



# Understanding How They Attack Your Weaknesses: CAPEC



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### Agenda



8:00-8:45am	Software Security Knowledge about Applications Weaknesses		
9:00-9:45am	Software Security Knowledge about Attack Patterns Against Applications		
	Training in Software Security		
10:15-11:00am	Software Security Practice		
11:15-12:00am	Supporting Capabilities		
	Assurance Cases		
	Secure Development & Secure Operations		





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### The Long-established Principal of "Know Your Enemy"

One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious. Sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement."



Chapter 3: "Planning the Attack"
 The Art of War, Sun Tzu





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### The Importance of Knowing Your Enemy

An appropriate defense can only be established if you know how it will be attacked

#### Remember!

- Software Assurance must assume motivated attackers and not simply passive quality issues
- Attackers are very creative and have powerful tools at their disposal
- Exploring the attacker's perspective helps to identify and qualify the risk profile of the software



### What are Attack Patterns?



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- Blueprint for creating a specific type of attack
- Abstracted common attack approaches from the set of known exploits
- Capture the attacker's perspective to aid software developers, acquirers and operators in improving the assurance profile of their software





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# Leveraging Attack Patterns Throughout the Software Lifecycle

- Guide definition of appropriate policies
- Guide creation of appropriate security requirements (positive and negative)
- Provide context for architectural risk analysis
- Guide risk-driven secure code review
- Provide context for appropriate security testing
- Provide a bridge between secure development and secure operations



# **Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)**



#### Community effort targeted at:

- Standardizing the capture and description of attack patterns
- Collecting known attack patterns into an integrated enumeration that can be consistently and effectively leveraged by the community
- Gives you an attacker's perspective you may not have on your own

#### Excellent resource for many key activities

- Abuse Case development
- Architecture attack resistance analysis
- Risk-based security/Red team penetration testing
- Whitebox and Blackbox testing correlation
- Operational observation and correlation

#### Where is CAPEC today?

- http://capec.mitre.org
- Currently 386 patterns, stubs, named attacks









# What do Attack Patterns Look Like?



### Primary Schema Elements

- Identifying Information
  - Attack Pattern ID
  - Attack Pattern Name
- Describing Information
  - Description
  - Related Weaknesses
  - Related Vulnerabilities
  - Method of Attack
  - Examples-Instances
  - References
- Prescribing Information
  - Solutions and Mitigations
- Scoping and Delimiting Information
  - Typical Severity
  - Typical Likelihood of Exploit
  - Attack Prerequisites
  - Attacker Skill or Knowledge Required
  - Resources Required
  - Attack Motivation-Consequences
  - Context Description



### Supporting Schema Elements

- Describing Information
  - Injection Vector
  - Payload
  - Activation Zone
  - Payload Activation Impact
- Diagnosing Information
  - Probing Techniques
  - Indicators-Warnings of Attack
  - Obfuscation Techniques
- Enhancing Information
  - Related Attack Patterns
  - Relevant Security Requirements
  - Relevant Design Patterns
  - Relevant Security Patterns

## **Attack Pattern Description Schema Formalization**



Description

- Summary
- Attack\_Execution\_Flow
  - Attack\_Phase<sup>1..3</sup> (Name(Explore, Experiment, Exploit))
    - Attack\_Step<sup>1..\*</sup>
      - Attack\_Step\_Title
      - Attack\_Step\_Description
      - Attack\_Step\_Technique <sup>0..\*</sup>
        - Attack\_Step\_Technique\_Description
        - Leveraged\_Attack\_Patterns
        - Relevant\_Attack\_Surface\_Elements
        - Observables<sup>0..\*</sup>
        - Environments
      - Indicator<sup>0.,\*</sup> (ID, Type(Positive, Failure, Inconclusive))
        - Indicator\_Description
        - Relevant\_Attack\_Surface\_Elements
        - Environments
      - Outcome<sup>0.,\*</sup> (ID, Type(Success, Failure, Inconclusive))
        - Outcome\_Description
        - Relevant\_Attack\_Surface\_Elements
        - Observables<sup>0..\*</sup>
        - Environments
      - Security Control<sup>0..\*</sup> (ID, Type(Detective, Corrective, Preventative))
        - Security\_Control\_Description
        - Relevant\_Attack\_Surface\_Elements
        - Observables<sup>0..\*</sup>



Homeland Environments Security Observables<sup>0..\*</sup>

臣	Blind SQL Injection			
Attack Pattern ID	7	Pattern Abstraction: Detailed		
Typical Severity	High			
Description	error messages are considered by Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a the error messages that facilitate through simple Boolean SQL expr injection was successful based or determines how and where the ta In order to achieve this usin For example, an attacker may the result is the same as when the the application is vulnerable to SO database server to extract inform database using the following type "username' AND ascii(lower(st > 108".	ubstring((SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype='U'), 1, 1))) properly, then the attacker knows that the first character in a table name on m and z. If it doesn't, then the attacker knows that the character must course that table names only contain alphabetic characters). By character positions, the attacker can determine all table names in the ocker may execute an actual attack and send something like:		

### **Complete CAPEC Entry Information**





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### A Few Key Use Cases for CAPEC in Support of SwA



- Help developers understand weaknesses in their real-world context (how they will be attacked)
- Objectively identify specific attacks under which software must demonstrate resistance, tolerance and resilience for a given level of assurance
- Indirectly scope which weaknesses are relevant for a given threat environment
- Identify relevant mitigations that should be applied as part of policy, requirements, A&D, implementation, test, deployment and operations
- Identify and characterize patterns of attacks for security test case generation
- Identify and characterize threat TTPs for red teaming
- Identify relevant issues for automated tool selection
- Identify and characterize issues for automated tool results analysis





# **CAPEC Status**



Where is CAPEC today?

#### •V1.4

•Massive schema changes

Including addition of Observables structure

Some new content

Added initial set of network attack patterns

### •V1.5

•Added ~25 new network attack patterns

•Added enhanced material to ~35 patterns

•New View added for WASC Threat Taxonomy 2.0

•Added ~65 mappings to CWE and several within CAPEC

#### •V1.6

Added 7 new application framework attack patterns as well as 68 new attack patterns in three new attack pattern categories: Physical Security Attacks, Social Engineering Attacks & Supply Chain Attacks
Added ~35 mappings to CWE and several within CAPEC

Currently 386 patterns, stubs, named attacks; 68 categories and 6



## **CAPEC Current Content** (15 Major Categories)



1000 - Mechanism of Attack •Data Leakage Attacks - (118) •Resource Depletion - (119) •Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) - (152) •Spoofing - (156) •Time and State Attacks - (172) •Abuse of Functionality - (210) •Exploitation of Authentication - (225) Probabilistic Techniques - (223) •Exploitation of Privilege/Trust - (232) •Data Structure Attacks - (255) •Resource Manipulation - (262) •Physical Security Attacks (436) •Network Reconnaissance - (286) Social Engineering Attacks (403) •Supply Chain Attacks (437)



### CAPEC Current Content (Which Expand to...)



Exploitation of Authentication - (225) 1000 - Mechanism of Attack Data Leakage Attacks - (118) Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Data Excavation Attacks - (116) Credentials - (21) Data Interception Attacks - (117) Authentication Abuse - (114) Resource Depletion - (119) Authentication Bypass - (115) Violating Implicit Assumptions Regarding XML Content (aka XML Denial Exploitation of Privilege/Trust - (232) of Service (XDoS)) - (82) Privilege Escalation - (233) Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible) - (22) **Resource Depletion through Flooding - (125)** Resource Depletion through Allocation - (130) Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution - (30) Resource Depletion through Leak - (131) Subvert Code-signing Facilities - (68) Denial of Service through Resource Depletion - (227) Target Programs with Elevated Privileges - (69) Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) - (152) Exploitation of Authorization - (122) Remote Code Inclusion - (253) Hijacking a privileged process - (234) Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) - (5) Data Structure Attacks - (255) SQL Injection - (66) Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies - (31) Email Injection - (134) Buffer Attacks - (123) Format String Injection - (135) Attack through Shared Data - (124) LDAP Injection - (136) Integer Attacks - (128) Parameter Injection - (137) Pointer Attack - (129) Reflection Injection - (138) Resource Manipulation - (262) Code Inclusion - (175) Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies - (31) Resource Injection - (240) Input Data Manipulation - (153) Script Injection - (242) **Resource Location Attacks - (154)** Command Injection - (248) Infrastructure Manipulation - (161) Character Injection - (249) File Manipulation - (165) XML Injection - (250) Variable Manipulation - (171) DTD Injection in a SOAP Message - (254) Configuration/Environment manipulation - (176) Spoofing - (156) Abuse of transaction data strutcture - (257) Content Spoofing - (148) Registry Manipulation - (269) Identity Spoofing (Impersonation) - (151) Schema Poisoning - (271) Protocol Manipulation - (272) Action Spoofing - (173) Time and State Attacks - (172) Network Reconnaissance - (286) Forced Deadlock - (25) ICMP Echo Request Ping - (285) Leveraging Race Conditions - (26) TCP SYN Scan - (287) Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions -ICMP Echo Request Ping - (288) (29) Infrastructure-based footprinting - (289) Manipulating User State - (74) Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records - (290) Abuse of Functionality - (210) DNS Zone Transfers - (291) Functionality Misuse - (212) Host Discovery - (292) Abuse of Communication Channels - (216) Traceroute Route Enumeration - (293) Forceful Browsing - (87) ICMP Address Mask Request - (294) Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL - (48) ICMP Timestamp Request - (295) Probing an Application Through Targeting its Error Reporting - (54) **ICMP Information Request - (296)** WSDL Scanning - (95) TCP ACK Ping - (297) API Abuse/Misuse - (113) UDP Ping - (298) Try All Common Application Switches and Options - (133) TCP SYN Ping - (299) Cache Poisoning - (141) Port Scanning - (300) Software Integrity Attacks - (184) TCP Connect Scan - (301) **Directory Traversal - (213)** TCP FIN scan - (302) TCP Xmas Scan - (303) Analytic Attacks - (281) Probabilistic Techniques - (223) TCP Null Scan - (304) TCP ACK Scan - (305) Fuzzing - (28) Homelan Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens - (39) TCP Window Scan - (306) TCP RPC Scan - (307) UDP Scan - (368) S SEDI FFRDC is managed and operated by The MITRE Corporation for DHS. ecurity Screen Temporary Files for Sensitive Information - (155)



## CAPEC Current Content (386 Attacks...)



## **Current Maturation Paths**



- Extend coverage of CAPEC
- Improve quality of CAPEC
- Expand the scope of CAPEC
- Bridge secure development with secure operations
- Improve integration with other standards (MAEC, CEE, etc.)
- Expand use of CAPEC





•V1.7 (within the next month or two)

- •Will flesh out ~30-40 stub patterns to full patterns
- •Will include existing content that has been refined for quality & consistency
- •Will incorporate initial use of the Observables sub-schema

•Strategic focus for the near to mid-term will be on utilizing CAPEC as a bridge between secure development and secure operations

- •Continue expanding and refining content
- •Continue expanding outreach and supporting CAPEC use
- •Establish initial compatibility program



# **Questions?**

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