that can be achieved with that capability. Expectations must be tempered by reality and the burden of accountability must be shared by those with the various tools for the different tasks.
2. Operational commands must agree on a set of preconditions that will make the overall security and defense operations successful. They must be able to articulate their vision of what their own individual role is but what exact preconditions are required to realize initial success and preserve operational gains.
3. There must be unity of command for various agencies coming together to address the gang problem. Clear lines of authority must be established between the armed forces and the civil security forces. AOs must be well

defined and timelines clear. The establishment of a joint interagency headquarters or task force could accomplish this unity of command.

4. The safety of the people must be the main effort of the operational objectives in any military security deployment. Supporting efforts should then focus on; destroying gangs, disrupting the drugs and arms trade, denying resources to gangs and occupying the social space left from retreating gangs. The objectives are security, social intervention and counter-gang.
5. Academic and intelligence study on gangs can fill obvious knowledge gaps which exist. Overall the need for a better understanding of gangs is obvious.
6. Some kind of oversight especially of politicians and security forces to avoid repeat of corruption and human rights abuses.
7. Anti-corruption laws to deal with political party financing, contracting and taxation as a method of stripping away the gang support infrastructure.
8. Information operations to offset counter narratives from gangs and their affiliates.
9. Laws and systems to protect witnesses and investigators.
10. Establishment of permanent security posts or bases in gang enclaves after clear and hold operations.
11. Establishment of special investigating departments and special operational units.
12. Armed forces to focus on defeating para-military gangs, conduct counter narcotics operations, border protection and retake territory.

13. Security force and prison reform to improve effectiveness and counter corruption.

Qualitative Analysis of Literature

The analysis of the literature review answered the two secondary questions:

(1) Why is the gang phenomenon so complex? and (2) What is the role of the armed forces in anti-gang strategy?” Some themes were identified in the literature review that impacted this study. It was shown that marginalized and socially excluded groups in a society act on their hopelessness and sometimes turn to the nihilism of the gang system. Excluded groups provide a ready source of human resources for gangs. In this environment organized crime employs gang violence and at the base of this violence are illicit drugs. The rise in the drug trade and the level of violence are positively related and it can be extrapolated that the drug trade influences the level and intensity of violence committed by gangs. The violence is also facilitated by the availability of guns and ammunition and the money to secure them. Meanwhile, the state is in retreat because it has lost its role of being the premier means of social cohesion and its justice mechanism is inefficient, broken or biased. Corruption in most instances extends from the lowest levels of society through the security forces and into the halls of government. The unfortunate spinoff of liberalization and the globalized free market is that it continues to push more people to the fringes, especially in urban sprawls. Instead of social policies, the states sometimes rely on repression as a response. This is argued to be mostly ineffective by itself. The use of security forces are the primary means of overt repression. The role of the military is sometimes obscure; their stated missions may sometimes not support the effects that they are having, especially on the population. The literature also

points to the lack of understanding of the gang problem by the government and security forces who are engaged with anti-gang activities. Human rights abuses are also a big concern especially where the history of those security forces are brutal and/or corrupt. The literature did not identify any security force mission which was aimed at securing the people, rather they are normally direct action aimed at interdicting gang members. Political corruption and the link between gangs and politicians was also highlighted as an important element in making the gang problem more complex.

A deeper understanding of the gang problem must precede the application of the solutions especially by the security forces. There is a gap in doctrine or the process guiding the employment of military forces. The literature gives historical accounts but not details on the establishment and planning for homeland defense missions. Clear laws were not discussed but emergency powers seem to be common among the countries studied. There is an antithesis to the gang/insurgent/terrorist link; but collaboration amongst the groups differs by region and circumstances and perhaps should remain under consideration. The literature also showed that a lack of resources on the part of the state causes it to be overwhelmed by well-resourced gangs. Essentially the literature proves that there is knowledge of the gang phenomenon and the effects but far less understanding of its complexities.

The Joint Multi-Agency operations have two great advantages. One, there is resource support from international partners; and two, there is a vetting process for local agents in order to negate internal corruption. Although the legal process of law enforcement is not a traditional role, it should not preclude an assessment to address the need for the military to exercise an expanded role in the legal process.

It is evident that for the tactical successes to be of value there are preconditions that have to be met. Some of these are outside the remit of armed forces in a democratic society, like prison reform and multi-lateral cooperation. Nonetheless the involvement of military formations and state military police demonstrates a possible template for establishing a role for the military in fighting gangs.

Summary of Qualitative Analysis of the Literature

The qualitative analysis uncovered some general characteristics of gangs that could drive the nature of potential solutions. The illegal drug trade has a great impact on the shape and character of the various gangs operating in a country. Though the impact varies, drug trafficking and drug use seem to be a common thread that runs through gangs and their operations. The gun also features in most of the gang violence. The availability of guns seems to be a common strength of gangs and a challenge for law enforcement. Young men are mostly involved in gangs and form the ready pool for gang recruitment.

Conclusions

Conclusions from Case Study Comparison

In observing the state of affairs in the countries and the characteristics of gangs, certain elements have been identified that are required when considering solutions. Security force practitioners must consider the following as possible tenets of anti-gang strategy:

1. Government civil departments, security forces and defense forces must make an effort at understanding the gang phenomenon by studying it. This should be the foundation of strategy.

2. Centralized planning agency must be tasked to predict and conduct forward planning.
3. Social programs must be integrated into security efforts which use repressive measures against gangs.
4. Robust counter narcotics strategy and operations which specialize in border control, internal eradication and demand reduction.
5. Counter gun operations which should involve border control, tactical response to gun violence by specialized units and gunfire tracking system. Very skilled and equipped forensics lab is required to track and link weapons to ammunition, users and suppliers.
6. Securing the most vulnerable segments of the population with tactical and operational maneuvers. The establishment of security posts to be ideally collocated and integrated with current social programs.
7. Creating a specialized intelligence, investigating department to address gangs.
8. Leverage available technology like forensics, communication and data processing. Integrated electronic sharing of information across the security and military forces could also assist in shortening time and information gaps for operational planning and targeting.
9. Increased the educational and training standards for members of security and military forces that operate in the public domain and against gangs. Ultimately creating an educated, disciplined and professional group which is responsible

for public safety which is a criterion for success. This is generally called security force reform.

10. Interagency and international cooperation on matters of intelligence sharing and joint analysis. Agreements and physical systems must be in place to do this.
11. New systems to facilitate witness security and protection.
12. Increasing the gang security force ratio in favor of the security forces.
13. Retraining and indoctrination of the security forces in anti-gang operations.

Facilitating an independent international anti-corruption body which has the authority to investigate and report on security force and political corruption.

Conclusions from Analysis of the Literature

The countries had issues that need to be addressed at the political level. This includes unresolved violent past, corrupt politics, repressed underclass, vulnerable population, injustice and corrupt security services. All the countries studied have a violent philosophy which is the remnant of cold war struggles and have not been completely resolved. This represents a legacy of violence and trauma.¹²¹ The corrupted political systems, in some way leave an opening for gangs to influence the political system for their own benefit. The three states have repressed the lower classes which live on the fringes of society, physically and otherwise. Their protection is not guaranteed by the state and so they tend to find allegiance with any reasonable replacement to the

¹²¹World Bank, "World Development Report 2011–Conflict, Security and Development," The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, worldbank.org (accessed 12 December 2012).

government. The justice systems are also inefficient and in some cases viewed as untrustworthy. The police and various arms of the security forces have corrupt reputations and have lost the confidence of large sections of the society especially those with poor records of protecting human rights. The resolution of such conditions can be viewed as preconditions for the success of security operations. So the preconditions for a successful counter-gang operation are: (1) a national healing from past conflict by re-sensitizing the population to violence and developing the peoples' trust in government and state intuitions; (2) depoliticizing the society and cutting gangs out of the political process; (3) reintegrate repressed and socially excluded groups and communities back into mainstream society; (4) efficient legal justice system; (5) professional, efficient and trusted police and armed forces; and (6) legislative support for anti-gang operations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

What seems to come out of this study is the realization that the gang problems in all three countries have an unlimited supply of human resources, a significant drug trafficking problem and plenty of guns. It also shows that certain preconditions are required within a country to enable successful counter-gang operations to be successful. The lack of these preconditions makes it difficult to resolve the gang epidemic in Jamaica. Social programs will be extremely important. Operations attempted by Jamaica, Guatemala and Brazil all have useful elements that fulfill the recommended tenets of counter-gang operations.

Recommendations

Policy

In order for anti-gang operations to be successful there are preconditions that the state has to address. First, a depoliticization of communities and institutions must begin. This should address the link between political parties and gangs, garrison politics and nepotism. Secondly, the justice system must be strengthened so it can deliver timely and unbiased justice for all classes in society. Thirdly, there should be a process of reintegrating the repressed and socially excluded groups and communities within the society. Fourth, an efficient police force is required to address security of the people; and finally, the state should attempt to regain public trust of government and state institutions.

Social programs that can be pursued to reintegrate the repressed and socially excluded groups and communities within the society must form a large part of government policy. Social programs and institutions should aim to attract international funding, reduce the pool of young men qualified for gang membership with intervention, reintegrate entire communities on the fringes of society like political garrisons, ghettos and squatter settlements, and facilitate the demobilizing and reintegration of gangs and gang members.

Military

Overall the researcher is recommending the establishment of a Joint Interagency Counter-Gang Task Force. The task force should fall under either the office of the Minister of Defense or Minister of National Security. The task force should establish a joint headquarters with a dedicated staff from various agencies and international partners. The most logical arms could include; a central intelligence department, case preparation department, social intervention department, public safety department and anti-gang direct action department. The defined role for the military would be to provide an operational force to conduct anti-gang direct action operations, where the police are unable to cope. The military will also manage border protection and defense tasks pertaining to gang related activities directly or by liaising with the other agencies or units who have the overall task. This includes the JDF Coastguard, The JCF Marine Police, The Port Security Corps, Customs Department and Jamaica Civil Aviation. Command must be passed to the military for any AO that requires a clear and hold mission, especially where the public safety department (police) is unable to cope. The public safety department must have clear roles and responsibilities to ensure security of the average citizen. Social

programs must also be used to secure the tactical gains from the provision of basic safety and freedom within affected communities or social groups. To assess and track performance, it is recommended that the joint headquarters staff establish lines of effort and by extension Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance. The task force must also establish a robust information operation by using private and government media. The task force with the authority of parliament must also allow for the establishment of an international, possibly UN-led oversight body to help investigate and refer cases of corruption and human rights abuses to the Director of Public Prosecution and Independent Commissioner.

Doctrine

Doctrine or philosophy around Jamaica's counter-gang approach should include a strategy that aims to understand the gang problem, resource already working techniques and approaches, protect the citizen, prepare through training and equipping, participate fully and conduct reassessments at regular intervals. The force structure of the JDF must also be revisited to authorize the JDF to provide additional forces for a Joint Interagency Task Force.

The researcher recommends that changes to doctrine should include a new way to incorporate an approach that will aid in planning. It may be useful to use the six-step process below especially when a unit or group is in the initial stages of responding to the gang problem in Jamaica. The six steps are: Understand-Resource- Protect-Prepare- Participate-Reassess. This will aid in enabling the JDF to reduce the impact of gang violence when it is tasked to do so. This should be treated as another aid at maneuvering

the complexities of the gang problem. These steps stand to provide guidance to planners as follows:

1. Understand: Be adept with the nuances of gangs within Jamaica.
2. Resource: Giving the requisite support to those solutions that are currently working and preparing to resource innovative future approaches. This where strategy will determine how the elements of national power will be used to address the problem. It can also determine at the operational level what TTPs to propagate and which ones to exclude.
3. Protect: The population should be protected at all costs. The focus may have to shift to public safety which should not be sacrificed in order to go on the offensive.
4. Prepare: Properly train and resource the forces that will be used against gangs. Incorporate innovative solutions and TTPs that are available and already working. Preparation should also include indoctrination of the forces for operating in a law enforcement role, where a better understanding of the threat may lead to more productive engagements with the population as a whole.
5. Participate: Ensure that efforts are made to incorporate all the relevant state agencies with a stake in security. Multiagency joint operations with unity of command from a military standpoint.
6. Reassess: Continuously conduct After Action Reviews as a means of introspection to prevent mission creep and lost opportunities.

Overall this study is concluding that for anti-gang strategy to work preconditions which relate to the country's internal infrastructure and institutions must be established. The gang problem must be thoroughly studied by both the academic and the intelligence community in order to have a better understanding of the phenomenon. This will highlight the characteristic components and confirm the broad tenets for operational approaches unraveling some of the latent complexities. Ultimately the study finds that the establishment of a Joint Interagency Task Force with a unified headquarters directly dealing with the gang problem is a key component to any anti-gang strategy. This effort could be buttressed by an international anti-corruption committee. Ultimately, the agencies involved must arrive at some acceptable methods of assessment during the execution of the various plans. Regular hearings by an oversight body or the responsible ministry must then decide and the progress being made when compared to the criteria and goals of the overall strategy.


There must be whole government approach towards addressing the gang problem. It is clear from the study that no one government department possess all the resources or expertise to address the gang problem. Government will have to facilitate the reform of agencies, institutions and practices in order to cope with the challenges that gangs pose to the country.

This chapter is intended to provide a viewpoint as to why Jamaica has not dealt with the gang problem and give some recommendations for a way forward. The overall recommendations are that: government must meet the preconditions for a successful counter-gang operation; it must also conduct desired and effective social programs; and at the same time security and defense institutions must enable the establishment of an inter-

agency task force with international support and with a doctrine that should guide the overall operations that the interagency task force can execute.


APPENDIX A

ILLUSTRATIONS




Source: Created by author using data from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012).

There is no significant difference between Brazil, Jamaica, Guatemala, and Mexico.




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The significant comparison is that in 2010 Brazil spent much more of GDP on the military than Guatemala and Jamaica.




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The fact is that both Jamaica and Guatemala have very small economies when compared to Brazil and Mexico.




Source: Created by author using data from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012).

The conclusion that may be drawn here is that there is far less money available to families to spend on basic items. The countries having the gang problem are in general far poorer than other countries. Gangs tend to flourish in situations where poverty and marginalization is prevalent.




Source: Created by author using data from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012).

There is some missing data but the information which is available seems to suggest that the intentional homicide rates are not decreasing. Overall the rates are higher in countries with gang problems. Mexico has a lower rate but it is highlighted because of its closeness to the U.S. and the savage nature of their murders. The international average is 6.9/100,000 (UNDOC, Global Study on Homicide, 2011) so it is obvious that the countries under study have doubled to sextupled the average.




Source: Created by author using data from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012).

The population density varies amongst the countries. In Guatemala and Jamaica the population density are much higher than Brazil. This is a function of geographic space. In fact the gangs and groups in the less dense countries have challenged the state more directly than the countries that are densely populated. So in Brazil the organized gangs challenge the state more directly and more densely populated centers seem to target non-state actors like the population and other gangs. There is therefore more organized violence in Brazil than in Jamaica and Guatemala.



Source: Created by author using data from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012).

Unemployment Brazil and Jamaica in 2000 are indicative of extremely low opportunity economies.



Source: Created by author using data from World Bank Data, “Country Indicators,” data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed 12 December 2012).

Urbanization is a general international trend. Guatemala and Jamaica have more people living outside of Urban Centers. The gang phenomenon is usually explained by many scholars as the result of increased urbanization. When compared to other countries the formation of gangs is an outcome and not necessarily the cause.

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