




# **JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED**

• QUARTERLY BULLETIN •

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## JWFC Lessons Learned Points of Contact

The JCLL seeks to identify trends, issues, and lessons that impact our Joint Force capability. We rely on the inputs from you in the field. You are in the best position to know and report what may improve Joint Force capability. You work the issue every day, so let us know:

- What was supposed to happen?
- What happened?
- What went right?
- What went wrong?

If you or your unit have an input that could help others do it right the first time, send it to us. Don't wait until you have a polished article. The JCLL can take care of the editing, format, and layout. Do provide a short, one paragraph biography on yourself. We will acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your article in a publishable form with you as the author.

**We want your e-mail address!** We now have the capability to electronically disseminate the Bulletin to you when it is published. You can sign up for this service in the Bulletin section of our website listed below. See the inside back cover for details and instructions.

We have a staff ready to serve you. Below are the staff points of contact if you have a question we can help you answer.

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Cover design by Mr. Wade Tooley and courtesy of the JWFC Graphics Department



## Message From the Commander

**MajGen Gordon C. Nash, USMC**  
**Commander, JFCOM JWFC**

Special operations forces (SOF) have played, and will play, a major role in recent and future U.S. conflicts. Examples of recent SOF involvement include Somalia, Afghanistan, and Panama. SOF is at the forefront of action in Iraq to stem the threat from Saddam Hussein and the terrorist networks he collaborates with against our way of life. Therefore, this Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin presents information on the SOF from the perspective of the Special Operations Command of the Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM). The majority of the articles in this Bulletin were written by the SOCJFCOM staff and present the lessons learned and recommendations from the SOF involvement in training exercises and real-world operations.

The first article, *Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM)*, by Col Mike Findlay, Commander SOCJFCOM, discusses the mission, role, and organization of SOCJFCOM. The article further discusses the integration of SOF into the joint force and the joint force commander's authority in regard to SOF utilization.

*Special Operations Forces-Integration in Joint Warfighting*, provides information on the relationship of SOF in the overall employment of forces, specifically at the theater level. LTC Mark Jones and LTC Wes Rehorn, SOCJFCOM, discuss planning and employment integration, and employment options of SOF as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) to enhance the overall mission effectiveness.

The third article by Col Mike Findlay, LTC Robert Green, and Maj Eric Braganca, SOCJFCOM, is based on an investigation of the role and integration of airpower with SOF ground forces, particularly in light



of the results of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. *Fires and Maneuver-Challenges on the Noncontiguous Battlefield. A SOF Perspective*, looks at the implications to doctrine, organization, and training of the cohesive effort between SOF and airpower support, and the challenges faced in the integration.

The fourth article, *Homeland Security and Special Operations: Sorting-out Procedures, Capabilities, and Operational Issues*, is a workshop report from a conference held in January 2002 by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and hosted by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). This conference was designed as an interagency brainstorming session to assist the Commanders of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in their roles in support of the homeland security effort.

The final two articles of this Bulletin are the June 2002 and November 2002 *Joint Special Operations Insights* newsletters. Published by SOCJFCOM to highlight specific topics, discussions, and recommendations, these newsletters provide a wealth of information on the challenges and lessons experienced by the SOF in areas such as training, command relationships, forming a JSOTF, procedures, techniques, and other aspects of the SOC mission.

GORDON C. NASH  
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commander, Joint Warfighting Center  
Director, Joint Training, J7





## JCLL UPDATE

*Mr. Mike Barker*

*Director, JCLL*

Rangers. Green Berets. SEALs. Air Commandos. Special operations forces (SOF) we have all heard about that represent specially trained elements of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the art of unconventional warfare. American military history is replete with the exploits of men associated with these units dating back to the French and Indian War:

- Major Robert Rogers, “Roger’s Rangers,” French and Indian War.
- Francis Marion, “Swamp Fox,” Revolutionary War.
- John Mosby, whose Confederate raiders harassed Union forces throughout the Civil War.
- 1st Special Service Force (Devil’s Brigade, Italian Campaign), 1st Ranger Battalion (Darby’s Rangers, Pointe du Hoc, Normandy), and Merrill’s Marauders (Japanese Campaign).
- Korea, Vietnam, Granada, Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan. Before 9/11/2001, this was a country that most Americans knew very little about. For those of us who have been around the military for over 20 years, we know it as the country that defeated the Soviet occupation forces with a resistance army of Majahideen fighters. Today, we know it as the defeated stronghold

of the Taliban, allies to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. We also know it as the first major SOF-centric operation with conventional forces placed in a supporting role. This relationship identified new challenges, or issues, that will require changes or modifications to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLP-F) construct, especially with regard to joint doctrine, training, and leadership.

Several articles provided for this Bulletin were written by the senior leadership within the Special Operations Command of the Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) and present their views on how to improve the supported/supporting command relationship between SOF and conventional forces. (Rebuttal articles are highly encouraged.)

The next several Bulletins are already in the works. The Jun 03 Bulletin will be an olio of several different articles and papers. The Sep and Dec 03 publications are programmed to focus on SOCJFCOM and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). If you have a paper that focuses on lessons, issues, trends, or capabilities on either of these subjects, or on other subjects of joint interest, please forward it to the JCLL for possible inclusion.

**“The time for extracting a lesson from history is  
ever at hand for those who are wise.”**

Demosthenes (384-322B.C.)

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# Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM)

*COL Mike Findlay*

Special Operations Forces (SOF) has a joint command focused on supporting the special operations aspects of joint force training, concept development and experimentation, and integration to enhance joint operations in the joint, multinational, and interagency environment.

Why is this important to you??? The nature of today's operations demand that we all know how to operate and fight as joint team. SOF may likely be in a crisis area before it occurs, and be part of whatever force is called upon to resolve the crisis, whether it is a U.S. unilateral joint team, or more likely a multinational and interagency effort. It is important that all SOF, from a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) to a Theater SOC, understand the "big picture" and issues facing our decision-makers and joint force commanders and staffs. By understanding their perspective and requirements, we will be better able to advise them on SOF considerations, and enhance our support to the fight.


SOCJFCOM, the Special Operations Command of the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has had this mission now for three years. Located in Norfolk, VA, near the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and Joint Experimentation Center, SOCJFCOM is well situated to assist in enhancing both the current and future readiness of SOF – and conventional forces. The SOCJFCOM is fully integrated into the joint training and experimentation world to ensure that key insights are shared between the SOF and conventional communities. As such the SOCJFCOM is well postured to support training of geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), joint task forces (JTFs), Theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs), and joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs). The SOCJFCOM is also well postured to collect and share gained insights in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to these commands and incorporate emerging insights into joint concept development and experimentation.

The SOCJFCOM has no assigned forces, but rather is

## **SOCJFCOM** *Mission Statement*

Support the special operations aspects of:

- 1) joint force training,
  - 2) joint concept development and experimentation,
  - 3) and joint force integration
- to enhance current and future military capabilities.




organized like a normal joint headquarters with a commander and 'J-code' staffs. However, SOCJFCOM is very weighted toward the J3 (Exercise Plans), and J7 (Training), and J9 (Concept Development & Experimentation). The SOCJFCOM has an affiliated reserve unit – our Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) that augments the SOCJFCOM when it stands up for exercises or experimentation as a JSOTF.

SOCJFCOM supports the training of joint force commanders and staffs in SOF employment.

We're working hand-in-hand with the JWFC's world class joint training organization responsible for supporting the training of GCC staffs and JTF commanders and staffs. They currently support approximately 15 joint exercises per year worldwide within the priorities established by the respective GCC Commanders. They are also called on to support real-world operations.

## **SOCJFCOM** *Organizational Breakout*




By working together with the JWFC, we'll be able to reach out and touch many of the prospective JTF headquarters designated by the GCCs such as XVIII Abn Corps, 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet, III MEF, and CENTAF. We support this GCC staff and JTF Hqs training by providing academic seminars on SOF capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations, and providing SOF obse-



erver – trainers (O/T) to provide additional training and feedback during the exercises or operations. We focus on considerations for SOF employment – with only a brief “prerequisite” overview on SOF capabilities and limitations.

While first recognizing that SOF may be one of a GCC’s primary means for achieving success in his theater security cooperation (TSC) plan and a likely force of choice for quickly responding to crises, we focus considerations for SOF employment toward those situations where SOF is part of a joint force. We then emphasize the absolute applicability of joint doctrine in a Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) considerations for employment of SOF.



Joint Publication 3-0 identifies four authorities that the establishing authority of a JTF provides that JFC. We use these authorities as the basis for the JFC’s employment of SOF (and all of his joint forces). But these authorities are not absolute. A JTF commander’s higher commander, normally a GCC Commander, applies numerous control measures in terms of limits to these authorities in the accomplishment of a mission. Rules of Engagement (ROE) based on mission, policy, and legal considerations is a common control measure. Other control measures may be the specifying of certain JTF task organizations (such as establishment of a JSOTF), retaining GCC-level control of certain forces or activities (e.g. SOF and some compartmented intelligence activities) and retaining mission approval authority for certain activities. So we can see that the four authorities are not absolute, but rather situationally dependent. Organizing the force and the Joint Operations Area (JOA) are discussed below.

**Authority to organize the force.** We address two areas in the organization of the JTF: task organization

#### Authorities of a Joint Force Commander

1. Authority to assign missions.
  2. Authority to organize the force.
  3. Authority to organize the JOA.
  4. Authority to direct required coordination.
- Joint Publication 3-0

and command relationships.

The JFC makes several key decisions in turning a force list into a task organization. Several are SOF specific. We emphasize that SOF is normally task organized to be located throughout the JTF organization. We note the advantages of attaching most Civil Affairs and tactical PSYOP units under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the ground force commanders – the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) or Army Forces (ARFOR) and Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR), while establishing a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) subordinate to the JTF. We also highlight the Naval Special Warfare Task Units (NSWTUs) that normally remain OPCON to the SOC or JSOTF, but may operate in direct support of the maritime component. AC-130s and other SOF aviation assets may temporarily fall under the Tactical Control (TACON) of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for specific missions such as Close Air Support (CAS) and Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR). And we note that, almost without exception, the JFC forms a JSOTF to provide centralized control of special operations.

The second area of focus is command relationships. Following the joint lead and lessons learned, we emphasize that key to effective, truly synergistic joint operations is consideration of all possible command relationships including the supported and supporting command relationships. Appreciation for, and use of, the supported and supporting command relationship has grown significantly in the past five years – both in joint doctrine and real-world operations.


This support command relationship has advanced joint warfare beyond the elementary and fractured component warfare perspective involving continual changes of OPCON and TACON toward a more coherent force with all components working together to accomplish the mission. And it reinforces a precept of joint warfare – taking advantage of Service core competencies – their expertise in employing their own forces to help each other rather than fragmenting or “CHOP”ing their forces to

other commanders who may not have the expertise needed to best employ them. It also supports a SOF principle noted in JP 3-05 of employing SOF through a SOF chain of command – again for the same reason – maintaining expertise in planning, preparation, and execution.

The supported and supporting command relationship has greatly advanced joint warfare.

Keys to success in supporting / supported command relationships are in the details: the JFC's clear delineation of scope of the support and authorities of the supported and supporting commander; the supported commander prioritization of mission needs and required reporting and liaison requirements; and, ascertainment and fulfillment of those needs by the supporting commander. Key enablers for this support command relationship are Liaison Officers (LNO) to ascertain the supported commander's needs, and elements such as the Special Operations Command and Control element (SOCCE) to facilitate support and enable responsive reporting to a supported commander.

### ***SOF Integration with the Joint Force***



Designation of supported and supporting commanders may often change throughout an operation, between phases, and even within phases and specific operations. But with a clear understanding of the commander's intent and priorities, this command relationship allows for the full capabilities of the joint force to be effectively brought to bear on mission accomplishment

This emphasis on supported and supporting command relationships does not however rule out the exercise of OPCON or TACON of SOF by non-SOF commanders when the situation warrants. There may be times when either the JFC or the JSOTF commander may weigh advantages and disadvantages, and opt to transfer SOF under the OPCON or TACON of another commander.

They may opt to change control of SOF in cases where:

1) the gaining commander has a long term need for the SOF support, 2) has the requisite expertise to control the SOF, and 3) the type of mission does not require additional SOF support or centralized SOF control. Bottom line - the JFC has authority to organize his joint force as he deems necessary.

**Authority to organize the JOA.** We address the JFC's authority to establish Joint Special Operations Areas (JSOA) much like he establishes areas of operation (AOs) for the land and naval component commanders. This battlefield geometry is important in fixing accountability and authority – particularly in the areas of targeting and maneuver. We emphasize, however, the pitfalls of being given an AO or JSOA greater than what the commander can monitor or control - implications such as the requirements for enemy and friendly force tracking, civil military responsibilities, and targeting.

Training of our SOC and JSOTF commanders and staffs.


Our Theater SOC's have numerous responsibilities: theater-strategic staff recommendation responsibilities to the GCC; command responsibilities for AOR-wide special operations; and in contingencies, the requirement to form operational level joint SOF headquarters, JSOTFs. Each SOC has identified training needs and shared ideas on how and when we can support their training. Many have addressed an "augmentee" trainup requirement. We believe that while we are well suited to meet their collective training requirements, the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) can best address their individual (both newly arriving and augmentee) educational needs.

We've identified several areas for JSOTF emphasis based on field input, lessons learned, and the school of hard knocks.

1. First is a good understanding of joint warfare from the JFC perspective. How better to succeed than by understanding your boss's concerns, priorities, and perspectives. Additionally, the SOC and JSOTF need to operate within the higher headquarter's battle rhythm with its many associated joint boards (like the joint target coordination board (JTCCB) and intelligence collection synchronization board (ICSB), groups (like the joint planning group (JPG)), centers, and cells.

2. Second is collaboration with the other components of a joint force: such as the JFACC and JFLCC. These

### SOC Commander's Roles



components, along with the JSOTF, may often be supported commanders.


3. Third is the need for proper joint manning documents (JMDs). Some personnel often forgotten are common operational picture (COP) managers, and fires support personnel to ensure the JSOTF is integrated into both targeting and accessing fire support. We also find that JMD fills are slow and often too late – hence the need for tailored battle rostering and unit training.

4. Our last emphasis area is in information management – ensuring that knowledge is shared efficiently and effectively throughout the JSOTF. In addition to looking at Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) initiatives, we've also developed a JSOTF web page to jump start JSOTF information management.

Sharpening the edge on SOF joint training methodologies.

In the past 2 years, SOCs have increasingly recognized the importance of their role at the theater-strategic level as the GCC special operations advisor (staff function) and commander of the entire AOR SOF (command function). The SOCs have also recognized their training challenges in performing as operational headquarters, and have increasingly requested external training support, much of it by the SOCOM designated and resourced JSOTF trainer, SOCJFCOM. The SOCs, with SOCOM's and SOCOM service components concurrence, have also increasingly tasked O-6 commands to form the core of JSOTFs performing at the operational and tactical level.

There is a very good news story here, as evidenced by the SOC training over the past 2 years. Some examples: SOC Pacific Command's (SOCPAC) crawl, walk, run training in 2001 and 2002 supported by SOCJFCOM




seminars, staffex, and then SOCPAC's full up participation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercise TANDEM THRUST – all this just prior to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and their operations in the Philippines. Another example: SOC Central Command (SOCCENT) in preparation for INTERNAL LOOK (IL) 03; again SOCJFCOM seminars and staffex at both the SOC and JSOTF level, with subsequent planned SOF Hqs participation in the JCS exercise – IL 03. A third example: SOC Southern Command (SOCSOUTH) with their training prior to and during a JFCOM computer assisted simulation exercise – UNIFIED ENDEAVOR. Another example is SOC European Command's (SOCEUR) training in support of one of their functional CONPLAN missions with subsequent planned participation in a EUCOM JCS exercise. Lastly, SOC Korea (SOCKOR) with SOCJFCOM supported training seminars, SOCKOR review and modification of its Special Operating Procedure's (SOP), and subsequent exercise of its warfighting competencies in ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL). SOCs and SOCOM components have also recognized the educational role of JSOU supporting both the intermediate and senior service schools, and in providing augmentees and newly assigned personnel with individual education in joint operations doctrine to better prepare them as members of joint commands.

SOF is taking the next step in increasing SOF's joint warfighting capabilities – that of a long term training strategy incorporating the crawl, walk, run methodology and “band of excellence.” This strategy consists of going beyond the “walk (partially trained)” level of training that SOCJFCOM, by itself, can support. It extends to the incorporation of all of the worldwide training opportunities and resources to increase warfighting proficiency to a “run (fully trained)” level. And it starts with clearly defined JMETL and identification of those

hqs that may be tasked as a JSOTF.

Key to this strategy is deliberate scheduling of “crawl” and “walk” training by the operational units through SOCOM with SOCJFCOM, integrated with “run” training as part of OCONUS JCS exercises and USJFCOM joint exercises in CONUS.


SOCJFCOM provides stand-alone “crawl and walk” level training support using “observer-trainers (O/T)” – officers and noncommissioned officers who have gained subject matter expertise through self study, schooling, and experience and insights gained from involvement in exercises and real-world operations. These O/T deploy to the training unit as part of SOCJFCOM tailored SOF Joint Training Teams (SOF JTTs). Our well known executive and functional level seminars, vignette style STAFFEXes, and facilitated after action reviews (AAR) and commander’s summary reports directly support the training audience’s commander’s training objectives. The SOF JTT can also support the training audience in “run” training through support to the planning and execution of JCS and JFCOM exercises. The JFCOM exercises provide excellent “bang for the buck” as they provide excellent realistic, high fidelity, joint integration exercises with a higher joint headquarters and the typical functional components as well (e.g. JFACC, JFLCC). And they occur in CONUS with its associated lesser cost than OCONUS exercises.



Obviously, the number of “run” level exercise opportunities for the SOCs and designated O-6 special operations commands is limited due to the number of actual realistic exercises and SOC and SOCJFCOM OPTEMPO and manning. There remains a great, and as yet untaken, opportunity to exercise at the “run” level during JFCOM sponsored ROVING SANDS and UNIFIED ENDEAVORS.

Supporting joint concept development and experimentation and integration.

We are assisting both USJFCOM and USSOCOM in their concept development and experimentation programs by sharing key insights gained from working with prospective JTF and JSOTF commanders and staffs. We currently review all USJFCOM conceptual documents, have a working knowledge of their ongoing experimentation program, and support key experiments such as the just completed MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE in addition to the PINNACLE PATHWAY series of experiments.



In conclusion, the men and women within SOCJFCOM, with a lot of help from the professionals in the Theater SOCs and the joint warfighting center have made great strides over the past few years. Their expertise is assisting the warfighters today as we support transformation for the future.

Visit our SIPRNET Web Page for more information at <http://socjfc.com>



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# Special Operations Forces – Integration in Joint Warfighting

*LTC Mark Jones  
LTC Wes Rehorn  
SOCJFCOM, Norfolk VA*

## Preface

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) thrust Special Operations Forces (SOF) into the spotlight of the U.S. military and the world. Despite this attention, these quiet professionals are just one member of the United States Armed Forces team. They are part of a joint team – a team made up of all of our military forces, along with the other elements of our national power, and our many multinational partners.

This paper addresses many of the areas that SOF are pursuing to gain greater integration within the joint team. Our hats are off to this maturation of the SOF community and the other services as they all strive to become a more proficient joint force – whose capabilities are fully integrated, all in support of our Nation’s leadership.


We’ve limited the scope of this paper in several key areas. First, we’ve kept the paper unclassified. Second, to stay on the focus of integration, we consciously omit discussion of capabilities and limitations of SOF. Third, we do not discuss two key elements of SOF – our psychological operations forces and civil affairs forces. Fourth, we don’t go into detail on integration within the interagency and multinational arena. These may be addressed in subsequent papers.

## Introduction

This paper addresses theater SOF, the role of the Theater Special Operations Command (SOC), employment options for employment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), and how full integration of SOF within the joint force enhances operations. The end of the paper discusses the importance of risk decisions and clear mission approval levels in terms of ensuring mission success and agility.

## Background: Theater SOF and Role of the SOC

The Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) has combatant command (COCOM) of assigned SOF in the theater, with operational control (OPCON) exercised for the most part by the theater SOC. The Theater Service Component Commands exercise administrative control (ADCON) of their respective Service SOF for common service type activities.




Commander, SOCOM is normally the supporting commander and provides SOF for employment by the GCCs. He may also be designated a supported commander in certain situations by the Secretary of Defense to conduct or coordinate operations.

Each of the GCCs has a Theater SOC. The SOC commander is normally an Army or Air Force Brigadier General or a Navy Rear Admiral. These SOC commanders have three major roles - much like the theater service component commanders. The SOC commanders have Operational Control (OPCON) of attached and assigned SOF within the area of responsibility (AOR), advise the GCC and staff on employment of SOF, and, when warranted, can quickly form operational headquarters to conduct special operations.

In every theater, SOF, like other elements of the armed forces, are conducting operations throughout the GCC’s AOR. These forces, due to their training, equipping, and experience, can and often do provide the GCC a ubiquitous presence throughout the AOR as “Global Scouts.” They are, however, high demand and low density forces, and are often given high risk missions as well, be they politically sensitive or operationally complex, that demand special operations expertise in both planning and execution.




This requires the SOC to maintain a theater-strategic perspective focused on condition setting while maintaining agility to respond to emergent requirements. This necessitates SOF to operate under centralized planning and control to maintain strategic and operational agility, and ensure mission success.



### Theater SOF Employment Options


We see three common options for employment of SOF, less the psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units.

The GCC may continue to command SOF through the Theater SOC. The SOC can either directly control SOF in a joint special operations functional component command (JFSOCC) role(1), or form a subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF) (i.e. a JSOTF) to control SOF for a specific period(2), or in a specific operational area. The SOC may be designated as either a supported or supporting commander vis-à-vis an GCC designated functional component or JTF for the conduct of operations in the AOR.



The GCC, with the SOC commander's recommendation, may also opt to attach SOF in the form of an established JSOTF under the control of a subordinate JTF(3). However, this "control" may not always be absolute. The GCC may opt to retain some SOF assets under OPCON of the SOC for theater-wide employment to retain agility to anticipate and respond to other requirements in the AOR. The GCC may also limit tasking authority of attached SOF assets for specific purposes within the capability of the JTF to control.


An important organizational consideration for all of these employment options is that the employing headquarters has the special operations (SO) expertise and systems to support the planning, control, and operational support of SOF. This expertise ensures that SOF are best employed within existing capabilities to support the joint warfight.



The typical JSOTF organization parallels that of most other JTFs. It has "service force" commanders like any other joint force. Administrative control (ADCON) lines still exist for service responsibilities. There are also similarities on the air side - the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) is functionally organized just as the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is for an GCC or JTF Commander. Subordinate task forces of the JSOTF are organized on either a functional basis (e.g. for reconnaissance or direct action) or geographic basis (e.g. by directing their focus for certain portions of the Joint Operations Area (JOA)) to best conduct operations. SOF has much experience working in the coalition and interagency environment. Coalition operations may be integrated at the tactical (e.g. team level) or in more of a parallel command structure dependent on the nation involved, amount of authority delegated from the coalition force's government

leadership, the capability and proficiency of the forces, and the mission and environment. SOF and the inter-agency also have much experience working together. Both understand the value of unity of effort, and work together toward common goals without worrying over achieving pure unity of command.

Taking the above options for employment of SOF in a Theater, there is a progression of organizations that an GCC may employ as he addresses the full range of military operations. It may start with a “peacetime” organization with the SOC (and other components) supporting theater security cooperation.




In the event of a crisis, the SOC can quickly form a small, tailored JTF, normally SOF-centric to provide rapid crisis response. The SOC is inherently joint, and is organized, equipped, and trained to the task of rapidly forming a JSOTF. The SOC can also perform as a lead JTF (such as the JTF-510 model in Pacific Command) to develop the situation as the GCC is forming a larger, more robust JTF. And at a later point, the SOF-centric JTF can be redesignated a JSOTF and subordinated to the larger JTF if appropriate. Of note, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) currently being developed by USJFCOM in conjunction with the GCCs provides the GCC and prospective JTF commanders an additional capability for command or augmentation throughout this progression.

### Preparation of the Battlespace

Today, more than ever before, the GCCs are concentrating on focused theater security cooperation and condition setting in the AOR to support national interests and potential military operations. This preparation of


the battlespace consists of both intelligence and operational activities (IPB and OPB) as depicted on the chart. SOF can support other government agencies in IPB activities, and conduct OPB under the GCC control.



In this latter role, SOF conducts pre-crisis activities to gain access and understanding of the AOR, and conducts advance force operations to set conditions for anticipated military operations. It is important for potential JTF commanders, staffs, and components to know of SOF's role in both this intelligence and operational preparation of the battlespace. SOF and other government agencies will very likely be on the ground and in the area as a JTF builds up, and forces deploy and prepare for operations.

### Integration in Employment


One of the themes previously addressed has been integration versus deconfliction. This has absolute relevance in the SOF community. While SOF, like the other components of the joint force, still receive their key tasks from the higher Joint Force Commander (JFC), we have come to see the greater synergy gained by more lateral collaboration and meeting of “peer” component needs in accordance with priorities established by the higher commander.



## Integration in Planning

SOF subject matter expertise is essential at all headquarters that are employing or working with special operations forces - just as it is a necessity for the other service forces.

SOF remains a strong advocate of the liaison officer (LNO) to perform as the JSOTF Commander's personal representative at the gaining hqs. Both physical LNOs and virtual presence (through newly developed collaboration tools) are important to optimize integration and effectiveness of the force.



We have noted a stumbling block in the past when the LNO is relegated to performing traditional staff activities such as updating the situation map, or monitoring JSOTF activities. These are functions and responsibilities of the headquarters staff; these SO-related responsibilities are JTF SO staff element duties, wholly different than the plans-centric and commander representative functions of an LNO. You may also note the LNO's relevance in terms of facilitating supported/supporting command relationships with adjacent components by ascertaining and assisting in the supported commanders' staff planning.


Last point - time and again we've also seen how other component LNOs to the JSOTF significantly enhance situational awareness and integration of planning and operations.

## Integration in the Battlespace

SOF must be well integrated in the battlespace. Key to success here is the interrelationship of specified areas

of operation, the authorities of the designated supported commander, and how SOF maintains SOF expertise in planning and execution of SO missions which satisfy the supported commander needs.

We typically see a SOCCE (Special Opns Command & Control Element) or Navy Special Warfare task unit (NSWTU) collocated with the supported force commander to control subordinate forces within the respective AO. It typically provides direct support (DS) to the supported commander and exercises TACON of subordinate forces. These supported and supporting command relationships work well to enhance the joint fight.




The SOCCE and NSWTU in conjunction with appropriate LNOs make the supported / supporting command relationship very effective and agile. Obviously this is not the only way to work the Command and Control (C2), but it's sure a good starting point. And, as always, the JFC has the authority to organize to best accomplish the mission. SOF reporting is also integrated to enhance joint operations. Reporting is performed within the parameters established by the supported commander - within his specified timeliness and content parameters. This often entails a SOCCE or NSWTU, or even the Special Operations Liason Element (SOLE), to directly terminate an operational unit's communications. We have seen how this can reduce "sensor-to-shooter" times to minutes.


## Targeting and Fires

As articulated in JP 3-09, designation of areas of operation and supported commanders are key to effective and responsive fires. This is true both on a linear, contiguous battlefield as well as the noncontiguous battle

field. The noncontiguous environment has many associated challenges in the orchestration of fires and maneuver, much like what we saw in Afghanistan. In the noncontiguous environment, we still see the need for battlespace geometry and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs).



We have found, through insights gained from OEF in Afghanistan, that the JFC has several key decisions to make: first is an upfront prioritization and apportionment to ensure maneuver and fires commanders are provided the resources to accomplish their missions. Second is designation of areas of operation and/or joint special operations areas giving authority and responsibility to these ground force commanders. These areas may be much smaller than previously seen — and in effect “gridded - and overlaid with kill boxes,” and may be rapidly activated and deactivated as forces move. Last is designation of supported and supporting commanders to fix accountability and provide requisite respective authority for operations and coordination.




SOF has been working with the joint community and

the Services on how to better support time sensitive targeting. We have found that reporting can be very responsive - even over-the-horizon reporting. SOF and the services are still working additional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in the area of terminal guidance operations especially with the new munitions on the battlefield today. We have also established rapid fires clearance processes within the joint fires element at the JSOTF. Key to this is accurate force tracking and common operational pictures (COP).

## Force Tracking

Force tracking is taking on additional importance in noncontiguous and fast moving operations. Both friendly and enemy force tracking and dissemination is important - both to mission success as well as preventing fratricide.

We note continuing challenges in the JFC establishing a clear COP architecture and specifying the timeliness of feeds - both manually and automatically provided feeds.



SOF, in most cases, has clearly gone in the direction of providing full vs discrete (or filtered) feeds to the COP. We have found that fratricide due to lack of common situational awareness is a much greater threat to our personnel than is the potential compromise of SOF locations over these secure COP mechanisms.

## Logistics and Communications

SOF relies heavily on the Services for much of its service support - in particular base operations support, force protection, and common services - such as fuel and rations. Funding is also complex business on today's battlefield. JFCs and their staff are challenged with




understanding Title 50 type of funding, especially when working with and supporting indigenous forces.

SOF communications are much more interoperable with the rest of the joint force than ever before - using the Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) to pass most information. The JFC still must develop the communications and multi-level security policies to interoperate with coalition partners. Multi-level security is often the greatest challenge for both SOF and the JFC.

### **Risk and Mission Approval Authorities**

In recent exercises and operations we've seen that the joint force commander often faces a dilemma in balancing risk – the risk to accomplishment of the strategic objectives with the risk to the forces conducting the operation. This relationship of strategic to tactical risk may in fact be inversely proportional; crafting the operation to afford low risk to the force may incur unacceptable risk to the overall strategic objective.

Another observation is that as tactical risk goes very high, there is a corresponding increase in strategic risk - due to the higher possibility of tactical mission failure.




An illustrative example of this is in the arrangement of operations (OPNS). Sequential operations may allow for lower tactical risk but at the risk of the target getting away or conducting asymmetric attacks elsewhere to attain his objectives. Simultaneous operations may have higher risk to the force due to the 'bridge too far' aspect, but often get to the strategic objective(s) more

quickly.

Special operations forces can help mitigate this dilemma by operating at the high end of the tactical risk domain. This brings us back to the JFC decisions in terms of risk, identifying how to mitigate tactical risk, and the degree of delegation of mission approval authority. This delineation of mission approval levels allows designated subordinates to operate within the commander's intent and take advantage of rapidly emerging situations on the battlefield.

One of the best ways we've seen that JFCs articulate mission approval levels is through the use of a mission approval matrix. It allows the JFC to assign the appropriate mission approval authority based on a number of criteria: political, economic, or informational sensitivities, risk to the force in terms of mission accomplishment, use of low density assets, and collateral damage.



The type of mission is also a factor, whether it is a new or recurring type of mission. This type of approval process allows subordinates to work within the commander's intent while still retaining the appropriate controls necessary for oversight.

### **Conclusion**

Joint warfare is exactly that; it's joint, not component warfare. And SOF is one of the team members in the joint team. Joint warfare is about working together to get the mission accomplished. Gone are the stovepipe days where one had to own a force - read OPCON or TACON - to get support and unity of command. With the increase in use of the supported and supporting com-



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mand relationship, we are finding much greater synergy, trust, and confidence between the members of the joint force.

We've noted some key areas of emphasis that are continually reinforced in both exercises and real-world operations. A key emphasis area is more definitive prioritization of supporting efforts to ensure everyone knows the priorities and allocates their efforts to support the joint fight versus only their component operations.

#### **Key Areas of Emphasis**

- **Clear Battlespace Geometry**
- **Command Relationships enabling Effectiveness and Agility**
  - **Use of Supporting and Supported Command Relationships**
- **JFC Prioritization of Supporting Efforts**
  - **Much like Apportionment Decisions**
- **Structured Collaborative Environment**
  - **To enable component interaction**
- **Risk Decisions & Empowerment**

We've also seen how a structured collaborative environment can assist in the development of the best concept of operations through gaining the insights of all the players. This structured and robust collaborative environment can allow for the exchange of information and intent amongst not only the JFC, his staff, and the components, but also between the warfighters of the JTF - the components. Lastly is the absolute importance of determining acceptable risk and defining clear lanes of authority for mission approval.

*LTCs Mark Jones and Wes Rehorn are members of Special Operations Command of US Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM). Mark, a special operations aviator, and Wes, a Special Forces officer, have gleaned these insights through 3 years of working with all of the Theater Special Operations Commands in both exercises and real-world operations, and by seamless interface with the conventional joint force trainers at the Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, VA. The SOCJFCOM unit web address is <http://www.socjfc.com.navy.mil> on NIPRNET and <http://socjfc.com> on the SIPRNET.*

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# Fires and Maneuver – Challenges on the noncontiguous battlefield A SOF Perspective

*COL Mike Findlay  
LTC Robert Green  
Maj Eric Braganca  
SOCJFCOM, Norfolk VA*

## Preface

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and joint air power achieved spectacular results during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan – particularly in those first few months when the eyes of America and the world were watching. The initiative, courage, and strength of character of the American Fighting men and women showed bright – we are all in debt to them.

We decided to investigate the integration of air power with special operations on the ground to gain insights on the challenges our forces faced in these chaotic first months, and how our front line commanders worked together to overcome them. Our hats are off to their calmness under pressure, their professionalism, their selfless leadership, and their one team, one fight mentality. And, because we know the SOF side well, a big salute to RADM Bert Calland, Army Colonel John Mulholland, Navy Captain Bob Harward, and Air Force Colonel Frank Kisner, for their leadership of those great special operations soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Also, a HOOAH to the air power side, to those who planned and controlled the air operations, and to those who flew the missions.

This integration of air power with special operations has significant doctrinal, organizational, and training implications. As the joint SOF trainer, Special Operations Forces Joint Training Teams (SOF JTTs) from the Special Operations Command of the Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) assisted the joint special operations commanders in OEF by sharing current insights, practices, and knowledge of the best techniques and procedures by which to employ SOF. While overall successful, we believe we could have better proactively focused on and assisted in improving air-ground fires integration. Integration of air power and special operations isn't new – in fact SOF and the joint air commu-

nity are very adept at close integration – and the men on the ground did a great job working with the air support. But at the operational level of war, integration on a noncontiguous battlefield with large indigenous maneuver forces was a new challenge for us and, to a certain extent, the operators. We were seeing a different paradigm from the traditional one of airpower in support of large maneuvering corps and division elements on a linear battlefield. We all learned and adapted. And after the fact, both the operators and we have further thought about the challenges and solutions of fires integration in noncontiguous operations. This paper addresses those thoughts.

The SOF Joint Training Teams dedicate this paper to the special operators and the airmen who won the day. We have learned much from OEF, and hope that these insights, while too late for the operations back in 2001, are thought provoking and of assistance to others in future operations.

We appreciate the support many gave us in the writing of this paper, in particular USAF Col Larry Stutzriem (ACC/XP), USA COL John Mulholland (5<sup>th</sup> SFG), USAF Col Bob Holmes (SOCOM), USAF Col Frank Kisner (16<sup>th</sup> SOW), USAF Col Mike Longoria (18 ASOG), USA COL (ret) Don Richardson, USA LTC Wes Rehorn, and Lt Col (ret) Rick Newton (JSOU).

To stay on focus, we consciously omitted detailed discussion of the SOF task organization, and did not address the multiple SOF Hqs' impact on Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) coordination nor US Army Central Command's (ARCENT) role as the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC).<sup>1</sup> We alone bear sole responsibility for the paper's facts, analysis, and recommendations.

### Key Challenges:

- Lack of Battlespace Geometry
- Command Relationships
- SOF Role in the Targeting Process
- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Small Air Support Organization in SOF Hqs

## Introduction

In Afghanistan during OEF, U.S. forces experienced a fully noncontiguous battlefield and discovered numerous challenges in coordinating fires and maneuver absent the traditional boundary lines demarcating land ar-

eas of operation (AO). We will discuss the challenges, the why and how commanders overcame these challenges, and offer insights for even further improvement. We purposely follow discussion of each challenge with the “field” solution; this in many cases takes away a “smoking gun” analysis and could result in the reader questioning whether there is an issue or challenge. We contend these are key future challenges, and offer insights at the end of the paper to potential solutions. Lastly, while we provide a special operations perspective on these challenges and insights, many have value to future conventional force operations on noncontiguous battlefields.

We address challenges in battlespace geometry, command relationships, air apportionment, and fire support processes for noncontiguous environments. We then shares insights on recommended increased use of small “gridded” areas of operation in conjunction with overlaid “kill boxes,” value of the “ground-directed interdiction” (GDI) initiatives, greater SOF leverage of joint targeting processes, continuous blue force tracking, and more robust and better trained fire support organizations for SOF.

#### Key Insights:

- Battlespace Geometry: Gridded AOs
- Support Command Relationships work!
- Value of Blue Force Tracking
- Value of a SOF Joint Fires Element
- Value of an Air Support Organization for SOF


Increased use of delineated areas of operation and killbox management techniques will better clarify fires and fire support responsibilities. Increased SOF understanding and participation in the targeting process will result in better input into the apportionment process, more timely target nominations and more responsive fire support. This will enable SOF to take full advantage of all of the effects that joint fires can bring to the fight by better leveraging planned interdiction and strategic attack, rather than primarily relying on close air support. We also support more investigation of the GDI concept in which the ground force identifies targets and directs interdiction fires. Lastly, this paper concurs with current emerging thoughts on developing an improved air support organization for special operations headquarters (much like the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) in the corps headquarters) to better facilitate actual execution of fire support for special operations.

Many in SOF and the Air Force have focused on specific technical and tactical training-related challenges for the actual request and control of close air support. While these may offer some improvements, we believe that harnessing the power of existing command and control tools offers the best opportunity for integration.

### Challenges and ‘Field’ Solutions

#### Battlespace geometry and command relationships

Challenge: Through the first months of OEF, there was minimal establishment of any subordinate (to Central Command (CENTCOM)) joint operations areas (JOA) or ground AO in Afghanistan.



The CENTCOM Commander did not initially assign the landmass of Afghanistan to the Theater Special Operations Command (SOC), a joint task force commander, or a ground commander as none were readily capable of performing all of the functions inherent in owning this large area (i.e. the targeting, enemy situational awareness, fires clearance, etc.). He instead retained it as part of the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Even later in the campaign, when he assigned the land mass to the CFLCC, and subsequently to the “de facto” forward land component, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, one could argue that the CFLCC was not capable of performing all of the functions of owning an AO.<sup>2</sup> Nor was the special operations component manned or trained to control such a large area. Neither organization had the command and control (C2) capability, or the forces, to monitor and control such a large area. It was only with the activation of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180, a joint task force formed around the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, that a subordinate joint command was able to monitor and control

the Afghanistan AO – designated as a Coalition JOA (CJOA).

### Definitions

#### **Fires**

The effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons

#### **Joint Fires**

Fires provided during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective

#### **Joint Fire Support**

Joint Fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, population, and key waters

Joint Pub 3-09

This initial absence of land boundaries, and the significant and widespread maneuver of SOF and Northern Alliance forces (and later, of conventional ground forces) in noncontiguous operations throughout Afghanistan, brought out some key challenges in traditional thinking of fires and fire support vis-à-vis maneuver.

Traditionally, ground maneuver occurs in the ground commander's AO. Operational design has always included two fundamental components - a mission and a designated area of operations (battlespace geometry) in which to accomplish that mission. This battlespace geometry is very important, especially to set the structure by which the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and the ground commander coordinate their operations to gain synergy. Numerous doctrinal publications lay out the relationship between these two commanders – Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-09 are two key documents. These publications direct “the land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders within the areas of operations designated by the joint force commander (JFC). Within their designated AOs, land and naval force commanders synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders have the *authority* to designate the *target priority*, effects, and *timing* of fires within their AOs [emphasis added].”<sup>3</sup> These publications also address the JFACC's normal authority and responsibilities outside of ground areas of operation and joint special operations areas (JSOAs) as the supported commander for interdiction and strategic attack.<sup>4</sup>

During the first months of operations in Afghanistan, there was very little battlespace geometry, no designated JSOAs or ground AOs, only the use of fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) such as no-fire-areas (NFAs), restricted-fire-areas (RFAs), and later killboxes.

By definition an FSCM is not a “control” measure; it is a coordinating measure for expediting or restricting fires support. Thus, one could argue that the CFACC was the supported commander throughout Afghanistan based on no established ground AO or JSOA.

### **Fire Support Coordinating Measures**

Fire support coordinating measures are designed to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and, at the same time, provide safeguards for friendly forces. JP 1-02

#### Permissive

To expedite the attack against enemy targets


#### Restrictive

To safeguard friendly forces and to prevent fratricide

The CFACC was indeed responsible for conducting interdiction and strategic attack throughout Afghanistan, and very likely (especially early in the war) viewed SOF (and the Northern Alliance) as key “sensors” on the ground supporting CFACC fires. This perception and use of SOF as an important human sensor has longstanding precedent; SOF and the Air Force have developed numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to enhance these types of “sensor-to-shooter” operations. However, in Afghanistan, the role for SOF was very different. SOF (with their Northern Alliance partners) was a maneuver force requiring joint fire support, just like any other friendly conventional ground force. Thus a key challenge was, absent a designated area of operations, how fires and fire support would support SOF as a maneuver force.

In the fall of 2001, many saw JSOTF-North as a “de facto” ground commander conducting maneuver and requiring fire support. In fact, several documents specified the special operations component as the “main” effort during some of the early phases. However, this designation as the “main” effort speaks to priority, and is not a command relationship as is the designation as a “supported commander.” The documents never directed when or where the JSOTF was the supported commander relative to other components of the joint force (specifically the CFACC). This had significant implications for the JSOTF's relationship with the CFACC. Additionally, despite being a “de facto” ground commander, the JSOTF Commander may not have known the extent

of his arguable authority to “designate the *target priority*, effects, and *timing* of fires” within his operational area. And, bottom line – nothing in terms of orders or directives expressly granted that authority; JSOTF-North had neither a designated AO nor was it designated a “supported commander.”



**“Field” Solution:** Fortunately, the commanders and their staff at the JSOTF and CFACC developed work-arounds to this lack of battlespace geometry, and vague command relationships to develop target lists and prosecute targets. A system of kill boxes and fires clearance procedures minimized the potential for fratricide while providing agility and responsiveness. Additionally, the CFACC worked with the JSOTF to develop logical prioritized target lists, and allocated a large amount of airpower to directly support SOF on the ground. However, this was mostly all done informally; no clear battlespace geometry for SOF was established, the only significant change was establishment of a “CJOA” and establishment of a CFLCC, and later a JTF.<sup>5</sup> But these did not solve the requirement for SOF controlled AOs and clear delineation of SOF as the supported commander prioritizing targets and designating required effects. This remains a key lesson learned; the Regional Combatant Command and Theater Special Operations Command (SOC) need to focus on ensuring clarity in command relationships and battlespace geometry in future planning.

#### **Air apportionment and fire support processes**

**Challenge:** Air apportionment in the first 10 days of OEF was focused on “JOA-wide” interdiction and strategic attack against fixed targets. There was minimal initial apportionment of air to support SOF operations

in either an interdiction or close air support (CAS) role.

#### ***Close Air Support (CAS)***

**Pre-planned CAS:** Those CAS missions foreseeable early enough in planning process to be included in the ATO process. Can be either for scheduled or on-call missions

**Immediate CAS:** ...cannot be identified early enough to allow detailed coordination and planning, which may preclude tailored ordnance loads..

**Emergency CAS:** CAS arising from situations requiring an immediate time-critical response such as troops in contact. (*No referenced definition – widespread usage*)

JP 3-09.3

This was probably due to several factors. First, was the largely air-centric focus and robust air control capabilities in CENTCOM over the past 10 years that had been developed for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. There was also a lack of precedent and experience in SOF being viewed as a maneuver force, and the lack of any battlespace geometry designating SOF as having an assigned ground AO (or JSOA) for reasons discussed earlier. Lastly, there was some doubt in SOF’s ability to quickly take a decisive role in the ground fight with its Northern Alliance partners. Thus, most of the air being flown was “JOA-wide” interdiction or strategic attack sorties – with the CFACC controlling those operations in accordance with CENTCOM targeting priorities and stated rules of engagement – *exactly their assigned function and a doctrinally correct role.*

The strategic urgency of inserting SOF into northern Afghanistan, coupled with the ongoing air campaign and lack of a robust fire support (e.g. targeting) organization in both the JSOTF headquarters and within the SOF liaison element (SOLE) at the CFACC, contributed to the small amount of sortie allocation to CAS or SOF-nominated interdiction in these early days. The SOC and JSOTF did not nominate many interdiction targets, nor receive a significant CAS allocation for distribution subsequent to their initial infiltrations. There was good reason for the small numbers of interdiction targets; positive identification rules of engagement (ROE) limited early-on interdiction of “moving” targets, and thus, SOF air crews were requested to plan routes around known enemy threats. In addition, the relatively new and ad hoc joint fires element (JFE) at the JSOTF was still learning and defining its role within the Theater



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targeting and fires process.<sup>6</sup> Nor was the air support organization at the JSOTF initially robust enough to gain and distribute allocated CAS, clear fires, and coordinate CAS. At the CFACC, the SOLE was focused on deconflicting special operations air sorties with conventional air missions, as well as deconflicting interdiction and attack sorties in the vicinity of ground SOF, and not focused on targeting. Bottom line – SOF prioritized their efforts on deploying forces, and planning and executing a major unconventional warfare campaign within the short timeline constraints over that of detailed theater-level coordination requirements for fires and targeting. Thus, with little special operations-nominated interdiction or pre-planned CAS, the CFACC initially provided fire support to SOF teams collocated with the Northern Alliance on an immediate CAS basis – i.e. sorties diverted from other missions.<sup>7</sup>

An example of the difficulties of integrating fires in this noncontiguous environment is the operation at Masare-Sharif. Minimal preplanned CAS and interdiction were developed for this attack, again for good reasons. The JSOTF couldn't predict locations of the opposition groups nor the mobile enemy forces. Additionally, the nature of Afghan tribal warfare (with capitulating forces rapidly changing sides and joining their enemies) dictated against SOF overly planning for interdiction. And there was no defined AO or JSOA within which the JSOTF could "doctrinally" designate target priorities and effects.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the JSOTF largely relied on the use of immediate CAS to meet fire support requirements. The JSOTF could possibly have taken more advantage of the targeting process to request interdiction support and preplanned CAS. But many admit, that in all honesty, SOF were spoiled by fairly responsive air. At this point, SOF on the ground were generating most of the targets, and there were abundant air assets not tasked with other requirements such as counterair, etc. SOF needed only to identify targets and the CFACC would provide fire support. CFACC assets were also very aggressive and responsive in fulfilling emergency CAS (ECAS) requests where CAS was requested to support SOF teams in unexpected contact with the enemy and in danger of being overrun.

"Field" Solution: As the war progressed, the CFACC and SOF quickly developed the GDI concept in addition to normal CAS. The CFACC supported SOF requirements for interdiction of enemy forces that SOF could see and provide mensurated targeting data, but with whom they were not yet in direct contact. In this

concept, the CFACC generated interdiction and CAS sorties for Afghanistan without designating specific targets. The aircraft then flew to the area, and received their targets as ground teams found and reported enemy forces. Ground elements were able to direct a great number of strike platforms, including many nontraditional platforms such as B-52s. The JSOTF and the CFACC used Killbox techniques to reduce possibilities of fratricide with this GDI. The JSOTF also established a more robust ASOC-like capability similar to that of an Army corps ASOC. This ASOC-like organization coordinated with the CFACC, C2 aircraft, and strike platforms to facilitate the joint fires. On-call strike platforms were handed off by the ASOC or airborne C2 platform, made direct radio contact with the ground team, and successfully struck their targets as designated.

GDI was beneficial and successful for two principal reasons: most targets at this point were moving forces, not stationary facilities; and positive identification (PID) was often required in accordance with CENTCOM rules of engagement. However several minor areas have been identified as requiring additional work for future operations. First is battlespace geometry - the designation, where feasible, of areas of operation or JSOAs (remembering the size and control implications discussed earlier in battlespace geometry challenges). This designation (in addition to standard FSCMs) will assist in the targeting cycle process, with its related apportionment, target nomination aspects, and fires clearance and synchronization authorities. Second is identification of the supported commanders to ensure clear prioritization of objectives / targets. Absent this delineation, a more simplistic (and possibly incorrect) division of authority may arise; all interdiction may be viewed as in support of the JFACC, with only CAS designated to support ground commanders. Third is continued emphasis on blue force tracking through use of beacon devices (e.g. MTX and Grenadier Brat tracking devices) to ensure good situational awareness and minimize potential for fratricide. Fourth is definitive ROE that supports target engagement in situations where PID is infeasible or impossible. This ROE dilemma is a recurring challenge with no easy solution. There remains a balance between the rapid declaration of a target as hostile to enable rapid attack with the risk of inadvertent strikes of nonhostile targets.

Summary of Identified Challenges. Many of the challenges have been noted above. However, in summary they are:

1. Lack of clearly designated supported/supporting command relationships.
2. Lack of delineation of areas of operation and joint special operations areas.
3. Non-apportionment and allocation of air assets in support of SOF in the early portion of the fight. Included is lack of clear guidance from CENTCOM on fires prioritization.
4. Lack of personnel at the special operations component and at the JSOTF level fully trained in joint fires procedures and capable of influencing the joint targeting process.
5. Lack of emphasis at the SOLE on targeting and fire support issues.
6. Lack of a formal ASOC-like organization at the SOF component or JSOTF level to facilitate all aerial fire support.
7. Close air support control procedures and methods (not discussed in this paper).


### **The Way Ahead – Insights and Recommendations**

Many are working on refining this new paradigm of fires and maneuver in noncontiguous environments. The sections below summarize some of the steps Special Operations Forces and the Air Force are taking to enhance fires and maneuver in the joint fight. They advocate increased use of small “gridded” areas of operation, increased use of overlaid “kill boxes,” increased SOF leverage of joint targeting processes, more robust and trained fire support organizations for SOF, and continued exploitation of blue force tracking technologies.

Increased use of delineated areas of operation and killboxes. No longer do areas of operation have to be linear nor large. A gridded arrangement of small areas of operation that can be individually activated and deactivated has proven feasible and can support rapid decisive operations with quickly moving forces. Use of killboxes overlaid on or outside of these defined areas of operation is an excellent FSCM that facilitates more responsive fires and fire support. No-Fire Areas (NFA) and Restrictive Fire Areas (RFA) may still be necessary to protect forces that may be supporting the CFACC’s interdiction efforts as sensors. All of these battlespace geometry and FSCMs are enhanced through the more reliable blue force tracking means available today.

Increased SOF participation in the targeting process.

### ***The Noncontiguous Battlefield***



SOF will continue to operate in noncontiguous environments in both supported and supporting commander roles. SOF needs to continue its increased participation in the joint targeting process through a robust, fully manned, and trained joint fires element (JFE) in the headquarters. Additionally, the SOLE must better support special operations requirements for fires in the targeting and air tasking order (ATO) development processes. The SOLE needs dedicated and trained maritime and ground expertise, similar to that of the Army’s Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), in order to better represent the SOC and JSOTF commanders during apportionment, target nomination, and the execution phases. Moreover, the SOLE must be directly linked to the future operations and future plans cells at the SOC and JSOTF headquarters to ensure fire support requirements for special operations are addressed in the theater-level planning cycle. The SOLE must also continue its superb activities in deconfliction and fratricide prevention.

The SOF community needs to enhance its knowledge and integration within the joint targeting process. The special operations community needs staff officers and NCOs who are operational-level fire support experts – who know the targeting process, and can plan for and direct fires to support JSOTFs. In addition to these experts, special operations officers and NCOs should attend joint aerospace command and control courses that will allow them to effectively operate as part of the joint fires element (JFE) within a SOF operational headquarters. Greater coordination on fires is also required between the JSOTF and the JFACC, and between the JSOTF and the JFLCC. The JFE and the SOLE need to learn how to influence the apportionment decision made by the joint force commander. And, the JFE and the SOCCE need to learn how to gain the proper support

by the JFLCC when operating in the JFLCC AO. The consequence for failing to learn these processes is being excluded when apportionment and allocation decisions are being made, thus being deprived of valuable fires support.

Air support organization for SOF. Much like the JFE and SOLE assist in target planning and coordination, so will an enhanced air support organization in the SOF headquarters (much like the air support operations center in the corps headquarters) better facilitate actual execution of fire support for special operations. A term “JACE” – joint air control element - has been coined by the 18<sup>th</sup> Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) commander for this type of organization. This JACE would be a cell within the JSOTF JFE and will be key to fully integrate air power with special operations.

Blue force Tracking. Continuous blue force tracking of SOF in noncontiguous environments will enhance situational awareness and reduce the chance for fratricide. Recommend SOF continue to pursue both automated tracking means (e.g. grenadier brat) while refining manual tracking and update techniques into the common operational picture (COP) when beacons are not available. Also recommend strong consideration of SOF providing full vs discrete (or filtered) feeds to the COP to ensure common situational awareness. It is believed that the likelihood of casualties due to fratricide from a lack of this situational awareness is much greater than from potential compromise of SOF locations over these secure COP mechanisms.

Training and Exercises. The SOF and conventional community can build on these insights, train staffs and commanders, and develop even better techniques and procedures through more involvement in CONUS-based, high fidelity, realistic joint training and exercises. There are many simulation and field exercises in which we can improve warfighting readiness.<sup>10</sup> Train the way we’ll fight – let’s not do something for the first time on the battlefield that hasn’t already been practiced in training or exercises.

## Conclusion

SOF and the JFACC worked well together in OEF overcoming some initial challenges. Much was learned. SOF recognized the value of the targeting process, and the JFACC recognized the value of SOF as both a maneuver force and an accurate and discriminating sensor on

the ground. SOF definitely learned the value of air apportionment and allocation to gain interdiction support and close air support. Both learned the necessity of developing clear battlespace geometry and designating supported/supporting command relationships at the start of operations. SOF learned the necessity for the SOLE to be an active player in targeting and fires – in addition to its traditional airspace coordination and deconfliction roles. SOF also learned the requirement for a knowledgeable JFE in the headquarters to better participate in the targeting process. And, the JFACC discovered the necessity for an ASOC-like organization for attachment to SOF headquarters to better control allocated air assets in support of SOF operations. Yes, the insights gained from OEF in Afghanistan are of great value to our joint air and SOF organizations as they continue to develop better organizations, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

## ENDNOTES

1. ARCENT, designated as the CFLCC in late November, was assigned responsibility for land operations in the coalition joint operations area Afghanistan (CJOA AFG) to coordinate and synchronize land operations. As a land component commander, they did not assume the full responsibilities of a joint force commander for the CJOA. This did cause confusion on targeting and fires. This same lack of definition also frustrated the 10th Mtn Div as they later took on certain CFLCC responsibilities. (Authors’ perception). However, all said, we do not desire to get into this degree of detail on CFLCC operations as it will dilute the focus of the paper.
2. See first endnote for discussion on this.
3. Source: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, (Ch.1, para. 3.b.)
4. This delineation of JFACC authorities for interdiction “outside of AOs and JSOAs” is key in later discussion of the 18th ASOG coined term “ground directed interdiction (GDI).” GDI may occur in or out of designated AOs and JSOAs; the location of the interdiction will determine who is the supported commander and who is responsible for fires clearance.
5. As will be discussed later, the CJOA / CFLCC establishment did not fully solve the issues. By definition a CJOA includes air and surface space; the CFLCC did not control the airspace, nor have authority over the CFACC. The TACON subordination of the JSOTF-North (a joint force) to the CFLCC (a ground force) was also confusing. Again, it was the commanders, the CFLCC commander and deputy commander, the CFACC, and the JSOTF commander who worked together to accomplish the mission.
6. Fortunately, 18th ASOG deployed one of their squadrons to the JSOTF-North location. The squadron commander and his personnel were able to fulfill many of the targeting responsibilities in addition to their normal Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) functions.
7. As noted above, the 18th ASOG personnel did a great job in the targeting area. Our comments are not meant to minimize their excep-

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tional work.

8. The JSOTF did however nominate targets for this operation. And due to the mission focus of all concerned, the operation succeeded.

9. Insights on ROE and PID are drawn from an unclassified article in "Inside The Pentagon," dated January 9, 2003, titled "Key Command Banned Nearly All Attacks On Afghan Roads, Bridges."

10. ACC and SOF units are already doing this – with great success!!

COL Mike Findlay (USA), LTC Bobby Green (USA), and Major Eric Braganca (USAF) are assigned to the Special Operations Command of US Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM). SOCJFCOM has the mission of supporting the special operations aspects of joint force training, concept development and experimentation, and integration to enhance joint operations in the joint, multinational, and interagency environment. SOCJFCOM has gleaned numerous insights through 3 years of working with all of the Theater Special Operations Commands, and by seamless interface with the conventional joint force trainers at the Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, VA. It shares these insights through publications and deployments of SOF joint training teams (SOF JTTs) to support exercises and real-world operations with both conventional and SOF warfighters. The SOCJFCOM unit web address is <http://www.socjfc.com.navy.mil> on NIPRNET and <http://www.socjfc.com.navy.smil.mil> on the SIPRNET.

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**Editor's Note:** This Workshop Report is from a conference held in January 2002 by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Our thanks and appreciation go to DTRA and to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Dr. Jacquelyn Davis, Executive Vice President, for permission to reprint this paper in the JCLL Bulletin. In the report, the term "Commander-In-Chief (CINC)" is used to refer to the Combatant Commanders. This term is no longer used for other than the President of the United States per direction of the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum, dated 24 October 2002.

## **Homeland Security and Special Operations: Sorting-Out Procedures, Capabilities, and Operational Issues**

*A Workshop Report  
April 2002*

### **Introduction**

On January 17, 2002, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), in support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), organized and convened a high-level, interagency, classified Workshop entitled "Homeland Security and Special Operations: Sorting Out Procedures, Capabilities, and Operational Issues." This meeting was designed as an Interagency brainstorming session to help Generals Charles R. Holland, USAF, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (CINC U.S. SOCOM) and William F. Kernan, USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CINC U.S. JFCOM) and their respective Command leaderships refine their thinking about Homeland Security.

Particular focus was given to the ways in which the commands can most usefully support and implement Presidential and/or Defense Department taskings and Lead-Agency mission directives in counter-terrorist contingencies in the United States, especially those in which terrorist actors may have access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The broader purpose of this Workshop was to examine the lessons learned so far in the war on terrorism and to gain greater clarity as to how DoD and non-DoD assets can best complement each other in the Homeland Security arena. To facilitate both objectives, participation in this meeting included senior

representation from the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Justice, as well as from the Homeland Security Office, the National Security Council, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Joint Staff, and the National Guard Bureau. What follows is an unclassified thematic summary of the Workshop discussion. A list of participants and the Workshop agenda is appended to this report.

### **I. Homeland Security and Special Operations Forces**

To open the Workshop and to engender discussion of the prospective mission-taskings for Special Operations Forces in a Homeland Security contingency, participants heard two briefs—one from JFCOM and one from SOCOM—outlining their perspectives of the challenges presented by non-state, trans-national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Both briefs emphasized the comprehensive nature of the challenges facing the United States in the Homeland Security arena, and each outlined, from a Command perspective, a concept of operations for U.S. military forces in various contingencies, including those involving terrorist operations and the use of WMD components. From each brief, it was apparent that U.S. military forces, both their active duty components and reserve units, are likely to be called upon to perform essential mission taskings in support of the National Military Strategy and/or specific Lead-Agency -i.e., the Department of Justice (DoJ) for counterterrorist (CT) activities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for Consequence Management (CM). This will be particularly the case in the counter-WMD arena where domestic agencies and local first-responders have limited training, expertise, and capabilities to cope with attack prevention, mitigation, and/or post-attack recovery. Even as there was no consensus among Workshop participants on the extent to which U.S. military forces could or should be assigned missions in the United States, much less agreement on definitions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, there was Workshop consensus that in the areas of prevention, deterrence, and counter-terrorist operations overseas, U.S. military forces, and in particular, Special Operations Forces (SOF), had an unique and important contribution to make.

The operational continuity between operations overseas and "Homeland Defense" sparked considerable Workshop discussion, with one participant suggesting that the clarity of thought and rigor in lines of authority that is evident in traditional defense operational planning ne-



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eds to be adopted by the office of Homeland Security. Having said that, he went on to observe that when DoD components discuss Homeland Defense, they appear to be talking about two distinct missions: one relates to the defense of U.S. borders, which clearly is an Inter-agency responsibility; the other concerns airspace and critical infrastructure protection, each of which also has a DoD component but in reality requires a broader set of operational capabilities. With that in mind, several other participants were interested to learn about the way in which DoD plans to “operationalize” planning for Homeland Defense.

This exchange led to an interesting discussion among Workshop participants about the priority that the U.S. continues to assign law enforcement in conceptualizing its approach to Homeland Security, leading one participant to muse that while sealing the U.S. borders is not a DoD responsibility, U.S. military forces are certainly needed to support civil authorities in this mission-area. Beyond that, because the lines are blurring with respect to concepts for deterring and preventing future terrorist operations on U.S. soil, it is readily apparent that the roles for U.S. military forces, particularly for the Reserve Components (RC), would likely grow in this mission area. To this, another participant suggested the need to specify mission taskings in the Homeland Defense arena so as not to over-stretch and add to the already exhausting operational tempos of U.S. military forces, including very specifically those pertaining to National Guard deployments.

Moreover, the nexus between prevention and deterrence of potential terrorist actions against U.S. interests and operational planning to foil impending contingencies heightened Workshop sensitivity to the operational continuities between overseas (i.e., OCONUS) and U.S.-based planning. One participant, in this context, contended that the use of SOF in domestic contingencies might be appropriate in certain limited circumstances, but in general, their greater value-added to Homeland Security lies in their capacity to perform operations abroad in regional theaters where state and non-state enemies of the United States were based.

Among other Workshop participants this occasioned debate over the best means by which to target terrorist organizations. Should, one participant queried, we target the organization and not the base, as we have more or less done in Afghanistan—differentiating between Al Qaeda, the Taliban leadership and the country itself -

or, can one be accomplished without the other, particularly in the context of clan warfare and the “revolving” loyalties, in this case, of the Afghan tribes? The importance of this discussion was revealed in Workshop consideration—albeit briefly—of “Phase II” operations. As viewed from one perspective, if this is indeed a “war” against terrorism, then, he contended—and as the President (subsequently) suggested in his State of the Union address—the United States really does have to consider comprehensive military options directed against states accused of complicity in terrorist activities.

Another participant disagreed with this line of reasoning and suggested the need to refine our thinking about counter-terrorist operations. From his perspective, it is important to ensure that U.S. forces operate within the bounds of international legal norms and where possible, try to make distinctions between official “state sponsors” and non-combatants. This, he suggested is all the more important when considering preemptive actions.

The subject of preemption occasioned considerable Workshop discussion, with several participants making the case for such operations on the basis of international law, which provides for the right of “anticipatory self-defense”—a concept that, in any event, could cover a multitude of military operations. This participant also pointed out that the need to establish overseas bases and over-flight rights reinforces the importance of operating within the context of international norms.

Operating within that context, moreover, need not circumscribe actions necessary to conduct counterterrorist or other operations—a concern that was articulated by several Workshop participants. The important point, from his perspective, is to prepare the case for such action methodically and with an eye toward coalition politics, although, as other participants cautioned, this must not be taken as a prescription for inaction when U.S. and coalition partner national interests clash. For future SOF operations, this implies the need for pre-planning both to speed the approval’s process once an operation is given the green light and to ensure that specific logistical issues are resolved beforehand so that operations can proceed unencumbered by subsequent alliance squabbles.

From this, Workshop participants raised the specific issue of Interagency collaboration, particularly with respect to intelligence collection, sharing, and operati-

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onal planning. Accordingly, the lessons-learned from SOFs' collaboration with other government agencies on the ground in Afghanistan served as an important focus of Workshop discussion.

From the standpoint of Department of Defense officials, innovative employments of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for one, opened up new operational possibilities for U.S. military planners, including new ways to support SOF activities on the ground. Workshop consideration of the use of UAVs in Afghanistan led to a broader discussion of new and emerging technologies, such as sensor technologies developed under DTRA's auspices for arms control compliance and verification, and just how they might further enhance Interagency intelligence collection activities, and in so doing, facilitate operational planning.

So, too, Workshop consideration of lessons-learned from the operations in Afghanistan placed a high premium on pre-planning for possible contingencies, including with respect to the need for streamlining the decision process and the need to facilitate peacetime planning for crisis operations, especially in contingencies in which WMD may be a factor. In this context, Workshop participants once again returned to discussion of preemption, this time, focusing on the nexus between operations overseas and potential terrorist threats at home. With respect to preemption, Workshop participants agreed that it is difficult to act without highly reliable operational intelligence. This, in turn, raised the question of actionable intelligence, and the need to address particular shortcomings in the Intelligence community, including the lack of HUMINT assets knowledgeable and hence able to operate in regions of the world where terrorists may take shelter.

Obviously, intelligence collection and surveillance/reconnaissance are areas in which SOF has the potential to play a central role. Workshop participants went on to consider just how SOCOM might optimize the role of SOF in future worldwide operations, without eroding other essential mission taskings and within the bounds of existing resource (i.e., personnel and financial) constraints. One suggestion in this regard focused on enhancing SOF's roles in CINC Theater Security Cooperation Efforts, while another offered a way to enhance the interface between the national intelligence community and federal, state, and local law enforcement through the fusion of stove-piped technologies, intelligence collection capabilities, and more common

training, a task to which JFCOM representatives at the meeting were enthusiastically supportive. Several Workshop participants noted the need for more Interagency table-top and real-world exercises, such as TOP OFF and DARK WINTER, in which all relevant Federal agencies and State and Local first-responders engaged to gauge the government's ability to respond to chemical, biological and radiological emergencies in various U.S. cities.

The requirement for enhanced Interagency collaboration in the areas of intelligence collection and reconnaissance/surveillance has become obvious to all involved in Homeland Security preparations. However, as pointed out by one Workshop participant, Interagency collaboration at the Federal level is only one aspect of what has emerged as a multi-layered Federal, State, and Local government imperative. With the big three-i.e., the Super Bowl, the Davos Economic Forum Meeting in New York, and the Utah Winter Olympics-in mind, several Workshop participants underscored the need for ongoing collaboration between U.S. military forces and local government first-responders, especially with respect to large special events.

In the course of this discussion, one Workshop participant observed that U.S. Reserve Component forces, particularly National Guard troops, were the "bridge" between the first-responders and the employment of active duty military forces in a domestic emergency. Their use, in their Title 32 roles in support of the nation's governors, was generally regarded as the crux between U.S.C. Title 10 restraints on the employment of U.S. military forces in the United States and existing Executive Order guidance. Still, some Workshop participants were uncomfortable in suggesting a broader use of U.S. military forces in domestic contingencies, especially in the event of simultaneous operations overseas where they might be fully engaged. That said, most Workshop participants agreed that in some particular areas, such as defeating the attempted employment of WMD, the expertise of active U.S. military forces may be required, and it was in this context that all of the military representatives present at this meeting agreed that exceptions were appropriate. For its part, SOF is likely to be needed to help train law enforcement and other national agencies in WMD-specific mission-taskings. So, too, SOF Civil Affairs units-24 out of 25 battalions of which reside in the Reserve Components-may also be needed to support civil authorities in a domestic emergency. Again, however, as several Workshop participants war-

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ned, any expanded use of U.S. military assets in Homeland Security mission-taskings would have profound consequences for operations overseas in simultaneous contingencies.

## **II. Homeland Security as a Full-Spectrum Mission**

From the preceding discussion, Workshop participants went on to consider options for enhancing Interagency collaboration in Homeland Security contingencies. Prompted by concerns articulated by General Holland and General Kernan, participants moved on to consider what could be done to enhance the ability of the United States to respond to Homeland Security emergencies, and beyond this, to facilitate a more proactive posture in terms of Interagency decision-making, including with respect to the approval's process for preventive activities. All Workshop participants recognized the complexity of the challenges facing the United States in this respect, and several went on to note that since September 11th, an opportunity had emerged to institutionalize Interagency collaboration on Homeland Security that before the events of 9/11 just did not exist. Prior to September 11th, there was a tendency to rely almost exclusively on the Department of Justice for counter-terrorist activities impacting the United States, and to assume that U.S. military forces would have a minimal role in CT and Consequence Management operations in the United States. However, the events of September 11th raised fundamental questions about rear-area security, including with respect to bases and installation protection in the United States, and opened debate on terrorist uses of mass destruction weapons and asymmetrical warfare techniques. At the same time, though, the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center also reaffirmed, from a DoD perspective, the operational continuity of overseas activities and domestic terrorist contingencies, while focusing new attention on the uses of U.S. military forces in regional theaters to impact counter-terrorist planning in the United States.

From this discussion, Workshop participants went on to examine the divisions, or "seams," that exist between and among organizational competencies in the United States Government (USG) and Federal-State and Local jurisdictions in an effort to hone Interagency collaboration (at the Federal level) and to make more efficient the decision process, particularly when considering the employment of DoD assets in CT or WMD-related contingencies inside the United States. Several Workshop participants admitted that prior to the events of Septe-

mber 11, 2001, their perceptions of how Homeland Security would be handled differed markedly from the reality that ensued after the attacks. While acknowledging the leading roles of the Department of Justice in CT contingencies and the FEMA in Consequence Management activities, these participants also registered their surprise at the considerable employment of American military forces to shore-up other Federal, State, and Local capabilities. From the mission-assignments of NOBLE EAGLE to preparations for, and security at, the Winter Olympics, U.S. military forces have been deployed in very large numbers within the United States. In some Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) this is proving to be a drain on operational planning for overseas employments. For this reason, several Workshop participants cited the need for more detailed planning for Homeland Security contingencies in which military resources would not be the first assigned the burden of tasks that could (or more usefully should) be performed by other elements of the Federal, State, or Local governments.

Toward that end, Workshop participants considered the need to create a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to coordinate more effectively regional, State, and Local assets with those of the Federal government in the Counter-Terrorism arena. Based on the U.S. experience in counter-drug operations, establishing a JIATF is considered an important step in making the Interagency process more efficient. Reinforcing, regionally-oriented JIATFs would be useful in identifying resource shortfalls and developing burden-sharing routines, especially in the CT and Counter-WMD areas where expertise and capabilities are limited and found largely in the military community.

In this respect, participants noted that SOCOM has long maintained counterproliferation capabilities. However, the primary focus of SOCOM's operational planning is on overseas contingencies. While SOCOM has worked closely with other government agencies on domestic counter-WMD planning, the Command today is more heavily involved in Homeland Defense taskings than originally had been expected, with no let-up in sight. Even as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is devoting more and more resources to the CT and counter-WMD areas, it still relies upon SOF for added expertise. Simply put, DoD assets and capabilities remain indispensable to crucial CT and counter-WMD mission-taskings.

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While the Department of Justice is in the process of redressing such operational shortcomings, it is uncertain when such capabilities will be in place, due to the need for specialized training and competing budget priorities. Moreover, as one participant observed, even assuming that the FBI does meet its internal deadline for having in place sufficient capabilities to undertake specific WMD-related mission-taskings, it still needs Interagency, and particularly DoD, assistance for other functions associated with Counter-WMD/CT in the United States. The strain that this may place on DoD assets, including very specifically SOF and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), may be considerable, and, at some point, could raise difficult choices for the Secretary of Defense in terms of deciding between and among competing operational priorities. The expansion of the war on terrorism to other theaters and regions of the world will likely exacerbate this dilemma, and it may raise the question of the size of SOCOM's force structure, a consideration that would have broad implications for the DoD, especially as it seeks to "transform" the nation's military force structure.

In this context, several Workshop participants noted that we are charting new waters, and a "business as usual" approach to defense spending and force structure modernization was ill-advised for the times in which we live. Other participants suggested that while Homeland Security does not lend itself to clear and unambiguous lines of authority, the creation in the Executive Branch of a Homeland Security Agency to identify and coordinate the Federal government's capabilities for Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Defense missions was a good start. That said, however, it remains apparent that in certain specific areas, including WMD contingencies and intelligence gathering, U.S. military assets will remain central to the CT mission. Certainly, this is true for JFCOM, whose support to Civil Authorities remains a definitive task - although one that is likely to be transferred to a new unified command, the creation of which was announced subsequent to this meeting.

At the time of this Workshop, JFCOM was tasked with contributing to Homeland Defense in a number of ways. While the most high profile of these is obviously support to Civil Authorities, it also has responsibility for providing military forces to the warfighting CINCs and for establishing training and exercise regimes to hone the military's expertise and interoperability for these (and other military) mission-taskings. The creation of a new North American Command is unlikely to change the te-

mpo of DoD involvement in Homeland Defense taskings, at least for the time being. The question for White House and Department of Defense leaders is what level of contribution is essential and appropriate given competing demands on the uses of U.S. military forces. In this respect, several Workshop participants raised the question of creating dedicated Joint Task Forces for Civil Support (JTFCs), one each to correspond to FEMA's regional Headquarters.

Others, however, were skeptical that this could be done, although they allowed that the establishment of additional dedicated JTFs for Civil Support functions would be desirable, even if they were tasked to support the geographic CINCs as well, as is now the case with JFCOM's JTF Augmentation Cell. Operationally, participants agreed that the concept of a dedicated JTF-CS was and is attractive, but in the final analysis, most Workshop participants felt that resource constraints would limit the establishment of more than a couple of such dedicated task forces. To this, another Workshop participant proposed the creation of one or two functionally based JTFs, one for CT and another addressed specifically to counter-WMD mission-taskings. As conceived, however, any functionally established entity would have to be available for CINC assignments overseas as well.

Closing off this discussion, another participant observed that from the horrendous events of September 11th, it is apparent that a recalibration of the Department of Defense's roles and potential contributions to the defense of the American homeland needs further thought. In this regard, another Workshop participant suggested bringing all Federal capabilities having relevance to Homeland Defense under one organizational umbrella structure. Notably, this would include the Coast Guard, selected U.S. military forces, and elements of the FBI, FEMA, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and so on. Other participants dismissed this as an unworkable suggestion and argued that in many instances the capabilities in question had "dual use" roles, which in any event, could not be disregarded or re-assigned to other Agencies because, quite simply, the capabilities do not reside anywhere else in the USG.

### **III. Sealing the Seams: Clarifying and Delineating DoD's Roles in Homeland Security**

From the preceding discussion and with an eye on the lessons-learned thus far from events post-September

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11th and the wartime operations in Afghanistan, Workshop participants went on to consider more precisely just how DoD, and, SOF in particular, can best support Presidential and/or SECDEF taskings in a domestic emergency involving terrorist activity in the United States, the use of WMD, and/or as part of a Consequence Management operation, without eroding their potential to fight the nation's wars overseas. To be sure, as all Workshop participants agreed, other USG agencies have relevant capabilities to fulfill many aspects of likely mission-taskings in a domestic CT or WMD emergency. But, as was also suggested by several Workshop participants, DoD may have assets and/or capabilities that other Federal, State, or Local agencies lack, necessitating the use of military forces to support, back-fill, or complete a specific tasking.

For example, one participant noted that DoD assets have assumed a broader role in port security since September 11th, despite the fact that this remains an area where the Department of Transportation (in the form of the Coast Guard) holds the lead agency responsibility. It is not that DoD has taken over this task, rather it is that DoD assets have been required to supplement Coast Guard resources given the increased requirement for the Coast Guard to stop and search vessels and containers entering U.S. ports under high threat of terrorist attack. Clearly the need to guard against prospective terrorist threats using shipping assets is at the top of Homeland Security planning considerations. Yet, the extent to which DoD capabilities are needed for this mission-area poses a tricky dilemma for U.S. decision-makers, raising the fundamental question: To what extent are DoD assets required to "seal the seams" in Homeland Defense mission-areas?

Unfortunately, from the perspective of some Workshop participants, there is a growing tendency, especially since September 11, 2001, to regard the employment of U.S. military forces as the first-line response to many contingencies related to Homeland Defense. On the whole, however, Workshop participants cautioned against over-reliance on the use of U.S. military forces, apart from specialized assets, such as the U.S. Marine Corps' Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), in domestic emergencies, and urged U.S. decision-making officials to formulate more comprehensive options for dealing with existing and prospective threats to Homeland Security. For Workshop participants, three major considerations must be factored into national decision-making about responding to Homeland Security

challenges. As discussed, these were said to include:

- **Know the Enemy.** Workshop participants expressed unanimous agreement on the seriousness of the security challenges facing the United States in the twenty-first century. As characterized by one participant, we are facing a new and chilling reality; from his perspective what we have seen thus far from Al Qaeda and from what we are uncovering on the ground in Afghanistan as well as from the interrogation of Al Qaeda combatants, the West is facing a sophisticated and lethal enemy. This is an enemy who fights without constraints and who rejects Western legal norms. This is an enemy who vilifies the West, and especially the United States, for the freedoms it holds dear. As a result, the United States can ill-afford to think about operations in Afghanistan from the twentieth-century prism of warfare. Until nations of the Western industrialized world come to grips with this reality, the chances for success in the "war against terrorism" were considerably diminished.

His comments engendered a wide-ranging debate among Workshop participants over the context in which our current operations should most appropriately be placed. Is this a war in the traditional sense of identifying an enemy and developing military options for eviscerating him, or should U.S. CT activities be more properly treated as a law enforcement problem, in which issues such as prisoners' rights and the sanctity of the evidence chain loom large. Whereas Workshop participants were unanimous in agreeing that fighting terrorism is not entirely a military problem, they did not view it principally as a law-enforcement issue either, which created for the discussants difficulties in delineating the limits on the use of military forces in terrorist contingencies. At the same time, as suggested by one participant, because the Al Qaeda members themselves consider their activities as part of a larger jihad in which suicide missions and irregular forms of warfare are characteristic aspects of their asymmetric warfare campaign, the United States would be remiss if it failed to prepare for, and respond to this threat using the panoply of American assets, including U.S. military forces. The issue that must be sorted out is the division of labor between defensive Homeland Security preparations and those necessary to undertake proactive measures overseas, going to the heart of the terrorists' sanctuaries. How one balances these two, perhaps competing priorities, in terms of resource allocations, is something that must occupy U.S. decision-makers, if neither mission area is to be short-changed.

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In this context, one participant suggested reviewing how Israel or the United Kingdom deals with such threats, given that both nations have struggled with similar issues for years. Another participant disagreed, suggesting that, perhaps, it would be more appropriate to draw from our own past, and review how the U.S. dealt with such domestic threats as the Weathermen during the 1960s. From this perspective, the differences between Israeli and British experiences with the Palestinians and the Irish, respectively, had little to offer the United States, which faced a different kind of threat. Other participants, however, disagreed, and thought that the Israeli model, in particular, had much to offer the U.S. as it considers Homeland Security issues and organizational mandates and structures.

• ***Homeland Security Must Be An Interagency and A Federal, State, and Local Priority.*** All Workshop participants agreed that Homeland Security is a multi-faced challenge that requires a national strategy. They also reiterated the importance of Interagency collaboration, as well as the importance of new partnerships among Federal, State, and Local governments, assets, and capabilities. One way in which these complex and variegated relationships can be facilitated is through the development of pre-planned Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) on key issues or functional problems. Participants thought that more needed to be done in this regard, if only to improve understanding between and among civil and military agencies. Closely related is the need to undertake more pre-planning in order to maximize our ability to act proactively later in a crisis or to prevent further terrorist actions on U.S. soil or against American interests overseas. In this context, one participant suggested the use of sensor technologies at the entrance of major waterways, such as the Chesapeake Bay, to detect the presence of radioactive materials onboard ships. Another participant picked up on this theme and discussed innovative ways in which Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Agency (INS) could work with the military to identify and monitor the influx of foreign populations along our northern border areas.

• ***SOF Cannot Do Everything.*** Finally, U.S. decision-makers must take care not to over-burden U.S. military forces with new missions. With their spectacular successes on the ground in Afghanistan, there is a tendency to suggest new roles and missions for the American military, and in particular SOF, in the Homeland Defense realm. On this issue, most Workshop participants

had a clear view that the role of the U.S. military is to fight the nation's wars overseas. SOF, in particular, have specific competencies, and their primary value to the United States is in their overseas engagements. While SOCOM welcomes the opportunity to support Lead-Agencies in specific mission-taskings for Homeland Defense, care must be taken to avoid diluting SOF's capabilities by diverting forces to domestic missions, which other agencies should be performing.

In this context, participants were reminded that SOCOM is a relatively small command, and its assets are already over-stretched by operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the war against terrorism. And, while it is true that the Command has some unique counterproliferation capabilities, those capabilities are not unlimited. Most Workshop participants agreed that SOCOM might benefit from additional resources and end-strength, but as one operator reminded the group, SOF are more experienced than your average soldier and it takes years to hone their language skills, cultural awareness, and capabilities for acting in an unconventional or covert manner. From his perspective, the optimum use of SOF warriors was not at home in CONUS, where the American public might have severe reservations about their employment in-country, but overseas to go after the terrorists where they live.

#### **IV. Recommendations for the Way Ahead**

The workshop discussion yielded many suggestions for the way ahead. Key among these were the following:

- At the highest Interagency levels we need to come to agreement on what Homeland Security constitutes. President Bush's Executive Order establishing the Homeland Security Office within the Executive Branch specifies Homeland Security as "detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from, terrorist threats or attacks within the United States." Operationally, as pointed out by one Workshop participant, this definition differs from that embraced by DoD, which calls for, "the preparation for, prevention, preemption, deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic populace, and infrastructure; as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression; and other domestic civil support." In other words, while the DoD omits from its formulation the White House's inclusion of "detection of terrorist threats," it adds two operational areas for inclusion: namely, "de-



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terrence” and “preemption.” In the DoD formulation, moreover, the threats are specified as arising from foreign sources, giving further operational coherence to the Homeland Defense mission-set. Consensus on the inclusion of deterrence and preemption has far-reaching implications for DoD’s role in Homeland Security.

- There is a need to streamline lines of authority for Homeland Security taskings and to develop a regional command and control (C2) structure to ensure timely and efficient action. Several participants suggested in this regard the need for leveraging existing information structures, such as, for example, DoD’s Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET), and to take advantage of current and emerging information technologies, including Virtual Public Networks (VPN), developed in the commercial sector as a model for Homeland Security activities. Improved “coms” must also be developed for small team operations, raising the issues of prepositioned materiel sets and Interagency logistics. Indeed, one of the lessons-learned from U.S. operations in Afghanistan is the need to improve U.S. logistics flexibility.

- Seamless and secure communications links are especially important for non-traditional mission areas in which coordination needs to be enhanced with other countries, including Canada and Mexico on border security issues, and more broadly with foreign governments on intelligence collection and sharing. Specifically, in that context, Workshop participants urged the new Homeland Security Agency to consider creation of a National Interagency Database for Intelligence, similar to the JIATF model developed for counter-drug operations. This might help sew the seam between Embassy reporting on suspicious persons seeking entry into the U.S. and Customs and INS information bases when processing arriving airline passengers or visitors (etc.) arriving at border crossings into the United States. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), for example, has much to offer in this regard, and participants suggested that the Homeland Security Office should take pains to incorporate INR reporting/information in a national data base.

- Following from this, Workshop participants enthusiastically endorsed the establishment of a fusion center for intelligence collection and assessment. From a DoD perspective, this is vital to preventive planning options, and essential to consideration of proactive and/or preventive action. In this respect, several Workshop par-

ticipants opined that much more needs to be done, raising the issue of pre-planning and rapid, decisive decision-making to ensure timely action in a crisis or before. One suggestion in this regard was the use of national assets in CONUS to support CT planning and DoJ operations. Another participant, in this same vein, suggested establishment of pre-approved rules for using force (RUF)-consistent with U.S. law and current policy-for complex operations involving counter-WMD mission-taskings.

- Military technologies and R&D for other defense-related mission-areas should be examined to assess their suitability to Homeland Defense mission-taskings. Both DTRA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have developed technologies that have applicability to Homeland Security. DTRA, in particular, has established expertise on WMD weapons effects and detection. Capabilities developed by DTRA could enable border security and augment other assets designed to provide early warning of a WMD attack. The use of UAVs to patrol U.S. land borders was raised in this context, as was the deployment of sensors to detect radioactive or chemical emissions. Workshop participants also observed that SOCOM’s creation of the Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC) to exploit new technologies and information management techniques for operational purposes offers a natural framework for furthering the Command’s already extensive collaboration with DTRA.

- Several participants suggested expanding SOCOM, but this should be done for the purposes of meeting new and growing OCONUS CINC requirements and not for the purpose of increasing SOF’s roles in domestic Homeland Security contingencies. All Workshop participants agreed that SOF’s most effective use was, and would continue to be, overseas in key regional theaters. And, in the context of DoD “transformation” it is appropriate to suggest additional end-strength for U.S. Special Operations Forces as they are viewed as pivotal to meeting the security challenges of the new era. To be truly effective, however, SOCOM and senior decision-makers must give new consideration to SOF’s traditional strengths, including their uses in peacetime as part of the CINCs’ Theater Security Cooperation Efforts, and in crisis or wartime to prevent and deter direct action against the United States. This suggests new emphasis on “unconventional” warfare programs, as well as boosting the Command’s Counter-WMD, Counter-Terrorism, information Operations (IO), and Psychological War-

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fare expertise/capabilities.

- The prospect of additional terrorist acts in the United States brought to the fore debate over the differences between the role and use of force in the United States and OCONUS. As explained by one participant, considerable progress has been made in refining rules of engagement (ROEs) in theaters outside the United States, including with respect to permissive and non-permissive environments. The same is not true, however, with respect to RUFs in the United States, and several Workshop participants contended that this is one area that needs further thought by Executive Branch decision-makers. Obviously, by precedent and by law, the use of deadly force is conditioned by the perception of eminent danger. There is not a lot of case precedence to guide U.S. officials in this area, and until such RUFs can be developed or clarified, the potential for law enforcement and military officials to find themselves in dangerous “gray areas” continues to exist.

- Repeatedly throughout Workshop discussion, several participants noted the comprehensive nature of the challenge ahead of us in Homeland Security. As such, an integrated approach is required in which counter-terrorist operations form but one aspect of a much broader problem. For example, the leadership of the U.S. Coast Guard has been adamant that Homeland Security embrace counter-drug operations as well. This suggests the need for a broad-based strategy and concept for Homeland Security, of which the Homeland Defense aspect is but one area of concern. And, with this in mind, another participant observed that making artificial distinctions between CONUS and OCONUS operations, for one, might lead us down the wrong path. In this context, he observed that FBI legal attachés (LEGATs) working overseas contribute to Homeland Security, just as SOF assets operating OCONUS support civil actions in the United States. In other words, he continued, we must think much more creatively about Homeland Security, and in so doing employ all instruments of national power, from intelligence to financial tools to the military, as appropriate to the challenges ahead.

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Editor's Note: In this issue of Insights, the term "Commander-in-Chief (CINC)" is used to refer to the Combatant Commanders. This term is no longer used for other than the President of the United States per direction of the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum, dated 24 October 2002.

## Joint Special Operations Insights

June 2002

Welcome to the first Special Operations Forces Joint Training Team (SOF JTT) Insights Report

**Task:** Share responsive and insightful feedback to the joint and SOF community on key observed insights (in both successful areas and areas needing improvement) along with recommendations.

**Purpose:** Assist joint SOF commanders and staffs to enhance the SOF contribution to joint warfare by better employing and integrating SOF within the joint, combined, and interagency force.

COL Mike Findlay  
Cdr, SOCJFCOM

### Special Operations Forces Joint Training Team

In 1999, the CINCs of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) agreed to resource and direct Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) to provide joint training and operational support to CINC, Joint Task Force (JTF), and joint SOF battlestaffs. The SOCJFCOM subsequently formed the SOF JTT to support:

- Training for CINC and JTF HQ concerning SOF employment
- Training for Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) HQ
- Joint Experimentation and Transformation

#### Support to CINC and JTF HQs

- Providing training seminars:
- Integration of SOF
- Crisis Management
- Providing exercise training and analysis support
- Providing After Action Reviews

#### Support to JSOTFs

- Providing training seminars (Intelligence, Operations, Plans, Personnel, Logistics, Info Mgt, Crisis Mgt, etc.)
- Providing exercise design, training, staff exercises and analysis support
- Providing After Action Reviews
- Providing senior mentors

#### Joint Experimentation Spt

- Participating in Future Concept Development
- Supporting experiments
- Facilitating USJFCOM-USSOCOM staff interaction

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
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### Topic: Theater SOC Commander's Dilemma in a Crisis


Discussion: Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Commanders have three major responsibilities:

- ♦ Be the CINC's special operations advisor for the employment of SOF.
- ♦ Maintain an area of operations (AOR)-wide focus of planned and current special operations.

Provide for the command and control of SOF (i.e., determine who will be the operational commander and staff) for a crisis situation (see graphic below).



The first two responsibilities are continuous and essential to the long-term success of the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and to the success of SOF in the theater. The Commander's dilemma exists in the third responsibility. He must decide who will provide the command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) of SOF during a crisis: *the TSOC or another tasked unit as a JSOTF*. Many TSOCs have taken the traditional approach of being the JSOTF while concurrently executing the other two responsibilities. This has proven to be difficult, especially in long duration or large-scale contingencies. For best results, this option may best be reserved for short, low intensity, small-scale contingency operations. Some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach to command and control are provided below.



#### Advantages

- Continuity of joint ops
- Regional focus
- Joint staff
- Operational focus

#### Disadvantages

- Reduces AOR focus
- Reduces CINC's advisor role
- Training dilemma / TEP
- If sustained – personnel issues

In a crisis the TSOC Commander may charge his deputy to perform the first two responsibilities – that of advising the CINC and controlling other AOR-wide SOF operations and training activities, while the TSOC commander goes forward to command at the operational level (JSOTF). However, in most cases this is feasible as a temporary option only; the TSOC Commander cannot normally divest himself of those responsibilities for the long term. Nor



can he fully commit the TSOC staff away from those longer term responsibilities. Since the TSOC Commander must execute the first two responsibilities, the only variable is the third responsibility - providing for the C<sup>2</sup> of SOF (determining who will be the operational commander and staff). If it is not the most desirable situation for the TSOC to be the JSOTF and also perform the other two responsibilities, then what are some other options?

♦ **Form a completely “ad hoc” JSOTF.** In this option the Commander and staff members come from various sources outside the TSOC on an individual basis. This should be avoided if possible due to the lack of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) / standard operating procedures (SOP) proficiency and a cohesive team at the core of the JSOTF.

♦ **Form a JSOTF from a portion of the TSOC headquarters** which is augmented by individuals from various sources. The TSOC Commander or Dep Cdr normally commands the JSOTF. This is a variant of the traditional model of the TSOC “doing it all.” However, a smaller portion of the TSOC is committed to the operation, and the TSOC Commander may not be the JSOTF Commander. This option has training challenges, but once trained at least a portion of the staff retains that knowledge for future operations.

♦ **Form a JSOTF from a Service O-6 level Command** where the Cdr and Staff of an Special Forces (SF) Group, Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG), Ranger Regiment, etc., become the core of the JSOTF HQ. This option was recently used in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with some success; however, it can initially be somewhat difficult for the O-6 commands since this is not part of their traditional mission essential task list. There are major training and resourcing implications for this option. However, it remains a viable option if given adequate Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) direction, resources, and training.


*The above options are currently available to the TSOC Commander. Some other options for consideration in the future are those listed below.*

♦ **Enhance the TSOCs with additional resources to “do it all.”** This option provides the TSOC with additional manpower and other resources to execute all three responsibilities without sacrificing effectiveness in any of them. Significant training issues still remain for ensuring the staff is capable of performing as a JSOTF in an effective and efficient manner.

♦ **Enhance Service O-6 level Commands.** These commands are not traditionally manned, equipped, nor trained to perform as JSOTF HQ. This option requires additional resources and training opportunities for the commands to reach a minimum level of proficiency. The required resource enhancements and training standards have not yet been determined. However, based on current practice, it is reasonable to expect these commands to be designated as JSOTFs in the future.

♦ **Form a Standing CONUS-based JSOTF Headquarters.** This option is not currently available, but may be worth considering, especially in consideration of a similar “Standing Joint Force Headquarters” concept being tested by DoD through USJFCOM’s Joint Experimentation authority. This option envisions the TSOC being augmented with a “standing JSOTF” and deploying it into the AOR for command and control of joint special operations. There are significant resource implications with this option and may require changing the focus and designation of some existing SOF HQ. However, the concept has proven to be effective in other situations.

To varying degrees, all of the above options have varying amounts of “ad hocness” to them. Regardless of the option, the reduction of the ad hoc nature of these JSOTFs is a goal for the entire special operation community. The graphic below depicts the goals and options for JSOTFs.



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
**Recommendation:** USSOCOM and TSOCs conduct an assessment to determine if the “other options” as provided above are:

- ♦ Suitable - Proper means to accomplish the mission
  - ♦ Feasible - Resources are available (doctrine, organization, training, materiel and technology, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF))
  - ♦ Acceptable - CINCs and TSOC Commanders approve/accept the concepts as viable options
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### Topic: Forming a JSOTF Headquarters

**Discussion:** Regardless of the option chosen to form a JSOTF Headquarters, a building process is necessary. When fully formed, the JSOTF staff should be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command. The Commander JSOTF (COMJSOTF) makes the final decision on the composition of the JSOTF HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, and cells. Some planning considerations for forming a JSOTF HQ include:

- ♦ **Organizational Factors.** Each JSOTF HQ is different. Some of the factors that determine the make-up of a JSOTF HQ include: mission and tasks, functions required (e.g., Rescue Coordination Center), force structure of the JSOTF, C<sup>2</sup> options, political limitations (e.g., host country restrictions), coalition considerations, space available/location (land, afloat, etc.), commander’s desires, battle rhythm, and duration of the operation. These factors should be considered when developing the JSOTF HQ’s joint manning document (JMD).
- ♦ **Staffing the HQ - the JMD.** One of the first tasks in forming a JSOTF is getting the right people in the right jobs at the right times. The current system (see graphic on next page) does work, but it requires attention to detail, persistence, and the involvement of the COMJSOTF and the TSOC Commander. For filling personnel positions, the JSOTF submits requirements to the JTF or TSOC (depending on the C<sup>2</sup> structure) for validation & filling. The billets the TSOC cannot fill are then sent to the theater CINC (with info copies of SOF requirements to USSOCOM). Those billets not filled by the theater CINC are passed to USSOCOM (SOF Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)) only and to the theater CINC’s Service Components for other MOSs. Those billets not filled by the CINC’s components or USSOCOM (or its components) are passed to the Services. Unfortunately, there are ample opportunities for headquarters to question the requirements, downgrade the rank structure, misunderstand the position descriptions, and generally slow down the process. One of the common complaints of the JMD process is that it is not responsive to newly formed commands.



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What can the COMJSOTF do to make the system work more efficiently? Some suggestions are:

- *Start with a previous JSOTF's JMD* - The TSOC should have examples of past JMDs that were tailored for specific missions. In addition, the SOF JTT has a generic template and several versions of past JMDs with tips on how to develop a JMD.
- *Understand the process* - The entire staff should understand the requirements generation process. The J1 should consolidate and process the requirements, and work the system. Information on these processes can be obtained from the SOF JTT.
- *Show Command interest* - The staff should be providing periodic updates to the COMJSOTF on the status of the development and validation of the requirements, and the filling of the JMD. The COMJSOTF should also make his higher Commander (TSOC, JTF, or CINC) aware of critical fills and priorities for the same. The JSOTF Chief of Staff should supervise the staff's efforts to ensure the JMD supports the needs of the command.
- *Integration of Personnel*. Almost all JSOTF HQ require some type of personnel augmentation. It is important to integrate these personnel into the JSOTF HQ as quickly and efficiently as possible. One technique is to use a two step process:
  - *Establish a Joint Personnel Reception Center*. This center conducts the reception (meeting, transportation, etc.), administrative inprocessing, equipment issuing, billeting, messing, facilities orientation, and staff directorate assignments of newly arrived personnel.
  - *Staff Integration*. Staff directors should be forceful in insisting that new staff members are given prompt assignments, orientation and situational awareness briefings, work space, battle rhythm, and most importantly training on their job and SOPs. If this process is left to chance, the new augmentee will not feel a part of the team and may be less productive than desired.

**Command & Staff Procedures.** These are normally provided in the unit's SOP (that most JSOTF staffs admit "need to be updated"). Given the changes in information technology and management concepts, there are probably many good reasons for this continual updating of SOPs. However, many procedures are not necessarily technologically driven - they are commander driven. These need to be clearly defined to the staff - especially to a newly formed staff with numerous augmentees. Some of these procedures are:

- ♦ *Identifying what the Commander needs to know and when he needs to know it.* The concept of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) has been in Army and Marine Corps doctrine for years, but only codified in joint doctrine since 1999. The concept is neither well understood nor effectively used by JSOTF personnel. In many cases CCIRs are defined at the beginning of an operation or training exercise and are never updated. Additionally, most JSOTF staffs do not understand that CCIRs belong to the commander and that the staff should develop CCIRs during the planning process; refine and update CCIRs daily; use CCIRs to prioritize information needs; tie CCIRs to potential commander decisions; actively pursue answers to CCIRs through a collection plan; and designate a staff section to manage CCIRs (i.e., thumb print on someone). Commanders should use CCIRs to focus the staff on his information priorities and avoid some of the staff "flail-ex" that is inevitable in newly formed JSOTFs.
- ♦ *Defining the JSOTF's "battle rhythm."* Some tips in developing a battle rhythm include:
  - Start with the JSOTF's higher headquarters battle rhythm. To a large degree, the JSOTF will have to adjust its battle rhythm to accommodate the information requirements of the higher Joint Force Commander's JFC headquarters.
  - Reduce the number of meetings. One means is to combine "commander's updates" with shift changeover briefings. This has been successfully accomplished in several JSOTFs. Instead of a morning shift changeover, a morning commander's update, a more formal evening commander's update, and an evening shift changeover, some commands combine these briefing into two, instead of four, daily meetings. Use standardized briefing formats. The same information requirements/formats should be briefed in all updates (e.g., commander's updates, visitor updates, etc.). Cutting down on the types and formats of briefings provides more time for productive thinking and doing within the established battle rhythm. These briefing slides can be electronically linked to enable staff sections to manage their staff update briefing slides vice a centralized point of contact having to consolidate and integrate the briefing slides prior to each briefing.
- ♦ *Balancing "Ops" and "Plans."* There is a tendency for JSOTFs (especially those formed from tactical-level

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Service SOF HQs) to tip the scales between current operations and future operations in favor of current operations. As a Service SOF HQ moves from the tactical to the operational level by becoming a JSOTF, it not only moves in terms of levels, but also in time. Because operational art comprises four essential elements (time, space, means, and purpose) the JSOTF commander and staff must:

-Project farther into the future to give subordinates more time.

Expand their spacial framework within the entire joint operations area.

-Designate the means to accomplish the missions. Some techniques for the commander to “move up and out” in this area are to prioritize mission areas, allocate SOF to those priorities, and seek mission approval levels that are as low as possible.


-Define the purpose through clear and concise commander’s Intent (see more later in this issue of “*Joint Special Operations Insights*”).

All these operational areas are defined in “future operations” and “future plans” - not “current operations.” Commanders and staffs that do not realize they have moved up in levels and out in time will likely revert to their tactical comfort zone - which merely interferes with and duplicates the work of subordinate components and reduces the JSOTF’s ability to focus on future operations and SOF integration in order to better support the needs of the JFC and JFC components.

**Recommendation:** JSOTF commanders consider the above factors when forming a JSOTF HQ.

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### **Topic: Understanding “Support” Command Relationships**

**Discussion:** The major command relationships in joint doctrine are:

- *Combatant Command (COCOM)*: Only CINCs possess.
- *Operational Control (OPCON)*: Usual authority given to JTF and JSOTF commanders.
- *Tactical Control (TACON)*: Temporary local control of the maneuver of forces or capabilities.
- *Support (Direct, General, Mutual & Close)*: Designated to ensure unity of effort.
- *Administrative Control (ADCON)*: Provides direction and authority for administrative support.
- *Coordinating Authority*: Provides a consultation relationship between commands.
- *Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH)*: Authority for direct coordination between commands.

The support command relationship is probably the least understood, but has great potential for use in defining relationships between SOF and conventional forces (both US and multinational). Joint doctrine is briefly explained below, followed by an example of how support can be better used in joint operations.

♦ Joint Pub 0-2 states that “*Support is a command authority.*” One of the first misperceptions to overcome is the idea that support has only a generic meaning with no associated authorities and responsibilities. When a JTF commander uses a phrase such as “I want the joint force land component command (JFLCC) to be the priority effort and the JSOTF to provide support,” he has defined a command relationship that needs clarification. Secondly, joint doctrine says that “*The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement.*” Turning this phrase around, you have the essence of the remainder of this discussion and why support can be more useful in joint operations:

*“The support command relationship is a very flexible authority, but it must be clearly defined by the establishing authority (the common superior commander) to be effective.”*

♦ Joint doctrine also states that it is the responsibility of the higher commander to ensure both the supported and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted. Also, the supported and supporting commanders have responsibilities. The simplified example below depicts those responsibilities.


**Mission:** On order, JTF-X conducts joint operations to destroy enemy terrorist forces in Country X.

**Task for Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC):** Seize lodgment in Country X and secure bases for introduction of follow-on forces.

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Task for JSOTF: Conduct SO in support of JFMCC for seizing lodgment.



The advantages of SOF using a support command relationship in conjunction with other forces are:

- ♦ Allows for the establishment of priorities without being too restrictive on SOF.
- ♦ When supporting, JSOTF commander retains mission approval authority.
- ♦ When supporting, JSOTF commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing the support.
- ♦ When supporting, JSOTF commander is better able to balance the support effort with existing capabilities and other assigned tasks.
- ♦ When supported, JSOTF commander is more likely to get significant support from other JTF assets.


**Recommendation:** JSOTF commanders encourage the use of support command relationships within JTFs. Consider additional control authority such as TACON or OPCON in cases where forces are in close proximity and require long term interaction. Consider use of support command relationships when appropriate within a JSOTF (between components) with the same advantages as those illustrated above.

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### Topic: JSOTF Joint Fire Support

**Discussion:** As the war in Afghanistan demonstrates, joint fires can be a very important part in supporting SOF in accomplishing assigned missions (UW,SR, and DA). This issue looks at the JSOTF HQ's roles in planning and coordinating joint fires. JP 3-0 defines joint fire support as:

*"Joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition (TA); **command and control (C<sup>2</sup>)**; and attack resources. Successful joint fire support depends on the detailed coordination of these subsystems.*



The JSOTF HQ is mostly concerned with the C<sup>2</sup> subsystem as described above - although it is involved with the other two, but to a lesser extent. What are the joint fires related responsibilities/tasks of the JSOTF HQ and what is the staff structure required to accomplish those tasks? It is difficult to find good, practical information on this subject. Consequently, the SOF JTT studied the issue and presents the following as possible answers.




- ♦ What joint fires related tasks should the JSOTF staff perform?
  - Advising the commander on all matters pertaining to the deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization of joint fires.
  - Writing the fires portion of all plans and orders.
  - Coordinating joint fire support and targeting with the joint force air component commander (JFACC).
  - Recommending, coordinating, and disseminating fire support coordination measures and airspace coordination measures.
  - Maintaining and disseminating the Joint, Restricted, and No-Strike target lists.
  - Updating subordinate units on all fires related matters.
  - Monitoring the execution of the air tasking order (ATO) and coordinating changes with the special operations liaison element (SOLE) and components.
  - Updating situation maps and overlays.

More information on these tasks may be found in the SOF JTT's "Joint Fire Support" academic seminar.

SIPRNET: <http://138.165.46.253>

- Look for "SOF JTT" and "Distance Learning"

Who performs these tasks? The following is a recommended minimum structure on the JSOTF staff for "Joint Fires" personnel.



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**Recommendations:** In situations where joint fires are an important element of operations, the JSOTF should form a joint fires element (JFE) and identify it as a requirement on the JMD. Those personnel will perform the eight major functions identified earlier. Much greater detail on the tasks they perform is available in the “Joint Fire Support” seminar available from the SOF JTT. A future edition of *“Joint Special Operations Insights”* will further address this subject.

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
**Topic: Information Management**

**Discussion:** The use of improved information management practices enables a JSOTF HQ to remain agile and relevant in future joint operations. The pillars of information sharing, collaboration, and force tracking provide the framework for an information management plan. Some lessons of information management include:

- ♦ **JSOTFs need an “Information Management (IM) Plan” as a part of their SOP.** An IM Plan outlines the procedures for efficiently handling all categories of information within a JSOTF headquarters using the most appropriate and efficient means. The numerous sources of information (telephone, e-mail, radio, television, VTC, etc.) within a headquarters can rapidly create an information overload situation. It’s impractical and risky to simply establish a policy that routes all information by a single means. Information management should begin with processes, not technology. Many organizations do not clearly define the processes (or information) they want managed before applying technical “solutions.” This can lead to overwhelmed staff members with a multitude of “helpful tools.” However, some processes have been sufficiently defined to allow for the prudent application of technological solutions.

- ♦ **Advances in web-based technology can enhance information sharing.** Maintaining situational awareness, both horizontally across a staff and vertically with components and higher headquarters, has always been a challenge. A web-based approach is one means that allows for a virtual presence and a common reference point for information. For example, electronic mission planning folders on the web page allow a one-stop shopping approach for information regarding a particular mission. Members of the JSOTF staff, liaison officers (LNOs), JSOTF components, and higher/adjacent commands can all have access to and share information in accordance with the access privileges the JSOTF allows. Advances in web technology (such as the SOF JTT’s Web Information Center) have also led to the development of interactive web pages that enhance the traditional static concept of posting information. Inputs can be made directly to a web-based Command Journal, for instance, vice the continuous downloading and uploading of a modified document. Taskers can be viewed and updated by action officers through the web page, and its status can be viewed by everyone with access (to include the higher headquarters). However, as with all advances, some issues need to be addressed. Chief among them is assigning responsibility for posting information or making entries through the web. The web can very rapidly become a repository for useless and outdated information if responsibilities are not assigned or procedures not followed.

- ♦ **Collaborative tools can enhance planning and operations.** Traditional linear or sequential planning processes can be streamlined through collaboration tools that allow for an interactive and dynamic interface between a JSOTF and its components or JTF. Instead of having two headquarters planning in parallel and reaching two disparate end states, they are now able to interact and share information continuously. Furthermore, current operations personnel can also enhance their situational awareness by using collaboration tools while monitoring missions in execution. One technique that has proven to be effective is the use of a text chat function, linking all the operations centers, and displaying it on the the wall as a means of maintaining situational awareness throughout the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Back-briefings previously done through bandwidth-intensive video teleconferencing suites can now be accomplished through a collaboration tool that allows for file sharing of a presentation right from a user’s desktop.



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♦ **Force Tracking.** Maintaining a common operational picture (COP) displaying near-real time friendly force disposition provides shared awareness between the JSOTF HQ and components. Advances in COP software now allow a staff officer to monitor mission execution without a certified Global Command and Control System (GCCS) operator. The “drill down” capability allows the staff officer to visualize the battlespace for added situational awareness. The sharing of overlay graphics for maneuver, fire support coordination measures, and targeting is another capability that a COP tool can provide.


**Recommendations:** Appoint an operationally oriented information management officer (IMO) to lead the efforts of integrating processes and procedures with information technology. Develop a tailored IM plan within the context of the JSOTF’s mission, and include the plan in the SOP.

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### Topic: Training a JSOTF HQ

Discussion: Due to many operational requirements, TSOCs have difficulty in maintaining their staff proficiency in forming and operating as a JSOTF HQ. Usually, TSOCs operate within a band characterized by higher and lower periods of relative readiness (see graphic below). Recently, several O-6 level commands have been the core of some JSOTFs, but most of those commands had little or no previous training to be a JSOTF. All commanders of units designated as possible JSOTFs must make maximum use of their scarce resources and training opportunities to maintain a reasonable level of staff proficiency that can be quickly expanded upon in time of crisis. The following issues deal with the training of JSOTF HQs.

**-Who needs JSOTF HQ training?** Naturally, each TSOC is responsible for operating as a JSOTF HQ and needs training. Accordingly, TSOCs must program and execute JSOTF HQ training on a regular basis. The issue



is whether O-6 level SOF commands should add “Operate as a JSOTF HQ” to their mission essential task list (METL) and train to that task. As of this date, three O-6 level SOF commands have become JSOTF HQs during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, with three others recently receiving varying levels of JSOTF training in anticipation of future requirements. If this is an enduring requirement, O-6 level commands must program and execute periodic JSOTF HQ training.

**- What are the standards?** The standards for being a JSOTF HQ are not clearly defined. There are two aspects of standards:

♦ **Standards of readiness.** Should all potential JSOTF HQs maintain their proficiency within the “band of excellence” as depicted above? Or should some units (TSOCs and designated units) train to maintain themselves as “combat ready” while others only maintain


a “partially trained” (or not ready) status for being a JSOTF HQ. For the latter units, plans could be developed for “just-in-time” training to bring them up to combat ready status before deployment if required.

♦ **Staff proficiency standards.** The “JSOTF HQ Master Training Guide (MTG)” (CJCSM 3500.06) provides some guidance to JSOTF staffs, but it is incomplete. The JTF HQ MTG (CJCSM 3500.05), on the other hand, is a good example of what a JSOTF staff needs to do and what should be in a revised JSOTF MTG.


**-What training is available to support potential JSOTF HQ training?** Maintaining unit readiness requires effective training to practice perishable skills. Once USSOCOM and the TSOCs determine who needs JSOTF HQ training and the standards, commanders will need a variety of training options to maintain those standards. The next page illustrates the training support available to a designated JSOTF HQ - both those required to be “combat

ready” and those with lesser requirements of readiness.

The Joint Training System is the joint community’s framework for identifying training requirements, developing training plans, executing the training, and assessing joint training events (see graphic below). It is a series of interlocking, logical, and repeatable processes intended to continuously improve joint readiness.



The Joint Warfighting Center and SOF JTT can provide the following support to both TSOCs and other designated JSOTF commanders in preparing for and executing their joint training programs.



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**Recommendations:** USSOCOM and TSOCs identify potential JSOTF HQs, establish standards, and provide training opportunities. Designated JSOTF commanders take advantage of the resources available to support JSOTF HQ training requirements.



SOF JTT Senior Mentor GEN (Ret.) Gary Luck is currently a Senior Mentor in support of the SOF Joint Training Team. In this role he provides advice & counsel to the commanders and staffs of the training audiences.

He has been the CG, Joint Special Operations Command; CG, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; and CG XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. His last assignment was as CINC, UN Command, Korea.



SOF JTT Observer/Trainer MSG(P) Ken Teske, USA is an Operations O/T for the SOF JTT. His primary duties include training Joint Operations Center personnel with an emphasis on information management. He is a Ranger NCO who has

served in numerous Ranger units including service during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. He also served as the Operations NCO for TF DAGGER during the initial stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He has been an O/T for two years.

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# Joint Special Operations Insights

November 2002

Last “Insights” we presented what we had learned while working with Special Operations Command, United States Central Command (SOCCENT) and the Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In this edition we review what we’ve learned from the experiment MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ’02 (MC02). This experiment demonstrated that a standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ), with a subordinate JSOTF formed from the SOC, conducting effects based operations (EBO) based on a good operational net assessment (ONA) is the way ahead, but these concepts still have some maturing to do. MC ’02, however, also validated current operational techniques and procedures including how the JSOTF organizes for operations and planning, how the JSOTF conducts collaborative planning, and how the joint intelligence support element (JISE) supports this with nodal analysis. These support special operations forces (SOF) as an accelerator for rapid decisive operations (RDO) in the future but also facilitate in the integration of SOF now, in current operations.


COL Mike Findlay  
Cdr, SOCJFCOM

## MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02 Overview

### *Experiment and Exercise Objectives*

- Establish and maintain information / knowledge superiority.
- Set the conditions for decisive operations.
- Assure access into and through the battlespace to provide sufficient freedom of action.
- Conduct effects-based operations that allow a joint force to focus on breaking the coherence of the enemy’s war-making capability.
- Sustain the force, specifically to deliver sustainment to combat units in synchronized non-contiguous operations, in order to execute rapid decisive operations in this decade.

### RDO Hypothesis



RDO is a concept to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy's ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. It employs our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against his critical functions to create maximum shock ....defeating his ability and will to fight


### Topic: SOF in MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02

**Discussion:** During MC 02, for SOF to provide enhanced support to the Joint Task Force (JTF), two themes were closely linked. In order to be an “accelerator for RDO,” SOF had to be closely integrated with the JTF, not just have its activities and missions “deconflicted” in time and space. This may seem an obvious goal but it is not always easily accomplished. How this was done will be the focus of the remaining issues and discussion.


The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) is designed to overcome the problems of an “ad hoc” JTF. Each geographic combatant commander will have one in his HQ. This provides a point for the Theater SOC (TSOC) commander to begin early integration into the planning and operations during a crisis. The SJFHQ should have SOF Liason Officer (LNO)/planners assigned full time. They perform the following functions:

- Integrate SOF expertise into Regional Component Commander's (RCC) SJFHQ
- Allow TSOC to concentrate on SOF operational roles
- Theater Security Cooperation (planning and execution)
- JSOTF for small scale contingencies (SSC)
- JSOTF for major regional contingency (MRC) or major theater warfare (MTW)

Some of the early activity to gain situational awareness may be planned and directed by the SOC until the JSOTF is stood up. (See the previous Insights publication for discussion of the Theater SOC commander's dilemma in a crisis). This supports USSOCOM's position on SOF as global scouts and having a ubiquitous presence. SOF is probably already in theater, or the SOC will be moving to bring them in to support the Phase 1 objective “Shaping the Begin State” or setting conditions.



### SOF RDO Concept - The Accelerator



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
During MC 02 these were some of the identified tasks for the JSOTF.

- Conduct special reconnaissance (SR) of mine storage facilities and mine laying assets in support of (ISO) Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) access assurance operations.
- Conduct SR against SSK submarines ISO JFMCC access assurance operations.
- Conduct SR of coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) sites/HQs/facilities ISO JFMCC access assurance operations.
- Be prepared to conduct SR against tactical ballistic missile/weapons of mass effects (TBM/WME) sites HQs/support facilities/production facilities ISO Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) limited pre-emptive strikes to prevent the use of WME equipped TBM against US forces and partner nations.
- Direct action (DA) against enemy leadership/infrastructure.
- Unconventional warfare (UW) to provide situational awareness.

These tasks were not developed solely by the JTF nor by the JSOTF, but were worked closely through coordination by the JSOTF with the JSOTF LNOs to the JTF and to the JTF components. The JTF and component planners are not always aware of the full range of capabilities that the JSOTF has to support their missions. It is the responsibility of the JSOTF through the LNOs to educate them and assist in the planning efforts. This can be particularly critical in the early stages of planning when SOF may be the only or the best asset available to provide eyes on critical nodes (WME/TBM sites, key facilities, leadership). The JSOTF continued this close coordination through collaborative planning for “Decisive Operations” and “Transition to Peace”. JSOTF tasks in these

phases included:


- Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to gain actionable intelligence on terrorist infrastructure and key leaders.
- Conduct SR/DA against key C2 / support nodes ISO Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) efforts to disable the enemy’s capability and isolate the islands.
- Conduct SR (hydro recon) ISO JFLCC operations to defeat enemy forces on the islands.
- BPT support JFLCC in conduct of offensive or stabilization operations in the southern region of Red.



**Recommendation:** SOF planners initially at the SOC and then JSOTF conduct close coordination with the JTF, through LNOs and use of collaborative planning tools, to determine how to best integrate special operations to fully support the JTF and its components.


Units / Tasks	July											August									
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>JTF</b>				Assume JOA ★			D-Day ★														
<b>JFACC</b> • Air access								TF Lance – SR 204(A) (GSTF Spt-TTR)													
• TBM/WME								TF Saber – SR 402(A) (TBM/WME)													
								TF Lance – SR 201(A) (TGO/UGS-China Lake)													
<b>JFMCC</b> • Maritime Access, Straits Transit								TF Blue – SR/DA 101(M) (CDCM-San Nicolas)													
								TF Blue – SR/DA 102(M) (SSK-Pearl Harbor)													
• Pirates								TF Blue – DA 10X(M) (VBSS)													
<b>JFLCC</b> • Islands								TF Lance – SR 202(L) (NTC Bicycle Lk)													
								TF Lance – SR 203(L) (UAV-SCLA)													
								TF Blue – SR 103(L) (BLS/ITG)													
								JSOAC – CAS (L) (AC San Clemente)													
								JSOAC – CAS(L) (AC Paratroop)													
<b>JSOTF</b> • Terrorists								TF Saber – UW 401(SO) (SR Terrorist Sites)													
<b>Force Closure</b>	1 Rgr Bn TF Lance JSOAC TF Blue	TF Sabre HQ + 1 Bn	Rgr HQ					3 <sup>rd</sup> SF Bn									2 <sup>nd</sup> Rgr Bn				

## Topic: Task Organization



**Discussion:** The JSOTF can organize functionally, geographically, and/or by Service or component. For MC 02 the JSOTF had two geographically based task forces (TF's), TF Lance and TF Sabre. Functionally, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) was formed with both Army SOF and Air Force SOF aviation assets. TF Raven was tasked with primarily maritime missions. TF Ranger was formed with Rangers, Naval SOF (1x SEAL PLT) and AFSOF (1xSTT) assets, to conduct quick reaction force (QRF), combat search and rescue (CSAR) and specified DA missions.

**Recommendation:** JSOTFs must consider a mix of organizational options in order to best accomplish the mission.



## Topic: JSOTF Missions

**Discussion:** The JSOTF mission statement was separated into each specified task and analyzed for what was the desired effect of that task. Each effect was then tied to the node or nodes that when attacked could yield that effect. This nodal analysis was done using the operational net assessment (ONA).

– **Neutralize designated enemy forces** within the joint operating area (JOA) that threaten access to the Gulf.

- Effect: Enemy forces are incapable of threatening access to and within the Gulf and transit passage through the Strait

- Nodes: SSKs, Mobile CP, and Fiber Optic Cable Network

- Effect: Enemy cannot control or employ terrorists

- Nodes: Key Personalities and Front Organizations

– **Neutralize designated enemy WME** capabilities in order to protect U.S. nationals, facilities, interests, and Gulf partners in the region

- Effect: Enemy is unable to employ TBM and WME

- Nodes: Surface to surface missile (SSM) Forward Support Facility and Tunnel Complex

- Effect: Terrorists do not employ WME

- Nodes: Ammo Storage and Key Black Star Leaders

– **Neutralize terrorist infrastructure and key leadership within the JOA** which threaten JTF operations to protect U.S. nationals, facilities, interests, and Gulf partners.


- Effect: Terrorist and pirate groups are incapable of threatening the flow of oil, commerce, and freedom of navigation

- Effect: Terrorists do not employ WME

- Effect: Enemy cannot control or employ terrorists


- Nodes: Key personalities and support infrastructure

The following slide shows the types of missions that were selected to target the nodes in support of the designated tasks. The apportionment was determined in coordination with the priorities and guidance of the JTF Commander to the JSOTF Commander. [\*WOE: Weight of Effort.]





**Recommendation:** JSOTF conduct early coordination to determine the mission priorities of the supported commander. This coupled with a thorough mission analysis, allows the JSOTF commander to apportion his forces based on these priorities. This provides the JSOTF components increased planning and rehearsal time for mission types without the specifics of a particular mission.

 <b>JSOTF Apportionment</b>		
Major CJTF-B Decisive Ops Tasks	WOE*	REQUIREMENTS
Gain and maintain air access dominance (JFACC) SE	LOW	SR/DA
Gain and maintain maritime access dominance (JFMCC) SE	LOW	SR/DA VBSS
Neutralize enemy TBM/WME capability (JFACC) SE	HIGH	SR/DA (Support facilities, TELs)
Neutralize enemy forces to ensure unrestricted access to Gulf resources and unimpeded Transit Passage thru Strait (JFMCC) ME	HIGH	SR/DA/CAS (CDCM, Mine-Laying, C2 Nodes, VBSS, MIO, Anti-Swarm)
Defeat enemy military forces occupying islands (JFLCC) SE	LOW	SR/DA (Hydro Recon, SR/DA)
Neutralize terrorists threats within the JOA (JSOTF) SE	HIGH	SR/DA/UW (Infrastructure and key leadership)
Neutralize pirates threats within the JOA (JFMCC) SE	LOW	SR/DA/VBSS

### Topic: Operational Net Assessment

**Discussion:** ONA is a process that uses a coherent knowledge base to link national objectives and power to apply integrated diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) options that influence an adversary's perceptions, decision-making, and elements of national will.

- Intelligence benefits the ONA process provides:


- ♦ Actionable intelligence products to enable faster planning and better decisions.
- ♦ A system of systems analysis as the centerpiece for understanding the adversary. The ONA generates understanding of the systems and linkages that give the adversary its capacity to act against friendly interests. The ONA further enables the understanding of how the enemies environment can be manipulated in order to decisively affect the behavior of the adversary.

♦ War gaming products to assist in the process of anticipating the adversary's actions, reactions, and counteractions.

- JSOTF JISE personnel conducted in-depth analysis using the ONA tools to build a collaborative (JSOTF J2 to JTF J2) intelligence picture for its primary mission of curtailing the threat of terrorism in the JOA. Using ONA tools the JISE was able to establish and display a detailed terrorist net/nodal analysis highlighting key terrorist infrastructure nodes such as: financial and criminal linkages, religious and regional linkages, and legitimate enterprise activities of the key terrorist organizations. Once armed with this intelligence, the JSOTF planners were able to recommend to the JTF key targets directed against the "soft under-belly" of these organizations. By attacking these soft targets the JSOTF was able to significantly eliminate the terrorist threats while reducing the risks to their own forces.

- Another direct benefit of conducting this ONA nodal analysis was in the area of collection planning. Once all (or the majority) of the nodes were identified the JSOTF J2 recommended types of JTF collection assets that could be targeted against each specific node type. See next page.

The ONA proved useful during this experiment as a operational and strategic planning and analytical tool. However, in order for it to be useful for continued crisis action planning it will require a substantial effort to maintain and update the online databases.








## Intelligence Update

### - Nodal Analysis -

**Recommendation:** The ONA should continue to be refined to increase the fidelity of the databases. A specific improvement would be in the area of search engines. An advanced search/filter capability would have allowed JSOTF intelligence analysts to search the ONA looking at specific “nodes” such as: key personalities and financial institutions, key personalities and businesses, key personalities and family, key personalities and religious contacts. Once these nodal searches were finished then JSOTF analysts could have over-laid the results and possibly determined “common” linkages, which might have been turned into JSOTF targets.



## Intelligence Analysis



### Topic: Collaborative Planning Tools and Processes

**Discussion:** SOF has traditionally done parallel vice the more time consuming sequential planning. Although parallel planning is naturally preferred to sequential planning, in today's rapid, high tempo, and increasingly joint environment, SOF must plan even faster and more interactively. Through the use of some new information management tools, the beginning of an evolution to *collaborative (or integrated) planning* was demonstrated during MC '02. Collaborative planning goes beyond parallel planning with the intent of subordinates being key players in providing input to the higher headquarters concept rather than just developing their own concept in parallel with their higher headquarters. Not surprisingly, there are advantages and disadvantages in doing collaborative planning. These advantages and disadvantages are provided below after a discussion of the tools and processes utilized to conduct collaborative planning.

-Tools - Many of the traditional tools are still used in collaborative planning, i.e. telephones, e-mail, messages, use of LNOs, etc. Three relatively new tools demonstrated in MC'02 included:

♦*Net Meeting* - This program provides text chat, audio, video, file share, white board, and file transfer capabilities. The video and audio functions are usually disabled based on bandwidth constraints. Text chat is the principal


means for collaboration with Net Meeting with the capability to save transcripts in an HTML format allowing a historical record to be maintained. This was a primary tool used to collaborate with the JSOTF's components for planning and execution of operations.

♦ *Information Work Space (IWS)* - IWS applications include instant messaging, chat, voice-over-IP, web video, application sharing, application casting, desktop conferencing, virtual meetings, and web presentations. It was extensively used in planning (and execution) of missions during MC '02 and proved to be a valuable and easy to use tool. However, due to equipment constraints, this tool was only used at the JTF and JTF component levels. Net Meeting was used from the JSOTF down to its components.

♦ *Web Information Center (WIC)* - WIC is a web-based application powered by "Cold Fusion" that manifests itself to the end user as a website or series of sites. The WIC is essentially a web-based GUI (Graphical User Interface)

designed to combine the following concepts into a single, scalable, and customizable product:

- Web based file sharing, management, and presentation. WIC provides web based file sharing that grants the individual user the ability to display, upload or delete files and folders via a web interface. Files and folders are displayed to the user with an intuitive structure, lending to ease of navigation. A search engine, incorporated within the WIC facilitates rapid file and database information retrieval. For planning, all mission folders can be displayed (or hidden) for subordinate or higher units' use.
- Database management and presentation. WIC functions as a web interface for database interactivity. Information can be created, stored, deleted, or modified by the user without having to manipulate the database. Various planning matrices/databases can be displayed within the WIC.
- Web navigation. WIC maintains the capability of indexing and mapping other sites or sub-sites, if the required permissions are assigned. Links to other web servers are also easily referenced within the WIC. This allows rapid interface with other sites involved in planning.



- **Procedures** - With slight modifications, the joint doctrine (Joint Pub 3-05.2) SOF mission planning process was used throughout the exercise. This provided a constant from which the new collaborative tools could be measured. However, the procedures for use of these tools (with the exception of the WIC) were less well-defined, especially for use of IWS.

- **Advantages and Disadvantages** of the new collaborative tools.

- *Net Meeting* - Net Meeting is exceptionally easy to use, thus very little training is needed for the first time user. It also requires very little bandwidth and has a history of being more reliable for secure communications than telephones in many remote sites. Net Meeting has great potential as a tool for collaborative planning.
- *IWS* - This proved to be a very powerful tool for planning and execution of missions. IWS demonstrated its potential for effective use between JSOTFs and their components. It requires slightly more training for the first-time user than does Net Meeting. With about an hour of instruction, and some more practice exercises on its features, the user is very comfortable with this tool. However, the major issue with this tool in MC 02 was that the procedures for its use were not well-defined. Since no schedules were published for specific collaboration meetings, IWS was used as an almost continuous planning session. JTF component commands had individuals essentially "surfing the IWS net" for meetings that were not announced, but had potential impacts on these units. This improved as the experiment progressed, but the normal rules for conducting any meeting need to be applied by the IWS users. Obvious items such as scheduling meeting in advance, naming the required attendees, publishing meeting objectives, maintaining discipline (not getting off track), and either summarizing or publishing meeting notes still apply for the use of this tool.
- *WIC* - Although a Beta version of the WIC has been used by many SOF commands over the past year, it is still

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a relatively new tool. The version used during MC '02 was the final test of WIC Version 1.0. With its many features for information sharing, the WIC has been proven to be a readily accepted tool for information sharing. It does not duplicate other planning tools such as SOF TOOLS or SWAMPS. It does, however, provide planners with the means to selectively share information (or products) with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units (e.g. the products of SOF TOOLS). WIC's easily used file structures, request for information (RFI) management, command journal, mission tracking modules, and other features provide planners and others with a powerful tool for better mission planning.

**Recommendation.** Collaborative planning must be more fully exploited in today's rapid, high tempo, and increasingly joint environment. The use of tools such as Net Meeting, IWS, and the WIC each provide unique qualities that make them useful to SOF in this environment. These tools should be incorporated into special operations units at the earliest opportunity. The SOF JTT has the capability to provide demonstrations and training on each of these tools.


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**Topic: Joint Fires Initiative**

**Discussion:** The joint fires initiative (JFI) was designed to speed the approval process for engaging time sensitive targets (TSTs). Essentially it was a means of facilitating concurrence from all parties on the TST net that it was or was not clear to fire on a TST. The working definition for TST has eliminated the previously used verbiage that "the commander is willing to accept the risk of fratricide to engage a TST." The JFI was designed to reduce that risk of fratricide by establishing a speedy process for all parties to give clearance to fire on a TST. The process was fast, however, there were problems with the accuracy of the blue force tracking reflected in the common operational picture/common

relevant operational picture (COP/CROP) and the posting of unit positions and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs), such as no fire areas (NFAs) and restricted fire areas (RFAs). This was exacerbated by use of multiple systems by the service components to include Theater Battle Management Control System (TBMCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and Army Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) to disseminate and display FSCMs. This increased the risk of fratricide.

**Recommendation:** The Joint Force Commander (JFC)/JTF must establish a joint fires element that establishes and publishes procedures for joint fires to include FSCMs. The JSOTF must also form a JFE, develop processes and procedures for planning and executing joint fires and train to standards.



## **SOF Lessons Learned for JSOTFs**


**Topic: Organizing for Planning**

**Discussion:** JSOTFs have several options to organize for planning. Regardless of the structure chosen, the following functions must be performed by JSOTFs:


- Developing input to the JFC's planning efforts (JFC's OPORD development, branch and sequel planning).
- Developing the JSOTF's initial OPORD.
- Developing the JSOTF's future operations plans (execution phase emerging mission)
- Developing the JSOTF's branch (or what if) plans
- Developing the JSOTF's sequel plans (sometimes in the form of additional OPORDs)

To accomplish the above functions, JSOTFs may organize their planning structure into one or more of the following options:


- Planning performed as an additional duty of the Current Operations (J33). In this case Current Operations performs all of the above listed functions related to planning as well as the traditional duties. This structure is appropriate for short duration operations, when JSOTFs have very limited types of missions (e.g., support to humanitarian operations), or very few forces and missions.








- Planning performed by separate planning organizations (e.g., Future Operations (J35) and Future Plans (J5)) in conjunction with Current Operations (J33). This structure is appropriate for large JSOTFs with multiple missions over a longer time period. It also provides the best direct interface with typical JFC planning structures.



- All planning performed by a single planning cell (i.e., J35) in conjunction with Current Operations (J33).




- All planning performed by a single planning cell under the direction of the J5 and in conjunction with Current Operations (J33).



**Recommendations:** Any of these organizational options will work with their own advantages and disadvantages. Regardless of the preferred organization, the functions must be performed.



## JSOTF JOC Operations



Discussion: The MC 02 concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) required the J3 to handle an increased number of missions compared to past exercises as well as to be responsive to an evolving situation. This was efficiently and effectively dealt with through a well-defined organization and clear delineation of responsibilities for the supervisory positions of J3, Joint Operation Center (JOC) Chief, and Current Ops and Future Ops Chiefs. For this exercise the JSOTF J3 was organized with a J3 Directorate HQ and a JOC. The JOC contained a JOC Chief, a Current Operations Section, and a Future Operations Section. The principal tasks of the J3 Directorate were to conduct planning for future operations; direct, monitor, and assess current operations; and maintain and share situational awareness. The J3 was the primary staff officer that focused on whether the operations were being conducted effectively and efficiently (operational assessment), and how the JSOTF could be more responsive to the JFC and its components (SOF integration). He worked closely with the JSOTF LNOs at the JFC/JTF and at the JTF components to gather this information. He determined if the JSOTF had the right forces for the right missions (apportionment and prioritization of effort) and recommended changes to better support the JFC/JTF. The J3 focused “up and out” on these operational issues. In order for the J3 to be able to focus on the macro-level issues, the JOC Chief was the one responsible for the coordination and synchronization of future ops and current ops and had the best overall situational awareness of the short-term battle (from now out to 96 hours). He had to be sure that this situational awareness was accurate and shared vertically down to the components and up to the JFC/JTF, as well as horizontally to the JFC/JTF components, and internally to the JSOTF staff sections. The JOC was the hub of information and the information management responsibility was considerable. He orchestrated the passing of mission responsibility from future ops to current ops through the plans handover brief. He ensured that the JSOTF was postured to provide its components what they needed to accomplish the mission. Additionally, he was looking at how the JSOTF components were accomplishing the mission, so that he could assist the J3 with his overall assessment of how the JSOTF was supporting the JFC/JTF and its components. All of this allowed the current ops chief to focus on monitoring missions in execution and anticipate any changing

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requirements that affected ongoing operations. The ground, air, maritime desk officers, joint fires element (JFE), rescue coordination center (RCC), and weather all worked directly for him. The COP/CROP manager also reported to him. As requirements dictated for resupply, immediate or emergency fire support, insertion or extraction, or CSAR, the current ops chief and section directed mission execution. The current ops chief faced the challenge of continuing to focus at the operational level and letting the components conduct the tactical battle, but he also assessed their mission accomplishment. The current ops chief ensured that his desk officers were aware of missions in planning in future ops and that they were keeping future ops apprised of the current situation and anything that might have an impact on those missions. The future ops chief focused on planning for the developing and emerging missions. The future ops section performed the following functions:

- Developed input to the JFC's planning efforts (JFC's OPOD development, branch and sequel planning)
- Developed the JSOTF's initial OPOD
- Developed the JSOTF's future operations plans (execution phase emerging mission)
- Developed the JSOTF's branch (or what if) plans
- Developed the JSOTF's sequel plans (sometimes in the form of additional OPODs)

He worked closely with the components to conduct collaborative planning and provided them the time and requirements to plan and accomplish their missions. Both the current ops and future ops chiefs worked with the JSOTF components' LNOs to share situational awareness.

**Recommendation:** The J3's organization and the duties and responsibilities of the supervisory personnel must be clearly defined to allow the proper focus and to increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of the JSOTF. Training and familiarization with duties and responsibilities must be done prior to activation as a JSOTF. All personnel must be trained together to include core elements and augmentees. A STAFFEX [Staff Exercise] will assist in working through processes and procedures.

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**Topic: Integration of SOF assets into the JTF Intelligence Collection Plan**

**Discussion:**

-JTF's continue to emphasize integrating platforms, like Predator, into collection management, but fail to integrate "human sensors", like SOF special reconnaissance (SR) teams, into their overall collection management plan. JTF collection managers fail to realize that SOF has the capability to insert intelligent, stealthy, adaptable, multi-spectral sensors (i.e. SR teams) throughout the JOA in support of the JTF collection efforts but SOF SR teams are rarely thought of as collection assets during JTF collection management planning.

- MC 02 highlighted the following areas of concern for the lack of SOF SR utilization:

- Basic lack of understanding of operational-level special reconnaissance by JTF collection managers.
- JTF collection managers are more familiar with technical collection assets (SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT) than with human collection assets. This was especially evident with USAF and USN collection managers/planners.
- Lack of understanding of SOF capabilities to include actual versus perceived "risk" involved with SOF missions. The general reluctance, both on planners and commanders, to use SOF assets for JTF collection is quite likely based on poor understanding of SOF capabilities.
- JTF J2s' Lack of understanding of the process to task JSOTF assets.

- MC 02 confirmed the utility of having special operations teams conducting HUMINT missions for the JTF in the following areas:

- The SOF SR, UW, and FID missions provided invaluable 24 hour/7 day coverage over a multidimensional collection spectrum on difficult JTF collection targets that could not have been adequately serviced using technical collection.
- SOF confirmed the qualitative difference between surveillance platforms (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), etc.) and the ability for reconnaissance teams to get up close and personal with the target. SOF provided fidelity that could not be found using purely technical means. SOF confirmed the additive value of special operations to mission accomplishment. By inserting SR teams, UW teams, and FID teams in early, the special operations forces were able to dramatically increase the situational awareness of the JTF, improve the accuracy and fidelity



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of joint fires, and provide the invaluable ability to interact directly with both tribal forces on the ground (providing the unmatched ability to provide ground truth) and directly interact with coalition forces. This ability to provide ground truth was an invaluable window into the complex social, political, and cultural factors in the JOA.

**Recommendation:** SOF staff officers and SOF trainers continue to work with JTF J2 and J3 personnel informing them of the importance of using SOF assets in J2 collection management planning. Special emphasis should be placed on highlighting the capabilities of 16<sup>th</sup> SOW, 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR, and NSW infil platforms and the fact that they are specifically designed to penetrate heavily defended areas with reduced risk of compromise.

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**Topic: Personnel Support-Casualty Reporting**

**Discussion:** A key insight revealed in MC02 was in reference to casualty reporting. To enhance this process the JSOTF J1 should collect the JMDs / personnel rosters from the subordinate components and receive changes on a daily basis. In case the component is unable to report a casualty, the JSOTF J1 will have the information to assist in the reporting process. Additionally, the JSOTF J1 should obtain the names of the team members on each mission to help expedite reporting in case there is an incident requiring casualty reports. Is there a duplication of effort, yes, to a certain extent. However, with today's automation capability, it is very simplistic to transmit a file by the push of a button. Providing the information to the JSOTF J1 enables the J1 to continue personnel ops should a subordinate HQ be destroyed, or automation or communications systems fail. Redundancy will ensure the timely reporting of casualties.

Also, many organizations improperly used the term/acronym "MIA". During MC 02, missing in action (MIA) was used immediately upon an individual's absence. The correct term is DUSTWUN (duty status whereabouts unknown). In accordance with DODI 1300.18, the actual status (i.e. AWOL, missing, etc) of the individual(s) should be determined within 10 days of the DUSTWUN status. If it is determined that a member is absent as a result of hostile action, the commander may only recommend a missing status and the Service Secretary concerned must make determination of actual status.

**Recommendation:** Continue to be proactive. Develop a user friendly personnel database that the JSOTF and all components are capable of using. Understand the casualty reporting procedures in your AOR before you deploy. Personnel planning and coordination done up front will pay big dividends later in the operation / exercise.

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**Topic: Logistics Support**

**Discussion:** The JSOTF for MC 02 had both a J1 and a J4 representative in the Joint Planning Group (JPG). This proved invaluable for both the personnel and logistics staffs. The incorporation of the support staff members in the JPG provided first hand information for emerging missions and eliminated any delay of timely information, allowing both the J1 and J4 sections to be proactive versus reactive. We recommend JSOTFs consider the value of the support staff being included in all your planning efforts.

Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) usually / generally / most of the time is pawned off on the support staff. The J4 section spent a lot of time up front considering the reception and integration of their staff, which paid large dividends in the end. Reception and integration of augmentees to the J4 section is essential to seamless operations. In addition to assigning a sponsor and developing a train-up plan for all assigned augmentees, the integration of "full timers" and "augmentees" mixed together on both the day and night shifts was crucial to preparing newly assigned personnel to key positions and led to the "right mix" of experience on all shifts. Since most special operations activities occur at night, it is imperative to have a strong night shift team to support ongoing operations.

Since MC 02 was an Experimentation Exercise, we attempted to conduct operations using new concepts and tools

to enhance the warfighter's capabilities. One such collaborative tool was IWS. We believe this will be a great tool for the future, even better than attempting to get a logistics VTC organized as everyone will be able to communicate right from their own workstation. The goal would be to use this tool while not limiting someone by having them sit at the computer terminal all day and night wearing a head set. JTF manning provides significantly more logisticians than the JSOTF manning document. Therefore, an issue to overcome concerns too many meetings scheduled on top of each other since the JTF staff had more personnel, while the JSOTF staff found themselves being pulled into multiple simultaneous meetings. Once notified, the JTF staff adjusted their meetings schedules accordingly. With more training, the IWS tool will prove beneficial in the future.

Another great tool was the "LOG watch-board" that allowed the JSOTF to "rollup" classes of supply to the JTF to paint an operational picture of requirements (a sample shown below). We identified this as a "best practice" and are looking at the concept for future integration into the WIC. Ideally, we will also be able to develop a "medical watch-board."

JSOTF CLASS III Status (POL)								
Date Last Update: 08/06/02 2300Z								
POL	Objective: 10		DOS					
Type	Capacity (Gals)	Rec'd Last 24 Hours	Iss'd Last 24 Hours	Proj Next 24 Hours	Qty On Hand	Percent Capacity	On Hand DOS	DOS Status
JP8	175,000	0	0	0	132,000	75%	9.9	99%
DFM/F76	50,000	50	1,020	0	38,090	76%	8	80%
JP5	5,000	20	1,000	0	4,000	80%	8	80%
MG1	16,000	0	150	250	14,850	93%	8.3	83%
Total	246,000	70	2,170	250	188,940	77%		86%
						Status	CDR Assessment	CDR Override
						86%	100%	G

SAMPLE Log Watch-Board Page

**Recommendation:** Each staff directorate work with the J1 in developing its portion of the JMD and develop a plan of action for incorporating augmentees into the work force. Plan both to receive some at home station and some in theater, and ensure clear, well thought out reporting instructions are provided. Monitor the development of both IWS and the Log Watch-Board for future use by JSOTF staffs.





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