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THESIS

**UNITED NATIONS LED DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) IN
THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

by

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December 2011

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**UNITED NATIONS LED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION (DDR) IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO**

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requirements for the degree of

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(STABILIZATION & RECONSTRUCTION)**

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC, was deployed following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July of 1999. A core pillar of the mission, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have attempted to address the issue of multiple armed nonstate actors operating, primarily in the country's eastern districts of Ituri, North and South Kivu. MONUC's DDR initiatives can be subdivided into the national DDR program for Congolese combatants and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. Although there has been some success in the DDR(RR) programs over the past 12 years of UN deployment, rampant insecurity attributed to the presence of armed groups in the DRC continues to plague the east. An examination of the DDR process in the east reveals that although the UN has assisted in the implementation of large, multidimensional DDR and DDRRR programs in, the situational context, voluntary approach, and links to Security Sector Reform (SSR) have all proven inadequate to achieving stability through DDR.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire
ALIR	Army for the Liberation of Rwanda
CCOC	Coordinated Joint Operation Centre
CI-DDR	Inter-Ministerial Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
CGFDR	DDR Financial Management Committee
CONADER	National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DDR(RR)	Referring broadly to both the DDR of combatants and the DDRRR of foreign combatants programs
DCR	Disarmament Community Reinsertion
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAC	Congolese Armed Forces
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FAR	Armed Forces of Rwanda (1962-1994)
FAZ	Armed Forces of Zaire
FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy
FDLR	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
FNI	Nationalist and Integrationist Front
FNL	National Forces of Liberation
GoDRC	Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards

IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MRND	Movement for Democracy and Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PNDDR	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TPVM	Third Party Verification Mechanism
RCD-G	Rally for Congolese Democracy - Goma
RCD – ML	Rally for Congolese Democracy – Movement for Liberation
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMI	Military Integration Structure
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNAMID	UN/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defense Force

I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Following on the heels of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) first deployed a monitoring force of just over 5,000 personnel. Eleven years later, the renamed United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) shifted its strategy from supporting the transitional government to protecting civilians in the east of the country. In the process, MONUSCO has become the largest and most expensive UN mission to date, totaling 24,378 personnel with an annual budget of just under \$1.4 billion.¹

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of national armed groups and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups operating in the eastern Congolese provinces of Ituri and North and South Kivu were scarcely addressed in the early years of the UN's presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Now, they have become the central focus of MONUSCO's mandate. But, as the importance of DDR(RR) activities in the east have gained recognition, so have criticisms of the program's effectiveness, especially as armed violence continues to exact a toll on the civilian population of the DRC. This thesis seeks to examine the growth and evolution of DDR practices both in the context of the complex situation that exists in the eastern DRC and how they measure up to broader UN DDR standards. How have the DDR(RR) programs in the eastern DRC evolved over time? Why do armed opposition groups continue to pose security concerns despite over a decade of ongoing UN DDR(RR) initiatives?

B. IMPORTANCE

Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have experienced rapid change in response to the emergence of widespread, protracted intrastate conflict. As

¹ "United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo," accessed May 10, 2011, <http://monusco.unmissions.org/>.

mission strategies and procedures adjust to meet the growing challenge of nonstate actors and their use of violence against civilian populations, DDR programs have become increasingly accepted as vital pieces of many mission mandates. Currently administrating thirteen DDR programs worldwide, the United Nations has taken a lead in DDR program development with a comprehensive approach it outlined in its 2006 publication *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* or the *IDDRS*.

Between three and five million Congolese are estimated to have perished since 1994, which ranks the DRC among the worst cases of prolonged human suffering since World War II. The central role DDR(RR) currently plays in stabilizing the eastern DRC makes its success highly relevant to ongoing UN interventions and future UN DDR doctrine. Understanding the role of UN DDR(RR) activities in the DRC not only adds value to the ongoing MONUSCO operation, but also will contribute to the operational knowledge in the larger DDR community as a whole.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Although the Congolese wars are officially over, violence and the suffering of the civilian population in the eastern provinces of the DRC continues, despite the efforts of the national government and the presence of the world's largest UN mission. Confronted with widespread violence perpetrated by multiple armed groups, UN peacekeepers have increased and broadened their DDR activities as a primary tool to reduce violence and restore order. But, as the mission's leadership and strategy change, barriers are emerging that question the efficacy of disarmament and demobilization tactics, challenge the success of the reintegration of ex-combatants, and cast doubt on the viability of DDR as a tool for achieving peace in the eastern DRC. Scholars and practitioners worldwide stand to gain significant insight into successful DDR by understanding how these shifts in DDR strategy came about in the DRC, and what this might mean both for international DDR standards and the success of MONUSCO as a peacekeeping mission.

The argument of this thesis is that, once the voluntary approach to DDR(RR) failed, MONUC adopted more coercive tactics. Not only are these tactics often at odds

with its mandate to seek voluntary compliance from armed groups, but also, they have not addressed the underlying factors that encourage armed violence in the Eastern Congo. As a consequence, despite the burgeoning scope and cost of the mission, armed groups have proliferated and the security situation for the local population continues to be critical in the eastern provinces of the country.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The substantial literature on the DRC reflects the length, complexity, and immensity of conflict. Additionally, a multitude of works regarding UN DDR activities have been published in response to the numerous UN-led DDR initiatives around the world. This research is focused on material relevant to UN DDR activities in the eastern Congolese provinces since the introduction of MONUC in 1999. The literature review will begin with a brief survey of the historical situation in the eastern DRC in general, then move to UN DDR activity specifically, and finally look at the thematic topics.

The three most relevant works pertaining to historical accounts of the conflict are those of Prunier, Stearns, and Autesserre.² While Prunier and Stearns each provide comprehensive historical accounts of the conflict beginning with the end of the Rwandan civil war in 1994, Autesserre presents an in-depth assessment of international intervention in the east. Complementing these scholarly works are a series of reports on the current situation in the eastern DRC, including works from the UN, *Oxford Analytica*, *Forced*

² Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jason K. Stearns, *Dancing with Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011); Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Migration Review, and the Congressional Research Service.³ While these works disagree in points of analysis and suggestions for successful conflict resolution, they concur that the international community has thus far failed to achieve peace.

The literature concerned with intervention in the DRC is unanimous that the UN mission in the eastern DRC, despite certain areas of progress, has failed so far to fulfill its mandate to protect the populations and organizations in the eastern provinces. An integral part of the overall strategy for creating a lasting peace, the DDR(RR) process has been scrutinized by the academic and peacekeeping communities in order to better understand its role in conflict reduction. The first major theme to emerge in the literature relating to DDR(RR) processes in the DRC is the inability of the international community to tailor a program to adequately address a problem of this magnitude. Utilizing two metrics for measuring success in MONUC's deployment in the DRC, Denis Tull finds that the UN mission's approach to the problem has been both reactive and under-resourced.⁴ Acknowledging the immense complexities associated with the conflict, and the failure of MONUC's DDR strategy, a body of literature has emerged supporting a locally oriented, or bottom-up approach, in DDR activities, challenging the current focus on top-down strategies.⁵

³ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2011/20 (January 17, 2011); United Nations Security Council, *Thirty-First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2010/164 (March 30, 2010); United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2010/512 (October 8, 2010); Oxford Analytica, "Congo-Kinshasa: FDLR Threat Continues in Kivus," *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, July 23, 2009; Pierra Jacquemot, "The Dynamics of Instability in Eastern DRC," *Forced Migration Review*, No.36 (2010); Ted Dagne, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 1, 2011).

⁴ Denis M.Tull. "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2 (2009): 215–230

⁵ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security*, Vol.2, No.1 (2009), 29–58; Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M.Weinstein, "Demobilization and Reintegration," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.51, No.4 (August 2007), p.531; Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*; Jeremy Ginifer, "Peacebuilding in the Congo: Mission Impossible?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.9, No. 3 (Fall 2002), 121–128.

As with all DDR operations worldwide, timing has been a key issue in the DDR(RR) process as supported by MONUC. Discussed by general DDR theorists⁶ as well as case studies concerned with the DRC,⁷ timely implementation of a DDR process reduces the number of weapons and returns former combatants to civil society. The successful implementation of voluntary DDR relies on the adherence by belligerent groups to a comprehensive peace agreement.⁸ Because peace agreements failed in the DRC, MONUC forces have struggled to demobilize groups, turning to coercive tactics in some cases.⁹ This perceived shift in mandate by UN forces has clearly changed the dynamics of international intervention and challenged the assumption that voluntary engagement in DDR activities is necessary for success. While there exists very sparse literature pertaining to the use of coercive force versus voluntary recruitment in a DDR process, a 2008 Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Shane Doolan¹⁰ is one of the few works analyzing the use of coercive DDR in peacekeeping operations. There is no in-depth analysis directly addressing coercive versus voluntary DDR strategies in the eastern DRC.

Another constant theme in the literature concerned with DDR(RR) activities in the DRC has been the interrelationship between DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR). The situation in the eastern DRC presents a unique problem set for UN peacekeeping

⁶ Nat J.Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction," in Robert I.Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.170; United States Institute of Peace, and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace: U.S.Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009).

⁷ Eirin Mobekk, "Security Sector Reform," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2 (2009), 273–286; Tull, "Peacekeeping in DRC."

⁸ Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M.Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141; United States Institute for Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*; Prunier, *Africa's World War*.

⁹ Jim Terrie, "The use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC," *African Security Review*, Vol.18, No.1 (2009); Now on PBS, "Can the U.N.Keep the Peace?" (Washington, DC: Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 2009).

¹⁰ Shane R Doolan, "Coercive Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) can it be Successful?" (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008).

personnel as violent abuses of the population are carried out not only by the multitude of armed nonstate actors, but also by an unruly national army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and even by undisciplined UN peacekeeping personnel. Discussing the nexus between SSR and DDR in the DRC, several authors¹¹ advocate a reevaluation of DDR-SSR processes, such as integration into the FARDC, rather than disarmament and demobilization of armed rebel groups. But until the FARDC can be trusted as a professional army representative of the country's national interest, DDR of nonstate actors will prove particularly difficult. Likewise, without DDR, SSR will lack an important tool to reduce the means for armed groups to wage campaigns of violence against the government and civilian populations of the east. But while this linkage is clearly indicated by a broad range of publications, the interface of strategies to bridge the gaps between SSR, DDR, and weapons reduction remain poorly understood.¹²

The final major discussion relating to UN-sponsored DDR in the eastern DRC pertains to the reintegration process. Widely regarded as the most challenging, expensive, time-consuming, but also the most important part of the DDR process, reintegration in the DRC is further complicated by the additional need for repatriation and resettlement of armed foreign groups. While there does exist extensive literature on

¹¹Mobekk, "Security Sector Reform," 273–286; Renner Onana and Hannah Taylor, "MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4 (October 2008), 501–516; Henri Boshoff, "Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Numbers Game," *African Security Review*, Vol.18, No.1 (March 2009), 70–73.

¹² Robert Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.27, No.1 (2006), 190; Alan Bryden, *Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa* (New York, NY: United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2007).

repatriation strategies,¹³ Hans Romkema De Veenhoop provides an excellent summation of the current repatriation activities in the DRC.¹⁴

This thesis will focus in how these different areas of DDR have been addressed in the DRC, what have been the biggest barriers to success, and how the UN mission has adapted its DDR policy in an attempt to create a successful DDR program. Specifically, the gaps addressed by this thesis include exploring bottom-up local solutions to problems of reintegration and identifying shifts in MONUC DDR policy towards more coercive methods in an attempt forcibly to disarm and process combatants.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will utilize process tracing of DDR activities in the DRC since the deployment of MONUC in 1999. Aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge responsible for influencing contemporary DDR practices and guidelines, the focus of this work will be on explaining the conflict in the DRC, how DDR activities have been utilized by the international community in the eastern provinces, and comparing these findings to current UN DDR guidelines in order to answer the major research question posed above.

In addition to the literature summarized in the above review, this thesis will draw upon all pertinent archived UN Security Council resolutions and reports of the Secretary General to gain a better understanding of background and current DDR practices in the DRC. This understanding will be comparatively analyzed against current UN DDR standards including the updated 2011 *IDDRS* and the 2010 publication *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Practices in Peace*

¹³ Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” 531; Colletta et al., “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 170–181; Sigrid Willibald, “Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes,” *Disasters*, Vol.30, No.3 (2006), 316; United States Institute for Peace, *Guiding Principles*; Hugo de Vries, and Nikkie Wiegink, “Breaking Up and Going Home? Contesting Two Assumptions in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.18, No.1 (2011), 38.

¹⁴ Hans Romkema de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington, DC: Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007).

Operations. These two publications will provide a comprehensive understanding of current UN DDR standards and practices against which to measure the experience in the eastern DRC.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter II will provide an overview of contemporary UN DDR doctrine. Focusing on the 2006 *IDDRS*, a comparison between Traditional DDR and Second Generation DDR is leveraged to explain the concept of Integrated DDR. Chapter III provides a brief background on state formation and internal conflict in the DRC to provide context for the conflict into which MONUC deployed in 1999. Chapter IV traces the deployment of MONUC forces and the development of DDR and DDRRR activities. Chapter V examines the use of a voluntary framework for DDR and explores how MONUC has utilized coercive means to achieve its goals. Chapter VI explores linkages with Security Sector Reform and how the process of army integration is at odds with broader DDR goals. Chapter VII concludes the thesis and provides lessons learned for future DDR missions. The overall aim of this thesis is to provide analysis on the development and implementation of the ongoing UN DDR mission in the DRC and how the international community may learn from the challenges and success unique to this case.

II. DDR BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

First published in 2006, the *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* (IDDRS) represent a major milestone in the development of UN DDR doctrine. The product of an interagency group comprised of fifteen UN agencies, funds, departments, and programs,¹⁵ the IDDRS is the first attempt to document an all-encompassing framework for DDR operations at both the strategic and operational levels. Although the emergence of the IDDRS is the first formal document addressing UN DDR protocol, it is not the first emergence of UN sponsored DDR activities within its peacekeeping missions. The first UN actions dealing with DDR date back to Security Council Resolution 650 in 1990 which expanded the mandate of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to include the demobilization of anti-government elements in Nicaragua.¹⁶ Since then, the UN has participated in administering or assisting DDR campaigns in more than 20 countries.¹⁷

In order to understand current UN DDR doctrine, this chapter traces the development of UN DDR strategy and policy from its initial beginnings in the 1990s to the current concept of Second Generation DDR and the IDDRS guidelines. Surveying documents from the Security Council, UNDP, UNDPKO, and prominent DDR scholars and practitioners, a pattern is established that has ultimately led to the adoption of the

¹⁵ United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG-DDR), *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*, (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010): 281. The IAWG is composed of: Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI), International Labour Organization (ILO), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 650*, (March 27, 1990)

¹⁷ IAWG-DDR, *Operational Guide*, 13.

IDDRS as a standard. Planners and practitioners are advised to utilize the IDDRS as a strong source of operational planning and implementation, but are cautioned to remain aware of the specific context of the conflict zones and the flexibility required to remain effective in such varied environments. Breaking down the development of DDR doctrine into two broad categories, contemporary DDR operations are characterized as Traditional, Second Generation, but most often, are a combination of the two.

B. TRADITIONAL DDR

In the decade following ONUCA, DDR activities emerged in many UN peacekeeping operations including missions to Guatemala, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Liberia, Angola, Croatia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.¹⁸ Yet, as these activities were recognized as pivotal aspects to UN peace-building, there was no formalized understanding of DDR as a practice. But by 2000, two important documents emerged providing the first articulation of Traditional DDR. In response to a request from the Security Council, the 2000 *Report of the Secretary General: The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration* details specific roles and responsibilities of UN peacekeeping personnel during DDR activities within a UN peacekeeping mission. Published within months of the Secretary-General's report, the UN DPKO's *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment* discusses many of the same points but provides a further breakdown of DDR related tasks with specific procedures to ensure success.

Traditional DDR is first described in these two documents and has since been further developed and implemented in a multitude of missions to the present. Concerned primarily with logistical operations around the removal of weapons and swift processing of ex-combatants, Traditional DDR tends to be administered in a top-down fashion and

¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General: The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, UN Doc S/2000/101 (February 11, 2000), 3.

focuses on short-term results.¹⁹ Often understood as a linear process aimed at completely eliminating the military capabilities of belligerent forces, Traditional DDR generally begins with disarmament. “Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences.”²⁰ Within this paradigm, the first, and often most visible, phase is disarmament.

1. Disarmament

Disarmament can be characterized as:

The collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management programs, including their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction.²¹

Put simply, disarmament is the removal and management of weapons in a given conflict, or post-conflict zone. Essentially, the disarmament process fulfills two main roles in the peace process. First, the physical elimination of weapons quite literally removes the means by which belligerents can wage war and incite violence. Second, the absence of arms helps create a stable environment wherein combatants may build confidence in the peace process and a common sense of security.²² Thus by removing the means for violence, a secure setting is created where parties may be confident in their safety and trust in the peace-building process.

Procedurally, disarmament generally follows a timeline of assembling cantonment zones for the concentration and disarmament of forces, registry of collected weapons and ammunition, and proper disposal or storage of said weapons. Simultaneous with these activities, UN forces are also concerned with weapons management both locally and

¹⁹ Desmond Molloy, “DDR: A Shifting Paradigm & The Scholar/Practitioner Gap,” *Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Occasional Paper*, (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2008): 3.

²⁰ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines*, (New York, NY: United Nations, 2000): 16.

²¹ United Nations Security Council, *Peacekeeping in Disarmament*, 2.

²² Spear, “Disarmament,” 142.

regionally. This includes the promotion and publication of legal frameworks for the ownership and procurement of weapons including enforcement mechanisms, as well as the prevention of illicit arms trafficking into the conflict zone.²³ At the ground level, these issues are aided by the presence of UN peacekeepers to observe arms flows and police borders. However, to effectively address these areas the UN must supplement local level policing with international arms embargos and regional appeal for the termination of the flow of arms.

2. Demobilization

Following on the heels of disarmament in Traditional DDR, demobilization

Refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military force.²⁴

Aimed at deconstructing the organizational structure of the armed group, demobilization disbands armed units, eliminates the chain of command including organizational rank and status, and removes the symbols of a combatant's military life (such as weapons, uniforms and insignias). In addition to organizational deconstruction, demobilization should also be a chance for DDR personnel to collect vital information on the ex-combatants that aids in the forthcoming reintegration process.²⁵ Surveying needs and aspirations, providing medical examinations, and gathering information on where ex-combatants and their dependents are from are a few areas of information vital to the reintegration process.

²³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Disarmament...Principles and Guidelines*, 55–56.

²⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Peacekeeping in Disarmament*, 2.

²⁵ Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.41, No.4 (July 2004), 57.

Following initial processing of disarmed combatants, traditional concepts of demobilization value the creation of cantonment sites to secure continued commitment to demobilization by ex-combatants. Cantonment sites provide two main contributions to the demobilization process. First, by keeping all the demobilizing forces in one location, DDR practitioners are capable of promising security and basic needs to the ex-combatants without taking away the possibility of re-mobilizing in the event of a breach in peace and a sudden need to take up arms. While this backslide into conflict seems to be at odds with the DDR process, the assurance that they can be ready to mobilize with their unit increases buy-in during the demobilization process. Second, cantonment sites provide various UN and NGO groups a venue to begin sensitization training, education and vocational training, and medical and psychological treatment of ex-combatants. These training opportunities and evaluations are critical for successful demobilization and reintegration.

It should be noted that not contexts call for the reintegration of demobilized forces into civilian life. In cases where the peace agreement mandates the creation of a new, unified national armed force, demobilized combatants are often called upon to be integrated into the new national force.²⁶ Although a significantly easier transition for most combatants than that of reintegration into civilian society, integration into a new armed forces should not cut the corners of disarmament and demobilization. As will be shown in the case of the DRC, attempts to absorb rebel units into the national army failed to deconstruct previous personal and ideological allegiances to the former rebel movement and thus resulted in issues of parallel chains of command and even a resumption of armed opposition by former rebel units.²⁷

²⁶ Spear, “Disarmament,” 147.

²⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 14 May 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc S/2009/253 (May 18, 2009), 8.

3. Reintegration

The final, and often most challenging, phase in Traditional DDR is reintegration.

Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects.²⁸

Reintegration during a Traditional DDR operation must therefore provide ex-combatants, and the communities they return to, a sense of physical and economic security to ensure they do not relapse back into organized violence. Reintegration is a crucial part of peace-building as it incentivizes a return to society for ex-combatants through the provision of security and economic and social opportunities. Reintegration addresses issues of security in several ways. First, it must provide security to the disarmed combatants so they continue to feel safe from the conflict in which they were once armed. Second, a reintegration strategy must address the possibility of “microinsecurities” where members of the general population feel at risk of being victimized by crimes perpetrated by former combatants. Finally, reintegration must address “macroinsecurities” amongst society as a displeased or underfunded ex-combatants may lead to fear of organized state insurrection.²⁹

Procedurally, reintegration must work to develop economic opportunities in order to ensure continued commitment by ex-combatants. This first takes the form of education and vocational training. Basic education and vocational training increases the abilities of ex-combatants, and their dependents, to secure employment and contribute to the local economy. But, beyond the development of skills, job creation and infrastructure development are also necessary. These are important areas for consideration as in many post-conflict settings employment tends to be oversaturated with labor and injecting new bodies into the job market without creating new opportunities will create points of

²⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Peacekeeping in Disarmament*, 2.

²⁹ Spear, “Disarmament,” 146.

confliction in the community. Additionally, community level development initiatives and infrastructure improvement provides assistance to the local economy, creating an environment that benefits all.

4. General Characteristics of Traditional DDR

The above concepts were initially formed in the 1990s and early 2000s by DDR scholars and practitioners as an attempt to standardize DDR practices. In addition to the knowledge pertaining to the individual phases of DDR, a few general characteristics for operations have also emerged. Relevant to the overall success of DDR operations, these five points of consideration are vital to the overall success of a Traditional DDR program. The first area relates to whether the DDR program is carried out utilizing voluntary or coercive means. Do combatants elect to disarm, enter a cantonment site, and reintegrate, or are they forced to following a military loss to opposing belligerent or peace-enforcement forces? Second, adequate planning is needed at all phases of DDR to ensure the proper implementation of the program. Third, the issue of timing is relevant, both with regards to when to start the overall program, and when to transition between different phases. Fourth, targeting is important. Who should the DDR program target and for what reasons? Finally, a process of verification is needed at every level of the process.

The record of voluntary versus coerced DDR programs is asymmetrical. Since 1990, the vast majority of operations have required a voluntary framework. Voluntary DDR is commonly associated with UN deployments following a cease-fire or peace agreement. This stands in contrast to coercive disarmament operations, which are deployed by either clear victors or outside interveners, such as India in Sri Lanka, the U.S. in Somalia and Haiti, and UN interventions in Albania and Haiti.³⁰ Nevertheless, DDR operations that were begun under a voluntary framework are often forced to adopt coercive means as belligerent forces either adopt semi-permissive participation, or renege

³⁰ Ibid., 142; Doolan, "Coercive Disarmament," 1–72.

on their peace agreements and disavow their participation in the voluntary program.³¹ Thus a major aspect of the deployment of a DDR program is the degree to which the targeted population is committed to the process, and the degree to which the implementing force is committed to the use of force to ensure compliance.

At both the micro and macro levels, adequate planning is needed before the implementation of Traditional DDR programs. Planning for DDR operations includes, among other things, identifying who is to be processed, to what extent they will be disarmed (i.e., just heavy weapons or all light and heavy armaments), the creation of a viable but flexible timeline of events, locations for arms collections and cantonment sites, logistics relating to the transportation of ex-combatants back to their communities, and organization of funding for the various steps in the process.³² Additionally, adequate time must be allotted for the implementation of the program. Expectations must be set with donors for both material and financial resources to ensure that the operation is seen through to its conclusion.

Issues of timing and targeting are of direct concern to Traditional DDR practitioners. From the very onset of a peace agreement it is important to include an initial framework for the establishment of a DDR program to maintain momentum and increase commitment to the peace processes.³³ Likewise, security conditions will have a direct effect on when a belligerent force is willing to give up their arms. Targeting the proper groups to be included in the program is imperative to ensure successful reintegration. This entails addressing the needs of not only the ex-combatants, but also those of their dependents and the communities they are to reintegrate into. Traditional

³¹ Fred Tanner, "Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament," in Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2006), 169.

³² United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines*, 31–43.

³³ United Nations Security Council, *Peacekeeping in Disarmament*, 22.

DDR doctrine also calls for special attention to be given to the reintegration of child soldiers, recommending a minimum of three years' commitment of resources to guarantee successful reintegration with society.³⁴

The final area of consideration in Traditional DDR operations is the development of clear and manageable verification methods, especially during the disarmament process. Important at every level of the process, verification ensures that the DDR processes are continuing in a clear and transparent fashion and provide early warning indicators for potential spoilers to the process. Verification methods include data crosschecking, UN monitoring and observing forces, and, in some cases, enforcement search and seizures of weapons and ammunition.³⁵

Since the first mention of DDR in ONUCA in 1989, Traditional DDR has developed through a multitude of missions. As is the case with most peace operations, outright success is hard to define. But, there have been noteworthy accomplishments achieved through Traditional DDR in UN missions to Mozambique, El Salvador,³⁶ Liberia, and Sierra Leone.³⁷ Consequently, there have also been tangible lessons learned from the failures of Traditional DDR efforts in UN deployments in Cambodia, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Botched attempts at Traditional DDR do not necessarily indicate poorly implemented programs, rather DDR scholars and practitioners have found Traditional DDR methods insufficient at addressing the underlying issues of armed conflict in certain cases. In order to address these complex, multivariate conflict zones, DDR scholars and practitioners have begun exploring more dynamic approaches to Traditional DDR. Although not formally coined as a specific doctrine, many in the peace-building community have come to refer to it as Second Generation DDR.

³⁴ Ibid., 17.

³⁵ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *DDR...Principles and Guidelines*, 63–69.

³⁶ Peggy Mason, *Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding*, (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 1997).

³⁷ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *DDR in Operations: A Retrospective*, (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010).

C. SECOND GENERATION DDR

Often misunderstood to be the “latest model” in a single evolving DDR process, Second Generation DDR does not intend to replace Traditional methods, rather it provides an additional, supplemental approach. Second Generation operations can thus be conducted in place of, before, alongside, or after Traditional programs.³⁸ While Traditional DDR continues to focus on combatants present in military structures, Second Generation programs are concerned with larger communities affected by armed violence.³⁹ Thus, the nature of Second Generation practices are approached from a bottom-up methodology. Instead of a linear process of graduated steps between disarmament, demobilization, and ultimately reintegration, Second Generation DDR approaches the three simultaneously. This more holistic approach focuses on three broad categories: post-conflict stabilization measures, specific group targeting, and alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons.⁴⁰

1. Post-conflict Stabilization

Post-conflict stabilization measures are undertaken immediately after the secession of hostilities, in sub-national or local contexts, and in environments where the security sector is weak or absent.⁴¹ A central theme in this area is the debate regarding the use of cash in the DDR process, particularly during disarmament and demobilization. A 2006 article by Sigrid Willibald effectively surveys the pros and cons of cash for immediate stabilization, suggesting cash has the potential to attract ex-combatants and increase compliance with disarmament, accelerate the disarmament process, diffuse political unrest, soften the impact of DDR activities on the communities, and can stimulate infrastructure and institutional capacity development in contexts where they are absent. However beneficial these areas may be, cash transfers also have the potential

³⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations*, (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010): 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

drawbacks of being manipulated to purchase new arms and better weapons, fuel expectations and demands, disincentive economic reintegration, cause community resentment by members not enrolled in the DDR program, and are likely to be abused due to the liquid nature of cash resources and the lack of financial management capacity of ex-combatants and the absence of banking and other financial infrastructure.⁴²

Regardless of the benefits and risks, the use of cash in Second Generation DDR activities must be approached carefully and coincide with economic development and job-creation to ensure a sustainable economy. This can take the form of ex-combatant short-term employment schemes, but only if followed on by longer-term community development. If done correctly, a successful DDR program can actually contribute to the growth of the local economy.⁴³ Generally, Second Generation approaches to job creation follow up the immediate public employment programs with a livelihood creation program that focuses on mobilizing the community to take on projects that increase employment over both the short- and long-term.⁴⁴ Although this often takes the form of increased agricultural development, tourism, light industry, and manufacturing, the informal employment sector is also targeted to provide livelihoods for ex-combatants that cannot get a legitimate job.

2. Identifying and Targeting Groups

The second focal point of Second Generation DDR is the identifying and targeting of specific groups. Building on the targeting policies of Traditional DDR, Second Generation practices highlight the significance on nontraditional combatants, the role of ex-combatant commanders in the DDR process, and specific regard for the role of women and child-soldiers in post-conflict society. Beginning with nontraditional combatants, Second Generation programs aim to identify and incorporate militias, self-defense

⁴² Willibald, 324.

⁴³ Lotta Hagman and Zoe Nielsen, *A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations*, (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, 2002), 5.

⁴⁴ Darryl McLeod and Maria E.Davalos, *Post-Conflict Employment Creation for Stabilization and Poverty Reduction*, (New York: NY: United Nations Development Programme, 2008), 20.

groups, gangs, and criminal networks into the DDR program. But these nontraditional groups often possess different characteristics from those of the formal military structures involved in Traditional DDR. For example, community defense forces often emerge in conflict zones as a response to abuses by rebel *and* government forces. These forces are based on a sense of community safety and increased opportunity and therefore may not benefit from a Traditional demobilization and reintegration program that seeks to break their ranks and separate their social and political structures. This is evident in the ongoing UN DDR operation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where local Mai-Mai militias did not understand the concept of demobilization and reintegration when they had never really left their traditional village area.⁴⁵

Second Generation programs have also recognized the political and economic significance of commanders and leadership of force structures undergoing DDR. These key leadership positions are addressed due to their inherent ability to command and control the demobilizing forces that positions them to be an asset of control, or, a potential spoiler. Additionally, the economic role of commanders has become recognized. In many conflict zones, commanders have taken control over economic activities including the production and circulation of goods.⁴⁶ But the role of ex-commanders in the DDR process needs to be monitored with fervor due to the dichotomous position they have to support the process or create serious roadblocks.

In addition to nontraditional combatants, Second Generation DDR also takes into account the role of women, at risk youth, and child-soldiers during and post-conflict. Women and child soldiers merit special attention due to the unique roles they have played in protracted conflicts. Firstly, women are often combatants, fighting alongside men. This must be taken into consideration during the DDR process as the gender roles of the communities they are reintegrating into may dictate a different kind of relationship for women ex-combatants. Therefore cash incentives and vocational training should be

⁴⁵de Vries and Wiegink, 40.

⁴⁶ Stina Torjesen, "New Avenues for Research in the Study of DDR," *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol.9, No.4 (December 2009), 415.

careful not to disadvantage women ex-combatants.⁴⁷ Additionally, scars of sexual crimes and abuses often exert an immense physical and psychological toll on women in post-conflict settings, an issue that should be adequately addressed. Specialized treatment is also important for former child soldiers who need long-term assistance and re-socialization in addition to the vocational training intended to increase self-reliance.⁴⁸ At-risk youth, whether former child soldiers or not, present a real risk of instability in post-conflict environments. Programs aimed at community-based education and welfare for orphaned or disenfranchised youth are powerful tools towards maintaining community peace.

3. Flexibility and Alternative Approaches

The final area of Second Generation DDR is the provision of alternative approaches for dealing with situations where disarmament is faced with more complexity or where Traditional DDR is not working.⁴⁹ These alternative approaches vary widely depending on the context of the specific conflict and region the program is deployed in. Programs designed to incentivize disarmament vary in format, often tailored to the specific conditions present in the conflict zone. Additionally, arms controls are approached from both the supply and the demand side, adding community reforms and national regulation to international embargos and import bans.

D. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Amended in 2010, the IDDRS effectively has integrated Traditional and Second Generation DDR into a working guide for both policy makers and field practitioners. Agreed upon by the two most active UN players in DDR, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Development Program (UNDP), the IDDRS enjoys the input from an additional 13 UN organizations that play essential roles

⁴⁷Willibald, 329.

⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Peacekeeping in Disarmament*, 18.

⁴⁹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Second Generation Disarmament*, 28.

in UN DDR programs. With 13 DDR programs currently being undertaken by the UN,⁵⁰ the operational success of the IDDRS has yet to be determined. Recent correlations with Security Sector Reform (SSR) have sparked new exploration into DDR as a part of larger overall security stabilization strategy.⁵¹ But as prominent peace-building strategists celebrate the latest frameworks for DDR and SSR, others grow concerned that “with the newly-crafted DDR and SSR hammers every post-war context is treated as a nail.”⁵²

In conclusion, the IDDRS is an exciting embodiment of over 2 decades of DDR knowledge. An operational document that lays out a comprehensive framework for planning and implementing DDR operations in a variety of conflict settings, the IDDRS should continue to be leveraged as the principle source of advice in DDR deployments. However, DDR scholars and practitioners should remain cognizant of the huge role that circumstance plays in conflict formation and resolution. While frameworks for the IDDRS provide excellent avenues from which to approach a given conflict, they ultimately can prove ineffective when rigidly applied to unique cultural, historical, and geographic contexts. Thus as the DDR community continues to move forward in the development and fine-tuning of its guiding documents, it should maintain flexibility as a principle pillar in the success of broad DDR doctrine.

⁵⁰ “United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resources Centre,” accessed August 3, 2011, www.unddr.org.

⁵¹ Alan Bryden, “Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa,” *Linkage Between DDR and SSR*, (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo: Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, 12–14 June 2007).

⁵² Nat J Colletta and Robert Muggah, “Context Matters: Interim Stabilization and Second Generation Approaches to Security Promotion,” *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol.9, No.4 (2011), 447.

III. CONFLICT IN THE DRC: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Republic of the Congo lies in the center of the African continent, situated between the Gulf of Guinea and the great lakes of eastern Africa. Comprising a vast 905,355 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the combined area of Western Europe or over 3 times the size of the U.S. state of Texas. Encompassing the majority of the large Congo River basin, the DRC is characterized by dense jungles, a maze of waterways, and the diverse settlement of over 200 ethno-linguistic groups. Experiencing large population growths during the Bantu migrations from present day Nigeria many centuries ago, the people of present day DRC are mainly of Bantu origin, sharing related, but not identical, cultural and linguistic traits.⁵³ There is a large diversity of ethno-linguistic groups present in the DRC, and many of them straddle borders with other modern African states. The multi-national nature of the country is the result of some population movements since modern African state formation following the decolonization movement of the mid-1900s but is mainly indicative of the difference between how pre-colonial African states and European colonizers viewed state boundaries and power projection. Beginning by briefly summarizing the history of state formation, this chapter will review the current conflict in the east from its origins up to the deployment of MONUC in 1999, and conclude with a survey of the specific demographics of the populations living in the eastern provinces to provide a formative understanding of the different groups and their relationships.

B. HISTORY OF STATE FORMATION

Characterized by nuclei of power, originating from a central source and dissipating with distance, pre-colonial African kingdoms rarely enjoyed a monopoly of power and authority beyond their initial geographic core. Low population densities, abundant resources and immense geographic variations made the projection of power and

⁵³ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 14.

authority impractical and uneconomical for pre-colonial African leadership.⁵⁴ Indicative of the situation in the Congo basin by the time of European exploration in the 19th century, there existed an array of independent settlements spanning from the Kongo Kingdom on the Atlantic coast to the small but centralized kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi on the shores of lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, respectively. But as European imperialism expanded, so did their desire for clear, demarcated colonial borders.

Emerging from the Berlin conference of 1884, the Congo Free State was established as an absolute monarchy to be ruled by King Leopold II of Belgium. Although the Berlin conference had granted Leopold sovereign power over the area, the Belgian parliament proved unwilling to take responsibility for the administration of the state, authorizing the action under the condition that Leopold would become the sole ruler of the Congo Free State, void of any financial or political commitment on the part of Belgium. Faced with the considerable financial burden to personal royal resources, Leopold sought the assistance from private enterprise, mercenary forces, and missionary groups to help in his conquest.⁵⁵

Emerging as Leopold's personal administration and military force, The Force Publique was established to construct infrastructure over the vast area and to forcefully bring the varied populations of the Congo Basin under Leopold's rule. Lasting more than three decades and claiming the lives of an estimated 70,000 Africans, the campaign for the settlement of the Congo Free State was carried out militarily by numerous European and African mercenaries and socially by a myriad of European missionary societies. Leopold's Congo became synonymous with brutal suppression and militarized rule. In addition to numerous cruel acts aimed at subduing the local populations, The Force Publique carried out a violent campaign to chase off Arab slave traders from East Africa.⁵⁶ But, possibly, the worst impact of Leopold's decades of direct rule for the

⁵⁴ An excellent documentation of these ideas is found in Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa, Comparative lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁵⁵ Rene Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), 31–32.

⁵⁶ L.H.Gann and Peter Duignan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa 1884–1914* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 52–84.

future of the DRC was that the entire economy and civil society was run by Europeans.⁵⁷ Finally succumbing to protests in Europe of Leopold's rule, Belgium officially took control of the Congolese state in 1908. Although the social and economic situation improved under Belgian rule, resentment continued to grow among the Congolese as Belgians continued to occupy all of the professional and administrative positions until independence in 1960.

As European powers began to accept decolonization, a new political class of Congolese emerged. Similar to the political formations occurring throughout the African continent, the process of forming multi-party democracy in the Congo faced massive hurdles inherent to the multi-national state created by colonial demarcation. The Congolese longed for self-governance as nationalism emerged at both the state and sub-state levels. Addressing the heterogeneous nature of Congolese society, the political parties emerging in the newly free Congo closely related to nonpolitical organizations including tribal, kinship associations, cultural organizations, and economic interest groups, each seeking to promote the specific interests of the constituencies they represented.⁵⁸ After the initial election results in 1960, a government was formed with the Congolese National Movement (MNC), led by prime-minister elect Patrice Lumumba, winning the parliamentary elections and Joseph Kasa-Vubu of the Alliance of Bakongo (ABAKO) elected president. But the success of this first republic was short lived. Within months of independence, a series of events unfolded—crushing the disintegrating the government and spiraling the entire country into war.

C. EMERGING POLITICAL CRISIS

Commonly referred to as “The First Congo Crisis,” the period from 1960 to 1965 saw the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Katanga cessation, and the deployment of the largest UN peacekeeping mission to date. Beginning with a coup in July of 1960, the First Congo Crisis was not over until the successful military coup of Joseph Mobutu in

⁵⁷ Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster* (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1961), 35.

⁵⁸ Lemarchand, *Political Awakening*, 167.

November of 1965.⁵⁹ Disenfranchised by the expatriate officers of the Congolese National Army (ANC), formerly the Force Publique, soldiers rebelled against their white officers in a chain reaction across the country. Adding to the chaos, a political movement lead by Moise Tshombe declared independence in the mineral rich Katanga region in June 1960.⁶⁰ Shortly thereafter, a deathblow was delivered to the national government as President Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba, sparking a personal conflict and bringing into question the legitimacy of the constitution.

Encouraged by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and approved by the Security Council, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) deployed in July of 1960 with unprecedented speed and force and moved to stabilize the country and provide security. Peaking at 20,000 troops, armed with heavy weapons and specialized personnel from 28 countries, the ONUC's mandate authorized the use of force beyond the newly developed peacekeeping concept of self-defense yet fell short of articulating enforcement operations.⁶¹ While ONUC was partially successful at restoring order to the country, the frustrations experienced trying to provide a peace-enforcement mission in a vast country and multi-faceted conflict foreshadowed the challenges that would be experienced by MONUC and MONUSCO responding to crises in the eastern provinces of the Kivus and Ituri.

The First Congo Crisis came to an end with the successful consolidation of power by General Joseph Mobutu in 1965. Backed as a political moderate by the United States and Belgium, Mobutu became the undisputed ruler of the Congolese state from 1965 to 1997. With continued support by Western countries during the Cold War to fight off communism and ensure access to the vast resource wealth of the country, Mobutu's 30 years of corruption and poor rule crippled the country's infrastructure. Renaming the

⁵⁹ Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo*, 95–96.

⁶⁰ Andrzej Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 64.

⁶¹ Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 52–54.

country Zaire in 1971, Mobutu Sese Seko wa za Banga⁶² embraced the ideas of Zairian nationalism and manipulated the state's federal arrangement to counter ethnic mobilization and secession movements. With the end of the Cold War, however, Mobutu switched tactics and increasingly played ethnic groups against each other, manipulating the democratization process to maintain political dominance.⁶³ By the end of his reign in the mid-1990s, Mobutu's regime was desperately grasping for control over the gigantic Zairian state. The infrastructure and economy were in shambles and Mobutu's support from abroad had waned with the Cold War rivalry leaving a very rich man losing control of a very poor and disgruntled country. The weakness of the Zairian state became evident when in 1996, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila and with support the Rwandan army, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) invaded from the east, toppled the Mobutu regime, and set of a sequence of events that has left the eastern part of the country in a state of crisis to this day.

D. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, CONGO WARS, AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF MONUC

Authorizing the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel in August of 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1258 established the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the second UN deployment to the country since independence in 1960. Initially aimed at providing transparency to the peace process following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement by the belligerent forces involved in the Second Congo War, MONUC deployed as a peace observation mission. But as the agreement in Lusaka disintegrated and the country plunged back into conflict, MONUC was forced to grow and adapt. Deployed as of July 2011 with 18,997

⁶² A self-proclaimed title roughly translating to "the all-powerful warrior, who because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake." Translation borrowed from Michela Wrong *In the Footsteps of Mr.Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: NY: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2007).

⁶³ Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," in William J.Durch ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 233.

uniformed and 4,391 civilian personnel, MONUSCO⁶⁴ has grown into the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in history, including one of the most expansive DDR operations, despite the formal ending of the Second Congo War in 2003. To comprehend the need for such an extensive operation, and to understand the massive instability that still grips the country's eastern districts, it is first relevant to review the origins of the conflict, beginning with the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the subsequent flow of refugees into the eastern Zaire.

The origins of the Rwandan Genocide are well documented. The social cleavages that led to genocide in the small African states of Rwanda and Burundi share common origins. A mixture of grievances relating to class stratification, manipulation by colonial powers, ethnic mobilizations by post-colonial leadership, and tit-for-tat revenge have all played major roles for Tutsi-Hutu ethnic conflict. The term "Tutsi" first emerged in 18th century Rwanda, originally describing an individual rich in cattle and with good social standing, while "Hutu" related to the status of a subordinate or follower.⁶⁵ Capitalized upon by European colonizers, Tutsi and Hutu became ethnically charged terms as colonial authorities sought to empower the new Tutsi minority as an administering class in an indirect rule structure. Subsequently, great animosities formed between the two groups leading to political and social conflict following independence from Belgium in 1960. Forming political parties along Hutu and Tutsi lines, the Rwandan government became dominated by Hutu-affiliated politicians from the beginning of the independence process in 1959. Violent clashes occurred between 1959–1964, and 1972–1973 leading to the exodus of over a half million Tutsi refugees.⁶⁶

In October of 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. A political movement comprised of Rwandan Tutsi exiles, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) formed in Uganda with great assistance from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni with the goal of retaking the Rwandan state from the incumbent Hutu

⁶⁴ MONUC was renamed United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in July 2010.

⁶⁵ Alison des Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 32.

⁶⁶ Gerard Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis* (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1995), 63.

party. The armed wing of the RPF, the RPA was led by General Paul Kagame following the death of RPA leader Fred Rwigema days into the campaign. Seeking to gain control of the Rwandan state, the RPA and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) fought a bloody war until a ceasefire was signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 1993. Intending to implement a power sharing government between the RPF and the incumbent Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), the peace process was shattered when the President of Rwanda and leader of the MRND was assassinated in April of 1994. While the true assassins have never been identified, ensuing pro-Hutu propaganda put into motion a countrywide campaign of terror carried out units of the FAR and pro-Hutu interahamwe militias. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 claimed the lives of over 800,000 Rwandans between April and July. A scar on the pages of human history, the genocide was the most efficient mass murder ever orchestrated, the ramifications of which would have massive effects on the future of the entire Great Lakes region. Following the conclusion of the ethnic pogrom in July of 1994 with an absolute RPA victory, the former Rwandan government fled into exile taking with them all of the money from the Central bank and herding approximately 2.1 million people into refugee camps in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi.⁶⁷ While violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutus appeared to be over, killings continued as an RPA counter genocide unfolded against suspected genocidaires in Rwanda with an untold number of casualties. But the problems in eastern Zaire were just beginning.

E. REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE KIVUS AND THE FALL OF ZAIRE

Dissimilar to other refugee movements fleeing conflict, the mass exodus of Rwandans to eastern Zaire bore the characteristics of an organized system of mass mobilization for political purposes.⁶⁸ Of the estimated 2.1 million refugees following the RPA victory, roughly 1.5 million settled in camps located in the North and South Kivu provinces of eastern Zaire. Among these were the entire command structure of the ex-FAR complemented by 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers. Sympathetic to the deposed regime,

⁶⁷ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 5–24.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Mobutu and his dysfunctional Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) allowed the FAR, complete with weapons and transportation, to enter North and South Kivu and remain mobilized with the intent of continuing an armed struggle against the RPA.⁶⁹ Facilitated by the massive inflow of international aid to address the growing refugee crisis, the former Rwandan government went about setting up a system of governance over the populations of refugees in a series of large camps around the city centers of Goma in North Kivu, and Bukavu in South Kivu. Much to the dismay of the local Congolese populations living in the area, the massive influx of refugees set up extensive settlements, clearing forests for charcoal and building materials, stealing cattle, and erecting large refugee cities. In an attempt to control the situation, the former Rwandan government and army leadership began exacting taxes on the local population and immediately began low-level military operations policing the area and making ready for a counter invasion to take back the Rwandan state.⁷⁰

To make the situation worse, there were increased arms flows into the area. In addition to arms supplies from organizations within former Soviet bloc countries, Mobutu seized the opportunity to leverage the former Rwandan governments and Interahamwe militias to wage a proxy war against the regimes in Kigali and Kampala with whom his relations had soured.⁷¹ As the situation spiraled out of control and armed incursions became frequent into Rwanda, it was not long before Kagame and the RPF leadership took action.

The First Congo war was largely the effect of the presence of large numbers of hostile ex-FAR soldiers and Intraahamwe in Kivu provinces paired with the decay of Mobutu's Zaire. Spearheaded by the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, a coalition of heads of state from Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Angola met to determine the downfall of Mobutu who they perceived as "the shame of Africa."⁷² Through largely Ugandan and Rwandan material, logistical, and training

⁶⁹ Ibid., 25.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 26.

⁷¹ Ibid., 28.

⁷² Ibid., 67.

assistance, Laurent-Desire Kabila and his AFDL invaded eastern Zaire in late October of 1996. Assisted by armed militias and Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers, the AFDL fought their way to Kinshasa by May of 1997. Facing imminent defeat and suffering from acute prostate cancer, Mobutu fled to Morocco where he died shortly thereafter. Sworn in as president on September 7, 1997, Kabila went about restructuring the nation and renaming it the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

But Kabila's tenure as president of the newly anointed DRC was to be short lived. Adopting many of the corrupt, authoritarian, and dynastic qualities of Mobutu's rule, Kabila lost popular support among Congolese and, more importantly, alienated his Rwandan backers and his Tutsi allies in the AFDL.⁷³ The subsequent fallout was to be catastrophic. Acting out of national interests ranging from providing border security to financial interests in the abundant resources present in the DRC, a multitude of regional states, including state-backed rebel groups, flooded into the Congo basin in what has since been coined Africa's World War. Concerned with securing their borders, and arguably, interested in mineral deposits, Uganda and Rwanda, with their respective rebel allies the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), invaded eastern DRC in late 1998 with the intention of securing the north and eastern regions of the DRC and disposing of Kabila's regime. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola entered the fray. Economically motivated, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe was principally concerned with securing timber and mineral concessions. Pledging support for Kabila, a fellow South African Development Community (SADC) leader, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Zimbabwe's Mugabe provided troops to support the Congolese government, although allegations of interest in diamond extraction were rampant. Finally, concern over the relationship between the longstanding Angolan rebel group the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Rwandan and Ugandan governments led Angola to the aid of Kabila's government with the long-term hope of weakening UNITA's supply lines and bases in the DRC.⁷⁴ By mid-1999, Kabila and his allies managed to halt the rebels' advance. Taking advantage of the

⁷³ Roessler and Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 236.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 240–243.

stalemate that had emerged, delegations from the United States, European Union, Organization of African Unity (OAU), South Africa, Zambia, and Libya facilitated a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia in 1999. In addition to a cessation of hostilities, the agreement emphasized the holding of a national dialogue, a framework for national disarmament, and a request for the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation.⁷⁵ Responding with Security Council Resolution 1258, MONUC was born.

F. THE EASTERN PROVINCES

Often referred to as interlacustrine Africa, the area is characterized by the large lakes formed by a geological rift valley. Home to large mountain ranges and dense equatorial forests, the region comprises the land spanning from the northern tip of Lake Albert in the DRC and Uganda, south to the western shores of Lake Malawi. The western edge becomes lost in the tropical forests found descending from the 5,000 meter Rwenzori massif into the dense Congo basin, while the eastern periphery is defined by the vast Serengeti plains found southwest of Lake Victoria in central Tanzania. Comprised by populations of modern day Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, the region is home to a multitude of heterogeneous cultural and linguistic traditions.

While the region's populations are broadly defined linguistically as Eastern Bantu, the demographics can be further sub-divided into five major categories. North of Lake Victoria, a group of Luganda and Lusoga dialects dominate central Uganda. Stretching in a long, narrow linguistic belt from Lake Albert to the area southwest of Lake Victoria is a group comprised mainly of Runyoro, Rutoro, Ruhaya, Runyambo, and Ruzinza speakers. The southwestern tip of Uganda and northern Rwanda is dominated by the Runyankore linguistic group. Located east of the Virunga volcanoes in eastern DRC, and west of the Malagarasi river in Tanzania, Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, and Kiha form a linguistic block that characterizes the majority of the Rwandan and Burundian

⁷⁵ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 49.

populations. Finally, spanning the western shores of Lakes Tanganyika, Kivu, and Edward are a group of linguistically similar people speaking Kifuriru, Mashi, Kihavu, Kihunde, Rukonjo, and Runande.⁷⁶

Although this work is not an exercise in linguistics, the above definitions provide valuable context towards understanding the demographic breakdown of the populations involved in the ongoing conflict in the region. Coinciding with long-term history and political cleavages, an understanding of the populations in this region, and how they relate linguistically greatly aids in comprehending the formation of volatile ethnic relationships. In addition to the observation that these linguistic groupings have often coincided with the formation of local-level ethnic and political alignments, and were thus the foundations for many contemporary local-level grievances and conflict, these groups were also the subject of study for many 19th and 20th century European anthropologists, linguists, geographers, and ethnographers.⁷⁷ Harmfully leveraged by colonial administrations in systems of indirect rule, these originally linguistic delineations were utilized by German and Belgian authorities to raise specific groups' status and power over that of their neighbors. These manipulations, although not solely responsible, have had lasting influence over many of the micro-level conflicts experienced in the region.

The epicenter of the war that erupted in 1996, the Zairian provinces of North and South Kivu hosted a wide array of conflicting ethnic groups and armed political movements well before the massive population influxes following the Rwandan genocide in 1994. With the above cursory understanding of the ethno-linguistic breakdown of the interlacustrine region, it is now pertinent to hone in on the demographics of the Kivus specifically in order to understand the context into which the region plunged into large-scale conflict.

Situated along the western boarders of Rwanda and Uganda, North Kivu is noted for its dense population, heavy rainfall, and varied terrain. Its capital, Goma, sits on the north shore of Lake Kivu and shares a metropolitan area with the Rwandan city of

⁷⁶ Jean-Pierre Chretien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, trans. Scott Straus (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2006), 46–47.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 47–60.

Gisenyi. Ethnic tensions in North Kivu, although varied in nature, are generally correlated with land ownership. The population may be broadly broken into two categories: the Congolese autochtones (including a majority of Runande speakers) and populations of Kinyarwanda speakers. Although Kinyarwanda populations have been present in the region since well before the establishment of the Congolese state, their presence experienced significant growth in numbers during the Mission d'Immigration des Banyarwanda carried out by the Belgians in 1937. Aimed at providing agricultural laborers from the overpopulated Rwanda, the program moved some 85,000 Banyarwanda into the eastern DRC, the majority settling in North Kivu.⁷⁸ Including both Tutsi and Hutu identities, the newly arrived immigrants provided cultural and community support to the minority Banyarwandan populations, much to the resentment of the Congolese autochtone groups. Creating conflicts over citizenship and land ownership, the situation was exacerbated by Mobutu as he sought to elevate Kinyarwandan political leadership to bolster support in the district as the Kivus were notoriously a troubled spot for his regime politically.⁷⁹

The situation in South Kivu is somewhat different. Due to a far lower population density, South Kivu does not experience the same land pressures as its northern neighbor. However, social and political cleavages do exist in a similar fashion to those of North Kivu with autochtone groups, primarily between Congolese Babembe and Bafulero groups and the “nonnative” Kinyarwandan speaking Banyamulenge groups and Burundian immigrants. Choosing to identify as Banyamulenge (referring to the Mulenge area in which they primarily settled) in order to differentiate between the Banyarwandan identity that were viewed as outsiders, the group played a pivotal role in the 1965 Simba rebellion as they accepted weapons and training from Mobutu forces to defend their settlements against rebel abuses.⁸⁰

It was within this state of tension between Congolese autochtone groups and the North Kivu Banyarwanda and South Kivu Banyamulenge that 1.5 million Rwandan,

⁷⁸ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 48.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 49

⁸⁰ Ibid., 52

primarily Hutu, refugees poured into the Kivus between July and August of 1994 fleeing the genocide in neighboring Rwanda. Aggravating the already present ethnic conflict in the region, the arrival of these refugees can be viewed from two points of view. The first, seen as pro-RPF, observes the arrival of large numbers of Hutu genocidaires and Interahamwe militiamen, complete with weapons and force structures of the ex-FAR, proceeded to prey on the local Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations who identified with Tutsi ancestry. The second view, coined as anti-RPF, interprets the presence of the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge as predators abusing the local Congolese autochtone groups.⁸¹ Needless to say, the ensuing situation was marred with complexity, political manipulation, land rights, identity issues, and the overarching air of evil that followed the Rwandan genocide.

⁸¹ Ibid., 53.

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IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF DDR ACTIVITIES

A. INTRODUCTION

Serving as the foundation for the MONUC DDR(RR) programs, UN Security Council Resolution 1291 mandated MONUC to assist the Joint Military Commission⁸² with “the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the [Lusaka] Ceasefire Agreement.”⁸³ The original Traditional DDR process in the east evolved over time to become a more integrated approach incorporating Second Generation DDR practices. Although initially promising in its timing and intent, a comprehensive DDR program in the DRC did not come to fruition for several years. Even though a comprehensive approach has been in effect for over seven years, MONUC supported DDR and DDRRR has produced mixed results. Affected by an array of exogenous and endogenous factors, comprehensive DDR and DDRRR programs in the east have struggled to provide short and long-term stability and security due to combination of factors. First, the political context into which MONUC deployed was extremely complicated: Congolese state institutions were weak to nonexistent; there was a large number of warring parties each with their own political agendas; the presence of foreign troops had greatly destabilized the peace process; finally, the availability of easily extractable minerals financed the arming and training of rebel groups. And if this were not bad enough, DDR programs suffered from MONUC’s inconsistent mandate, a lack of coordination, and insufficient resources to provide a force adequate to execute DDR activities. This chapter will trace the development of DDR and DDRRR programs in the DRC.

⁸² Established in July of 1999 with representatives from all the warring nations who were party to the Second Congo War.

⁸³ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1291*, UN Doc S/RES/1291 (February 24, 2000), 4.

B. EXOGENOUS FACTORS

1. The Situation

Well before Laurent Kabila took power in Kinshasa, the institutions of the Congolese state were in shambles. The country, compartmentalized by vast geographic barriers, lacked critical infrastructure and possessed few governing institutions. Although Kabila sat in the capital and enjoyed the title of head of state, his ability to project power and provide governance to the far eastern districts was nonexistent. This inability to provide state functions would be a debilitating factor for the regime during the peace process as the national army has struggled to implement and engage in DDR functions.

Similar to Kabila's weak hold over the state institutions, the political nature of the armed opposition groups who opposed Kabila's rule at the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement presented a major hurdle to the DDR process. The opposition did not represent a single homogeneous group but rather represented different regions and ethnicities. The armed groups in the east also contained large numbers of Ugandan and Rwandan troops. Although the heads of state from the Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe and leadership from the RCD and the Movement for the MLC all signed the ceasefire of 1999, successfully disarming and repatriating all foreign troops proved to be a problem. Only one month after the signing of the agreement, RPA and UPDF forces clashed in the east resulting in over 600 casualties, which soured relations between the Ugandan and Rwandan governments.⁸⁴ Additionally, the fracturing of the RCD movement into RCD-G and RCD-ML further complicated the conflict dynamics. If an internationally brokered DDR program mandated by the Lusaka Agreement were going to succeed, all parties had to be on board.

The prevalence of easily extractable resources is also a major issue for DDR. Rich in mineral deposits including diamonds, gold, copper, and coltan, rebel groups operating in the DRC are able to finance their movements through the illegal extraction of resources. When combined with the vast and largely unregulated borders, the ability of armed rebel movements to maintain large weapons stocks was a very real threat to

⁸⁴ Osita Ofoaku, "Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and Strategies," in John F Clark, ed., *African Stakes of the Congo War* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 118.

DDR operations. Although the UN recognized this threat and included arms embargos in early stages of MONUC's deployment, the continual inflow of small arms and light weapons into the region has been greatly counter-productive to DDR efforts.

2. The Armed Groups

The following provides a brief overview of armed rebel groups operating in the DRC between 1999 and 2011:

a. Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma) – DRC

Emerging in August of 1998, RCD-Goma was largely funded and controlled by the RPF in Rwanda. Propped up by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi as a force to challenge and overthrow Laurent Kabila, the RCD-Goma consisted largely of Banyarwanda and Banyamulege populations of the Kivu districts. Despite maintaining a goal of establishing a healthy democracy and protecting eastern Tutsi populations, the RCD-G's track record proved to be dismal. Preying on local populations and operating as a de facto arm of the RPA, the RCD-G was cited multiple times by MONUC and human rights organizations for massacres and other abuses of the population.⁸⁵ Transformed into a political party with the majority of its soldiers incorporated into the new Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), the RCD-G ceased operating as an armed opposition group by late 2004.⁸⁶

b. Congolese Rally for Democracy – Liberation Movement (RCD-ML)–DRC

Originating from the broader RCD movement, the RCD-ML emerged in September 1998 centering on the northeastern city of Bunia. Formed after Wamba dia Wamba failed to secure leadership in the RCD-G in the lead up to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, RCD-G accepted continued assistance from Uganda until the relationship soured when Uganda attempted to coerce the RCD-ML leadership into merging with the

⁸⁵ Roessler and Prendergast, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 237.

⁸⁶ Hans Rouw and Rens Willems, *Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from the Eastern DRC* (The Hague, Netherlands: Peace, Security and Development Network, April 2010), 9.

Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). Although originally aligned with the goals of the broader RCD movement to oust DRC president Laurent Kabila, the RCD-ML, with strong ties to ethnic Lendu groups, engaged in ethnic conflict with Hema populations who enjoyed Ugandan support. This led to ongoing fighting by the RCD-ML against local Hema militias in addition to military clashes with the RCD-G.⁸⁷ Similar to the RCD-G, the RCD-ML now operates as a political party in the DRC government, its armed elements incorporated into the FARDC.⁸⁸

c. *Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) – DRC*

Cultivated by Jean-Pierre Bemba with the support of President Museveni in Kampala, the MLC emerged in November of 1998 in Gbadolite on DRC's northern border with the Central African Republic. In addition to strong Ugandan support, Bemba leveraged relationships with highly capable former Mobutu officers.⁸⁹ Growing into a highly capable political and military force, the MLC enjoyed several victories over Kabila's forces and his Chadian allies. In addition to its military capability, the MLC possessed popular support unmatched by the other rebel factions. Bemba went on to play an important role in the transitional government as vice-president, as the MLC transformed into a political party, and its military elements incorporated into the FARDC.⁹⁰

d. *National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) – DRC*

Emerging in May 2004 under the leadership of General Laurent Nkunda and his deputy Bosco Ntaganda, a conglomeration of fighters drawn primarily from the FARDC's integrated RCD-G troop base invaded and occupied Bukavu in South Kivu claiming to prevent a potential genocide of the Banyamulenge population. Later retreating to North Kivu, Nkunda negotiated a process of "mixage" whereby his units

⁸⁷ Roessler and Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 238.

⁸⁸ Rouw and Willems, *Connecting Community Security*, 9.

⁸⁹ Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory*, 225.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 232.

would be incorporated back into the FARDC, without demobilizing and reorganizing his units. The failure to demobilize these fighters was a mistake because Nkunda continued autonomous operations against FDLR elements, committing serious human rights violations against populations throughout the Kivus. Reorganizing as a political movement in 2006, the CNDP emerged as a pro-Tutsi force, which exacerbated ethnic tensions between Banyarwanda and Banyamulege groups and their Congolese counterparts.⁹¹ The conflict between CNDP and the FDLR was finally brought to an end with the arrest of Laurent Nkunda by Rwandan forces in January of 2009 and the reincorporation of CNDP forces, now led by former deputy Ntaganda, into the FARDC.⁹²

e. Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) – DRC

Operating in the Ituri province of the DRC, the FNI militia is dominated by ethnic Lendus. Formed as militia to protect Lendu populations against rival Hema groups, the FNI fought vigorously to control lucrative mining sites that are rich in gold. The FNI funded itself largely from illegal resource extraction and was reported to have direct links to AngloGold Ashanti, a corporate mining company that sought gold extraction in Ituri.⁹³ Cited for numerous human rights violations, the movement is purported to have links with UPDF and assisted with Ugandan mineral acquisition in the Ituri. The FNI maintained a strong presence in Ituri, fighting rival Hema group Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and on occasion attacking MONUC forces. Following several rounds of DDR and the subsequent arrest of FNI leadership in February of 2008, the movement has largely been pacified.

⁹¹ Stephanie Wolters, *Trouble in Eastern DRC: The Nkunda Factor* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 3 September 2007), 1–6.

⁹² Henri Boshoff, *Completing the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration process of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Link to Security Sector Reform of FARDC* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, November 23, 2010), 1.

⁹³ Johan Pottier, “Displacement and Ethnic Reintegration In Ituri, DR Congo: Challenges Ahead,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.46, No.3 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 435.

f. Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) – DRC

Juxtaposed to the Lendu dominated FNI militia in Ituri, the UPC represented ethnic Hema community interests. Operating in Ituri in the early 2000s, the UPC funded its movement by illegal mineral extraction, similar to their Lendu counterparts. The group was reported to maintain relations with Rwanda who sought to leverage the movement against the Ugandan supported FNI. The vast majority of the UPC has been processed through the national DDR program, their leadership arrested and handed over to the ICC in March 2006.

g. Mai Mai Militias – DRC

While all the other nonstate actors in the eastern DRC are in some way connected to an outside actor, whether by funding, political aims, or foreign fighters, the Mai Mai are a distinctly Congolese phenomenon. An umbrella term referring to a small group of fighters who have banded together to protect their community from rebel and government threats, Mai Mai militias appear to lack a political center of gravity. Some groups remain loyal to the Congolese government while others look to outside support from Uganda or Rwanda. Still others have allied with rebel groups such as the FDLR. Although defensive in theory, different Mai Mai groups have perpetrated human rights abuses.⁹⁴ Present before the conflict began, Mai Mai continue to be major players in armed conflict in the east and a primary target for MONUC's DDR operation.

h. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – Rwanda

Currently, the largest armed opposition group operating in the eastern DRC, the FDLR are the primary focus of the ongoing MONUSCO DDR(RR) operation. Formed in late 2000, the FDLR emerged as an umbrella organization comprised of the two Army for the Liberation of Rwanda groups (ALIR I & II) operating in the Kivu provinces during the Second Congo War. Made up mainly of ex-FAR forces, including genocidaires and Interahamwe militias who fled after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the

⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 1 April 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc S/2002/341 (April 5, 2002), 11.

FDLR was closely aligned with Joseph Kabila's government as a proxy against Rwandan and Ugandan supported groups in the east. The withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces in 2002–2003 led to a shift in support for the FDLR forces as they became a target of DDRRR operations by MONUC. With a current estimated strength of between 6,000 and 8,000⁹⁵ members, the FDLR seeks to regain control of the Rwandan state and espouses hardline, anti-Tutsi rhetoric.

i. *Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – Uganda*

A major factor leading to the eventual UPDF invasion of northeastern DRC was the presence of ADF bases. Supplied largely by the Sudanese intelligence services to wage a proxy war against Uganda (a response to the heavy support the SPLA received from Uganda in South Sudan), the ADF promoted a heavily militarized Islamic agenda, carrying out raids into southwest Uganda from bases in the Congolese Rwenzori Mountains.⁹⁶ Largely dismantled by Ugandan offensives carried out in late 1998, the movement has since been dormant. A joint FARDC and UPDF 2010 mop-up operation displaced 100,000 Congolese IDPs.⁹⁷

j. *Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – Uganda*

Infamous among 20th century rebel groups and synonymous with human rights abuses, kidnapping, child soldiering and cult-like beliefs, the LRA continues to operate in equatorial Africa without any clear stated political or social goals. Originating as a Ugandan rebel group in the mid-1990s, the LRA has since been pushed out of northern Uganda into South Sudan, and finally into DRC and the CAR where it currently operates on a limited basis.⁹⁸ Although not a major actor in the Congolese wars and the current instability in the east, the LRA is nevertheless a dangerous actor that poses a constant threat to the populations in its area of operation.

⁹⁵ Dagne, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*, 6.

⁹⁶ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 121–122.

⁹⁷ Dagne, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*, 6–7.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

k. *Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) – Burundi*

The armed wing of the Hutu dominated opposition party the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), the FDD maintained a large presence in South Kivu in 2002 allied with local Mai Mai militias and Kabila's regime in Kinshasa.⁹⁹ The group signed a comprehensive agreement with the government of Burundi in 2005 but did not transform into a major political party.

l. *National Forces of Liberation (FNL) – Burundi*

Unlike the FDD, the forces of the FNL have resisted negotiations and sought an outright victory over the Burundian government. Although a 2005 peace agreement dismantled large portions of the movement, small groups persist in South Kivu. Largely viewed as a carryover of a past conflict by the current Burundian government, the last few FNL fighters remain on the Burundian border surviving off fishing in Lake Tanganyika.¹⁰⁰

C. ENDOGENOUS FACTORS

MONUC's DDR performance was severely hindered by slow adaptation to the changing conflict environment. Deploying in the wake of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, MONUC established a three-phase plan that pushed DDR to the third phase, to be undertaken once military observers had been deployed and a peacekeeping force was present to monitor the disengagement of forces. Unfortunately, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement carried little weight in the war-torn east. MONUC's sluggish adjustment of its DDR programs in the face of a rapidly changing conflict environment can be explained by two factors: First, like most UN peacekeeping deployments, external support has been both tardy and inconsistent. Second, national and international bodies failed to coordinate DDR and DDRRR initiatives. This has since created a complex web of overlapping and duplicative international, bilateral, and regional programs. Although

⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 1 April*, 4.

¹⁰⁰ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 322.

MONUC is supposed to integrate these efforts, so far it has proven unable to ensure UN wide coherence or coordinate the array of bilateral and multinational organizations engaged in DDR-related programs.¹⁰¹

1. International Support for the Mission

These problems of coordination occurred in spite of the fact that the severity of the problem was well recognized internationally. In 1999, newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke spearheaded an initiative to get the UN involved. However, Holbrooke hesitated to support the deployment UN peacekeepers in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement.¹⁰² Meanwhile, France argued in the Security Council that the immediate deployment of 10,000 peacekeepers was necessary and that a comprehensive peace agreement would not materialize absent a heavy UN troop presence. Despite this plea, the United States remained cautious of supporting a large peace enforcement operation to disarm nonstate actors.¹⁰³ It was becoming clear that the international community recognized the seriousness of the situation yet remained unwilling to provide immediate support to an operation in the region absent national interests and a mission framework.

2. DDR Actors and Initiatives

Since the very beginning of the DDR process in the DRC, the proliferation of various DDR bodies, donors, structures, and relationships complicated the DDR environment. Although MONUC has played a crucial role in the ongoing DDR and DDRRR activities in the eastern provinces, it is not the only actor involved in the process. Focusing on the main initiatives, this section will provide an overview of the UN programs, the MDRP lead by World Bank, the DDR and DDRRR structures as mandated by the Congolese government, and the role that MONUC played in each.

¹⁰¹Tull, "Peacekeeping in DRC," 226.

¹⁰² Roessler and Prendergast, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 250.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 251.

a. Government of DRC Initiatives

On 18 December 2003, President Kabila issued three presidential decrees creating the framework for GoDRC DDR activities. Establishing three different bodies concerned with conceptual and policy aspects, program implementation, and financial management, the bodies were intended to organize all DDR and DDRRR efforts in the country. The first, an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CI-DDR), was tasked with DDR orientation and project conceptualization.¹⁰⁴ Second, the National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER) was placed in charge of program execution and coordination. Finally, a funding management committee, the Committee for the Administration of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Funds (CGFDR) was created to provide financial oversight and funds allocation to the DDR programs. Although these bodies were positive developments in the organization of DDR activities by the Congolese government, they did not become immediately functional. The three organizations made sense structurally; however, the process lacked a coherent overall strategy. This problem was rectified with the creation of the National DDR Program (PNDDR), developed with the assistance of the UNDP, MONUC and Belgium in June 2004.¹⁰⁵

b. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

Operating between 2002 and 2009 under the World Bank, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was created to address the macro problem of proliferated armed groups operating across borders in the Great Lakes region. Concerned with demographics and terrain from seven different countries, the MDRP was an enormously complex and technical program intended to address an estimated 350,000 combatants from Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic,

¹⁰⁴ Rouw and Willems, *Connecting Community Security*, 9.

¹⁰⁵ Onana and Taylor, "MONUC and SSR," 505.

Republic of Congo, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.¹⁰⁶ Focused on the organization of funds relating to DDR and DDRRR activities in the Great Lakes region, the MDRP was a multilateral program funded by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the European Commission.¹⁰⁷ Although established in 2002, the MDRP did not become a significant actor in the DDR activities in the DRC until initial funding began in 2004. Subsequently, the establishment of a Coordinated Joint Operation Centre (CCOC) in February and March 2005, which was jointly managed between the MDRP and the Congolese government, acted as a coordination mechanism to unify the efforts of the various DDR actors in the DRC and optimize the implementation of the PNDDR.

c. Additional DDRRR Initiatives

Because the process of DDRRR involved the repatriation of combatants across national boundaries, a number of additional programs emerged to aid DDRRR. First, and arguably most prevalent in the early years of the DDRRR process, was the efforts made by the Rwandan government to forcefully repatriate armed rebels while the RPA still maintained significant numbers of troops in the east. Concerned with destroying the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) movements (the group did not coalesce into the FDLR until after the RPA had left Congo in 2002), the RPA reduced the ALIR strength from an estimated 40,000 to 12–15,000. Although this force reduction signaled a significant accomplishment, it failed to dismantle the FDLR command and control, which continued to field large numbers of troops under the FLDR banner.¹⁰⁸ Most active in 2003, The Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) operated as a mechanism to monitor and implement the bilateral Pretoria agreement of July 2002. Developed jointly by MONUC and the government of South Africa, the TPVM was

¹⁰⁶ The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, *Final Report* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, July 2010), 1.

¹⁰⁷ Zoe Marriage, “Flip-flop, dollar soldier,” in Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko, eds., *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 127.

¹⁰⁸ de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 96.

leveraged by the latter to develop a series of Disarmament and Repatriation activities in addition to the mandated monitoring functions. Focusing primarily on elements of the FDLR, the TPVM managed to repatriate 400 combatants between January 2003 and February 2004.¹⁰⁹ Finally, civil society groups have played an important, albeit less recognized, role in facilitating the disarmament and repatriation of foreign combatants in the east. Acting to reduce community violence and sensitize combatants to the MONUC DDRRR initiatives, local NGOs, churches and businessmen have helped to aid the repatriation process at the local level.¹¹⁰

D. MONUC'S DDR MANDATE

Administered by the CCOC and CONADER, the PNDDR program was designed to address the myriad of armed nonstate actors operating throughout the vast country. On January 24, 2004, the Military Integration Structure (SMI) was established to create a dual-track process by which all combatants entering the PNDDR would be pooled before entering into a demobilization and reintegration track or integration into the national army.¹¹¹ Administered by the CCOC and CONADER, MONUC was delegated the limited role of providing security in the vicinity of the brassage¹¹² centers and oversight of weapons control during the dual track process.¹¹³ By spring of 2004, all of the major armed groups had agreed to the PNDDR terms and registered their forces for entrance into the program. The numbers posed a daunting task, however, with the RCD-G registering 45,000, RCD-N 10,000, RCD-ML 15,000, MLC 30,000, and FAC 100-200,000.¹¹⁴ Although the PNDDR seemed to be making progress, the program became stalled as the resulting security vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops intensified ethnic conflict in Ituri and the Kivus. Forced to redirect its

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 95.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 96.

¹¹¹ Rouw and Willems, *Connecting Community Security*, 9.

¹¹² French term that translates roughly to brewing, intermingling, cross-fertilization or mixture

¹¹³ Henri Boshoff, *Update on the Status of Army Integration in the DRC* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, September 2, 2005), 4.

¹¹⁴ Marriage, "Flip-flop, dollar soldier," 127.

attention to peace enforcement and bringing a secession to hostilities, MONUC was unable to address DDR objectives until late 2004 when a combination of financial assistance from the MDRP, reforms in the Congolese PNDDR, and the deployment of a greater force strength allowed the UN finally to intensify DDR activities.

The PNDDR suffered further setbacks as ethnic militias in Ituri continued to resist the program claiming there was insufficient security to allow them to disarm. The ongoing conflict between the FNI and UPC lacked a clear basis for settlement and the PNDDR failed to provide adequate sustainable livelihoods through its reintegration process.¹¹⁵ But the nature of the conflict did not allow MONUC the luxury of waiting for a comprehensive peace settlement between the groups. Large deposits of gold allowed the rebel groups to continue financing their campaigns and with the violence largely directed at the population, MONUC was forced to act in accordance with its Chapter VII mandate to protect the population. Acting in coordination with the FARDC, MONUC proceeded with a robust program of cordon and search operations to coerce militias to disarm between 2004 and 2005. When on June 25, 2005, the disarmament and community reinsertion program ended, the UN claimed that 15,607 combatants had been disarmed and 6,200 weapons collected.¹¹⁶ While the operations had been successful in dismantling the UPC, the fact that so many weapons remained unaccounted for allowed elements of the FNI to continue to harass UN and FARDC forces.

Concurrent to the setbacks experienced in Ituri, RCD-G forces in South Kivu continued to resist the PNDDR. As the Congolese government began to assert itself in the Kivus and integrate, through brassage, soldiers from the rebel groups operating there, RCD-G officers, already in UN cantonment zones, rebelled against the regional FARDC commander. Citing inequalities in FARDC integration and inadequate protection of the Banyamulege population in the region, a contingent of RCD-G marched on Bukavu,

¹¹⁵ Pottier, *Ethnic Reintegration In Ituri*, 439.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2005/506 (August 2, 2005), 5.

taking it from UN and FARDC forces with little opposition.¹¹⁷ In addition to the havoc it wreaked on the population, the action illuminated the weakness in MONUC's support role of the PNDDR strategy. Of the rebelling RCD-G soldiers, the majority had already agreed to the PNDDR terms and some actually had already been integrated into the FARDC. The Bukavu crisis emphasized that the DDR process lacked both the ability to provide security for the processing of combatants and, even once processed into the FARDC, there was limited ability to keep ex-combatants from returning to armed struggle.

E. MONUC'S DDRRR MANDATE

Included in the Lusaka agreement, the first round of DDRRR activities was not launched until after the Pretoria Agreement in 2002.¹¹⁸ At Pretoria, Rwanda agreed to withdraw its army from the eastern DRC within 90 days while the Congolese government agreed to track down and forcefully repatriate the FDLR within the same time frame.¹¹⁹ While Rwanda by and large kept to its scheduled troop withdrawals, the government in Kinshasa proved unable, and to a large extent uninterested, in disarming and repatriating the FDLR. As this trend continued through 2003–2006, the implementation of DDRRR fell to MONUC and other local organizations.¹²⁰ Thus, while MONUC operates as a facilitating force in the PNDDR process, it possesses a significantly larger leadership role in the DDRRR of foreign combatants. The current MONUSCO DDRRR figures list 19,810 combatants and dependents returned to Rwanda, 874 to Uganda, and 3,904 to Burundi between 2002 and 2011.¹²¹ Concerned primarily with the FDLR & FNL forces operating in the Kivu provinces, the ADF in the Rwenzori Mountains bordering Uganda, and LRA in the northern border areas of the Central African Republic and Republic of

¹¹⁷ Roessler and Prendergast, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 289.

¹¹⁸ Marriage, "Flip-flop, dollar soldier," 129.

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration," *ICG Africa Report*, No.63 (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, May 23, 2003), 13.

¹²⁰ de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 91.

¹²¹ "Statistics Ex-Combatants of Foreign Armed Groups," accessed September 15, 2011, <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4905>.

Congo, the DDRRR process involves the cooperation of both the armed combatants and the nation of their origin. As statistics from the past nine years show, the program has been relatively successful at repatriating a large number of foreign combatants. In 2011, MONUSCO reported that the FDLR is estimated at 3,000 combatants, half of its 2008 strength.¹²² Additionally, ADF, FNL, and LRA forces all number less than 500 each and remain well hidden, avoiding open confrontation. Yet the remaining numbers of combatants, no matter how small, are still the perpetrators of horrendous crimes and have continuously refused voluntary repatriation.

The remaining groups represent the hardline leadership of these movements. With the case of the FNL and the ADF, the governments of Burundi and Uganda have granted amnesty and support reinsertion programs. However, the situation for the FDLR is somewhat different. Led by Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe militiamen, their unwillingness to return to Rwanda, where they would likely face prosecution for genocide crimes, has made voluntary DDRRR impractical.¹²³ While the LRA is worthy of mentioning, it holds a unique position within the Great Lakes conflict system and does not merit further examination for the analysis of MONUC DDRRR.

MONUC's participation in DDR and DDRRR programs has been shaped by two factors. First, DDR and DDRRR both expect combatants to enter the programs on a voluntary basis. In supporting the PNDDR in Ituri and the Kivus, MONUC was expected to provide security of cantonment sites and collect arms from combatants on a voluntary basis. Although this was practical, given the endogenous constraints on the mission's capabilities, it assumed incorrectly that groups would voluntarily give up arms. In the DDRRR of foreign combatants, a similar assumption was made that the foreign armed groups operating in the east would be compliant in the disarmament and repatriation process. A second factor concerns the issue of integration of demobilized combatants into a national army. The difficulties of incorporating a myriad of armed groups representing different ethnic and geographic grievances into a coherent national force

¹²² "The Foreign Armed Groups," accessed September 15, 2011, <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4904>.

¹²³ Edmonds et al., "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 44.

provides a major obstacle to the success of the PNDDR process. The following two chapters will explore these two problems and conclude with a summary chapter establishing lessons learned from MONUC's DDR and DDRRR programs.

V. A VOLUNTARY FRAMEWORK

Although both coercive and voluntary measures have been used in UN peace operations, there is no conclusive evidence to support the absolute success of one method over the other. Additionally, it is incorrect to correlate a voluntary framework to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, or a coercive framework to Chapter VII peace enforcement operations.¹²⁴ Successful coercive tactics have been utilized in Haiti and Albania and failed in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Likewise, voluntary frameworks have produced successes in Namibia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and El Salvador yet struggled in Angola, Sudan, and Cote d'Ivoire. Officially, MONUC only supports a voluntary structure for DDR and DDRRR. Numerous Security Council Resolutions have outlined a voluntary DDR framework for MONUC including Resolution 1355 in June of 2001 and Resolution 1565 in October of 2004. However, massive insecurities and a lack of voluntary cooperation by ex-combatants have led to coercive actions by MONUC forces on several occasions and internal criticism of its voluntary framework.

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF A VOLUNTARY FRAMEWORK

Security Council Resolution 1355 established the norm for a voluntary DDRRR framework in 2001 authorizing "MONUC, consistent with the Secretary-General's report, to assist, upon request, and within its capabilities, in the early implementation, on a voluntary basis, of the DDRR of armed groups..."¹²⁵ This standard was further reinforced by Resolution 1376 in November of 2001 calling for the voluntary DDRRR of foreign combatants specifically, and Resolution 1493 calling for voluntary DDR of Congolese combatants. This voluntary framework is still present at the time of this writing as can be seen in the MONUSCO DDRRR mandate:

The current Resolution 1925 (2010) under the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO, and previous ones have also called for a comprehensive and voluntary Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of

¹²⁴ Tanner, "Consensual Versus Coercive," 169.

¹²⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1355*, UN Doc S/RES/1355 (June 15, 2001), 6.

Congolese armed groups, and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups for the long-term stability and economic development of the DR Congo.¹²⁶

Although a commitment to voluntary DDR and DDRRR of foreign combatants is seen in UN documentation spanning the entirety of the program, further analysis reveals that the mission has not always been consistent in utilizing voluntary methods.

B. CRITICISM OF VOLUNTARY METHODS

Concern regarding the voluntary framework first appeared in 2003 when the Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated: “Experience indicates that the MONUC voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme can be completed successfully only in conditions of reasonable security, and with the full cooperation of all parties concerned, including the armed groups themselves.”¹²⁷ This assertion coincided with the recognition that, at the time, the RCD-G and various Mai Mai groups had not offered full cooperation and were in fact forcing demobilized combatants to abandon MONUC’s Lubero DDRRR reception center in North Kivu. This is but one example of many acts of resistance by armed rebel groups, particularly by their hard-line leadership, to resist the MONUC implemented DDR processes. In fact, in 2004, MONUC warned that “the continued pursuit of its voluntary repatriation would not succeed in resolving the problem within an acceptable time.”¹²⁸ Additionally, a 2007 report funded by the World Bank revealed skepticism about the efficacy of the voluntary DDR amongst several MONUC officials, who favored applying greater military pressure.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ “MONUSCO DDRRR Mandate,” accessed September 15, 2011, <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4902>.

¹²⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2003/566 (May 27, 2003), 6.

¹²⁸ Tull, “Peacekeeping in DRC,” 219.

¹²⁹ de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 93.

C. MANDATE CONTRADICTIONS

The mission's mandate is vague about the requirement for voluntary methods. Review of UN documents reveals a great deal of ambiguity that allows the mission's mandate to be interpreted by force commanders to allow for the use of coercive DDR methods. For example, Resolution 1565, paragraph 5(d), calls for MONUC to "facilitate the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and their dependents." In the same resolution, the Security Council also "Authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means, within its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, to carry out the tasks listed in paragraph 4, subparagraphs (a) to (g) above, and in paragraph 5, subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) above."¹³⁰ While this tactfully avoided directly contradicting paragraph 5(d), it did authorize the use of "all necessary means" including support of disarmament operations led by the FARDC, contribution to the national program of DDR, and arms collection and seizure. Thus, seemingly contradictory statements were left for UN force commanders to resolve in the field.

D. COERCIVE ACTION

The contradictions became more acute as MONUC began engaging armed groups with much greater force. The first of these operations came to fruition following frustrations in the DDR process in Ituri. As ethnic conflict between the UPC and FNI groups in Ituri began to spiral out of control following the withdrawal of Ugandan troops in 2003, the UN was forced to ramp up its militarized presence to provide security over the population. In addition to an increased UN presence, and responding to the inefficiency of CONADER to address the situation, the Congolese government launched the Disarmament and Community Reinsertion (DCR) program. While the DCR program had succeeded in demobilizing 15,811 combatants, it had only collected an estimated 20% of the weapons in the area. In the presence of continued community insecurity and a stalled reinsertion program, almost all of those who had demobilized returned to the

¹³⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1565*, UN Doc S/RES/1565 (October 1, 2004), 2–3.

bush and rearmed.¹³¹ Finally, on 25 February 2005, facing continued armed violence and resistance to the DDR process, the FNI attacked and killed 9 Bangladeshi peacekeepers. Responding with overwhelming force, MONUC's Eastern Division deployed extensive forces killing 50–60 FNI militia.¹³² The response, although criticized by some as a punitive action, was reinforced by high ranking mission leadership including The Special Representative of the Secretary-General who set a April 1 deadline for the militias to enter the disarmament program, and the MONUC military chief who stated “If you do not surrender your arms by 1 April you will be treated like armed bandits and war criminals and we will chase you.”¹³³

Clearly, these statements do not reflect the ideals of voluntary disarmament. But the security situation on the ground seemed to have left little choice. As MONUC forces deployed in greater numbers to protect the civilian population, it was forced to engage belligerent forces. Once it had defeated these forces in combat, was it supposed to simply allow them to return to their camps and plead with them to volunteer? Withstanding criticism of coercive practices, including those who suggested using passive measures such as arms embargos, despite the proven ineffectiveness of such actions,¹³⁴ the UN explored utilizing robust practices in other areas as well. In July of 2005, the UN led simultaneous operations in the Walungu territory of South Kivu. Coined Operation Iron First and Operation Falcon Sweep, the concurrent land and air campaigns were an attempt to root out members of the FDLR, disarm them, and return them to Rwanda. However, as stated by MONUC military officials, the main objective was to reduce human rights abuses, possibly explaining why MONUC's DDRRR unit was only marginally involved.¹³⁵

Just seven months after the operations in Walungu commenced, MONUC partnered with FARDC forces and moved, once again, against FDLR forces in the

¹³¹ Rouw and Willems, *Connecting Community Security*, 10.

¹³² Terrie, “The use of Force,” 23.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 24.

¹³⁵ de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 98.

Bunyakiri territory. But similar to the Walungu operation, the joint MONUC-FARDC force proved ineffective at dismantling and repatriating the FDLR forces in the area. The operation can, in fact, be cited as causing more problems as they pushed the FDLR forces into other communities where they were able to operate and abuse the local population with impunity.¹³⁶ Further adding to the conundrum was the unruly FARDC. Committing massive human rights violations, rife with corruption, and disorganized by parallel command structures of former rebel groups integrated, but not assimilated, into its ranks, the FARDC was widely distrusted, even feared, by the general population. As MONUC was seen operating shoulder to shoulder with the FARDC, the legitimacy of the UN force, and its DDRRR program, was damaged by the actions of the FARDC.¹³⁷

But coercive methods of DDR utilized by MONUC should not be condemned outright. Although the operations in Walungu and Bunyakiri did not result in significant increases in DDRRR of FDLR combatants, the campaign against Ituri militias is largely considered to have contributed to the relative stability currently observed in the province. From early 2005, MONUC conducted some of the most aggressive actions ever seen by UN forces and by June of that year claimed the successful disarmament of some 15,000 combatants through cordon-and-search operations and preemptive operations against armed militias.¹³⁸ In fact, the majority of militia leaders in the DRC who have surrendered to the DDR process have done so only in the face of resolute UN forces.¹³⁹ But why then were the operations in South Kivu less successful?

Comparison of the operations in Ituri and those in Walungu and Bunyakiri provides valuable discussion points for the debate of voluntary versus coercive DDR and DDRRR structures in the eastern Congo. The first factor is the demographic differences of the armed groups. The militias in Ituri were the UPC and FNI. Although they were

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Janine N. Clark, "UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Reflections on MONUSCO and its Contradictory Mandate," *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.3 (September 2011), 374.

¹³⁸ Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry Stimson Center, 2006), 165.

¹³⁹ Terrie, "The use of Force," 30.

split on ethnic lines, they were both considered to be Congolese. The FDLR in the Kivus, however, are primarily Hutu fighters from Rwanda. This created a significantly more complex situation for the combatants of the FDLR as they were faced with repatriation to Rwanda where they would possibly face prosecution for crimes committed during the 1994 genocide. Second, the absence of strong participation of the MONUC DDRRR unit in the Walungu and Bunyakiri operations meant that there was no acceptable DDRRR process for FDLR combatants. In contrast, almost simultaneous to the robust response from MONUC to FNI aggression, the UNDP assisted the Congolese government in establishing five DDR centers to process FNI militia members.¹⁴⁰ Finally, there existed vast differences in force strength and coordination mechanisms between Ituri and the Kivus. UN agencies had created a specific DDR program in Ituri, separate from the inefficiencies of the national program. Additional support was also present as more grassroots conflict prevention initiatives and nongovernmental organization operated in Ituri than in any other Congolese province.¹⁴¹ The overall force size between the provinces was asymmetrical. In September of 2003, MONUC had deployed almost half of its 10,800 troops to Ituri in addition to the EU lead Operation Artemis that, in May of 2003, saw the deployment of 1,800 European troops under with France as lead nation.¹⁴² This meant that while MONUC forces in Ituri could secure a location and force belligerents into the DDR program, the territory swept clean by MONUC and the FARDC in the Kivus was not held and was quickly repopulated by FDLR units who exacted revenge on the local population who they accused of assisting MONUC.¹⁴³ Additionally, poor coordination with the FARDC in the two operations in South Kivu greatly hindered success. Disgruntled FARDC units, operating months without pay, collaborated with FDLR assisting them to escape in some instances. This point provides

¹⁴⁰ Marriage, "Flip-flop, dollar soldier," 128.

¹⁴¹ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 207.

¹⁴² Ibid, 208.

¹⁴³ de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 98.

a good transition into the next chapter, which focuses on the links between DDR and SSR, specifically the manner in which FARDC units were formed in Army integration through the national DDR framework.

In summation, MONUC's voluntary framework for the support of the national DDR program and the DDRRR of regional foreign combatants has a crisis of identity. Although a voluntary structure aligned with UN norms of traditional peacekeeping and force neutrality, its foundation rests on the presence of a comprehensive peace. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement provided the document, but peace in the eastern districts of Ituri, North, and South Kivu is far from comprehensive even 12 years later. The FDLR and LRA also present unique problems as they are foreign armed groups with no real political stake in the DRC. This has contributed to their ongoing resistance to voluntary framework and led to several MONUC operations against their forces. The complex nature of the conflict in the east has forced MONUC forces to employ their Chapter VII mandate on numerous occasions to protect themselves and the civilian population. Once robust action has been taken against a belligerent, the voluntary framework no longer applies.

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VI. LINKS TO SSR – THE BRASSAGE PROCESS

Key to the long-term stability of the DRC, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been a prominent pillar of MONUC's mission and has been key to the ongoing success of DDR activities. Broadly defined as “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice,”¹⁴⁴ SSR has been inextricably linked to the PNDDR through the role of army integration, also known as brassage. The brassage process in the DRC was one of two tracks offered to ex-combatants who entered the national program, the second being full demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. Serving as both a track for the processing of ex-combatants and as a tool for army reform, the brassage process is vital to both DDR and SSR. Serving the PNDDR, brassage provided an avenue for Congolese rebel soldiers and community militiamen immediately to integrate into the national army, avoiding many of the pitfalls inherent in the demobilization and community reintegration process. As a step in SSR, it helps to provide the manpower to the newly forming national army. However, the brassage process was severely flawed in several ways and presented as many problems as it solved. First, inadequate funding for sensitization, army training and salaries has created a situation where FARDC units pursue abusive actions against the population for personal, ethnic or financial reasons. Second, the process did not adequately demobilize integrated individuals and units, allowing for polarization of the FARDC and parallel chains of command. Finally, proper structures were not created to provide for systematic selection and rejection of combatants wishing to join the FARDC. This allowed for inconsistent recruitment that included the incorporation of foreign combatants, child soldiers, and perpetrators of crimes against humanity, in contravention of Articles 180 and 184 of the Transitional Constitution.

¹⁴⁴ United States Institute of Peace and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles*, 51.

A. FUNDING

Although the process of DDR and army integration was linked in theory and design, the funding structures remained segregated, undermining the dual track process.¹⁴⁵ Although ex-combatants were filtered into these two tracks, the funding levels for the different programs were unbalanced, with \$200 million allocated for demobilization and only \$14 million assigned to army integration.¹⁴⁶ This weakness first became apparent with the Bukavu crisis in May of 2004. Apart from the inherent failure this represented to the brassage process, as newly integrated RCD-G units of the FARDC were directly engaging loyalist troops, the Transitional Government also broke with the established dual track program and moved 15,000 unintegrated troops to the eastern province to assist in stabilizing the region. The move not only further stressed the balance of power in the region, but also was used as cover for the embezzlement of millions of dollars allocated for transportation and logistical needs.¹⁴⁷

Simultaneous with these developments in 2004, and hindered by a lack of financial autonomy as the CGFDR controlled the funding mechanisms, CONADER's DDR actives were paralyzed in the region preventing forward progress.¹⁴⁸ In response to these setbacks, the Security Council mandated MONUC to establish three joint commissions in October 2004, one of which was tasked with oversight of SSR.¹⁴⁹ Traveling to the east to tour the brassage centers three months after its establishment, the SSR commission found a dismal situation. Lacking adequate food, water, shelter, medicine, electricity, and basic equipment, combatants and their dependents had abandoned the centers for nearby shantytowns and had resorted to pillaging the surrounding communities to secure basic necessities.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Onana and Taylor, "MONUC and SSR," 507.

¹⁴⁶ Marriage, "Flip-flop, dollar soldier," 127.

¹⁴⁷ Onana and Taylor, "MONUC and SSR," 508.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1565*, 3.

¹⁵⁰ Onana and Taylor, "MONUC and SSR," 510.

The crisis in Bakavu split wide open issues of funding in the brassage process specifically, and the DDR program overall. At the international level, partner states and international organizations did not have a coherent strategy for fund allocation to the overall process. While some donors chose to finance the MDRP and its DDR goals, others financed the Congolese defense ministry bilaterally, often circumventing the collective efforts of the MDRP.¹⁵¹ Although bilateral funding for SSR objectives directly with the Congolese government proved debilitating to the overall DDR process, such behavior is common in post-conflict environments as the host government seeks to strengthen aid relationships with individual states that will provide less pressure to conform to certain standards.¹⁵² At the national level, the PNDDR experienced significant hurdles between CONADER, charged with DDR program execution, and the CGFDR, which managed DDR finances. Coinciding with the events in Bukavu in 2004, the CGFDR repeatedly blocked the disbursement of funds to CONADER, severely hindering the DDR progress.¹⁵³ This problem was eventually solved in 2005 when a presidential decree dissolved the CGFDR, transferring financial management over to CONADER, yet rampant corruption and political infighting continues to take its toll on program efficiency.

As established above, financial coordination has had serious negative effects on the structural linkages of SSR and DDR in the peace-building process. But these shortcomings have not been confined to the structural level alone. At the operational level, gaps in funding have repeatedly disrupted the brassage process. Lack of funds at the ground level have left FARDC salaries unpaid on repeated occasions causing disregard for the command structure and abuse of the population. Funding for sensitization and training has also been meager as combatants who chose to stay in the brassage track receive only a 45 day training course meant to sensitize the soldiers to human rights and sexual violence in addition to providing military training and

¹⁵¹ Mobekk, "Security Sector Reform," 278.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Onana and Taylor, "MONUC and SSR," 508.

organization.¹⁵⁴ Thus, in addition to operational inefficiencies, the FARDC continuously ranked high in reports of human rights abuses including rape, murder, and torture.

B. UNIT INTEGRATION

Since its formation in 2004, the FARDC has been plagued by operational inefficiencies on the nominal side and outright rebellion and war on the extreme. The simple fact that the FARDC is set out to be the amalgamation and assimilation of former FAC, RCD-G, RCD-ML, MLC, FNI and various other militias, all separated by extensive ethnic and geographic differences, has made group cohesion difficult to attain. The brassage process intended to break down those who chose army integration over demobilization into individuals and reassemble mixed brigades out of the 45 day training course. Soldiers naturally gravitated towards leaders of a common ethnicity or previous rebel movement and often refused postings where they did not feel their group enjoyed that majority.¹⁵⁵ This continues to lead to disunity in the forces and crimes of revenge by members of the FARDC against former adversaries.

Although the FARDC eventually retook Bakavu in July 2004 from the RCD-G dissidents, the problem of rebellion from within the force did not disappear. Citing a lack of protection for the Banyamulenge in the Kivus, General Laurent Nkunda led the assault on Bakavu and maintained a strong following of ex-RCD-G soldiers. After engaging in talks with the Congolese government, Nkunda agreed to allow his forces into a “mixage” process whereby his forces would maintain unit organization but would be commanded side by side with other integrated FARDC brigades.¹⁵⁶ This proved to be an extremely costly move for the process of army integration as Nkunda continued to operate autonomously from FARDC leadership. Emerging with the new CNDP movement, Nkunda enjoyed support from all of his brigades gained during the mixage process and waged a war against the FDLR, self-funded through the illegal exploitation of minerals.

¹⁵⁴ Mobekk, “Security Sector Reform,” 277.

¹⁵⁵ Mark Knight, “Military Integration and War Termination,” in Melanne Civic and Michael Miklaucic, eds., *Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 64.

¹⁵⁶ Wolters, *Trouble in Eastern DRC*, 2.

The danger of mixage was further emphasized in 2008 when several top CNDP commanders, having been integrated into the FARDC, were confirmed present and in command of troops at the Kiwanja massacre of Congolese noncombatants.¹⁵⁷ While Nkunda was arrested by Rwanda in January of 2009 and his CNDP disintegrated back into the FARDC, army integration continues to be challenged by parallel command structures and contains several unintegrated brigades who have yet to go through the brassage process.

C. SELECTION PROCESS

In addition to the issues relating to funding and structuring of army integration, the SSR-DDR process lacked a coherent method for determining eligibility for army integration versus demobilization and reintegration. From the very beginning of the DDR program Congolese transitional leaders undermined the process by demanding a quota system to ensure even numbers of combatants from each of the belligerent forces. Due to the fact that every faction had inflated its numbers of combatants the quota system began to imply coerced enrollment into the army reintegration track by ex-combatants as recruits were falling far short of the predetermined numbers.¹⁵⁸ This demand for integration encouraged the relaxing of standards for recruits and would create future issues for the DDR process.

Although proscribed by the Transition Constitution and 2006 national Constitution, the use of child soldiers by the FARDC continued. Child soldiers who entered the PNDDR program and chose army integration were turned away only if they were suspected of war crimes or possessed an overt physical ailment.¹⁵⁹ Children utilized by CNDP and FARDC forces were actively hidden from UN authorities during the mixage process and continued to be processed into the national army as late as 2007.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 14 May, 20*.

¹⁵⁸ Onana and Taylor, "MONUC and SSR," 505.

¹⁵⁹ Rouw and Willems, *Connecting Community Security*, 10.

¹⁶⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2007/391 (June 28, 2007), 8.

On 17 February 2007, the then FARDC Chief of Staff informed all officers that they would be held responsible for continued military service of any children prompting a slight decrease in their numbers, yet the problem persists to the present.¹⁶¹

In addition to child soldiers, the admittance of perpetrators of crimes against humanity and integration of foreigners has presented roadblocks to the army integration process. The presence of war criminals within the leadership of the FARDC (the most notable of which perhaps is former UPC and CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda who, in addition to being a Rwandan national, is wanted by the ICC for war crimes) has presented MONUC with complex problems as it seeks to support the FARDC yet remain accountable to international law. Although CONADER has developed some methods for screening foreign combatants who try to enter the brassage process, it has failed to create linkages with MONUC and DDRRR actors to ensure those turned away continue to be processed rather than returned to the field.¹⁶²

In summation, funding for DDR and SSR related activities has been inconsistent and uncoordinated. Insufficient and mismanaged funding has occurred at the international, national, and operation levels of the brassage process and has generated missed opportunities in DDR and further stresses the conflict dynamics in the region. The process of demobilization of units has also created serious problems for army integration. FARDC units have been insufficiently trained and integrated, creating a force that has become, in many instances, as violent and abusive as the rebel forces it opposes. Finally, the selection criteria established by the FARDC and CONADER has proven insufficient in providing proper screening of combatants. On countless occasions the FARDC has unconstitutionally incorporated child soldiers and foreign combatants into its ranks. Additionally, FARDC leadership has looked the other way when integrating commanders and units are guilty of war crimes. In addition to creating a poorly trained, unprofessional force, the lack of criteria for recruitment has contributed to

¹⁶¹ Claude Rakisits, "Child Soldiers in the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol .27, No .4 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2009), 115.

¹⁶² de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 90.

the FARDC's less than exemplary track record on human rights. Although MONUC cannot bear the entirety of the blame for the FARDC's shortcomings and abuses, the continued support of DDR and SSR programs that produce such a force should be reevaluated.

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VII. CONCLUSION

MONUC/MONUSCO is operating in its twelfth year in the DRC and there does not seem to be a definitive exit date. Although headquartered in Kinshasa, MONUSCO maintains its largest force numbers in the east, where rampant insecurity is still a paramount problem. This thesis does not suggest that the UN efforts in DDR and DDRRR through MONUC and MONUSCO have been a failure. Such a supposition would be in ignorance of the many DDR successes achieved by the mission in the past decade. It is also important to note that the DDR(RR) programs run by MONUSCO are ongoing, their conclusion remaining to be seen. Instead, this thesis will conclude in three sections. First, the nature of the security environment in which UN DDR(RR) activities have been operating is important. Demographics, physical geography, exogenous forces, and endogenous factors have all had their effect on the DDR(RR) programs. While the mission did successfully adapt in several ways to security environment, ultimately this only occurred in reaction to failure.

Secondly, UN DDR(RR) programs in the eastern provinces suffered from an array of operational problems. Coordination of DDR funds was poorly managed and in some cases negatively impacted the process. Additionally, the link to SSR, in the form of brassage, was poorly thought out and was used as a “shortcut” around full demobilization. The setbacks experienced from failed attempts at army integration have been the catalyst for renewed violence and have damaged the legitimacy of both the FARDC and MONUC forces. Finally, the voluntary framework for DDR(RR) has, at times, been at odds with the mission’s Chapter VII responsibilities. As protection of the civilian population became a priority for the mission, MONUC was forced to take robust military actions against armed aggressors. These actions often conflicted with the stated voluntary framework for DDR(RR). Finally, this paper concludes with suggestions for future DDR(RR) operations based on the experiences of MONUC.

A. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

As reviewed in Chapter III, the demographics of the Congo are vastly diverse and contain a myriad of ethnic relationships and conflicts. Accordingly, conflict in the eastern provinces of Ituri and the Kivus is multidimensional. Ethnic differences at the community level, such as the Hema-Lendu conflict in Ituri or the Banyamulenge in the Kivus have created exceedingly localized conflict. Thus, even if peace accords like the ones signed in Lusaka in 1999 and Pretoria in 2002 were able to stabilize conflict between regional states and large rebel movements (which they didn't), they did very little to ensure community security. Without a comprehensive sense of security combatants have not felt safe enough to disarm. This was the cited claim by Laurent Nkunda between 2004 and 2009 as his CNDP movement remained mobilized and militant claiming inadequate protection of the Banyamulenge population in the Kivus. Likewise the continued existence of Mai Mai militias throughout the east, remain vigilant in the protection of their communities.

Commensurate with the ethnic diversity has been the number of armed actors operating since the conflict began in the mid-1990s. In addition to the presence of foreign militaries, over twelve different armed, nonstate actors have characterized conflict in the eastern DRC. In the face of this proliferation of armed groups, the challenges to successful DDR become exponential, as a program must accommodate each group's specific needs as best as possible. Because each movement represented a different constituency with different reasons for rebelling, this has proved a difficult task for DDR planners.

The regional security environment has also provided difficulties to the DDRRR process. The lack of a strong Congolese state means that many communities in the east feel less of a connection with the Kinshasa government than they do with neighboring Uganda, Rwanda or Burundi. Banyarwandan, Banyamulenge, Tutsi, and Hutu ethnicities in the east all find greater cultural and historical ties to the interlacustrine states than a sense of Congolese nationality. Following the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwanda forces in 2003, the two countries continued to undermine the security situation through covert support of Congolese rebel movements and militias. As MONUC DDR initiatives

sought to pacify these movements, little effort was made to address the broader issue of foreign support. Currently the largest threat to stability in the east, the FDLR is inextricably linked to Rwanda. Guilty of genocide crimes in 1994, the hard line leadership of the FDLR refuses repatriation to Rwanda and actively disrupts communications and information sharing between FDLR combatants and their original communities in Rwanda. But the group is also unwelcome in the Kivus where various militias have risen up to protect against FDLR abuses on the local Congolese Tutsi population.

Geography also presents a major obstacle to security and effective DDR. Dense forests, high mountain ranges, and a lack of transportation infrastructure create an environment where large forces can disappear and hide with relative ease. Additionally, the geographic area of focus of DDR activities is vast in the DRC. This has presented barriers to voluntary enrollment in DDR as many combatants have to travel far, and often outside the safety of their host community, to reach a cantonment zone or DDR center. In addition to providing barriers to movement, the geography of the eastern DRC is rich in easily extractable mineral resources. A blessing to a state that enjoys a monopoly of power over its borders and a healthy economy, the abundant resources in the DRC has been a curse. Rebel groups have been able to illegally remove resources from the land and use the profits to fund their movements. Combined with the vast, dense landscape, this wealth has made it easy for belligerent forces to acquire weapons from foreign sources to maintain their military strength.

In summation, the context of the conflict into which MONUC deployed and supported DDR(RR) initiatives was and still is hugely complex. Although many of these factors were individually identified early in the mission's deployment, the overall complexity born from the sum of these factors was underestimated.

B. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

Operationally, MONUC faced challenges in coordination with a myriad of foreign donors and international initiatives. The dire situation in the DRC did not go unnoticed in the international community, but the lack of strategic interest by any of the Permanent

Members of the Security Council, funding for a robust UN mission was not immediately forthcoming. Additionally, as funding did begin to arrive for DDR activities, proper coordination between funders was absent as international and bilateral agreements distributed funds unevenly. This took the form of asymmetrical funding for community reintegration and army integration, missed opportunities as DDR units were not effectively coordinated with during peace enforcement operations, and inconsistent funding for DDR activities between the large MDRP initiative and various other bilateral programs.

Perhaps the most visible operational issue in DDR activities has been the army integration process of brassage. Aimed at addressing SSR and DDR objectives, brassage has produced setbacks to both. Poorly integrated FARDC units have been cited multiple times for human rights violations and have on several occasions mutinied against state control, reverting back to their prior rebel leadership. Provided as one of two tracks in the PNDDR, brassage's 45 day training program has proven insufficient at demobilizing former combatants and realigning their allegiance to the national government. Additionally, the selection process has been marred by inconsistency as child soldiers, foreign combatants, and perpetrators of human rights violations have been allowed to integrate into the FARDC.

The use of a voluntary framework for DDR(RR) activities must also be reevaluated. Noted for its large and well-armed force, relative to UN peacekeeping, MONUC has undertaken some of the most aggressive actions ever carried out by UN forces. A response to continued insecurity, justified under the mission's Chapter VII mandate, and in the name of civilian protection, these robust actions have challenged the voluntary DDR(RR) framework. UN actions in Ituri, Walungu and Bunyakiri are prime examples of robust operations, which stood at odds with the mission's voluntary DDR framework. But while those in Ituri have contributed to the province's relative stability, the actions in South Kivu have not been viewed under such a positive light. This difference is likely attributable to the mission's overall commitment in Ituri and the presence of close coordination between MONUC military forces and the DDR unit. While Ituri had large numbers of troops and a fully deployed DDR structure, smaller

MONUC forces in conjunction with FARDC forces that possessed questionable training and loyalty carried out the operations in Walungu and Bunyakiri. Additionally, the operations were not adequately coordinated with the DDRRR unit to ensure the successful processing and repatriation of captured FDLR units.

While voluntary frameworks for DDR are not to be dismissed, they rely on the presence of a peace to be kept, in the form of a viable and comprehensive peace agreement. Although peace agreements were signed during the conflict, none of these agreements has been able to provide a comprehensive peace between all armed belligerents. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement forged a tentative peace between all of the sovereign states present in the Congo basin. The Global All-Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria in 2002 provided an agreement between the major rebel factions, RCD and MLC, and the Congolese government. However, due to the multi-faceted nature of the conflict, and a lack of credible state institutions with which to negotiate, a comprehensive and defensible peace was never achieved. This simple fact should provide fair warning to all planners who seek to utilize a voluntary framework for DDR operations. The DRC provides a strong example that, without a comprehensive peace to keep, voluntary DDR will almost certainly fail to secure the enrollment of belligerents.

Thus inadequate funding, poorly designed linkages to SSR, and a reliance on voluntary methods have plagued UN led DDR(RR) operations. Although the mission has not yet concluded, and the security situation in the east is far from resolved, these operational lessons provide valuable insight into UN DDR operational guidelines.

C. LESSONS LEARNED

Lesson #1: DDR funding must be properly planned and coordinated at the international, national, and local levels to avoid counterproductive initiatives and operational setbacks.

The presence of multiple UN and international initiatives in DDR has proven to be debilitating to the overall DDR process in the DRC. The presence of World Bank and other various bilateral funding for DDR(RR) initiatives in the DRC often provided contradictions in the programs and slow response time on the ground. Although the

GoDRC has established a dual track program for the PNDDR, funding was asymmetrical for the two tracks, creating biased implementation of the program. Additionally, the proliferation of DDR bodies under the GoDRC created unneeded complexity and provided the cover for corruption and misappropriation of funds. Meanwhile, the DDRRR of foreign combatants was largely neglected, remaining the major source of insecurity in the east.

Lesson #2: Military integration is not a shortcut around the demobilization process.

Although the DDR need for the dismantling of rebel armies and militias coincided with the SSR objective of creating a national armed forces, the process of brassage proved to create as many problems as it solved. While FARDC brigades were stood up in a relatively small amount of time, brassage has compromised the force's integrity and functionality. The eastern provinces are far removed from army headquarters in Kinshasa. The Great Lakes conflict system is also defined by rampant insecurities and community level conflict that the brassage process has failed to recognize. Thus FARDC units that have been assembled through brassage have only occasionally represented the needs of the nation and have often been perpetrators of egregious acts against the population. The current FARDC force, intended to relieve the expensive MONUSCO mission of peacekeeping and security tasks, has proven inadequate.

Lesson #3: Once a Chapter VII mandate was established for MONUC, the voluntary framework for DDR should have been reevaluated.

Although, as mentioned in Chapter V, it is incorrect to directly correlate Chapter VII mandates and coercive DDR, the presence of a large number of warring parties, the absence of a comprehensive peace, and a mission mandate to protect the civilian population all have made voluntary DDR impractical. Eventually faced with open confrontation against belligerent parties in the name of civilian defense, MONUC was forced to take coercive action without commensurate coercive DDR policies. This does not suggest that MONUC should abandon its voluntary framework entirely for a coercive

model, rather than the recognition of its coercive military actions by the DDR unit would better serve its DDR process instead of reacting to these actions in an ad hoc nature.

UN led DDR(RR) efforts in the eastern DRC continue to evolve to meet the demands of the conflict environment. As the UN mission enters its thirteenth year, a review of the national DDR and DDRRR of foreign combatants reveals programmatic evolution in reaction to events on the ground. Founded on a Traditional DDR framework, MONUC supported DDR(RR) efforts have incorporated many of the aspects present in Second Generation DDR. While many successes have emerged, the absence of a comprehensive peace and the reliance on a voluntary framework has continued to plague the success of the programs. Armed militias, like the Mai Mai, continue to operate in the eastern districts of the DRC, resistant to the DDR(RR) programs present there, because the Congolese government and MONUSCO are incapable of maintaining a secure environment, necessary to facilitate voluntary DDR. Additionally, foreign groups like the FDLR and LRA face barriers to their repatriation that Congolese programs cannot address. These groups have shown, time and time again, a total disinterest in repatriation to a society that will undoubtedly prosecute them for their crimes. And they are not welcome in the Congo where their presence is the source of continued violence and illegal resource extraction. Thus poor coordination at the national, international, and local level, the failure in SSR to create a viable Congolese defense force, and the UN's continued focus on voluntary methods of DDR(RR) have stalled the progress of the DDR(RR) programs and allowed for the continued presence of armed nonstate groups in the east.

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