


Strategy Research Project

Defense, Diplomacy and Development – Status, Challenges, and Best Practices

by

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United States Army War College
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT – STATUS, CHALLENGES, AND
BEST PRACTICES**

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In the twenty-first century, the U.S. military has increasingly been called upon to conduct civil development activities as part of reconstruction and stabilization operations or recovery from natural or man-made disasters. These activities overlap development activities of both the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Three D (Defense, Diplomacy and Development) coordination is a subset of interagency coordination that provides a forum for DoD, DoS, and USAID to collaborate and align efforts in order to create synergy and avoid wasting resources in pursuit of national interests. This paper provides the current status of Three D efforts in Washington, DC and at the Combatant Command level, speaks to Three D coordination challenges, and details some of the best practices being used either as Three D or interagency coordination efforts. It also links the requirement to coordinate to National level documents including the *National Security Strategy* and subordinate strategies, the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Joint publications, USAID's *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, and the "pre-decisional draft" *3D Planning Guide, Diplomacy, Development, Defense*, a Three D product of the Joint Staff, DoS and USAID.

DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT – STATUS, CHALLENGES, AND BEST PRACTICES

The Kouta Bouyya primary school in rural Djibouti lacks classroom space according to a village elder.¹ A United States Army civil affairs team attached to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) works directly with the elder and other local and regional leaders to contract a three-room addition to the school. The building project goes smoothly, a beautiful dedication ceremony takes place and the children are all smiles as they look at their gleaming new classrooms. Three years later another Army civil affairs team visits the same school and comes across three locked classrooms. When they inquire, the headmaster opens the locks and shows them the empty classrooms. These are the same classrooms requested by the locals and built with U.S. funding three years earlier. The classrooms look nearly the same as they did the day they were dedicated, but the civil affairs team returns to Camp Lemonnier wondering why the classrooms are empty and unused.

Another primary school in Djibouti City, “École Cinq,” has been in work for the better part of five years. Contractors hired by CJTF-HOA tore down the original, dilapidated school and began building a new one. However, due to poor construction, contractor mismanagement and other issues, construction had completely stalled. The CJTF-HOA lead engineer spent numerous hours figuring out how he could build the promised school within the funding limits available. Through extensive dialogue with both the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Representative and the U.S. Ambassador, a compromise was reached to scale down CJTF-HOA’s part of the project and bring in another contractor using a separate USAID funding stream to complete the rest of the project so that traditional building materials could be used.²

Only through close coordination and collaboration between CJTF-HOA, the Ambassador and the USAID Representative, the project was completed in a culturally acceptable way, dedicated and is now in use.

These two real-world schools were built for the same purpose through the same organization, but only one is currently a success. Of these two, the Kouta Bouyya project seemed to go smoothly while École Cinq took more sweat and tears, but the project that went smoothly now stands as a monument to the failure to coordinate efforts of the “Three-Ds” or “Defense, Diplomacy and Development,” also known as Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and USAID.³

The purpose of this paper is to examine the status, guidance and background of the “Three D Process” and how it is being utilized at all levels of planning. In particular the paper will look at the national level in Washington, DC and at the theater level within the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), taking into consideration Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and all Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), except USNORTHCOM.⁴ While concentrating on planning at the national strategic, theater strategic and country team levels (which has ties to both theater strategic and operational levels of military planning), this paper will also look at some of the challenges to coordinating civil development activities among three agencies that bring different goals, cultures, planning styles and other significant factors to the table. Finally, the paper will examine some Three D or interagency best practices being implemented at the national, theater and operational levels.

Three D Status and Guidance

Throughout the last decade in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, Haiti and Japan, the United States military has been impelled to perform non-

traditional mission sets, including civil development-type activities, in an effort to rebuild areas damaged by war or natural disaster and/or reduce the influence of violent extremists.⁵ The military instrument of national power is often chosen to conduct development activities for multiple reasons including DoD's ability to conduct operations in high threat environments, the requirement to stabilize post-conflict or post-natural disaster environments, the need to establish and maintain access to locations and populations, and the availability of DoD resources. These activities may take place in areas of conflict or in areas where the U.S. desires to provide stability or maintain peace, and they may be undertaken in support of other United States Government (USG) agencies or to attain military-specific goals. Due to the overlap with development activities normally conducted by the DoS and the USAID, it is important to ensure the efforts of the three agencies or "Three Ds" are aligned with United States national interests and foreign policy goals. In his 2002 *National Security Strategy* (NSS), President Bush raised the significance of United States foreign assistance (Development) to the same level as Diplomacy (DoS) and Defense (DoD).⁶ Both President Bush's 2006 and President Obama's 2010 NSS continued to emphasize the importance of Development in national security. Furthermore, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD 6) in September 2010, which "recognizes that development is vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative . . . [and] It calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a course for development, diplomacy and defense to mutually reinforce and complement one another."⁷ The President's directive is a clear indication of the strategic importance of development to U.S. national security.

Many like terms have come into use to describe collaborative coordination of United States Government planning. From “interagency coordination” which Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, defines as “interaction that occurs among USG agencies, including DoD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective” to the “whole-of-government” approach to the “comprehensive” approach and “interorganizational coordination.”⁸ One of the challenges with the term “Three-D” is that it is a subset of the terms mentioned above, and it is difficult to find policy or doctrine that refers directly to Three D coordination. USAID’s Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy is one of the few written documents that speaks directly to the Three D approach, defining it as “a policy that recognizes the importance of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as partners in the conduct of foreign operations, particularly in the developing world.”⁹ Getting the most from available resources has always been important, but in the present time of fiscal austerity the United States Government must ensure taxpayer dollars are being spent in ways that directly tie to national interests and that do not run counter to efforts being made by other government agencies. In other words, there needs to be unified action leading to unity of effort, and the way to ensure that is to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of multiple agencies. Use of Three D or related coordination approaches ensures unity of effort and responsible use of resources. While the importance of aligning the efforts of DoD, DoS and USAID at all levels, from strategic to tactical, is recognized, and there is plenty of language indicating the need for interagency coordination, enforcing a requirement to coordinate has proven difficult given that DoS and USAID cannot always dictate requirements to DoD, nor can DoD dictate requirements to DoS or USAID. Adding to

that are the negative effects arising from the perpetual parochial competition between agencies. At all levels, but particularly below the level of the National Security Council, ensuring Three D Coordination takes place often comes down to the particular leaders and organizations involved and their dedication and enthusiasm to coordinate and compromise with the other agencies.

DoD, DoS and USAID guidance to coordinate starts with direction from the President in *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44* of 07 Dec 2005, which remains in effect. Specifically, the Secretaries of State and Defense “will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”¹⁰ President Obama’s National Security Strategy calls on all government agencies to work together to align resources with security challenges, singling out Defense, Diplomacy, Development and other areas of focus.¹¹ In the DoS 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)*, Secretary Clinton articulates “Department of State must also coordinate the development of integrated country strategies, . . . The purpose is not to direct the operations or redirect the mandates of other agencies, . . . It is rather to ensure that these operations are coordinated within an overall strategic framework.”¹² USAID maintains the *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, which lays out USAID’s policy to coordinate with DoD on foreign assistance issues and its guiding principles for policy implementation.¹³ This four-page policy clearly, and in a non-biased way, provides a strong testament to USAID’s institutional belief in the importance of Three D collaboration. Another USAID publication, the *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, states that “USAID must develop closer coordination with the military community, to understand how to work alongside

them, and to ensure that both civilian and military efforts are aimed at the same set of goals.”¹⁴

DoD receives direction from multiple sources including the *National Defense Strategy*, the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, and the *National Military Strategy*, which states the requirement for “America’s foreign policy to employ an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense.”¹⁵ Multiple Joint Publications (JPs), as well as DoD Instructions and Directives, including JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* and others provide direction for Joint Forces to coordinate with interagency partners.¹⁶

Though Joint Publication 3-08 provides guidance to Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to work with their counterparts in other agencies to coordinate at the theater strategic and operational levels to achieve strategic objectives, the level of standardization is not consistent, partly because cross-agency guidance on utilizing the Three D process has been missing.¹⁷ In an effort to bridge the gap between national level guidance and agency-specific direction on interagency coordination, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) stood up the “3D Planning Group (3DPG)” in the late 2009 to early 2010 timeframe.¹⁸ One of the products of that group, jointly written by representatives from the Joint Staff, DoS and USAID, is a pre-decisional working draft document entitled *3D Planning Guide, Diplomacy, Development, Defense* with the stated purpose to “support collaboration between State, USAID, and Defense for more informed and effective planning coordination.”¹⁹ This reference is written at the national strategic level with applications down to the country level. According to Mr. John

Dunlop, USAID's Acting Deputy Officer Director and Chief, Plans Division in the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation (formerly Office of Military Affairs), the document was initiated when Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Ms. Janine Davidson, saw the need for interdepartmental guidance on conducting Three D coordination and at the same time recognized the near impossibility of moving such a document through the convoluted bureaucratic approval process. Ms. Davidson found like-minded people within DoD, DoS and USAID, including Mr. Dunlop, and set them to work developing the *3D Planning Guide*. This document, itself a product of the Three D process, was most recently published in September 2011 in a "Pre-Decisional Working Draft," a status unlikely to change. According to Mr. Dunlop, the current draft has been "cleared at medium levels" within all three agencies and is being received warmly.²⁰ Though it lacks formal approval, the *3D Planning Guide* has the potential to go a long way toward standardizing the use of Three D planning at the strategic and operational levels. This innovative handbook "is a reference tool designed to help planners understand the purpose of each agency's plans, the processes that generate them, and, most importantly, to help identify opportunities for coordination among the three."²¹ A spring 2012 revision is planned.²²

Though there is guidance for all three agencies to coordinate, there exists the question of which agency is in charge and which has the final say. The naming convention of the Three D approach illustrates the issue. Most often the Three Ds are spelled out as "Defense, Diplomacy, and Development" as in the definition of the Three D approach taken from USAID's *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*. However, it can also be written as "Diplomacy, Development, and Defense" as is the case with the

subtitle for the *3D Planning Guide*. Advocates of the Three D approach, will refer to it this way, and take it a step further by referring to Defense as “the little D.” In terms of amounts of foreign assistance distributed, it is an apt designator. However, when determining who is in charge, there are other factors to be considered. First, “USAID is the lead U.S. government agency for U.S. foreign assistance planning and programming.”²³ In Washington, at the national-strategic level, that means USAID should be in charge of Three D coordination, though the other two agencies have the responsibility to initiate communication and coordination with the other Ds on items of interest.

Once outside of the United States, having lead agency status does not necessarily mean USAID always leads, particularly within sovereign foreign nations. Per DoS’ Foreign Affairs Manual, the Chief of Mission (COM), usually an Ambassador,

shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government Executive Branch employees. . . and shall ensure that all Government Executive Branch employees in that country (except for. . . employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.²⁴

For USAID, even in a situation where the Ambassador is a more junior Foreign Service Officer (FSO) than the USAID Director, the Ambassador, as the President’s direct representative, holds positional seniority. Addressing the singular topic of development issues and clearly articulating the need for Three D or broader interagency coordination, the PPD 6 fact sheet states, “In the field, the Chief of Mission will ensure the coherence and coordination of development cooperation across U.S. agencies.”²⁵ As for DoD, JP 3-08 speaks to COM authority, but highlights an area of overlap between COM authority

and Combatant Command (COCOM) authority, “The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those assigned to a combatant command, . . .”²⁶ Some military personnel like the Defense Attaché are placed under COM authority, but all other in-country military forces assigned under COCOM authority *could* be considered exempt from COM authority. In practice, the CCDR and COM have a symbiotic relationship and ideally align their efforts, though this can be personality dependent. In most instances, the CCDR and subordinate commanders ~~will~~ inform and coordinate operations with the COM. A good relationship is particularly important to the CCDR, since he/she must use a regional approach and depends on reliable interagency relationships. On the other hand, if a COM is not interested in working with a CCDR, he/she will develop the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP) devoid of CCDR assistance. Bringing the issue into focus, while the CCDR has the COCOM authority to conduct military operations without COM approval, his/her long-term interests are better served by making the effort to communicate, coordinate and gain COM approval.

With the need for Three D coordination established and some of the hierarchical arguments made, the next step is to look at where it is being used. The first place to look is Washington, DC. At the highest level, the National Security Council (NSC), Three D coordination is inherent since all three agencies are represented in the forms of the Secretary of State, who as a statutory member of the NSC represents both Diplomacy and Development, and the Secretary of Defense (also a statutory member of the NSC) as well as others the President may invite from OSD and DoD, who represent Defense. As evidenced by the history of the *3D Planning Guide*, Three D coordination

is being embraced in Washington, outside the NSC by USAID, DoS and the Joint Staff. According to the 3DPG's slide briefing entitled "3D Planning 101," the 3DPG has both a steering committee made up of high-level representatives (Deputy Assistant Secretary level, per Mr. Arthur Collins, Branch Chief, Pol-Mil Policy and Planning at DoS) from the three agencies and a working group made up of mid-level personnel.²⁷ Within the 3DPG, the three agencies are co-equal. In fact, the chair of the steering committee rotates regularly between all three, and the chair "carries no additional authority."²⁸

In addition to Three D efforts in Washington, the 3DPG actively advocates Three D coordination to other strategic level organizations. The "3D Planning 101" brief includes a slide that speaks to where the 3DPG sees the intersection of Three D agencies' planning: "Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) & Country Plans [CCMD/DoD], Bureau and Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (BSRPs/MSRPs) [DoS], and Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs) [USAID]."²⁹ According to 3DPG working group members, the *3D Planning Guide* has been forwarded to all U.S. missions and Combatant Commands, which are the physical meeting points for all of these planning documents.³⁰

It will likely take time before CCMDs begin to utilize the 3D Planning Guide. However, all CCMDs have an office and personnel who are primarily charged with interagency coordination, and it is apparent that effort is strong. Perhaps due to the nature of planning at the CCMD level where plans are broad and involve many interagency partners, there may be limited need to conduct coordination exclusively among the Three Ds, except in cases of crisis action planning for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or other very focused issues.

A CCMD maintains country plans that are nested within the TCP, but the true strategic CCMD planning and effort is regional in nature. Below that, working at the operational level, a Joint Task Force (JTF) or sub-unified command will look at a smaller slice of geography, and may or may not focus on individual countries. One group of military personnel consistently looking at country level issues are those assigned within the U.S. embassies under the Senior Defense Official (SDO), but they fall under COM authority and their responsibilities are quite different from the leader of a CCMD, JTF or sub-unified command. On the other hand, within DoS and USAID, long-term planning is conducted at the country level inside individual embassies.³¹ This fact leads to a potential for Three D strategic planning to become disconnected from DoS/USAID strategic level planning. Ensuring Three D coordination takes place at the country level between military CCMD strategic level planners, operational level military planners and planners within the embassy country team is essential to whole of government success.

At the tactical level Three D coordination can become much simpler. Tactical issues are usually less complex, involve fewer people and resources, are smaller in scale, and involve less fiscal risk. Often, the Three D partners needed to coordinate such activities are in close proximity to one another, as in the construct of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) where Three D representatives normally live and work together on a daily basis. Within the relatively small area of a PRT there are representatives from additional U.S. agencies, and any Three D issues are easily coordinated. According to LTC Michael Hert, Deputy Commanding Officer, PRT Paktya Province, speaking about his PRT interagency partners, "Due to the nature of our lines of effort none of us can operate in a silo and are very dependent on the other. . . . We

see each other daily and our living quarters are a few steps away from each other. . . . if you really need to talk about something you just wander over to their office space.”³²

For other tactical operators working in small teams, like Army Civil Affairs teams, Navy Maritime Civil Affairs Teams, or Travelling Contact Teams, it is vital that Three D coordination be completed through the Embassy Country Team prior to conducting operations. These types of teams operate at the tactical level, but tie in to DoS/USAID at the strategic level. Small team members tend to be more junior and have had less exposure and are less knowledgeable about their Three D partners in DoS and USAID, so it is critical that the need for Three D coordination be emphasized by those in the military chains of command at the operational and strategic levels. DoS and USAID have a more complete understanding of sociological and cultural issues which are important to consider during the planning process. Failure to conduct Three D coordination of small team activities can directly lead to non-alignment of United States actions, waste of resources and regression in host-nation relations and objectives.³³

Challenges and Mitigation³⁴

One of the most basic challenges to Three D coordination is simply promoting knowledge of the issue and getting buy-in and commitment from Three D actors. Most importantly, those at the highest levels of the Three D organizations must understand and advocate for Three D coordination. With the initiation of the 3DPG and the creation and promulgation of the *3D Planning Guide* from those within OSD (DoD), DoS, and USAID at the national level, the standard is set, and it is evident that the broader concept of interagency coordination is making progress at the CCMD and lower levels. Continued high-level emphasis on Three D and interagency coordination provided for

mid-level and junior personnel is required to ensure enthusiasm and understanding are communicated and espoused at each level within all three agencies.

In essence, Three D coordination is really about communication, which provides multi-faceted challenges. There are different sets of vocabulary, acronyms, and ways of dealing with classified information within the three agencies, which may lead to unintended lack of transparency about plans and operations.³⁵ One reliable way to mitigate the challenge of poor communication is to provide training at every level. Mr. John Dunlop of USAID, says that training is needed from top to bottom in all three agencies, specifically pointing out how critical it is for senior level personnel like ambassadors as well as very junior personnel like military company commanders to receive training. Having personally dealt with problems arising at the country level, Mr. Dunlop is emphatic that company commanders must understand the Three D concept and what it is that the other agencies are trying to accomplish.³⁶

In terms of being good stewards of United States taxpayer's dollars and promoting a synchronized United States foreign policy, it is essential for Three D representatives to understand the importance of their coordination efforts. It would be unwise for one USG agency to move forward on a development activity that runs counter to the objectives of another USG agency or overall USG objectives. Such a situation would detract from unity of effort, squander resources, detract from strategic goals, and cause confusion among host nation personnel about U.S. intentions. DoS and USAID are longtime close partners, both in Washington, DC and at the country level, skilled at coordinating development activities. However, there is a growing potential for increased Three D friction as DoD becomes more active in development

activities, making DoD's efforts to coordinate with DoS and USAID in order to ensure unity of effort, reduce friction and enhance alignment critical.

Understanding the motivations and organizational cultures of fellow Three D partners is also important. Each agency has objectives aimed at strengthening United States national security. While the outward manifestations of development may look similar, the desired affects, sometimes second or third order affects, may differ from agency to agency. For instance, CJTF-HOA does not build schools and other facilities for the sake of development itself, as USAID might. Instead the CJTF-HOA's development projects are primarily designed to impede the spread of violent extremism by building partner nation capacity. In the words of one of the recent commanders, CJTF-HOA does more than build facilities; it "helps mitigate the root conditions that contribute to instability."³⁷

Agency parochialism is potentially the most common challenge and one that cannot be overlooked. Mr. Dunlop admits protection of "rice bowls" can make it difficult for the three agencies to coordinate, both from the standpoint of protecting budgets and also from the standpoint of dealing with the red tape in transferring resources from one agency to another better equipped to deal with a particular problem. However, he also points out the sheer size difference in personnel and budget between DoD and USAID puts USAID in a position where they must defend the resources they have.³⁸

DoD's increased use of soft power available through the conduct of development projects has helped perpetuate the trend of downsizing within DoS and USAID. This atrophy of civilian power is noted in the most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and OSD recognizes the need for a rebalancing to take place: "adequate civilian capacity

will take time and resources to develop and . . . [DoD] will therefore continue to work with the leadership of civilian agencies to support the agencies' growth and their operations in the field, so that the appropriate military and civilian resources are put forth."³⁹ The soft power capabilities DoD has brought to bear over the last decade will not soon go away, but it is imperative the correct balance be struck and the Three D agencies continue their coordination efforts. According to the 2007 House Foreign Affairs Committee testimony of Michael Hess, then Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID, it is important to recognize that DoD's participation in foreign assistance/development efforts may blur the lines, leading to "confusion and misperceptions. USAID coordination with the DoD should not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broader foreign policy goals."⁴⁰

As pointed out by Mr. Dunlop, "The three organizations have different jobs, organizational goals, cultures, mindsets, vocabulary and doctrine."⁴¹ DoS is the face of the President's foreign policy in the world. At the country level, even though tour lengths are two or three years, ambassadors and USAID directors are likely to take a much longer term approach. In almost all countries, the U.S. Embassy has been in place for decades or centuries and has an established close relationship with the host nation. DoD does not necessarily share the same relationship. This is especially true when the mission is disaster response, or where the military is conducting phase O, IV or V operations.⁴² DoD's immediate goal is often to create enough goodwill to be able to maintain access and gather information or to begin the transition from a kinetic environment to one where civilians can safely operate. This focus leads to a short-term

approach and a desire for immediate results. Add tactical operators who have not been trained in working with interagency or Three D partners, and it becomes possible to lose sight of the overall U.S. foreign policy goals and simply concentrate on immediate results, as judged by the tactical team, without considering the multi-ordered effects. Shorter tour lengths for military personnel compound the issue since personnel do not have adequate time in a six-month or one-year tour to gain the same situational awareness and cultural understanding as their DoS or USAID counterparts. In addition to fully coordinating activities through the Three D process, military staffs can diminish this challenge by evaluating measures of effectiveness (MOE - "Are we doing the right things?") in addition to measures of performance (MOP - "Are we doing things right?")⁴³

In addition to having different geographic foci, DoD and DoS have regional boundaries that are not aligned. CCMD boundaries, as laid out in the Unified Command Plan, do not line up with State Department regional bureau boundaries. One can see positive and negative consequences that are beyond the scope of this paper, but additional coordination and communication challenges exist when an area of operations overlaps multiple boundaries for multiple Three D partners.

Best Practices

Interagency coordination is not a new initiative, and looking across the interagency reveals some best practices from which the Three D process already benefits, or possibly could. This section highlights a few of those practices. Starting with the basics, interagency action works more effectively when collegial relations are created. Getting to know one's Three D partners, understanding where those partners sit and what motivates them, and having the familiarity to be able to reach out and connect when needed is essential to transparent and effective Three D coordination.

Three D partners should make the effort to understand each other's language and perspective to enhance communications. The next step is to look for common desires, objectives and goals in order to leverage synergies to be gained through alignment. Knowing one's Three D partners will help, but it is also important to look to source documents from the national, theater and country level for assistance.⁴⁴

As mentioned earlier, top-level buy-in for Three D coordination is vital. The existence of the 3DPG is assuredly a best practice, and use of its product, the *3D Planning Guide*, is another one. Three D partners at every level may find ways to mirror the Three D actions of the NSC and 3DPG. CCDR buy-in is also essential, and it appears the majority espouse and understand the importance of "Interagency coordination." Two of the CCMDs take interagency coordination a step further by including civilians from DoS and USAID at all levels within their commands. USAFRICOM's J-9 Interagency Branch Chief, Mr. Bernie Dobner, states that "AFRICOM uses an 'Embedded Interagency' (vs. [Joint Interagency Coordination Group] JIACG) model" with "Regular collaborative meetings in the form of an [chartered] 'Interagency Board' [to] complement this 'embed' model."⁴⁵ The trend of CCMDs embedding interagency partners in their staff structures will likely continue to good effect. As they do so, it will be important to ensure the lines between defense and development do not blur too much, and that CCMDs retain the capability to defend the United States using traditional military power.

There is no, single model for interagency coordination. CCMDs establish interagency bodies, according to their main staff functions and responsibilities. Looking at the CCMDs provides two primary models: one where the office is located in the J3

and one where it is located in the J9 directorate. Using an alternative, the Joint Staff in Washington, DC maintains their Interagency Planning Branch within the Joint Operational War Plans Division, J5 directorate.⁴⁶ According to the USCENTCOM's Interagency Planning Branch Deputy Director, COL Mark Murphy, placement within the J3 means smoother interagency coordination, since the Division Director is also the Deputy J3 Director, enabling better visibility and quicker access to the J3 Director and Command Group.⁴⁷ On the other hand, USAFRICOM maintains its interagency branch within the J9, the Outreach Directorate. Operating from within a directorate focused on partners and away from the commotion of a directorate focused on operations and logistics provides distance and perspective for a branch that “plays a key part in driving process analysis, disseminating agency relevant information, recruiting/on-boarding, standardizing education and training, and raising staff awareness of interagency capabilities.”⁴⁸ In short, there are good reasons to place the interagency branch in specific locations depending on the command.

One of the original constructs for conducting interagency coordination is the embassy country team. Led by the COM, “the country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US programs and policies.”⁴⁹ Country team composition can vary, but generally is composed of FSOs from within the embassy, the USAID Director or Representative, representatives from other U.S. federal agencies, normally to include DoD, and any guests the COM wishes to incorporate. The COM chairs routine country team meetings for the purpose of formulating relevant policies. The COM assigns policy implementation to a lead agency, which coordinates with other

relevant agencies in the process, keeping the COM apprised of progress, queries for clarification, or obstacles. The country team also coordinates issues less formally on a daily basis via face to face contact, telephone and email in order to gain approval and keeps the COM apprised of plans and operations. All military staffs and teams should make every effort to coordinate operations through the COM and country team and gain a seat at country team meetings. Three D coordination through the country team will ensure that military plans and activities do not contradict or undermine existing policies, that the COM is aware of them, and that the timing is correct. For military personnel, teams and staffs, the first point of contact within the country team should be the Senior Defense Official (SDO), often dual-hatted as the Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT).

At the national level, USAID has put several best practices into use, starting with the advent of the Office of Military Affairs, which stood up in March 2005 “to serve as its primary point-of-contact with the U.S. Military and to implement the civilian side of the partnership between development and defense.”⁵⁰ The office is still going strong, and was recently renamed the “Office of Civilian Military Cooperation” in order to reflect more accurately the emphasis on *cooperation*. The office is an effective standard for Three D coordination and is made up of FSOs, General Schedule (GS) government employees and contract workers from the USAID Plans Division, one O5-O6 level liaison officer (LNO) from each GCC and two from USSOCOM, a representative from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N52 - Office of International Engagement, and a representative from the U.S. Marine Corps.⁵¹ Two other written documents which speak to agency-level commitment to Three D coordination are the concise *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy* quoted earlier and the more detailed

Civilian-Military Operations Guide, which states “USAID must develop closer coordination with the military community, to understand how to work alongside them, and to ensure that both civilian and military efforts are aimed at the same set of goals.” Published primarily for USAID employees, but useful for DoS and military partners, the guidebook addresses the challenges of civilian-military cooperation, providing insight into agency-specific planning models, vocabulary, and organization while providing real-world examples, as well as annexes dealing with specific interagency, particularly Three D, partners.⁵² The well-informed Three D participant should maintain this volume alongside the *3D Planning Guide* and *JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.

Two other practices that provide for better Three D relationships and flow of communications are the use of LNOs and holding regular Three D or interagency meetings. All three agencies make use of LNOs at most levels, including DoS use of Political Advisors (POLADs) on many high level military staffs and USAID’s addition of Senior Development Advisor (SDA) positions on CCMD staffs beginning in 2007.⁵³ DoD also maintains LNOs on Three D partner staffs at the national and country level.⁵⁴ Having LNOs on Three D partner staffs can often mean a seat at the table in events like regular U.S. embassy country team meetings, the staff JIACG or similar group, and any type of Three D meeting. Such opportunities continue to come into being and mature in order to better bind the Three D and interagency processes. Three D partners do well to seek out these venues to engage, coordinate, and synchronize their efforts.

Conclusion

The trend of U.S. military involvement and use of civil development activities that has grown so rapidly during the last decade are likely to continue into the future.

Twenty-first century warfare will likely involve irregular warfare in which development and assistance activities play a role to promote or protect U.S. national interests using a combination of hard and soft power. The U.S. military will also increasingly be called upon to flex its soft power in times of humanitarian crises. Coordination and collaboration among DoD, DoS and USAID will be keys to aligning efforts and reaping the cumulative benefit that will come from working synergistically as Three D partners. Three D coordination must start at the national level in Washington (i.e., the national security council) and be embraced within Combatant Commands and U.S. Embassies worldwide. Three D partners should provide training to their personnel and coordinate planning and operations from the strategic level down to the tactical, so that even junior personnel operating in small tactical teams understand how their actions work in concert with the efforts of their partners to attain U.S. national interests and objectives. Three D partners will continue to wrestle with how best to attain buy-in at all levels, improve communications, mitigate parochialism, and understand each other's motivations, goals, vocabulary, and cultures. Through dedication to training, relationship-building, understanding and commitment, the Three D partners will be able to come together and utilize best practices that include use of the *Three D Planning Guide* and other written direction/doctrine on interagency coordination, liaison officers on each other's staffs, and forums/meetings like Embassy country teams, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups and Three D meetings. Three D coordination requires compromise and work, but is crucial to ensuring transparent, aligned and responsible use of resources in pursuit of U.S. national interests.

Endnotes

¹ Brian T. Montgomery, Country Coordination Element Officer in Charge for the nation of Djibouti, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, January 2010-January 2011, personal experience and recollection. Kouta Bouyya Primary School, Dikhil District, Djibouti.

² U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *3D Planning Guide, Diplomacy, Development, Defense* [Pre-Decisional Working Draft] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2011), 4. USAID falls under Department of State for guidance and for representation at the cabinet level, but is otherwise an independent agency of the U.S. Government.

³ When spelled out, the order of the Three Ds is usually written as either “Defense, Diplomacy and Development” or “Diplomacy, Development and Defense.” This difference is illustrative of the fact that the process is not completely formalized and there is contention about which agency leads. Due to mix of two departments and one agency, the three will collectively be referred to as “agencies” periodically throughout this paper.

⁴ The author attempted to reach out to USSOCOM, and all GCCs except USNORTHCOM to interview each CCMD’s interagency lead. Neither USSOCOM nor USSOUTHCOM replied to electronic and voice messages requesting an interview. Public documents from all these CCMD websites, to include mission statements, strategy statements and congressional testimony were researched to gain perspective on how each CCMD embraces and makes use of Three D coordination. From this point forward, reference to the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) will mean USEUCOM, USPACOM, USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM. Though they are interagency players, NORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USSTRATCOM do not have enough potential Three D issues to have been required research subjects.

⁵ Military personnel, often assigned to Civil Affairs (CA) teams or Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), undertake development activities that include conducting Key Leader Engagements (KLE) with tribal and government leaders, conducting Medical, Dental and Veterinary Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs, DENTCAPs and VETCAPs), digging wells, distributing humanitarian assistance supplies, constructing schools, clinics and hospitals, and other engagements.

⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002).

⁷ “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy,” September 22, 2010, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/index.html> (accessed December 18, 2011), 1.

⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2011), xviii. JP 5-0 defines Interorganizational Coordination as “interaction that occurs among elements of DoD; engaged [U.S. Government] USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; [International Governmental Organizations] IGOs; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”

⁹ USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, July 2008), 1.

¹⁰ George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2005), 4.

¹¹ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 14-15.

¹² Hillary R. Clinton, *Leading Through Civilian Power, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, December 2010), 5.

¹³ USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, 3.

¹⁴ USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, April 2010), 5.

¹⁵ Michael G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011, Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2011), 1.

¹⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2011), II-2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs provides the following guidance "CCDRs, in conjunction with their counterparts in DoS, USAID, and other USG agencies, and other non-USG organizations and sectors, will determine how to coordinate planning and operations, actions, and activities and resources at the theater strategic and operational level to achieve strategic objectives."

¹⁷ *Ibid*, II-4.

¹⁸ Arthur Collins, U.S. Department of State, Branch Chief, Pol-Mil Policy and Planning, telephone interview by author, November 22, 2011.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *3D Planning Guide*, 8.

²⁰ John L. Dunlop, U.S. Agency for International Development, Acting Deputy Office Director and Chief, Plans Division, Office of Civilian Military Cooperation, USAID, telephone interview by author, December 14, 2011.

²¹ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *3D Planning Guide*, 4.

²² John L. Dunlop, telephone interview, December 14, 2011.

²³ USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, 3.

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Post Management Organization*, U. S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 2 Handbook 2, Section 207, September 22, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89604.pdf> (accessed December 16, 2011).

²⁵ “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy,” September 22, 2010, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/index.html> (accessed December 18, 2011), 6.

²⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, JP 3-08, IV-2.

²⁷ Arthur Collins, telephone interview, November 22, 2011.

²⁸ 3D Planning Group (3DPG), “3D Planning 101,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, DC, 3D Planning Group, October 24, 2011, 1. Additionally, slide 10 identifies three products or initiatives for the 3DPG in Washington, DC to work on, including both the *3D Planning Guide* and the slide briefing “3D Planning 101.” The additional item is a Three D pilot project that will focus on a subject like countering violent extremism or combating a pandemic illness where there is likely to be a great deal of Three D interest and effort overlap.

²⁹ 3D Planning Group (3DPG), “3D Planning 101,” 9.

³⁰ Peter Martinson, J5 Interagency Planning Branch, Joint Staff, telephone interview by author, November 10, 2011; Mr. Arthur Collins, telephone interview, November 22, 2011; Mr. John L. Dunlop, telephone, December 14, 2011. Additionally, Mr. Collins noted that the document would also be promoted at an upcoming Joint Worldwide Planners Conference.

³¹ John L. Dunlop, telephone interview, December 14, 2011.

³² LTC Michael Hert, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding Officer, Provincial Reconstruction Team Paktya Province, Afghanistan, email message to author, November 4, 2011.

³³ Tactical teams operating independently and without an appreciation for the importance of Three D Coordination to national level strategy implementation and success can too easily lead its junior personnel into seemingly small missteps that if blown out of proportion can result in a phenomenon known as “the strategic corporal.” Due to the speed and availability of modern media technology to capture and transmit content rapidly across the globe, the good intentions of these junior personnel can be misinterpreted so quickly and widely that a very junior person may unintentionally make a negative strategic statement with words or actions. Three D coordination won’t eliminate the possibility of such missteps, but will help mitigate the potential.

³⁴ For the purposes of this paper, discussion of challenges and best practices includes issues that the CCMD interagency coordination offices associate with the wider process of interagency coordination. There is a great deal of similarity and opportunity to glean value for Three D process function from interagency process lessons.

³⁵ DoS and USAID tend to keep things at the unclassified level to a much greater extent than DoD, and when there is classified information to deal with, the data systems handle it in two different ways that can lead to misunderstandings and further overclassification or worse yet, compromise of classified information. For instance, a document that is classified “SECRET” on a DoD system requires the user to specify to which countries the information is releasable. If there is no other indication, the information is assumed to be “No Caveat” meaning no foreigners may view the information. To be totally accurate, a document that cannot be seen by foreigners would have to be labeled “SECRET//REL USA” to indicate that only U.S. personnel with a Secret clearance and a need to know may view the document. This way of classifying

documents is necessary when operating in a coalition environment. In contrast, within a U.S. embassy, documents are not labeled in terms of releasability because there is normally no need to release to foreigners, unless the Ambassador or other high-level foreign service officer who has classification and release authority finds the need. In cases where it needs to be made clear, classified documents can be labeled “SECRET NOFORN” which is the equivalent to “No Caveat.” Consequently, when a document labeled “SECRET” initiated with DoS or USAID is forwarded through proper channels to DoD personnel, it will be assumed to be “No Caveat” or “NOFORN” though it may be releasable. By the same token, a “SECRET//REL XXX” document forwarded by DoD personnel to DoS/USAID personnel will transfer into DoS’ Class Net system as “SECRET” leaving an opportunity for spillage and compromise of classified information.

³⁶ John L. Dunlop, telephone interview, December 14, 2011.

³⁷ Brian L. Losey, “Conflict Prevention in East Africa.” *Prism 2*, no. 2 (March 2011), 78.

³⁸ John L. Dunlop, telephone interview, December 14, 2011.

³⁹ Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 69.

⁴⁰ Michael E. Hess, U.S. Agency for International Development, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, “USAID Official Testifies on Establishment of AFRICOM,” ProQuest document, August 2, 2007, <http://search.proquest.com/docprintview/471221637?accountid=4444> (accessed November 3, 2011).

⁴¹ John L. Dunlop, telephone interview, December 14, 2011.

⁴² Definitions of phases of a campaign or operation come from: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2011), xxiii-xxiv. Phase 0 is referred to as “Shape,” Phase IV is referred to as “Stabilize,” and Phase V is referred to as “Enable Civil Authority.”

⁴³ As an example, in the case of a water project, this means ensuring not only that the team or contractor builds a well that works properly, but also ensuring that the well has been placed in a good geographic position so that it does not lead to tribal tension or warfare, and that it is done in an environmentally sound way. This is exactly where the local and cultural knowledge of Three D partners from DoS and USAID can help ensure success.

⁴⁴ Documents like the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, *State’s Leading Through Civilian Power*, *The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, specific Bureau Strategic and Resource Plans (BSRPs) and Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (MSRPs), CCDR’s Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plans, as well as specific CCMD Country Cooperation Plans (CCPs) should be helpful.

⁴⁵ Bernard Dobner, Department of Defense, J9 Interagency Branch, U.S. Africa Command, email message to author, November 21, 2011. The USAFRICOM Interagency Board (IAB) is a chartered organization that meets every other week. The J9 Interagency Branch has responsibilities associated with the IAB, but is not a voting member.

⁴⁶ Peter Martinson, U.S. Joint Staff, Interagency Planning Branch, J5 Joint Operational War Plans Division, email message to author, November 14, 2011.

⁴⁷ COL Mark Murphy, U.S. Army, Interagency Plans Division Deputy, U.S. Central Command J3, telephone interview by author, December 12, 2011.

⁴⁸ Bernard Dobner, email message, November 21, 2011.

⁴⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, JP 3-08, xviii.

⁵⁰ Patricia Lerner, "Linking The Defense, Diplomatic And Development Communities to Reduce Forest Conflict," on or before February 8, 2006, <http://www.etfrn.org/etfrn/sdfc/presentations.htm> (accessed October 23, 2011).

⁵¹ John L. Dunlop, telephone interview, December 14, 2011.

⁵² USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, 5.

⁵³ USAID Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, 48. "(SDAs) are senior Foreign Service positions, and many of the new SDA officers have experience implementing development and stabilization programming in collaboration with DoD and DoS in GWOT countries...SDAs provide advice and counsel to Combatant Commanders regarding development, relief, reconstruction and stabilization issues in the AOR. SDAs will provide critical linkages for COCOMs with USAID headquarters and with bilateral USAID missions in a role analogous to that of the POLAD for the Department."

⁵⁴ Brian T. Montgomery, personal experience and recollection. A relatively recent construct being used by CJTF-HOA in East Africa is embedding O5-O6 level staff officers and their Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) assistants into U.S. embassies in most of the countries where CJTF-HOA conducts engagement. These Country Coordination Element (CCE) personnel are primarily tasked with ensuring Three D coordination of all CJTF-HOA activities. CJTF-HOA has seen much greater levels of coordination and synchronization, while Country Teams have experienced lower levels of frustration since the advent of the CCE in the middle of the last decade.