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THESIS

**COMPSTAT 2.0: AN INNOVATIVE POLICE STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT PLAN THAT FACILITATES
PERFORMANCE IN THE ALL CRIMES AND ALL
HAZARDS ENVIRONMENT**

by

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March 2011

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PLAN THAT FACILITATES PERFORMANCE IN THE ALL CRIMES AND ALL
HAZARDS ENVIRONMENT**

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ABSTRACT

The delivery of police services has been governed by various strategic management plans. Flaws exposed in the professional model gave rise to the development of community policing (COP). Eventually, dissatisfaction with COP gave rise to Compstat. Today, Compstat is the dominant strategic model for the provision of police services in the U.S. and, has been credited with significantly improving the delivery of police services. The practical implementation of Compstat has however, exposed certain flaws, paradoxes and gaps in the model that impede crime fighting effectiveness, and diminish public trust. The threats and challenges of the twenty-first century call for the police to develop a strategic management plan that facilitates not only crime fighting but also enhances the ability to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the harm caused in the all hazards environment. This thesis provides evidence and arguments from a body of strategic management literature, and the lessons learned from prior police management practices, to suggest an innovative adaptation of Compstat. Compstat 2.0 is a hybrid that builds on what has been shown to work best in Compstat, COP and other models while diminishing or eliminating what has been shown to be dysfunctional.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BOS	Blue Ocean Strategy
CAPSTAT	Citywide Accountability Program
CFS	Calls for Service
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
COP	Community Policing
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GIWG	Global Intelligence Working Group
HSP	Homeland Security Project
ILP	Intelligence Led Policing
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LPD	Lowell Police Department
MPD	Minneapolis Police Department
NCISP	National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan
NGO	Non Government Organizations
NJSP	New Jersey State Police
NPD	Newark Police Department
NYPD	New York City Police Department
QOL	Quality of Life
SLTLE	State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies
SOT	Speed of Trust
TEAMS	Total Efficiency Management System
TEW	Terrorism Early Warning Group
UCR	Uniform Crime Reports
UK	United Kingdom

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I. INTRODUCTION

A PROBLEM STATEMENT

A theme in the study of homeland security is that the world is becoming more complex. Increasing complexity demands new management practices that hone our effectiveness in perceiving and acting on the threats, challenges, and opportunities that surround us. As homeland security providers, we are urged to be innovative, accepting the principle that neither our challenges nor the solutions we seek will be linear; with simple causes, effects, or remedies. The homeland security community has spent the past decade working to address challenges not even contemplated seriously in this county twenty years ago. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies (SLTLEs) have some experience over the past century in adapting to an increasingly complex context. Through the twentieth century, the delivery of SLTLE services was governed or influenced by various strategic management philosophies. When flaws were exposed in the Professional model of policing, Community Oriented Policing (COP) as a management practice gained prominence. As flaws were discovered in the application of COP, Compstat came to the fore. Today, Compstat is the dominant strategic model for the provision of SLTLE services in the U.S. Compstat has been credited with significantly improving the delivery of Police services and has spread further and faster than any previous management method. The threats and challenges of the twenty-first century have however forced SLTLEs to examine one again the fundamental questions of what the police should be doing, how they should be doing it, and how best to measure progress towards those goals.

Since 2001, SLTLEs have been called upon to make a contribution to the Homeland Security Project (HSP). As our understanding of the HSP matures, many SLTLEs will be called upon to accept a significant role in critical infrastructure protection, disaster planning, and consequence management. None the less, the duties SLTLEs have traditionally embraced remain unabated. SLTLEs still are primarily occupied with; reducing crime and victimization, calling offenders to account, reducing

fear, enhancing individual security, ensuring civility in public places, the efficient and fair use of public resources, using force and authority economically and fairly, and providing quality services, and maintaining customer satisfaction. (Moore & Braga, 2003). In an effort to address the challenge of meeting traditional SLTLE service delivery needs with the requirements the HSP brings, the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) was formed. This body produced the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). The NCISP recommended that SLTLEs adopt a different model of strategic management. This group has recommended intelligence led policing (ILP) as the latest model of strategic management “to provide public safety decision makers the information they need to protect the lives of our citizens” Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003).

Both Compstat and COP were designed before the attacks of September 11 and thus neither was designed with the HSP in mind. While each has strong points of merit, they have fundamental contradictions with each other. While the ILP model has been endorsed broadly in this country and abroad “it remains a fairly nebulous concept and most agencies are just toying with implementation” (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). What is required as SLTLEs move forward is a functional, commonly understood framework that takes the greatest advantage of law enforcement’s current capacities, resolves the conflicts amongst the various management philosophies and incorporates the best practices of each. Greater intelligence capacity, enhanced community policing, and the incorporation of Compstat’s key components are all likely to enhance both the crime fighting and the HSP mandates. Departments, however, cannot be expected to develop each adequately, independent of and, by extension, in competition with each other. What is needed today is a strategic management plan for SLTLEs that is scalable, adaptable, reflective of the lessons learned in previous systems, and functional for the increasingly complex environment SLTLEs are working in.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION (S)

The research herein is designed to examine Compstat, as it is practiced currently, and to determine what, if any, modifications are necessary to enhance the practice's effectiveness. To explore this question fully, several secondary questions will be asked:

1. What elements of Compstat are functional for the crime fighting mission and the HSP?
2. What elements of Compstat can be improved to enhance effectiveness in the crime fighting and HSP missions?
3. What elements of COP and ILP can be synthesized into the Compstat model that would produce a hybrid more effective than any one of the models in the current state?
4. What barriers exist to making structural improvements to the Compstat model?
5. By what metrics can this hybrid model be judged for effectiveness?

C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This research is designed to offer an innovative strategic management alternative to SLTLEs that enables agencies to accept and excel within an environment of finite resources in the face of increasing complexity, increasing urgency, and increasingly serious consequences. In pursuit of these goals, this thesis will:

1. Provide an overview of the existing research on COP, Compstat, and ILP;
 - a. Describe the distinct elements of each in light of function or dysfunction as it relates to the crime fighting and HSP missions
 - b. Describe where each philosophy has overlap and the ideological or practical conflicts inherent between each.
2. Propose and explain a strategic model (Compstat 2.) for SLTLEs accentuating functional elements of COP, Compstat, and ILP while diminishing or eliminating the dysfunctional elements of each.
3. Propose a series of actions that will increase the likelihood Compstat 2.0 can be successfully implemented, overcoming the bureaucratic barriers strategic innovations frequently face.
4. Discuss the various methods by which Compstat 2.0 and performance within the model should be measured over time.

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This thesis will contribute to the ongoing debate surrounding the question of how best to manage SLTLEs and guide them into more productive uses of their limited resources. While frameworks have been previously adopted or promoted by anecdote and by assumption, this thesis will provide a detailed explanation of how to modify today's most popular and pervasive police management system so that it can become more adaptive to and successful in a variety of problem contexts. Simple solutions are inappropriate for complex challenges just as complicated problem solving is not necessary or efficient when the challenge is relatively simple and straightforward. A police management system that is practical, adaptable, and productive is the ultimate goal of strategic management in SLTLEs. Police organizations are traditionally slow to accept structural change and often loath to veer too far from traditional hierarchies and methods. This thesis will propose a series of adaptations that are designed to improve on, synthesize, and adapt rather than scrap, the most popular and successful structures in modern American policing. The author is employed as a mid-level manager in a large police department. The author regularly prepares products for senior management regarding process improvement. It is expected that this thesis will be reviewed by senior leaders at the author's agency to determine if alterations in our Compstat practice are warranted. A clear majority of large SLTLEs currently operate with some form of the Compstat philosophy. Research that establishes a better way to employ the Compstat model is valuable to the large body of SLTLEs, many of whom struggle with limited resources in the face of increasing demands for service and protection. This research will contribute to the body of knowledge that suggests why SLTLEs should adapt their strategic management structures and how they can accomplish that goal.

E. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis proposes that of all the examined SLTLE management philosophies, Compstat is the architecture best suited for adaptation and adjustment to the demands of policing in a post-9/11 environment. When applied properly, the core principles of Compstat do allow for a great deal of flexibility. Compstat can be modified to facilitate

the incorporation of innovative strategies and tactics to fight crime, enhance preparedness, and develop an intelligence capacity in line with the changing context of policing. Specifically, this thesis will support the argument that certain specific organizational conditions and structures in combination with modifications to the current Compstat architecture are likely to produce better results for SLTLEs than reliance on either COP or the ILP in isolation.

Because what is measured is what is important in most bureaucracies, this thesis will propose a method by which to apply reasonable metrics of productivity and effectiveness to the proposed model. Currently, Compstat has one primary metric, crime rates. Changes made to the Compstat architecture will necessarily require changes to the metrics of performance and accountability. Specifically, this thesis will support the argument that the collection, analysis and exchange of valuable information and intelligence can be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. This thesis will also support the argument that SLTLEs can measure and monitor intelligence capacity and performance along with all-hazards preparedness within the Compstat architecture.

Formative Program Evaluation will be used to examine in depth the strengths and weaknesses of the Compstat philosophy. Evidence will be collected from surveys, testimonials, and in depth holistic case studies on Compstat as it is currently operating in various large and medium sized SLTLEs. Additionally this thesis will examine similar case studies, surveys and testimonials on COP and the ILP to determine points of intersection and conflict between the various philosophies. The research will go into depth to explain how Compstat works, and where it paradoxically impedes the goals it espouses. A rigorous comparison of the various strengths and weakness of each philosophy will be incorporated into recommendations for how large and medium sized SLTLEs can build a better Compstat for their organization. The goal of the research is to suggest incremental improvements to the Compstat architecture and the methods of employing the most functional elements of each philosophy into a coherent plan that supports and enhances crime fighting, suppression of disorder, all-hazards preparedness, and a robust intelligence capacity. The proposed incremental changes must be measured against an agencies unique resource requirements, political feasibility, and functionality

with an eye towards efficiency and ease of incorporation. The metrics for performance evaluation will be studied against past practices and will be compared to espoused requirements in the traditional police mission and the new requirements relevant to the homeland security mandate.

F. OVERVIEW

While the introduction has provided the reader with an understanding of what this research seeks to accomplish and why this field of exploration has merit; the reader may also appreciate an overview of what can be expected in each chapter. The literature review in Chapter II starts with a review of various writings on strategic management and good business practices with an eye towards innovation, trust, flexibility, and the various contexts in which problems reside. The literature review transitions to an exploration of various strategic management plans already employed by SLTLEs. Here, the historical context, the practical elements, and the research evaluating the effectiveness of COP, Compstat, and ILP as models are presented. By combining literature on strategic management with the literature of various management practices in SLTLEs, a broad foundation is built from which evaluation and synthesis can occur. The third chapter offers a formative program examination of Compstat as it has been applied since 1994. This chapter provides an in depth appraisal of what research in various cities across the nation has exposed regarding the strengths and the weaknesses of Compstat as it is currently employed. The fourth chapter offers an analysis of COP, Compstat, and ILP in comparison to each other and in light of the broader schools of thought on strategic management. The fifth and final chapter takes the product of the analysis in chapter 4 and proposes a method by which Compstat can be adapted and improved.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

There is a case to be made that the provision of police services can benefit from innovations in management theory that have been successfully applied in other industries. Compstat and ILP both are linked in the literature to business management practices. While the concepts of profit and market competition are different in the provision of municipal services, police managers are expected to manage resources wisely, improve efficiency, measure effectiveness, motivate workers, and produce outputs that contribute to outcomes that the taxpayer is satisfied with. The management literature that contributed to this research is focused on developing, and implementing strategic management plans that produce greater value and focus on innovative ways to meet new challenges with the resources at hand.

1. The Speed of Trust

The *Speed of Trust* (SOT) (Covey & Merrill, 2006) focuses on trust as the first and primary driver for success in relationships. While the notions of trust building are applicable to personal life, Covey et al. focus on trust in the business context. The authors make the case that in relationships where there is high trust, processes flow more quickly and more cheaply. When trust diminishes, exchanges go more slowly and costs are increased by added rules, hierarchies, inspections, and the like. Organizational leaders need to recognize that their actions affect trust both internally amongst the employees and externally amongst the client base. Trust is not static; rather it is continually influenced by the behaviors of the parties involved in a relationship that requires trust. By engaging in trust building behaviors, an organization can lower the costs and delays suffered in low trust relationships. Building trust is not simply a component of character in this argument but also, is influenced by the demonstration of competence and the production of results. To be trusted an organization must show the qualities of character deserving of trust. An organization must demonstrate the ability to achieve mutually agreed upon goals and

produce a pattern of success so that the trust invested in the organization can be sustained and grow over time. By engaging in a pattern of high trust behaviors, an organization can expect certain trust dividends as opposed to paying a trust tax. High trust organizations, according to Covey, enjoy greater collaboration, are more innovative, inspire greater loyalty and execute with more efficiency than low trust organizations over time (Covey & Merrill, 2006). This argument is a great deal more in depth than an admonishment to be honest. While that is a component of trust, it is the floor as opposed to the ceiling. Because there is no controlled double blind study to back up the authors' assertions; the arguments here are made more by assertion, logic, and anecdote than with scientific evidence.

A correlation can also be drawn between the arguments in the *Speed of Trust* and in the expectancy theory of leadership and performance. Hughes Ginnett, & Curphy (1999) describe the expectancy theory as a rational understanding of the relationship between effort and outcome. In the expectancy theory, motivation and effort are conscious choices. These choices are influenced by factors that speak primarily to trust. Employees must trust that their effort is correlated to the value of their outputs. Stated simply this means that employees must believe that the harder they work, the more likely they are to produce something that is valued. Employees also must believe that there is a relationship between producing something of value and, receiving things of value. The trust that producing valued results will result in receiving valued rewards is also referred to as instrumentality. Employees will not work hard if they believe that added work will not produce results (low expectancy) or if they believe those results will not translate to things they value (low instrumentality). Trust is a key component of performance in this model. By ensuring that the work process is efficient, management contributes to the employee perception that their effort is closely related to outputs. Allowing inefficient, inequitable, sloppy systems to persist constitute negative management behaviors that diminish trust in the process (Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 1999).

Expectancy can be graphically represented as:




Figure 1. The Expectancy Theory of Motivation (After Hughes et al., 1999)

2. The Starfish and the Spider

The authors of *Starfish and the Spider* (Beckstrom & Brafman, 2006) argue that we need to view organizations differently in the modern era. Where previously, organizations were defined by their rules and organizational charts, many of today's successful organizations appear more like a network with flattened structures and broader bases. The authors make it clear however that not all organizations can be starfish. A starfish organization needs a shared ideology or larger purpose to grow and survive. This need supersedes the common and understood needs for capital, strategic planning, and bureaucracy. The authors also make the argument that starfish are formidable. Groups that can form around an ideology with very few organizational barriers and low costs cannot be easily contained. Terrorists groups and disorganized criminal elements can tie up or even overcome far more "powerful" state forces using leaderless network that spreads by commitment to shared value as opposed to a leader, a paycheck, or a rule bound bureaucracy. Conversely, the community and state can participate in a starfish organization by sharing information and collaborating in a relationship of shared power and mutual benefit. Relevant segments of the community, private industry, and the state

can share information, and cooperate to produce a more robust protection against and response to the significant threats of terrorism and criminal activity (Beckstrom & Brafman, 2006).

3. The Blue Ocean Strategy

In the *Blue Ocean Strategy* (BOS) the authors argue that there exists a cycle of success and failure in most traditional industries (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In a traditional “red ocean” industry, the waters are churning with the blood of cut throat competition in that one competitor’s gain represents a loss to the others in the field. Competitors enter the field because they believe they can produce the particular good/service at a price point to create profitability. The BOS offers a different path, away from direct competition and towards profitability through added value. The authors offer examples of how various industries thrive; not because they beat the competition but because they changed the game. This game changing emphasis can be seen in the development of a product of service that is a variation on previous themes but not a direct “apples to apples” comparison.

The BOS focuses on how to view business challenges differently from the normal competitive context. Assuming there is often a better way or a “third path”, the authors encourage us to look for a value added approach and not simply a way to diminish costs. Achieving added value is an act of deliberate effort in management and a function of leadership not accident. While innovation is important in achieving added value, innovation is often the product of conditions fostered by effective management. One of tools designed to help management emerge from a red ocean to a blue ocean is the “Four Actions Framework”. The four actions are applied to the current red ocean activity systematically.

The four actions can be graphically represented as:

Table 1. A Four Actions Framework (After Kim & Mauborgne, 2005)

<u>ELIMINATE</u>	<u>RAISE</u>
Those things that are identified as counterproductive and not worth saving or improving	Create greater emphasis and add resources to the elements of existing system that are functional
<u>REDUCE</u>	<u>CREATE</u>
The elements of the system that are functional enough to not be eliminated but should not be emphasized	This is where innovation can take place.

The four actions guide the efforts of an organization to develop and implement a better way of doing business. This is not to say, doing the same business better. While the red ocean is full of competition amongst similar agents; the blue ocean is focused on producing new and unique value rather than on outperforming the competition. The Blue Ocean Strategy is at the heart, about helping businesses develop and implement new strategies. The authors explain that successful new strategies follow the four action framework and have three characteristics in common. In order to be successful, a strategy must; be focused, create divergence or differentiation from what already exists, and have a compelling tagline (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). The strategy can be graphically represented using a device they call a strategy canvass. The canvass is a simple tool designed to communicate what factors will be emphasized and conversely, deemphasized in the new strategy.

An important component of strategy development discussed in the literature is implementation. It is axiomatic that the value of a strategic management innovation is not realized until it is successfully adopted. Organizational change is difficult; not just because building a better model is challenging but, primarily because those who are being led, must first be convinced. Leadership by fiat is short lived at best and lasting organizational improvement requires changes in behavior at all levels throughout an organization. Strategic planning is not an end to itself but rather, it is “a disciplined effort

to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or other entity) is, what it does and why it does it” (Bryson, 2004). People tend to resist change for a variety of reasons that include; lack of understanding, fear, low levels of trust, self interest, and mismatched priorities (Collie, 2006). While organizational change is difficult in most settings, it is especially difficult in the bureaucratic, rule bound, setting of most SLTLEs (Carter & Carter, 2008).

Kim and Mauborgne (2005) list the organizational hurdles that commonly work against successful implementation of a new strategy. They are:

1. The cognitive hurdle: This may be the most significant challenge. In order to institute change there must be a relatively broad agreement that change is necessary. The status quo is a powerful force. Acknowledging change is necessary can imply that the current management is less than highly effective, and requires a degree of introspection that is often difficult. This inertia can be overcome by a shock to the system where stakeholders are confronted with the negative outcomes they previously did not see or chose to ignore.
2. The resource hurdle: A brilliant innovation can be dashed easily on the rocks of limited resources. A successful implementation requires a clear understanding of how to acquire the necessary resources or how to implement the change with existing resources. In difficult economic times, it can be assumed that the later is required. Moving into a blue ocean often requires a combination of bringing more resources to concentrated areas of greatest need (hot spots), reallocating resources that are underused in the areas of low need (cold spots), and trading for resources with other stakeholders that find value in the trade (horse trading).
3. The motivational hurdle: This can be especially challenging in the SLTLE environment. In public sector work, private sectors tools like bonuses and targeted incentives are ethically problematic. Quotas for performance are also problematic. It seems entirely reasonable to offer a salesperson a specific target to improve sales by in a given period. It also is very common in the private sector to expect that this goal will matter to the employee if they can expect positive or negative consequences relative to achieving the goal. Conversely, in SLTLE work because it would injure the public trust and thus mission effectiveness, if any enforcement actions were motivated by an officer’s desire to achieve professional benefits, monetary gain, or to avoid negative consequences. The ethical and legal consequences of this incentive structure are plain. The authors of BOS argue that the motivational hurdle can be overcome by targeting

management efforts on key stakeholders rather than the entire population of employees. Changing the mindset and practices of key employees, like middle managers, has a cascading effect on the larger pool of employees and requires far fewer resources than does a plan to affect the incentives and behaviors for all employees. Following this train of thought, the authors of BOS argue that middle managers can be influenced when greater attention is paid to their individual performance and consequences are transparent and closely tied to that performance. The authors of BOS also emphasize that the large and sweeping goals of a strategic shift must be communicated in such a way that they are perceived as attainable. If the employee base is allowed to believe that the goals set for them are unrealistic, there will be a low motivation to achieve them. If however, the employees see incremental progress towards the goals set, the motivation to progress will grow. This thinking is entirely in line with Vroom's expectancy theory discussed earlier.

4. The political hurdle: SLTLE work is not only heavily influenced by the norms of bureaucracy but also by politics. No public organization can long withstand significant resistance from senior political leaders. Because strategic change in this context is closely tied to what an organization does to achieve public goals and how public resources are dedicated, senior political leaders must be leveraged early on if the innovation is to be successful. Conversely, political opponents to the change must be convinced or their arguments must be overcome. The most reasonable and carefully crafted strategies can be derailed if this opposition is not dealt with effectively.

The authors are clear that no blue ocean is a permanent haven. Size and scale in the blue ocean do not provide protection against the conditions changing and are not as valuable for longevity as a good chart and the ability to set a new course towards the next blue ocean. An organization entering a blue ocean through the narrows of a successful implementation strategy cannot rest on their laurels. Conditions will change, and with those changes, there will always be a need for scanning the horizon to plot the next course away from dysfunctional competition.

4. The Cynefin Framework

The Cynefin framework was developed to help leaders recognize the context of their organizational challenges so that they could design the most appropriate leader responses. In local law enforcement, leaders face challenges that range from the simple across the spectrum of complicated and complex to the chaotic. While simple challenges

require simple interventions, they can also breed complacency. Complex challenges are characterized by many moving parts, high stakes with disproportionate consequences, and a cause and effect relationship influenced by past actions and institutional memory (Snowden, 2007). The Cynefin framework suggests that in the complex context, leaders encourage discussion, debate, diversity of opinion, and ensure that conditions support the development of best practices rather than mandate results. “Because outcomes are unpredictable in a complex context, leaders need to focus on creating an environment from which good things can emerge, rather than trying to bring about predetermined results and possibly missing opportunities that arise unexpectedly” (Snowden, 2007).

In the simple context, the facts are known and undisputed. A simple context assumes clear communication, shared understanding, and shared goals. Clear relationships between cause and effect are expected in the simple context. For every question in the simple context, there is a right answer but, not likely more than one right answer. When problems arise in the simple context, line level workers are often able and expected to address them. Managers are needed to ensure rule adherence and find ways to improve efficiency. Speed, efficiency, uniformity, predictability, and stability are the positive attributes of the simplex context when things are running smoothly. The negative effects of a smoothly operating simple context are complacency, rote response, lack of innovation, and an over reliance on experience rather than learning. The simple context can easily become past focused and leaders can fall into micro management. While micro management can diminish trust and the incentive to innovate, standard operating procedures, functional bureaucracy, and hierarchical leadership are well suited to guide processes to successful conclusion in the simple context.

In the complicated context, the relationship between cause and effect remains strong but, is less clear. For every question, there can be more than one right answer but, no question is unanswerable. In the complicated context, analysis is required to take the known information and determine the unknown root of the problem. In the complicated context, non objective elements such as subjective values can influence decision making. While decision makers endeavor to apply root cause analysis to singular and often interrelated problems, the information required to perform that analysis is often difficult

and will require the assistance of subject matter experts. Experts can become bogged down in entrenched and territorial thinking to the detriment of problem solving. When this occurs, new sources of input, additional scanning, and collaboration are required. Decisions in the complicated context take more time to arrive at and will often involve a deliberative process and consensus. While hierarchy can be adhered to in the complicated context, flexibility and innovation are beneficial.

In the complex context, decision makers are working with even more significant challenges. The complex context is characterized by imperfect information, and an unclear understanding of cause and effect. In this context it is likely that there is no historical context from which to make predictions. Challenges in the complex context are likely challenges that have never been seen before. This is the context where innovation is not just beneficial but required. Rigid adherence to standard operating procedures here will almost certainly result in failure. This is the context famously described by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld when he stated in 2002, “There are things we do not know we don’t know.” Where standard operating procedures are insufficient, and innovation is required, the best management plans rely on experimentation. Patterns can be discerned over time that lead to more effective predictions but these processes require greater time and more acceptance of failure. Rule based culture, hierarchy, and bureaucracy are not as effective in the complex context as openness, flat structures, and value based goals that are broadly shared. Management plans that rely on experimentation must accept that there will be setbacks and that each setback is a learning opportunity. Management must foster conditions that support innovation and avoid setting conditions that judge success only by predetermined results. While targets cannot be objectively defined in this context, the shared values and culture of an organization can have positive influence on achieving outcomes that are beneficial. These values can be expressed effectively in super ordinate goals and simple barriers that guide performance rather than direct it.

In the chaotic context there is a sense of urgency. Failure to act is likely to result in dire consequences and there is no opportunity for deliberation or incremental change. The primary responsibility of management in a chaotic context is to restore order and

stop the ongoing harm. Command and control mechanisms are effective in a crisis and those receiving direction are often eager for it. Over reliance on command and control models however can interfere with learning from the crisis and thus diminishing the likelihood of repeating it. Crisis management in the chaotic context must be seen as a temporary solution only. Successful management in the chaotic context will bring about a transition to one of the other contexts and management must adapt to that change. Heroic leaders who successfully guide an organization through a crisis can become over reliant on crisis management techniques to the long term detriment of the organization. The context of disorder emerges when multiple leaders with varying agendas vie for prominence in a complex or chaotic context. No solutions can derive from the context of disorder. Disorder can only be diminished when a focal leader is agreed upon or when the complex problem is broken down into various parts, the context of which can be seen and addressed in terms of one of the other four contexts.

The Cynefin framework was designed to help leaders not only identify in which context they were operating but also, to help describe the management techniques most suited to that context. The framework however is not static. Leaders must develop systems that allow for transition across the various contexts because no organization can expect to remain in one context permanently. The framework is graphically represented in Figure 2.



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William Proctor, CCC 2010

Figure 2. Cynefin Framework (From Snowden & Boone, 2007)

The literature on strategic management establishes the following basic principles that are relevant to the research questions this thesis addresses. Good leadership matters. It is incumbent on SLTLE leaders to develop and successfully implement strategic management plans that guide and shape the efforts of their organizations. The expectancy theory applies to leaders as much as it does to subordinates. Properly applied leadership as expressed in effective strategic management has a correlation to improved performance. Improved SLTLE performance has a correlation to positive outcomes both in the leader subordinate exchange and beyond. Good planning involves a mixture of adaption, synthesis, collaboration, the ability to overcome obstacles, and an adherence to shared values. This knowledge combined with what can be learned from the various existing SLTLE strategic management plans provides a solid foundation for developing the next adaption of SLTLE strategic management.

B. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN SLTLES

The examination of a body of literature on strategic management generally, provides a foundation for the examination of three different strategic models in the provision of SLTLE services. Community Oriented Policing (COP) was the first significant innovation in policing to transcend what is referred to as the traditional model. This model was designed to address a changing context in the policing environment, was broadly implemented and enjoyed real successes. Compstat followed COP, emphasizing different priorities and addressing a changing context. Compstat was implemented even more rapidly than COP, enjoyed great success, and remains today the dominate model for medium and large SLTLEs in the U.S. Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) is a more recent innovation in SLTLE strategic management that has been endorsed widely in the United Kingdom (UK). ILP seeks to address the changing needs of SLTLE service delivery especially in the context of a call to address all crimes and all hazards. While there are calls in the US to adopt ILP more broadly, Compstat remains predominate. An examination of the historical context for each model and the relative merits of each will be instructive to the question of how SLTLEs can design and implement the most effective strategic management plans for the future.

1. Literature on Community Oriented Policing (COP)

a. Historical Context

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a rise in crime rates in various urban areas and a series of civil disturbances that contributed to a general sense of dissatisfaction with the quality of police services. The police did not appear prepared to address the rise of drug related crime. There was a growing perception of disorder in public spaces. Brutality and the apparent inability to effectively manage violence associated with the anti war and civil rights movements further eroded the public confidence in the current policing structures. There developed a sense that the police were growing increasingly distant from the public and that distance was increasingly dysfunctional. In the early 1970s, social science researchers conducted studies designed

to examine the effectiveness of common police methods. The conclusions of the 1972 Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment raised concerns regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the traditional way police services were delivered. The findings argued that:

1. Traditional patrol (the deployment of marked patrol cars distributed across a geographic area and tasked with deterring crime by their mere presence and the rapid response to calls for service) was not as successful as hoped in preventing crime or reducing the fear of crime.
2. Patrol Officers spent the majority of their on duty time in random patrol waiting to respond to a call for service instead of being involved in any proactive crime fighting effort. (Alexander, 2005)

The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment in 1979 examined the value of returning to a patrol tactic of assigning officers to patrol areas on foot. While it was clear that foot patrol officers were limited in the area they could effectively patrol and the specialized equipment they could carry, they were also far more able to establish relationships with the citizens they served and a deeper understanding of the unique challenges in the community they patrolled. The findings argued that:

1. Foot patrol was not significantly more effective in preventing crime than traditional patrol but;
2. The closer relationships officers built with community members resulted in a greater sense of satisfaction with police services and a diminished fear of crime in the community and increases in perceived quality of life (QOL). (Alexander, 2005)

These findings contributed to a growing sense that the police could and should make strategic changes. The research suggested that quality of life and fear of crime were important to the public, and that traditional patrol methods were not producing the results the public was expecting. A transformative text, *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective* (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990) contributed to a broader understanding of what was to come. While there are many varying definitions of COP in the professional literature, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux define COP as follows:

Community Policing is a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop new relationships with law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems (Chappell, 2008).

b. Components of the COP Model

Gary Cordner (2001) describes several different elements of COP. COP officers are asked to forge stronger bonds with the community in various ways which include; conducting neighborhood surveys, forming citizen advisory groups, attending town meetings, and generally becoming more accountable to the people they serve (Corder, 2001). All of these efforts to enhance communication with members of the community reflect recognition of increasing complexity in the policing environment. No longer could the police or even law makers be alone in setting the priorities. During the development of COP, scholars and members of police management discovered in various cities that what the police saw as priorities, emergency calls for service, violent and drug related criminal activity, were not always in line with the community's concerns. In many communities, the residents were at least as and, sometimes even more concerned about nuisance crime, vagrancy, traffic, and the maintenance of order in public places. A significant number of law-abiding citizens saw the risk of violent of drug related crime directly affecting them as lower than the daily effects they suffered from these seemingly less serious crimes. The effect on a community associated with crime as opposed to the effects on individual victims came to be associated with the term quality of life (QOL). The COP model sought to improve QOL by addressing a variety of community concerns. In COP the police did not abdicate their responsibility for address serious crime and victimization, but they took on the additional mantle of responsibility for QOL issues.

Building trusting relationships with the community is an important first step in helping to establish shared priorities and seeking assistance in the design and

implementation of effective tactics. The COP model recognizes that the police would have to deliver police services in line with public expectations. A variety of methods are employed to establish stronger bonds of trust. Officers in COP are encouraged to engage in face to face encounters with community members, seeking out non confrontational settings where law-abiding community members could get to know their police and by extension see them as effective, committed and trustworthy partners. Tactics such as door to door visits, surveys, town meetings, and neighborhood sub-stations are all used based on conditions and resources. Citizens are encouraged to participate in ride-along opportunities and to attend citizen police academies while officers are assigned to participate in police athletic leagues and midnight basketball programs. At the far end of the spectrum of efforts to establish greater trusting relationships with community, officers are offered federally funded loan programs to buy homes in distressed neighborhoods and some Departments establish citizen review boards to review use of force allegations and the investigation of policy violations.

COP was a necessary innovation, in part because the context of policing had become more complicated. Instead of remaining in the simple context, where more patrol, faster response, and more arrests were the metrics of success, SLTLE leaders came to see a more complicated relationship between cause and effect. Sociologists argued that the police could do little to directly affect crime and the most they could hope for was to respond and mitigate harm. SLTLE leaders wanted a strategic management plan that incorporated the community and other government agencies into effective partnerships that enhanced their collective efforts to enhance safety, deter crime, and effectively respond to the conditions that supported criminal behavior. In this increasingly complicated view of how to deliver police services, crime prevention and problem solving were all employed in the COP model to achieve the ultimate goal, safer communities. The COP model argues that officers should not necessarily focus on arresting criminals as the ultimate goal of police work. “Routine activities theory holds that crime takes place when a motivated offender and a suitable target rub shoulders in time and space in the absence of a committed guardian” (Cassady, 2008; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Traditional policing focuses heavily on removing the offender by arrest or,

his motivation by increasing the offender's perception of risk. Attacking crime problems by focusing on the offender has proven to be an incomplete solution in that there is a high recidivism rate for minor crimes and the clearance rate for the most serious crimes (UCR Part 1) hovers at approximately 20 percent (Cassady, 2008). While various COP programs did work to design more effective arrest strategies such as targeting repeat offenders (Pelfrey, 2005), other programs are employed to affect potential victim behavior, to harden targets, and to address underlying social conditions that contribute to negative outcomes.

c. Problem Solving

COP officers are expected to address and resolve the conditions that contribute to a diminished quality of life. COP in fact relies on problem solving, to help narrow the focus and properly allocate limited resources. Without problem solving, the COP “approach is not well focused on crime problems and provides a common set of services throughout a jurisdiction” (Braga, 2006). A primary text on problem solving, problem oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990) argues that the police should look to individual cases and incidents to determine if in fact, they are symptoms of a more profound disease affecting the public body (Cordner, 2001). Officers are trained to apply the SARA model of problem solving when addressing community concerns. Officers are expected to **SCAN** for and **ANALYZE** unsafe conditions or criminal activity that affects their communities. Officers are then tasked with designing innovative, target specific and effective tactics to **RESPOND** to these concerns. Every response should later be **ASSESSED** to determine what worked and what did not. In SARA model, officers are expected to learn from failures and adapt on a regular basis.

A problem solving theory that is often incorporated into the order maintenance priority of COP is Broken Windows policing. First employed in a New Jersey foot patrol experiment of the 1970s, Broken Windows posits that the police are tasked with preventing serious crime by rigorously addressing minor crimes and nuisances before they become more serious (Wilson & Kelling, 2001). In this model, Broken Windows are a metaphor for minor violations of the law and informal

neighborhood standards that previously would not receive the attention of the police who previously saw themselves as tasked with more serious criminal enforcement. Just as a broken window is a sign that property is untended, in the metaphor, ignoring minor violations gives rise to more significant crime and disorder in that it signals a community is untended and that standards are not enforced. In this model, law enforcement is not restricted to an individual perspective, focusing only on the exchange between a violator, victim and law enforcer. The community and its standards also play a role in decision making. The officer is expected to maintain community standards in his/her enforcement practices in an effort to facilitate the development of stronger informal social controls throughout the community. The crux of this model is the assertion that greater order maintenance will lead to greater crime prevention.

Broken Windows has been incorporated into various COP programs to reassert control over communities that suffer from visible signs of disorder. It is also closely tied to a zero tolerance model where all violations, no matter how insignificant, are addressed with enforcement action. Like the larger more encompassing COP, this model does not rely on layers of bureaucracy and, empowers the individual officer to take action in pursuit of addressing community concerns. Broken Windows speaks not only to the enforcement of community standards and the diminution of public disorder but also seeks to address the fear of crime. Reducing the fear of crime is seen as an important metric of police performance in COP. When decent citizens are afraid they will be victimized, they engage in social isolation. That isolation contributes to a breakdown of the informal social controls that previously acted to inhibit disorder through a fear of shame or other negative consequences.




Figure 3. Public Disorder and its Consequences (After Weisburd & Eck 2004)

Those that argue against Broken Windows as an effective tactic assert that it can lead to abuse and further erode trust in the police. Police seeking to reflect a community standard can be misguided easily into enforcing norms and standards the courts will not uphold. In groups and out groups can be established so that some laws are ignored and others are enforced without equity. When misapplied, this tactic can lead to 14th Amendment Equal Protection claims, citizen complaints, and heavy handedness. The court rulings rejecting vagrancy, loitering, profanity, and loud noise ordinances in various communities, speak to this conflict. Further, research conducted in seven cities indicates that there is no strong correlation between intense enforcement activity and reduced disorder (Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

d. Partnerships

COP officers seek out opportunities to collaborate with relevant stakeholders both in and out of government to; alter potential victim behaviors, harden

targets, increase informal social controls, or otherwise alter the underlying conditions that make crime and disorder more likely. The COP model emphasizes forging productive partnerships with and providing education for community members. The practical application of this component of the COP model has spawned several successful programs collateral to and functionally supportive of the police mission. These programs reflect the COP ethos in that they rely on interaction between the police and the community to exchange information and to affect change neither would be as likely to accomplish without the partnership. It is of special note that many of these programs continue to be successful and are funded with local dollars to this day long after the grant funding that fueled their inception has waned. Neighborhood Watch, School Resource Officers, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), and Crime Solvers are all reflections of the COP principle that the police and the community can act as effective partners in deterring or addressing a variety of crime and QOL challenges.

A tactic later referred to as Pulling Levers policing reflects the commitment to partnerships and collaboration in the COP model. This tactic is relatively complex when compared to Broken Windows policing in that it requires the police to exercise influence in areas and with stakeholders over whom they have no formal authority. If, for example, it is determined that the problem with burglaries is related to an increase in truancy, Broken Windows policing might direct that officers seek out and detain all truants. Pulling Levers policing can improve on this tactic by collaborating with the school board to design more effective truancy monitoring and school based programs to address truancy. The Juvenile Courts can participate by applying stricter sanctions for truancy violations. Information about the link between skipping school and more serious impacts on the community can be shared with civic leagues, business associations, and the media all in an effort to increase citizen awareness and reporting of these minor violations.

In the Boston area, a rise in youth gun violence was determined to be beyond the scope of the police alone to resolve. Police management developed the Boston Ceasefire project and worked with other stakeholder agencies and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) at a management level to produce a coordinated response that

involved the Juvenile Courts, the prosecutor's office, the schools, community advocates, the faith community, and the police. Repeat offenders were targeted for monitoring and warned of severe consequences if they choose to continue their criminal activity and gang affiliation. They were also offered alternative strategies for avoiding future violence. Forging these partnerships and maintaining a sense of accountability amongst the disparate agencies was a task well beyond that expected of any one stakeholder and proved to be an effective response, lowering significantly the rate and severity of youth violence (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). In an experiment testing the value of partnerships compared to simple arrest strategies, researchers studied the difference in crime and disorder in small communities following a series of drug arrests. In the control group, no treatment was applied other than the arrest. In the experimental group, police collaborated with landlords and regulatory agencies facilitating additional follow on consequences. The treatment group was observed to have less disorder in the following period than the control group (Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

The literature suggests that successful adoption of COP requires a series of changes at the management and strategic level well beyond simply painting COP on the side of patrol cars and accepting grant funds. Patrol officers need to have more time away from the burdens of 911 responses to engage in COP activities such as, face to face exchanges and partnership development, follow up investigations, attending meetings, and conducting surveys. One effective way to reduce calls for service conflicts with COP activities is to alter departmental policies to provide for differential response to calls for service. For some calls, a screening can establish that a delayed response is appropriate while other methods like telephone or web based reporting can satisfy the callers needs while decreasing the burdens on manpower (Cordner, 2001). Hiring more officers is frequently necessary to meet the additional goals COP layers on top of traditional patrol expectations. A strategic plan that relies on additional resources is vulnerable to the absence of those resources. Hiring requires additional taxpayer resources which can at times be very difficult to generate. Police hiring can also be controversial especially in the COP model in that there is often a call to hire more members of the distressed or minority community. Building trusting bonds with a community can involve being open

to hiring people from that community. In recent years, several cities have suffered through hiring and promotional scandals and lawsuits wherein the underlying allegations speak to bias that negatively impacts citizens who are members of a protected class. These lawsuits and the complaints that surround them, do little to enhance the public trust.

The COP model calls on SLTLEs to empower officers at the line level to make decisions with greater autonomy and authority than in the traditional model. Collie (2006) argues that empowering line officers to make decisions previously reserved for supervisors, demonstrates a level of trust in and expectation of professionalism in the line performer. Further this level of autonomy in decision making builds some a level of resilience and independence that can prove useful when a crisis makes traditional hierarchy based communications and decision making impractical (Collie, 2006). COP stresses decentralization and flattening throughout the organization recognizing that the model expects officers to employ differential responses to problems based on the conditions they observe, their own unique skills and abilities, the abilities of various stakeholders to contribute to problem solving strategies, and the unique priorities expressed by the community. Maintaining several layers of bureaucracy before decisions can be made and resources committed communicates a lack of trust in the line officer, delays the work that need to be done, and relies on decisions made by superior officers who are not as familiar with the unique dynamics of the particular situation.

COP offers the potential to develop nontraditional skills in officers by calling on them to conduct more follow up investigative work. By conducting the basic investigative and follow up procedures to cases they initiate, officers can have a greater stake in the resolutions well beyond the traditional, rapid responder/report taker role. When successful, officers not only gain the satisfaction of a job well done but also earn a measure of trust based on the demonstration of competence. This empowers the officer and encourages the community they are serving. Increasing the commitment of patrol officers to follow up investigative work places a further burden on 911 response, requires training patrol officers in investigative techniques, and adds an additional layer of complexity to the tasks patrol officers are accustomed to. At the same time, more case

clearances from patrol officers lower the burden on specialty investigative units. This shift in needs offers the potential for managerial shift in resources and the assignment of proportionally more officers to COP duties (Cordner, 2001). To the extent that COP officers can reduce the burden on specialty investigators, there is increased decentralization. Regardless who is assigned to the casework, COP departments can no longer simply focus on the who, what, and where of a criminal problem but now must also develop an understanding of why a crime problem is emerging or persisting and what conditions support the problem.

In order to increase the likelihood of success in problem solving, officers must be encouraged to take risks in order to produce innovative and tailored responses. Any acceptance of risk in decision making also requires the acceptance of failure to a certain degree. Supervisors are expected to exhibit coaching and mentoring behaviors in their interactions with subordinate officers focusing on development and empowerment rather than rigid adherence to policy and rule bound authority (Corder, 2001). Police management can also find a role in facilitating a higher level of problem solving by coordinating the efforts of various partner agencies in a fashion usually beyond the scope of an individual officer. While partnerships are a key component to the COP model, there are some structural difficulties COP agencies faced in forming them. A significant proportion of the criminal enforcement activity occurs during the night shifts. Officers assigned to night shifts have difficulty collaborating with representatives from other government agencies and NGOs who normally work during the day shift. The coordination and flexibility for officers to cross shift boundaries is possible in the COP model but presents its own series of scheduling and overtime challenges. Managers can play a role in the success of partnerships collaborating with managers from outside agencies to ensure that barriers are overcome and that the work at the line level is productive for all involved.

In COP the demands on and expectations of an officer are significantly different than in the traditional model. These differences make holding officers accountable for performance outcomes more difficult in some ways. While management through consequences is a necessary strategy at times, it is significantly more difficult in

the COP model. No one officer can be blamed or punished for the fact that a particular crime was not prevented. It is also more difficult to single out and appropriately reward the individual efforts and successes of officers when they are assigned to work as teams and with outside stakeholders. It is far easier to reward a heroic act or the clearance of a particularly difficult case than it is to single out a team member for long term problem solving efforts that resulted in fewer calls for service. Output measurement in the traditional model is one of the benchmarks for evaluating officer performance. Measuring simple and countable outputs such as arrests also makes it feasible to institute minimum standards of performance and differential rewards for excellence. Measuring less objective and more variable factors in the COP model is substantially more difficult. Officers in COP should be evaluated more on the outcomes they contribute to (safer communities and satisfied citizens) as opposed to the outputs they can measure (tickets and arrests). This requires a broader and longer term view in evaluating officer performance. Performance evaluations and incentives in the COP model are geared towards performance measures significantly more complex than simple stat counting. This can create frustration on the part of officers and supervisors alike and can contribute to a culture wherein accountability for performance is lacking. While the COP model speaks extensively to the importance of the line officer, there is little discussion in any of the literature regarding the unique role of management. The literature advocates for less emphasis on hierarchy and rule making, generally telling managers what they should avoid while there is little description of proscriptive management behaviors. The role of the supervisor as generally described in the COP literature is to facilitate and empower the officer.

e. Adoption of the COP Model

According to Braga, “By the 1990s, the idea of community policing had affected most American police agencies” (2006). The federal government expressed its commitment to COP in the 1994 Omnibus Crime bill which authorized federal grants funds to support hiring in local agencies that adopted and employed COP. These grant funds were designed to fund the hiring of an additional 100,000 officers for up to three

years. (Corder, 2001) By 2000, “66% of municipal agencies and 62% of Sheriff’s departments had sworn officers engaged in community policing activities” (Alexander, 2005). The federal funding was significant in two ways. First, the funding provided the incentives necessary to push COP beyond the “buzzword” status and into the mainstream (Pelfrey, 2005). Additionally, “as agencies implemented community and problem oriented policing, researchers collaborated with these agencies and conducted evaluative work to assess the effectiveness, facilitators, and impediments to successful community policing” (Pelfrey, 2005).

The research on COP is extensive and replete with mixed results. Scholars like William Pelfrey Jr. (2005) and Chappell (2008) argue that the partnerships and innovative strategies that COP introduced proved effective at reducing crimes against persons and property. Others argue however that much of the research on the crime fighting effectiveness of COP is not sufficiently rigorous and that “only a slight majority of the studies have detected crime decreases” (Corder, 2001). Skeptics however claim that Cop simply has not been shown at all to be effective in preventing crime (Mastrofski, 2006). Some COP tactics such as, community meetings, Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), neighborhood watch, and newsletters have been shown to reduce fear of crime while they have little effect on crime itself (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). One tactic, door to door visits, has been shown to reduce crime and the fear of crime (Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

The evidence however is clearer with regards to the effects COP has on minor crime and instances of public disorder. Tactics such as foot patrol and an emphasis on problem solving have been shown to reduce disorder (Corder, 2001). Lowering disorder is correlated to reducing fear of crime and subsequently decreasing social isolation. COP proponents argue that by attacking the factors and conditions that support criminal activity and reduce QOL, the long term result will be diminished calls for service. The evidence in this regard however is entirely unclear. COP opens lines of communication and is designed to proactively seek out areas of concern independent from the traditional calls for service mechanism. It is too difficult to measure the calls for

service effects of COP in part because under COP one must consider the potential for a rise in calls to other agencies, requests for assistance that were not calls for service, along with many other factors.

There is a general agreement in the literature that COP tactics are manpower and time intensive. To be used to their best effect, COP officers must be assigned to smaller areas of patrol and afforded sufficient time, training and opportunity to engage in problem solving. Furthermore, officers assigned to a neighborhood must work in teams that can develop a coherent unity of effort across the shifts of the day and the days of the week. In the COP model, officers are oriented to place as opposed to time and each must assume some investment in the outcomes and service delivery for a particular area. This concept is alternatively expressed as zone ownership. While developing a sense of accountability to and investment in a neighborhood is functional for building trusting relationships and the capacity to better engage in differential response, it works against the notion of patrol flexibility. If management wants officers to build solid relationships with a community, it is dysfunctional to that mission to reassign officers based on emerging needs in neighboring communities.

There is encouraging evidence to argue that COP is effective in improving citizen and officer satisfaction alike. COP has been credited with improving police relations with members of the minority community who heretofore had distrusted the police (Braga, 2006). With respect to officer attitudes, “a clear majority of the studies that have investigated the effects of community policing on officer’s job satisfaction, perceptions of the community and other related attitudes have discovered beneficial effects” (Corder, 2001). Officer attitudes however are affected by various factors including whether or not they themselves participated in COP activities, the frequency of their participation in COP activities (Chappell, 2008) and whether or not COP participation was voluntary. There is evidence to suggest that when agencies employed COP as a specialty assignment, an internal tension exists between responders and COP officers (Alexander, 2005). Others have described this tension as a “conflict between specialists and other members of the agency, frequently reflected in derogatory remarks about the grin and wave squad” (Corder, 2001).

While there is a body of research to suggest that COP offers agencies a variety of benefits, and that it was adopted to varying degrees by a majority of SLTLEs in the 1990s (Braga, 2006), it has receded from its primacy as a result of several factors. Chappell (2008) argues that SLTLE commitment to COP waned for reasons including; the conflict between the ongoing demands to address calls for service and the desire to apply longer term problem solving tactics, failures in interagency cooperation, difficulties in supervision accountability and performance evaluations, and the perception that COP is softer on crime than the traditional model (Chappell, 2008). In Norfolk Virginia patrol officers not involved in COP resented what they perceived as the unfair allocation of resources to COP (Chappell, 2008). Research focusing on why COP was not successful as a strategic management plan (Braga, 2006) concludes that there with several different problems with the practical application of various key components. Departments had difficulty treating citizens like equal partners in the setting of priorities and preferred to relegate them to the status of sources. Officers generally preferred arrest strategies to alternative problem solving exercises. Many SLTLEs resisted the COP mandated push away from hierarchy and centralization of decision making. For their part, officers were generally weak in developing and employing analytical and problem solving skills and relied on traditional enforcement techniques (Braga, 2006). The problems listed above combined with shrinking local tax revenues in the 1990s and an increase in drug and violent crime related to the emergence of crack cocaine all contributed in varying degrees to communities and agencies losing confidence in COP as the strategic plan of choice.

After 2001, many SLTLEs took on additional responsibilities related to the HSP. In general, there were not significant staffing increases or grants to support hiring extra officers in support of these goals as had occurred in 1994's Omnibus crime bill. In 2004, a survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police indicated that several agency heads believed that the additional duties imposed on them related to homeland security would further reduce their ability to employ COP and problem solving tactics (Simeone, 2002). Despite this, there is a growing body of literature that argues COP is in fact, a strategic management plan that is functional for SLTLEs and their work in the HSP. Rather than diminishing the commitment to COP,

the United Kingdom (UK) incorporated their version of COP “neighborhood policing” as the centerpiece to their nation’s response to the growing threat of terrorism (Simeone, 2002). While U.S. SLTLEs have generally been more focused on improving their capacity to respond to a terrorist incident, agencies in the UK have placed a great deal of emphasis on prevention. Using COP tactics, UK agencies have worked to establish closer relationships with local communities where radicalization can take place and to establish effective lines of communication with members of those communities. UK agencies hope that these efforts will improve their ability to communicate to community stakeholders a sense of common purpose in preventing radicalization and allow for improved intelligence gathering on possible radicals. This philosophy has been formalized in various national laws including the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and the 2002 Police Reform Act (Simeone, 2002). These laws were written to reflect and “all crimes” approach where COP is relevant and integral to fight against crime and terrorism. These laws mandate that the police seek out community opinion and cooperation in identifying and resolving issues of concern. To address the ever present shortage of staff coupled with the increasing demand for services, the UK instituted a non sworn position, the community support officer, and instituted a trained volunteer position, the special constable, to provide outreach, conflict resolution and problem solving assistance. These positions provide valuable contributions to the mission but save significantly in labor costs. In addition to saving money, the non sworn officers allow sworn officers additional freedom to conduct crime fighting operations more suited to their training and unique authorities.

Today, UK agencies employ a team concept in neighborhoods. Neighborhood teams are headed by a supervisor, staffed with sworn officers, community support officers and special constables (volunteers) (Simeone, 2002). These team members attend civic meetings, share information with community members and conduct follow up and outreach using face to face visits and a variety of web based technologies. The experience of the 1980s race riots in the UK and the lessons learned from them has been a factor influencing UK agencies to adopt a strong commitment to outreach to the Muslim communities as a method to reduce violence and social isolation (Paris, 2007).

By reducing social isolation and increasing a sense of trust and common purpose between UK agencies and the Muslim community, the hope is that radicals will have less safe space within which to operate and moderates will be more likely to cooperate with authorities. After 2001, the UK formalized this commitment with the institution of a Muslim Contact unit at the London Metropolitan Police Department (Paris, 2007). In addition to improving outreach and intelligence exchange, the COP philosophy in the UK is geared towards reducing the fear of crime and terrorism amongst the citizenry. Proponents of this method argue that COP is an effective strategy at reducing fear and that such a reduction reduces the impacts of terrorism (Collie, 2006).

The UK has also advanced the concept of partnerships with the community in a variety of “watch schemes”. In addition to facilitating neighborhood watch programs, UK agencies work with private security providers in a program called Project Griffon to exchange information and provide training specific to the protection of economic assets and critical infrastructure (Simeone, 2002). Aviation enthusiasts have been enlisted by the police to receive training in how to spot and report suspicious activity in and around airports. UK agencies apply this watch concept to crime and disorder problems also. In a program known as Pub Watch, bar owners are enlisted to identify and report and ban unruly patrons in an effort to deter crimes of violence and reduce impacts on the QOL.

UK efforts at employing the COP strategy to fight crime and diminish the threat of terrorism are not universally applauded. Peter Clark, the head of Police Counter Terrorism in the UK, has argued that assistance and information provided by the public has to date played a negligible role in UK apprehensions and prosecutions of terror suspects. He further argues that there is a competition of ideals between those that propose greater assimilation of minority communities and the community members that argue strongly in favor of cultural isolationism (Paris, 2007). A survey conducted shortly after the 7/7 bombings in the UK revealed that approximately 10 percent of Muslim students would not report a terror bombing plot they had become aware of (Simeone, 2002). This finding could argue strongly for the need for increased outreach to that community or it could also be seen as a sign that no matter the outreach, there will remain

a population resistant to cooperating with the police. COP advocates neighborhood outreach, and collaboration with leading representatives amongst the community. If these community members are seen by the officers as sources of information to be exploited, more than as partners, to be collaborated with; the balance will trend away from productive relationship building and simply turn transactional. Transactional relationships in this context can be productive but are rarely driven by higher minded, selfless ideals. Officers too closely engaged with informants can become blind to the informants criminal involvement while, sources motivated by selfish aims can exploit the police to arrest or not arrest people for ignoble reasons. The balance can tip in the other direction also. In Birmingham England, Sikhs rioted in protest of a play they felt was culturally insensitive and offensive. Instead of protecting the play as a lawful expression, the police chose to not interfere and the producers closed the show in fear for their safety (Caldwell, 2006). Allowing lawful speech to be suppressed by unlawful conduct (rioting) is an example of the police being improperly influenced by the community standard.

In the U.S. to date, there has been significantly less effort to employ COP as a strategy to address the threat of terror and to guide the efforts of SLTLEs. By framing the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as an effort to fight terror “over there” and by framing the larger effort as a global war on terror, the citizenry is not encouraged to take an active role in vigilance and cooperation with SLTLEs in the larger HSP effort (Paris, 2007). The war on drugs and other anti crime campaigns have called for far greater citizen participation. While there are relatively few U.S. cities with a large concentration of Arabs, there are some positive examples of COP strategies being used to address the threat of radicalization specifically in U.S. Islamic communities. Dearborn, Chicago, New York, Boston, and San Diego have been noted for employing effecting outreach and communication in line with the COP model (Paris, 2007). William Pelfrey Jr. has studied the link between COP practices and the new demands on SLTLEs in the HSP. He argues that, “basic community policing practices such as utilizing other city agencies, neighborhood watch programs, EWS, gang intelligence units, CPTED, and a variety of other strategies are all underway in most medium and large law enforcement agencies. By reorienting these existing programs, law enforcement units can significantly

heighten their ability to prevent terrorism” (Pelfrey, 2005). Alexander (2005) argues that what the police already practice in the COP model creates core competencies that are effective in the prevention of radicalization, the protection of critical infrastructure, the collection of intelligence, and the provision of early warning. The U.S. Department of Justice Community Policing Services is studying ways to adapt COP to the modern complex environment of the HSP and has sought out the input of various stakeholders regarding how to incorporate COP strategies in the new HSP (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).

2. Literature on Compstat

a. Historical Foundation for Compstat

In 1994, Commissioner William Bratton of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) was faced with an environment of bureaucratic dysfunction and a series of significant challenges. A study commissioned by Bratton as he assumed his new role in the NYPD provided several disturbing insights. (Comiskey, 2010; MacDonald, 1999; Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, & Willis, 2004).

1. The NYPD was more focused on avoiding conflict and controversy than on crime control.
2. A culture of low expectations and low accountability had produced an acceptance of low performance at all levels.
3. There were significant deficiencies in data collection and tracking that made it difficult to identify crime trends within months of their emergence.
4. Mid level managers (Precinct Commanders) had neither the authority nor exhibited the desire to apply innovative problem solving strategies to crime problems or QOL issues.
5. Multiple layers of bureaucratic process impeded initiative and decision making.

Understanding some of the significant events in the long history of the NYPD can provide a perspective that helps in understanding the organizational state as Commission Bratton found it. Corruption scandals had injured the NYPD’s reputation and effectiveness at different times since the nineteenth century’s Tammany Hall days.

These corruption scandals eroded not only the public's trust in the NYPD but also trust within the organization itself. The cost of this loss in faith can be seen in different anecdotal examples. When senior leaders did not trust that officers would resist corruption, officers were restricted from making arrests for violations where corruption was more likely (vice and narcotics) (MacDonald, 1999). When officers lost confidence that senior leaders could be trusted, they were less likely to feel a strong kinship to the success of the Department and thus less likely to take the risks inherent in formulating and initiating innovative responses to crime. When the public perceives that they cannot trust the police, the police suffer more incidents of violent resistance, more lawsuits, and more complaints. Trust in public institutions is critical to performance and the NYPD had suffered many injuries to its reputation over the years. Covey et al. (2006) expresses the cost of lower trust graphically:

$$\downarrow \text{Trust} = \downarrow \text{Speed} \uparrow \text{Cost or alternatively } \uparrow \text{Trust} = \uparrow \text{Speed} \downarrow \text{Cost}$$

Figure 4. Trust Equation (After Covey & Merrill, 2006)

When Commissioner Bratton came to the NYPD, he found an organization with a severe “trust tax”. In the NYPD of 1994, there existed layers of bureaucratic procedure and rule bound methods that lowered the speed at which decisions could be made and increased the general cost of operations. Further the trust tax paid by the citizens was profound in that officers and managers had disengaged from the primary mission, crime fighting. In colloquial police language this trust tax is expressed by the old adage “Big arrests = Big problems but No arrests = No problems.” The NYPD further suffered from a sense of disengagement brought on by a history of brutality scandals and race riots in the 1960s. Police managers had adopted a philosophy that avoiding conflict was preferable to crime fighting especially when the result could be another riot or newsworthy lawsuit. When asked about his policies in minority districts like Harlem, former Commissioner Patrick Murphy was quoted as saying, “Very little of what we did had an intimate connection to crime of crime prevention” (MacDonald, 1999). NYPD management was further reinforced in these dysfunctional norms by a

pattern of promotion that seemed to value the absence of controversy over excellence and innovation in crime fighting. (MacDonald, 1999). “New York City was veering towards anarchy” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In their effort to relate this condition to a business model, the authors of BOS argue that the NYPD was an industry with over 36,000 employees and millions of customers. The “business” was suffering from low employee morale and low effectiveness. The customers perceived low quality or value in that crime had risen for several years. While no police agencies competed with the NYPD, the competition could be seen as the criminal elements which, for all intents and purposes, appeared to be winning. The NYPD of the early 1990s could be seen as a red ocean in which the current strategic management plan simply was not working.

While Commissioner Bratton faced a serious challenge as he took over the NYPD but he did not come to this challenge empty handed. Commissioner Bratton brought with him a wealth of experiences and a broad base of knowledge, all of which played a role in the development of Compstat. After serving the Boston Police Department for just three years, in 1973, Bratton participated in a strategic overhaul of the BPD when he was assigned to headquarters. As part of his assignment, he worked with academics and focused on the best and the worst elements of various police methodologies. While serving the BPD, Bratton was recognized for developing effective problem solving strategies that coordinated the work of officers and community members to resolve crime and disorder issues in a distressed community. Bratton went on to head the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority where he instituted significant changes in technology, procedure, and leadership so that at the end of tenure; crime was down 27 percent, and ridership was up (Comiskey, 2010). As the chief of the New York City Transit Police, Bratton applied the Broken Windows theory aggressively in the subways. Bratton recognized that fare evasion was a minor crime that had been ignored resulting in disproportionate consequences in disorder. By insisting that officers make fare evasion a priority he was able to increase the rate of arrest. After numerous fare evaders were arrested, the data showed that there was a strong correlation between fare evasion and more serious crime. One in seven fare evaders had an outstanding warrant and one in 21 had a weapon. Targeting this Broken Window contributed to a long term crime reduction.

As crime went down, ridership and profits went up (Comiskey, 2010). As the chief of the Boston Police Department, Bratton was a proponent of neighbor policing, problem solving, technology and innovation. He went from this assignment to the NYPD in 1994, as the new Commissioner under Mayor Giuliani.

While Commissioner Bratton had successfully employed COP/problem solving strategies in his previous assignments, he rejected the argument that COP should be the primary management philosophy of a SLTLE. Commissioner Bratton did not accept the premise in the COP model that the youngest, least experienced officers could or should be trusted with responsibility for the complex tasks associated with problem solving strategies without guidance from senior officials who had greater responsibility, greater access to resources, broader experience and a broader perspective (Comiskey, 2010). Commissioner Bratton also rejected the social scientists that argued the police could have little effect on crime in that the root causes of crime were well beyond the capacity of the police to address. Commissioner Bratton believed that middle management should be responsible for setting priorities and allocating resources in the various geographic commands and set about designing a strategic management plan that reflected these values and his experiences. Commissioner Bratton was well versed in the strategic management theories used in private industry and applied them to the NYPD. Compstat was designed to help the NYPD focus its efforts on crime fighting and to apply the latest in management theory towards that goal. While the NYPD developed the model for Compstat, they also advertised the merits of their model and invited scholars and law enforcement managers from around to world to learn from and adopt what the NYPD had found to be an effective police management plan.

b. Components of the NYPD Compstat Model

Reflecting what Commissioner Bratton had learned from his study of private sector strategic management, he focused on the basics and reoriented the strategic model to reflect a commitment to performance in an objective and transparent sense. Compstat starts with a clarified mission focusing all efforts on crime reduction. Compstat focuses on clear and objective standards (crime statistics) so that there is no

ambiguity as to what metrics mattered. In Compstat, middle managers (precinct commanders) are the decision makers as opposed to the line officer or the chief. Commanders are enabled, empowered and expected to lead their team (precinct) in the development of effective strategies. One of the most significant changes envisioned in the Compstat model was the degree to which the commanders would be held accountable for results (Alexander, 2005).

Stated simply, Compstat:

1. Facilitates the expression of management's priorities and, clearly describes the metrics by which progress towards those goals will be measured.
2. Facilitates the rapid accumulation and analysis of relevant data to help focus resources towards the accomplishment of management's priorities.
3. Empowers managers to design innovative and targeted responses controlling and dispersing resources to their best judgment.
4. Holds managers directly accountable for:
 - a. Accomplishing goals previously set,
 - b. Sensing and responding to emerging threats in the tactical environment
 - c. Continuous learning and adaptation

Jack Maple, Commissioner Bratton's Deputy and one of the chief architects of the Compstat, described the primary elements of the model more simply (Comiskey, 2010).

1.) Accurate and Timely Intelligence. The NYPD, like many other Departments, collects criminal complaint data using the standardized FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) method. In UCR, the seven part 1 crime: Murder, Rape, Robbery, Felonious Assault, Burglary, Grand Larceny, and Grand Larceny Auto are generally considered to be the most serious. Before Compstat, the NYPD reviewed part 1 crime information every three months. This meant that precinct commanders rarely had the accurate and timely information that they needed. A serious crime problem could grow for months before anyone discovered it. Further, there was very little capacity in the precincts to analyze the data that could be collected. Before Compstat, commanders

would have difficulty answering the simple question: What is the most serious crime problem in your precinct today? Commissioner Bratton committed himself to improving the state of technology and the procedures involved in data collection and analysis so that his commanders would be enabled to rapidly identify problems and take appropriate action. Commanders were expected to review UCR and other relevant data weekly instead of quarterly. McDonald (2010) notes that UCR data is a good place for SLTLEs to start but explains that “data developed through calls for service, information from the public, field contact reports, debriefings of arrested persons, parole and probation records, other agencies’ sources, informants, and citizen observations all help in developing a clear view of the crime problem in an area” (McDonald, 2010).

The analysis of crime data can point to one of three challenges. If the data indicates a small and definable area is suffering from a significant increase in criminal events of whatever type, the area can be designated a “Hot Spot” (McDonald, 2010). The commander can concentrate resources immediately to deter crime, canvass for additional information and leads, or to interdict offenders. This simple tactic is costly in manpower and time but concentrated where it is needed most. “Studies that focus police resources on crime hot spots provide the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available” (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). The first of these studies was the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment which clearly established that concentration of police resources contributed significantly to crime prevention (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). If the data suggests that a particular crime is committed by the same or related subjects in various areas, the problem can be identified as a crime pattern (McDonald, 2010). Crime patterns almost always require the coordination of effort and resources across geographic areas commanded by different people. Crime patterns may well require the use of specialty or investigative resources under the command of a different leader. The Compstat model provides a mechanism for the various leaders to collaborate and for follow up to determine if they are all cooperating effectively. Finally, if the data indicates that a series of crimes can be related to each other by common conditions, the problem can be identified as a crime trend. Crime trends also require coordination and often involve targeting one offense or condition to resolve the other

related ones (McDonald, 2010). A simple example of this may be the correlation of public drunkenness to felonious assaults. Interdicting the drunkenness as a minor violation or coordinating with the regulatory agency in charge of licensing bars could be examined for effectiveness in lowering felonious assaults.

2.) Rapid Deployment. Once crime trends are identified, the Compstat model expects that commanders will dedicate the right resources rapidly to resolving the issue. No precinct has sufficient resources to be non specific in their crime control tactics. Targeting and proactive enforcement are hallmarks of the Compstat model. Commanders in the new model were given greater latitude and resources to rapidly deploy without additional layers of bureaucracy.

Precinct commanders were “authorized to allow their anticrime units to perform decoy operations, a function that had previously been left to the Citywide Street Crime Unit. Precinct personnel were permitted to execute felony arrests warrants, and [commanders] could use plainclothes officers for vice enforcement activities. Patrol cops were encouraged to make drug arrests and enforce quality of life laws.” (Weisburd et al.,)

When the problems require resources from functional specialties, those specific commanders are expected to coordinate their efforts with and provide timely assistance to the precinct commanders. The emphasis on rapidity is reflective of Commissioner Bratton’s commitment to the Broken Window theory. By attacking problems early, the expectation is that they will not be allowed to grow larger, and resource requirements will be kept in check. Crime mapping software is a hallmark of Compstat. The visual representation of crime clusters sends a powerful signal to assist in the deployment of resources. “Viewing a mass of points on a computer cartographic display can be confusing in the case of high volume data and computer programs that extract hotspots can be used to simplify visual displays and allow easier interpretation...” (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001).

3.) Effective Tactics. One of the hallmark principles in the Compstat model is that the police can be effective in fighting crime. Commanders are tasked with applying innovative and effective tactics to the problems they identify. The Compstat meeting is an opportunity to review current tactics and to collaborate with other

commanders to share lessons learned and be adaptive to changing conditions. In Compstat, results matter more than process and a key component to achieving the best results is employing the best tactics. Commanders are empowered to design their response strategies and are expected to be flexible, adaptive, and innovative in the application of their limited resources. Results are expected and the commander is accountable for those results. The Compstat model allows a great deal of latitude for commanders in deciding what tactics to employ but relies on the follow up mechanism for feedback.

4.) Relentless Follow-up. Reviewing tactics and their effectiveness is critical to the success of the model. Follow up holds commanders accountable and provides a mechanism for learning. Without, accountability, focus on performance can be lost. Without a commitment learning through follow up, innovation is diminished. Accountability in the model does not equate to discipline or shaming. Instead, the model assumes that with innovation, there will be risk, and with risk, there will be failures. Failure to hold leaders accountable to a regular review of what is working and what is not dooms the organization to repeating failures and forgoing opportunities for success. A function of holding commanders accountable is of course setting goals. In Compstat the chief or senior leader takes on a new and more directive role than in the COP or the traditional model. The chief “must formulate a clear vision expressed as objectives or goals for the agency since operational goals and objectives set priorities for members” (McDonald, 2010). As a component of follow-up, the chief must be willing to reallocate resources, and exert “relentless pressure gently applied” (McDonald, 2010).

Carter (2004) defined Compstat in a manner that encompasses these various components. He defined Compstat as:

...timely and effective deployment of people and resources to respond to crime, disorder, and traffic problems and trends which are detected over a relatively short period of time. The process is much more than performing a sophisticated data analysis and mapping. It requires accountability at all levels of the organization, necessary resource allocation, and both immediate triage and long-term solutions to problems. (p. 44)

The FBI published a guide to Compstat graphically representing these principles:




Figure 5. Compstat Process (From Shane, 2004)

When Compstat was first initiated into the NYPD its most visible manifestation was a series of meetings through which the Compstat process transitioned from an idea to a practice. The meetings occurred at headquarters twice weekly. Each meeting would be attended by the commanders of various boroughs and precincts. Meeting with all 76 precincts at any one time would be impractical. Precinct Commanders were expected to take the podium and provide an in depth and up to date briefing describing the state of their command focusing on crime trends and the efforts underway to address them. Members attending the meeting would be provided a packet of information relevant to the precinct presenting. The packet would describe criminal

complaints for the relevant week and offer points of comparison across time (week to date and year to date) and across geographic command (as compared to neighboring precincts). Enforcement efforts and resources and cases of special interest would be described in the packet. During the briefing, the presenting commander would be interrogated by his seniors in an effort to establish that the commander was entirely familiar with the data, had allocated resources appropriately, and was rigorously pursuing crime reduction. These meetings became the avenue by which leaders were held accountable. There is some contention in the literature on the issue of accountability and what role it plays in the Compstat model. Some (Alexander, 2005; MacDonald, 1999) argue that accountability was the center piece of the Compstat process and that outcomes mattered significantly more than adherence to process. Magers (2004) writes that Compstat's primary feature was holding commanders accountable to results. (Magers, 2004) "Only commanders committed to double-digit crime reduction could hope for promotion; those that did not succeed were out" (MacDonald, 1999). Jack Maple argued that commanders were expected to demonstrate their adherence to the process and values of Compstat (see Figure 2) and would be secure in their positions even if crime numbers went up despite their reasonable efforts. Maple went so far as to say "Nobody ever got in trouble because crime numbers on their watch went up." (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, & Greenspan). One may read a different message in the fact that Commissioner Bratton dismissed or re assigned approximately one half of his 76 precinct commanders in the first year of Compstat (Weisburd et al.).

What cannot be argued is that Compstat became entrenched as the strategic model of choice in the NYPD. Politicians, academics, journalists and others all praised Compstat and credited the model with significant gains. By 1996, without any significant increase in the budget, crime (the competition) was down in New York City. "Felony crime fell 39 percent, murders 50 percent, and theft 35 percent" (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). The public rallied to support the NYPD and customer satisfaction almost doubled to an outstanding 73 percent rating (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). Employee morale rose significantly and, while a great deal of credit was heaped on Mayor Giuliani and Commissioner Bratton; the model persisted long after the departure of both leaders.

Among various awards and distinctions Compstat was recognized by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and from former Vice President Al Gore. (Weisburd et al., 2004). Compstat was heralded by academics like George Kelling and his colleague William Sousa as “perhaps the single most important organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the twentieth century.” (Willis et al., 2003) The results as published by the NYPD are impressive and deserve recognition. After the first year of implementation, Compstat is credited in New York for a 17.9 percent drop in murder and a 12.3 percent drop in all crime (Comiskey, 2010). By 1998, the NYPD reported that murder had dropped by an incredible 70 percent since 1990, violent crime had dropped by 50 percent and all crime was down 60 percent (Alexander, 2005). “In 2009, NYPD reported 104,462 crimes, 325,998 (-75.49%) fewer than 1993, and 461 murders, 1,466 (-74.9%) fewer than 1993” (Comiskey, 2010).

Over the course of years between 1994 and the present, the NYPD has conducted a robust campaign to publicize their successes and the merits of the Compstat model. Agencies from across the nation and around the world have been influenced by the NYPD and a significant portion has adopted this strategic innovation. In their study of Compstat and its diffusion across the U.S., Weisburd et al. (2001) found that “an overwhelming number of departments who observed a Compstat meeting ... did so at the NYPD” (Weisburd et al.). SLTLEs wanting to enjoy the same remarkable successes as the NYPD, rapidly adopted this innovation at an alarming rate. Weisburd (2004) found that almost a third of large SLTLEs (those with more than 100 sworn officers) had adopted Compstat while another quarter claimed to be in the process of adoption (Weisburd et al., 2004). Based on the observed rate of adoption it was expected that 90 percent of all SLTLEs in the U.S. would employ Compstat by 2007 (Weisburd et al., 2004). This level of adoption is unprecedented both in its speed and breadth. Weisburd et al. in 2008 wrote, “One of the clearest findings in our study is that Compstat has spread widely and quickly across American police agencies... It is fair to say that Compstat as a recognized programmatic model has literally burst in to the American police scene” (Weisburd et al., 2008)

There is relatively little literature to be found focused on how Compstat can be employed in support of police functions beyond crime fighting. An important element of the Compstat model is a zealous focus on crime reduction, through the identification and effective response to trends related to emergent crime. There are however a few examples in the literature of arguments that Compstat can also act as a management plan to enhance all hazards preparation, pandemic procedures, mass casualty response, the protection of critical infrastructure, or any of the other functions the police now are called to participate in. Alexander (2005) argues that Compstat can be modified to better address the prevention of terrorist attacks in American cities. Instead of looking at crimes (or attacks) that have already occurred to establish a pattern, and then develop a response; Alexander argues that police managers could look for different metrics that would direct performance more towards prevention than to response and investigation (Alexander, 2005). If, for example, commanders using Compstat were tasked with reporting on suspicious activity that was consistent with pre-attack surveillance, radicalization, or even disaster preparation, the priority attached to these activities would be clearer. The mechanisms and technology needed to collect this data is no different than the tools used to track and map, criminal activity currently. Compstat's strong accountability mechanisms would be instrumental in seeing commanders allocate resources and effort towards HSP priorities. In an article written very shortly after the attacks of September 11, MacDonald (2001) argues that Compstat should be adopted by the FBI. Advocating for a Fedstat, she states that the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) should be held to a Compstat like model, answering in regular meetings to the commanders of the various municipal agencies that partner with them. MacDonald argues that by "Compstating" the JTTFs, there will be more accountability for performance and a greater exchange of information between the parties. MacDonald makes the link between Compstat's success at lowering crime and its potential success in reducing vulnerability to terrorist attack (MacDonald, 2001).

3. Literature on Intelligence Led Policing (ILP)

a. Historical Foundation for ILP

ILP is the most recent strategic management plan widely discussed in the literature on policing. ILP originated in the UK to address crime problems the local police were struggling with in. In Kent and North Umbria, the community suffered from a rash of property crimes. Budget and resource constraints made saturation patrols impractical. By carefully examining data, analyzing offense reports, and gathering intelligence, local police came to believe that the theft and vandalism problems that were overwhelming them could be linked to a relatively small number of repeat offenders. In order to devote the time and resources necessary to target those offenders, the police were authorized to divert low priority calls for service or to simply refer those calls to other municipal agencies for follow up. Freed from a portion of the standard calls for service burden, and armed with information about offenders in addition to offenses, the local police were able to develop directed patrols, and investigative tactics that contributed to a 24 percent decrease in property crime in Kent over three years (Peterson, 2005). North Umbria used ILP to target repeat offenders and enjoyed consistent drops in their annual crime rate. (McGarrell et al., 2007). Over the course of time, more agencies across the UK came to see the value in using intelligence to guide the efforts and allocation of resources for law enforcement agencies. The UK went to a National Intelligence Model (NIM) that more clearly articulated a commitment to ILP. The NIM established a uniform tasking and coordination process, rules and standards for training, and a framework for ensuring ongoing efforts remained focused (Peterson, 2005). The NIM followed a central government call to incorporate business practices and a search for efficiency into public sector practices (Carter & Carter, 2008). By using intelligence products and engaging in a cyclical process of tasking intelligence requirements, collecting and analyzing relevant data, distributing that analysis to the customers that need it, and receiving feedback on the functionality of the intelligence product; the NIM proposes that local UK law enforcement agencies can impact community safety, disorder, and crime (Peterson, 2005).

In the U.S. there has been a long history of intelligence collection if not thorough analysis, in local policing. In the twentieth century, SLTLEs were called upon to help the Federal government protect America from the Communist threat. During the McCarthy era, SLTLEs began to collect dossiers on American citizens suspected of un-American activities and sentiments. This practice continued and spread as SLTLEs collected information on American citizens, engaging in lawful protests to support the civil rights movement and anti Vietnam War protests (Carter, 2004). In the 1970's, several lawsuits targeted various SLTLEs and the Federal authorities for their practice of maintaining intelligence files on citizens who were not suspected of criminal activity but who were engaged in lawful activity. This was a time of changing public consensus and the courts reflected those changes. The suits resulted in losses for the various agencies, a reversal of practice, and some embarrassing revelations regarding how law enforcement money and time had been spent. SLTLEs were by no means alone in these activities. The FBI's Counter Intelligence Program, a domestic intelligence gathering function, was examined by the Senate's Church committee, which found that:

Domestic intelligence activity has threatened and undermined the Constitutional rights of Americans to free speech, association and privacy. It has done so primarily because the Constitutional system for checking abuse of power has not been applied. (Carter, 2004)

The intelligence function came to be tightly regulated by law and public scrutiny. SLTLEs scaled back their commitment to intelligence as a strategic tool. In the 1980s and into the 90s, SLTLEs came to face an emergent threat of organized crime that was increasingly sophisticated and violent. Existing federal and regional intelligence capacity proved insufficient to meet the local challenges SLTLEs were facing with increasingly violent and persistent street crime. Street level crime bloomed due in large part, to easier availability of weapons, the rise in street gang activity, and the crack cocaine epidemic. SLTLEs found themselves behind the curve with limited intelligence capacity to predict criminal actions, prevent violent crime, or develop tactics that would address emergent crime. Many local agencies remained tied to paper reporting systems and could not regularly track or map relevant data on crime. In many ways, the SLTLE intelligence function had become an underfunded and underused repository of old case

work and sensitive information, rarely used in subsequent investigations (Carter, 2004). This was the era from which COP emerged and 100,000 officers were to be hired with grant funding. This was the era that produced mandatory sentencing for crack and weapons violations. During this era, police addressed growing gang crime with tactics ranging from zero tolerance policing to midnight basketball. While there were resources available to fight the growing crime trends during this time, building the capacity for strategic intelligence and intelligence sharing was not the priority.

After the attacks of September 11, there was a renewed call for U.S. SLTLEs to build a robust intelligence capacity. Within a month of the attacks, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) set in motion a series of events that resulted in the formation of the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG). The intelligence professionals working in this group dedicated themselves to understanding how to build and manage a functional intelligence capacity in SLTLEs. The GIWG found that SLTLEs were hobbled in their ability to effectively use intelligence by five key factors:

1. There was a lack of intelligence sharing amongst local, state and federal agencies. A series of regulatory laws and a wide variety of policies controlling information sharing had contributed to this outcome.
2. SLTLEs suffered from a lack of technology to support greater collection or the ability to integrate currently available databases necessary to produce more valuable intelligence at the local level. There was a lack of infrastructure to support greater sharing of intelligence across the various levels of law enforcement.
3. There was a confusing array of standards for collection, analysis; personnel training, data storage, and sharing that left the value of various products in doubt further inhibiting sharing.
4. Analytical capacity was low compared to collection ability. SLTLEs did not have sufficient personnel adequately trained or equipped to perform analysis of available data.
5. Across various agencies there existed parochial interests and rivalries that produced barriers to intelligence sharing.

The GIWG studied these challenges and published in 2003, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) (Peterson, 2005). The NCISP contained 28 recommendations designed specifically to help SLTLEs and their Federal partners

address the needs listed above. Amongst these 28 recommendations was the call for SLTLEs to adopt the ILP model. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission published its findings. The Commission made specific reference to the growing need for SLTLEs to work more closely with Federal authorities to identify and apprehend terrorists (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). In that same year, David Carter published on behalf of the Justice Department, the seminal guidebook describing in detail how SLTLEs can and should incorporate intelligence into their daily operations (Carter, 2004).

b. Defining ILP

While the NCISP is clear in its mandate to adopt ILP, it neither defines the concept nor offers guidance on how ILP can be implemented across the various SLTLEs (Carter & Carter, 2008, p. 314). In many ways, it can be said that ILP is as difficult to define as COP. Some have described ILP as the next progression in professional law enforcement, taking the best of problem solving from COP and what has already been learned from Compstat. Advocates for ILP argue that it is the strategic management plan most suited to address the homeland security challenges SLTLEs now face. In their analysis of ILP, Carter and Carter (2008) define it as “the collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats” (p. 317). Others in the literature describe ILP as a process wherein SLTLEs allow intelligence to guide and direct their priorities and the strategic allocation of resources. This can be graphically represented as:




Figure 6. A Simple Model of Intelligence Led Policing (From Collie, 2006)

Where tactical intelligence is used to increase the odds a particular criminal will be captured or a critical incident will be safely resolved, ILP is designed to use intelligence to properly interpret the environment that facilitates criminal activity in order to disrupt those conditions and thus, diminish the criminal activity. Proper interpretation of the environment requires the collection of accurate data in a timely fashion and the competent analysis of that data. This can include risk assessment and root cause analysis in addition to cost and benefit projections. In ILP, this analysis is worthless if it is not disseminated to the right decision makers in a format they can easily digest. In ILP, intelligence allows the proactive assessment of conditions that guide the most efficient and effective use of resources. Through planning and evaluation, agencies target their actions more than react to circumstances. A simple analogy can be drawn between ILP and the use of a map. Law enforcement intelligence (LEI) is a map of the wilderness, drawn both progressively and, over time by people who have walked the trails, or talked to those who have. It is harder to use the map if you don't know where you are (tactical intelligence) and what your destination is (strategic intelligence). Careful study of the map can help design the quickest routes and avoid the biggest delays (threats). The map represents reasonable conclusions from a combination of multiple

inputs but, cannot promise the pinpoint accuracy of GPS. In almost all cases however, having a map in unfamiliar territory is better than relying on what you remember from the last wilderness.

The literature indicates that the term intelligence is often misused because there is misunderstanding surrounding the distinction between information (data) and intelligence. Simply stated, intelligence is the valuable product of rigorous analysis performed on a variety of data. Intelligence is defined by Carter (2004) as “the product of an analytic process that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality” (p. 9). The various sources of data which in combination contribute to effective analysis can be graphically represented:



Figure 7. Diverse Sources of Data (After Carter, 2004)

While this diagram is by no means all inclusive, it depicts the wide array of sources from which information is gathered. In the center of the diagram, two of the many questions tactical and operational analysis attempts to address are represented. Various sources of information are culled and analytical questions are applied to a particular problem. In order for this process to begin, a crime or series of crimes must have already occurred. The tools and processes described above are employed to solve the known problem. Tactical law enforcement intelligence (LEI) is valuable but not a recent innovation in policing. This has been the trademark of quality investigations for some time.

What is innovative about ILP is that it envisions the use of LEI in a cyclical way as opposed to in a segmented or finite fashion. In the ILP model, an agency seeks to examine and address the conditions that contribute to criminality or that affect vulnerability on an ongoing basis. This ongoing analysis can be seen as organizational learning and can be applied to the complicated and the complex contexts. ILP is designed to address larger, longer term questions of strategy and complexity. The difference between traditional case based intelligence and ILP can be graphically represented:

Table 2. Intelligence in Policing vs. Intelligence Led Policing

Traditional (Intelligence in Policing)	ILP (Intelligence Led Policing)
Crime focus-Reactive and designed to address a particular issue. Attempt to locate/Attempt to abate. Answers questions like: Who/What/Where/How many?	Treat focused- Scanning Identifies crime trend or pattern, or vulnerability in us or the opposition, Answers questions like: Why/ How likely/ What if/Is there a better way?
The information that comes in shapes the analysis rather than the need for information shapes the collection Crime Solvers/Canvass/Informants	Requirements driven: Knowing the threat or the vulnerability directs what is being collected
Analytical product is either a lead, a link or evidence sufficient for Court	Analytical product is a lead, a link, a prediction or a judgment often not sufficient for Court
Intra agency focus Classification of Intelligence Clandestine methods enhance effectiveness	Multijurisdictional focus: Value of intelligence is in the sharing Cooperative collection and analysis
Lessons learned from case work not readily shared/Goal is to convict or resolve	Strong Feedback component designed to improve process, share what was learned, cyclical process

The intelligence process is the series of decisions and actions that distinguish traditional intelligence work in policing from the ILP model. The process is designed as an ongoing loop of decisions and methods used to guide the actions of the department from a more centralized perspective. If the SLTLE leaders agree they need to know more about the relationship between juvenile delinquency and its link to adult criminal behavior, traditional police intelligence methods are not well suited to that task. Criminal informants are not able to answer questions of that nature with credibility. No detective clears a particular crime on that analysis. The courts would not use evidence of such a linkage to convict an adult defendant. ILP asks different questions of SLTLEs and thus requires a different process. That unique process is called the intelligence process in the literature.

The intelligence cycle or process is graphically represented in the NCISP

as:



Figure 8. Intelligence Process (From Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003)

The intelligence process illustrated above is best understood through the explanation of its component parts. This process begins as Covey would say, with the end in mind. In the Planning and Direction phase of the process, leaders announce what they intend as an outcome. The leader's desired outcome can be as finite as improving traffic safety at a high crash intersection. Similarly, the desired outcome can be as broad in scope as decreasing vulnerability to mass casualty incidents. More than COP or Compstat, ILP is designed to address large scale, multi jurisdictional, complex challenges that range from criminal enforcement to hazard response and mitigation. In this process, analysts are expected to collaborate closely with decision makers so as to avoid the inappropriate collection of data, diminish redundant processes, designing a tailored

product on a timeline and with expectations that are realistic. This first step in the cyclical process is critical. Time spent on analytical products not valued by decision makers is time wasted. Agreement and understanding with respect to the desired outcome (fewer robberies, lower vulnerability to terrorist attack, etc.) informs the direction given for data collection. Publically available or open source data, criminal complaints, calls for service, informants, tipsters, surveillance, and wiretaps, can all be relevant.

In the U.S., SLTLEs are regulated in their collection of information by Federal regulations summarized in 28 CFR Part 23.20. All information collected must be examined by the agency that collects it to insure that it is accurate, and tied to a legitimate law enforcement need. While this is not the analysis of information envisioned in the next step of the process, due diligence is required to insure that all data applied to subsequent analysis is collected lawfully, accurate, and credible. These processes have all become far more practical and realistic with advancements in database technology. The development of electronic records management systems (RMS), real time field reporting, computer aided dispatching (CADS), electronically stored informant debriefs, and improvements in collaboration amongst various databases, all have contributed to significant gains in SLTLEs ability to collect the best data, rapidly and with greater assurance of accuracy.

While SLTLEs have developed some clear gains in collecting information, the analysis of that information requires a different skills and resources. “Analysis is quite simply a process of deriving meaning from data” (Peterson, 2005, p. 7). Analysis, both in the strategic and tactical context, attempts to remove the confusion produced by coincidence and answers the larger question; so what? Tactically applied, analysis can take bank records and produce conclusive evidence of criminal activity. Strategically, bivariate analysis of disparate criminal activity can find areas of commonality that prompt a strategy to attack one crime, knowing the other will diminish as a result. Vulnerability analysis is designed to prompt the reallocation to enhance deterrence or response capacity. Simple analysis of crime data contributes to more efficient shift assignments. Analysis is expected to meet the needs described in the planning and direction phase. Clearly, without an understanding of the commander’s intent, the value of analytical products is haphazard at best. In this phase of the process, credibility of

information must be examined. While false information can be culled out during the collection phase, separate sources must be compared against each other in the analysis phase to test reliability and soundness.

Analytical products are of little value in a vacuum. While processes must be in place to restrict dissemination of sensitive information, those rules must not become a barrier to effective intelligence sharing. Many analytical products can and should be shared with the public while others must remain classified. One of the findings from the 9/11 Commission was that there was insufficient sharing of intelligence between SLTLEs and local enforcement authorities. ILP envisions a regular review of analytical products to assure that they are not only accurate, functional, and timely but also expects that those products are disseminated to the right customers. Issues of classification, priority, need to know, investigative effectiveness, informant safety, legal compliance, and public scrutiny all apply in this phase of the process. The FBI's JTTFs were expanded in part to address the barriers inherent in sharing and dissemination of federally classified analytical products. By bringing representatives from various SLTLEs into the JTTFs and providing them with certain clearances, the local agencies can participate in a controlled fashion with state and federal authorities in a classified environment.

The reevaluation phase provides a mechanism for feedback and learning. Holding the process accountable to continuous improvement, guards against stagnation, complacency, and the inefficiencies common in bureaucratic functions. End users evaluate the products while analysts and collection specialists evaluate the clarity of the planning and direction. In addition to carefully scrutinizing the process, this phase can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the larger effort. The data may be relevant, the analysis may be sound, but there may be other barriers that impede mission effectiveness. Failing to recognize these barriers consigns the participants to frustration. Feedback is meant to be candid and challenging with the expectation that experimentation will result in failure and that failures constitute an opportunity for learning.

c. ILP Practically Applied

ILP has become a hallmark of UK policing in the past twenty years. This method is incorporated in the NIM and has been adopted throughout nation. Advocates in the literature argue that ILP inclines agencies to guard against crime at least as much as resolve the crimes that have already occurred. “The accurate targeting of police resources to the right problem, at the right time, in the right place, is a fundamental aim of a proactive intelligence-led police service.” (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001) London’s borough of Newham is a good example of ILP contributing effectively to the crime fighting mission. Newham has approximately 300 cameras and targets antisocial behavior, such as graffiti, public urination, and vandalism. The agency used repeat offender data for hooliganism and crimes of violence associated with sporting events. Analyzing the data helped Newham police develop the intelligence necessary to more accurately predict who was likely to commit crimes of violence at a particular upcoming sporting event. The combination of video technology, and this predictive intelligence proved its worth when 12 known hooligans were successfully identified and interdicted out of 4,300 mass transit riders as they approached a sports arena (NIJ Journal, 2003). In 2001, Lancashire County used ILP to address a significant problem. The ongoing problem of thefts committed by a relatively small number of habitual offenders motivated by a need to fund their narcotics addiction had not been abated by the application of traditional methods. The Lancashire Constabulary had identified a hot spot of criminal activity and gathered intelligence about the patterns of criminal activity and the offenders themselves. Through careful analysis, it was decided that there was a clear relationship between the drug addicts and the thefts. Instead of continuing to target the thefts, the police instead targeted drug activity. Between 2002 and 2004, the Constabulary conducted thousands of controlled narcotics purchases that resulted in the arrest of over 400 offenders on multiple warrants. The Constabulary cooperated with outside authorities and shared information that contributed to the other agencies being able to target the courier routes far removed from Lancashire. Repeat offenders who were compliant with drug treatment were monitored and offered additional services. While this was a

relatively complex operation, spanning years, thousands of offenses and multiple jurisdictions, it was highly effective (Loyka, Faggiani, & Clifford, 2006).

ILP in the UK is also used to guide the actions of the police in counter terror efforts. ILP can be adapted to serve police missions beyond crime control and is uniquely suited to respond to the expanded local police role in reducing vulnerability and fighting terror related criminal activity. The UK has made a commitment to use ILP in the fight against radicalization and terror. The use of ILP combined with multiagency, multijurisdictional cooperation, and technology were instrumental in the arrest of terror suspects after the London subway and Madrid train attacks (McGarrell et al., 2007). While many argue that ILP is effective in the fight against terror in addition to organized crime; McGarrell (2007), Carter (2004), Peterson (2005), there to date is a gap in the research to bolster this claim with science. Today there are very few empirical studies that provide quantitative analysis comparing the effectiveness of various state actions against terror. While there is a great deal to find on counter terror campaigns, the rigorous analysis of these programs and a method to scientifically compare one to the other is an area where further study is required (McGarrell et al., 2007).

While the UK commitment to ILP is clear, the implementation took longer and was more complicated than originally expected. Following the ILP model, each divisional police station needed an intelligence officer who would act as “the hub of the local intelligence gathering effort with responsibility for the timely and accurate passage of information in a variety of directions around the service” (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001). While the UK generally had more experience than most in the application of intelligence in law enforcement, achieving this standard required a significant investment to increase the number and quality of analysts assigned to various local agencies. Implementation went slower than expected and critics of ILP argue that it has proven to be esoteric, providing a low return on investment (Carter & Carter, 2008).

In his examination of UK anti terror legislation and police authority, Walker (2005) sheds light on some of the challenges inherent in using intelligence to guide law enforcement efforts. Walker argues that policing is often narrowly focused on evidence, apprehension, security and facts while intelligence is geared to produce

inferences based on judgments. These judgments are not the same thing and do not serve the same purpose as evidence in court (Walker, 2005). There must be a balancing of the infringement upon shared liberties a police action will create against the benefits gained in shared safety. When this balance is improperly struck, the real costs to liberty outweigh the perceived benefits to safety. When this imbalance persists, the very safety that was highly valued is endangered by civil unrest and a loss of faith in government. When the police are perceived as unjust in their application of authority, the paradoxical effect of police actions can be to inspire more resistance to governmental authority.

When the London Metropolitan Police used intelligence to guide their actions against the Irish Republican Army, many citizens were detained for long periods. Intelligence about previous attacks led the police to an understanding of the characteristics consistent in the offender population. Targeting people who share those characteristics was seen by the government as a reasonable step to take to deter or prevent future attacks. This perspective gives little credence to the costs of these actions as they erode trust. A later review of UK police actions, published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) concluded that the detention of nearly 2,000 Catholics contributed to an erosion of trust in rule of law and boom in IRA recruiting (Feikert & Doyle, 2006). More recently, UK laws that provide the police with expanded power to use intelligence and judgment as opposed to case specific evidence when deciding who to detain or question; has resulted in a significant increase in the detention and questioning of Asians. An expert asked about this practice warned that “one of the biggest dangers of counter-terrorism policing must be that it will grow the very terrorism which it seeks to defeat” (Feikert & Doyle, 2006). Profiling in the UK extends to the application of intelligence to determine what areas are the most subject to terrorist or radicalization activity. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act of 2000, allows UK police to designate certain high risk areas where anyone can be searched without individualized suspicion. While the designation of an area as a search zone involves the use of intelligence, judgment and prediction, this tactic has not been linked to any specific deterrent effect. The random searches of people in certain areas has created backlash amongst community members who feel unfairly targeted (Caldwell, 2006).

In the U.S., ILP has been overshadowed by Compstat. ILP is designed to address larger more complex problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries (Carter & Carter, 2008). Many US SLTLEs however have not placed multi jurisdictional, complex organizations as a priority over the day to day burdens of maintaining the peace and enforcing the laws. In addition to the competition from Compstat and COP, there are a variety of reasons cited in the literature as to why ILP has not been widely adopted in US SLTLEs. Carter and Carter (2008) argue that the US SLTLE experience with intelligence is vastly different, and more limited than the experience UK agencies gained over time. The UK ILP model relies on greater centralization and standardization of procedures than is practical in the U.S. In the UK, approximately 50 large agencies need to agree on collection, storage and dissemination procedures for ILP to be functional across the entire nation. The U.S. has more than 18,000 agencies spread across a much larger area. Amongst those SLTLEs, there are 50 states with distinct laws and thousands of municipalities with their own ordinances. ILP requires a high level of standardization in collection, verification, analytic, and dissemination procedures for effectiveness. Achieving the level of cross agency consensus similar to that seen in the UK's NIM would be impractical according to Carter and Carter (2008). While UK agencies had to spend time and money developing the capacity to make each divisional station an intelligence hub, the scale of the task here in the US, is very difficult to imagine. Many U.S. SLTLEs cannot develop the analytical capacity to make ILP effective. The average U.S. SLTLE has fewer than 50 sworn officers and insufficient funds to support a permanent analyst. Today, there is still no standardized training on intelligence collection, the intelligence process, or ILP for recruits in police academies across the 50 states (Loyka et al., 2006). This fact alone speaks volumes as the long term likelihood U.S. SLTLEs will more broadly adopt ILP. Small agencies do not have the infrastructure to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence across jurisdictions especially when that intelligence does not directly support service delivery in their community.

Some large agencies like the New Jersey State Police have committed themselves to ILP, (New Jersey State Police, 2006). Peterson (2005) describes these agencies as Level 2 intelligence agencies. These SLTLEs can produce strategic,

operational and tactical intelligence using resources under their control. These are the major municipal and state agencies that have the resources to invest in developing and maintaining a robust intelligence function. There are approximately 500 such SLTLEs in the U.S. (Peterson, 2005). An argument against further implementation of ILP in the SLTLEs was put forth by a body of senior SLTLE leaders speaking at a conference hosted by the U.S. Department of Justice. They argued that efforts to expand independent intelligence capacity more broadly across the SLTLEs would not only be costly but also would create stove pipes of information and dysfunctional redundancies (Peterson, 2005). These leaders argue that cooperation with existing bodies like the JTTF, the RISS, and Fusion Centers, provides a more centralized, accurate, and valuable intelligence product.

One example of ILP in action cited in the literature is the Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW). This multi agency, multi discipline, multi jurisdiction work group was initiated in 1996 to serve the Los Angeles area. TEW members work with the JTTF to provide SLTLE members with the most accurate assessment of threat conditions and vulnerabilities based on an all hazards/all sources perspective. The TEW is functional as a regional effort to overcome the resources barriers, classification barriers, standardization barriers, and tasking conflicts that would be evident if each member agency attempted to independently achieve this capacity (Peterson, 2005). The TEW, JTTF, Fusion Centers, New Jersey State Police (NJSP), and the NYPD, all model elements of ILP but to different purposes and with different effect. Fusion Centers and the TEW are regional groups that are staffed by and exist to serve the informational needs of their constituent agencies. The JTTF relies on partner agency staffing but acts with Federal authority. In addition to facilitating the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence useful to the Federal authorities and the SLTLEs, JTTFs provide operational resources in various jurisdictions. The NJSP and the NYPD both have robust intelligence units functioning at what Peterson (2008) describes as Level 2. The NJSP however does not guide all, or even the majority of its enforcement actions through the application of ILP. In the NJSP, ILP is used specifically “to identify, target, and infiltrate organized criminal groups and to enhance their alliance with the FBI to combat terrorism” (Guidetti & Martinelli, 2010). The NYPD has a robust intelligence capacity consistent with what

Peterson (2005) describes as Level 2, and has distinguished itself by having one of the most robust municipal commitments to anti terrorism efforts, the daily work of the NYPD is still guided by the Compstat strategic model as opposed to ILP.

McGarrell (2007) compares the state of implementation of ILP in the US to the state of COP more than 20 years ago. Just like COP two decades ago, ILP is “being endorsed by all the key law enforcement professional organizations and there are reports of promising practices...but it remains a fairly nebulous concept and most agencies are just toying with implementation” (McGarrell et al., 2007, p. 154). Others describe the implementation of ILP as being in the embryonic stages. (Martinelli & Shaw, 2010) Advocates for ILP recognize that the majority of U.S. SLTLEs are already invested in management plans that center on Compstat or COP. Knowing the real hurdles associated with broad organizational change, ILP advocates argue instead for the smaller agencies to learn more about intelligence; the regulations governing its collection, storage and dissemination, and the ILP model so that they can participate in the Intelligence Sharing Environment (ISE) as mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (Carter & Carter, 2008).

While the majority of SLTLEs are well accustomed to using intelligence to support investigations and tactical requirements (intelligence in policing), there may be unintended consequences to more completely adopting ILP across small and medium sized agencies. At a conference discussing these issues, a body of SLTLE leaders resisted the notion they should expand their intelligence capacity. Instead they argue that greater use of existing regional resources such as the JTTFs, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS net) and cooperative agreements with Level 2 agencies would be more productive. These SLTLE leaders also argued that developing independent intelligence functions across Level 3 and 4 SLTLEs could create the unintended consequence of additional stove pipes of information that would contribute to important data not being linked or properly analyzed (Peterson, 2005). Proponents of ILP argue that it can be effective in narrowly targeting the crimes that are considered precursors to terrorist activity such as; document fraud, illegal immigration, tax evasion, and interstate weapons offenses. Those wary of expanding ILP argue that these offenses are currently the

purview of federal authorities and expanding the capacity of SLTLEs to investigate them, would be redundant to the work of the JTTFs, would require significant increases in resources, and would necessitate sweeping legislative changes.

Another argument against the implementation of ILP more broadly across U.S. SLTLEs can be found in the same problems already experienced in the UK. In addition to cost, infrastructure and redundancy arguments, there is the question of what to do with predictive information when the intelligence process works well and analysis aids in prediction. While many agree that predictive ability in policing is to be valued and commended, there are deeper questions on the impacts those predictions make and the moral implications of applying predictive knowledge across a class of people. When the intelligence process is applied, predictions regarding the offender population can be made. This is really no different than the medical profession or insurance companies treating different classes of people differently based on their class profile. Men do not get tested for pregnancy and young people pay more for auto insurance for obvious reasons. When the intelligence process however identifies a class of people as more likely to be involved in a criminal activity, there are real questions as the moral and efficient police response to that information. Arrest data shows clear demographic trends for various crimes. This type of data in a particular city can produce a clear profile of the race, age and gender of the offender for any of a wide variety of crimes based on who has been arrested for those crimes in the past. A police response that takes that data and uses it to justify future criminal enforcement actions (search, detention, etc) against people who match the offender profile, would be in violation of the 14th Amendments mandate for equal protection under the law. U.S. law demands that the police have individualized and particular factors of suspicion before a person's rights can be infringed upon. In most cases, race, gender, religious affiliation, ethnicity, national origin, cannot be factors considered as suspicious. These immutable characteristics are often used to make judgments about people in the real world but, when U.S. SLTLEs use them as factors of criminality, they open the door to lawsuits, reversals in court, and an eroding of the public trust.

When SLTLEs engage in profiling for criminal behavior they can narrowly target their efforts towards the people as opposed to the type of people, likely to commit crime. When properly employed, profiling is a tactic that identifies the behaviors that are more consistent with criminal behavior and less likely to have an innocent explanation. The key elements of a successful profile are things that are within the control of the offender to affect. It is the behavior and not the race, age, gender, etc of an offender that will lead to the elements of the crime being investigated and thus it is the behaviors that should be focused on. There is cause for concern however when profiling is used, not to aid in the identification of a particular offender (case probability) but to make predictions relevant to a class of offenses and by extension the class of offender (class probability). Racial profiling can be considered an unintended and dysfunctional consequence of the principles of class probability being poorly applied. When SLTLEs incorporate class probability into case specific examples, an appearance of unfair bias can emerge. In addition to damaging the public trust, the practices that emerge from dysfunctional profiling can create significant liability for the SLTLE and can in fact, diminish crime fighting effectiveness. Several SLTLEs including the New Jersey State Police and the New York City Police Department have been forced to enter consent decrees with the Federal Authorities to settle lawsuits brought against them for practices that appeared to reflect an application of class probability in stop and search practices. A lawsuit against the NYPD resulted in the NYPD being forced to provide the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) with quarterly data on what had become known as the NYPD practice of stop and frisk (The Center for Constitutional Rights, 2009). The data provided to the CCR by the NYPD showed that stopping and frisking was a relatively common practice that showed no signs of abating over the years between 2005 and 2008. The data further showed that blacks and Latinos were stopped and searched disproportionately to their per capita population. During the period measured, Blacks and Latinos comprised roughly 25 percent and 28 percent of the NYC population but accounted for 81 percent of the 1,648,769 stops during the same period. During the same period, a cumulative total of 775,428 of the stops made by NYPD resulted in a frisk. Eighty-five percent of those frisked were Black or Latino. The rate of arrest or summons

subsequent to these searches was extremely low (approximately six percent) and relatively equal across Whites, Blacks and Latinos (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2009). Whatever the justification or good sense behind any one of these stops/searches, Minorities are disproportionately stopped and searched when compared to their per capita populations and, more that 90 percent of those searches does not produce evidence of criminal activity.

Beyond questions of class probability, an intelligence investigation can reveal case specific details that indicate a particular person has engaged in specific behavior that, while odious, or simply controversial, is constitutionally protected. The regulations and laws that control U.S. SLTLE intelligence operations forbid the initiation, maintenance, or distribution of intelligence records on subjects who are not specifically tied to criminal activity. The first amendment protections of free speech and assembly; and the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable seizure have been foundational to SLTLE practice and are not likely to be modified. While people who express sympathy for a particular cause may be susceptible to radicalization, targeting them for surveillance or detention without evidence of a criminal act is antithetical to what our judicial system stands for. As the emphasis on intelligence grows, so does the risk of poorly managed intelligence operations. Advocacy groups like the ACLU have successfully brought legal action against SLTLEs within the past decade for gathering intelligence on a nun who was protesting the death penalty and several citizens protesting pork processing (Guidetti & Martinelli, 2010). The costs associated with violating the rules, regulations, and laws associated with intelligence operations are serious and far reaching. The effects of eroding the public trust last for a prolonged period and the "trust tax" (Covey & Merrill, 2006) spreads far wider than the individuals involved in the violation. The risks and costs associated give emphasis to the argument that intelligence operations should be very narrow in scope, controlled tightly and used only for complex criminal organizations, terrorist threats (Guidetti & Martinelli, 2010).

Some in the literature argue that intelligence should be woven into the existing operations of an SLTLE. Advocates of this position argue that intelligence is integral to all of policing and thus should not be treated as a program separate from core

service delivery. Peed et al. (2008) argue that information gathering and analysis should be woven into the regular tasks of community policing. The likely benefits and potential pitfalls of stronger partnerships between law enforcement and the communities where radicalization takes place are discussed by Paris (2007), Simeone (2002), Caldwell (2006), and others earlier in the literature review of COP. Officers trained in the techniques required to foster and maintain productive relationships in this manner, are adapt at gathering information and scanning for anomalies in the same community.

ILP can be considered a natural progression from COP. In COP, SLTLEs scan frequently for the root cause of criminal conditions and enlist the support of partners in and out of government to address those matters separate from and in addition to criminal enforcement strategies (Peed, Wilson, & Scalisi, 2008). ILP agencies recognize that this scanning is of little value without ongoing analysis and adaptations. ILP recognizes that there are often bivariate and multivariate relationships between crime and social conditions that are not always apparent to the untrained eye. Peed et al. (2008) draw clear parallels between COP elements such as partnerships, collaboration, and problem solving and ILP elements such as targeted intelligence collection and rigorous analysis. Carter and Carter (2008) argue that the core competencies COP developed in officers are applicable to ILP. COP officers are already trained and conditioned to scan their communities for abnormalities, to solicit information from community members, partnerships, and problem solving. While all of these skills were developed to address quality of life issues and crime fighting in communities, they translate easily to protecting communities from terrorism and all hazards. McGarrell et al. (2007) point out that the communication skills developed by COP officers are very useful, not only when information needs to be collected, but also when information needs to be dispersed throughout the community (McGarrell et al., 2007). Officers with established ties to the community are well suited to get information out about disaster response, evacuation, and lookout notices more effectively than officers unknown to the community.

When comparing ILP to Compstat, it is clear that both rely on data, analysis, problem solving, and feedback. ILP and Compstat both benefit from centralized decision making, integrated data systems and mapping. Both are focused on prevention

(Carter & Carter, 2008) One can also draw important distinctions between Compstat and ILP. Compstat is incident driven and focused on intra-jurisdictional matters while ILP is geared towards multi-jurisdictional matters and focuses on threats more than incidents. ILP has a longer time focus and deals with more strategic issues than Compstat. Compstat in SLTLEs addresses street crime, primarily the UCR part one crimes and quality of life issues. While Compstat relies on analysis, the analytical product shapes the efforts of geographic commands within a jurisdiction. The collectors and consumers of analytic products are relatively close together and in frequent contact in Compstat. In ILP, there is a larger and broader scope. While ILP requires centralization, there can be significant diffusion between collector and consumer in the model. The practical application of Compstat seems to be geared towards managing the crimes and conditions that plague SLTLEs on a daily basis. ILP is better suited to address organized crimes and complex conditions that are not a daily function of line level SLTLEs. While ILP is designed to expand in scope across the multiagency, multijurisdictional divides, it is not as scalable towards smaller agencies and smaller tasks. The skills and technology required to initiate Compstat in a SLTLE are attainable as proven by the model's rapid and widespread adoption.

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III. COMPSTAT 1.0

A. COMPSTAT 1.0 COMPSTAT AS APPLIED ACROSS THE SLTLE COMMUNITY

While federal COP grant funding included mandates to conduct research on the efficacy of the COP and its practical application, no such grant funding existed as Compstat spread far and wide across the nation. Willis et al. argued that ‘the glowing accounts of Compstat’s success are fueled mostly by studies that rely on anecdotal evidence or concentrate on the NYPD, the nation’s largest and, by any measure, most exceptional police department’ (Willis et al., 2003). There is also a growing body of criticism for Compstat in the NYPD that reveals more controversy about the model than one would expect from merely reading the crime statistics. An analysis of Compstat as practically applied is required to formulate judgments about how to improve the model. One of the earliest national academic studies of Compstat was conducted by Weisburd et al. (2001). In this 1999 study, all 515 SLTLE agencies with 100 or more sworn officers were polled as was a sample of the 698 agencies with 50–99 officers. The survey enjoyed an 86 percent response rate and provided the researchers with a better understanding of how the practical implementation of Compstat compared to the model as described in academic literature (Weisburd et al.). Weisburd et al. identified six core elements or factors that were required for the program to be a successful management plan. These elements were: 1. Mission Clarification, 2. Internal Accountability, 3. Geographic Organization of Operational Command, 4. Organizational Flexibility, 5. Data Driven Problem Identification and Analysis, and 6. Innovative Problem Solving Tactics. These components are the metrics by which Weisburd et al. measure the strength and effectiveness of implementation.

In a different study (Willis et al., 2003), researchers conducted in depth analysis at three particular cities. Willis et al. conducted research in Lowell Massachusetts, Minneapolis Minnesota, and Newark New Jersey. These three cities were chosen by the researchers because each professed a strong commitment to Compstat implementation.

The object of the study was to assess how the practical application of Compstat in differing cities compared to the expectations of the Compstat model. Instead of relying solely on surveys, Willis et al. conducted field observations, attending Compstat meetings, and conducted a series of interviews to: “(1) describe how Compstat functioned as a specific program; (2) to examine how it changed police organization and practice; and (3) to provide some insights into the direction Compstat is leading policing in the United States” (Willis et al., 2003).

While the previous chapter included analysis of Compstat’s origins and design, there is much to be learned from the study of Compstat in its practical application, over the course of time. In New York City and in other cities where there has been a strong commitment to implementing this strategic management plan, there are lessons to be learned about what works and where improvement is needed. Using Weisburd’s six components as a measuring tool, this chapter provides a comparison of what the academic literature professed could be expected from Compstat to what was actually observed.

1. Mission Clarification

a. In the Model

A clear mission is critical to establishing goals and objectives. The mission in this case can be seen either as the larger mission statement or as the goals and objectives expressed in a task setting process. An agency implementing Compstat must ensure its mission statement is aligned with the primary goal of Compstat, crime fighting, and the goal setting process aligns with the mission. In different terms the element of mission clarification can be compared to the Covey instruction to “Begin with the end in mind.” McDonald (2010) explains further writing “perhaps the single most important factor in the whole process is the ability to select specific objectives. The leader must know what he or she wants to achieve, what improvements citizens demand, and what targets will ultimately improve public safety” (McDonald, 2010). Bryson (2004) argues that a public organization must come to consensus regarding its overarching goals and the

larger purpose it serves before it can proceed with any other work on developing a strategic plan. Achieving clarity of purpose, frames the rest of the work, providing direction and decreasing the potential for conflict downstream (Bryson, 2004).

Setting a clear organizational mission requires an examination of what is desired and what is practical. A mission that appears impractical or unattainable to the workforce conflicts with Vroom's expectancy theory. There will be low motivation to achieve that which appears unattainable. Conversely, a mission that appears trivial will also not inspire strong commitment. A mission that conflicts with the commonly held values and vision of the workforce will also diminish motivation while a mission that reflects those same values will be inspiring (Collie, 2006). While it can be argued that SLTLEs do a great deal more to protect the public than simply fight crime, it is important to note that in the Compstat model, goals and objectives are narrowly focused on crime fighting (McDonald, 2010). McDonald cautions against setting crime fighting goals as specific percentages by which crime will decrease because this is the expression of an output rather than an outcome (McDonald, 2010). Compstat goals should be focused on crime reduction outcomes because it is those outcomes the public can perceive and it is a reflection of a substantial rather than an incremental commitment to improvement. The authors of the BOS argue that in setting goals for a strategic innovation it is important to "focus on the big picture, not on the numbers" (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). Too much focus on narrow and objective measurements in formulating a strategic plan can mire the leaders in the red ocean, failing to set the conditions that support innovation.

b. In the National Survey

Weisburd et al. discovered that amongst the responding SLTLEs, there was a wide disparity regarding mission clarification. Of the responding SLTLEs that claimed to have implemented Compstat, 48.2 percent of the agencies stated that they had not committed to lowering crime or a crime related problem by a specific percentage. Because roughly half of the agencies adhere to the standard of committing to a set reduction in crime while the other half does not; there is clearly disagreement in the SLTLE community on how to practically apply the mission clarification element of the

Compstat model. Some SLTLEs reported they chose to not commit to a set reduction for fear of not meeting the goal and facing external accountability. One could argue that there is an inherent paradox when a management system is adverse to external accountability while extolling the virtue of internal accountability. The national survey also revealed that 31.4 percent of responding agencies that claimed to have implemented Compstat, had mission statements that committed them to many goals and did not focus solely on crime reduction. Mission statements that reflect multiple priorities are not in line with the McDonald's (2010) exhortation to use Compstat to focus on crime problems exclusively. Mission statements that commit a department to a variety of goals however are reflective of the COP model. While the ILP model is designed for larger scale and more complex situations, its practical application in the UK suggests that it is also adaptable to all crimes and all hazards.

c. In the Three Cities Study

Willis et al. examined the relationship “between mission statements and the degree to which officers shared the crime-fighting values of Compstat” (Willis et al., 2003). The Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) was the only agency out of the three to have established a clear goal to lower UCR Part 1 crime by 10 percent. The Newark Police Department (NPD) made no specific reference to a crime reduction goal in their mission statement. The Lowell Police Department (LPD) set a mission goal of becoming the safest city of its size. The researchers identified a paradox in the practical application of Compstat. Their study suggests that “mission statements might actually undermine widespread commitment to the organization’s goals-the opposite of what is intended” (Willis et al., 2003). When asked to rate the importance their agency’s Compstat strategy placed on reducing violent crimes, MPD officers had the lowest rating of the three with 52 percent stating that fighting violent crime was very important to the MPD’s Compstat model. The LPD and the NPD measured a stronger commitment to crime fighting as the primary goal of Compstat. Among LPD officers, 77 percent reported that fighting violent crime was very important while 82 percent of the NPD officers said the same (Willis et al., 2003).

Willis et al. sought to determine if any management actions or internal structures contributed to MPD officers not sharing the priority or primacy of the crime fighting mission that the Compstat model and MPD management sought to emphasize. Willis et al. suggested that because the MPD had been more committed than the other two agencies to the COP model before adopting Compstat, many officers were experiencing a tension brought on by conflict in the priorities of the two models. Officers familiar with the COP model had internalized a variety of goals beyond crime fighting, to include order maintenance, relationship building, and alternatives to arrest. Willis et al. suggested that the MPD's public and explicit commitment to the singular goal of crime fighting was incompatible with the officer's perception that multiple valid goals existed in police work and that the other goals could not be legitimately or practically de-prioritized. Willis et al. wrote "the more an organization responsible for a variety of important tasks focuses its limited resources on only one goal, the more likely it is that the goal will be met with disaffection among those whom it is intended to most inspire" (Willis et al., 2003).

In an effort to further emphasize the crime fighting goals of the new MPD mission, MPD management insisted that officers not on a call for service engage in directed patrol proactively seeking out criminal acts in what had been determined to be concentrations of criminal activity (hot spots). Officers were further instructed to employ aggressive enforcement tactics when employed on these directed patrols. This mandate represented a significant reduction in the amount of discretionary authority officers had grown used to in the previous COP model. Some officers reported to Willis et al. that they felt this loss of discretion and the redirection of their patrol efforts disconcerting. Officers complained that reallocating patrol resources to high crime areas left the law-abiding citizens with less police protection. They further argued that the heavy enforcement mandate was counterproductive because they were "wasting time to stop people for loitering and not answering calls" (Willis et al., 2003). Willis et al. argue that this loss of discretion created as dissent from, rather than allegiance to the mission goals. Collie (2006) argues that this fundamental dissonance regarding the larger purpose an organization serves will diminish the likelihood a strategic innovation will be

successful. The apparent break between leader intent and results here can be equated to a loss of trust. The mandates of senior MPD management communicated a lack of trust in the application of discretionary authority that had previously been common with the line officer. Some officers perceived disingenuousness in the conflicting priorities of management. The officers were told to prioritize proactive hot spot enforcement when in practical terms; they knew they would still be accountable to respond to calls for service. The apparent conflict between these priorities eroded line officer faith in senior management. As Covey (2006) argues, a diminished sense of trust and common purpose leads to the levying of a trust tax. In this case, lower trust resulted in the trust tax of a lower rate of acceptance of the crime fighting goal. Trust was further injured at the MPD when minority members reacted with distrust and anger at the department's newly aggressive enforcement efforts. While the concentration of law enforcement efforts in a hot spot is shown to be an effective response to lower crime, overly aggressive enforcement or crackdowns, are also shown to be ineffective or to only enjoy temporary positive changes (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). When the public perceives enforcement actions are heavy handed or unfair, the trust tax is severe and can lead to increased instances of violent resistance, increased complaints, lawsuits, and the lack of voluntarily provided information. The public trust gained by diminishing crime must be constantly balanced against the trust lost when the public perceives police actions as unfair.

It is interesting to note that the instruction from management to focus on crime reduction by employing heavy enforcement in hot spots was entirely in line with the Compstat model. The loss of officer discretion and de-prioritizing rapid response to calls for service are also in line with the Compstat model and an evidence based approach to what works in crime prevention. While rapid response to calls for service is a hallmark of the standard model of policing and high levels of officer discretion is a hallmark of the COP model, neither factor heavily in Compstat. Kelling et al. (1974) had established that random patrol was not effective in reducing crime, disorder, or fear of crime. The Kansas City Police showed that lowering response times was also not effective in crime prevention or apprehension in the majority of cases (Kansas City Police Department, 1977). While management appeared to understand the Compstat model and issue

instructions that were reasonable and productive in that model, management did not apparently effectively instill a sufficient amount of understanding and buy in from the line officers as to the practical application of this element of Compstat. It is ironic that the MPD received the lowest amount of buy in when they were the only agency to mandate training in Compstat for every officer (Willis et al., 2003).

2. Internal Accountability

a. In the Model

For many who study or employ the Compstat model, internal accountability tied to the reduction in crime, is the most visible and possibly the most critical component. This school of thought asserts that holding commanders directly accountable for results “drive[s] the development of crime reduction tactics at the precinct level” (Kelling & Sousa, 2001). By holding precinct commanders accountable to being knowledgeable about and proactive towards crime conditions in their precincts, the Compstat model works to ensure a change in their motivations and thus a change in their behaviors. Before Compstat, the link between a Commanders actions and crime rates was unclear at best. In some agencies, Commanders were tied to a bureaucratic culture that focused on rule enforcement and careful stewardship of resources. Success was measured in the allocation of resources or the process of crime fighting as opposed to the results. Maintaining the optimal number of officers evenly distributed, rapidly responding to calls for service, and developing a capacity to react effectively to crisis were the metrics by which commanders measured success. In organizations dedicated to COP, commanders were accountable for setting the conditions that supported communities in their efforts to address quality of life and crime conditions. In both models, avoiding embarrassment or controversy were higher priorities than actual success in crime fighting. Increases in crime could be attributed to social conditions beyond the commander’s control. The bureaucratic culture that preceded Compstat also made it difficult for chiefs to hold commanders accountable in meaningful ways as reassignments, demotions, or terminations were extremely rare. After Compstat, commanders saw a refocus on crime fighting as the top priority and a narrowing of the focus of accountability on the

commander as the person most responsible. This accountability reflected the belief that the police could have a direct impact on crime and the conditions that support crime. It also emphasized results over the application of good methods or process as the metrics of performance. Clearly defining the precinct commander as the one person primarily responsible for crime conditions in his/her precinct brought a distinctly sharper focus to their actions. Increasing the responsibility and decision making authority of commanders reinforced the traditional hierarchy and was functional for decision making. The one person empowered by the hierarchical organizational chart to make decisions was also the one person who would be called to account for failing to make decisions. This component of the model clearly reflects Commissioner Bratton's rejection of previous models where decisions could be made and resources allocated without involving the commander. A simple way to restate this argument is that when everybody is in charge, then nobody is running the show. While it is easier for the chief to affect the behaviors and motivations of his senior staffers, it is substantially more difficult to create the same effect for the entire staff. The literature indicates that the model places the burden of accountability squarely on commanders and not subordinate officers, community leaders, social conditions, or limited resources and support. The model assumes that commanders will be creative and collaborate with each other; demonstrating a commitment to appreciative inquiry, taking risks, learning from failure, sharing information and resources to each other's mutual benefit (Willis, Mastrofski, Weisburd, & Greenspan, 2003).

b. In the National Survey

Weisburd et al. found a strong commitment to internal accountability amongst the agencies that responded to the survey. Of the responding SLTLEs that claimed to have adopted Compstat, 70 percent reported a commander's position would be in jeopardy if they remained ignorant as to crime data. 80 percent reported that a specialty commander's position would be in jeopardy if they persistently were unable or unwilling to provide timely assistance to precinct commanders (Weisburd et al., 2004). The respondents reflected the model's exhortation to punish commanders or shame them

simply because crime did not drop fast enough or even if crime rose. It appears from the responses that the majority of Compstat agencies see the accountability mechanism tied to the expectation that commanders will maintain a high degree of situational awareness and will respond rapidly to emerging problems. It is of special note that while a clear majority of SLTLEs understood that commanders could be punished for failing to meet expectations, a much smaller number believed that commanders would be rewarded for meeting or exceeding performance goals. Only 25 percent of responding agencies asserted that a commander could expect a tangible reward if goals were met (Weisburd et al.). This is reflective of a negative leadership bias more heavily weighted towards punishment than reward. The respondents also did not indicate that the accountability mechanism was perceived nearly as strongly by first line supervisors and officers.

A significant paradox was discovered in the practical application of Compstat regarding accountability. It appears that the strong emphasis on accountability degrades the ability to innovate and to exhibit the flexibility the model expects. These findings will be discussed in more detail in the appropriate sections. Further, when accountability is focused on the commander and not equally perceived down the chain of subordinates, the motivations to perform cannot be equally perceived. There appears to be dissonance between the results based accountability perceived by commanders and the process or rule based accountability that remained with subordinates.

c. In the Three Cities Study

Willis et al. found that Compstat dramatically increased commander's perception of accountability for performance in all three agencies. There was no doubt amongst the various commanders that they were expected to be knowledgeable about and constantly engaged in crime fighting efforts in their precincts. Officers and commanders alike agree that commanders were not likely to be terminated or disciplined as a direct result of an increase in crime but all agreed, failure to be knowledgeable about, and actively engaged in tactics to reduce crime trends, would bring about negative consequences. Commanders in each city claimed to be more powerfully motivated by fear of shaming or sanction than by the promise of praise. In fact, there were little to no

examples found in any of the three cities of commanders receiving praise for a job well done. Chief Davis of Lowell Massachusetts, told researchers he understood that shame and ridicule were not the best methods to maintain a sense of accountability but at times, he too “balled out” subordinates (Weisburd et al., 2008). At the NPD, the chief, dissatisfied with one presenter, ordered him to step down and stand behind a subordinate as a shaming mechanism (Willis et al., 2003). With this negative focus, Compstat meetings were characterized as tension filled and confrontational. In the hopes of avoiding sanction for failing to implement a plan, commanders failed to reflect the model in two important ways. Commanders did not use Compstat meetings as a forum to collaborate with peers. Peer commanders were reluctant to offer suggestions for fear it would be perceived as an attempt to denigrate the presenter before the commander. By failing to collaborate, but instead, seeking an immediate fix for any problem, commanders also abandoned long term, in depth problem solving strategies and innovations. The vast majority of responses were entirely traditional and not reflective a commitment to innovate.

While commanders all perceived a strong accountability mechanism through the implementation of Compstat, the effectiveness of that accountability was debatable. Even though Commissioner Bratton was able to replace, or reassign a significant proportion of his commanders in Compstat’s first year, smaller agencies have more difficulty in such personnel changes. In each of the cities, chiefs reported that they were very reluctant to replace a commander for failing to live up to expectations for a variety of reasons. The chiefs noted the difficulties in finding a qualified replacement from the pool of subordinate officers, and the negative effects such a move would have on morale. Willis et al. also found that the officers did not perceive any consequences or sense of accountability for results consistent with the perception of commanders. This may have been due to the fact that officers and first line supervisors had little to no input or involvement in Compstat meetings or because they were not responsible for designing and monitoring response tactics. The officers were further distanced from the accountability process in that none of the cities had a mechanism to conduct similar meetings or to transfer similar perceptions of accountability down the chain or at the

precinct level (Willis et al., 2003). These factors combined to leave in some officer's minds the impression that Compstat was for the managers more than for the line, and that it was a program more infused with light than heat.

3. Geographic Organization of Operational Command

a. In the Model

Decision making and responsibility rests neither with top levels of management or the line officer. The geographic commander is the person most responsible for decision making and thus accountability rests with the precinct commander. With responsibility for the precinct across the days of the week and the hours of the day, outcomes are measured by territory as opposed to shift or even functional specialty. In the model, the question is not "how much did robbery drop during the evening shift?" it is "how much did robbery drop in the 2nd precinct?" With the organization centered on geographic operations, commanders are empowered in the model to reallocate resources within their precinct or district, as they deem necessary. There is some disagreement in the literature regarding what resources the precinct commander should have. One camp suggests that each commander should have under his/her control the various specialty and functional elements that are required to employ through problem solving. The other camp, suggests that it is impractical and inefficient to assign functional specialties to the various geographic commands and thus the Compstat model need only facilitate the collaboration of functional elements with the precinct. One can imagine the difference in manpower and financial costs between staffing a centralized SWAT or homicide investigations unit against the notion of one such team for each Precinct. A further argument against the notion of assigning functional specialties to each of the geographic commands comes in the greater potential for silo effects. Having a centralized tactical or investigative component allows for greater opportunities to collaborate, train, and share lessons learned as an integrated body. Still others argue for a hybrid model, providing some general investigators and plain clothed resources, leaving the most costly and complex specialty components to a centralized command. The hybrid approach suggests that commanders are empowered to either employ their own

investigative and specialty assignment resources or to solicit the assistance of a specialty commander who would dedicate resources on behalf of the precinct commander (Weisburd et al., 2008).

The intersection between community policing (COP) and Compstat is noteworthy with respect to geographic organization of operational command. Both COP and Compstat seek to deliver targeted police services, specific to the needs of a particular geographic area. Neither model envisions an entire jurisdiction requiring the same services and the same resources equally distributed at all times. In the ILP model, resources are to be narrowly targeted also rather than equally distributed but, the emphasis in resource allocation in ILP is on the crime problem as opposed to the geographic area. COP empowers and expects the line officer rather than the commander to identify the needs of the community he/she serves while Compstat moves to centralize decision making and resource allocation. In ILP, decision making is also more centralized than in COP. In the COP, the area of geographic responsibility and influence can be as small as a neighborhood while in Compstat, decisions are made at the patrol district level so that resources are more efficiently allocated, there is greater coordination in responses, and there is more centralized accountability for results. Centralizing command is also more consistent with the traditional model of policing.

b. In the National Survey

The national survey again produced results that deviated from what one would expect in the model. 90 percent of responding SLTLEs that claimed to use Compstat agreed that their commanders had a level of authority and discretion consistent with the model. When the crime problem however carried a high degree of visibility, only 69 percent of the SLTLEs believed that the commander would be able to select the strategies to apply and manage the matter without receiving the consent of higher-ranking officials (Weisburd et al., 2008). Commanders were even less likely (38.7 percent) to be able to determine staffing levels for patrol shifts without the approval of senior leaders. Changing beat boundaries without higher level approval was extremely unlikely (19 percent). In its practical application, Compstat appears to reinforce a top down model of

leadership where the senior most leaders continue to exert a high degree of influence in decision making, resource allocation, and even tactics. This can become dysfunctional when geographic commanders perceive accountability for outcomes but do not perceive the same level of authority to affect change. When authority and accountability are disjointed, those without authority are less effective and risk disenfranchisement. This is especially the case when senior leadership takes the initiative to overturn or contradict geographic commanders precipitously.

c. In the Three Cities Study

Each of the three cities had adhered to the model to a certain degree. Geographic commanders were charged with 24 hour responsibility for their areas granting these commanders additional authorities and conferring upon them greater responsibility than in the traditional model or in the COP model. The MPD had gone the furthest by making sector lieutenants responsible for 24 hour management of their sectors. The MPD also followed the model more closely than the NPD or the LPD by providing the commanders with crime prevention officers, a community response team (CRT), and property crimes investigators. These additional resources empowered MPD commanders to implement a wider array of responses without having to coordinate with other commanders or compete for centralized resources. Neither the NPD nor the LPD provided additional resources to the geographic commanders leaving all functional specialties under independent and centralized commands. All three cities allowed geographic commanders greater latitude in designing and leading response strategies but all three also reported that the chief was more likely to intervene or contradict the commander if the crime problem was of a higher profile. While each city had made some progress towards geographic organization of operational command, Willis et al. assessed that; “geographic organization of operational command had contributed to two internal organizational challenges that were common to all three: (1) the complexity of coordinating tasks both between central units and districts and across districts and shifts, and (2) the disproportionate burden of responsibility placed on middle managers in an organization that is structured both geographically and temporally.” (Willis et al., 2003)

The notion of geographic command as opposed to the traditional temporal responsibility was a source of concern for commanders as was the lack of authority over or coordination with functional specialties. Geographic commanders complained that they were held responsible for outcomes while they were forced to compete for investigative resources they did not control. Issues surrounding even the lack of information sharing with the precincts from the functional specialties remained a concern (Willis et al., 2003).

4. Organizational Flexibility

a. In the Model

To properly employ the Compstat model, an agency must accept the premise that generalized and equal patrol coverage is inefficient. While it may seem equitable to assign each commander, each neighborhood, and each shift an equal share of the available resources, this is inefficient because the need for those resources is never equal. This premise has been described as the sine qua non of Compstat. A Compstat organization will reallocate sufficient resources quickly to where they are most needed and then be prepared to redeploy resources continuously, expecting that resource requirements will change. This thinking is very much in line with the Hot Spots patrol tactic described earlier. Using crime data as the primary metric to determine resource allocation seems axiomatic but in fact, is not. Commanders and chiefs face pressure to allocate resources on a variety of factors distinct from crime patterns and emergent problems. Some of this pressure is political in nature and reacts to citizen perceptions of vulnerability as opposed to objective analysis of data. Some of this pressure comes from a perspective of preparedness and argues that there must be a ready capacity of resources tied to the size or density of population as opposed to the crime data. The argument for preparedness is echoed in the sentiment that an agency needs to build and maintain the capacity to address certain needs (hostage rescue, hazardous material release, homicide investigation) even if those occurrences are a rarity. While all of these factors compete in the debate over how to allocate resources, flexibility as demonstrated by concentrating on Hot Spots as they emerge is one of the only tactics that repeatedly proves itself effective in the research.

Organizational flexibility is closely related to geographic organization of operational command. With the commander's responsibility to control crime in a particular area, there must also be a commensurate authority and ability to access resources in various times, places and concentrations as the commander sees fit. Flexibility to address resource requirements across districts is required because it would be impractical to provide every district commander with sufficient resources to address every potential need and surge capacity. Doing so would produce inefficient redundancies and the cost would be prohibitive. Agencies increase intra-district response flexibility by reassigning specialty and functional units from centralized control to district control. There is a cost to this approach. Providing each geographic commander with their own investigative or tactical resources can increase costs, and can diminish performance generally. Providing each geographic command with a team of investigators will often require more investigators and supervisors than would have been required in one centralized unit. Decentralizing a functional specialty can also result in the various units receiving different instructions, perceiving different priorities, and could result in the formation of various intelligence silos amongst the geographic commands. In this model there is little incentive and thus, little likelihood that the burglary investigator from one precinct will invest the time and energy to discover or share information that is valuable to the drug investigator from another geographic command. Where investigators are decentralized, intelligence and valuable assets such as reliable informants are also decentralized. The investigators in one geographic command could become ignorant of the needs another group may have for such an asset and, without incentives to share those assets, investigative efficiency is degraded. There is also a real risk that the lessons learned from an operation in one area will not be absorbed in another. This structure inhibits learning and adaptation to the general detriment. The benefits associated with increasing intra-district flexibility, must be balanced against increases in cost and decreases in investigative or tactical efficiency.

In addition to building intra-district flexibility, agencies must also build and exercise a capacity to increase inter-district flexibility to respond to those crime problems that overwhelm a particular district or cross district boundaries. The literature

proposes various responses organizations can apply to these challenges all centered on organizational flexibility. Agencies can form a temporary task force, made up of assets from various functional and district commands. A task force may report directly to the chief, operating independently from the individual commands and would focus on a particular emergent crime trend or pattern. A task force, independent of the geographic commander can be problematic in that it creates chain of command contradictions. When the leader of a task force operates in but is not subject to the leadership of the geographic commander, it is difficult to hold the geographic commander accountable for the outcomes. An alternative approach to increasing inter-district flexibility discussed in the literature is the formation of rapid response squads. A rapid response squad can deploy quickly and can be applied to crime trends, hot spots, or crime patterns. Rapid response squads can be deployed to serve a particular geographic commander or can be assigned to assist multiple commanders on a matter that crosses district boundaries. Both task forces and rapid response squads are staffed from the pool of officers and investigators that would otherwise be assigned to a particular district. This means that gains in staffing to address inter-district needs come at the expense of resources and manpower that would otherwise be dedicated to intra-district needs. While this could be seen as a problem, it could also be seen as a mechanism to address emergent crime problems while leaving a pool of officers available to handle more traditional police duties such as response to calls for service and traffic enforcement.

b. In the National Survey

Weisburd et al. found results that were similar to what the model would predict. Commanders in 75 percent of the responding SLTLEs were empowered to approve flexible hours for officers while 84 percent of the responding departments reported having reassigned more officers to a crime problem to help resolve it. 80 percent of the responding agencies reported using overtime to facilitate extra staffing when needed to address a crime problem (Weisburd et al.). Using overtime is a common response to increase available manpower. Agencies noted that other alternatives were significantly more complicated to implement. While moving resources rapidly to address

emerging problems is the flexibility the model envisions, the practical application of that value must account for union rules, contracts, and policies that mandate more stable shift and days off assignments. It would be very difficult to manage shifting officer's days off and shifts as often as crime patterns or trends emerge. In addition to these considerations, reassigning an officer from a beat he is familiar with and relatively successful in, to an unfamiliar beat that has more crimes and calls for service, can negatively impact officer morale and performance. The community that loses officers in the exchange can also perceive that they will suffer longer response times and argue that they now are at greater risk. Politically powerful stakeholders can exert pressure for or against the shifting of resources when their interests are at stake. All of these factors contribute to the pressure to reassign officers with overtime dollars instead of flexible assignment. Using overtime to address an emergent crime problem results in fewer complaints from officers and from stakeholders but there are drawbacks. In addition to being a costly remedy, addressing crime trends with overtime staffing diminishes the continuity of patrol and increases the likelihood of intelligence silos across the various officers who are filling in as opposed to working a primary assignment.

As discussed previously, the strong internal accountability perceived by commanders paradoxically can work to diminish organizational flexibility. Commanders, feeling a strong sense of accountability for achieving mission goals in their assigned area, have a perverse disincentive to share resources with peer commanders. This zero sum game mentality exists despite the fact that it represents a paradox or a contradiction to the Compstat model ideal. None the less, the paradox was evident in the practical application of Compstat as evidenced by the responses in the National Survey (Willis et al., 2003).

Organizational flexibility can also be viewed as the ability of a geographic commander to focus on priorities other than crime fighting where the primary metric is crime statistics. The heavy focus on crime statistics as the primary metric in the practical application of Compstat deemphasizes flexibility in alternative measures commanders may employ to achieve positive outcomes. The organizational responses discussed in the national survey were relatively limited and traditional. Directed patrols, increased visibility, diligent follow up, and targeting repeat offenders are all common responses

revealed in the survey. Other positive police tactics such as traffic enforcement to increase public safety, order maintenance, intelligence gathering, and critical infrastructure protection are given short shrift.

c. In the Three Cities Study

By allocating resources proportionally, factoring population and district size, the LPD and the NPD followed a more traditional model. The MPD however used crime data in part as a method for assigning district boundaries and allocating resources. (Willis et al., 2003) In the LPD, the practical application of increased organizational flexibility was low in comparison to the other cities. LPD's chief was not inclined to form centralized task forces because he felt they contradicted the strong commitment the LPD had to Community Policing (Willis et al., 2003). In the LPD, district commanders were believed to be the best suited to identify problems and to design the appropriate solutions without the interference of a task force recently and temporarily inserted into a community they are less familiar with and less committed to. The LPD did authorize overtime dollars to provide additional staffing on an ad hoc basis (Willis et al., 2003). The LPD chief also sought to increase the number of officers available by investigating suspicious or abusive leave patterns. In the LPD, political pressure from merchants and the housing authority played a role in resource allocation at times in conflict with what the crime data would warrant. While the chief decided to not decentralize functional specialty units, he did emphasize to his commanders the priority he placed on effective sharing of resources and collaboration at their level. In all three cities however, the primary metric commanders continued to be judged by was not the success of their collaboration but the crime statistics in their geographic area.

The NPD and the MPD demonstrated greater organizational flexibility in the practical application of their Compstat models than the LPD. The NPD used task forces frequently to address crime problems that crossed district boundaries. The NPD chief would use a task force for a specific problem and assign various officers to the effort for relatively brief periods of time. The frequent use of task forces in the NPD resulted in a great deal of organizational flexibility. In the MPD, task forces were

employed less frequently. The various commanders were provided with the highest degree of decentralized resources with each receiving a Community Response Team (CRT). These teams were not expected to respond to calls for service but rather to focus on the emerging crime problems in their district. CRTs could be flexible in their assignment and could develop a high degree of area specific knowledge as they rarely were assigned to problems beyond their district. This degree of flexibility was functional for the district commanders and did not require the non voluntary shifting of resources to address emerging problems (Willis et al., 2003).

In the analysis of the three cities study, it was found that there existed a paradox between the emphasis on geographic organization of operational command, internal accountability, and organizational flexibility. Commanders had a strong incentive to avoid the negative consequences of crime rising in their district but a much lower incentive to be flexible in the sharing of resources, accepting that they may have less to work with because the need was greater elsewhere. The model values organizational flexibility as much as the other components. When practically applied however, as accountability increases, the incentives to demonstrate flexibility decrease. Willis et al. suggest that this paradox cannot be resolved until the Compstat model incorporates “a structure that specifically recognizes and rewards district commanders for voluntarily sharing valuable resources and collaborating with other precincts...” (Willis et al., 2003).

5. Data-Driven Analysis of Problems and Assessment of Problem Solving Efforts

a. In the Model

Just as the old adage says, “If it isn’t counted, it doesn’t count.” Compstat relies on the availability of timely, accurate, and useful data. Without this, commanders are severely handicapped in their ability to identify the emergence of hot spots, crime patterns, or trends. This data can come in various forms and from various sources but the model expects that data sets will be standardized, accurate, and comparable. Mapping is a key component of the model and represents a significant departure from simple counting of crimes. The graphic representation of criminal complaints, and the deployment of

police assets, helps commanders readily identify changes in activity and where resources are needed. While the former standard of excellence in this method of data collection and analysis was the pin map, readily available software makes mapping various events, finding relationships, and making time based comparisons significantly easier. The NYPD placed an early emphasis on mapping in the Compstat model. Jack Maple once likened Compstat without mapping to Generals deploying troops in wartime without a map (Silverman, 1999).

While different geographic commands may find different crimes and crime clusters, the data and methods they use must facilitate the comparison of apples to apples when deciding how to allocate resources especially if inter precinct collaboration is proposed. Data in the model is the building block from which most decisions are made. What data gets collected speaks to the enforcement priorities of the agency. Data in the model also represents the scorecard by which performance is measured. The data collected during and after a response plan, is useful in determining when a response should be altered or when it has achieved the goal. Post-intervention data represents the building blocks from which the department can evaluate and communicate the lessons learned. Commanders rely on data in the model so that they can demonstrate the effectiveness of their interventions. In the absence of data, a commander neither knows a crime problem is emerging nor whether it has waned.

b. In the National Survey

Results indicated that the vast majority of responding SLTLEs are using mapping to help them identify clusters and emergent crime concerns (85.2 percent). Almost all, (93.4 percent) conduct some type of crime analysis to identify trends. It is of interest to note that far fewer SLTLEs (57 percent) use statistical analysis in the Compstat meetings. (Weisburd et al.) The responding SLTLEs also asserted that they had access to relevant data in a timely manner. The clear majority could access incident reports, arrest reports, field interviews, call for service and citation information within seven days. This is the baseline data from which trend analysis can occur and it is a clear reflection of the model that this element seems well reflected in the responding SLTLEs. None of the

responding agencies collected and reported in Compstat on data that was reflective of police priorities other than crime fighting. One can surmise from this general omission, that Compstat, practically applied, did not place as great a priority on traffic enforcement, the diminishment of complaints, disaster preparedness, or quality of life issues as they did on crime suppression as measured in criminal complaint data. There was also a general agreement in the responding agencies that the speed and accuracy of the data was emphasized over the value of the analysis applied to that data. There was a great deal of emphasis on commanders being familiar with the data in minute detail while there was relatively little emphasis on expanding the quality or academic rigor in the analysis of that data.

c. In the Three Cities Study

The LPD, MPD, and the NPD were like the vast majority of responding agencies in the National Survey in that they had developed systems for record keeping that made UCR data available to decision makers quickly. The three agencies however made use of that data in different ways. In the LPD, clerks insured offense reports were entered into a database daily. Bulletins were distributed to the various districts on a regular basis but, these bulletins contained little in the way of analysis. The bulletins did not make it easier to identify or act on the emergence of crime patterns, trends, or hot spots and thus were seen as not useful (Willis et al., 2003). In the MPD, crime reports were entered into a mapping program on a regular basis. Commanders could regularly view maps to quickly identify hot spots and emergent crime patterns. Narrative debrief information was also collected and made available to investigators investigating particular offenders or unknown subjects linked to crime patterns. In the NPD, crime information was regularly entered into a database and then aggregated by crime type. Commanders and ranking subordinates, rather than analysts, regularly met to discuss the data and to collaborate in an effort to identify emergent patterns, trends, and hot spots. While NPD did not focus on mapping between Compstat presentations as the MPD did, the NPD focus on pattern identification was functional and selective when compared to the LPD method of simply listing crime. In addition to crime reports, complaints were

also regularly collected and reviewed in NPD's Compstat process. Collecting and reporting on complaint data in the context of crime and enforcement reports signals an attempt to communicate the priority of balancing crime fighting against maintaining good relations with the public.

Referring again to the adage that what gets counted is what counts, it is clear that the Compstat data collection process communicated senior leader priorities. Each agency collected data on the Part 1 UCR crimes. This is in line with the majority of agencies nationwide that use Compstat. What is notable is what is absent regarding data collection and analysis. With respect to collection, no agency appeared to collect data on traffic infractions as a component of crime suppression. None of the three agencies had employed a method of significantly reducing errors in reporting or data entry. None of the agencies had emphasized the collection of data related to quality of life and nuisance issues. None of the cities had developed a formal mechanism to collect data on enforcement priorities from law abiding members of the communities. These omissions could contribute to an informal and perhaps unintentional communication that traffic enforcement, error reduction in reporting and data entry, quality of life issues, and partnership with the community, are not high priorities to the senior leadership.

Another facet interesting in its omission centers on mapping as a component of Compstat in the three agencies studied. While each used mapping in the Compstat presentation, researchers assessed that mapping and statistical analysis played a very small role in how commanders made decisions regarding response strategies and resources allocation (Willis et al., 2003). In each of the cities, district commanders conducted simplistic analysis often relying on simple counting, anecdotal information, and factors distinct from evidence to plan their responses. Willis et al. attribute the gap between what analysis could be conducted by each agency's Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) and what was used by district commanders to a sense of urgency and a lack of training. (Willis et al., 2003). In most cases, district commanders were not trained in, nor sought a deep understanding of statistical analysis. Commanders also perceived in each of the cities that there was a premium placed on rapidity over deliberation and the slow development of an evidence based approach to a particular crime problem. While this

contradiction to the model was evident in all three cities it was most prevalent in the LPD. Commanders there read every offense report written in their districts before a Compstat meeting. The commanders spent a significant amount of their time on this task, more to avoid the embarrassment of being caught unaware of a particular event, than to glean trend or pattern information. Even in the MPD, where mapping technology and analytical capacity was the most widely used, commanders focused on simple characteristics such as time and place in their analysis (Willis et al., 2003) While Compstat brought clear gains to each agency in terms of making more data, more rapidly available, there were limited gains in the rigor of the analysis applied to that data. Willis et al. found that commanders in the LPD, MPD, and NPD, were not seeking more in depth analysis. The focus in each Department was on how to make more data more accessible more quickly as opposed to how to produce more insightful, predictive analysis to guide their separate and collective efforts. This can be attributed to the fact that commanders were judged more on their understanding of and familiarity with incidents than on the depth of their analysis of those incidents. Furthermore, it was clear, in each of the departments, that having a plan to address those incidents was more critical to avoiding sanction, than was demonstrating that the plan was the best option, focused on efficiency and effectiveness.

6. Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics

a In the Model

The Compstat model anticipates that commanders will remain informed and aware of the latest advancements in crime fighting and innovation. Commanders, driven by the latest data and analysis, are expected to collaborate with each other and select or design differential responses to crime problems that reflect the current state of professional knowledge and understanding. When extolling the virtues of the model as demonstrated in the NYPD, Silverman writes, “Compstat is the forum where new problem-solving approaches are often presented; reviewed analyzed, reexamined, and circulated. Many of the solutions are first developed at the Precinct level” (Silverman, 1999). While it is clear that simple problems can often be best addressed by simple, tried

and true best practices, innovation remains a key element of the Compstat model to address challenges of greater complexity. Willis et al. in their research however argue that this component of the Compstat model is not well developed in the literature (Willis et al., 2003).

Accepting that innovation is needed to face new and more complex challenges also requires an acceptance of the premise that the risk of failure is a cost of doing business. The NYPD model as described by Silverman, expects that commanders will be accountable to conduct follow up examinations of their responses to crime problems and report on their findings (Silverman, 1999). The NYPD model does not take follow up by commanders for granted however. Reflective of the top down, highly centralized, accountability driven, model, NYPD officials went so far as to conduct post-Compstat meetings where a detailed record of who was responsible for what outcomes was updated and later distributed (Willis et al., 2003). Senior leaders referred to these reports and asked follow up questions in subsequent meetings to insure that commanders were monitoring the effectiveness and lasting effect of previous and ongoing response tactics.

From this follow up examination, it is expected that failures will be exposed and that lessons learned will be shared across a broader audience. Similar to a scientific process, the model accepts failure as an opportunity to learn. The literature makes these expectations clear but offers no real explanation as to where or how the commanders were expected to develop the skills necessary to employ a scientific approach to problem solving. Nothing was found in the literature to describe what training or education departments offered commanders to enhance problem solving skills, or to train commanders in how to develop strategic innovations and learn from failures. In this regard more than the others, the argument that commanders can perform these skills is made by assertion rather than with evidence. Silverman, in writing on NYPD's Compstat model, describes the innovative process in the NYPD as "the energizer of strikingly creative decision making at headquarters and in the field" (Silverman, 1999).

b. In the National Survey

Results in the national survey indicated that there was a gap between the model and Compstat as practically applied. Only one third of responding SLTLEs indicated they drew on the experiences of outside agencies when designing responses to crime problems. Only 40 percent indicated they even conducted research into the practices of other agencies. When designing a crime control response strategy, the majority (66 percent) relied upon tactics that they had previously employed to good success. While it may seem reasonable to employ a previously successful tactic, it is not innovative, and does not reflect the mandate in the model (Weisburd et al.). It should come as no surprise then that the two most common strategies employed to address crime problems in SLTLEs that responded, were saturating the area with additional officers (79 percent) and, increasing arrests (74 percent) (Weisburd et al.). What may be a surprise however, is an assessment researchers made during field visits. “Many times [commanders] appear to be more concerned with appearing to be knowledgeable about problems than in actually developing strategies to ameliorate them” (Weisburd et al.). Commanders reported that the pressure to avoid embarrassment or sanction at the Compstat meeting increased the likelihood commanders would simply rely on traditional strategies they were already familiar with. There was no evidence that commanders intentionally chose strategies they believed would be unsuccessful. Anecdotally, however, some did assert it was more important to have some strategy before the Compstat meeting than to have the right strategy (Willis et al., 2003).

The pressure on commanders to avoid embarrassment in the Compstat meeting, combined with the traditional reliance on rank structure and public demonstrations of respect for rank, further eroded the capacity to develop innovative problem solving responses. Commanders presenting at Compstat had often already initiated a response and thus, invested their credibility to some degree in that plan. The efforts by a peer commander to offer suggestions or alternatives could be easily interpreted as efforts to undermine the presenting commander in front of the chief. Subordinate officers attending the presentation or assisting in the commander’s preparation were influenced by social pressure to simply agree with the commander

presenting. The presentations in Compstat were focused primarily on data that has already been analyzed and responses that were already under way or recently concluded and thus there was little opportunity for brainstorming. Any comment on these efforts from peers, or subordinates, could easily be seen as criticism. While competition between commanders for resources and credit may provide an incentive to criticize a peer commander in front of the chief, those benefits must be weighed against the knowledge that there will soon be an opportunity to feel that pressure from the presenter's podium. While these pressures are understandable they are entirely out of line with the mandate in the Compstat model to find innovative and targeted solutions, through collaboration, and an acceptance of risk (Willis et al., 2003).

In addition to the factors that work against innovation in the development of response plans, Willis et al, describe the barriers to innovation that emerge in the post-operational phase. After action reports, operational debriefs, and follow up data collection to measure outcomes are all facets of a commitment to learning and innovation. Accepting the premise that not every response will work equally well in every condition, requires an acceptance that some responses are better than others. Reflecting on what worked and what did not, offers leaders at the tactical level an opportunity to learn from mistakes, and better respond to similar problems in the future. Measuring public safety outcomes in a community as opposed to outputs associated with a response, can offer a candid assessment of effectiveness. Willis et al. found that the same factors that worked against innovation in the development of patrol plans, also worked against candid follow up and assessments of lessons that could be learned from those same responses. Risk avoidance, an acute sense of internal accountability, and over reliance on traditional tactics conspired to limit innovation in the development of problem solving strategies.

c. In the Three Cities Study

As one might expect, the three cities reflected the model's commitment to innovation in varying degrees. In the LPD, Chief Davis encouraged brainstorming during the Compstat presentations. Willis et al., however, found that those offering advice focused far more on their personal experiences and hunches, than on research and best

practices developed in other jurisdictions (Willis et al., 2003). Commanders relied heavily on traditional responses to various and often unrelated crime problems. In most circumstances, the practical application of Compstat in the LPD communicated to commanders that it was more important to recognize a problem quickly and implement a response than it was to carefully mull over options and design the best response possible. While the vast majority of responses relied on saturation patrols and extra manpower, there were a limited number of successful innovations. LPD's Compstat played a role in that data collection was a key in identifying the problem and showing that over time, traditional responses were not effective. A long term auto theft problem finally resulted in collaboration with an outside Police agency, the deployment of a new tactic (bait car) and the formation of a task force with other city agencies. The task force was successful in that it targeted the stolen car destinations (chop shops) as opposed to the individual thefts. A nuisance boarding house was successfully closed down but only after innovative patrol tactics were employed and, the owner was targeted for code violations. The data available through LPD's Compstat process was helpful in the formation of the tactics and defending their application to the public (Willis et al., 2003). These innovations however were not the norm and certain members of the LPD expressed frustration to Willis et al. during their research. Unnamed ranking officials in the LPD complained that a serious crime problem discussed at one Compstat meeting might never be revisited in subsequent meetings and that there was no mechanism to reward innovation over the application of traditional responses. Presenting at an LPD Compstat meeting was compared to taking a test or submitting a school paper. In the minds of the presenters, the problems were behind them as soon as the presentation was complete (Willis et al., 2003).

In the MPD, Willis et al. did not find a great deal of emphasis on innovation in patrol tactics. Directed patrol and zero tolerance schemes were the primary tactics employed in the MPD to address emergent and ongoing crime problems. This however did result in some backlash from citizens. In Minneapolis, citizens were outraged and argued against what they believed were intrusive and overly aggressive patrol tactics employed after Compstat was adopted in that city (Weisburd et al., 2004). MPDs Compstat process did not specifically reward or incentivize innovation and

measured success primarily as a function of lowering crime numbers. This incentive mechanism contributed to a heavy reliance in the MPD on traditional patrol tactics. Emphasis on rapid assessment and response, combined with the aforementioned high degree of accountability both contributed to the perception that innovation was not a priority in MPD patrol and response tactics. Follow up was more common in the MPD than in the LPD. Follow up consisted of regular reviews of crime maps and questions about progress regarding ongoing responses. Reports were presented to commanders to help them track what was discussed in previous meetings. In the NPD, there was also a strong reliance on traditional police response tactics. The more common use of task forces however did contribute to a culture of brainstorming and collaboration at the tactical level. In the NPD, a Compstat book was maintained by the CAU to track information, analysis, and changes on a regular basis to aid in decision making and accountability. This tool contributed to tactical performance but was not linked to significant innovation. The format of the Compstat presentation in each city also contributed to a focus on traditional as opposed to innovative methods. Generally, Compstat presenters issued reports in the past tense. By discussing what had already happened, there was less room for innovation than if the focus of the reporting had been on forecasting and priority setting. While each of the three departments claimed to emphasize innovation, the emphasis on accountability, time pressures, and past tense reporting all contributed to a reliance on traditional responses more than innovation.

B. GENERAL NOTES ON THE THREE CITIES STUDY

It is important to note that while all three cities experienced different problems with Compstat in its practical implementation, there were also benefits. The LPD implemented Compstat in 1997. In that year, property and violent crime (combined crime) went down 8 percent. In 1998 combined crime went down 12 percent and in 1999 it decreased by 21 percent. The MPD implemented Compstat in 1998 and enjoyed a combined crime decrease of 16 percent in that year. 1999 brought a 10 percent additional decrease in combined crime for the MPD and the following year brought a 12.5 percent decrease. The NPD implemented Compstat in 1997 and saw an 18 percent decrease in

combined crime. That decrease was followed in 1998 by a 20 percent decrease and again in 1999 by an 8 percent decrease. There are many factors not related to Compstat, that may have contributed to these declines but, none the less, the declines were real and perceivable. None of the agencies noted in the study any difficulty in funding Compstat and each applied it in different ways to fit their unique needs. This suggests that Compstat was scalable to agencies of different size and with different funding. While there was a general need for higher quality analysis and more training in how to apply that analysis, each agency operated Compstat within the boundaries of the resources available to them.

C. COMPSTAT AS PRACTICALLY APPLIED IN THE NYPD

The NYPD has the longest track record with the practical application of Compstat and thus presents a unique and informative perspective on the model. Commissioner Bratton focused the NYPD on a clear and compelling mission when he committed the department to a 10 percent reduction in crime in the first year. He argued that a specific goal with a numerical value attached would hone the efforts of his commanders because the goal was unambiguous (Willis et al., 2003). It is clear that a new and compelling focus was developed centering on internal accountability. Commissioner Bratton increased geographic organization of operational command and organizational flexibility by providing commanders with additional investigative resources, operating under their direct command, and loosening the restrictive policies that limited the types of warrants precinct officers could serve or the types of investigations they could initiate. There have also been clear improvements in data collection and mapping to help guide commanders in their decision making. The NYPD can boast of numerous successful innovations in patrol tactics, liaison with other agencies, and the development of a strategic management plan mimicked throughout the SLTLE community.

Compstat contributed to significant crime decreases from the very beginning and those effects have already been detailed. What is especially interesting is that the NYPD continues to report significant decreases in criminal complaints more than 15 years after it was implemented. The NYPD reports a significant and ongoing decrease in homicides

since 1990. The steady decrease in murder was graphically represented by the NYPD in this graph published in the *Wall Street Journal*.




Figure 9. Murder Counts (From Gardner, 2010)

The article this graph was published in and others, credit the NYPD application of Compstat for significant and lasting reductions in criminal complaints across the city and over a long period of time. While this article specifically addressed a very slight increase in the number of homicides in 2010, the general consensus was that increases were very small and could not be attributed to a failure in the model. Compstat was credited with changing the mindset of precinct commanders. Before Compstat, commanders ranked summons writing and restriction of overtime expense as their two top priorities (Willis et al., 2003). After Compstat, it was clear that commanders viewed serious crime reduction as the top priority. Commissioner Bratton was credited with successfully appealing to line level officers by linking their efforts to real and measured success in a goal they could embrace. By appealing to the traditional role of crime fighter, Commissioner Bratton inspired officers to accept his priorities thus facilitating the broad adoption of Compstat (Willis et al., 2003). The rapid and prolonged success of Compstat in contributing to reducing crime resonated with the citizens who widely applauded the NYPD.

Commissioner Bratton was also applauded for inviting external stakeholders to attend Compstat meetings (Willis et al., 2003). While Compstat does not place the same priority as COP on external stakeholders contributing to priority setting, Commissioner Bratton achieved several important outcomes from his effort to increase transparency. By inviting local political leaders, he garnered their support and buy in. This level of support helped him at various times overcome the real political hurdles that may otherwise have derailed Compstat. By inviting the press and academics, he opened the Department up to external accountability and enjoyed positive media coverage for his innovations. By inviting members of SLTLEs from all over the world he contributed to the rapid spread and adoption of the strategic model he had invested so heavily in. Unfortunately, this practice, which greatly contributed to a sense of transparency, has been discontinued under Commission Kelly (MacDonald, 2010).

While Compstat in the NYPD has produced real and significant advantages for the citizens of New York City, there are areas of concern that have emerged. There are also a series of reports that indicate the paradoxes and inherent conflicts in the Compstat model have revealed themselves in the NYPD just as they did in the cities cited earlier. In Brooklyn, 2009 crime statistics showed significant increases in certain felonies. The 72nd Precinct reported that burglaries had risen by 120 percent. Car theft rose in the 67th Precinct by 51 percent (McLaughlin & Pearson, 2010). While these increases cannot be attributed to a failure in the model, they do support the contention that no strategic management system can reliably predict or expect a permanent and ongoing decrease in crime. Compstat as applied in the NYPD was a clear divergence away from COP where citizens played an important role in crime reduction in their communities. This diminished emphasis on partnering with citizen groups combined with the general success of Compstat in reducing crime, may have contributed to the decline of neighborhood watch programs in the various precincts. In 2010, the 70th Precinct was so concerned about increasing crime that a new neighborhood watch was forming (McLaughlin & Pearson, 2010).

What appears to be more concerning than recent increases in reported crime is the growing body of evidence that dysfunctional norms of accountability have injured

effectiveness, morale, and public trust. Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple added a great deal of pressure to presenting commanders during Compstat meetings with behavior that could be seen as degrading and unprofessional. In one meeting, he is reported to have flashed pictures of Pinocchio on the display screen during a presentation to communicate his lack of faith what that commander was reporting (Willis et al., 2003). This dramatic shifting of accountability shaped future efforts of geographic commanders in powerful ways. A survey published in 2010 revealed that a significant portion of retired commanders were aware of crime reports being altered to reflect lower crime statistics. This survey, heralded by its authors as “the first research to systematically address the positive and negative aspects of Compstat from the perspective of those who have actually participated in the process” (Eterno & Eli, 2010) polled retired NYPD commanders who had experience with Compstat. 168 respondents stated they had been aware of intentional changes to crime reports. These alterations at times served the legitimate purpose of correcting errors but also, at times, were done to downgrade serious crimes distorting the accuracy of Compstat reporting. Of these 168 respondents, more than half reported that they perceived at least some of the alterations they were aware of as highly unethical (Eterno & Eli, 2010). While the researchers point out a flaw in Compsta’s accountability mechanisms they argue that Compstat should be modified as opposed to scrapped.

There are many who argue that the Eterno/Silverman study has flaws and placed too much weight on the anonymous statements of former supervisors. The proponents of Compstat point out that any large scale conspiracy to alter records and case files to present a false image of crime rates and trends would require an unrealistic level of corruption and coordination over a long period of time. The NYPD has a regular auditing mechanism to ferret out false reporting and manipulation of data. The NYPD reported that its auditing showed a decrease in misclassification from 4.4 percent in 2000 to just 1.5 percent in 200 (MacDonald, 2010). In 2009, a NYPD captain was forced to resign when this auditing established he had downgraded 23 felony larcenies to misdemeanors (Messing, Celona, & Fanelli, 2010). Others argue that perhaps there need not be a great conspiracy or a high degree of coordination amongst officers but instead there simply

exists an understanding that too many reported crimes in a Precinct can result in greater stress for the command and additional hours spent in directed patrol for the officers. This realization can influence some (or many) to lean towards less formal resolutions when faced with crime complaints that have a low likelihood of being solved. It is possible this larger, less obvious phenomenon can be found in a comparison done between the number of serious assaults reported by the Police in NYC and the number of hospital admissions during the same period for assault. Between 1997 and 2002 the rate of serious assaults documented in criminal reports fell by 24 percent. During the same period, the rate of hospital admissions went up 19 percent (Eterno, 2010). In the UK, researchers have said plainly that the pressures similar to those described above lead to “manipulation of data to provide pleasing results” (Eterno, 2010).

In addition to the dangers associated with lowering the motivations to adequately report, classify, and investigate every crime; dysfunctional accountability can lead to abuses in the proactive application of authority. When commanders become risk adverse, slow to share resources, and fail to focus on developing innovative responses to crime problems, responses tend to consist of little more than directed patrols and calls for more manpower. Sufficient pressure to address a crime problem can lead to zero tolerance enforcement and much greater numbers of controversial police citizen contacts. By their very nature these responses are not narrow or tailored to the particular crime or likely offenders. Many citizens are detained, searched, or questioned before they are shown to be innocent of criminal involvement. This can be seen by the innocent citizens and their loved ones as harassment at the worst or simply the bad work of bureaucrats who fail to see the harm they are causing each time they detain an innocent person.

In NYC the police conducted “stop and frisks” on approximately 595,000 in 2009. 90 percent of these people were minorities (Balko, 2010). This aggressive enforcement posture also revealed itself in the steep increases NYPD posted in small scale marijuana arrests which went from less than 1,000 in 1993 to over 40,000 in 2008 (Balko, 2010). Officers themselves complain when they believe that their decision making and discretionary authorities have been diminished in favor of a quota system. Many argue quota systems alienate good citizens disproportionate to the societal good created by

making the arrest. In New York, there is a state law that prohibits explicit quotas in part because; this practice diminishes officer credibility when prosecuting cases that may appear as if they were cited to meet a quota. A high ranking NYPD supervisor was found to have broken this law when he punished officers for failing to meet quotas in 2006. In 2010, this same supervisor was reportedly engaged in similar activity in the 79th Precinct (Parascandola, 2010). An officer from the 81st Precinct has filed a \$50 million lawsuit against the NYPD accusing his supervisors of improper conduct surrounding quotas and mistreatment of officers who resist them (Parascandola, 2010).

D. COMPSTAT SPREAD BEYOND POLICING

Perhaps the most compelling evidence that Compstat is a successful strategic model is the fact that Compstat has spread not only to various SLTLEs across the US. For a variety of reasons, Compstat came to be seen as a practical strategic management plan in other municipal services beyond policing. An adaptation of Compstat renamed the Total Efficiency Management System (TEAMS) was employed in the New York City Department of Corrections. In TEAMS the primary goal was not crime reduction but rather reducing inmate violence and the costs associated with previous management failures. A five year evaluation of TEAMS claimed significant decreases in inmate violence (-93 percent), and staff use of force (-76 percent). Employee morale appeared to improve as sick leave hours taken decreased and costs decreased as the need for overtime went down (Comiskey, 2010). New York City took the Compstat model and used it to coordinate the efforts and resources of 18 different city agencies in the Citywide Accountability Program also known as CAPSTAT (Comiskey, 2010). In 2000, Baltimore's new mayor, Martin O'Malley worked with Jack Maple to design and implement a Compstat inspired model, CitiStat. Originally deployed to address the high costs of rampant absenteeism, the model was expanded to coordinate the efforts and resources of 16 city agencies under the leadership and the direction of mayor's office. With centralized leadership setting the direction, high quality data and analysis driving decisions, an environment encouraging cross agency collaboration, and a sense of accountability to mission performance, Baltimore enjoyed significant gains. Absenteeism

went down significantly as did the overtime costs to address absenteeism. Mayor O'Malley credited CitiStat with saving \$350 million for the taxpayers since its inception. Performance measures at various agencies also went up and CitiStat remained in Baltimore after Mayor O'Malley became Maryland Governor O'Malley. Today the CitiStat model is being employed at the state government level in Maryland and Washington and several other cities have decided to initiate similar programs (Perez & Rushing, 2007).

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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS MODELS

Applying what the literature on strategic management relates to COP, Compstat and ILP can help SLTLE policy makers develop a new strategic management plan for improving the delivery of police services. A new SLTLE strategic management plan should focus on what is practically attainable, and optimizes what has proven effective from previous models. A new SLTLE strategic management plan must also facilitate problem solving across the various contexts, embracing the broader mission goals agencies face today.

A. ANALYSIS OF COP

COP was created out of the red ocean of the traditional model. In that model, the norms of policing had become dysfunctional. SLTLEs had distanced themselves from the communities where they were most needed. SLTLE focus on resource distribution, rapid response to calls for service and arrest as the metrics of success; had resulted in a perception in some communities that they were being policed on rather than protected by the police. Failing to cooperate and collaborate with relevant stakeholders diminished effectiveness and enhanced this dysfunctional perception.

COP is a method by which SLTLEs can be successful in a more complicated context. By applying a more in depth, root cause analysis to crime and attacking the conditions that support the crime, SLTLEs transcend the simple context of being focused solely on response and arrest strategies. By focusing on relationship building and encouraging community members to assist in setting police priorities, SLTLEs improve their ability to scan for emergent problems. By focusing on effective partnerships and innovative tactics like the SARA problem solving model, neighborhood watch, crime solvers, and CPTED, COP allows SLTLEs to implement long term solutions to abate or mitigate long term crime problems. COP is less well suited for the simple context in that it has proven to be less effective than other models at simple crime fighting, and emergency response. There remains a resource and a mission conflict in COP between long term problem solving and the ongoing expectation that the police will respond to

calls for service. While policing has broadened into the complicated context, COP waned due to dissatisfaction over its effectiveness as a crime fighting tool in the simple context. COP is also not as well suited to the chaotic context than Compstat. By flattening the organization, and diminishing the relative importance of hierarchy, COP diminishes an agency's ability to address crisis and resolutely resolve short term problems in a cohesive, coordinated manner. While individual officer may be more able to implement actions at the line level, and citizens may feel more empowered to contribute to hazard mitigation, COP does not strengthen an agency's ability to mobilize large forces in a coordinated manner.

COP had mixed results with respect to building trust. Trust increases in COP with the application of a focus on face to face relationship building. Assigning officers to smaller patrol areas and encouraging them to participate with community members in non criminal enforcement, non- threatening encounters is costly in manpower and time but, does have a positive effect on community trust and officer morale. In that officers expand their personal knowledge of the unique characteristics of a community and apply effective problem solving, they demonstrated the commitment and competence needed to build and maintain trust. Trust is injured however when crime suppression takes too long or is deemed ineffective. Trust is also injured when communities perceive inequity or unfairness. The hiring and promotional lawsuits SLTLEs have faced, is reflective of this. COP did not meet the mandates of the expectancy model. By focusing on the efforts of teams and partnerships rather than identifying clear chains of responsibility and authority, COP diminished expectancy in the line officer and the commander alike. The message that crime can only be resolved through the collective effort of many stakeholders, the individual officer or commander is allowed to claim success even in the face of bad outcomes. The metrics of success in COP are also not closely tied to the outputs that are in the control of individual officers and commanders. Because it is difficult to measure the success of individual officers towards achieving shared goals, the valence relationship is also diminished. In Cop it is both more difficult to single out good performance and reward it and, to single out shoddy performance and mandate improvement. The absence of differential rewards diminishes individual motivation.

COP is clearly a move towards becoming a starfish organization. By increasing the capacity of line level officers to work independently and opening the organization up to various priorities, the traditional hierarchy was weakened and SLTLE organizations moved to reflect a flatter structure. COP contributes to the development of innovative and collaborative problem solving. These same attributes however also contribute to a dissonance with the values of traditional policing that focus on hierarchy, discipline, and crime suppression. COP, well applied, is functional for gathering intelligence and enlisting the cooperation of communities in the all crimes/all hazards environment. Poorly applied, COP can result in dysfunctional norms where the police are forced to decide which laws they will enforce and which one they will ignore.

B. ANALYSIS OF COMPSTAT

Compstat was born in the red ocean of inefficiency and low accountability. Compstat has an impressive track record of success in contributing to the lowering of crime rates. The wide adoption of Compstat across the nation in SLTLEs both large and small gives weight to the argument that it is a scalable management plan that can be adapted to the various needs and capacities of an SLTLE. While there was less evidence that Compstat was functional for the smallest SLTLEs, medium and large SLTLEs appeared able to adapt readily Compstat resource requirements. Some agencies were able to implement Compstat without any additional funding. The practical application of Compstat showed that the software and mapping resources are readily available and that agencies do not need to increase staffing to employ Compstat. The fact that Compstat has spread to contribute to the wider goals of municipal management beyond policing gives emphasis to the argument that Compstat is scalable and adaptable. Compstat reflected the expectancy theory by refocusing officers and especially commanders on their role in diminishing crime. By focusing on the data and showing that rapid reaction to emergent crime problems has a positive effect on diminishing crime, commanders developed a deep understanding of the relationship between their effort and the desired results. Practically applied, however, many Compstat agencies did not see a similar increase in valance. Commanders perceived a much greater likelihood they would suffer negative

consequences for failure than positive rewards for success. Officers often perceived a low relationship between their efforts and differential rewards. This focus on motivation through consequences can be effective but is not a complete management strategy.

Compstat refocuses on the simple context. Compstat emboldens precinct commanders to believe they are able to directly impact crime rates in a way that the COP model did not support. Compstat appears also to be adaptable to the chaotic context. Resolution strategies in the chaotic context rely on rule bound, directive, and authoritarian steps to reestablish order (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Compstat is a strategic management system that is well suited to these needs as perhaps evidenced by the exceptional response of NYPD to the crisis of 9/11. While agencies employing Compstat have shown a remarkable increase in their ability to sense and analyze data; the sensing is narrowly focused on crime data and the analysis is relatively simplistic. Compstat did however mark a significant leap over COP in the ability of SLTLEs to apply objective data to problem identification. Practically applied, Compstat appears to focus on clear cause and effect relationships, and short time lines more consistent with the simple and chaotic contexts than the complex and complicated. The metrics of success in the Compstat model as practically applied add weight to this argument. By focusing on UCR Part 1 crimes almost to the exclusion of other relevant mission goals, Compstat 1.0 diminished the emphasis agencies applied to good outcomes as opposed to good outputs. Instead of including an appropriate emphasis on difficult to measure factors like, diminishing fear of crime or, increasing preparedness for all hazards; Compstat has not adequately incorporated the lessons learned from COP and has not availed itself to the Homeland Security priorities SLTLEs must now accept.

Compstat's focus on leader accountability has contributed to improved performance. The improved performance contributed to a demonstration of competence that increases public trust. Paradoxically research shows that too much emphasis on accountability, while strengthening traditional hierarchies, has also stifled up chain communications and innovations making the environment overly risk adverse. The focus on accountability has resulted in senior leaders reflecting an overemphasis on the present. When commanders pour over data and individual crime reports so that they are not

caught ignorant of a particular fact, they are less able to think strategically, identifying the threats they need to address. Too much attention to minute details contributes to entrained thinking when developing responses. A commander reading individual case reports represents a severe “trust tax” as described by Covey. Trust is further injured when scandals are revealed about inaccurate record keeping, and quota systems.

By focusing on traditional hierarchies and centering accountability and decision making authority in the hands of geographic commanders, Compstat reflects the spider more than the starfish. Compstat however has elements of a starfish model in that the model facilitates the incorporation of open systems theory and organizational learning under the guidance and accountability structure of a central figure (Magers, 2004). While Compstat encourages collaboration and innovation in the model, practically applied, there is little evidence of innovation in problem solving, collaboration or external accountability. Eterno and Silverman put it best when they wrote:

But even great management systems can go astray, and as time progressed, Compstat morphed into a numbers game directed by top-down, centralized control that emphasized the quantity of arrests, summonses, stops and above all- reductions in the seven major categories of crime which were the only crime data reported to the public. Officers were given less room to make intelligent discretionary choices. Activity numbers were idolized. (Eterno & Silverman, 2011)

C. ANALYSIS OF ILP

ILP is well suited to the complicated and the complex contexts. ILP can be especially helpful in addressing organized crime, inter-jurisdictional crime, crime trends and the emergent threat of terror. ILP is effective at sensing and analyzing to expose cause and affect relationships. In the complex context of defending against radicalization and terror, ILP is well suited to help probe effectively for information across a broad spectrum of data points and sources. ILP however appears to be less well suited to address the simple and chaotic contexts. ILP is designed for long term problem solving and requires a significant investment in building analytical capacity and an understanding of rigorous analysis that may be redundant to existing regional and federal intelligence sharing structures. The cost of building the necessary analytical capabilities in the 17,000

U.S. SLTLEs argues against this model being as scalable and adaptable as other models. Most U.S. SLTLEs are forced to remain focused on what they can accomplish with the resources at hand as there is little likelihood of additional resources in these difficult economic times. Many of the challenges SLTLEs face daily do not include the multi jurisdictional, complex investigations ILP is well suited to but rather, rapidly emergent simple criminal events the public expects to be resolved within a short time line. While chaos is thankfully rare in most SLTLEs, the need also remains for the hierarchy and rule bound authority to rapidly respond and restore order. These capacities are not closely matched to ILP. All of these factors contribute to the low level of implementation of ILP in U.S. SLTLEs. While ILP recognizes the need for centralized intelligence and coordination, it cannot be easily characterized as a spider. ILP has elements of a starfish organization in that it encourages partnerships and relationships. ILP can increase trusting relationships with the police when applied well but the risks are clear. When ILP helps officers narrowly target offenders while leaving the innocent protected and unmolested, trust builds as a demonstration of competence. Where intelligence is misapplied and contributes to dysfunctional profiling or aggressive tactics the public sees as low in value while high in intrusive costs, trust diminishes rapidly.

V. BUILDING A BETTER MODEL

A. COMPSTAT 2.0 BUILDING THE BETTER MODEL

Compstat is the dominate model for strategic management in the vast majority of medium and large SLTLEs today. A significant investment in time, effort and credibility went into the work agencies have done to establish a robust Compstat program. Compstat spread quickly, was widely adopted and has transitioned into other municipal service deliveries, not by accident, but because in many ways, it works. The flaws and inherent paradoxes in Compstat 1.0 must however be addressed and remedied if the system is to continue making contributions to SLTLE management. The growing body of knowledge on strategic management and innovation gives this author confidence that a new blue ocean can be found by focusing on what works best in Compstat, and augmenting that with what works best in other models. Taking what has been revealed by this research and, applying the four actions framework to Compstat 1.0.; a new model, Compstat 2.0 can be designed. Any new model must be adaptable and scalable to SLTLEs of various sizes, serving various communities. The proposed innovation must also be relatively easy to adopt, making the best use of the talents, equipment and infrastructure that already is common in the SLTLE community. Compstat 2.0 should retain the elements that make it successful as a crime fighting tool while diminishing the negative leadership behaviors that contribute to dysfunctional accountability and intra departmental competition. Compstat 2.0 should work to enhance the functional relationships, public accountability, transparency, and bonds of trust an SLTLE seeks to share with the community it serves. Compstat 2.0 should facilitate innovation and be adaptable to the various decision making contexts identified in the Cynefin framework.

The tools developed in the Blue Ocean Strategy (BOS) are best suited to describe what Compstat 2.0 will look like, and how it can be implemented. The first step the authors of the BOS suggest is the development of a four actions framework. In this graphic representation one can quickly discern what elements of Compstat are to be

altered and in what ways to form the innovation envisioned in Compstat 2.0 (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In the proposed innovation (Compstat 2.0) police leaders should:

Table 3. Compstat 2.0's Four Actions Framework (After Kim and Mauborgne, 2005)

<p><u>Eliminate</u></p> <p>Competition across geographic sectors Negative leadership behaviors Quotas</p>	<p><u>Raise</u></p> <p>Quality of and Reliance upon Analysis Innovation / Experimentation Cross Group Bureau & Agency Collaboration</p>
<p><u>Reduce</u></p> <p>Past Tense Reporting Focus on Short Term Gains Reliance on outputs as success metric</p>	<p><u>Create</u></p> <p>HSP/ CIP/All Hazards Focus Citizen/Corporate Collaboration Transparency</p>

Knowledge of what should change to create an innovation is important but must be paired with an understanding of how to implement those changes. The grid above is effective at explaining the “what” but does little to describe the “why” or the “how” of a strategic innovation. A good plan can still run aground on the rocks of bad execution and low investment from the line performers. Research in police culture and organizational change has found a “well documented subcultural resistance to police innovations...” (Chappell, 2008). Police in fact are in many ways wedded to maintaining the status quo as a reflection of their success in maintaining order, and preserving the public good.

The first step in overcoming the organizational inertia towards the status quo is to address the cognitive hurdle or, “make people aware of the need for a strategic shift and to agree on its causes” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In the current model, Compstat’s primary purpose is to enhance crime fighting ability. The primary metric of success is the demonstrated ability to lower crime rates especially for UCR Part 1 crimes. Compstat

1.0's emphasis on a clear and inspiring mission has proven functional in that it can inspire public support, raise officer morale, and provide the structure for a unity of efforts. The mission must remain clear, unambiguous, and inspirational in Compstat 2.0. The mission also must reflect that the context of policing has changed since 1994. This is the strategic shift that an SLTLE leader must focus on when designing a new shared understanding of the mission in his/her SLTLE. The lessons learned from COP and from the mandates of the NCISP make it clear that agencies should adopt a mission that includes a broader focus. In addition to maintaining a strong commitment to traditional crime reduction, it is clear that maintaining the public's trust and reducing the fear of crime are also critical to the performance of an agency. A Compstat 2.0 agency must also reflect the priorities of contributing to homeland security by enhancing hometown security. In the modern era, the police must embrace that they play a significant role in reducing their community's vulnerability to terror, and disaster. A leader seeking to implement Compstat 2.0 must overcome the cognitive hurdle that lowering crime is the only metric by which police success should be measured. A lower homicide rate provides little security in the event of a terror attack, epidemic, or natural disaster. Preparedness for all hazards, increasing the capacity of an agency and the community to address longer term more complicated or complex problems, increasing the quality of life for all, are noble and functional organizational goals that can be achieved and all work towards the ultimate goal of safer communities.

A leader seeking to implement Compstat 2.0 must also overcome the cognitive hurdle of reliance on increased internal accountability as the primary method to improve performance. While it is clear that Compstat 1.0's focus on internal accountability was highly functional in motivating geographic commanders to focus on the crime fighting effectiveness the paradox of dysfunctional accountability must be addressed and overcome in Compstat 2.0. Compstat 1.0 was formed in part because there was an insufficient sense of accountability for and, interest in crime trends amongst senior police leaders who did not feel their career progression was related to the crime fighting efforts of those under their command (Weisburd, Greenspan, Mastrofski, & Willis, 2008). When subjected to dysfunctional accountability commanders have been found to engage

in two distinct behaviors that are paradoxical to the larger purpose of Compstat as a crime fighting tool. Commanders restrict the availability of resources they control for distribution to other commanders while asking for more resources from their peers. Commanders sensing that they are judged on and held accountable to crime trends and the rapid resolution of criminal problems do not see an incentive in making their manpower or other resources available to assist other commanders. Further, sensing an immediate need to address the problem before being held accountable for it creates an incentive to apply traditional responses merely because they are easy to implement and have seemed to work in the past. Compstat has the capacity and is designed to support evidence based problem solving and innovation but, in the main, has been practically applied in a way that controls rather than empowers decision makers (Walsh & Vito, 2004). Freedom to experiment and innovate in the design and application of police responses to crime problems requires a certain tolerance for failure. Compstat 2.0 must maintain a functional level of internal accountability while developing a greater level of external accountability.

Overcoming the cognitive hurdles that allowed dysfunctional levels of accountability to emerge and persist will require the innovative leader to demonstrate to the key stakeholders, clear examples that demonstrate how dysfunctional norms diminish the tolerance for failure associated with innovation favoring instead a reliance on traditional responses, and establishing a self fulfilling cycle of diminished innovation. While this can prove embarrassing to the leaders who have fallen into these patterns, emphasis must be placed on establishing the link between dysfunctional accountability in various departments and an organizational culture where leaders are risk adverse, reluctant to innovate, all to the detriment of organizational flexibility. Evidence that an over emphasis on accountability has produced in officers and police leaders alike certain ethical and performance dilemmas must also be made clear. Simply as a method to manage the risks associated with lawsuits, and the loss of public trust, Compstat 2.0's emphasis on eliminating dysfunctional accountability should be compelling.

Some may argue that diminished innovation and organizational flexibility or even the disputed potential for under reporting, are not nearly sufficient incentive to senior

leaders to accept and embrace strategic change. Some argue that the crisis has to be real and significant to motivate past the status quo. It is likely however that senior leaders can be sufficiently motivated by the desire to avoid the pitfalls seen in other agencies. A SLTLE leader can additionally motivate kingpins in the agency and engage in tipping point leadership by focusing on the disproportionate consequences of failing to embrace the post-9/11 mandate that local police departments assume an ever growing role in CIP, increasing the ability to sense and collect information relevant to homeland security (HS), and in increasing the capacity to respond to an HS crisis or mass casualty. This is not a zero sum gain argument however as no serious SLTLE leader can eschew crime fighting without endangering the community in the near term. The emphasis in Compstat 2.0 should be on a mission that expands the traditional and well accepted goal of crime fighting into the new context. When done with forethought, crime prevention is good terrorism prevention (Peterson, 2005). While relatively little empirical research has been done on the effectiveness of SLTLE counterterrorism efforts, (McGarrell et al., 2007) there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that SLTLEs can have an impact on certain crimes at the local level that are precursors to terrorist activity. Research on various terrorist attacks has shown that there is often a pre incident period of surveillance where suspicious activity can be detected, that a significant number of the offenders live within a short distance of the target location and that many of the offenders have had previous encounters with law enforcement (McGarrell et al., 2007). To facilitate their larger agenda, terrorists often engage in crimes SLTLEs are already familiar with such as weapons violations, document fraud, land use violations, motor vehicle offenses, and bias based violence.

If the department must assume new and substantial duties and the goals that align with those duties, the performance management structure must also adapt. An SLTLE leader cannot remain rooted in the perspective that the health department is solely responsible for epidemic preparations, Emergency management for natural disasters, and the FBI for counter terrorism. Compstat 2.0 must accept a mission orientation that focuses on the multi agency unified purpose perspective. SLTLEs in Compstat 2.0 must find and exploit the areas of intersection where their unique capacities and resources can

enhance the mission effectiveness of the other agencies dedicated to Homeland Security. The more an organization responsible for a variety of important tasks focuses its limited resources on only one goal, the more likely it is that the goal will be met with disaffection among those whom it is intended to most inspire (Willis et al., 2003). Assuming new roles and duties as an agency is a reasonable segue to explore what changes in management structure, performance metrics and procedures would facilitate accomplishing more with the same resources.

Overcoming the resource hurdle is the next step in the implementation process described in the BOS. It would be unreasonable to assume an innovation in strategy will be heralded by a significant increase in resources especially during these difficult times. Any successful plan to strategically innovate will, by necessity account for where the resources come from and how they will be spent. The elements of the proposed innovation described in the four actions grid above all can be accomplished with very little new equipment. Staffing of course will be a concern as many agencies are already operating under hiring freezes or layoffs. As Compstat 2.0 calls for more innovation, problem solving, long term focus, and evaluation; there will be friction with the current burdens of calls for service (CFS). Officers cannot be expected to continuously bounce from a reactive stance where any task can be interrupted by the next CFS, to a proactive deliberative posture. Splitting a patrol division into a squad that handles the CFS and a squad that handles the patrol based responses to emerging criminal behavior would allow both the CFS and the Compstat missions to be accomplished but could create an increase in the work each CFS officer is tasked with proportional to the number that left the CFS squad. This resource hurdle should be addressed with a proposal to lessen the CFS burden generally by restricting the types of calls that will require an officer go by in person. This is in line with the COP model and can take advantage of various technological advancements in the field such as web based crime reporting. Many cases can be handled remotely and many victims want nothing more complicated than a report number to provide their insurance.

Compstat 2.0 should increase the level of training, and expertise for analysts. While officer training to understand and incorporate the principles of Compstat is critical

to success, this training will cost little more than time. The NCISP recommends a two-hour block of training to familiarize line level officers with the basic principles and best practices (Peterson, 2005). Hiring and training analysts to a high standard will be more costly. Analysts are a critical component of any successful Compstat plan. Analysts in Compstat 2.0 must be able to distill crime data, informant debriefs, citizen input and previous lessons learned in the intra jurisdictional context. By distinguishing hot spots from, crime trends or patterns analysts help decision makers apply the tactics best suited to the emergent crime challenges. Decision makers in Compstat 2.0 must also receive training better understand how analysts can contribute to effective decision making, diminishing the dysfunctional behaviors that contribute to an incident based focus and a lack of innovation. Standards for analyst and leader training have already been developed and can be found in the NCISP's "Core Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for United States law Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies" (Peterson, 2005).

While analysts in Compstat 2.0 must maintain a focus on tactical intelligence geared towards the development of evidence and case resolution; they must also develop the capacity to contribute to strategic intelligence focused on risk assessment, and threats. This perspective is in line with the mandates of ILP and will help guide decision makers in resource allocation and longer range planning. The SLTLE leader should not push political leaders to acquire an expensive tactical response capability to the exclusion of addressing a more likely and more devastating threat from natural disaster. Cost benefit and risk based analysis are critical components of strategic planning in Compstat 2.0. By developing a threat focus, analysts also contribute to efficiently tasking the intelligence gathering efforts of line level officers. With the ability to communicate threat information, analysts can participate in the intelligence tasking process that initiates the intelligence process. Specific tasking for information guides the efforts of officers in the field who are best able to scan for and report on suspicious activity. Officers thus empowered are far more likely to gather relevant data and report that data more efficiently than when guided only by the most general of instructions.

It would be resource prohibitive to expect that most SLTLEs would be able to staff an office of analysts sufficiently trained and resourced to meet all of the needs for information envisioned in Compstat 2.0. Reflective of the lessons learned in COP, Compstat 2.0 requires analysts to engage in effective partnerships. Analysts focused on threats and vulnerability can provide valuable information to citizens and private industry. Law abiding citizens have proven the value of COP based tactics like the Amber alert, Neighborhood Watch, and Crime Solvers program. When given accurate and timely information about the behaviors they should be vigilant for and a mechanism to report those behaviors, citizens often behave in a way that protects their community. A hotline tipster relayed valuable information to the NYPD that contributed to the apprehension of Sharawar Siraj in 2004 for his role in planning a bombing in New York (Comiskey, 2010). Consistent with the guidance in the *Speed of Trust* (Covey & Merrill, 2006), an agency that develops credibility with members of a community can expect to receive more cooperation and support from that community. A study conducted in several U.S. cities concluded that effective information sharing and COP tactics resulted in Muslim's being more likely to share information with local police than with Federal authorities (Paris, 2007).

Communicating threat based information with members of private industry can also be highly effective in protecting our nation's critical infrastructure. Empowering private security to be vigilant for the specific threats they are likely to face increases deterrence and decreases vulnerability. For some time now, law enforcement has shared threat based intelligence with targeted members of the private sector to diminish the opportunities for criminal activity. The meth watch program calls on merchants to be vigilant for and report on the suspicious purchases of precursors to the production of dangerous drugs. Banks have long operated with suspicious transaction reporting requirements in an effort to diminish the opportunity for money laundering and organized crime. Today, the NYPD operates the "Shield" program to coordinate the efforts of private business interests in protecting the community from terror threats. Landlords,

doormen, parking lot attendants, wire transfer businesses, security guards and others regularly received updates targeted to their field and have a mechanism to relay information about suspicious activity (Comiskey, 2010).

The resource hurdle associated with the expanded role of analysts in Compstat 2.0 is not insurmountable. Compstat 2.0 does not envision that many SLTLEs will be able or willing to develop a robust inter-jurisdictional capacity. Instead, Compstat 2.0 should take advantage of the regional and federal intelligence sharing mechanisms that already exist. The U.S. Department of Justice administers six Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS). An RISS facilitates the exchange of criminal intelligence across SLTLEs and federal agencies, provides analytical support for multijurisdictional criminal investigations, and provides intelligence products as needed by member agencies. Over 7,000 SLTLEs already participate in an RISS (Peterson, 2005). In 2003, the FBI's, Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system was integrated with RISS to facilitate the exchange of Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) information to SLTLEs nationwide. The DEA provides regional support to SLTEs, conducting drug investigations by developing intelligence products and maintaining a national pointer system (NDPIX) to link investigators targeting the same offender or pattern of criminal activity (Peterson, 2005). In addition to these resources, SLTLEs can collaborate with one of the 72 Fusion Centers (FC) nationwide. FCs "incorporate the various elements of an ideal information and intelligence sharing project [achieving] a unified force among all levels of law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies such as fire, health, transportation, and the private sector" (Comiskey, 2010). FCs today are adopting the all crimes all hazards approach that is most useful for SLTLEs of various sizes. The Colorado FC has distinguished itself by providing threat management and intelligence coordination amongst the various agencies tasked with supporting the 2008 Democratic National Convention and collaborating successfully with the FBI in the successful resolution of the Zazi terrorist threat. (Comiskey, 2010) The National Fusion Center Project Management Office has also developed new and more functional guidelines for suspicious activity reporting for SLTLEs. These new guidelines have been endorsed by the ACLU. By coordinating the collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence within the

boundaries of Federal regulations and best management practices as expressed in 28 CFR part 23, FCs protect SLTLEs and citizens alike from the abuses that have brought scandal to agencies in the past, while providing a robust intelligence and threat assessment capacity few SLTLEs could duplicate with the resources they control.

Compstat 2.0 envisions that the resource hurdle will also be overcome by focusing on the mutual benefits of other partnerships beyond intelligence sharing. Participation in the FBI JTTF provides a tactical and investigative support mechanism most SLTEs cannot duplicate. The NY JTTF proved its value in 2009 when they collaborated with the NYPD to arrest several suspects, intent on bombing Jewish houses of worship in the Bronx (Comiskey, 2010). Instead of encouraging the JTTF to act independently of the various SLTEs that support it with staffing, Compstat 2.0 envisions regular meetings between the SLTLE senior leadership and the JTTF so that tactical and strategic intelligence can be shared, taskings assigned and feedback shared. This model would closely resemble what others have referred to as Fedstat (MacDonald, H., Use Compstat Against Terror, 2001). Modeling what has been shown to work in Baltimore's City stat and in various programs such as Boston's Ceasefire, other government and non government stakeholders would be regularly invited to Compstat 2.0 meetings to collaborate in priority setting exercises, the setting of intelligence taskings, and the design of cooperative plans to resolve larger scale crime, safe community, and quality of life issues. While the agencies invited will be specific to the problems addressed, the priority of collaborating in an environment of shared accountability and evidence based problem solving will be wholly embraced by Compstat 2.0.

To overcome the motivational hurdle, Commissioner Bratton of the NYPD was commended for his ability to make the geographic commanders the *kingpins* in the organization using their success or failure within Compstat as a marker for others to follow (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). While this practice was successful in many ways, the implementation of Compstat 2.0 should focus on a different method to engage and motivate mid and line level workers. Research has shown that the sense of accountability and ownership geographic commanders perceived in the current Compstat model does not translate down to line level officers or even first line supervisors (Willis et al., 2003).

Compstat is often perceived by these officers as an exercise for the brass but not closely tied to the work they do. The implementation of Compstat 2.0 will require additional in house training for line officers in the principles of Compstat, the plan and should additionally call for a regular rotation of line level and supervisory officers to present briefings and engage in feedback sessions at the Compstat forum. Geographic commanders should demonstrate down chain modeling of Compstat 2.0 in their home commands and expect the same down chain modeling from the supervisors assigned to them down to the line level. While officers may come to understand the concepts inherent in Compstat 2.0, it will be little more than an academic exercise if Compstat remains seen as the realm of management only. Officers in Compstat 2.0 should have an understanding as to how allocation and tactical decision are made and how to follow up on any lessons learned. Officers engaged in regular Compstat meetings will have a broader understanding of crime throughout the City and in their areas of patrol and will sense a closer kinship to the responses that were devised at the previous meeting. This information will increase the level of investment they may demonstrate through the application of various tactics including; SAR reporting, debriefings, traffic enforcement, false document interdiction, vandalism, etc. By incorporating these outputs in the metrics of success for Compstat 2.0, there will be a clear reflection of the priority to develop intelligence proactively.

To overcome the political hurdle in the implementation of Compstat 2.0 will be primarily the task of the chief. The chief should call together a meeting of various high level stakeholders, to examine the innovation with a cynic's eye. These stakeholders will almost certainly include the Mayor and members of City Council. Members of civic groups, law enforcement, and labor groups should also be invited to weigh in with their concerns. The changes proposed in Compstat 2.0 would impact police service delivery and thus must be shared with representatives of the community before implementation. While the chief could simply order it, information and explanations provided to the public go a long way towards reducing anger, distrust and confusion at a later date. Additionally, various members of the public and the business community should be invited regularly to Compstat 2.0 meetings. In this forum, private security will be able to

share information and describe concerns about security that may be entirely relevant to police work. Businesses will receive information about disaster preparedness and can be canvassed for information about larcenies and vandalism. The public can influence greatly the formation of priorities for the department much as is common with community policing. The relationships built over time, and fostered by productive cooperation will almost certainly contribute to the collection and dissemination of critical information about suspicious activity in line with the ILP. The accountability and clear lines of authority in Compstat 2.0 will keep different work groups on task and, transparent follow up/lessons learned component will ensure that accountability and credit go to the right people and foster a commitment to continuous improvement. Political leaders who endorse Compstat 2.0 will be instrumental in making interagency partnerships functional. While the SLTLE chief has little authority to demand accountability from other agency heads or federal authorities, political leaders who understand the larger goals and the functionality of Compstat as a management tool will be able to provide appropriate guidance and support when conflicts arise.

Taking the Cynefin framework into account, one could surmise that Compstat 2.0 must guard against complacency in the application of standard responses to routine challenges, foster debate from a diverse collection of experts, encourage collaboration, and remain vigilant for the emergence of best practices from unexpected sources. A Compstat 2.0 that takes the best of what exists currently in Compstat, diminishes or eliminates the ineffective elements and blends in the most productive elements of Community Policing and the ILP model; is likely to prove a powerful combination when challenges face the organization in a complex context. By encouraging the participation of other stakeholders in the innovative Compstat process, better use of experts can be made and innovation can be encouraged. Where the problem is properly identified as complicated or complex, the framework will allow for a more deliberative and analytical response that allows for patterns to emerge over a longer course of time so that the best interventions can be applied.

A strategy canvass, comparing the current state from the proposed state envisioned through a strategic innovation can be a powerful tool to help illustrate the point.




Figure 10. Compstat 2.0s Strategy Canvass (After Kim and Mauborgne, 2005)

This simple canvass speaks to what an SLTLE leader should focus on. The canvass has no numerical scale because the focus should be on the big picture and not the numbers. This canvass shows that a clear mission and internal accountability are highly valued in Compstat 1.0 and should remain so in Compstat 2.0. The quality of analysis, innovation in patrol tactics, and experimentation can be emphasized in the new model when the focus shifts from negative leader behaviors, cross command competition, and reporting on events that have already occurred. Compstat 2.0 should align commanders with the importance of quality analysis as a tool for proper resource allocation and the

development of problem solving strategies. The leader of a Compstat 2.0 strategy must also reflect priorities in SLTLE service delivery beyond crime control. This can be accomplished with relatively simple changes in the structure of the questions asked. Instead of allowing commanders to report in the past tense on crime control measures that have already occurred and metrics that focus on lowering only UCR part 1 crimes; the commander should be asked different questions.

B. PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND METRICS FOR COMPSTAT 2.0

While there has heretofore been a great deal of theory and research discussed in this theses, a brief summary of practical recommendations for the SLTLE leader in Compstat 2.0 can also provide insight into how the model would offer added value and functionality when compared to Compstat 1.0.

In Compstat 2.0:

1. Commanders are no longer expected to report solely on objective measures of crime statistics and anecdotal reflections on significant arrests. Commander reports instead are centered on how their analysis of that and other data informs their planning for the threats that face them in the coming period. Commanders should be expected to report on how what they know about the community's input, traffic safety data, calls for service, quality of life issues, and crime data, is affecting the problem solving strategies they are proposing. They should be expected to demonstrate how that knowledge informs and guide their priority setting. The Chief would align commander reports in the context of his/her priorities and provide feedback. This is more reflective of the intelligence process and the ILP model but retains the structure and accountability mechanisms that have proven functional in Compstat 1.0. Commanders should be expected to report not on the problems that have been fixed but on the problems they expect to face so that resource allocation decision can be made in the light of the challenges faced by each geographic command. The expectation that commander reports will provide evidence of innovation, an examination of best practices, and a focus on learning will guide commanders away from the paradoxical behavior that has to date impeded effectiveness.
2. Cross command collaboration and the intelligence gathering process will be enhanced when the Compstat 2.0 report expects a briefing, not on the arrest that was made but, on the information that was gained from that

suspect and how it was shared with other commands that could make the most of it. The robbery arrest in this model will be less valuable than the debrief that provides narcotics information for the next arrest. The suspicious call for service will not be as valuable as the SAR that was generated and shared with the JTTF. The commander that incorporates the efforts and resources of an outside agency such as the probation office, into the larger problem solving strategy will be praised while the commander that ignores the synergy this cooperation offers will be addressed. When Compstat 2.0 is perceived measure productive collaboration that collaboration will increase just as crime control increased in Compstat 1.0.

3. Compstat 2.0 should also give greater emphasis to post arrest or non arrest tactics that have proven effective in other management models including problem oriented policing, and community oriented policing. Outcomes measured in the reduction of fear of crime, quality of life and increase traffic safety should also factor as important metrics of success for commanders in Compstat 2.0.
4. Compstat 2.0 must also incorporate a priority on the all hazards mission. Commanders should not only be expected to remain cognizant of emergent crime problems; but also vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and preparedness for hazard response and mitigation. Commanders in Compstat 2.0 will report on the state of preparedness and vulnerability assessments in their respective areas. This report should not encourage redundancies but rather, effective collaboration with regional, state, and federal authorities, private industry, citizen groups, and the media. By making all hazards preparation a component of Compstat reporting, commanders will be more likely to embrace this priority and find ways to bring credit to themselves by demonstrating effective collaboration. The metric for this component of success can be measured in diminished vulnerability of critical infrastructure or the demonstration of greater preparedness. Regular exercising to build response and mitigation capabilities can dramatically increase preparedness, condition the public to increase resilience, and diminish fear or panic in the event of a chaotic event.
5. The transition to Compstat 2.0 will require a strong commitment from a leader that embraces the challenge of charting this new course. The focal leader must also address expectancy and valence issues. Differential rewards must be visibly applied in a manner consistent with reasonable expectations. Vigilance will be required to guard against the dysfunctional norms described in Compstat 1.0. Feedback from commanders and line level officers will be functional for the senior leader in guarding against dysfunctional accountability.

6. Effective implementation will require the buy in and support of community members, politicians and the police themselves. Bringing a high degree of transparency to the Compstat process by inviting these stakeholders to participate regularly will increase the likelihood of this buy in. Collaborating with the various governmental agencies that have a stake in quality of life and crime control issues will enhance effectiveness in problem solving. Sharing information with the business community about criminal threats and infrastructure protection needs in the Compstat forum can inspire a productive exchange and ongoing collaboration. Responsibly sharing information about resource limitations and allowing community members input in police priority setting can pay large trust dividends, fostering productive information gathering. Convincing politicians that this system is cost effective and can be implanted throughout municipal government will garner their support when political barriers impede progress. While nothing herein is proposed to be easy, the need to improve Compstat is clear backed by a body of compelling evidence. The principles of strategic management and innovation have proven to be successful and have clear application to improving Compstat. The challenges may be significant but they are not insurmountable.

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