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“U.S. Presence in Africa: Preserving National Interests and Competing with China to Achieve Strategic and Defensive Objectives”

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The content of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of the Defense.

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ABSTRACT

U.S. interests in Africa are geostrategic, economic, political, and humanitarian. A knowledge and awareness of Africa's strategic importance are essential to the military profession both as tactical operators and as operational planners. This research examines the preservation of United States interests and successful achievement of national security and defense objectives as they relate to Africa. Additionally, this research advances the idea that as China arguably exercises unconditional foreign policy in Africa to build political allies and garner natural resources to fuel its aggressively growing economy, the U.S. needs to utilize all instruments of national power to broaden its involvement with Africa or risk endangering U.S. interests and failure to achieve objectives of U.S. national security and defense.

This research begins with a brief overview of the current National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) and their applicability to Africa. The intent of this research is to associate the objectives of national security and defense with ongoing issues in the various key regions of Africa. A portion of the research provides an overview of African raw materials and natural resources which are essential to preserving U.S. national interests. Also provided in this research is an analysis of pertinent economic information and a brief overview of applicable historical U.S. policy as it relates to Africa. The research then intends to demonstrate the geostrategic and geopolitical importance to both the United States and the international community of a secure and stable African continent. Furthermore, this study also offers an overview of China's foreign policy in Africa and the resulting challenges for the United States as China seeks to secure access to Africa's extractive industries (i.e., oil, gas and minerals) to meet its growing demand for energy and resources.

Findings and recommendations are provided with regard to specific key areas of Africa where the United States must endeavor to do more (i.e., diplomatically, informational, militarily, and economically) to successfully achieve U.S. national security and defensive objectives. In conclusion, this research demonstrates U.S. national security and a successful national defense strategy rely on increased U.S. involvement in Africa and the balance of regional efforts with China.

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INTRODUCTION

United States engagement in Africa has declined over the past several decades as overall U. S. strategic interests in Africa have become a relatively low priority when compared to the other regions of the world such as the Middle East and south central Asia. For this reason, among others, Africa has not been a primary focal point for the U.S. as it relates to the successful implementation of the National Security and Defense Strategies. Nonetheless, U.S. national security and a successful national defense strategy depend on increased U.S. involvement in Africa and the balance of regional efforts with China.

The establishment of Africa Command (AFRICOM) on 1 October 2008 as the U.S.'s newest regional combatant commander signifies the United States is endeavoring to make considerable strides by investing in Africa in the interest of protecting and furthering U.S. national security interests. However, with a new National Defense Strategy promulgated in 2008 and a Presidential Administration change in 2009, the U.S. must at a minimum maintain its ongoing economic, diplomatic and military efforts while also looking to provide a more genuine effort in Africa to make U.S. strategic investments in the region more enduring and worthwhile. Therefore, even with the uniqueness of AFRICOM being a more concentrated blend of the diplomatic and military elements of U.S. national instruments of power, the U.S. can not settle for AFRICOM as being the apex of U.S. diplomatic and military actions in the region and should instead view the new combatant command as the beginning of increased involvement necessary to bring security and stability to a region vital to U.S. national security interests. To preserve U.S. national security and for the new National Defense Strategy to achieve

success, the U.S. must not only maintain, but also improve its actions in Africa while balancing the efforts of China if it is to remain influential in the region both diplomatically and economically.

As nested in the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) delineates an approach founded on two major pillars. The first pillar being to promote freedom, justice, and human dignity “by working to end tyranny, promote effective democracies, and extend prosperity.” The second pillar is to confront the challenges of the current times by “leading a growing community of democracies.”¹ Both of these pillars speak to reasons for Africa’s importance as it relates to national security and defense. The 2006 NSS endeavors to create a “world of well-governed states” that can essentially provide for the welfare of their citizens and “conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” Through this approach of promoting freedom, human dignity, and democracies, enduring security can best be provided for the American people.²

Using a framework of ends, ways, means, and an inclusion of risk assessments, the 2008 Department of Defense (DOD) National Defense Strategy flows from the President’s 2006 National Security Strategy. The five key objectives of the DOD are Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and Win our Nation’s War.³ Africa possesses U.S. strategic and economic interests which are key to successfully achieving these objectives. Additionally, even as China exercises arguably an unconditional foreign policy of non-interference to build political allies and garner natural resources to fuel its aggressively growing economy, the U.S. needs to

¹ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. *The National Defense Strategy* (June 2008), 1.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 6.

increase political and economic involvement with Africa's nation states or risk losing important U.S. interests in Africa while failing to achieve the objectives of the NSS and the NDS. Furthermore, while the current NDS and NSS do not specifically emphasize the importance of securing U.S. interest through engagement in Africa, these documents do focus on the growing strategic importance of engagement with China. Therefore, it is Africa where the U.S. can engage with China to help pursue stability and security of U.S. national interests. While this engagement with China can certainly be collaborative on various diplomatic levels, the current U.S. - China relations may result in competition rather than cooperation. Thomas Barnett wrote, "China's significant push into Africa in recent years is simply a large-scale version of the 'hit 'em where they ain't' strategy: the West and especially the United States, ignores resource-rich but highly trouble sub-Saharan African, but China cannot afford to be so picky in its trade choices, and so it leaps in the region with development and investment packages galore."⁴ This statement implies China will frequently conduct business with unsavory dictators to gain freedom of access to energy and raw minerals. So, in response to such tactics by China, the U.S. needs to more actively engage on the African continent to guide China's increasing presence in the region in directions that are more beneficial for regional security and stability which subsequently helps preserve the national interests of the U.S.

By reviewing a combination of historical events, the objectives of the existing national strategies (i.e., the NSS and NDS) can be tied to various critical regions of Africa (with much of the focus on the sub-Saharan regions). Additionally, access to African raw materials and natural resources (i.e., the strategic ores and minerals of the

⁴ Thomas Barnett. *Blueprint for Action*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2005), 170.

extractive industries) are arguably a zero sum formula and are vital to securing U.S national interests. Whether it is the effects of a prosperous African tanzanite market on the global war on terrorism or the negative impact of limited access to the markets of the African oil rich nations due to regional conflicts and corruption, the U.S. must not choose inaction, or a reduction in action, at the risk of other nations such as China garnering control of these vital extractive industries. With limits on how much the U.S. can do militarily, all instruments of national power, Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economics (DIME), must be utilized on the African continent in order to achieve the strategic ends promulgated in the existing U.S. National Security and National Defense Strategies.

Chapter I: Strategic Importance and Threats to Security

African is a continent of fifty three nations that has significant strategic importance to the security of the United States. In its most recent Strategic Plan, the U.S. Department of State describes Africa as a region of opportunity and promise, citing the significant increase in the number of democracies over the past decade and continuing trend.⁵ Yet as rich as Africa is in strategic ores and minerals and as important as it is to the war on terror, Africa embodies many challenges which include the pandemic threat of disease, terrorist activity and human rights. Furthermore, fragile states border “fledgling” democracies, vast numbers of people are displaced by conflict, over 350 million live on less than one dollar per day, and HIV/AIDs, malaria diseases overwhelm the continent’s health systems and stymie economic growth.⁶ To secure U.S. vital interests in Africa, free markets, peace, security and economic globalization must prevail. U.S. policies in African are to support political freedom and democracy; to expand economic opportunities and growth; to fight infectious diseases, to end wars and combat terror and violence, and to increase mutual understanding through cultural and educational exchanges.⁷ The U.S. has demonstrated commitment to meeting these challenges through the implementation of initiatives and policies to extend the values of freedom, liberty, and democracy which have been promulgated at the national level via the NSS and NDS. However, active engagement must continue and increase in magnitude if the U.S. is to successfully protect its interest and assist in maintaining regional stability.

⁵ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Acting USAID Administrator / Acting Director of Foreign Assistance Henrietta Fore. *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012* (May 2007), 44.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Claudia Anyaso. “U.S.-Africa Relations: Building Alliances through Trade Education, Culture, Diplomacy, Peace.” *U.S. Department of State* (23 July 2008)
<http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2008/107586.htm> (accessed September 4, 2008).

As mentioned previously, the President's 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) delineates an approach founded on two major pillars. The first pillar being to promote freedom, justice, and human dignity by working to end tyranny, promote effective democracies, and extend prosperity. The second pillar is to confront the challenges of the current times by leading a growing community of democracies.⁸

Released in June 2008, the current National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides the newest national level strategic guidance which informs our most senior military leaders on those National Security Strategy objectives which are to be implemented by the Armed Services. As emphasized in the 2008 NDS, the core responsibility of the U.S. Government is to "protect the American people" and goes on to state that "America shoulders additional responsibilities on behalf of the world... and is to remain a beacon of light for those in dark places."⁹ Under this overarching premise, Africa remains important to successfully achieving the objectives of the NDS and NSS.

The 2008 NDS also states there is no stronger advocate than the United States for those struggling for a "better life" and the U.S. commitment to democratic values must be matched by deeds. The 2008 NDS further explains the United States, our allies, and our partners face a similar range of challenges to include violent transnational extremist networks, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources.¹⁰ Africa is just such a place that these ideals of national security and defense speak to.

Within the strategic environment, the NDS emphasizes the importance of nation states being able to effectively "police themselves" or cooperate with regional partners to

⁸ *National Defense Strategy*, 2008, 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

ensure regional security and that a lack of cooperation and reasonable stability is a “challenge to the international system.” Furthermore, without this lack of regional stability and security, armed sub-national groups, to include violent extremist organization, “threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states” and, if unimpeded, will spread instability to regions of interest to the United States.¹¹ “Addressing this problem will require local partnerships and creative approaches to deny extremists the opportunity to gain footholds.”¹²

Even though Africa has experienced positive change with regard to its political orientation, the continent still faces sobering problems of human rights, freedom of the press, social inequities, transparency and governance. Notably, two thirds of the forty eight sub-Saharan African countries have held free elections with Liberia electing the continent’s first female president. In contrast to these relative successes, are the concerns over the future of seemingly fragile states such as Kenya and failed states such as Zimbabwe. Regardless, U.S. commitment must stay firm in Africa. Initiatives for fighting infectious disease and expanding economic opportunities and growth must prevail and remain substantial. In 2003, under President George W. Bush, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDs Relief (PEPFAR) was established and committed to spending \$15 billion to combat HIV/AIDs in the world’s most high-prevalence countries (twelve of these countries are in Africa). Largely due to PEPFAR, the African regions that once seemed hopeless with regard to controlling of HIV/AIDs, have demonstrated some degree of success. In its first year, PEPFAR reached 42 million women and administered medication to prevent mother-to-child transfer of the disease. With this medication, it’s

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 3.

estimated over 47,000 infant HIV infections have been prevented. Similarly, positive results are also being experienced in the prevention and treatment of malaria, tuberculosis, and avian influenza.¹³

Since the initial commitment of \$15 billion (the largest commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in history) the United States reaffirmed its dedication by signing into law on July 20, 2008, authorization for spending up to \$48 billion over the next 5 years to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.¹⁴ Again, the majority of this money will be spent on the twelve countries where HIV/AIDs threatens the maximum number of people and includes Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. Within most of these countries, rising levels of infection, occurrence of AIDS, deaths and social-political destabilization still persists. However, countries such as Uganda and Senegal have successfully stymied the spread of HIV infections.¹⁵

Although U.S. strategic interests in the African region have seemingly been a low priority, the continent of 53 nations is important because of its geo-strategic location. The enormous continent is adjacent to critical sea lanes of communication to include primary routes for Middle-Eastern oil to Europe, Asia and the United States. For this reason, the African coastal nation states are considered geopolitically important to Western oil-importing powers and their adversaries. Furthermore, the continent's tangential location to the Indian Ocean makes the African littoral states just as important

¹³ Anyaso.

¹⁴ U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. State Department. "About PEPFAR." The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm> (accessed February 15, 2009).

¹⁵ Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman. *More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Towards Africa*. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2006), 66.

to the rising great powers of China and India.¹⁶ With Africa containing nearly a third of the world's sovereign nations, Africa has had more than a nominal role in pursuing a new world order through increased participation in regional conferences, organizations and the United Nations. This engagement seeks to address aid, trade and investment throughout the continent. In pursuing national security objectives, the U.S. has a vital interest in garnering African support and participation in the international arena for such strategic endeavors as the future of oceans, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non-proliferation, energy, and population growth.¹⁷

Although, the role of African's economy in the current economic globalization is arguably relatively small and at one point accounted for only five percent of the world trade, Western European trade and investment in the continent have been at times nearly ten times more than of that of the United States.¹⁸ Africa's extractive industries, including the strategic ores and minerals, have become a key source for the more dependent Western industrialized nations. The Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government's Energy Information Administration reports on Africa and its role in the word energy markets.¹⁹ Of note, both Algeria and Nigeria are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest in the World. Its major consumers of oil include Western Europe and the United States. The third largest producer of oil in Africa is Angola. Its production capacity was forecasted to exceed to 2 million barrels per day

¹⁶ Schuyler Foerster and Edward Wright. *American Defense Policy*. (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 265.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Energy Information Administration. "Country Analysis Briefs-Africa." Department of Energy. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Region_af.html (accessed September 4, 2008).

in 2008. Because of Angola's offshore finds, it has become a key focus of hydrocarbon exploration in sub-Saharan Africa. Natural gas from the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which officially includes Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, has seen a significant increase recently with pending construction plans for new pipelines to Spain and Italy. The AMU is an important producer and exporter of oil and gas transiting the center to southern Europe.²⁰

In northern Africa, Libya is considered a major exporter of oil, particularly to the Europeans regions of the globe. Oil companies have become eager to resume and expand operations in Libya following the lifting of U.N. sanctions in 2003. Even in the tumultuous nation of Sudan, oil production and exports have risen considerably over the past several years. Although current production numbers were unavailable, it was forecasted by the Sudanese Energy Ministry that Sudan would achieve production of 500,000 barrels per day in 2005. The Republic of South Africa is the continent's largest energy consumer and second largest energy producer. Although South Africa has only a small indigenous reserve oil supply, it is a major coal producer and exporter and has a highly developed synthetic fuel industry. Meanwhile, with the completion of a 650 mile Chad-Cameroon pipeline in July of 2003, the African Nation of Chad has become a significant energy producer as well. The new pipeline has also provided opportunities for Cameroon to revive its declining petroleum sector. The Gabon, in sub-Saharan Africa, is the region's sixth largest crude oil producer. However, declines in oil production have created long term concerns about Gabon's petroleum reserves and resulted in the Gabonese government encouraging development of the non-oil sector of Gabon in an effort to diversify its economy. Conversely, the future of energy looks bright for the

²⁰ Ibid.

African nations of Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, and Equatorial Guinea. Increased offshore oil development and discoveries in Congo-Brazzaville have played a more important role in the world energy markets. Similarly, recent discoveries and prospects will result in Equatorial New Guinea becoming one of the key areas for oil explorations in sub-Saharan Africa. Cote d'Ivoire will also see an increasing role in the world energy markets as its oil and natural gas reserves grow and refinery and electricity capacities increase.²¹

Just as important the role Africa plays in the world energy markets are the strategic ores and minerals that mostly lie in sub-Saharan Africa. Access to these mineral deposits is a key strategic concern for the West and the United States. Outside of the former communist regions of the world, over half the production of commodities and critical elements are extracted from the continent of Africa. These include chromium, cobalt, diamonds, germanium, manganese, platinum, and vanadium. While the United States may arguably be less reliant on Africa for these resources due to its own wealth of resources, Europe is largely reliant on Africa for these resources.²² As an example, the Congo possesses such an abundance of copper, diamonds and uranium, by 1959 it was producing almost 10 percent of the world's copper supply, 50 percent of the world's cobalt, and 70 percent of its industrial diamonds.²³ As China's economy continues to outpace most of the worlds, it too will rely on Africa as a critical source for these strategic ores and minerals.

Africa's richness of strategic oil and minerals has not and cannot be the single source for solution on the continent. For example, Equatorial New Guinea obtained its

²¹ Ibid.

²² Forester and Wright, 365.

²³ Martin Meredith. *The Fate of Africa*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 97.

independence in 1968 and has been ruled by the same Nguema Family despite several coup attempts. Under the leadership of the Nguema family, Equatorial New Guinea has become West Africa's third largest crude oil exporter. U.S. investors, which include ExxonMobil, Amerada Hess Corporation, and Marathon Oil invested nearly \$5 billion in 2006 and are projected to double that amount over the next five years. However, despite this, Equatorial Guinea still lacks a suitable police, coastguard, and military capability. Furthermore, the United States remains critical of Equatorial Guinea for its violations of human rights, human trafficking and failure to invest in social spending.²⁴ Ironically, in many instances, the indigenous natural resources that exist in Africa have contributed to creating the numerous challenges that face the continent today. Only with global assistance, including from the United States, can African nations prosper and become economically viable.

In Africa's post World War Two era, the world market values of African commodities and natural resources increased to unprecedented levels. African commodities such as cocoa and copper were in high demand on the world market and resultant prices reflected this. From 1945 to 1960 colonial African economies grew between four and six percent per year. Groundnut production in West Africa doubled between 1947 and 1957. Cotton and tea production grew significantly as well.²⁵ Contributing to these seemingly auspicious conditions was the lifting of government restrictions between 1954 and 1964 and low public debt, which increased peasant output on the average of seven percent per year. Furthermore, global support in the form of Western aid proved substantial. Western Europe and North America together provided

²⁴ Lake and Whitman, 34.

²⁵ Martin Meredith, 141.

more than \$1 billion in aid to the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁶ During the 1970's, Tanzania was the major beneficiary of this aid, receiving more foreign aid than any other African country.²⁷

Meanwhile, South Africa benefitted from increased prosperity as well. In the 1960's, second only to Japan, it experienced one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world. While South African factories grew and the economy continued to industrialize, its extractive industries saw records amount of minerals, in particular gold. This resulted in increased foreign trade with the more developed economic markets of the Western world, a surge in investment competition from the likes of the United States, Britain, France and Germany, and a significant increase in the net flow of annual foreign capital.²⁸ More recently, South Africa plays a key role in supporting the growing demand of raw materials and natural resources to support China's aggressively growing economy. In addition to boosting the transportation infrastructure of South Africa, China's demand for resources has led to a prosperous mining industry as well.²⁹ More specifically, China's recent requirement for several hundred tons of iron ore to placate its extraordinary demand for natural resources provided a stimulus to the South African mining industry and its related suppliers. This stimulus ultimately resulted in the expansion of the South African system of roads and railways and the associated raw materials and machinery.³⁰ Partly as result of the current demand for South Africa's extractive natural resources and its long term economic growth, South Africa has become the "pillar of sub-Saharan Africa, the flow-through point for global foreign direct

²⁶ Ibid., 142.

²⁷ Ibid., 280.

²⁸ Ibid., 412.

²⁹ Barnett, 153.

³⁰ Ibid., 348.

investments on the African continent and the lead goose on technology adoption and network construction.”³¹

Similar to the South African framework, other African nations can utilize the continent’s surplus of extractive resources to develop infrastructure and become economically viable on the global market. The emergence of those regions of the world that are “actively integrating their economies” into the international markets, and “adhere to the globalization’s emerging security” framework, continue to grow the labor force which will seek industries for employment.³² Africa’s wealth of extractive minerals and natural resources can be the source of this industry. However, it must first overcome its fragility and corruption. It is in the best interest of U.S. national security that Africa succeeds in doing this.

A secure and stable Africa is essential to the future of U.S. energy supplies. The United States should seek oil sources outside those of the Middle East in order to help strengthen and protect its strategic interests. With increased levels of exploration and production investment in West Africa (to include Nigeria and Angola) and significant growth in the Gulf of Guinea, the region has become a strategic supplier of crude oil and natural gas to the United States and global energy markets. It is estimated the region has approximately sixty billion barrels in proven reserves. This may seem somewhat insignificant when compared to the reserves of those in the Middle East. However, the global energy market depends on the mid range producers such as Angola and Nigeria to bring stability to global oil prices and reliability of supply as worldwide demand continually increases. Additionally, the more environmentally favorable sweet, low-

³¹ Ibid., 230.

³² Ibid., xvi.

sulfur crude oil from West Africa is more easily transported to eastern shores of the United States for refining and distribution. An estimated \$50 billion has been invested by foreign companies in the Gulf of Guinea's energy sector. With discoveries of offshore oil forecasted to increase and resultant production to increase, the amount of foreign investment will likely grow over the next several years resulting in two to three million barrels per day in new crude oil productions while, at the same time, West Africa establishes itself as a primary global exporter of natural gas. Meanwhile, petroleum development will grow outside of the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa as well. Both Chad and Sudan have become legitimate producers of crude oil and exploration is commencing in Ethiopia and off the shores of Kenya and Namibia.³³

Unfortunately, the exploration, development, and production of these petroleum products do not come without their unique African challenges and vulnerabilities. These challenges and vulnerabilities have prevented West Africa from reaching its full potential to become established African nations with rule of law, free markets and supporters of human rights, which are all values the United States seek to preserve and propagate globally. Unlike the world's other fast-growth offshore energy zones (which include the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, Brazil, and the Caspian), the Gulf of Guinea and neighboring states of West Africa are susceptible to instability and disruption. The root causes of this economic vulnerability originates from corruption, presence of large criminal syndicates (based in Nigeria), organized mercenary groups projecting themselves from South Africa into the region, threat of armed insurgency in Nigeria's Niger Delta, limited regional

³³ Lake and Whitman, 28.

integration and infrastructure (both on land and at sea), weak governmental structures, and potentially several unstable autocratic governments.³⁴

The United States has several strategic interests interrelated to a stable Africa. Its endeavors include “promoting democratic processes, actively promoting growth and reliable petroleum supplies from Africa, combating HIV/AIDS, and curbing global terror.”³⁵ In order for the United States to successfully achieve its strategic interest in the Gulf of Guinea region of Africa, it must utilize a “broad, multilateral approach that balances energy security with democratic governance and transparency, internal stability, equity, environmental stewardship, development, and diversification of energy supply.”³⁶ This energy diversification is what best suits the United States in achieving energy security.

Energy security for the United States is best achieved by establishing and sustaining affordable, stable supply of energies from diverse origins. With oil prices surging to \$147 a barrel in July of 2008, viable efforts that look to expand global exploration and production contribute positively to the energy security of the United States. For this reason, the increased production and exploration of oil and natural gas throughout the Gulf of Guinea is a positive effort the United States should continue to help ensure. From 2005 to 2010, the Gulf of Guinea region will see over \$33 billion in onshore and offshore capital investment with more than 40 percent of this investment coming from companies based in the United States. Additionally, during this same period, it’s likely that one in five barrels of oil that enter the global market will come from the Gulf of Guinea. This will potentially increase its contribution to U.S. imports

³⁴ Ibid., 28-29.

³⁵ Ibid., 29.

³⁶ Ibid.

from 15 percent of 20 percent. Deepwater production in Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea will likely be the source of the majority of the new oil.³⁷

The Gulf of Guinea region is of strategic importance to United States because of the significant amounts of U.S. investment, share of U.S. imports, U.S. citizens who conduct the exploration and production, and the quantity and quality of sweet (low-sulfur) crude. Furthermore, as the United States increasingly relies on imported natural gas to meet the increasing demand for power generation as its own domestic supplies begin to decline, West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea region has become increasingly important to the energy security of the United States. Because of the region's importance, the United States must stay engaged in Africa's oil producing states to mitigate threats to its strategic interests, particularly in the Niger Delta region, where the aforementioned crime syndicates operate large scale crude oil thievery with help from suspected partners within the provincial refineries.³⁸

Crime syndicates consist of well-equipped backed militias that operate autonomously to take advantage of ethnic and economic grievances to garner support from the local populace. An estimated 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day go missing from the world market as a result of oil theft within the Niger Delta region. Using the July 2008 peak cost of oil per barrel (\$147) and the higher estimate of 300,000 barrels per day, over \$44 million a day were lost last summer. With today's average price nearing \$50 dollars a barrel and the lower estimate of 70,000 barrels lost per day, total oil funds lost is approximately \$3.5 million per day or nearly \$1.3 billion per year. Compounding

³⁷ Ibid., 30.

³⁸ Ibid.

the financial cost of this thievery is the likelihood that the stolen energy funds are used to traffic arms and buy political influence in an already fragile government system.³⁹

When President G.W. Bush visited the region in May 2005, Nigerian President Olusegun requested assistance from the United States to combat money laundering, arms trafficking and illegal oil sales. In December 2005, an agreement along these lines was announced between the United States and Nigeria. Unfortunately for Nigeria, and subsequently the surrounding region, progress to date on eliminating the financial crimes and corruption has not been promising. Prosecutions of the adjudicated crimes demonstrate the corruption and oil theft activities have infected senior personnel in the Nigerian Navy and possibly higher ranking officials in various parts of the Nigerian government. Furthermore, the same oil theft that has armed and politicized the region has also resulted in cash flows which have been used by federal and state level officials to maintain political control of the Delta region.⁴⁰

The oil theft, accompanied both with financial and political corruption, make West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea susceptible to terrorist attacks. Therefore, “the threat of terrorist attack in West Africa against U.S. or Western interests is real...Terrorist action in Nigeria would have deeply destabilizing effects on oil production.”⁴¹ An example of these negative effects on the global oil market occurred in 2004 when Nigerian Delta warlord Alhaji Dokubo-Asari made threats against foreign oil workers and caused a spike in oil prices on the world market. Asari, who profited and built his support directly from stolen oil revenues, demonstrated what power his words alone could yield. Other terror threats include those inspired by Islamist militants. These particular terrorist groups

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 31

⁴¹ Ibid.

focus their threats mostly in the northern regions of Nigeria. It is probable that local terrorist groups in the northern regions are supported by radical Islamist groups following Osama Bin Laden's 2003 pronouncement to focus terrorist activities in Nigeria. In doing so, the terrorist groups seek to take advantage of the much criticized Abuja's government close ties with the West and attack "soft targets" such as the foreign constructed infrastructure.⁴² Additionally, terrorist groups contribute to political instability throughout other regions of Africa and the resultant political instability in the oil producing nations is detrimental to strategic energy interests of the United States. Therefore, "U.S. engagements to address the threat of instability will require an expanded and more robust diplomatic presence in each of the target countries."⁴³

Despite the many challenges that face the African oil producing nations, there are very limited signs of progress and hope. In Angola, civil war was ended and constitutional reform, electoral laws and oversight are progressing, albeit slowly. Nonetheless, the first elections since the early 1990's were held recently. Additionally, the diplomatic climate within Angola is improving. Independent monitoring groups have the capability to function; various religious clergy have become more active in lobbying for reconstruction, human rights, accountability and the easing of poverty for most Angolans. More indicative of progress is the judiciary system being used more for proper adjudication and less for repressing and intimidating dissenters.⁴⁴ Angola also continues to refine the management of its oil wealth through cooperation and dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help bring about reforms. However, the entry of the Chinese into the region has provided Angola additional options and

⁴² Ibid., 32.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 33.

economic incentives causing delays in the reforms. For example, in 2004, China agreed to provide Angola a \$2 billion low-interest financial assistance package which has made coordination with the IMF to reach an agreement on economic reforms more challenging.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, despite these financial challenges, Angola has experienced some limited progress. Meanwhile, securing U.S. national energy interests in other neighboring African nations and promoting enduring democratic reform and stability has proven more difficult.

Embedded among the previously mentioned challenges facing Nigeria are the internal ethnic and economic divisions between the Muslim-majority in the north and a largely Christian south. This is not unlike the division between the more rich nations of the Maghreb in northern Africa and the poorer nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption, organized crime, and fragile governments make countries susceptible to exploitation by radical Islamist groups (likely in collaboration with external partners) who desire to discredit or damage the existing government and its external ties. State governments have demonstrated little capacity to distribute its federal revenues effectively and equitably.⁴⁶ These limited capacities to govern and remain stable are critical concerns of the United States as it relates to failed states.

Documents pertaining to U.S. national security strategy have increasingly emphasized the importance of addressing the many threats from nation states that have been described as “weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed.”⁴⁷ These threats which include providing safe havens for terrorist, organized

⁴⁵ Ibid., 33-34.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁷ Liana Wyler. *Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security and U.S. Policy*. (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2008), 1.

crime and other violent extremist organizations undermine U.S. efforts to promote democracy, good governance and economic freedoms by creating conflict, instability, and humanitarian emergencies.⁴⁸ Although no standard definition for “weak state” or “failing state” appears to exist, some analyst surmise a weak state is indicative of its “erosion of state capacity” and its ability to “govern effectively” which can sometime result in the “complete collapse of state power and function.”⁴⁹ U.S. government and government affiliated efforts relate weak and failing states to four major, overlapping elements. These elements include peace and stability, effective governance, territorial control and porous borders, and economic sustainability.⁵⁰

Weak and failing states have become the vehicles for transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation, civil conflict and humanitarian emergencies. As officials and analysts became more aware of the emerging international security environment, in particular after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States increasingly recognized the threats posed by weak states and the danger they pose to our U.S. national security interest. Terrorism, international crime, nuclear proliferation and regional instability are the four key threat areas that can potentially emanate from weak states. Several analyses show that weak or failing states can be ideal for terrorist groups to establish their base of operations. The terrorist groups exploit the little or no law enforcement structure in weak states to further their illicit economic activities for financing of their terrorist activities while providing easy access to weapons and equipment.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., 5.

Within these weak, failing or failed states, exist safe havens for international criminal organizations. These criminal organizations take advantage of unenforced laws and high levels of official corruption to move illicit contraband and launder illegal monies. In recent years, there has been a surge in the number of transnational crime groups emerging in safe havens of the weak, conflict prone states such as those in West Africa. Additionally, in African countries such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, where arm embargoes have been imposed by the United Nations, the criminal groups profit from failing regimes and rebel groups who solicit the service of the ubiquitous illicit arms trafficking networks to fuel regional conflict. There are also links between these transnational criminal groups and terrorist groups. Rebel groups from the West African diamond trade have reportedly worked with Al Qaeda and Hezbollah.⁵²

Weapons proliferation is a significant threat emanating from weak and failing states. Porous borders accompanied with widespread corruption make these states susceptible to becoming transshipment points for illicit chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) trafficking. From 1993 to 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed permeable international borders and feeble international oversight contributed to nearly 1100 nuclear and radiological smuggling cases by member states. Although the majority of the illicitly trafficked nuclear material is allegedly to have originated in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the newest region of considerable concern is Africa, where more than 18% of the earth's extractable uranium resources are located. Fragile governments, ineffective regulations, and secluded mine locations exacerbate the concerns of Africa being utilized as a transshipment point for radioactive substance.⁵³

⁵² Ibid., 6.

⁵³ Ibid., 7.

The National Intelligence Council has acknowledged that failed states and their associated regional influence pose an enormous burden, if not directly, then certainly in measurements of time and resources, to the United States. Recent studies reveal nation states do not necessarily fail or become weak in isolation. The instability of a weak or failing state can spread beyond its borders in the forms of immense refugee flows, arms smuggling, and collapse of regional trade.⁵⁴ Additionally, as a weak or failing state, it is more difficult to improve its status of being an unstable state because of the inability to receive the needed foreign aid to help oneself as a nation. In addition to not being able to meet the requirements for aid programs such as the United Nations Millennium Challenge Goals or qualify for U.S. assistance programs under the Millennium Challenge Act, most weak and failing states do not have the necessary capacity and infrastructure to absorb large amounts of foreign assistance for proper follow-on distribution and allocation. Largely due to this encumbrance, the World Bank reports that fragile states grow only one-third as fast, have 50% higher debt-to-gross domestic product ratios, and double the poverty rates of other low income countries. The World Bank also finds that fragile states tend to remain that way for long periods with the average fragile state lasting about 56 years. Just as concerning, statistics show there is only a 1.8% probability that a fragile state will experience a sustained turnaround.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the U.S cannot waiver on its guidelines, policy or programs in dealing with weak and failing states, especially as they relate to the African continent. As Colin Gray noted, “Literally in every place in the world today that is experiencing serious instability, the United States

⁵⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 9.

is a relevant presence serving the American notion of order, arguably with the lonely exception of sub-Saharan Africa.”⁵⁶

Africa remains a source of transnational threats to the United States and the global community and exists as a welcoming environment for violent extremists. Although the correlation between terrorist organizations and organized criminal elements in Africa has sometimes proven difficult to document, recent studies have demonstrated links between al-Qaeda and the gold and diamond trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and South Africa. Reportedly, terrorists acts have been financed from the sales and resulting profits of tanzanite through criminal organizations serving as fronts for al-Qaeda.⁵⁷ In a published report on transnational terrorist involvement in Africa, Douglas Farah made specific note of Hezbollah and al-Qaeda involvement in the diamond trade of West Africa. The West African countries involved included Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic of Republic of Congo and possibly Angola. He stated that, “While Iranian and Syrian financial and political support is much noted for Hezbollah, the terrorist group also receives a significant amount of support from the Shiite Muslims *diasporas* of West and Central Africa...”⁵⁸ The diamond traders do not work directly for Hezbollah. It is believed the multi-million dollar a year diamond trade is controlled by the large Shiite Muslim population of the local Lebanese community. In 2003, two Hezbollah sympathizers (Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly) were convicted in Belgium for illicit diamond smuggling. These same two convicted criminals also aided al-Qaeda diamond

⁵⁶ Colin Gray. “After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy.” *Strategic Studies Institute* (January 2009): 28. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=902>. (accessed February 25, 2009).

⁵⁷ David Shinn. *Panel on Terrorism and Transnational Threats-Causes and Enablers*. (George Washington University, November 2005), 5.

⁵⁸ Douglas Farah. “Hezbollah’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America.” *International Assessment and Strategy Center* (August 4, 2006). http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=118. (accessed February 5, 2009).

merchants in purchasing and transporting large amounts of diamonds in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the months prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.⁵⁹ It's been reported that al-Qaeda purchased between \$30 million and \$50 million worth of diamonds from the former Liberian President Charles Taylor during the eight month period leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The purchase of the diamonds was a popular laundering method to transfer value from other assets and not solely a business venture for profit. One such business venture was al-Bakarat, a money transfer company that operated throughout Somalia and was successfully shut down by the United States for funneling millions of dollars annually to al-Qaeda⁶⁰

The convicted Aziz Nassour had been the chief diamond expert for the dictator of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, and was selected by al-Qaeda operatives based on his reputation as someone who had the capability to move large quantities of African diamonds to Europe. Nassour, who also had strong political connections, was reported to have smuggled \$25 million worth of diamonds a week from Africa to Europe while operating in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In addition to providing millions in financial resources, the West Africa region, in particular Cote d'Ivoire, is often used as a safe haven for Hezbollah leaders. Hezbollah has targeted parts of Africa for recruitment of militants and the establishment of more radical Shiite imams and mosques to compete with the existing Saudi-funded Sunni *salafist* efforts.⁶¹

Another immense geostrategic important aspect of Africa is its proximity to key waterways and global markets. A key to securing U.S. strategic interest rests with maintaining the ability to operate freely at sea by preventing blockage of vital Sea Lines

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Shinn, 5.

⁶¹ Farah.

of Communication (SLOC) and strategic maritime chokepoints which encompass the continent of Africa. The Gulf of Guinea has been discussed previously as a valuable potential energy source. However, just as important to maintaining U.S. strategic interests in Africa are the regional SLOCs that allow international elements of commerce, energy and defense to flow freely and feed into the surging globalization. These associated African SLOCs and maritime choke points include those oriented to and from the Cape of Good Hope, Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, Suez Canal, Straits of Sicily, and the Straits of Gibraltar. The maritime domain, which includes the world's oceans, seas, coastal areas and airspace above them, supports 90% of the world's trade, transport two-thirds of its petroleum and is the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth. With increased globalization comes potential competition for scarce resources which could encourage affected nations to exert claims of sovereignty over waterways and natural resources important to strategic interest of the United States.⁶²

The use of the maritime domain for criminal purposes has grown as commerce in the global maritime domain has grown. These criminal purposes include the smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband along with piracy and armed robbery against merchant vessels.⁶³ Furthermore, "Piracy and incidents of maritime crime tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity, especially where there is significant political and economic instability, or in regions with little or no maritime law

⁶² U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (October 2007): 4-6. <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf> (accessed February 25, 2009).

⁶³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (September 2005): 5. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf (accessed February 25, 2009).

enforcement capacity.”⁶⁴ The maritime domain associated with the African continent has these described concentrated areas of piracy, most notably off the coast of Somalia.

Demonstrating capabilities to board and take control of large underway vessels, as was the case with the Sirius Star crude oil tanker in 2008, piracy is also utilized to facilitate acts of terrorism. Along these lines of supporting terrorist, the money generated from the trafficking of contraband such as drugs and weapons via these maritime domains contribute to the efforts of international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations. These illicit funds have been used to weaken the framework of fragile governments through bribery of officials, fund illegal activities (i.e., trafficking of weapons and people) and provide various terrorist operations a steady supply of cash as a means to support their clandestine activities.⁶⁵

Maritime piracy, also referred to by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)⁶⁶ as maritime hijacking, has seen a steady rise in occurrence since the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) began reporting on worldwide occurrences in 1992. In its most recent annual report (released January 2008), the IMB shows an unprecedented rise in maritime hijacking in 2008. In total, there were 293 worldwide incidents of piracy which reflects an 11% increase from the previous year (2007) during which 263 incidents of piracy were reported. A total of 49 maritime vessels were hijacked in 2008 with 889 crew members taken hostage. Additionally, there were 46 vessels that reported to have been fired upon with 32 additional crew members receiving injuries, 11 fatalities and 21 missing (presumed dead).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ The IMB is a part of the ICC Commercial Crime Services, which is a specialized division of the world business organization International Chamber of Commerce. International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services. “IMB reports unprecedented rise in maritime hijackings,” International Maritime Bureau, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-rise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (accessed February 3, 2009).

Guns were used in 130 of the piracy incidents. This was an increase from a total of 72 weapons related incidents in 2007.⁶⁷

Understandably, all these incidents of piracy did not occur in or around the territorial waters of the African continent. However, the majority of the increase in piracy incidents can be attributed to the spike in recent attacks in the Gulf of Aden. More specifically, there were 111 piracy incidents reported in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia. The number of incidents in 2008 peaked in September with 19 and then showed a slight decrease with 15 attacks in October and 16 attacks in November. When compared to the data from 2007, this represents a 200% increase of piracy incidents. While worldwide piracy has been a growing problem, the issue of piracy off the east coast of Africa received unprecedented notoriety when pirates from Somalia commandeered a ship full of Russian Tanks and then later a crude oil supertanker (the Sirius Star). The hijacking of the Sirius Star signified the largest oil tanker ever to be hijacked by Somalia pirates, demonstrating that regardless of type, speed, or size, all vessels could be potentially targeted by the increasingly more prepared and better armed pirates.⁶⁸

Despite what has been covered more regularly in the open sources of media, other regions of Africa are notorious for incidents of piracy as well. With 40 reported incidents in 2008, Nigeria (the Gulf of Guinea) is ranked second worldwide. This includes 27 vessels boarded, five hijackings, and 39 crew members kidnapped. The Piracy Reporting Centre reports there are likely another 100 unconfirmed incidents off the coast of Nigeria with vessels in this region often under-reporting. In addition to the waters off the coast of Somalia and Nigeria, pirate attacks near Tanzania (using similar tactics against vessels at anchor) continue to be of significant concern. Near Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), there were 14 vessels

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

attacked, with 12 of these being container ships that possessed cargo targeted by the attackers vice the ship themselves (as has been more the case in the Gulf of Aden). Although the IMB PRC has been collecting data for more than 16 years, it is difficult to determine an accumulative cost of piracy, both worldwide and off the coast of Africa. For now, the IMB can only encourage owners and shipmasters to report all incidents of piracy (actual and attempted) as the first link in the response chain to help ensure adequate global resources are provided by the governments of the international community to address this threat to global security and stability.⁶⁹

As noted, an estimate on the quantitative cost of global piracy is difficult to ascertain. This is partly due to the difficulty of universally agreeing upon what should be included in the calculation (For example, insurance premiums, freight rates, rerouting costs and ransoms). Analysts have suggested that the cost of global piracy ranges from an average of \$1 billion to \$16 billion per year. While this may seem insignificant when compared to an annual global maritime commerce in the trillions of dollars, it cannot be dismissed by nations such as the United States, in particular as it relates to the geopolitical importance of Africa. Equally as difficult to quantify, but just as important, would be the cost of a coordinated attack in the seas near Africa which results in the closing of the international strategic sea lanes of communication through which the globalized world economy and defense depends.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Stephen Hanson, "Backgrounder: Combating Maritime Strategy." *New York Times*, January 28, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slotl_20090127.html (accessed January 30, 2009).

Chapter II: Competition and Cooperation

Throughout the Cold War, the United States was concerned with the Soviet Union exploiting regional instability during Africa's modernization. While China has not directly engaged in conflict on the African continent, as the Soviet and Cuban military did in local conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia-Somalia, the U.S. should observe China's African economic and diplomatic engagements as watchfully as it did the former Soviet Union.⁷¹

The 2008 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the importance of considering "the possibility of challenges by more powerful states." It explains that these states will "actively seek" to counterbalance the strategic and operational efforts in the United States in the various domains of traditional warfare or to "gain an advantage by developing capabilities that offset" those of the United States. Furthermore, the 2008 NDS recognizes some of these potential state competitors are also "partners" in the many existing diplomatic, commercial and security efforts which complicates these relationships even further. The 2008 NDS specifically makes mention of China as being "one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States." Therefore the United States will need to "hedge against China's growing military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security." As a result, the United States' interaction with China "will need to be long-term, multi-dimensional and will require peacetime engagement between defense establishments as much as fielded combat capabilities" to preserve and enhance U.S. "national advantages over time."⁷²

⁷¹ Forester and Wright, 265.

⁷² *National Defense Strategy*, 2008, 3.

More simply stated, China is a growing power whose efforts in Africa cannot be overlooked as they relate to preserving global and regional stability. In support of this concern, Colin Gray stated, “Rising states such as China and India are on a collision course with each other and possibly the United States.”⁷³

China has experienced three decades of transformation and growth, bearing little resemblance to the China that existed in the Cold War. Relations between the United States and China varied significantly for nearly a century and a half. At times China and the United States have been allies sharing common interests against a common foe such as Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union spanning the decades from the seventies to the eighties. Conversely, diplomatic relations were different in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became the ruling party of mainland China. Epitomized by military conflict in the Korean War, the decades spanning from the fifties to the sixties saw China and the United States as staunch enemies. As China has experienced unprecedented economic growth and national development, the status as enemy to the United States has evolved to strategic partner and stakeholder. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), energy crisis and preservation of the global environment are threats shared by both the United States and China. Therefore, it is often accepted that as arguably two of the most prominent members of the international community, the United States and China can be collaborators vice competitors in the international community to create greater global security and stability.⁷⁴

⁷³ Gray, viii.

⁷⁴ David Kay, “Engaging the New China.” *National Security Watch*, NSW 08-3 (September 2, 2008), 1.

Both China and the United States benefit from an increased international stability and security. However, it should be fundamentally recognized that despite commonality, China cannot be expected to frequently support the United States on many issues. Therefore, “it is important to realize that China is neither always an enemy nor always a friend, and that we must see China for what it truly is and how we want it to be.”⁷⁵ The Chinese political system remains authoritarian and the domain of the Communist Party. A Communist Party which continues to suppress political dissents, stifles freedom of the press, and rejects democracy.⁷⁶

Throughout the 1990’s, China aggressively increased its petroleum production of oil and natural gas to keep pace with its rapid industrial growth. To meet its growing requirement for electricity in the decade prior, China constructed coal mines and updated the nation’s power grid system. Although portions of the country still experience power outages, China is now more prepared to provide power to the newly erected factories and office buildings resulting from its unparalleled economic growth and development. China’s modernization efforts include plans to build enough nuclear plants to triple their power generation by the year 2020. In addition to an improved electrical power supply system, China invested in its infrastructure to increase the efficiency of transporting goods both domestically and internationally. Most notable of these infrastructure enhancements was the building of their highway and road system. From 1989 to 2010, China is forecasted to increase its miles of expressways from 168 to 40,000 with 55,000 miles of highways reached by 2020. This increase in accessible roadways allow goods once constrained to only local provinces to be shipped to distant provinces or ports for

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Robyn Meredith, *The Elephant and the Dragon*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008), 31.

shipping overseas. Additionally, the people of China have become capable of driving between cities, producing demand for automobiles, hotels, and the occasional roadside fast food western meal. Without these improvements in infrastructure, the Chinese economy would not have experienced its current economic growth.⁷⁷ Furthermore, this economic growth has not come without challenges. One of the most significant is the ability to secure global sources of energy which has led to a more aggressive presence by China throughout the continent of Africa.

China's oil consumption has doubled since 1994 and is second only to the United States as a consumer of oil. With its estimated one billion more citizens, China consumes 7.3 million barrels per day, of which 3 million barrels days are imported. This increase in consumption represents an increase of approximately 5 million barrels per day from 1980 to 2006.⁷⁸

China's 2008 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was forecasted by the World Bank to be at 9.8 percent. By 2020, China's GDP is forecasted to surpass that of the United States. The strengthening concepts of Chinese capitalism, accompanied with a weakening primacy on the rights of the labor force, demonstrate that China, while still a communist state, show signs of shifting of a one party impetus as a guiding national force to those of nationalism and economic growth. Through this fairly new found nationalism, the CCP has seemingly reinvented itself to deflect criticism and refocus the attention towards the impediments caused by foreigners interfering in China's internal affairs. China once accepted that it was the center of the world and existed as the Middle Kingdom until the destructive influences of the colonial powers and Japan ravished the

⁷⁷ Ibid., 27-28.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 162-164.

nation. Because of this history, ideologically, the Japanese represent the greatest nemesis to the Chinese people with the United States being next in succession.⁷⁹

China's foreign policy consist of three underlying strategic objectives: 1) maintaining the "One China Policy" with regard to Taiwan as an integral part of China; 2) improving China's political, economic and security in the greater Asian area; and 3) building relationships with states around the globe to enhance China's image and influence to ensure the supply of strategically vital raw materials and the flow of Chinese exports. In regards to Taiwan, China continues to view a threat to its sovereignty as a serious threat and the issues related to Taiwan remain as driving forces with China's foreign policy. Because of its own sensitivities to Taiwan and Tibet, it distances itself from any foreign affairs resembling separatist movements and the intervention of other states into a sovereign nation's internal affairs. To better delineate this approach, China pronounced its adherence to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" as it relates to noninterference with the internal affairs of other states. These Five Principles of Coexistence are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In parallel with these five ideals, China strongly opposes what is refers to as the "Three Evils" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. China's diplomatic approach to Kosovo can be viewed as an example of China's implementation of this foreign policy guidance. In this instance, China viewed the state of affairs in Kosovo as an internal issue of the ruling government and remained in opposition to any NATO bombing of Serbia out of concern it may provide creditability

⁷⁹ Kay, 2.

to violent opposition from oppressed minority groups in the struggle for independence from a national government.⁸⁰

The political goals of China focus on garnering support from African nations for China's political, economical and trade concerns. Most noteworthy of these being to propagate its one-China policy and continue to isolate Taiwan in the international community.⁸¹ For decades now, China has utilized its diplomatic and economic instruments of power to sway nations to discontinue relations with Taiwan. At times, if a country did not sympathize with China's view and its One China policy, China would retaliate with effective use of its available national instruments of power. For example, after Guatemala neglected to sever ties with Taiwan in 1997, China vetoed a United Nations mission to send peacekeepers to Guatemala after a civil war had ravaged much of the country. Similarly, large western corporations have been made aware of the ramifications for continued business with Taiwan. Recently, Boeing was warned by China that if the aircraft company continues to do business with Taiwan in the form of selling military technologies, China would refuse to purchase any of its commercial airliners, an action indicative of a China that is willing to use its ascending economic instrument of power to achieve its own national strategic objectives.⁸²

With 44 out of 48 sub-Saharan African countries not maintaining official relations with Taiwan, China considers their approach successful in achieving its goal. Additionally, China will support policies that are beneficial to both the Chinese and African nations by using its influence in international forums such as the United Nations. Some of these mutually shared interests are the efforts to promote a multi-polar political

⁸⁰ Ibid., 6.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

system and to counter U.S. global political, economic, and military influence. Of equal importance to many African nations is that China does not impose conditions of improving governance, economic reform, and human rights on its offers of financial aid. This seemingly unconditional aspect of receiving aid appeals to many African governments since many, like China, are weary of being criticized (or refused aid) because of their nation's record on human rights or status of not being a democratic government. This greater acceptance of China by the African countries increases China diplomatic clout in the region and has created an emerging economic and political competition between the Chinese and the United States.⁸³

To achieve its national strategic objectives and continue to grow its economy, China is in an apparent frantic pursuit of global resources. China has taken action to secure agreements around the globe for the purchase of natural gas and oil. Between 2000 and 2005, China's state controlled oil companies invested and estimated \$15 billion in exploration rights of foreign oil fields and stakes in foreign oil companies. The majority of this investment went to South America, the Middle East, and Africa. Wearisome byproducts of this type of investment are the relationships China has created with problematic states such as Sudan and Iran. Often prioritizing its requirement to secure adequate resources and energy supplies over other national interests, China establishes economic and diplomatic relations with nations previously considered enemies or unworthy of dialogue because of their leadership and poor status of government.⁸⁴

⁸³ Thomas Lum, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*. (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2008), Pg 113-118.

⁸⁴ Robyn Meredith, 165.

Similar to the international tension caused by China's reliance on oil from Iran, China's energy and resource endeavors in Africa have produced concerns as well.⁸⁵ In Darfur, China has been seen as an enabler of the ongoing genocide in the region. China imports sixty percent of Sudan's total oil production and constructed arms factories in Sudan to produce a variety of guns, ammunition, and other weapons to be sold domestically in the war-torn nation. As was the case with Iran, China has used its position in the Security Council to block any UN attempts to impose sanctions on Sudan to eliminate the ongoing genocide which has resulted in the death of several hundred thousands of people in Darfur.⁸⁶

China's impact on African affairs does not start and end with Sudan. The government of China has established economic agreements with African states throughout the continent to include Angola, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea. In the first half of 2006, China's major suppliers of oil included Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia and Angola, with Angola being its largest supplier of crude oil. In that same year, China invited forty eight African nations to participate in a summit to pronounce China's new type of strategic partnership with the nations of Africa. As a result of this new strategic approach, China agreed to \$1.9 billion in trade agreements and distributed \$5 billion in aid. The following year, Chinese President Hu Jintao solidified additional diplomatic ties during an African visit of eight nations at which time he offered additional Chinese aid

⁸⁵ Thirteen percent of China's oil imports were from Iran in 2003. In 2004, China's state – owned Sinopec signed a thirty year, \$70 billion deal to buy liquefied natural gas from Iran and to develop an oil field in Iran. This deal, two years later, proved controversial when China initially sided with Russia to block the UN from imposing sanctions after Iran was accused of violating existing nuclear nonproliferation agreements. Eventually, China was diplomatically swayed to side with the West and imposing limited sanctions on Iran. Nonetheless, this can be cited as an example of China's aggressive quest for energy sources partly influencing the geo-strategic balance in a region. In this particular case, China's influence on the ability of Iran to pursue its goal to become a nuclear state. Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 166.

for development.⁸⁷ The impetus for this aid is none other than for economic growth and trade in support of China's industrial growth.

Although the European Union (EU) is China's largest trading partner, China has established major economic investments and commerce with the states of Africa. Shedding its reluctance to become more involved and responsible internationally, China has become more accommodating with the United Nations. With nearly two thousand military and paramilitary personnel supporting thirteen UN mission worldwide, China has more peacekeepers deployed than any other member of the UN Security Council. However, this participation has not come without some contention among its fellow UNSC members (i.e., France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States). Similar to its response to NATO's handling of Kosovo, China demonstrated its reluctance to support the UNSC by vetoing a measure in July 2008 to enact an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and restrict the finances and travel of the African nation's ruling officials. Previously, in June 2008, China did, however, support a UNSC resolution to condemn electoral violence and called for legitimate elections in Zimbabwe. The same mixed signals were sent by China in its handling of Sudan. While it supported and contributed UN missions to Darfur, it rebutted any attempts by the West to enact any sanctions on Sudan. Again, invoking its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its policy of noninterference in the internal matters of other states, China seeks to maintain its relationship with some of the failed or failing states in African such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Kay, 7.

Under the umbrella of this noninterference policy, China continues to sell weapons and military equipment to questionable African regimes in exchange for much needed access to strategic resources. Such is the case in Sudan. Furthermore, often opposed to the ideals of the West (i.e., democracy, religious freedom, human rights, and free market economics), China promotes its authoritarian system with strong economic growth as a more viable, if not more appealing, system to the authoritarian African regimes which are less likely to identify with western policies and not be critical of the domestic human rights record in China or its uncompromising stance toward Taiwan.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, China has demonstrated its willingness to diverge from its commitment to the five principles when deemed advantageous for the strategic interest of the nation.

In October 2006, China took unilateral actions against North Korea. Something it was unwilling to do with nations of Sudan and Zimbabwe. Once North Korea's most steadfast ally, China supported UNSC condemnation of North Korea's detonation of a nuclear test weapon. More significant though was China's threat to cut off oil and other vital exports to North Korea if the international demands concerning its nuclear program were not met. Again, were it not for China's own vested national security interests; it is likely it would not have interfered. In the case of North Korea, China has a stake in a nuclear-free northeastern region of Asia. To begin with, a war with North Korea involving China's largest trading partners (United States, Japan and South Korea) would destroy its economy and create havoc among the resultant mass numbers of refugees and internally displaced personnel. Also, China's diplomatic firmness with North Korea demonstrated to the international community a willingness to take on additional global responsibility while being able to influence a process with the United States and its

⁸⁹ Ibid., 8.

western allies.⁹⁰ Similar parallels relating to China's strategic interests trade-offs can be drawn in other regions such as Iran and Africa.

A nuclear Iran is detrimental to the national security of China as well as it is to United States and the Western world. Similar to a nuclear North Korea, a nuclear Iran increases regional instability and the risk of eventual military intervention from the West. Both of these ensuing conditions could inflict chaos on the international oil market and the adjacent strategic sea lines of communication. China's security and economic prosperity rely heavily on each. Such is the case in parts of Africa as well. Assisted by China's unconditional support of the existing regimes, Sudan and Chad remain on the threshold of a civil war (with its Chinese sources of oil at risk) demonstrating that China's willingness to stay engaged in the problematic regions of Africa are detractors and decreases international goodwill towards China.⁹¹

China has been known to provide training in China for military officers of African nations. Additionally, China has provided technical aid with its sale of military equipment and assistance in building African military capacities. Military-to-Military accords exist with twenty five African nations, yet no African countries have participated in joint military exercise with the Chinese military. In 2006, China formally released a paper entitled *China's African Policy* promulgating China's politics and economic goals in Africa. In this paper, China also pledged to increase military aid and provide Africa assistance in the form of judicial and police training to combat regional crime. The assistance also would help Africa establish channels for intelligence sharing to target

⁹⁰ Ibid., 10.

⁹¹ Ibid., 11.

terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and various other transnational criminal activity.⁹²

Within the global weapons market, China often sells to the regimes of questionable nations. China supplies customers who cannot afford higher quality products from other sources such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia. Customers of China's weapons sales include both government and non-state actors. Regimes in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar along with rebel groups in Democratic Republic of the Congo's destructive civil war all have purchased weapons from China. Most of the weapons exports are small arms and what it considered as light weaponry (i.e., AR-56 assault rifles, similar to the Russian AK-47). However, the Chinese have also exported tanks, fire control radars, short range air-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and both trainer and frontline combat aircraft. Even more telling, China has been sanctioned by the United States for providing nuclear and missile technologies to countries such as Iran and Pakistan. However, neither Iran nor Pakistan has established itself as China's most prevalent customer of arms. Instead, this acknowledgement belongs to Sudan.⁹³

In violation of internationally imposed sanctions, China has been the most conspicuous supplier of arms to Sudan. Between 2004 and 2006, it is estimated that China provided Sudan with 90 percent of its imports of small arms and light weapons. It is widely believed that the majority of these arms imports have been funneled to the Janjaweed militias that are responsible for the thousands of deaths in Darfur. Additionally, China has reportedly assisted the Sudanese government in building

⁹² Lum, 130.

⁹³ William Hartung, "Deadly Traffic: China's Arms Trade with the Sudan," *New America Foundation: Arms and Security Initiative Policy Brief* (August 2008), 1-2.

weapons and ammunition factories in the nation's capital of Khartoum. Guns and ammunition, however, are not the only Chinese provided equipment used in Darfur. Amnesty International documented that in a 2004 Darfur massacre trucks supplied by China were utilized to gather 168 people from the Wadi Saleh village that were subsequently blindfolded and gunned down by soldiers and militiamen. Sudan has also been the recipient some of the tanks and combat fighter planes previously mentioned.⁹⁴

The impetus for China's arms exports to Sudan has less to do with the impact on the Chinese economy and more on the overall value of China's economic relationship with Sudan. Following its performance on the global stage during its hosting of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China continues to take strides to project an image of a responsible stakeholder and global power. However, it risk damaging this image by continuing to arm what is considered by many to be one of the world's most oppressive regimes. However risky these business deals may be, China considers it more vital to have greater access to energy sources, including those in Sudan. As has been mentioned, China has established itself as the world's second largest consumer of oil, behind only the United States. With most of China's oil being imported, forecast show China will import sixty percent of its oil by 2020. Human rights record or not, China will make arrangements as necessary to meet these energy requirements. Reportedly, in Sudan, there are nineteen oil reserve locations. Of these nineteen, eight are considered legitimate reserves with China having the majority rights to drill in all eight of the locations. Furthermore, China's state owned China National Petroleum Corporation owns 40 percent of the Sudanese oil development consortium GNPOC (the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company) and

⁹⁴ Ibid., 2-3.

has constructed the entire oil pipeline system throughout Sudan.⁹⁵ The motive for China's involvement in Sudan and other fragile regimes remains fundamental. China recognizes a pending domestic energy crisis and is hedging its position in the global market to ensure those sources are available in the decades to come.

Domestic resources of oil and natural gas in China will not be able to meet China's growing requirement for energy in the future. China is reported to have sizeable coal reserves (13 percent of the world's supply of coal). However, its natural gas (1 percent) and oil (2-3 percent) reserves remain relatively small as is relates to China's cumulative energy requirements. Currently, China has indigenous sources of oil in fields located in three major domestic regions. However, these sources are reported to be diminishing rapidly. Energy experts have projected China's domestic crude oil production will plateau over the next twenty years as domestic exploration and new production of oil (both on and offshore) fail to curtail the surge of oil imports resulting from increased demand. As a consequence of domestic energy supplies not being able to keep up with demand, China has adopted a comprehensive energy strategy. The three major elements of this strategy are: reforming the energy sector to maximize domestic production and attract foreign direct investment; diversifying the energy mix to reduce the nation's dependency on fossil fuels and contain pollution; and diversifying international energy sources to restrain dependence on one or a few producing regions. Having said this, it would seem reasonable to believe that Russia would be a likely

⁹⁵ Ibid., 3.

energy partner with China. After all, China's energy requirements are soaring while Russia's oil and gas deposits sit closer than sources in the Middle East and Africa.⁹⁶

Russia remains the second-largest exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia and owns the world's most plentiful reserves of natural gas which are located in fields more easily accessible for export to China than the fields that supply energy to end users in Europe and Russia. However, differences in political and economic ideals, including those related to energy security, have prevented the two allies from formulating a mutually beneficial Sino-Russo energy pact.⁹⁷ For example, Russia's contribution equates to about 11-12 percent of China's oil imports. China and its policy makers have been unenthusiastic about making Russia an energy security partner because Russia's constant delays of shipments, pipeline construction and efforts to manipulate the markets of Europe, Asia, and China against each other. In actuality, the underdeveloped transportation infrastructure linking the two nations is the primary reason bilateral energy cooperation between Russia and China does not exist.⁹⁸ Largely because of this dynamic, China more easily undertakes the implementation of its energy strategy in regions such as Africa to seek diversification of its energy sources.

While the Bush administration repeatedly stated Chinese engagement in African was not viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in the region, the United States has been actively monitoring China's activities in Africa since their efforts could present a myriad of potential issues for U.S. policy makers and defense planners. In addition to China's

⁹⁶ Richard Weitz. "China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism Without Partnership or Passion?" *Strategic Studies Institute* (August 2008): 17-18.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub868.pdf> (accessed September 4, 2008).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 20.

potential negative impact on the motivation of Africa countries to practice good governance, democratization, and transparent reforms, left unaddressed, China's African engagements will increase economic competition between the United States and China in the energy sectors and the strategic ores and minerals industry, both of which have a direct influence on U.S. national and energy security. Furthermore, China's increased textile production and subsequent exports to Africa are detrimental to efforts by the United States to improve Africa's clothing and manufacturing sectors with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) program. Through the AGOA program the United States hopes to spur increases in African production by allowing African exports to the United States to be granted duty-free access.⁹⁹

Trade with Africa is relatively minute equating to a yearly average of approximately 1-2% of the total U.S. global trade. However, trade is increasing. Although the trade is comprised mostly of U.S. imports from Africa, the flow of exports from the United States to Africa continue to grow. Currently, approximately 18% percent of the oil in the United States is imported from Africa with oil making up approximately 76% of the total value of all imports from Africa. The AGOA, enacted in 2000, serves as a key medium to foster this trade relationship. With duty free access granted and other trade benefits, the AGOA is premised on the hope that an increase in U.S.-African bilateral trade will increase African manufacturing export capacity, better integrate Africa into the global economy, and foster African reform efforts while providing better access to U.S. technical expertise and credit lines.¹⁰⁰ The AGOA, along with various other programs exist to build trade capacity in Africa and promote U.S trade

⁹⁹ Lum, 118-119.

¹⁰⁰ Lum, 132.

with Africa. China's economic policy and business approach towards Africa can negate the building of this trade capacity if cooperation does not occur between China, the United States, and other influential nations trying to affect positive change in Africa.

Chapter III: Past and Present

The United States has long believed in the rights of people to choose their own governments. As the United States emerged as an ascending superpower and European influence began to decrease, World War Two and the postwar time period brought momentous change to the African continent. In 1941, as Great Britain and the United States worked together to compose the Atlantic Charter, President Roosevelt reaffirmed U.S commitment to maintaining these rights. Later in 1943, after a revealing visit to Gambia, President Roosevelt made it a point to ensure Morocco and other colonies that postwar objectives will include “self-determination” for all African colonies.¹⁰¹

With the fall of Zaire’s President Mobuto in 1997 and demise of other dictators on the African continent, the end of “neo-colonialism” seemed to have ended. Many believed a new era had begun and democracy would be the model to emulate. African countries comprised of a military dictatorship and one party governments were no longer perceived as acceptable forms of governance. With the help of advocates like Thabo Mbeki, the African “renaissance” received worldwide attention including accolades from the West. While in his second term, President Clinton was eager for the United States to implement a more proactive approach toward Africa and used the idea of a new and improving Africa as an impetus to this make change in U.S. policy towards Africa. In March 1998, motivated to implement this change, President Clinton completed what was at the time the most extensive excursion throughout Africa by a U.S. president still in office. The President’s itinerary incorporated ten days of travel including stops in six

¹⁰¹ Martin Meredith, 9.

different countries.¹⁰² During this trip, while in South Africa, President Clinton demonstrated the importance of the African continent to the United States and the international community by publicly stating, "...what can we do *with* Africa? Yes, Africa still needs the world, but more than ever the world needs Africa."¹⁰³ Clinton followed up his proclamation by supporting the establishment of a small group of African leaders who ostensibly met the requirements of the United States with their commitment to good governance, civil rights, economic revitalization and democracy. The group included Mbeki, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni; Rwanda's Paul Kagame; Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi; Eritrea Isaias Afwerki, and Ghana's Jerry Rawlings. Although well intended, the new found strategic approach for Africa soon proved to be a wasted effort.¹⁰⁴

No less than three months after President Clinton's historic tour of Africa and the gathering of the resurgent African leaders, any definitive thoughts that Africa had begun a new era of prosperity and economic growth were dismissed as approximately one hundred thousand people died in the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Additionally, one third of the Eritrea population was internally displaced and several hundred millions of much needed financial assistance was instead wasted on the purchase of arms. Meanwhile, Uganda and Rwanda pushed themselves into war with the Congo. Ultimately, Africa soon became embattled with war in Angola, Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea and various other conflicts. Not surprisingly U.S. support for the new era in Africa quickly evaporated.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, President Clinton's intent to impart the importance of Africa on the United States and the international community

¹⁰² Ibid., 677-678.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 678.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

was not without merit and demonstrated that the West should appropriately stay engaged in Africa because of its strategic importance to both the international community and the United States.

Since President Clinton's Administration, there have been several global initiatives by the United States and other Western nations to help mitigate crisis in Africa. In addition to the previously mentioned AGOA program, in 2002, the Bush Administration announced the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). Managed by the Millennium Challenge Corporations (MCC), the purpose of the MCA is to serve as the vehicle by which the United States allocates funds to those nations which demonstrate a sustained propensity for economic freedom and overall good governance. After meeting these eligibility requirements, along with those related to free markets, endorsement of entrepreneurship and a steadfast willingness to invest in its indigenous people, countries are able to receive assistance through two types of MCC programs. The two programs are categorized as compacts and threshold programs. The compacts are "benchmarked" development agreements that a beneficiary nation agrees to carry out utilizing MCC financing. The threshold programs are designed to support the efforts of eligible would-be compact countries to formulate compact proposals. Compacts have been signed with Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and Tanzania totaling \$3.1 billion in funds and ranging from \$109.8 million to \$698.1 million each. In addition, there has been \$111.3 million worth of threshold programs for Kenya, Niger, Sao Tome', Principe, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Several countries which were funded by the MCC for threshold programs have subsequently been funded for compacts. While both Mauritania and Rwanda are

threshold program eligible, and Namibia and Senegal are compact assistance-eligible, none of these four African countries are signatories to the assistance agreements of the MCC.¹⁰⁶

Today the United States has established diplomatic relations with all 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa while maintaining embassies in all but five. The African nations without embassies (Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, Sao Tome, and Somalia) received support from U.S. embassies in bordering countries. After recently establishing diplomatic ties with the African Union (AU), the United States now maintains an Ambassador whose task is to support the mutual interests of both the AU and the United States. Top U.S. officials have participated in bilateral visits hosted by African countries although not as frequently as their Chinese counterparts. Instead, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and other State Department officials from the African Affairs Bureau often travel to Africa with a focus on issues relating to conflict mediation, democracy promotion and various other related issues. From this approach, the United States has developed U.S. policy toward Africa with an emphasis on five areas: democracy building and adherence to human rights (including conflict mitigation), socioeconomic development, trade promotion, investment; and environment protection and management. The five policy areas have been incorporated into the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework which defines the strategic goals of the United States' engagement in Africa. The 2003 establishment of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is one of the ways the United States has sought to prioritize efforts to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa in pursuit of these five policy areas.¹⁰⁷ To successfully

¹⁰⁶ Lum, 130-131.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

implement these policy areas, United States engagement in Africa must remain resolute and vehicles of reconstruction and stabilization such as PEPFAR, AGOA, and MCA must continue to exist and be adequately resourced.

Chapter IV: Findings and Recommendations

Since no single existing document list all the United States' interests, it often becomes difficult to clearly identify and to develop national policies in support of them. This becomes even more difficult when you apply this premise to Africa. The values and interests of the United States are sometimes not shared by all nations and international organizations. Furthermore, the values and promotion of strategic interests of others may exist in opposition to those of the United States. The United States has shared interests with allied countries and these countries will often chose to support the United States because it positively affects their overall strategic interest. However, there are times, compatible interests or not, the United States will have to utilize all available national instruments of power unilaterally to protect its strategic interest for the preservation of national defense and security.¹⁰⁸ However, with China's involvement on the African continent, the United States should increase the intensity of its engagement on the continent and must do it multilaterally in order to achieve success.

Sustained and increased engagement in Africa supports and protects U.S. national interests and policy. The objectives delineated in the sources of national level strategic guidance can be better achieved with effective regional efforts in Africa. With a finite amount of resources, prioritizing U.S. strategic interest and determining their intensity is a necessity. Strategic interest must be deemed vital, important or peripheral. Vital interests, if unfulfilled will have immediate consequences on core national interests. Important interests, if unfulfilled will result in damage that will eventually affect core

¹⁰⁸ Fred Sadrak, *Aid to Formulating a Regional Strategic Appraisal*. (U.S. Army War College, 2001), 585-586.

national interests. Lastly, peripheral interests are those, if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core national interests.¹⁰⁹ With regard to regional interests in Africa, the War on Terror can be considered a “vital” interest as it relates to the physical security of the United States. Other regional interests are good governance and human dignity; energy and natural resources; and access to economic markets and sea lanes of communication. These three regional interests have an intensity of “important” with the energy and natural resources, access to economic markets and sea lanes of communication having direct affect on the economic prosperity of the United States. Meanwhile, good governance and human dignity relate to our national strategic objectives in Africa in the form of promoting U.S. values globally. From these regional strategic interests in Africa, we can establish that several regional strategic factors exist on the continent and must be properly addressed by the United States in the interest of protecting national security interests. To name the most notable, these strategic factors include poor governance, HIV/Malaria and pandemics, energy and natural resources, poverty and economic disparity, illicit trafficking of narcotics, weapons and people; WMD transit point; infrastructure, piracy, regional and tribal tensions; religions and religious fault lines, topography, and external state and non-state actors (i.e., China, Russia, India, VEOs, etc...).

A baseline strategic analysis of Africa determines the United States must not only sustain its current efforts but also increase its level of engagement in Africa through an increase in resources and efforts (i.e., equipment, funding, personnel, multilateral agreements, etc...). The means and ways currently employed are not appropriate for achieving the objectives in Africa and, as result, a strategic imbalance exists. For this

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 589.

reason, the United States increases its risk, or threat of failure, in achieving national strategic and defense objectives in Africa.

With regards to energy security in Africa, there are challenges which must be addressed by the United States to protect its important national strategic interests. Although Nigeria is taking the corruption and theft among the oil industry more seriously, it is far from achieving success in eliminating it. With a lack of technical capacity and an ineffective political strategy, Nigeria's efforts have been unsuccessful. With the technological assistance and naval expertise from the United States, Nigeria and other countries in Gulf of Guinea region could obtain the necessary surveillance training and equipment to detect and deter oil offenders, track vessels and provide security within their own ports. Engagement similar to the efforts to curb piracy off the coast of Somalia would test the regions resolve and provide insight into the effectiveness of a coordinated multinational interdiction program. Additionally, without any viable means for collaboration and intelligence sharing within the region, the United States could assist with security by acting as a coordinator of regional intelligence to facilitate interdiction and interception between Nigeria and the other countries which receive the stolen crude oil for their refineries. Just as President Bush agreed to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo's request in 2005, the United States should continue to use its vast experience with international coordination and assistance to curb money laundering, arms trafficking, illegal oil sales and financial crimes.¹¹⁰

In 2003, nearly five years prior to the establishment of AFRICOM, the United States' European Command (EUCOM) took steps to increase the security in the Gulf of Guinea and proposed the Gulf of Guinea Guard assistance and training program to

¹¹⁰ Lake and Whitman, 31.

“improve control of the coastal areas, enhance physical security of national ports, and promote cooperative maritime security.”¹¹¹ Subsequently, in 2004, EUCOM assembled Gulf of Guinea Chiefs of Naval Operations for a Coastal Security Conference in Naples Italy. Together, these two endeavors represented a combined vested interest in the future security of the region and willingness among senior official to cooperate and engage in continued discussions. In the interest of protecting stable and reliable sources of energy, the United States is a stakeholder in this process and should continue to provide the necessary support and resources for addressing the “threat level, strengthening capacity in the target states, and indentifying a viable, regional entity.”¹¹²

Effective U.S. future engagement with the oil producing nation states of West Africa will require a framework that aligns U.S. foreign policy with geo-political interest in the energy-rich countries. To further demonstrate a legitimate interest in engaging in the Gulf of Guinea region, the U.S. needs to establish transparent and coherent policy utilizing all instruments of national power. This policy, and subsequent national strategy, is to focus on improving the communication, cooperation and coordination between regional U.S. diplomats, various U.S. government Agencies, and the U.S.-based energy companies. The establishment of AFRICOM in 2008 and its somewhat unique command structure is an example of the United States and the Department of Defense endeavoring to create effective strategies and objectives with an emphasis on the whole of government. Furthermore, the agencies that will need to be engaged in the development, regional stability and supply efforts include, but are not limited to, the U.S. Departments of Energy, Interior, Treasury, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the

¹¹¹ Ibid., 36

¹¹² Ibid.

United States Coast Guard. Also, this cannot be a unilateral effort by the United States. To remain effective, it must be addressed with assistance from China, the European Union, and the G8 (Canada, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States).¹¹³

Additionally, the United States should look to reinforce “regional initiatives of multilateral agencies like the IMO’s (International Monetary Organization) cooperative arrangements with regional ports... and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in conflict prevention and mediation.” As mentioned previously, the United States Coast Guard could be utilized to provide improved training in the protection of shipping and offshore structures to their local counterpart.¹¹⁴

With regards to the challenges of failed states, the United State lacks a coherent strategy for dealing with weak and failing countries in Africa. Until an effective strategy is developed, the United States must enhance the funding and resourcing of several existing programs and initiatives. The area of focus for these existing programs and initiatives seek to address all aspect of weak and failing nations and include early identification of threats and monitoring of weak states, engaging weak states through international diplomacy, directing foreign assistance toward the alleviation of state weakness symptoms, and implementing on-the-ground civilian and military stabilization operations.¹¹⁵

To address the piracy issues in Africa, the United States must continue to act multilaterally. In January 2009, an area encompassing 2.5 million square miles of sea were being patrolled by an estimated 30 ships representing more than a dozen nations.

¹¹³ Ibid., 37.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 38.

¹¹⁵ Wyler, 10-19.

This included the United States, United Kingdom, India, France, Russia, and China. The European Union's military operations, EU NAVFOR, which began in December 2008, and the newly stood up multinational contingent known as Combined Task Force 151 represented the two multinational anti-piracy patrols in the area, allowing the United States to pursue a non-Western approach to counter piracy with the inclusion of eastern Navies.¹¹⁶

While the presence of the naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden region have aided in deterring attacks, it is unclear how successful the patrols will ultimately be. Arguably, the anti-piracy patrols demonstrate tactical legitimacy to combat piracy but do not address that which allows piracy to flourish the most within the region, which is the failed state of Somalia and its inability to self govern. The United States cannot alone solve the piracy issue off the east coast of Africa. However, it should allocate legitimate resources to support what experts have suggested by establishing an internationally administered coast for Somalia. With assistance from modern navies, to include the United States, East African and Middle Eastern countries could acquire the necessary technical assistance and ships to work together and successfully patrol the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. An approach similar this idea has been implemented by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand in the Straits of Malacca. This collaborative effort, along with an information-sharing center in Southeast Asia, is credited with effectively reducing piracy in that region demonstrating that when governments provide focused, multilateral engagement, the incidents of attacks can be diminished. In the case of the Gulf of Aden region, a legitimately established Somalia Coast Guard could be run by the African Union (AU) or the United Nations (UN) with

¹¹⁶ Hanson.

the intent to eventually transfer responsibility to the Somalia government, if and when it becomes stable and self governing.¹¹⁷

With regards to China's engagement in Africa, on some levels it is a zero sum game that must be addressed by the United States through multilateral cooperation with China and other Western nations. It is considered zero sum, because natural resources and access to these resource are not infinite. With increasing global demands for energy sources, the strategic African resources cannot be overlooked or left for others to consume because of oversight by the United States. U.S. engagement must be cooperative because Africa is a continent with unparalleled issues and challenges. No single nation, not China or the United States, can mitigate these challenges unilaterally. The 2008 NDS states, "Meeting these challenges requires better and more diverse capabilities in both hard and soft power, and greater flexibility and skill in employing them."¹¹⁸

It is difficult for policy makers and strategist to develop a national strategy without a foe that dominates the strategic or operational environment. In today's environment, al Qaeda and its network of terrorist can arguably be this dominant foe. However, some American perceptions view China as the "designated enemy of the future" and the dominant threat to U.S.-led global order of the 21st century.¹¹⁹

Chinese President Hu Jintao recently stated that currently China needs the United States economically more than the United States needs China. For China's economic growth to continue successfully, it requires technology from the West and for the West to continue to purchase Chinese made goods and products. However, by 2015, the United

¹¹⁷ Hanson.

¹¹⁸ *National Defense Strategy*, 2008, 4-5.

¹¹⁹ Gray, 61.

States and China will reach an economic balance and in the years that follow, the United States will rely on China as much as China relies on the United States. When this global balance of power shift occurs, China will possess much more economic and military leverage than it has today.¹²⁰ For this reason, China doesn't wish to risk losing its most important customer, the United States. On China's domestic front, if trade relations between China and the United States faltered, millions of workers in China could be unemployed. Millions of angry unemployed workers contributing to a national instability is not what the ruling Chinese Communist Party endeavors to cope with.¹²¹

In Africa, as demonstrated with its handling of North Korea, the United States and China can find a willingness to come together on a common ground to cooperate in solving the myriad of difficult issues facing Africa and the international community today. By appealing to each other's self interests, China can be encouraged to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international community.¹²² Despite many historical examples of China's reluctance to interfere, a modern example of its willingness to interject itself as a responsible stakeholder occurred in December 2008 when China, for the first time in centuries, deployed a contingent of naval vessels from Chinese territorial waters to help combat the growing piracy problems off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Normally considered a "brown water fleet" which operates in the littorals and coastal waterways, China deployed two Chinese destroyers (with two embarked helicopters and special operation forces) and a supply ship from its southernmost island province of Hainan with a mission to protect Chinese merchant vessels operating in the water off Somalia from pirate attacks. The Chinese naval vessels operated as members of

¹²⁰ Robyn Meredith, 174.

¹²¹ Ibid., 200.

¹²² Kay, 10.

a multinational naval task force which consisted of naval vessels from Russia, India, NATO member states and the United States.¹²³ While this decision may be viewed by some as another example of what China is willing to do to protect its vital energy supply lines, it can also be seen as an example of China's apparent increased commitment to the international community and its role as a responsible stakeholder.

Furthermore, to curtail China's arms trade throughout Africa, policy must be formulated with ties to Chinese economic interests and stability. One such way would be to get China to acknowledge that conducting arms sales with unsavory African regimes does not justify the return on investment. To emphasize this point, the global economic powers, to include the United States and European Union, can apply diplomatic pressure through reduced trade which China critically needs to maintain its economic growth in order achieve its strategic objectives. For a more probable and enduring change, the United States should look to create a global energy policy of cooperation instead of competition with China which would create a strategic environment allowing each nation to further distance themselves from problematic oil rich nations.¹²⁴

During the Presidency of George W. Bush, he and his administration pursued four broad goals which had direct applicability on the African continent and engagement with China. These goals were promulgated as: reinvigorating U.S. alliances; forging new relationships with countries that share our values; seizing new opportunities for prosperity and growth; and confronting shared challenges. President Bush's Administration believed that a successful future for Asia required strong involvement of

¹²³ Cable News Network. "China Warships Set Sail on Anti-Pirate Mission." December 26, 2008. CNN.com. <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/26/china.pirates/index.html> (accessed February 13, 2009).

¹²⁴ Hartung, 3.

both the United States and China. Along these lines, the United States established new strategic dialogue with China. The dialogue focused on long-term solutions to address shared concerns for each nation's economies, including common methods to address matters such as currency exchange rates and intellectual property rights. President Bush also reasserted China's role in the international community as a responsible stakeholder. More specifically, President Bush emphasized, as a leader in the global economy, China has a duty to act responsibly on a myriad of issues ranging from the environment to energy to the development of Africa. However, ultimately China has to decide what role and course it will follow in the establishing itself in the international community.¹²⁵ The new administration of President Barack Obama has not yet published specific guidance on its policies regarding China. However, from initial public statements and White House sources, the new administration has emphasized the importance of new partnerships in Asia. These sources state that under President Obama, "the United States will forge a more effective framework in Asia...and work to ensure China plays by international rules."¹²⁶

¹²⁵ The White House. "Fact Sheet: The United States and Asia: Enduring Freedom and Prosperity." Office of the Press Secretary (The White House), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080807.html> (accessed September 4, 2008).

¹²⁶ The White House. "The Agenda: Foreign Policy." Office of the Press Secretary (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy (accessed February 15, 2009).

Chapter V: Conclusion

U.S. national security and a successful national defense strategy depend on increased U.S. involvement in Africa and the balance of regional efforts with China. The United States and the new Administration must not forget that Africa is an economically poor continent, containing many of the world's deprived countries. Therefore, it must maintain a long term national strategic approach that helps Africa become a more stable, prosperous and humane continent. This vigorous approach will require robust efforts in the form of all national instruments of power. Currently, the U.S. cannot get there from here unless, at a minimum, it continues to sustain and seek to increase its current efforts with AFRICOM as one of the many vehicles.

U.S. interests in Africa are geostrategic, economic, and humanitarian. Knowledge and awareness of Africa's importance, as well as a belief that the U.S. must not only maintain, but also improve its involvement in the region, are important to our military profession both as tactical operators and as strategic planners. "Emerging regional powers, let alone new super states, will accept U.S. leadership in some security matters only if that leadership serves their national interest in helping to offset the strength of regional rivals."¹²⁷

For meaningful diplomatic relations to exist with China, the United States will need the capability to influence those strategic interests that China finds vital. While China's record on human rights and democracy remain contentious focal points for the United States, China's obstinacy on these matters decreases leverage of the United States and the Western world to influence positive change. For this reason, the United States

¹²⁷ Gray, viii.

must prioritize which of the national security matters it feels are most important as they relate to China.¹²⁸ China's engagement on the African continent and the influences on the global economy, regional stability, and the national security of the United States should make Africa a priority.

Despite Russia's recent flexing of its diplomatic strength and the ascendancy of India, China currently remains the one state that is most likely to contest the United States as a competitor in the decades to come. With record high growth rates and a still very poor demographic, there's little uncertainty that many challenges lie ahead for China during this ascendancy. However, China must be continually monitored for both its capabilities and intentions. The continued expansion of its military and remarkable economic growth, even in times of a global economic crisis, continue to be the likely means for China to reestablish itself as the Middle Kingdom and pursue the desirable "One China" goal. In turn, the United States must dedicate an increased amount of resources to effectively engage with China economically and diplomatically, in particular in regions of the globe such as Africa. The increased amount of resources can span all national instruments of power. Similar to the approach with efforts in the Middle East and south central Asia, an increase in resources should be used to expand the number of personnel (both civilian and military) that have a greater understanding of the languages and cultures of China and Africa. With an increased understanding of culture and country comes greater intelligence collecting capacity and enhanced dialogue between regional specialist and U.S. decision makers which result in better understanding of the realistic strategic environment vice one that is perceived incorrectly. Recognizing that China and U.S. assumptions will continue to evolve over the next 20 years, this is vital to

¹²⁸ Kay, 10.

successful policy development and ongoing reevaluation of U.S-China foreign relations. Therefore, the United States should pursue international stability and improved national security by engaging with China on common interest matters, including those on the African continent, such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, energy and environmental issues which influence the national security of both the United States and China. The challenge for United States policy makers and defense planners will be to take actions in Africa that seem affable and in the spirit of cooperation while simultaneously remaining cognizant of China's continued progression in development of war fighting methods and any ensuing U.S. defensive or strategic vulnerabilities.¹²⁹ To successfully achieve this, "The United States must continue to maintain its alliances, but above all, maintaining the world's most competent military in terms of personnel, technology and doctrine is not an option but a necessity."¹³⁰

Lastly, as Colin Gray once said "China today is not interested in establishing a global imperium, but it is firmly committed to the dismantlement of American leadership and guardianship of global order, most especially in its own neighborhood in East Asia. China may not be overly interested in fighting to become Number One, but it is resolute in rejecting the humiliating status of being Number Two."¹³¹ Policy makers and defense planners must not forget this as the United States forges ahead in multilateral efforts in Africa and other key regions of the world.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 13.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Gray, 48.

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VITA

Commander Richard Davis attended the United States Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, NY and received his commission upon graduation in June 1990 along with his Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Transportation and USCG Third Mate License. Commander Davis also holds a Master of Science degree in International Relations from Troy University.

After being designated a Naval Aviator in October 1993, Commander Davis completed MH-53E fleet replacement pilot training with the “Sea Dragons” of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron TWELVE (HM-12) in Norfolk, Virginia. His initial sea duty assignment was with Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron FIFTEEN (HM-15) in Alameda, California. While with the “Blackhawks” of HM-15, he deployed in support of operations in the Sea of Japan and served in the positions of Flight Officer, Aircraft Line Division Officer, and Quality Assurance Officer.

In March 1999, Commander Davis completed initial training in the SH-60F/HH-60H with the “Warhawks” of Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron TEN (HS-10) and reported to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE (VX-1) in Patuxent River, Maryland. While with the “Pioneers” of VX-1, he served as the Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) and MH-53E Operational Test Director. As test director, Commander Davis completed the operational assessment of the AN/AQS-20 minehunting system and participated in the initial development of organic AMCM (OAMCM) systems for the MH-60S.

In December 2001, Commander Davis returned to HM-15 for his Department Head tour and served as Detachment TWO Officer in Charge (OIC) from February to September 2003 while deployed to the 5th Fleet AOR in support of Navy and coalition forces during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. After completing his tour as DET TWO OIC, Commander Davis served as HM-15’s aircraft Maintenance Officer and was assigned to Commander Helicopter Tactical Wing Atlantic Fleet in June 2004 as the Operations Officer. He reported as the prospective Executive Officer to the “Black Stallions” of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FOUR (HC-4) based at NAS Sigonella, Sicily in September 2005 and subsequently served as the Executive Officer until February 2007. In May 2007, Commander Davis assumed command of the “Fleet Angels” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron TWO and completed his tour as Commanding Officer in July 2008.