MESSAGE TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTERS

As U.S. Joint Forces Command continues to interact with the combatant commands and Services, we recognize that there is no universal agreement on the best way to plan and execute a strategic communication and related activities strategy. Additionally, there is very little doctrinal guidance, consequently we have updated this pre-doctrinal handbook to help joint force commanders and their staffs understand alternative perspectives, techniques, procedures, “best practices,” and organizational options.

Strategic communication must be at the heart of U.S. Government efforts to inform and influence key audiences in support of U.S. national interests, policies, and objectives. We seek to achieve this influence by understanding and engaging them with coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, images, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

The U.S. military plays an instrumental supporting role in strategic communication, primarily through information operations, public affairs, visual information, and defense support to public diplomacy. Strategic communication considerations should be associated with every military operation across the entire range of military operations from routine, recurring military activities in peacetime through major operations. Every commander should develop a coordinated and synchronized communication strategy and provide guidance for the support and execution of a coherent effort. Effectively synchronized strategic communication has the potential to achieve national, theater-strategic and operational-level objectives in a manner that could lessen the requirement for combat in many operations. This is especially the case in circumstances where the focus of operations is on gaining and maintaining support of the relevant population, such as in counterinsurgency and other operations associated with irregular warfare.

During the past five years, understanding of strategic communication and its impact on joint operations has continued to evolve across the joint community. These experiences and insights are described in this handbook. I encourage you to use the information in this handbook and provide feedback to help us capture value-added ideas for incorporation in emerging joint doctrine.

STEPHEN R. LAYFIELD
Major General, U.S. Army
Director, J7/Joint Warfighting Center
PREFACE

1. Scope

This handbook is a pre-doctrinal document on “Strategic Communication (SC)” and the development of communication strategy at all levels of command. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and procedures that are evolving in the joint community and moving toward incorporation into joint publications. This handbook serves as a bridge between current practices in the field and the migration into doctrine. As such, the intent is to inform SC proponents, practitioners, doctrine writers, educators, and trainers of SC for inclusion in joint doctrine, education, and training.

2. Content

This handbook outlines current doctrine, useful results from relevant studies, recognizes best practices, clarifies SC support requirements for the joint operation planning process, and offers other techniques and procedures currently used in the field. It also addresses some techniques, procedures, and implications for further development of SC-related joint doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. A hypothetical vignette is included in Appendix J to assist in understanding the material.

3. Development

Development of this handbook was based on data obtained from applicable approved and emerging joint, multinational, multi-Service, and Service doctrine and procedures; training and education material from CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE, and PINNACLE senior executive education programs; joint exercise observations in facilitated after-action reviews and commander’s summary reports; related joint concepts; experimentation results; the draft DOD Directive on SC; other related Joint Staff (JS) directives; joint exercise and other trip reports; joint publication assessment reports; and Service and joint lessons learned databases. Additional research involved discussions with members of the Services, doctrine development organizations, combatant commands, JS, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); a review of the USJFCOM Communication Strategy 2007; the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy (PD) Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication; Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication; 2003 and 2008 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication reports; emerging USJFCOM Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept (JIC); SC conferences and working groups; congressional testimony; and various related reports, articles, publications and studies.

4. Application

This handbook is not approved joint doctrine, but is a non-authoritative supplement to currently limited SC doctrine that can assist commanders and their staffs in planning, executing, and assessing SC-related activities and developing a coherent communication
Summary of Changes

strategy. The information herein also can help the joint community develop SC doctrine, mature emerging SC concepts for possible transition into joint doctrine, and further SC effectiveness in joint operations. Commanders should consider the potential benefits and risks of using this information in actual operations.

5. Contact Information

Comments and suggestions on this important topic are welcomed. USJFCOM JWFC points of contact are LtCol Robert Kurowski, 757-203-7966 (DSN 668), robert.kurowski@jfcom.mil; and Mr. David Spangler, 757-203-6028 (DSN 668), david.spangler@jfcom.mil.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY HANDBOOK (VERSION 2.0)
DATED 27 OCTOBER 2009

- Provides a discussion of the "Battle of the Narrative," including planning and analysis considerations. (Page II-13)
- Provides a more robust explanation and guidance for key leader engagement (KLE), including KLE assessment. (Page III-7)
- Provides a summary of “Information Effects” takeaways from the Israeli-Palestinian case studies. (Page M-3)
- Updated the communication strategy support to the joint operation planning process, Figure IV-3 (Pages IV-10 through IV-13).
- Updated the communication strategy vignette, Appendix H.
- Added Appendix O, Process Map, as follows:
  - Strategic Communication / Communications Strategy (SC/CS) Process Chart is a map of the process for developing a communication strategy and supporting and leveraging extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and assessment.
  - Individual stages are broken out and some detail is provided about specific steps, tasks, flow of inputs and outputs, important products, key participants, and which entity has primary responsibility for each step.
  - A dark thick arrow shows the critical path through the process, with diamond shapes showing decision points.
- Added Appendix P, Principles, Capabilities, and Trust, which highlights an emerging construct of principles and aligning words and deeds to build credibility and gain public trust.
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Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group

- Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook

Joint Task Force Counter- Improvised Explosive Device Operations
(CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT)

These documents can be downloaded at:

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/

Click on the “JWFC Pamphlets” link in the “Global Resource” box.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the background, definition, and doctrinal underpinnings of strategic communication (SC)
- Addresses synchronizing themes, messages, images and actions
- Defines “narrative,” “theme,” “message,” and discusses the “Battle of the Narrative.”
- Describes current SC practices at the strategic and communication strategy (CS) at the operational and tactical levels
- Identifies some SC/CS “best practices” from the field
- Identifies the need to shift and broaden key leader engagement
- Identifies unique skill sets needed to assist in understanding the operational environment
- Provides planning tools to assist CS planning efforts
- Provides sample CS planning and execution products
- Discusses other SC initiatives
- Identifies operational implications of SC/CS implementation
- Provides a process map for developing a communication strategy and supporting and leveraging extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and assessment

Communication Challenges

Strategic communication (SC) must be a responsive and agile whole-of-government effort with synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and actions.

The continuous, rapid communications flow in the information environment, facilitated by modern technological advances and media distribution methods, requires responsive, agile processes and capabilities to preserve and enhance the credibility and influence of the United States. To address these challenges through unified action, a whole-of-government approach known as strategic communication (SC) has emerged. SC generally is accepted as “Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage
Executive Summary

key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” Further and more specifically, effective SC requires synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and actions with other nonlethal and lethal operations.

The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified SC as one of five specific “areas of particular emphasis” critical to the Department of Defense (DOD) ability to address a strategic environment “characterized by uncertainty and surprise.” The QDR went on to state that DOD, “…must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture; developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) that reflect the US Government’s overall strategic objectives.” The primary military capabilities that contribute to SC include public affairs (PA), information operations (IO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

Synchronizing SC-related themes, messages, images and actions across the joint force is often critical to mission accomplishment. However, SC encompasses national-strategic level and non-DOD activities that are not under the direct control of the joint force commander (JFC). This adds to the complexity of the effort to adapt and apply themes, messages, images, and actions at each level within military operations to create desired and avoid undesired outcomes in selected audiences.

National Strategic Communication

Within the USG, the Department of State’s (DOS) Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has the lead for SC. DOS also created several new organizations and structures such as the Global Strategic Engagement Center. Additionally, the DOS Rapid Response Unit (RRU) responds to urgent issues by providing approved strategic-level SC statements that military leaders can use to develop military-oriented SC-related products. The DOS also uses their INFOCENTRAL website as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, research, analysis, and other products for use by SC programs at all levels. This site is available to assist the joint force in SC planning. A close collaborative working relationship has developed between DOS and DOD on SC.
Executive Summary

DOD Organization, Processes, and Guidance

To support the USG effort led by DOS, DOD has established new staff organizations and processes to guide and provide support to the SC effort. In late 2005, SecDef appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication ((DASD (JC)) charged with the responsibility “… to oversee Department of Defense activities directed at shaping department-wide communications doctrine, organization, and training for the joint force.” These organizational changes and other efforts have produced significant results. Publication of the QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap (SC Roadmap) was instrumental in initiating numerous SC-related activities within DOD. OSD has released an SC concept of operations and a set of SC principles, Appendix A.

Definitions and Nesting

In order to eliminate the confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term “strategic,” we may want to consider using the term “Communication Strategy” for the overall construct, leaving specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of command. Strategic documents, like the National Security Strategy (NSS), provide enduring strategic communication, set within a contextual background, and identify the ultimate goal or end state. This enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state is often called a “narrative.” Messages should support the themes at that level, the themes should support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes, and themes at all levels should support strategic themes and the enduring national narrative. This ensures consistent communications to global audiences over time.

Battle of the Narrative

The battle of the narrative is a full-blown battle in the cognitive dimension of the information environment, just as traditional warfare is fought in the physical domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare in the physical domains, is to shape the environment such that the contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to your advantage. Likewise, a key component of the “Battle of the Narrative” is to succeed in establishing the reasons for and potential outcomes of the conflict, on terms favorable to your efforts. Upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in a different setting and purpose.
Executive Summary

winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in a different setting and purpose.

Joint Force Practices

The commander’s communication strategy must be commander-driven, proactive, and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions.

Some organizations find it useful to distinguish the SC-related planning and execution that occurs within the theater from SC-related activities at the national-strategic level. This approach uses the CCDR’s communication strategy to support the broader interagency SC effort and closely coordinate support from other agencies and organizations. This strategy must be commander-driven, proactive, and synchronized with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions. A synchronization matrix provides a graphical representation of the JFC’s communication strategy and an effective tool in matching words and deeds directed toward the various audiences.

SC activities and organizations are at different levels of maturity and effectiveness.

Current SC staff organizations and processes used by JFCs are at different levels of maturity and effectiveness. Likewise, a number of JFC’s have both increased senior leadership involvement in the SC effort and have integrated SC into planning and staffing processes. Five specific examples of these efforts are increased command emphasis, tasking an existing staff leader, direct planning team integration, centralized control of all SC-related activities under a separate directorate, and a strategic communication director with small coordination staff and supporting SC working group.

Thirteen Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) SC “best practices” may be adaptable to other areas of responsibility.

In April 2008, USJFCOM sent a team to identify Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Communication Division “best practices” for possible inclusion in joint doctrine, curricula, and training events and consideration by other commands. The team observed MNF-I, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and US Embassy communication programs and identified 13 best practices. Some are unique to the operational environment in Iraq; however, many could be adapted to other operational areas.

Other Strategic Communication Initiatives

Although progress is being made, resourcing remains an ongoing challenge.

Much effort has gone into progress on SC Roadmap assigned tasks, resourcing remains an ongoing challenge. There is a growing desire for the creation of courses and programs focused on SC. The DASD (JC) conducted a review of military education programs to determine quantity and quality of SC education. This review has discovered that current SC-related instruction primarily consists of lessons/material within courses
Executive Summary

on IO and PA. The DASD (JC) has sponsored and scheduled a number of SC-related conferences designed to gather SC educators and key practitioners for thoughtful discussions on SC education and training issues.

KLE is not about crisis engagement.

KLE is not about engaging key leaders when a crisis arises, it is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support our interests during times of crisis. Without periodic and consistent engagement, these relationships often lack the depth of understanding and strength needed to gain support on important issues. It might be beneficial to consider expanding assignment of KLE responsibility beyond the typical set of commanding generals, to include deputy commanders, chiefs of staff, or even some key directorate heads. Likewise, immediate post-KLE debriefing is critical to the assessment process, to support well-planned focused engagement.

Planning and Assessment

The field struggles with how to implement SC planning.

There are many specialty areas supporting the joint operational planning process that require specialists to plan effectively, such as intelligence, logistics, IO, PA, and others. The field is currently struggling with how to implement SC planning. Some feel that there needs to be a separate SC analysis and planning effort. Others feel that simply training planners to include SC considerations in the doctrinal process would be sufficient. Investigation of this issue will continue, but the requirements for synchronization of SC efforts across the force and integration into the final plan remain steadfast.

To properly support SC, understanding the operational environment must include the cognitive dimension.

Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operation planning, and is particularly important for effective SC/CS. In particular, the JFC and staff must attempt to understand what people think, how they perceive the operational environment, and why. It may require analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeate the local social, political, economic, and information networks. However, the JFC must understand that these are complex, adaptive systems that are more difficult to understand than closed systems, such as an air defense network. This is a challenging undertaking, complicated by factors such as the audience pre-existing bias, cultural lens, stimulus-response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of current situation.

Understanding and mapping the cognitive dimension may require
Executive Summary

leveraging unique skill sets not normally found in a military organization.

in one situation might not work in another. The JFC, chief of staff, J-2, and others may also need to leverage outside experts to support joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, planning, and assessment, either by deploying them forward or through “reachback.” Examples of such expertise include the following:

- Anthropology or Sociology (understanding the local culture)
- Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/interest in the local population and venues for communication)
- Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communication processes and products)
- Local and regional communications expertise (understanding the means, methods, and relative impact of local and regional communications)
- Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)
- US Embassy/DOS/United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expertise (understanding coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)

Identifying reframing indicators is critical. Because the environment and the problem are going to change over time, it is critical during the operational design and early joint operation planning process to identify indicators that will enable us to detect when it is time to “reframe” the problem and change the operational approach.

SC/CS Support to the Joint Operation Planning Process

This handbook provides SC planning techniques and considerations.

The active participation of SC/CS planners throughout the planning process is critical to successfully integrating CS activities/products. Appendix O provides a process map for developing a communication strategy and supporting and leveraging extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and assessment. Throughout planning, most functional areas meet to conduct mission analysis and staff estimates, provide input to the planning process, and develop their detailed pieces of the concept/plan. The CS working group performs that functional coordination process for the communication strategy. For detailed support to planning, Figure IV-3 shows CS support activities for each step of the JOPP. Page IV-21 outlines some short, medium, and long-term planning techniques. Appendix G provides a more detailed checklist.
Executive Summary

There are three fundamental considerations for planning CS-related messaging activities: delivery vehicle, timing, and tempo.

- It is clear that construction of the message must include considerations for resonance with the intended audience, but the delivery vehicle can also significantly distort, impede, or facilitate reception by the audience. Selection of the appropriate vehicle can be quite complex and must consider message content, desired audience impact, resistance, vehicle advantage, and other factors.

- Timing of the message is important for myriad reasons, including synergy with other messages/events, receptivity of the audience, momentum, audience motivation/expectations, and stimulus response patterns. Factors that define the timing window often include audience social/cultural expectations, motivation, the perception of personal impact, and timing of other important messages.

- Tempo of message delivery can directly affect how the audience decides to take action. A continual drum beat of a specific message or type of message can result in the receiving audience over time treating it as noise. However, a well-timed message at the optimum tempo can have significantly increased effect.

Measuring progress toward mission accomplishment assists commanders in decision-making and adjusting operations to achieve military objectives and reach the end state. With local population perception playing a pivotal role—particularly in irregular warfare—and the fact that “battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension,” assessment has a key role in SC-related activities. Because SC attempts to create outcomes primarily in the cognitive dimension, it is a challenge to create measures that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced.

Operational Implications

In order to integrate and synchronize SC efforts and capabilities, as noted in the SC Roadmap, the joint community needs to publish SC policy and expand joint doctrine. This effort should include identification of value-added emerging structures and practices, the scope and limits of SC, subordinate elements, supporting capabilities, and relationships. Training and education may be the key...
Executive Summary

Enabler to rapidly increase effectiveness of SC operations and facilitate the adoption of the more effective interim organizational methods. Training of commanders and staffs to synchronize words and actions can help the JFC close or avoid the “say-do gap” and influence audiences more efficiently and effectively. Appendix N has a good example of how this problem manifests itself and possible causes.

An analysis of SC processes, organizational needs, and coordination means may be of value.

More work needs to be done to identify an SC end state for DOD, analyze existing doctrinal processes to determine needed modification, and provide organizational constructs to support the process changes. This work could produce some efficiency for SC-related activities and organizations. Likewise, investigating ways to better reach out and coordinate SC with interagency, coalition, and other partners may provide significantly improved coherence in SC themes, messages, images, and actions for achieving long-term SC-related objectives.

Commercial and nongovernmental expertise may be useful to SC.

A study of private enterprise or nongovernmental expertise in the areas of advertising, marketing, and progress measurement may be beneficial to help shift paradigms and develop new ways to conduct SC as well as new ways to use military resources in the execution and assessment of SC.

Annex Y needs expedited.

Although SC guidance templates are being submitted and processed above the combatant command level, processing is taking weeks in some cases. Some combatant commands have stopped using Annex Y in favor of placing two or three paragraphs in the commander’s intent section and referring to the IO and PA annexes. A more expedited process may be warranted.

Training planners to include SC considerations and providing authority to SC directors should help planning and synchronization of SC activities.

The detailed techniques and procedures for how the JFC should synchronize IO, PA, and DSPD in support of higher-level SC themes, messages, images, and actions have not been decided, so organizational changes – particularly those that require more resources – are premature. A more efficient approach may be to train planners to incorporate SC more completely into the existing doctrinal joint operation planning process and to slightly modify and expand the doctrinal baseline. Whether or not organizational changes are necessary, those leaders responsible for implementing, coordinating, or directing SC-related activities for their command must be given the requisite authority, tools, and other resources to accompany the responsibility.
Executive Summary

**Diminishing stovepipes could help unify SC efforts.**

Diminishing stovepipes, review of authorities or bridging DOD organizations that overly segment missions or inappropriately restrain employment of capabilities may prove invaluable to producing a more unified SC effort. While this may require some revision of staff process and procedures within joint organizations, the results could be a single coherent effort that can more effectively meet the challenge of conducting successful operations at all levels.

**Feedback from the field indicates a need for a machine translator and a center of excellence.**

SC subject matter experts in the field have indicated that a “Center of Excellence” type organization for SC may be useful in developing SC doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, concepts, capturing lessons learned, and advocacy for warfighter SC issues. Likewise, feedback from the field indicates that development of a machine translator that is dialectically accurate, agile, and culturally validated should improve the JFC’s ability to communicate with indigenous personnel. It would facilitate dialogue, enable discussion, and improve understanding.

**Personnel shortages affect SC efforts significantly.**

Interviews with DOD SC experts have indicated that personnel shortages continue to affect SC efforts significantly. In order to alleviate some pressure on the personnel resource system, intensifying the incorporation of SC considerations into joint and Service planner development programs may be of value.

**Developing regional and country experts may prove valuable.**

A key enabler for many SC programs is an understanding of the local language, cultural and information environment. Development of regional and country experts to assist in intelligence preparation, planning, and executing SC-related tasks may prove valuable. Network analysts will need the unique skill set to support SC efforts.
Executive Summary

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CHAPTER I
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES

"Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners. Effective communication must build and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological support for terrorism."

Quadrennial Defense Review Report February 6, 2006

1. Preserving Influence

a. The continuous, rapid communications flow in the information environment, facilitated by modern technological advances and media distribution methods, requires responsive, agile processes and capabilities to preserve and enhance the credibility and influence of the United States. The communication capabilities of today greatly amplify the impact and speed of change in foreign and domestic public opinion and the subsequent influence on activities of the US Government (USG). Adversaries are often unconstrained in this environment, unencumbered by traditional processes, and unconcerned about necessary ethical, moral, or legal constraints under which the US and its allies operate. They have successfully used the information environment to advance their objectives and undermine our ability to do the same. In Irregular warfare, where the struggle is for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations, US and coalition forces may be at an extreme disadvantage operating in an unfamiliar environment where the adversary has a cultural and communication advantage and may already have the support of certain segments of the population.

"... I say to you: that we are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma."

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Letter to Al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005

b. This is not to say that SC in only important in irregular warfare, because SC focuses on selected audiences beyond the local population as well. Therefore, SC is critical across the range of military operations.

2. Providing Unified Action

a. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Key activities that contribute to unified action are assignment of
Chapter I

responsible, organizing, establishing relationships, and collaboration. Unified action is a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort. An example from 2007 of how unified action is sorely needed:

Our government’s view concerning the recent Supreme Court ruling on tribunals is a case in point. The administration failed to provide a unified response to the court’s ruling that military tribunals are illegal. Since the administrative branch (including the departments of State, Justice, and Defense) could not or did not decide what unified message to promulgate regarding the ruling’s significance to the war effort, widely different media interpretations abounded and went unchecked by a government public information counterweight. BBC News bluntly termed the ruling a “stunning rebuff to President Bush,” and the French press generally followed a similar theme of “Supreme Court disavows Bush.” German national radio hailed the ruling as a “Victory for the Rule of Law.” Civilian news media from Spain to Italy, Pakistan, and China agreed, while the Swedish newspaper Sydsvenskan’s editorial writer commented, “Now the judicial power has put a check on the executive power. Thanks for that.” In contrast, the Arab press reaction was skeptical. Writing in London’s Al-Hayat Arabic newspaper, columnist Jihad al-Khazin commented, “This was all great news, so great that it was reported by all American and international media outlets and continues to draw reactions until this very day, but none of it is true, or, if we wish to be accurate, will ever see the light of day, because on the same day that the Bush Administration declared its commitment to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Senate Judiciary Committee was holding hearings on the treatment of accused terrorists.”

“We hurt ourselves and the message we try to send when it appears we are doing something merely for the credit. We hurt ourselves more when our words don’t align with our actions.”

Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Force Quarterly, 29 Aug 09

b. Strategic Communication. To address the challenges we face in the information environment, a whole-of-government approach known as SC has emerged. SC is defined as:

Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.\(^2\)

Further and more specifically, effective SC requires synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and activities with other nonlethal and lethal operations to inform and influence selected audiences in support of US national interests. However, a lack of sufficient government-wide guidance, resources, and capabilities hinders our ability to effectively coordinate and synchronize our activities and achieve unified action.
3. Guidance and Capability Shortfalls

a. Policy and Resources

(1) The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified SC as one of five specific “areas of particular emphasis” critical to the DOD ability to address a strategic environment “characterized by uncertainty and surprise.” The QDR went on to state that DOD, “…must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture; developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the US Government’s overall strategic objectives.”

(2) DOD subsequently released the September 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication (referred to in this handbook as the SC Roadmap) that assigned fifteen tasks to USJFCOM, including SC joint integrating concept development, force generation analysis, collaboration tools development, and various training and education initiatives. Likewise, many other SC activities are underway within the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and other US government agencies to improve SC within their respective areas of responsibility. These activities have resulted in different views from the joint community about how to implement SC.

(3) The 2008 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication report acknowledges improvement at the operational level since the 2003 report, but states “…despite progress, much work remains to be done.” Specifically, the latest DSB report expresses concern for the permanence of this progress:

Positive changes within organizations are real, but they depend to a considerable extent on the skills and imagination of current leaders. These changes must be evaluated, and those that work should be institutionalized. Resistance from traditional organizational cultures continues. Resources for strategic communication have increased, but they fall substantially short of national needs.

Expansion of limited SC doctrine and training can help institutionalize these positive changes.

b. Military Capabilities and Limitations

(1) Joint Doctrine. The primary military capabilities that contribute to SC include public affairs (PA), information operations (IO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD). The SC Roadmap also list visual information (VI) and military diplomacy (MD). PA, IO, and DSPD have established doctrine and terms of reference and there is discussion of the need to coordination and synchronization, but little joint doctrine exists to integrate them for SC purposes. SC is relatively new and other operational implications could emerge. Discussions across DOD, including those with flag officers at CAPSTONE and PINNACLE seminars, underscore the need to develop a common, clear SC baseline across DOD in the areas of doctrine, concept development, experimentation, and training.
(2) The SC Roadmap clearly outlined current military limitations: "The US military is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, coordinate, and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America’s interests. Changes in the global information environment require the Department of Defense (DOD), in conjunction with other US Government (USG) agencies, to implement more deliberate and well-developed Strategic Communication processes."

(3) Synchronizing themes, messages, images and actions that contribute to SC across the joint force can be critical to mission accomplishment. However, SC encompasses national-strategic level and non-DOD activities that are not under the direct control of the joint force commander (JFC). This adds to the complexity of the effort to adapt and apply themes, messages, images, and actions at each level within an area of operations to create desired and avoid undesired outcomes in intended audiences.

(4) There are many disconnects in how major stakeholders approach SC. Ongoing discussions with key SC practitioners in the field revealed that many feel that the current SC definition is too broad and vague. Likewise, the ASD (PA) and DASD (JC) have begun briefing that SC is a process and are using the SC Roadmap definition instead of the approved DOD dictionary definition. Joint trainers are currently teaching that SC resides solely at the strategic level and that the “Commander’s Communication Strategy” replaces SC at the operational level. Some Services also state that SC is solely at the strategic level, others do not. This varied approach, in the absence of policy, is causing problems.

“The panoply of US force actions must be synchronized across the operational battlespace to the extent possible so as not to conflict with statements made in communications at every level from President to the soldier, sailor, marine, or airman on the street.”


c. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operation planning, and is particularly important for effective SC. In particular, the joint force commander (JFC) and staff must attempt to understand what people think, how they perceive the operational environment, and why. It may require analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that shape the local social, political, economic, and information systems. However, the JFC must understand that these are complex, adaptive systems that are more difficult to understand than closed systems, such as an air defense network. Such analysis should assess the audience pre-existing bias, cultural lens, stimulus-response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of the current situation. An additional challenge is that the information environment is typically complex, has many competing signals, and is globally interconnected. Understanding and mapping the cognitive dimension may require unique skill sets not normally found in a military
Strategic Communication Challenges

organization. In irregular warfare, where popular support is the center of gravity, a more detailed understanding of the information environment and cognitive dimension is vital.

"With overwhelming firepower, Western armies rarely lose in combat to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. But in communications battle, the militants appear to hold the edge. The gap has grown especially wide in the Afghan war zone, analysts say. Using FM transmitters, the Internet, and threatening notes known as ‘night letters’ (TIME), Taliban operating from the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan have proven effective at either cowering citizens or winning them over to their message of jihad. . . ."By early 2009 Afghan and Pakistan Taliban factions were operating hundreds of radio programs, distributing audio cassettes, and delivering night letters to instill fear and obedience among their targeted populations."

Greg Bruno, Council of Foreign Relations, Winning the Information War in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 11 May 2009

d. Assessment. Measuring progress toward mission accomplishment assists commanders in decision-making and adjusting operations to achieve military objectives and reach the end state. With local population perception playing a pivotal role—particularly in irregular warfare, such as COIN operations—and the fact that “battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension,” assessment has a key role in SC-related activities. Because SC targets the cognitive dimension, traditional assessment associated with lethal fires is not adequate and creating metrics that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced is a challenge.

"While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational issue – clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us – but we can defeat ourselves."

General Stanley McChrystal
Commander, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Revised Tactical Directive 02 July 09 (Publicly Releasable Portion)

4. Addressing Shortfalls

To assist joint force planners, this handbook provides definitions of SC-related capabilities, discusses their relationships, provides a brief discussion of USG and DOD strategic-level SC implementation, and offers more in-depth information on current practices at the operational level. To provide stability and consistency, this handbook proposed a “commander’s communication strategy” construct to address SC-related activities at every level of command. To assist in planning, executing, and assessing SC-related activities, this handbook provides principles (Appendix A), selected best practices from the field, planning considerations, techniques, procedures, capabilities that support SC (Appendix B, Figure B-1), and potential conflicts (Figure B-2). This handbook discusses ongoing developmental activities, such as USJFCOM SC Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) development and SC education initiatives. Finally, this handbook provides a process
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map for strategic communication, developing a communication strategy, and supporting
and leveraging extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and
assessment (Appendix O).

“Face the fact that communication superiority is a prerequisite for success in irregular
warfare, just as air superiority is a prerequisite for victory in conventional war. To
date we have been ineffective in the strategic communication campaign to
strengthen the will of our own people, to weaken the will of our enemies, and gain
the support of people around the world. In the current battle of wills, strategic
communication is the center of gravity. This conflict is not to be won through
economic, diplomatic, and military means.”

Sam Holliday, Cross and Crescent
CHAPTER II
ESTABLISHED POLICY AND GUIDANCE

“In the past when soldiers were trained to adjust artillery fire, they were instructed to make bold corrections because the eye often underestimates the distance to the right or left, up or down, that the gun’s aim must be adjusted to hit the target. So it is with strategic communication. To date, the American effort to get into the game has been half-hearted and limited to bureaucratic fixes.”


1. National Strategic Communication

   a. Within the USG, the Department of State’s Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has the lead for SC. DOS established an interagency (IA) coordination body with primary responsibility for SC oversight:

   The Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is the overall mechanism by which we coordinate our public diplomacy across the interagency community.12

   (1) The primary product of this committee, recently renamed the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), is the US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. This document provides USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core messages under which DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities.

   (2) The Department of State’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) engages international audiences on issues of US policy, society, and values to help create an environment that is receptive to US national interests.

   b. Commanders and their staffs should plan activities to function in coordination with these and other national-level communication initiatives. The 2008 National Defense Strategy acknowledges, “Our efforts require a unified approach to both planning and implementing policy ... one that seamlessly combines civil and military capabilities and options.”

   Strategic communications will play an increasingly important role in a unified approach to national security. DoD, in partnership with the Department of State, has begun to make strides in this area, and will continue to do so. However, we should recognize that this is a weakness across the US Government, and that a coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation of strategic communications.13

   c. A significant national SC resource is the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center (OSC), formerly FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service), which provides media reports and broadcasts from specific countries and regions.
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2. **Department of State Organization, Processes, and Products**

   a. Within the Department of State, the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) has the lead for SC. The Undersecretary directs the work of three bureaus: International Information Programs (IIP), Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), and Public Affairs (PA).

   b. Within PA, the DOS Rapid Response Unit (RRU) addresses high-profile, urgent issues by providing daily (Monday to Friday) approved strategic-level statements by senior US officials, which military leaders can use to develop military-oriented SC-related products. Send an e-mail to rru@state.gov to request being placed on the RRU listserv.

   c. The DOS IIP bureau runs the INFOCENTRAL website ([https://infocentral.state.gov](https://infocentral.state.gov)), which serves as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, talking points, research, analysis, and other products for use by SC programs at all levels. This unclassified, password-protected site is available to assist the joint force in SC planning. The complete collection of RRU reports is available on INFOCENTRAL, at [https://infocentral.state.gov/guidance/rapid-response2](https://infocentral.state.gov/guidance/rapid-response2).

   d. Also available on INFOCENTRAL is the DOS Counterterrorism Communications Alert, which reviews international media treatment of terrorist actions and messages, particularly those of Al Qaida and affiliated groups, and efforts to counter them.

   e. To engage Internet audiences, DOS established IIP’s america.gov website ([www.america.gov](http://www.america.gov)), which contains clear, concise, accurate articles and interactive features relevant to US foreign policy goals in seven languages. Also, DOS IIP’s Digital Outreach Team actively interacts on key local and regional forums, blogs, and social media sites in Arabic, Persian, and Urdu.

   f. Within the office of the Under Secretary, the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources (R/PPR), provides strategic direction to public diplomacy activities, managing resources (people and funding), overseeing performance measurement, and integrating the same into strategic planning and resource allocation.

   g. The DOS Global Strategic Engagement Center (R/GSEC) is an interagency organization, housed at State, but with personnel assigned from within the DOS as well as from DOD, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the intelligence community and other USG entities involved in SC. It serves as the primary locus of day-to-day interagency coordination, research, analysis, and planning on USG-wide global strategic engagement issues. The GSEC operationalizes decisions made by the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) for Global Engagement.

   h. The Director for Strategic Communication, National Security Council (NSC), chairs the IPC for Global Engagement. Collaborative efforts on the IPC have contributed to the decision of the NSC to establish a recently announced “Global Engagement Directorate.” DOS, DOD, USAID and others are forming interagency groups to support the GED and the IPC.
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i. A close, collaborative working relationship has developed between DOS and DOD on SC. For example, DOS sent participants to DOD SC education conferences and is actively participating in the DOD SC Education Consortium. Other examples are DOS participation in DOD biweekly SC Directors secure video teleconferences, attendance at the quarterly DOD SC Directors Group meetings, and the co-sponsoring of last year’s Worldwide SC Seminar. Likewise, multiple DOD organizations participate in the weekly Interagency Strategic Communication Network video teleconference, which offers a forum for SC professionals from DOD, DOS, and other agencies, as well as outside experts, to share information and ideas on SC.

“We recognize that our current governmental structure was not meant to resolve the problems of the global Information Age – the mismatch between authorities for public diplomacy in State and the resources in DOD – being one obvious proof of this.”

Dr. Michael Doran, DASD for Support to Public Diplomacy
House Armed Services Committee testimony, 8 Nov 07, 8-9

3. Department of Defense Organization, Processes, and Guidance

a. To support the USG effort led by DOS, DOD has established new staff organizations and processes to guide and provide support to the SC effort. In late 2005, SecDef appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication (DASD (JC)) charged with the responsibility “… to oversee Department of Defense activities directed at shaping department-wide communications doctrine, organization, and training for the joint force.”

Another initiative included the establishment of a Strategic Communication Directors Group to provide DOD, combatant command, Joint Staff, and Service-level collaboration/coordination.

(1) This group meets monthly via secure video teleconferences (chaired by the DASD (JC)) to address operational and educational issues, initiatives and events.

(2) This group also meets quarterly in person to focus on major strategic and regional issues.

These organizational changes and other efforts have produced significant results. Publication of the SC Roadmap was instrumental in initiating numerous SC-related activities within DOD. Publication of the DOD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan and facilitating approval of CCDR SC templates helped accelerate SC implementation in the field. Appendix C, Figure C-1, provides an example of an SC guidance template format.

b. The DASD (JC) facilitates broader DOD SC efforts, such as the Wounded Warrior communications plan. This effort now involves 38 stakeholders, including interagency partners such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Health and Human Services.
Likewise, current DASD (JC) efforts include developing SC policy, advocating for SC doctrine and increased SC fidelity in exercises, and combining DOS and DOD SC plans for Afghanistan into a single document that provides useful strategic-level guidance. DASD (JC) has also established a strategic-level SC working group of all key stakeholders that conducts SC assessment, analysis, coordination, and cross-agency information sharing. Finally, DASD (JC) oversees SC portfolio interests within joint capability areas for better alignment with the budget. Because of the need to synchronize the myriad SC-related capabilities, organizations, and missions, some have likened SC to an orchestra (Figure II-1). In order to create the desired effect (outcome), different sections of the orchestra play at different times, tempos, and volumes.

c. OSD has released an SC concept of operations and a set of SC principles (Appendix A). In addition, the QDR SC Execution Roadmap augments the discussion of SC within the QDR Report and assigns execution tasks. No DOD policy directive or instruction currently exists for SC; however, DOD has developed a draft DOD directive on SC. Once approved, this document should provide additional guidance and clarify roles, responsibilities, and interactions of various organizations within DOD. This important policy should accomplish the following:

(1) Require close alignment of DOD SC efforts with USG SC efforts led by DOS.

(2) Direct that SC be institutionalized as an integrating process across DOD, included in concept and doctrine development, strategy and plan design, execution, and assessment, and incorporated into Service and joint education and training programs.

Figure II-1. Strategic Communication is Like an Orchestra Producing Harmony

The selection, timing, and emphasis of SC instruments help orchestrate the message to stakeholders consistent with a desired effect or commander’s intent. The conductor must continuously adapt the score based on stakeholder feedback.
Established Policy and Guidance

This includes the establishment of senior leader positions and necessary organizational structures at the Service Secretary and combatant command level to integrate communication efforts across each organization’s span of influence.

(3) Direct that coordination and synchronization of DOD actions, images, and words occur throughout strategy development, planning, execution, and assessment in order to achieve desired impact at all levels.

(4) Direct that military plans address SC objectives throughout all phases of an operation and direct integration and synchronization of SC dimensions of military plans with US national policy, plans, and objectives.

(5) Confirm that DOD SC-related activities do not replace traditional IO, PA, and DSPD roles, functions, and missions.

(6) Clarify and assign SC-related responsibilities to the Joint Staff and relevant DOD agencies.

4. Joint Doctrine

“*We must emphasize doctrine as the driver for change. You can’t cement change in the organization until you adapt the institutions. That change begins with doctrine.*”

GEN George W. Casey Chief of Staff of the Army

a. Overview. Joint publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, contains the established doctrinal definition that is very similar to the SC Roadmap’s definition, with the exception that the SC Roadmap characterizes SC as a process. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, states the USG uses SC to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. The military instrument of national power plays an important supporting role. Coupling primary SC capabilities, including DSPD and military diplomacy activities, allows the JFC to implement a holistic SC effort. In addition, two keystone joint doctrine publications briefly discuss SC:

(1) JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, contains the JP 1-02 definition, and mentions that SC planning will, among other things, determine objectives, themes, messages, and actions; identify audiences; emphasize success; and reinforce the legitimacy of national strategic objectives. It continues by stating that SC-related activities are particularly essential to shaping, security cooperation activities, stability operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and combating terrorism.

(2) JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, slightly expands the SC discussion by stating that SC is a “natural extension of strategic direction.” JP 5-0 requires SC to be included in all joint operation planning and to be coordinated with the Department of State (DOS) diplomatic missions. CCDRs consider SC during peacetime theater security
cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their resulting plans. CCDRs review SC guidance during operational design and mission analysis, and their staffs address SC issues, as appropriate, in their staff estimates. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures, 29 Sep 06, requires CCDRs to brief the SecDef on their SC planning during contingency planning and crisis action planning in-progress reviews. It further states, “The Department of Defense will operationalize and institutionalize strategic communication strategies in the DOD organizational culture and enhance support to combatant commanders to reinforce the USG overall strategic objectives. Combatant commanders will integrate communications effects across all planning so that they link with broader plans, policies and actions.” As described in JP 5-0, synchronized planning of PA, IO, and DSPD is essential for effective SC. JP 5-0 also establishes a specific requirement for concept plans and operation plans (OPLANs) to include an ANNEX Y24 (Strategic Communication) that proposes a synchronized SC effort for “interagency coordination and implementation.”

b. **Doctrinal SC Enablers.** The predominant military activities that support SC themes, messages, images, and actions are IO, PA, and DSPD. This document focuses on the integration and synchronization of these predominant activities. However, there are many other SC-related activities and capabilities that must not be overlooked and need to be integrated and synchronized as well. Some examples include Civil Affairs activities that are conducted primarily to support SC themes and messages; operations, operational maneuver, or show of force conducted principally to send a message; relationship building activity with individuals and groups to influence behaviors, such as KLE; non-traditional media engagement (e.g. blogging, MySpace, Facebook); and theater engagement activities designed to support themes and messages (such as MEDCAP/DENTCAP, sports events, mil-to-mil engagement, exercises, and MIST support to the US Embassy to develop events to support themes). These and many other activities can have an impact and should be coordinated through the joint operation planning process.

“IO’s importance grows daily, and our enemy, who recognizes that victory can be secured in this domain alone, has seized the opportunity to be the best at operating in the information domain.”

LTG Thomas Metz, USA, Military Review, May-June 2006

(1) **IO** are the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. IO core capabilities are used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities. It is important to understand their relationships in order to determine how the military will integrate these capabilities to support SC objectives during planning and execution and how joint doctrine will clearly describe this integration. The effective integration of IO core capabilities of EW, PSYOP, OPSEC, MILDEC, and CNO in support of the JFC’s objectives can be a
challenge for the staff. “Supporting” capabilities that need to be coordinated with IO include physical attack, information assurance, physical security, counterintelligence, and combat camera. Civil-military operations (CMO), PA, and DSPD are “related” capabilities and must also be coordinated, further complicating planning and execution. Figure II-2 uses a Venn diagram as one way to depict these doctrinal IO and SC relationships. The sets of supporting and related capabilities partially intersect the IO core set, because the JFC also employs them in other ways not connected with IO. The core capabilities have their own internal Venn relationships within the IO core set, but they are omitted from Figure II-2 for simplicity.

(2) PA conducts three basic functions (public information, command information, and community engagement activities) supported by planning, analysis, and assessment to support the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). As the primary coordinator of public information within the military, PA plays a key role in SC efforts. Because accurate and timely information is essential to the public’s understanding and resolve in times of crisis, planners must include this consideration in planning. The PA mission is to support the JFC by communicating factual and accurate unclassified information about DOD activities to various audiences. Official information released in a timely manner can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies, and help mitigate unofficial information and adversary propaganda. Public affairs officers at all levels provide counsel to leaders on the possible outcomes of military activities, and identify the potential impact on the public information realm. Appendix B, Figure B-1, summarizes the IO, CMO, PA, DSPD, and combat camera support to SC.
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(3) **DSPD** includes those activities and measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts. *JOPES Volume I* defines DSPD as:

*The ability to understand, engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of US policy and advance US interests, and to collaboratively shape the operational environment. This ability can include public information activities as well as information operations consisting of multi-media programs such as websites, radio, print, and television to assist selected host nations and the Department of State in reaching foreign target audiences....DSPD comprises DOD support to USG public diplomacy, which are defined as those overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.*

Efforts that support building partnerships like medical and dental civic action programs are examples of DSPD activities which support both broader USG diplomacy efforts and SC objectives. Key leader engagement (KLE) and other theater engagement activities are also examples of DSPD.

c. **Application.** SC planning must be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in OPLANs, and coordinated and synchronized with the Host Nation (HN), other government agencies, multinational partners, and possibly non-governmental agencies.29

(1) **Integration.** The point in understanding the relationships in Figure II-2 is that military support of specific SC objectives with themes, messages, images, and actions typically will require the integration and synchronization of two or more IO core and supporting capabilities as well as PA, DSPD, CMO and VI activities. Moreover, the type and balance of actions between these capabilities can be different at the CCDR’s level than at a subordinate JFC’s headquarters (HQ), and will vary from operation to operation. For example, the focus of a CCDR’s activities to support a specific SC objective could be on PA and DSPD, while the subordinate JFC might accomplish supporting tasks primarily with CMO and PSYOP. Based on their purpose, certain IO capabilities (such as CMO, PSYOP, and MILDEC) typically will have greater potential to support SC objectives than will information assurance, and OPSEC. Coordinating and synchronizing SC-related capabilities is critical, but care must be taken to anticipate and mitigate potential conflicts. Appendix B, Figure B-2, shows some of the potential conflicts within communication capabilities.

“Army doctrine has evolved greatly over the last three years to deal with this challenge. It acknowledges that the information domain truly is a battlespace and that acquisition of favorable media coverage supporting regional and national political objectives should be equated with seizing a form of key terrain.”

*Brigadier General Mari K. Eder, USA, Military Review, July-August 2007*
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(2) **Consistency.** As a coordinated effort integrated into the joint operation planning process (JOPP), **synchronized planning of PA, IO, VI, and DSPD with all other military actions is essential for effective SC.** JOPP provides consistency for all planning efforts. Additionally, interagency efforts can help promote international support from nations in the CCDR’s area of responsibility (AOR) and help advance our regional and global partnerships. CCDRs should ensure that their PA, IO, and DSPD planning is consistent with overall USG SC objectives and coordinated with other USG agencies in the AOR. Because PA and IO both disseminate information, themes, messages, and images adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistency and establish/maintain credibility. Chapter IV discusses SC efforts in support of JOPP and assessment in some detail.

(3) **Balance.** The balance between PA, IO, VI, and DSPD efforts in support of SC depends upon multiple factors such as the SC objectives, information environment, and intended audience. For example, if the objective is to encourage a host nation (HN) government to support a particular strategy, the CCDR may engage key HN and regional leaders in the AOR one-on-one or in small groups in support of DSPD, with little IO or PA participation. Conversely, if the objective is to inform or influence a larger part of the population in order to reduce support for an adversarial group, PA could be prominently involved using local and regional media to reach the specified HN audiences supported by VOICE-named programs. More focused influence efforts may require more IO involvement than PA or DSPD.

(4) **Differences.** Figure II-3 shows the purpose, function, target, effect, dimensions, and supporting capabilities of SC, IO, PA, and DSPD. This figure was created to enable the reader to more easily see how SC, IO, PA, and DSPD have significantly different purposes, functions, etc. Clarifying these differences should assist planners in better determining the appropriate application of each capability. **It is equally important that the distinction between PA, DSPD, and IO activities remain clear so as not to diminish their effectiveness and institutional credibility.** The text in italics indicates material that cannot be found explicitly in joint doctrine, other instructions, or manuals; but can be inferred from the corpus of material on the subject.

d. **Organization and Process.** Joint doctrine does have significant material on the SC-related capabilities of IO and PA. However, JP 5-0, JP 3-0 and JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters,* currently do not discuss organizational structures or processes specifically for planning, and executing SC-related activities. For detailed discussion of doctrinal implications, see Chapter V, “Operational Implications.”
Chapter II

5. Definition Inadequacies

a. Webster’s definitions of “theme” and “message,” and the JP 1-02 definition of the term “message” are too broad and insufficient for differentiating between overarching themes and the supporting messages. Likewise, field observations noted that the definitions are insufficient for clarifying the differences in military use and application. Therefore, the definitions in the following text box are proposed for inclusion into joint doctrine and applied throughout this handbook. These definitions are currently on track for establishment in JP 3-61, Public Affairs, currently in the "Revision Final Coordination" stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Supporting Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable</td>
<td>Focus efforts and synchronize</td>
<td>Key Audiences</td>
<td>Understand and Engage</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making</td>
<td>Integrate</td>
<td>Adversary human and automated decision making</td>
<td>Influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp</td>
<td>Physical, Cognitive, Informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Educate and inform the public, and deter adversaries</td>
<td>Communicate timely and factual unclassified information about DOD activities</td>
<td>Domestic and international publics</td>
<td>Inform and deter</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSPD</td>
<td>Support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts</td>
<td>Support foreign policy objectives</td>
<td>Foreign audiences and opinion makers</td>
<td>Understand, inform, and influence</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure II-3. Military Communication Capabilities Comparison

b. Ongoing discussions with practitioners in the SC primary communication supporting capabilities reveal that many feel that the current SC definition is too broad and vague. Likewise, the ASD (PA) and DASD (JC) use the SC Roadmap definition, instead of JP 1-02, and are briefing that SC is a process. Some at the strategic level (USG/DOS/NSC) are using the term “Global Engagement.” Joint trainers are currently teaching

KEY TERMS

**theme** – an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives.

**message** – a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a theme.
Established Policy and Guidance

that SC resides solely at the strategic level, that the “Commander’s communication strategy” replaces SC at the operational level, and the communication strategy (CS) supports the strategic-level effort. Using the term “strategic” communication naturally brings a mistaken intuition that it resides only at the strategic level. However, every level of command needs a strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions in support of SC-related objectives and ensuring the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. This strategy must be coordinated with those above, below and adjacent in order to deliver a mutually supporting communication to the intended audiences. In order to eliminate the confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term “strategic,” we may want to consider using the term “Communication Strategy” for the overall construct, leaving specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of war. For example, the US Army uses the term “information engagement”31 at the tactical level, “commander’s communication strategy” at the operational level, and “strategic communication” at the strategic level. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, has established the term “Communication Strategy” as:

A joint force commander’s strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support national level strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level.

Figure II-4 provides a Venn diagram to show how these constructs can be utilized to provide much more clarity, without disrupting currently used terms, efforts, or programs.
Chapter II

“

It’s time for us to take a harder look at ‘strategic communication.’ Frankly, I don’t care for the term. We get too hung up on that word, strategic.”

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Force Quarterly, 29 August 2009

6. Nesting

a. Themes provided from the strategic level will necessarily be very broad and typically do not change for the duration of the operation. Commanders must create their own themes that are appropriate for their level of command, are slow to change, achieve specific objectives, and support higher-level themes. To provide a consistent effect, the themes at each level must be nested underneath the themes of the next higher level, and all levels support the strategic themes. Messages are subordinate to themes and deliver precise information to a specific audience to create desired effects while supporting one or a number of themes. Messages are necessarily more dynamic, but must always support the themes. This construct is widely accepted and used throughout the force; however, there is still one issue outstanding.

b. Even though themes are more enduring, they are typically created for specific objectives and operations (or interventions) by our nation. Because having these often-independent themes delivered to a global audience can have lasting and sometimes conflicting impacts, SC practitioners must consider nesting their themes under even more enduring constructs. Strategic documents, like the National Security Strategy (NSS), provide enduring strategic communication, set within a contextual background, and identify the ultimate goal or end state. This enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state is often called a “narrative.” For example, the National Security Strategy states:

Our goal remains a [Western] hemisphere fully democratic, bound together by good will, security cooperation, and the opportunity for all our citizens to prosper. Tyrants and those who would follow them belong to a different era and must not be allowed to reverse the progress of the last two decades. Countries in the Hemisphere must be helped to the path of sustained political and economic development. The deceptive appeal of anti-free market populism must not be allowed to erode political freedoms and trap the Hemisphere’s poorest in cycles of poverty. If America’s nearest neighbors are not secure and stable, then Americans will be less secure.32

KEY TERMS

narrative - enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state.

theme – an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives.

message – a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a theme.
c. USSOUTHCOM developed theater-strategic themes that nest underneath the NSS narrative: Latin America, the Caribbean and the US share common interests, Security is a necessary condition for prosperity and lasting democratic institutions, Regional challenges require cooperative solutions, and SOUTHCOM is committed to lasting partnerships. Appendix J also shows how the themes in Afghanistan support other higher-level goals. For enduring conflicts, such as the previously named “Global War on Terrorism,” there can be a continuing clash between the competing narratives of the protagonists. This is often what is referred to as the “Battle of the Narratives.” Succeeding in this battle is critical to both long-term and operational success, particularly in irregular warfare where gaining the support of the local populace is by definition a center of gravity.

“Working together with our Afghan partners, we can overcome the enemy’s influence and give the Afghan people what they deserve: a country at peace for the first time in three decades, foundations of good governance, and economic development.”

General Stanley McChrystal
Commander, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Revised Tactical Directive 02 July 09 (Publicly Releasable portion)

d. In sum, messages should support the themes at that level, the themes should support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes, and themes at all levels should support strategic themes and the enduring national narrative. This ensures consistent communications to global audiences over time.

7. Battle of the Narrative

a. The Battle of the Narrative is often thought of as a battle for the local audience to “buy” our “story” and push out the enemy’s “story,” such as “we are the good guys, we are here to help you and bring you a better quality of life.” This perspective on the “Battle of the Narrative” is incorrect. The battle is not merely to push aside, defeat or gain superiority over the enemy’s narrative; it is to completely supplant it. In fact, upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in a different setting and purpose.

b. The battle of the narrative is a full-blown battle in the cognitive dimension of the information environment, just as traditional warfare is fought in the physical domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare in the physical domains, is to shape the environment such that the contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to your advantage. Likewise, a key component of the “Battle of the Narrative” is to succeed in establishing the reasons for and potential outcomes of the conflict, on terms favorable to your efforts. Theses “reasons” and “outcomes” must be well-grounded in the realities of the situation, including cultural, political, and social perspectives of the intended audiences. WWII is a perfect example, where Germany and the U.S. struggled to define both the reasons for the conflict and potential outcomes. Specifically, the U.S. attempted to establish a narrative that painted the Germans as brutal ruthless aggressors, the war as a fight against evil and potential outcomes as either slavery or freedom. This narrative remained throughout
the conflict. Conversely, on 4 February 1943, German propaganda emphasized the prowess of German arms and the humanity German soldiers had shown to the peoples of occupied territories. The narrative was one of German might and benevolence bringing efficiency, jobs, and prosperity. Germany depicted pilots of the Allied bombing fleets as cowardly murderers and Americans in particular as gangsters in the style of Al Capone. After Stalingrad, the main German narrative changed to portray Germany as the sole defender of what they called “Western European culture” against the “Bolshevist hordes.”

Foreign Volunteers in the German Wehrmacht in WWII

One of the most amazing aspects of WWII, and one of the least well known, is the incredibly large number of foreign volunteers that joined the German Armed Forces between 1939 and 1945. During WWII, nearly 2,000,000 foreigners served within the German fighting forces, many as willing volunteers, others through varying degrees of conscription. The reasons these volunteers joined the German Wehrmacht were varied, but a simple look at the numbers begins to tell the story - in the East alone nearly 1,000,000 men volunteered for service with Germany. This number is a direct result of the situation millions faced under the brutal rule of the Soviet Empire. In particular, because of the atrocities suffered under Stalin, many Ukrainians, Balts, and other oppressed nationalities, fought for the Nazis.

http://www.feldgrau.com/foreign.html accessed 29 April 2010

c. An analysis of the adversary narrative and other factors can be value added to the planning effort. Some important considerations:

(1) How does the adversary frame and explain his ideology?
   (a) What are the adversary talking points?
   (b) Have we adopted a posture of strategic listening, to facilitate our understanding and adapt to adversary and environmental changes?

(2) How does the adversary make their ideology appear enduring and natural to the local culture?
   (a) Do we challenge their assumptions, beliefs and meanings?
   (b) Can we leverage the local culture/society goals that are also acceptable to the international community?

(3) What are the inconsistencies in the adversary narrative?
   (a) How does the adversary obscure the inconsistencies to smooth their narrative?
   (b) Do we target these inconsistencies?
(4) What is the structure of the narrative?

(a) How can we breach their structure?

(b) How can we influence, alter, manipulate, or confound them from within?

“This problem of illegitimacy is especially acute at the village level of rural Pashtun society, where dynastic and religious authority has been unquestioned for over a thousand years. …the Karzai government is illegitimate BECAUSE it is elected.”

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template
November-December 2009, Military Review
CHAPTER III
CURRENT PRACTICES AND INITIATIVES

“At Southern Command, Strategic Communication is our main battery.” We’re in the business of launching ideas, not Tomahawk missiles.”

ADM James Stavridis
Commander US Southern Command

SECTION A. JOINT FORCE PRACTICES

1. General

a. Observations of current joint force practices result primarily from JWFC’s training and exercise support in numerous exercises and assistance visits to combatant commands and US joint and Service component HQ in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Lessons learned recorded by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis also provided valuable insights.

b. Some organizations find it useful to distinguish the SC-related planning and execution that occurs within the theater from SC-related activities at the national-strategic level. For example, a USCENTCOM Service component uses the term “operational communication” for this purpose. As mentioned earlier, USJFCOM JWFC observer-trainers discuss with training audiences the value of a JFC’s “communication strategy” as an integral part of the JFC’s overall military strategy (Figure III-1). This approach uses the CCDR’s communication strategy to support the broader interagency SC effort and closely coordinate with and solicit support from other agencies and organizations.

c. This strategy must be commander-driven, proactive, and synchronized with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions. As depicted in Figure III-1, developing a comprehensive communication strategy requires an integrated process that synthesizes all means of communication and information delivery. In addition to synchronizing the communication activities within the joint force, an effective communication strategy is developed in concert with other USG organizations, coalition partners, and non-governmental organizations as appropriate. Additionally, commanders should be cognizant of the impact that joint force CS activities have on the other three elements of national power (diplomatic, information and economic) as well as all aspects of the military operation.

“Good commanders know how to lead in combat. Great commanders possess the unique intuitive sense of how to transition very quickly from active, kinetic warfare distinguished by fire and maneuver to a more subtle kind of cultural warfare distinguished by the ability to win the war of will and perception. Rare are the leaders who can make the transition between these two disparate universes and lead and fight competently in both.”

MG Scales, USA (Ret) House Armed Services Committee testimony, 15 July 04
of the operational environment including political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems. A synchronization matrix provides a graphical representation of the JFC’s communication strategy and an effective tool in matching words and deeds directed toward the various audiences. Appendix D, Figures D-1 and D-2, provide examples. This tool works well for synchronizing CS activities in the context of a specific operation.

d. Current CS staff organizations and processes used by CCDR and other JFCs are at different levels of maturity and effectiveness. Likewise, a number of JFC’s have both increased senior leadership involvement in the CS effort and have integrated CS into planning and staffing processes. The following five numbered paragraphs discuss specific options, observed in the field, for organizing and directing CS efforts.

2. Option 1: Increased Command Emphasis

In this construct, leaders maintain traditional HQ staff structures and processes, and increase command emphasis on CS through promulgation of commanders’ CS intent, guidance, and increased oversight. Examples include designation of the Chief of Staff (COS) or deputy commander as the overall CS director (as an additional duty). The
principal advantages of this model are that it places emphasis on unity of command, requires the least additional manpower, and the COS or deputy commander already have direct access to the JFC.

"An ISAF patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day?"

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF Commander
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

3. Option 2: Tasking an Existing Staff Leader

a. In some cases, the JFC or COS tasks the leader of one of the SC-related capability sets (normally IO or PA) or a director (J-5, J-3) with CS planning and execution. This responsibility typically includes supervising the CS staff coordination mechanism (such as the CS working group (CSWG)) if one exists. Historically, most CS organizations begin with this model by simply expanding the focus and/or membership of an already existing working group or planning entity (such as an IO working group, the PA staff, or an operational planning team).

b. This model also employs no additional manpower, but there are several observed disadvantages to this approach:

(1) The direction, focus, and output of the CS efforts tend to be more heavily weighted toward the expertise of the appointed lead (such as the PA Officer (PAO), IO staff leader, etc.).

(2) In a crisis, the requirement to coordinate the planning and execution of the broader CS-related activities detracts from the CS lead’s ability to perform principal duties (such as IO cell chief or PAO).

(3) Typically, the command does not provide additional staff to assist with the new CS coordination requirements. Therefore, these tasks devolve to the lead’s previously established staff section. This exacerbates the problems mentioned above by proliferating them to the lead’s staff officers as well.

(4) Most importantly, coordination, participation, and command emphasis on CS has been historically weak in cases where the CS lead lacks adequate seniority and a direct reporting relationship to the commander.

c. Most observed instances of this model occurred early in planning and execution. As the staff evolved, this model typically transitioned to more permanent and mature
structures and processes. No observed JTF HQ has chosen to implement this approach as a permanent solution.

4. Option 3: Direct Planning Team Integration

a. In this alternative, IO and PA experts are typically assigned to operational planning teams and provide their inputs directly to planning team chiefs. This eliminates the requirement for a separate CSWG or CS director to integrate CS activities. The planning team chief, J-5, and J-3 are responsible for including relevant CS considerations into the planning process and products.

b. The principal advantages of this approach are the direct inclusion of functional experts into existing processes and integration of CS-related activities in the planning effort from conception. However, several issues have hampered the use of this approach in the field:

   (1) Staffs at all levels have struggled to provide adequate functional representation from all CS-related capabilities to the multiple operational planning teams that typically exist. Even in the largest HQ, the supply of IO, DSPD, and PA functional experts is limited. Inadequate force structure for joint PA has been documented in the CJCS-directed JPA study (March 06). Thus the pace and scope of operations can quickly overwhelm the CS-related staff’s ability to support multiple teams.

   (2) With increased manpower requirements, the IO and PA functional experts assigned to each team may lack appropriate joint education (i.e., Joint Forces Staff College) and directly affect the quality of the plan. Likewise, operational planners are typically less familiar with the employment of the nonlethal CS-related capabilities, and tend to revert to traditional lethal solutions.

   (3) Having no designated lead for championing CS issues or communication integration can result in less than optimum CS level of effort and synchronization.

   (4) This approach provides no direct CS connection to the commander or command group, observed to be a fundamental element of successful CS efforts.

c. These problems often result in a general lack of CS emphasis that causes CS-related shortfalls in joint operation planning and execution. No observed JTF or combatant command HQ has had the resources available or staff maturity to execute this approach successfully.

5. Option 4: Centralized Control of All Communication Strategy-Related Activities Under a Separate Directorate

a. In this option, a newly created staff entity or directorate controls the IO, PA, VI, and other CS-related functional capabilities directly. The director typically outranks other staff counterparts (J-3, J-5, etc.) and is de facto “super-director.” Observed variations on this model have been as far-reaching as placing the entire PA, IO (including PSYOP), CMO, engineers, and lethal fires elements of the HQ under a single director. The associated cross-functional staff organizations (i.e. working groups and boards) tend to
Current Practices and Initiatives

include multiple working groups and approval boards, with the final board chaired by the “super-director,” COS, or deputy commander. Some HQs have titled these directorates differently, but the basic premise is the same: they attempt to integrate staff activities through consolidation of staff structure and power versus using coordination processes that cross normal functional staff sections. Observations of this model have only been at the JTF level. Current and historical examples of this model include the Strategic Communication Directorate circa 2006 (called Strategic Effects, now called CJ9) at Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the Strategic Communication Directorate at Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa; the Effects Coordination Cell at MNC-I; and the Effects Directorate at Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan circa 2003. Only MNF-I still employs a form of this model. There is one example in the field where a command has consolidated all communications capabilities under a separate directorate, including those PA and IO activities outside CS. In this construct, the directorate head created functional communications branches with each reporting to the deputy directorate head. The CS branch, however, reports directly to the head of the directorate. Some of the successes achieved under this organizational construct are discussed in detail later in the “Other Implementation Observations” section.

b. While the centralization of authority under a single staff entity has the potential of providing focus, clarity, and emphasis on CS capabilities, HQs have had varying degrees of success employing this model. Several difficulties observed with this model include:

1. Managing a capability set normally led by several directorates is a challenge.

2. The scope of responsibilities tends to overlap with the traditional responsibilities of the J-5 for future planning and the J-3 for current planning/operations.

3. The successful employment of this model requires special relationships and understanding between the heads of other directorates within the HQ.

4. A direct-support PA element is still required to provide direct PA support to the commander.

5. The associated cross-functional staff organizations can become so prolific that they represent, in essence, planning teams and decision venues separate from doctrinal planning processes.

6. The placement of PA and IO capabilities directly under the same staff structure has tended to draw ongoing criticism and unwanted attention from outside DOD.

6. Option 5: Communication Strategy Director with Small Coordination Staff and Supporting Communication Strategy Working Group

a. This last construct combines some of the advantages of the previous models. Eight combatant commands are either currently employing or transitioning to this
Chapter III

**model.** Observations have shown this configuration to produce the most consistent progress. Details vary among HQs, but the primary components of organization, process, and output include the following:

1. A separate CS director (O-6/7 or GS-15/SES) who has immediate access and reports to the COS and/or JFC. This facilitates JFC involvement in the CS process and ensures the ability to synchronize the wide variety of capabilities from across the command on behalf of the COS/JFC.

2. A small CS staff (2-5 personnel at the combatant command level) to assist the director in monitoring and assessing CS-related activities and managing the CSWG. While this staff manages the CSWG process, it does not supplant the functional expertise of IO (including PSYOP), PA, and other CS contributors or their direct support to operational planning teams. Staff responsibilities typically include:

   a. Organize and lead CSWG meetings, including communication planning, integration, and products.
   
   b. Present CSWG recommendations to the operational planning teams for incorporation into planning and execution.
   
   c. Manage the assessment of CS-related activities for presentation to the JFC.
   
   d. Ensure CSWG representatives write applicable portions of the operations plan, to include Annex Y.

3. Some HQs have also chosen to provide PA and IO LNOs to J-3/5 operational planning teams and across traditional communications stovepipes. For example, in USEUCOM PA LNOs reside within the IO staff and visa versa to foster cross-communication and coordinate product development.

4. Staff integration mechanisms typically include an action officer-level working group, a directorate-level steering group, or an approval board. The board allows senior decision makers to provide CS guidance on objectives, themes, establish planning priorities, assign resources, and approve inputs to planning.

   a. Some current examples of these groups include:

   1. USEUCOM – Senior Executive Council and SCWG
   
   2. USSOUTHCOM – Office of Strategic Communication (OSC) Strategic Communication Board (SCB) and SCWG
   
   3. USNORTHCOM – Communication Strategy Working Group and Blue Team Meetings
Current Practices and Initiatives

4. USJFCOM – Enabling Strategic Communication Cell and Communication Synchronization Cell

5. USCENTCOM – Effects Synchronization Committee

6. USPACOM – PACOM Communication Integration Working Group

7. USAFRICOM – Outreach Director, SC Division, SC Council, and SC Coordination Group

(5) CSWG outputs have typically included CS country plans in support of theater security cooperation (TSC) activities, Annex Y (Strategic Communication) to OPLANs and concept plans, and planning and execution synchronization matrices for inclusion in operations orders and fragmentary orders. Appendix E provides the format for Annex Y. Appendix D provides some example synchronization and execution matrices.

(6) The CSWG serves as the multifunctional conduit to coordinate support from departmental/USG-level resources and those of other agencies through the process discussed earlier, under the ASD (PA).

b. This model typically has a central repository (linked to the HQ main website/portal) for CS-relevant guidance and products. This facilitates collaborative planning and information sharing for all CS supporting activities. One example is the USEUCOM Senior Leader Engagement Portal. This site provides CS-specific information for current events and detailed country plans for countries in their AOR. In 2008, they had plans posted for 89 of the 92 countries. The site displays engagement activities in a current operational picture linked to their TSC information management database. Any portal user (including US Embassy country teams) can instantly view the full set of CS-related activities in the AOR by type of activity or by country. This has proven extremely useful as both a resource for functional planners and a preparation tool for senior leaders, the broader staff, and subordinates.

7. Key Leader Engagement

“Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Earning the trust of the people is a large part of our mission. Build relationships with tribal, community, and religious leaders. Success requires communication, collaboration, and cooperation.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance

a. Key Leader Engagement. Peace enforcement, counterinsurgency (COIN), foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, stability operations, and many other joint operations require coalition forces to engage and impact the attitudes of key
local and/or regional leaders. Developing messages and finding an effective means of
delivery are challenges, especially in societies where interpersonal relationships are
paramount. Building relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence
usually takes time. Understanding cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, and
communication methods is essential to any CS approach. For personal relationships, it
may also require and understanding of their cultural/social background, perspectives,
capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, authorities, spheres of influence, and motivators.
KLE is not about engaging key leaders when a crisis arises, it is about building
relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support
our interests during times of crisis.

(1) KLE Cells. USCENTCOM uses face-to-face engagement and tailors the
topics/messages to local conditions. The KLE cell oversees this process and includes
representatives from PA, J-5, IO, and civil affairs. KLE engagements are designed to
support a menu of CS, IO, PA, PSYOP, and DSPD objectives. This cell develops a detailed
background briefing on each key leader, and then suggests specific approaches to convey
the command’s overall theme for encouraging support for stability and reconstruction
activities. As a tool for implementing a communication strategy program, the employment
of KLE cells has ensured that whenever commanders meet with leaders, they are delivering
an effective, consistent message that supports the command’s goals.

(2) KLE Plan. An April 2008 lessons learned report states that a detailed
KLE plan for engagement of local leaders is essential. Too often, different units engage
local leadership on identical issues, but with different desired end states and little or no
coordination. This afforded the local leadership the opportunity to exploit gaps between
these units. For example, one coalition unit incentivized the local police to do criminal
investigations faster by offering to provide more facilities if investigation speed increased.
A different coalition unit later undermined this effort by simply offering the facilities
without any stipulations. In another example, a civil affairs team told the Mayor they
would build a clinic if the local leader increased police recruitment. Then a battalion
representative told the same leader that they would provide the clinic if he would simply
promise to be their friend. Without a detailed engagement plan, units met with and
engaged local leadership with different desired end-states, thereby undermining the ability
of any or all units to build capacity and work towards transition. To assist in KLE plan
development, the J-9 or J-2 can develop a map focused on municipal and neighborhood
leaders. The lessons learned report cites an example in a large city, where the J-2 used
human terrain mapping to develop an extensive database of all tribal leaders and their
respective affiliations. The report claimed that the synergy developed by the human
terrain mapping led to breakthroughs in tribal support for the coalition forces which
continued to build and eventually turned local sheiks against Al-Qaida.

(3) KLE Assignment and Periodicity. Assignment of KLE responsibility to
specific individuals will provide de-confliction, ensure desired coverage, and aid in creating
a coherent effort. However, periodic maintenance is often overlooked and which result in
weakened relationships that are unable to deliver the level of understanding and support
desired.
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“Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed ... distributed toy rifles to Somali children, hoping that some would be mistaken for real rifles by UN troops, prompting them to fire on Somali children, which would make great propaganda against UN troops. The UN recognized this danger and ran influence campaigns, which were unsuccessful in convincing Somali parents to turn in the toy guns. It was only when the head of the Somali Women’s Organization, who was trusted in the community, urged their surrender that the toy guns were turned in.”

Dr. Robert Cialdini, Regents’ Professor of Psychology, Arizona State University, Interagency Strategic Communication Network meeting, 10 April 2009

(a) Analysis to determine appropriate assignment of key leader engagement responsibility across the AOR should include the HN leader formal status in the hierarchy (tactical/operational/strategic), support base, locality, and sphere of influence. KLE should then be assigned to the appropriate Coalition leaders to ensure that all HN key leaders are covered. Likewise, to maintain unity of effort, key interagency, IGO, NGO, and coalition partners may need to be engaged as well. This list requires careful management to ensure that it does not become too extensive or cumbersome for our senior leaders to support.

(b) We must establish and maintain consistent and effective personal relationships with key leaders across the operational environment because in irregular warfare “trust is the coin of the realm,” it drives unity of effort, and we can only conduct responsive operations “at the speed of trust.” In many societies, there is an expectation of a certain level of routine engagement to maintain a desired level of trust. Therefore, periodic engagement, simply to maintain a level of understanding and strength of relationship, must be included in any KLE plan. This makes it even more imperative to spread KLE responsibilities across the coalition, to ensure that these requirements do not become unsupportable. It might be beneficial to consider expanding assignment of KLE responsibility beyond the typical set of commanding officers generals, to include deputy commanders, chiefs of staff, or even some key directorate heads. Without periodic and consistent engagement, these relationships often lack the depth of understanding and strength needed to gain support on important issues.

(4) KLE Assessment. Immediate KLE post-engagement debriefing is critical to assessment and supporting well-planned focused engagement. The assessment process measures progress toward creating effects and achieving objectives to reach the end state. KLE does attempt to create effects in the cognitive dimension, but is often not supported by a complete assessment process. To maintain an accurate human terrain map described above, debriefing immediate following a KLE could produce valuable information. Some examples could include what issues were discussed, key leader positions on the issues, messages/themes delivered, requests made, agreements reached, other considerations surfacing, and impressions. Just as KLE products are developed and our leaders briefed-up prior to the engagement, KLE post-engagement debriefing should be part of the KLE process and scheduled immediately after the engagement, while memories and impressions are fresh.
Chapter III

8. Cards

a. As an augmentation to training, cards can be a useful way to provide each soldier and USG member a handy reference to study and use as needed. These cards should be developed with and made available to our partners, including USG, HN, NGO, IGO, and private sector stakeholders. Two very successful examples, used by USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM are “Themes and Messages Cards,” and “Cultural Smart Cards.” Public Affairs typically develops these cards in consultation with the CSWG lead and coordination with the other communication capabilities.

(1) Themes and Messages Cards. Failing to synchronize SC-related activities with actions at all levels sends conflicting messages and significantly inhibits the creation of desired outcomes. Many refer to this as a “say-do gap.” To help solve this problem in the CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM AORs, units issued each soldier a card with key themes and messages to carry with them at all times. This approach was designed to synchronize words and activities all the way down to the individual level. This card helped soldiers and activity participants consistently communicate the desired message and guided their actions during unanticipated circumstances. Arming each soldier/participant with key information helped close the “say-do gap,” which enhanced CS and overall operational efforts.39 These cards were not a replacement for leadership involvement, but an augmentation to ensure that information was provided to help each soldier/participant understand why the US is involved, what are the objectives, their role in the operation, approved themes, and messages. Appendix K provides an example card from USSOUTHCOM. Appendix P highlights an emerging construct of principles and aligning words and deeds to build credibility and gain public trust.

(2) Cultural Smart Cards. Another tool that facilitated understanding and interaction was a Cultural Smart Card, issued to each soldier in Iraq. These cards served as a quick-guide to cultural understanding. They contained key religious facts (five pillars of Islam, key dates, and associated behaviors), customary dress (male and female) and gestures, major ethnic and cultural groups, cultural customs, and history. Appendix L provides an example card from USCENTCOM.

9. Dialogue

a. JP 1-02 uses the JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, technically oriented definition of the term communicate: “To use any means or method to convey information of any kind from one person or place to another.” Webster’s similarly defines communication as a noun. However, the Webster’s verb form of communicate is “to transmit information, thoughts, or feeling so that it is satisfactorily received or understood <two sides failing to communicate with each other>.” Communicating effectively requires confirmation that the message was not only received, but that it was understood. If we are to operate effectively in the cognitive dimension and influence intended audiences, we need to assess the effectiveness of our communication efforts in order to confirm receipt of transmission, audience understanding of the message, and their reaction. This requires dialogue.
Current Practices and Initiatives

(1) **Face-to-face conversations are the preferred method of dialogue**, because it allows participants to assess the effectiveness based on both verbal and non-verbal cues. Human terrain team members and civil affairs personnel can offer valuable insight on the effectiveness of communication efforts due to their training, experience, and close contact with the local population. Anyone who has frequent contact with the local population, including NGOs and OGAs, are also useful sources of information on the perceptions of the people. Simply asking the local population what they think about the current situation, and what should be done about it, can produce some ideas that had not been considered. Dialogue during KLE can be useful, but must be filtered through an understanding of the perspective, position, and/or agenda of the leader engaged. Information is most useful when in comes from sources who can be trusted to tell the truth, such as those with whom we have built genuine relationships over time. Consideration of biases is necessary, however, because biases will always be present to some degree. This personal interaction with the local population also has many other beneficial effects, such as showing them respect, showing that we are willing to listen, showing we care, showing that we welcome feedback, being personable and reasonable, etc.

“We must be better listeners. The Muslim community is a subtle world we don’t fully—and don’t always attempt to—understand. Only through a shared appreciation of the people’s culture, needs, and hopes for the future can we hope ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative. We cannot capture hearts and minds. We must engage them; we must listen to them, one heart and one mind at a time—over time."

Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Forces Quarterly, 29 Aug 2009

(2) Social media sites (i.e. blogs, Facebook, twitter, etc.) offer another means of dialogue and should be considered when developing communication strategies. However, an understanding of the operational environment is essential as access to these new sites is very limited in many non-western or underdeveloped countries. This would limit the dialogue to populations that are typically urban, with a good income, etc. and using social media would only give you dialogue with a small upper segment of the society. However, this may be the segment that controls most of the decision-making, power, authority, and resources.

(3) Finally, using assessment instruments, like surveys, can provide very effective feedback to measure changes in behavior, etc. However, these assessment instruments are not a replacement for dialogue, because they lack many of the cues available from face-to-face dialogues and deliver none of the benefits of portraying a positive image, developing relationships, and gaining deeper insights into the situation/population.

10. MNF-I Best Practices

a. MNF-I provides an example of a large separate CS Directorate. In April 2008, USJFCOM sent a team to identify MNF-I Communication Division “best practices” for
possible inclusion in joint doctrine, curricula, and training events; and consideration by other commands. The team observed MNF-I, MNC-I, and US Embassy communication programs and identified 13 best practices. Each of these in itself would be a significant accomplishment for a major military HQ, so it is remarkable that they were all found at MNF-I. Some are unique to the operational environment in Iraq; however, many could be adapted to other operational areas. The observation team attempted to prioritize MNF-I’s practices to identify those with the greatest positive impact. This prioritized list follows:

1. The commander is clearly involved and regularly provides CS intent at the daily battle update assessment meetings and twice weekly at the communication division meetings. The division meetings focus on measures of performance (MOP) and future activities. During these meetings, he provides feedback, direction, decisions explained with depth, and personal insights. The MNF-I commander accepts risk in order to shorten the time it takes to release information and requires MNF-I and MNC-I to release information to the public within ninety minutes of a significant operational event or incident. The commander also shifted the priority of communication activities from international/western media to “communicate locally first,” which resulted in a significant improvement in the local information environment. (For Afghanistan, it may be worthwhile to consider further shortening this information release timeline.)

   “... in Afghanistan, US forces carry out an operation ‘and within 26 minutes—we’ve timed it—the Taliban comes out with its version of what took place in the operation, which immediately finds its way on the tickers in the BBC at the bottom of the screen’.”

   Dr. Michael Doran, DASD for Support to Public Diplomacy
   Heritage Foundation lecture, Feb 08

2. Two senior (O-6) LNOs greatly improve efforts to integrate communication division activities with intelligence and special operations task force (SOTF) operations. PA personnel assigned within SOTF provide draft PA public disclosure materials to the LNOs explaining selected operations that require time-sensitive release. The LNO efforts speed the review and release of information resulting from operational actions. This enables actionable CS planning, cueing to future operations, exploitation of adversary documents, dissemination of beneficial information, and anticipation of adversary reaction.

3. The communication assessment team integrates operational research and systems analysis (ORSA) expertise into planning and execution. The assessment effort evaluates current and past communication efforts, informs leadership and planning, provides support to theater and major subordinate commands, helps anticipate public and adversary reaction, and integrates and shares knowledge. This communication assessment capability appears to be without peer in DOD.

4. A media operations center (MOC) provides immediately actionable information through real time monitoring, translation, and assessment. The MOC has 24/7 capability including communication event planning, visual information management,
managing public information distribution, and rapid media response. The MOC supports MNF-I, its components, US Mission Iraq, and aggressively pursues media outlet correction of misinformation and disinformation. MOC actions ensure early release of operational information into the public domain, as well as providing aggressive correction/clarification as needed several times daily.

(5) Engagement of Government of Iraq (GOI) spokespersons is accomplished at the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Prime Minister Offices by contracted experienced Iraqi US citizens assigned as LNOs. These contractors provide common language, culture, and experience that facilitate building relationships and enables a shared understanding. The LNOs assist in coaching, mentoring, building ministry capacity, coordinating and reinforcing Iraqi/coalition actions, and supporting a free press with diverse opinions.

(6) Proactive full-time US media engagement is closely coordinated with ASD (PA) and focused on US media needs and production schedules. This practice compliments MOC operations, supports daily OSD press briefs, and involves an expanded circle of military speakers.

(7) An expedited process for rapid release of military VI products is utilized, to include attached detailed storyboards. The impact of visual images has been recognized and integrated into planning considerations. Assignment of two dedicated, experienced VI professionals to create, implement, and manage the process significantly streamlined procedures for planning, executing, transmitting, editing, and clearing visual information for public release. Public release is authorized from the division level, with visual information from airborne platforms being scrubbed at the air operations center and released from MNF-I.

(8) The US Ambassador and MNF-I commander work closely together as do their staffs. The MNF-I communications division assigns LNOs to the US Mission Iraq PA, and they share planning, execution, and assessment resources. Coordinated and combined media engagements and congressional testimony are the outcomes of this close relationship. Coordination and information sharing is facilitated by their collocation.

(9) MNF-I created a corps-level IO task force with robust products and assessment shared with MNF-I and GOI. This unique effort is based on innovative application of marketing and communication principles, combined with major funding and insightful contracting actions. These efforts are informed by and deconflicted with PA and MNF-I communications division actions and responsibilities. Highly effective focused products are pre-tested, carefully placed, and assessed. The communications environment is closely studied and results are shared with MNF-I and GOI.

(10) A combined press information center with integrated media support was established. A media support facility enables integrated support to media and the MOC. The facility is well equipped and located for ease of media access. Personnel resources include US Army Reserve PA operations center staff, Armed Forces Network staff to support the studio, and employees from the host nation to interact with Iraqi media.
Chapter III

(11) The proactive Iraqi media engagement team includes Iraqi employees who operate from a protected facility and focus on building a free-press culture in support of democracy in Iraq. Coalition providing Iraqi media training and access to information are key enablers.

(12) Current, comprehensive, and practical CS planning involves US Mission Iraq and major subordinate command participation. Planners provide ample detail and synchronize the communication annex with the campaign plan, supporting all major elements.

(13) A commander-driven emphasis on KLE events stimulates action at all levels. MNF-I Commander’s intent directs the focus of KLE efforts and component commander’s guidance further shapes planning at each level. KLE planning includes US Mission Iraq efforts and employs coalition military leaders at all levels to execute the plan. This effort focuses on building relationships with local leaders and enjoys decentralized execution.

“We can’t win this thing with a bullet. We can’t win it by killing everybody. We have got to attack the insurgency from what source it comes from.”

MG Benjamin Mixon US Army Commander of Multi-National Division-North and the 25th ID

11. Operational-Level Challenges and Enablers

a. Some of the challenges that affected CS efforts may be unique to the Iraq operational environment, but many occur in other theaters as well. These challenges are as follows:

(1) Individual augmentee rotation cycles caused a continual turnover and drain on experienced personnel.

(2) PA personnel did not have adequate local language skills and cultural awareness/understanding varied.

(3) Local media was still immature and blog engagement under-resourced.

(4) The impact within the AOR of some regional media outside Iraq was challenging.

b. Several enablers, listed below, applied to many or all of the MNF-I best practices.

(1) Commander-driven communication effort

(2) Assignment of seasoned public affairs officers
Current Practices and Initiatives

(3) Adequate resources and facilities

(4) Robust assessment

(5) Responsive processes

(6) Linkage to joint campaign plan and lines of operations

(7) Blended workforce that includes active duty, reserve, contractor personnel, operators, intelligence, PA, and ORSA specialties.

(8) Risk acceptance enabling a learning environment

(9) Communication division portal

12. USSOUTHCOM’s Main Effort

a. Another example of significant progress is in USSOUTHCOM, which has elevated SC to the “main effort.” Because USSOUTHCOM utilizes the title “Strategic Communication” for all CS-related products, processes, and organizational constructs, we have left in the SC references for consistency with their convention. The USSOUTHCOM Office of Strategic Communication uses the SC Director and small staff model described earlier (seven personnel plus one historian). This office collaborates via the SCWG, which includes representatives from all staff sections, to develop key objectives and themes, gains the SCB’s approval, and then passes them to the planners to develop tasks and activities in support of the “messaging.” Therefore, in this sense, the message drives the operation in this HQ. According to the SC Director, the SC directorate is “concerned with the aggregate and long term effects; IO and PA are concerned with the day-to-day activities.”

(1) In recent years, USSOUTHCOM’s AOR has experienced increased anti-American sentiment. Accordingly, one theater-strategic objective for USSOUTHCOM is to improve the public image of the US among regional populations. Because SC is Southern Command’s “main battery,” planners incorporate actions to improve regional perceptions into all planning efforts. One example follows below.

(a) Upon receipt of CICS approval to conduct a humanitarian assistance mission involving the hospital ship USNS COMFORT, the USSOUTHCOM OSC assembled the SCWG to review national and command guidance, including the USSOUTHCOM Strategic Communication Framework, and craft nested SC objectives and themes. All of the themes for this mission supported USSOUTHCOM theater-strategic themes, such as “The United States, Latin America and the Caribbean share common interests” and “Regional challenges require cooperative solutions.” The OSC passed the nested objectives and themes to the J-3/5 planners that shaped planning and execution of the mission.

(b) A Strategic Communication Base Plan facilitated consistency in planning and execution at all levels by providing SC planning guidance, objectives, and
tasks to subordinates. The headquarters provided this plan to components and security cooperation offices, who work directly with embassy country teams. The plan integrated eight partner nations for support, six NGOs, and included visits to seven other nations.

(c) These SC-focused planning and staff actions resulted in numerous cross-functional and IA value-added activities, such as a USNS COMFORT planning seminar with all DOS embassy PA officers at USSOUTHCOM HQ. The seminar increased coordination throughout the AOR and enhanced efficiency and effectiveness during the operation.

(d) These cross-functional and interagency relationships also proved critical in constructing a robust “Initial Impact Assessment” immediately following the deployment. USSOUTHCOM is using this data when developing SC themes and messages to inform a variety of audiences on multiple aspects of the highly successful mission.

“The COMFORT vastly outperformed years of Cuban medical assistance in ‘one fell swoop’ and reversed a decade-long feeling that Washington had forgotten about its neighbors along the third border.”

Lester Bird
A&B Opposition Leader

(2) The commander has encouraged individuals throughout the staff to engage in blogs and other social media (like MySpace, Face Book, Twitter, 2nd Life, U-Tube, TED Talks Forum, etc). Some of the benefits of this engagement include:

(a) Gets the military story directly to participants

(b) Uses nonconventional means

(c) Refuses to cede this environment to the adversary

(d) Gets someone before the public in addition to the PAO or Commander

(e) Supports SC, when individuals are informed about the command themes and messages

(f) Encourages the staff to actively engage the public

(g) Improves individual comfort with disseminating information

(h) Leverages individual efforts thereby significantly multiplying resources in support of command SC-related objectives

(i) Improves military transparency and perception with various populations
Current Practices and Initiatives

(j) Builds trust between the military and social media users

“The House Armed Services Committee said ‘online strategic communications,’ such as Web sites now run by the Defense Department in the Balkans and North Africa, ‘are essential tools for the department to effectively counter the violent extremist groups abroad.’ It described the Pentagon as ‘overly cautious’ in its approach, for fear of violating the law that prohibits films and articles produced by the State Department from being circulated in the United States. The committee said the Pentagon should conduct a new legal review of that law, which it said applies only to the State Department, and expand its online media operations even if they can be accessed in the United States by American audiences.”

Washington Post
28 July 09

(3) Some other beneficial initiatives begun by the OSC:

(a) Invert the military thinking from “information protection and risk aversion,” to “information sharing and risk acceptance” that is appropriate to the situation.

(b) Aggressive internal information sharing and using the previously mentioned theme and message cards (Figure K-1) to empower the entire command.

(c) Use the historian to mine for communication lessons learned.

(d) Focus information dissemination to the preferred media means (print, video/TV, word of mouth) in various countries.

(e) Proactively engage and inform regional audiences to prevent conflict and shape the information environment.

(f) Find DOD/DOS shared interests and collaborate to offset DOS scarcity of resources, while being informed by DOS insights, information, context, influence, etc.

(g) SC planning is inclusive and transparent, including representatives from DOS, interagency, and other stakeholders.

(h) Effectively countered the long-standing argument by adversaries that the hospital ship visits were merely public relations stunts that only happened once a decade. USSOUTHCOM recently requested a change to the schedule to revisit previous stops once every year.

(i) Focused on customer pull (HN) vice producer push (US), established ongoing dialogue, and got customer feedback on desires and needs.

(j) Kept shareholders (taxpayer) and board of directors (congress) desires and concerns in mind
(k) Lowering barriers to input into the process and opening the dialogue with leadership produces better ideas by leveraging entire staff talent.

(l) Institute climate of innovation and pushing the envelope, “in a risk informed and legal way.”

(m) Put Annex Y themes in the base plan up front, and ensure it is seamless with the PA and IO annexes.

(4) Interview with the USSOUTHCOM head of plans revealed that their planners now “think SC and interagency all the time,” to include use of indirect means and Special Forces. They use a disciplined approach and bring the interagency participants through the entire JOPP. When necessary, they send LNOs to other departments/agencies to facilitate their planning on common interest items. For example, they sent a planner to DOS for six months to assist their planning on a USSOUTHCOM-related issue. Likewise, they sent a planning LNO to FEMA to assist on a similar issue, and when the planning effort was complete “they did not want to let him come back.”

SECTION B. OTHER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION INITIATIVES

13. Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept Development

a. The SC JIC, currently in development at USJFCOM, focuses eight to twenty years in the future and outlines the operational problem as one of “influence.”

The concept deals with the challenge of influence—convincing others to think and act in ways compatible with our objectives, whether this means causing others to adopt a specific course of action or simply understand us better and accept us more. The joint force commander must be able to affect the actions or behaviors of selected populations, governments or other decision-making groups to accomplish the mission and promote broader national interests in a socially complex and globally interconnected information environment. A key dimension of this challenge is integrating all the various influencing actions of the joint force to maximize their combined effect and likewise to coordinate these actions with those of any partners.

b. SC Goals. The draft JIC proposes that the spectrum of influence extends from “inform” and “educate” to “persuade” and “coerce,” and should involve all SC-related capabilities. Engagement in full-spectrum influence and use of all SC-related capabilities should facilitate accomplishment of four specific SC goals.

(1) Improve US credibility and legitimacy.

(2) Weaken an adversary’s credibility and legitimacy.

(3) Convince selected audiences to take specific actions that support US or international objectives.
Current Practices and Initiatives

(4) Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions.

c. In viewing SC holistically, the JIC states that commanders must understand and apply the old adage “actions speak louder than words.” When promulgating their intent or guidance, commanders must include overarching themes and guidance on how actions will support them. Sometimes these actions speak volumes when compared to the various communication activities and can amplify or degrade their impact. In this context, commanders must view SC results within the context of actions taken across the full range of military operations. This also means that SC is a continuous activity and that even inaction can convey a message, whether intentional or not. Planning and execution must include these considerations.

d. **Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop Model.** The ultimate objective of most DOD SC or CS-related activities is not only to influence perspectives or attitudes, but also to produce actions by the intended audience. CS should include efforts to understand and motivate individuals and groups to act in ways that help accomplish JFC objectives. In order to accomplish this, we must consider the full spectrum of cognition from audience observation of the information or event all the way through to audience action. One approach to this is to use the Boyd OODA loop model as the basis for moving CS themes, messages, images, and actions from providing information toward producing action (Figure III-2). This model is often used to discuss the commander’s decision cycle, but it also applies to how the audience observes, perceives, and acts. In basic terms, the “observe” step is simply “what does the audience see?” The “orient” step is “what does the audience think about what it saw?” The “decide” step is “what does the audience believe it should do about what it saw?” The final “act” step is how the audience reacts (or does not react).

![Figure III-2. The OODA Loop—The Strategic Communication Process](image-url)
“We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. It is their fears, frustrations, and expectations that we must address.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

1. When studying this model, it appears that the orient step may be the most critical step in influencing an individual in a specific audience to act in a desired way. To facilitate or accelerate the orient step, the CS effort should either leverage orientation patterns that already exist or instill new ones. Sending messages that fit neatly into pre-conceived orientation patterns should shorten the time from observation to action. Creating new orientation patterns is much more difficult, but sending messages that leverage other high-credibility orientation patterns can help. For example, a new orientation pattern message may include known local influencers modeling orientation patterns that we desire, such as local religious leaders speaking on Qur’ an passages that condemn attacks on innocent women and children.

2. To implement a re-orientation approach fully, all CS-related activities must be coordinated. The problem with uncoordinated CS-related activities, happening simultaneously and at multiple levels, is that conflicting messages can very quickly undermine long-term efforts to establish new orientation patterns that facilitate desired action. Trying to establish new patterns of orientation and decision requires coordinated messages at all levels over time.

14. Strategic Communication Education

a. There is a growing desire for the creation of courses and programs focused on SC. The DASD (JC) conducted a review of military education programs to determine quantity and quality of SC education. This review has discovered that current SC-related instruction primarily consists of lessons/material within courses on IO and PA. For example, the Joint Forces Staff College incorporates SC discussion in its multiple IO-related courses, as well as in its Joint Advanced Warfighting School program. The DASD (JC) also reports that the Army War College addresses the topic in a similar fashion. The Defense Information School incorporates an SC block of instruction into its new Joint Senior PA Course for O-6 level participants. In addition, USJFCOM JWFC, working with the National Defense University on the PINNACLE and CAPSTONE senior leader development programs, has incorporated discussion of SC, bolstered by segments specific to public communication, IO, and IA relationships. The creation of dedicated SC educational curriculum is progressing. The DOD Senior Executive Strategic Communication Workshop is a three-day course offered through the Naval Postgraduate School (Executive Education Center) and the University of Southern California Annenberg School for Communication. This course discusses SC from mainly a corporate perspective and may provide new insights that can be brought into DOD SC efforts. However, there is no discussion of the Joint Operation Planning Process, or how SC efforts support or integrate into that effort. When attending a recent workshop, as participants were given tasks to develop SC...
Current Practices and Initiatives

plans, most were unsure about the process and did not use JOPP as a guide. As a result, only one group was observed to spend time on clearly defining the problem before attempting to develop a solution. The products varied widely in quality and content. Clarifying how SC or CS planning efforts directly support JOPP, using that process as a guide to product development, and incorporating some techniques proposed in this handbook could significantly improve SC education and training.

b. The DASD (JC) has sponsored and scheduled a number of SC-related conferences designed to gather SC educators and key practitioners for thoughtful discussions on SC education and training issues. DASD (JC) held the SC Education Summit in March 08 with the following goals and objectives:

(1) Create draft “principles of SC” from a JFC’s context (Appendix A).

(2) Align draft SC learning objectives.

(3) Align SC in all senior service school/intermediate level education core curricula.

(4) Form an SC education consortium.

(5) Explore additional SC education initiatives.46

c. The goal of this effort to begin to standardize the teaching of SC processes, horizontal integration, and synchronization of actions, words, and images is to start to align current SC practices until clear policy and doctrine is established.

d. Efforts to find distance education material on SC or CS produced only a very short list of lessons on “The Commander’s Communication Strategy” tailored to different audiences. Every exercise over the last two years has confirmed that many personnel assigned to SC billets have little prior SC experience and as a result are having significant challenges successfully completing SC-related tasks. Development of distance education material for each of the typical SC billets on a joint staff, especially planners or planning LNOs, could greatly enhance training and staff performance in support of SC or CS. This author could find no reasonably detailed training or educational material (with TTP) for SC or CS support to planning, roles, or responsibilities for specific SC or CS staff positions.

e. Training can be crucial to effectively delivering messages to local audiences in a way that will resonate. Appendix N shows how a say-do gap can be generated despite well-intentioned hard working young leaders trying to deliver approved messages to local populations. Some of the causes can include lack of cultural training, not understanding tribal perspectives, lack of observation, socially unacceptable behaviors brought about by yielding to stress, inadequate interpreters, and not adapting a higher-level message to better resonate locally.
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CHAPTER IV
PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

“Information is a powerful tool in the operational environment. In modern conflict, information has become as important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations. ... Since information shapes the perceptions of the civilian population, it also shapes much of the operational environment.”

FM 3-0, Operations, Feb 08, 4-3

1. General

“Everyone is a planner” is a phrase underpinned by the proposition that planning is a problem-solving process that determines and describes how to employ “means” in specific “ways” to achieve “ends” (the problem’s solution). Since there are various ways that commands are organized for CS, for the purpose of this handbook we use the term “CS planner” to represent a planner from any CS supporting capability. Planning for CS can present the JFC with a unique problem set depending on strategic objectives, the operational environment, and many other factors. Among other challenges, planning for certain CS-related results may require topical specialists not normally available to the joint force. Even when initial operations focus on large-scale combat, the CCDR and subordinate JFCs must nonetheless plan both current and future activities that support national and combatant command CS-related objectives, while avoiding actions that are counterproductive to the CS effort if possible. CS success can be especially problematic during types of irregular warfare in which there typically is competition for long-term influence over the local population. Even with the initiatives already discussed that pertain to Iraq and Afghanistan, they continue to seek the most efficient and effective ways to plan and manage solutions for the CS problem set. The following paragraphs discuss various factors that affect CS-related planning.

“Virtually every action, message, and decision by a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population, to include how coalition personnel treat civilians during cordon and search operations, the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment, and the treatment of detainees. Unity of message is key in this regard.”

Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation
RAND Corporation, Feb 07

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. Systems Perspective. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operation planning, and is particularly important for effective CS. This includes viewing the operational environment from a systems perspective and understanding the interaction of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII), and other systems relevant to the specific operation. Systems analysis identifies links,
nodes, and relationships within and across systems. This helps planners understand how a system behaves and how best to create desired results. In particular, the JFC and staff must attempt to understand what people think, how they perceive the operational environment, and why. It may require analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeate the local social, political, economic, and information systems. It may also require human factor analysis of specific audiences. However, the JFC must understand that these are complex, adaptive systems that are more difficult to understand than closed systems, such as an air defense network. This is a complex undertaking, complicated by factors such as the audiences preexisting bias, cultural lens, stimulus-response patterns, motivation, expectations and view of the current situation. Adding to the staff, or utilizing reach-back to subject matter experts that understand the local cultural, linguistic, religious, political, and economic perspectives can significantly help analysts and planners.

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for more information on understanding the operational environment.

b. The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension of the information environment encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience. It is the dimension in which commanders, staff, and the audience think, perceive, visualize, and decide. Public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence the cognitive dimension, and CS “engagements” and “the battle of the narrative” are won or lost here. To communicate effectively with the intended audience, it is necessary to understand this dimension and how it pervades the operational environment’s social, political, informational, and other systems.

(1) CS planners must understand that cognitive factors can vary significantly between locality, cultures, operational circumstances, and that the CS ways and means that worked in one situation might not work in another. For example, Figure IV-1, which was taken from a research project, shows that our undeniably logical and irrefutably reasoned arguments may not be compelling to an audience that is motivated by feeling, honor, and appearances (shame). The J-2 must consider these variances during JIPOE.

(2) In order to assist CS planners in understanding the operational environment, presenting CS-significant information on a terrain map can be helpful. This information can be distilled from the CS-relevant JIPOE analysis of information, political, or social systems. Additional information could include individual perceptions of the situation, motivations, expectations, and attitudes derived from polling data, focus groups, or interviews/discussions with key leaders. This information could identify perceptions or attitudes that the commander desires to change and help planners to tailor messages...
COGNITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF ARAB MALE

Epistemology (ways of knowing) - Authoritarian to Empirical

Approach to Understanding - Thinking to Feeling

Religious Beliefs - Critical to Irrelevant

Concern about Honor - Low to High

Concern about Shame - Low to High

Group Orientation - Collective to Individualistic

- Middle Aged, Well Educated US
- Well Educated Arab males < 29
- Poorly educated Arab males < 29

Figure IV-1. Cognitive Attributes of Arab Male
more affectively. Finally, results of CS-related activities can be added to the map to begin
to determine what messages and actions resonated with which audiences in specific
locations.

c. **Staff Expertise.** Although the J-2 manages the analysis and development of
JIPOE products that provide an understanding of the operational environment, this is a
cross-functional process in which the entire staff participates. For SC purposes, the JFC,
chief of staff, J-2, and others **may also need to leverage outside experts** to support JIPOE,
planning, and assessment, by deploying them forward or engaging them through
“reachback.” Examples of such expertise include the following:

1. Anthropology or Sociology (understanding the local culture)\textsuperscript{54}

2. Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/
interest in the local population and venues for communication)

3. Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local
communication processes and products)

4. Local and regional communications expertise (understanding the means,
methods, and relative impact of local and regional communications)

5. Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)

6. US Embassy/DOS/United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) expertise (understanding coordination requirements and methods between DOD
and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)

d. **Opportunities.** The Defense Science Board identified existing “critical science
and technology opportunities” that can benefit SC and recommended that DOD:

1. Identify nodes of influence through systems analysis

2. Support communication and media analysis with machine translation

3. Understand viral information flows and influences (information that flows
from one individual to another with a multiplicative effect)

4. Utilize innovative evaluation and measurement methodologies (e.g.,
sentiment detection/analysis)\textsuperscript{55}

> “… success will depend on the ability to deliver news quickly and accurately and
equip locals with the tools to communicate freely with each other. … an effective
approach in Afghanistan could be ‘empowering conversation’ among Afghans by
supporting indigenous broadcasting, protecting radio towers, and fostering debate.”

**RADM Gregory J. Smith, Director of Communication,**
**United States Central Command, Interview by Greg Bruno, CFR, 11 May 09**
e. **Result.** Informed by a detailed understanding of the operational environment, the JFC and staff can improve their plan objectives, themes, messages, images, and tasks to support national and theater-strategic objectives, themes, and messages.

f. **Information Requirements.** The commander’s critical information requirements, priority information requirements, and other information requirements drive collection management. CS planners must submit their information requirements and work to have them placed high enough in the priority list to have collection assets assigned. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, and JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, discuss process details and outline how to submit information requirements properly. Feedback from the field indicates that CS-related experts must clearly identify desired information, including specific indicators for success or failure, and may need to assist in interpreting the information once collected. The previous section on understanding the operational environment lists some of the unique skills required for CS-related information collection and interpretation. This effort could result in a better understanding of how the adversary operates in the information environment; which themes, messages, images, and actions are resonating with the local population; adversary communication capabilities and infrastructure that may be vulnerable to interdiction or exploitation; and their ideological and physical strengths and weaknesses.

> “Taliban leader Mullah Omar received widespread media coverage when, in 1996, he took Mohammed’s shroud out of storage in the shrine of Kharka Sharif in Kandahar, and wore it in a public rally, as a way to identify himself with the Prophet, and give himself legitimacy. However in 2007 there was no coverage of the decision of the elders of Kandahar that he should be stripped of the cloak for his un-Islamic actions. This was a fleeting opportunity.”

**CDR S A Tatham, MPhil RN, Advanced Research and Assessment Group**

**Strategic Communication: A Primer, Special Series 08/28, December 2008**

Examples of information that might be of use during CS planning are found in a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report on Iraqi insurgent media use:

1. Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters worldwide are exploiting the Internet to pursue a massive and far-reaching media campaign. Insurgent media are forming perceptions of the war in Iraq among the best-educated and most influential segment of the Arab population.

2. The Iraqi insurgent media network is a boon to global jihadist media, which can use materials produced by the insurgency to reinforce their message.

3. Mainstream Arab media amplify the insurgents’ efforts, transmitting their message to an audience of millions.

4. The insurgent propaganda network does not have a headquarters, bureaucracy, or brick-and-mortar infrastructure. It is decentralized, fast-moving, and technologically adaptive.
(5) The rising tide of Sunni-Shi’ite hate speech in Iraqi insurgent media points to the danger of even greater sectarian bloodshed. A wealth of evidence shows that hate speech paved the way for genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

(6) The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. An alternative, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand.

(7) There is little to counter this torrent of daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, and even television channels.

(8) We should not concede the battle without a fight. The insurgent media network has key vulnerabilities that can be targeted. These include:

(a) A lack of central coordination and a resulting lack of message control.

(b) A widening rift between homegrown nationalist groups and Al-Qaeda affiliated global jihadists.

g. **Adversary Transmission Techniques.** Our adversary, though very limited in resources, can leverage existing information infrastructure to transmit their message. Likewise, because they are operating within their own language, culture, and society, they understand what resonates with the local population and can tailor their messages and means of communication quickly. In fact, the 2008 National Defense Strategy states that:

> Although the United States invented modern public relations, we are unable to communicate to the world effectively who we are and what we stand for as a society and culture, about freedom and democracy, and about our goals and aspirations. This capability is and will be crucial not only for the Long War, but also for the consistency of our message on crucial security issues to our allies, adversaries, and the world.  

"We often speak disparagingly about our adversaries, but the reality is when it comes to strategic communications, they are very 21st century. They are far more agile than we are."

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 2009

The Israelis encountered this difficulty in the 2006 campaign against Hezbollah, where Hezbollah was able to dominate radio and TV coverage of events in Southern Lebanon. In contrast, support for Columbia’s terrorist group FARC was seriously undermined in 2007 when student activists utilized Facebook to build and energize a social network of more than 12 million people in 190 cities in a “One Million Voices Against FARC” demonstration. The action took only two months to plan and execute, and “did more to..."
delegitimize FARC than any other action to date.” Better understanding of the information environment, language, culture, and society may help change this dynamic.

h. Adversary messages. Understanding adversary messages and their points of resonance can help us better understand the local culture, cognitive dimension, and provide potential vulnerabilities for exploitation. Just as we lose credibility when we do not match themes, messages, images, and actions; the enemy can create a say-do gap as well. We can exploit these gaps to our advantage. For example, the recently released “Taliban Code of Conduct” (Layeha (rulebook) to the Mujahideen) explicitly spells out 29 “Rules for mujahideen.” It states, “Each mujahid is obliged to obey the following rules.” Some examples:

9. No person in a position of responsibility is allowed to use jihadi equipment and property for his personal interest.
15. If any mujahideen or commander is disturbing innocent people he should be warned by his leader. If he doesn’t change his behavior he should be expelled from movement.
17. Mujahideen have no rights to take the money or personal belongings of the people.
18. As under the earlier [Mullah Omar] regime, mujahideen should avoid smoking cigarettes
19. Mujahideen are not allowed to take young boys without beards to the battlefield or to their homes.

As we encounter the adversary breaking these rules by intimidating locals, taking their money/belongings, using young boys, or working for their personal interest; we can discredit them by citing the fact that they do not even follow their own “29 rules [which] are compulsory.” We can also show the contrast with our much better behavior in that we try to protect them and work for the development of their common good.

3. Planning Sequence and Key Considerations

“Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy. ISAF will succeed when GIRoA earns the support of the people.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

a. General. This section outlines CS-related activities in support of analysis, planning, execution, and assessment, Figure IV-2. Additionally, Figure IV-3 provides some typical CS tasks to support planning during each step in the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Finally, Appendix G provides a more detailed checklist of planning considerations to assist planners in considering important CS factors during preparatory information gathering, planning, Annex Y development, and execution.
Figure IV-2. CS Support to Analysis, Planning, Execution, and Assessment

CS SUPPORT TO ANALYSIS, PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOCUS</th>
<th>Analysis: Understanding Capabilities and Relationships</th>
<th>Planning: Develop Engagement Strategy</th>
<th>Execution: Execute CS Capabilities</th>
<th>Assess: Adapt and Refine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>Identify and interview stakeholders</td>
<td>Align objectives, audiences, and activities</td>
<td>Assist, coordinate and synchronize with interagency constituent activities</td>
<td>Assess communication performance and effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>targets and segment target</td>
<td>Identify, analyze and segment target audiences</td>
<td>Identify key communicators</td>
<td>Recommend alternative conduits as needed</td>
<td>Recommend alternative conduits as needed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Determine performance measures</td>
<td>Monitor engagement tasks (actions, images, words)</td>
<td>Adjust communication strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Determine effect measures</td>
<td>Recommend adjustment to current activities as required</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support Joint Operation Planning Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OUTCOMES</td>
<td>Stakeholder Analysis</td>
<td>Plan, CONOPS, or Annex</td>
<td>Synchronized engagement</td>
<td>Operational Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target Audience Analysis</td>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness and Performance (MOE/MOP)</td>
<td>Coordinated actions, images, and words</td>
<td>Refined audience analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Audience behavior and/or Attitude change</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Revised strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Analysis
2. Planning
3. Execution
4. Assess

Focus on understanding capabilities and relationships, developing engagement strategy, executing CS capabilities, and adapting and refining.
“The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out-propagandize Al Qaeda, but through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
14 August 08

b. SC/CS support to JOPP. SC/CS planners are an integral part of the operation planning effort. The active participation throughout the planning process is critical to successfully integrating CS activities/products. Most commands have a working group to coordinate communication activities, called an SCWG or CSWG, described earlier. For the purposes of the remainder of this handbook, we will only use SC in reference to strategic-level activities. Throughout planning, most functional areas meet to conduct mission analysis and staff estimates, provide input to the planning process, and develop their detailed pieces of the concept/plan. The CSWG performs that functional coordination process for the communication strategy. Prior to the CSWG meeting, other related working groups meet (such as the IOWG, CMOWG, etc) to develop their inputs. The CSWG coordinates and consolidates communication inputs to provide a coherent comprehensive communication strategy input to the planning process. Some of these products the group may develop for the plan include: synchronization matrix, consolidated staff estimate, key audience identification and segmentation, message/action alignment, stakeholder analysis, KLE priorities and guidance, desired effects, desired communications means/conduits, high-value targets, risk assessment, decision points, assessment measures and means, and Annex Y. The CSWG products are typically provided to the planning teams via a communication liaison assigned to the team, such as an IO, PA, or CA representative. These representatives must ensure planners incorporate all non-lethal CS-related effects, and mitigation measures for undesired effects.

“An ISAF unit in a relatively permissive area had a difficult time maneuvering large vehicles along a road because it was lined with fruit trees. To improve mobility, the unit had the trees cut down. Many people in the village had their livelihoods destroyed. IEDs began appearing along the road shortly thereafter.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

“In places like Kunar Province, we have successfully designed integrated military-politico-economic operations to connect local Afghan populations with the government and create a political narrative that puts the Taliban on the outside, killing innocent Afghans, and ourselves on the inside, defending them … this strategy makes for ‘more effective communications’ because words are matched by action.”

Steve Biddle, Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations
Figure IV-3 highlights typical communication strategy-related activity that supports each of the steps of JOPP.

Appendix O details the process for developing a communication strategy and supporting and leveraging extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and assessment. It also delineates the engagement cycle including specific steps, tasks, flow of inputs and outputs, important products, key participants, and which entity has primary responsibility for each step.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Operation Planning Process Step</th>
<th>Communication Strategy (CS) Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Understand the Operational Environment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Review guidance:</strong></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>- National strategic guidance</td>
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<td>- SC guidance</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>- Higher headquarters planning directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>- Initial JFC intent</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Provide CS perspective during mission analysis</strong></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Identify intelligence requirements to support CS planning</strong></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Conduct CS-specific mission analysis; identify specified, implied and essential CS tasks</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Develop CS facts and assumptions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Provide input to determination of JFC operational objectives and effects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Provide input to determination of JFC operational assessment measures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Develop CS initial estimate</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Ensure JIPOE includes CS-related analysis, such as the information environment, communications conduits, Key Leaders, impact of the information environment on military operations (figure IV-4), etc.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Ensure Key themes are included in the restated mission statement</strong></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Ensure the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) Initial Intent statement includes Key themes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Ensure the JFC's Planning Guidance included CS guidance</strong></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Ensure CCIR include CS considerations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Understand communication philosophy from commander's intent:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>- Restrictive and risk averse: nobody communicates unless authorized and reviewed, vetted, validated, and absolutely correct [Engage CDR to improve]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>- Agile, responsive, but higher risk: everyone informed and authorized to communicate because speed and broad continuous engagement are very important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>- Something in-between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>Participate in all boards, bureaus, centers, cells and working groups (B2C2WG) related to planning</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-3. Communication Strategy Support to the JOPP and Execution
### COMMUNICATION STRATEGY SUPPORT TO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS AND EXECUTION (CONT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Operation Planning Process Step</th>
<th>Communication Strategy (CS) Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Course of Action (COA) Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Participate in course of action (COA) development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure the approved COA provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of CS activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure the approved COA focuses on friendly and adversary COG, which in IW will be the support of the contested population</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure the approved COA avoids discernable patterns, timing, and tempo that can be exploited by the adversary</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure the approved COA visualizes the campaign in terms of the CS objectives, effects, themes, activities, and functions involved</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ensure the approved COA relates the JFC’s objectives and effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide CS input to ensure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Themes and messages are supported by operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Organizational constructs and tentative task organizations support integration of themes, messages, images and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continue participation in all B2C2WG’s related to planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integrate CS activities to optimize the Deployment Concept to rapidly deploy CS-related capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analyze audiences/stakeholders: Who, Stake, Relationship to coalition, History with the organization, Perspective of the situation, View of truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revise the CS staff estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis and Wargaming</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Participate in COA analysis and wargaming - identify advantages and disadvantages of each COA from a CS perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide input concerning intended audience perceptions and effects caused by significant events in each COA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide data for use in synchronization matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify high-value targets for CS engagement/leverage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct a CS risk assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify potential decision points for key CS activities and/or shifts in focused messages</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide input for Governing Factor selection</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide input for potential Branches and Sequels, based on key audience perspectives, reactions, and effects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide input to COA refinement to better support key objects/effects through themes, messages, media engagement, KLE, and other CS-related activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revise the CS staff estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify advantages and disadvantages for CS effectiveness for each COA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continued participation in all B2C2WG’s related to planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparison</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revise the CS staff estimate as needed based on wargaming:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Identify how the COA mitigates risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level, such as information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Communication Strategy Support to the Joint Operation Planning Process and Execution (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Operation Planning Process Step</th>
<th>Communication Strategy (CS) Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Comparison (Cont)                    | - Fratricide, ability to get the messages out faster than the enemy does (< 25 minutes), eliminating the say-do gap, international/HN/domestic support, etc.  
|                                     | - Identify how the COA places the force in the best posture for future operations, such as the impact on strategic themes, messages, and narrative  
|                                     | - Identify how the COA provides the maximum latitude for initiative of subordinates  
|                                     | - Evaluate COAs from an CS perspective  
|                                     | - Provide CS input on COA recommendation  
|                                     | - Continued participation in all B2C2WG related to planning |
| Approval                             | - Confirm the approved COA provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of CS activities  
|                                     | - Confirm the approved COA focuses on friendly and adversary COG, which in IW will be the support of the contested population  
|                                     | - Confirm the approved COA avoids discernable patterns, timing, and tempo that can be exploited by the adversary  
|                                     | - Confirm the approved COA visualizes the campaign in terms of the CS objectives, effects, themes, activities, and functions involved  
|                                     | - Confirm the approved COA relates the JFC's objectives and effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary  
|                                     | - Continued participation in all B2C2WG related to planning |
| Concept of Operation (CONOPS)        | - Provide CS input to CONOPS development  
| Development                          | - Refine CS requirements (capabilities, force structure, equipment/logistics and other resources) to support the CONOPS development  
|                                     | - Provide CS personnel requirements for the request for forces (RFF)  
|                                     | - Participate in the Time-phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) build/validation as applicable  
|                                     | - Continued participation in all B2C2WG related to planning |
| Plan or Order Development            | - Continue refinement of force, support and capability requirements  
|                                     | - Provide input to the operational planning process for all applicable annexes including B, C, D, F, G, O, V, and draft Annex Y  
|                                     | - Coordinate any administrative or contracting requirements  
|                                     | - Develop and submit proposed Annex Y to JS J-5 and DASD (JC) for coordination/approval  
|                                     | - Coordinate with subordinate CS staffs to ensure plan synchronization and a smooth transition to deployed operations  
|                                     | - Continued participation in all B2C2WG related to planning  
|                                     | - When developing an OPLAN, the supported JFC should designate the main effort and supporting efforts as soon as |

---

*Figure IV-3. Communication Strategy Support to the JOPP and Execution (Cont.)*
c. JIPOE. CS planners must ensure that JIPOE analysis and assessment support CS efforts. Feedback from the field indicates that direct liaison with the J-2 during JIPOE development could facilitate this process. JIPOE analysis should include the cognitive dimension, populace, leadership, and the impact of the information environment on military operations, Figure IV-4.59

“There needs to be an active listening of insurgent messages so that we, one, are aware of the message, what the message really is, and also where are they moving the message to.”

RADM Gregory J. Smith, Director of Communication, United States Central Command, interview by Greg Bruno, CFR, 11 May 09

(1) The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. In this dimension, people think, perceive, visualize, understand, and decide. These activities may be affected by a commander’s psychological characteristics, personal motivations, and training. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors may also affect cognition. Particularly in operations characteristic of irregular warfare (such as counterinsurgency), operations can succeed or fail based on how adept the commander and staff are at understanding and operating in the cognitive dimension with respect to the desired population. The analysis of the cognitive dimension is a two-step process that: (1) identifies and assesses all human

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Joint Operation Planning Process Step</th>
<th>Communication Strategy (CS) Actions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan or Order Development (Cont)</td>
<td>possible. This action is necessary for economy of effort and for allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces. The main effort is based on the supported JFC’s prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported JFC will concentrate capabilities to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. Ensure there is consideration, where appropriate, to making the battle in the cognitive dimension the main effort. CS activities would be central to this main effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Provide CS representatives/support to the planning teams for each of the three event horizons: current operations (J-33), future operations (J-35), and future plans (J-5) • Provide CS representative/support to the assessment cell and collection effort, as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-3. Communication Strategy Support to the JOPP and Execution (Cont.)
characteristics that may have an impact on the behavior of the populace as a whole, the military rank and file, and senior military and civil leaders; and (2) evaluates the influence these human characteristics have on military operations.

(2) The Populace. This portion of the JIPOE analysis should consider both civilian and military populations, especially in countries where military institutions may have an adversarial or oppressive relationship with all or portions of the civil populace. The degree to which the attitudes, beliefs, and backgrounds of the military rank and file
Planning and Assessment

either reflect or conflict with core values held by the populace as a whole and/or the leadership is extremely important to this analysis. Additional significant factors to consider include population patterns, living conditions, ethnic conflicts and rivalries, languages and dialects, cultural and class distinctions, political attitudes, religious beliefs, education levels, and any existing or potential refugee situations.

“One ISAF unit and their partnered Afghan company were participating in a large shura in a previously hostile village. Over 500 people, to include former fighters, were in attendance. Nearly the entire village turned out. The unit had been working for months to build relationships with elders and people. As the relationships strengthened and local projects began improving quality of life and employment opportunities, the village elders requested the meeting. During the meeting, two insurgents began firing shots at one of the unit’s observation posts. Knowing the stakes of the meeting, the young sergeant in charge of the OP told his men to hold their fire. He knew this was a provocative act designed to get him to over-react and ruin the meeting. He reported the incident. The shura continued. Later, the village elders found the two militants and punished them accordingly.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

(3) The Leadership. Biographical background data on key adversary military and political leaders, both ruling and opposition, should be compiled. This data should include information regarding the leader’s ethnic, class, and family background; education, experience, and training; and core beliefs and values. Character trait data such as a leader’s core beliefs and values, perceptual biases, and decision making style should be combined with a historical track record of that leader’s past decisions. Such information may be used to construct a psychological profile for the leader that may assist in predicting how that leader may respond in a given situation. Depending on the amount of data available, it may be possible to construct a psychological profile for the leadership as a whole, as well as for specific individuals. CS liaison interaction may be able to encourage development of similar information for other non-adversary key leaders in the area of operations. This information could be very beneficial to key leader engagement efforts.

(4) The Impact of the Information Environment on Military Operations. The impact of the information environment should be analyzed to consider how significant characteristics affect friendly, neutral, and adversary capabilities and broad COAs. Significant characteristics, further analyzed within the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions, can be graphically represented on a combined information overlay (Figure IV-5).

d. Planning Policy. JOPES planning policies and procedures manual requires plans to have a discussion of the commander’s CS goals and objectives in the commander’s intent; unity of themes, objectives, and messages among key activities; consistency in intent or effect between command actions and information; and a risk assessment of the information that may reach unintended audiences, unintended consequences, and risk mitigation measures.60 This same document requires IO and PSYOP guidance in the Warning Order; however, you can normally expect to see SC/CS guidance as well.
e. Key CS Planning Considerations. Although dialogue is the preferred means of communication, it is often not feasible. Appendix G includes many detailed planning considerations, but there are four fundamental considerations for planning CS-related messaging activities: delivery vehicle, timing, tempo, and coordination.

1) Delivery Vehicle. The selection of a delivery vehicle can significantly affect the impact of even the most carefully crafted message. Selection of the appropriate vehicle can be quite complex (Figure IV-6) and must consider message content, desired audience impact, resistance, vehicle advantage, and other factors. For example, use of key leaders for message delivery can speed reception to audiences with limited access.
However, audience perceptions of the key leader will color the message and may bring unintended consequences. Clearly understanding a key leader’s previous stance on issues, audience perception of the leader, potential baggage, and perspective may be crucial in creating the desired effect. Other considerations for selection of the appropriate delivery vehicle can include formats (visual, written, or word-of-mouth) and available activities, such as KLE, soldier-populace interaction, civil-military operations, and many activities of subordinate commands that interact with selected audiences. Having a superb message delivered by the wrong vehicle can be disastrous. Risk mitigated measures can include utilizing multiple vehicles and reinforcing messages.

(2) **Timing** of the message is important for a myriad of reasons, including synergy with other messages/events, receptivity of the audience, momentum, audience motivation/expectations, and extant stimulus response patterns. Sending some messages immediately following an event is optimum, such as following an attack by the enemy. Delay of other messages is preferable, such as showing how the legitimate government is improving quality of life in a recently secured area. This would allow time for repairing initial combat damage and improvements to become more visible. Likewise, launching a major military activity can draw significant media attention and obscure other more important messages. For example, on 16 March 2006, the launch of Operation SWARMER (a large air assault exercise to familiarize Iraqi forces with procedures for conducting a heliborne assault) was billed as the “largest air assault since the Iraqi invasion,” leading the media to believe it was an actual operation. This immediately dominated the news of the day at the same time that MNF-I had put extensive effort into planning and executing a communication campaign for two important strategic messages including the US National Security Strategy release and implementation of significant Iraqi constitutional reforms.
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The commander later commented that had they known that the two strategically important events were happening on that day, they would have delayed the exercise. The main problem is that a message sent too early may lose its potency, and one sent too late results in a lost opportunity. Factors that define the optimum timing window often include current activities, audience social/cultural expectations, motivation, the perception of personal impact, and timing of other important messages.

(3) **Tempo** of message delivery can directly affect how the audience decides to take action. A single attempt to reach an audience will likely be ineffective just as a continual drum beat of a specific message or type of message can result in the receiving audience over time treating it as noise. However, a well-timed message at the optimum tempo can have significantly increased effect. For example, providing a rapid tempo of messages is beneficial in circumstances where we desire a relatively quick response, such as messages attempting to motivate occupants of a city to give up their arms during the week leading up to an operation or be caught up in a sweep to clear terrorists. However, a slow tempo of messages is more appropriate when the audience must decide/respond over a longer period, such as the message to embrace democracy. In the latter case, it is important to vary the message content, style, and delivery method to keep it fresh. In other situations, there may be a need to show progress, such as in the 2003 period in Iraq where the MNF-I issued a daily “drum beat” to the Iraqi population that showed the good things that the Iraqi government was doing each day.

(4) **Coordination**. Coordination of CS activities within the coalition, nesting within higher-level themes, and supporting other strategic-level communication initiatives is vital for sending consistent information to desired audiences. However, coordination with IGO, NGO, HN, or private sector can be just as important. During humanitarian assistance, there are typically many non-US agencies involved (such as United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and Feed the Children) and the public and media will be interested in their activities as well. Close coordination with other involved agencies will help ensure consistent information is presented about the total US response effort.

f. The following FM 3-0, *Operations*, excerpt, based on operations in Afghanistan, provides a good example of incorporating CS into planning and synchronizing CS with counterinsurgency operations.

In January of 2007, a large Taliban force attempted to destroy a US combat outpost near Margah in the Afghan Province of Paktika. Seasoned by months of experience, the US brigade combat team in that area had organized their entire counterinsurgency operation around influencing specific audiences with carefully combined information and action. The brigade identified, engaged, and destroyed the enemy force as it moved into the area from Pakistan. In the ensuing week, with joint support, the brigade implemented a comprehensive information engagement plan to:

- Persuade the Afghan elders around Margah to deny support to the Taliban.
• Erode the cohesion, morale, and support base of the Taliban.

• Reassure the local population in Paktika Province.

• Persuade the Pakistani Army to increase active measures inside Pakistan to disrupt the Taliban.

Additionally, the joint commander wanted to use this battle and other events to inform regional and global audiences about progress in this part of Afghanistan. Soldiers gathered evidence and met with the local populace to ensure they understood the situation. The provincial reconstruction team helped the Afghan governor to organize a meeting with the Margah elders to pressure them into cutting ties with the Taliban. The attached psychological operations detachment developed and disseminated sophisticated products, targeting Taliban survivors of the battle. The public affairs officer then organized a press conference on-site in Margah to allow the Afghan governor to tell the story of the security success to local and regional audiences. The joint public affairs team organized a similar event for the international media. The joint commander met with senior commanders of the Pakistani and Afghan military.

The operation proved successful. The Pakistani Army improved security cooperation along the border. The Margah elders began to sever ties with the Taliban. Perhaps most importantly, the tribes in Pakistan began to resist Taliban recruiting efforts. Closely integrated information and action on the ground allowed joint and multinational forces to exploit tactical success.

4. Some Short, Medium, and Long-Term Planning Techniques

 a. Just as simultaneous planning efforts are conducted during execution along three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans); CS support to planning should focus on three time horizons: short term, medium term, and long term. Although the techniques and considerations along these time horizons can be quite different, CS efforts must be coordinated across all three time horizons to be successful. For example, communication activities should be immediately planned for short-term crisis response situations, while medium-term programs also need to be started, and relationships begun to produce long-term results. These three sets of activities must be conducted simultaneous and be complimentary, or the medium and long-term outcomes may be in jeopardy.

 (1) Short-term planning techniques. Have a “Crisis Communication” plan and update it regularly, such as a civilian casualty response plan (CIVCAS). In the plan identify crisis topic, spokesperson, response type, speed, and rumor and disinformation control. As always, truth and compassion are very important.

 (a) Crisis communication planning can be ineffective when a failure of imagination fails to anticipate the crisis type.
(b) Consider spokesperson preparedness/training, credibility, attractiveness, and ethnicity. Studies have showed that audiences are more affected by a spokesperson similar to themselves.

(c) Match the response to the type of crisis. For example, use of one response model would indicate that when we did not commit the offense, “denial” is the appropriate response. When we committed the offense, but can show we were not in control, an “excuse” would be most appropriate. When in control but no standard of right/wrong was broken, “justification” would be appropriate. Finally, when clear standards were violated, “concession” and apology is the best response.

(d) As seen in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan dealing with counterinsurgency, rapid response is very important. As previously stated, the Taliban is able to get their version of the story out in 26 minutes. Beating that cycle time may require commander’s taking risk and requiring battalion/company/platoon commanders to get initial information statements out within 25 minutes of an incident.

(e) Rumors and enemy disinformation can be countered effectively by attacking general uncertainty about the issue, high personal anxiety, and believability. This can be accomplished by providing truthful information to the public, attacking credibility of the source, and using a spokesperson perceived as honest, knowledgeable, or high status. Honesty is the most important. Discrediting the source as having something to gain from the disinformation is also effective.

(2) **Medium-term planning techniques.** Determine attitude or behavior to change, logical relationship between communication and change, required steps, alternatives, and time required.

(a) **Audience Segmentation.** Define the target audience and segment them along lines that are personally relevant to them, such as attitudes about the behavior to be changed (identified above). For example, personal attitude about the acceptability of suicide bombing (religious, social, and moral) would be a segmentation factor if the desired behavior change was to cause them to stop supporting suicide bombing. Another segmentation factor could be “hot button” or “turn off” issues. Others could include their viewpoint toward joining a terrorist group, or reporting suspicious activity.

(b) Identify the most credible messenger for each segment.

(c) Identify potential segment drivers.

(d) Understand the environment, to include: cultural or language barriers, key leader relationships, political constraints, staff/force communication skill levels, stakeholders and their interests, media means/methods/bias, and audience attention to media sources.

(e) Conduct message pre-testing to discover mistaken cultural/social/political assumptions.
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(f) Include as much community involvement as possible, such as encouraging audience reply and debate, feedback for message refinement, and persuade them to persuade others.

(g) Determine most effective message content type and delivery.

1. One versus two-sided communication involves whether or not to include the opposing argument. Two-sided communications are the most effective choice when the audience is knowledgeable about the issue or is opposed to the position of the message. Research indicates that opposing arguments can increase messenger credibility as long as it does not exceed 40 percent of the total content, and is most powerful when it includes refutation of the opposing position.

2. Gain versus loss framing involves encouraging the audience to make a choice, framed as either a gain or loss to them. For example, the choice could be to stop supporting suicide bombers framed as either a choice that could save lives, or as a choice to honor the lives already unnecessarily lost. Research indicates that loss-framed messages are more persuasive to audiences aggressive toward outsiders and submissive to authority. Conversely, gain-framed messages are more influential for those less supportive of authoritarianism.

3. Positive versus negative emotions have a significant effect in that positive emotions increase the effect of logically weak arguments but decrease logically strong arguments. However, if the audience is predisposed to disagree, a positive tone is ineffective. A negative or fearful message should be supplemented with something the audience can do to avoid the negative outcome.

(3) Long-term planning techniques. The 2008 DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication report separated long-term strategic communication into two categories: building partnerships, and engaging in a dialogue of ideas.

(a) Establishing Relationships. With typical troop rotations, establishing long-term relationships can be difficult. In a tribal society like Afghanistan, establishing lasting relationships with tribal elders is crucial. USSOCOM has instituted a troop rotation cycle where individuals are deployed to a specific area for six months, then home for six months. While home, they continue to closely watch the assigned area. Repeatedly rotating back to the same area allows for development and maintenance of long-term relationships.

1. Establishing good relationships with other stakeholders is also important. These could include NGOs, interagency representatives working in the area, intergovernmental and international organization representatives, and the media.

2. The RAND study identified four key elements of a successful relationship, in priority order: control mutuality (acceptance of the balance of control), mutual trust, commitment to the relationship, and relationship satisfaction. The study
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indicated that “Reliable survey tools have been developed to capture and measure these factors.”

(b) **Engaging in a Dialogue of Ideas.** If the exchange is to be a dialogue that influences, instead of a debate, it has to be in a context of respect, transparency, and honesty. There should be the appearance of active listening, consideration for the other viewpoint, and a perceived benefit for changing perspective (such as peace, prosperity, dignity etc.)

1. One strategy to delegitimize terrorism could be to show it inconsistent with moral, religious, or social standards. Another strategy could be to show it as unattractive, such as portraying it’s practitioners as “desperate,” “cowardly,” “impotent,” or “inept.”

“In its more aggressive form, long-term influence over social norms can involve shifting the public image of terrorism to that of a doomed, pathetic, and deeply shameful act, deserving of scorn and ridicule. A well-known use of this approach in communications during the global war on terrorism was the 2006 release of outtakes from a video message of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, showing him unable to fire a machine gun. This approach is quite distinct from moral or political arguments that paint terrorism as evil or highlight the pain that terrorists have inflicted on others; certain individuals may be attracted to images of evil power and destruction, and talk of terrorist “masterminds” and the like may only romanticize the tactic and further encourage these individuals to seek out violence. In making this argument, social scientists (Pech, 2003) have highlighted the importance of language, counseling communicators discussing terrorism to avoid such words as “assassin” and “revenge” in favor of such labels as “insecure” and “weak.”

2. Two caveats include the requirement to be consistent, and to offer a viable and satisfactory alternative at the same time. For example, lack of consistency could be sending messages about terrorists being weak and pathetic one week, to reduce public support; then next week sending messages about terrorists being sneaky and hard to target, to explain why more progress has not been made. Proposing an alternative may be a message indicating that support of the government can bring peace, stability, and prosperity. In some cultures, such as those that have a history of accepting tribal authoritarianism, offering democracy as an alternative may not be a satisfactory alternative and actually undermine the strategy. The offer of democracy may need to come later in another context.

“This is your country; the kind of country it's going to be is up to you – not to the United States or any foreign country. What kind of country do you want it to be? Are you willing to help restore order, and law, and civility – or are you going to sit quietly while those who seek to destroy what you have do their work?”

*The US Message in El Salvador twenty years ago*

b. **Other Considerations**
Planning and Assessment

(1) **Mirror-imaging is insidious and dangerous in communications.** Do not assume audiences want the same things, use the same communication means, share perspectives or context, should be approached in the same way, or will respond in the same way.

(2) Expertise in the local culture, language, and specific audience issues is critical in message design.

(3) Continuous local monitoring and rapid adaptation is usually far superior to centralized, intuitively constructed messages.

5. **Assessment**

   a. **Measuring progress** toward mission accomplishment assists commanders in decision-making and adjusting operations to achieve military objectives and reach the desired end state. Success in irregular warfare requires organizations to rapidly learn and adapt, and because “battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension,” assessment has a key role in CS-related activities. It is a challenge to create measures (Figure IV-7) that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced because CS attempts to create outcomes primarily in the cognitive dimension.

   "Local groups from Iraq to the Philippines have rejected al-Qaida’s stagnant ideology. And the timing of these events contradicts claims that US policy in Iraq has radicalized Muslims worldwide. Currents of opinion in Muslim regions are more complex than polling data can ever show. Even where polls suggest growing anti-Americanism, the link between attitudes and behavior is a complicated one. Muslims may not like US policy, but it does not follow that they will turn to al-Qaida."

   Dr. Michael Doran DASD for Support to Public Diplomacy
   House Armed Services Committee testimony, 8 Nov 07

   b. **Pattern Determination.** In an assessment, commanders are most interested in patterns: the changes to attributes of a system, node, link, task or action. Other factors can include rate of change, periodicity, historic comparison, and statistical analysis. Metrics show change over time and indicators give commanders a sense of whether they are making progress. However, determining relevant thresholds is often not knowable until sufficient measurement has taken place to show a pattern or trend, especially when assessing human behavior.

   c. **Measurement Types.** Both MOEs and MOPs can be qualitative or quantitative measurements. Whenever possible, quantitative measurements are preferred, because they are less susceptible to staff interpretation—subjective judgment. They demand more rigor (or proof) and are enduring even when the analysts and the users—the commanders—change. For these quantitative measures to have maximum utility, however, they should have three common characteristics: each indicator must consist of at least one measure, metric, and a standard (or threshold).

   d. **Measuring performance** is the most straight-forward measurement endeavor and helps track what is being transmitting into the information environment. For example,
tracking completion of media engagement activities (picture below of a USCENTCOM “Media Engagements” briefing slide), press releases, and other CS-related activities helps to determine if the force is “doing things right.” Other examples of measures of performance include: was the intended audience reached, how long, or did other media sources pick up the information? The measuring of performance is often referred to by other Agencies and organizations as measuring output.

**KEY TERMS**

*measure* – the extent, dimensions, quantity, etc., of something. (Webster’s)

*measure of effectiveness* – A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

*measure of performance* – A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

*metric* – the distance between two points being independent of the order of the points. (Webster’s)

*threshold* – the point at which a stimulus is of sufficient intensity to begin to produce an effect. (Webster’s)
Measuring Effectiveness. Developing substantive and reliable measures of effectiveness to determine outcomes in the cognitive dimension is more difficult than measuring results from traditional lethal means. Some example measures of effectiveness include: attitude/opinion/behavioral changes in selected populations, changes in media portrayal of events, change in insurgent activity/organization, insurgent supporter shifts, or changes in international response. The measuring of effectiveness is often referred to by other Agencies and organizations as measuring outcomes or results.

(1) Throughout 2006 and 2007 hundreds of academics, government officials, military personnel, NGOs, and other experts and practitioners gathered for working sessions and seminars to try to address the need for effective MOEs for stability operations. The resulting report entitled “Measuring Progress in a Conflict Environment (MPICE)” provides a recommended framework for measuring progress toward specific goals. This project resulted in a widely accepted set of historically validated outcome measures for both the drivers of conflict, and institutional performance of the host nation government to deal with instability.

(2) MPICE identified four assessment methodologies: content analysis, survey/polling data, expert knowledge, and quantitative data. Content analysis involved searching readily available publications on specific topics. It notes that while it was easy to get the publications, the process was labor intensive and choosing which publication to monitor was a challenge. The second methodology, expert knowledge, involved interviewing subject matter and/or local experts either individual or in groups. Experts, while very experienced, may have political agendas that bias their opinion. Quantitative Data used
statistics to assess progress, and the forth methodology was to use surveys and polling data to assess public opinion. Including results from these four methodologies allows assessment analysts to utilize both quantitative and qualitative data, and tailor collection means to obtain optimum data for the desired measures. Current operations in the field have incorporated some of these same methodologies for measuring progress associated with CS-related activities. In Iraq, for example, CS practitioners use content analysis of Western and Pan-Arab media and brief leadership daily (picture above of a USCENTCOM “Pan-Arab & Western Media” slide).

(3) **Polling** is an excellent method to gauge local perceptions. Although attempting to determine causality by linking increase or decrease in perception to any specific event is difficult, polling is an important tool for assessing progress on achieving desired effects (outcomes). Public opinion polling provides the best means to gauge local public perceptions on numerous and various topics in order to perform trend analysis. If the polling sampling is sufficiently large and representative of the national population, results can be projected to the larger population.

(4) A **focus group** is a qualitative research method that uses open-ended questions to explore attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of 8-12 individuals in a small group setting. Focus groups explore new ideas to gain an in-depth understanding of the participants' opinions on a particular topic. While, the results from Focus groups are usually not projected to the larger population due to small sample size, they are useful for testing proposed communication content, means, and approaches.
(5) **Weekly assessments** review the success of specific actions that were taken to support CS-related objectives, such as PSYOP leaflet distribution, PA initiated news conferences emphasizing key messages, and KLE activities.

(6) **Commercial Methods.** Use of commercially available assessment tools designed to review consumer attitudes and desires, can be tailored to assess MOEs. With the level of effort expended daily by industry in advertising and assessing outcomes, it would appear that a wide variety of validated and value-added assessment techniques might be available.

f. **Complexity**

(1) **Assessing adaptive systems**, such as insurgent recruiting or attitudes of a certain segment of the population, requires the commitment of extensive resources due to the number of variables involved. The need for constant assessment, and the difficulty in keeping the assessment current, may require using a federated approach. This has been used in Iraq where assessment groups from the military/coalition, interagency, HN, and other stakeholders developed a federated approach to data collection. These meetings were useful in determining what data is already available, who is most efficient and/or effective at collecting specific types of data, individual assessment needs and priorities, agreeing upon data sharing, establishing consistent reporting methods, and reducing redundant efforts.

(2) In order to predict future outcomes (what will happen), based on assessment results (what happened), the analyst must determine causality (what caused it to happen). Determining causality is often possible for a closed system, but requires significantly more effort. Having experienced analysts (like ORSA members) on the assessment team would be advised. However, attempting to accurately establish causality in complex adaptive systems is difficult, due to the number of variables involved.

(3) **Determining causality is difficult and may be unnecessary.** For example, based on shared experience, we can agree that if you stand on the top of a building, lean over the side, ensure the pathway remains clear, and drop a ball, it will fall to the ground. However, if we come outside the building on another day and see a ball on the ground, we cannot assume that it was dropped from the top of the building. Determining specific direct causality requires the control of all but the one independent variable. Because in military operations many variables usually can not be controlled, we are actually only determining “correlation” between our action and changes in the environment. Adding more resources and methodologies to assessment, to rule out more of the variables, can tighten the correlation, but still can not deliver causality. **Assessment can be used to confirm that our actions have “contributed” to the change (correlation), which typically is sufficient.** As we are able to confirm correlation of more of our actions to favorable outcomes in specific environments over time, our confidence in those actions resulting in favorable consequences in similar environments increases.

(4) **Confidence.** Selecting measures, combining, weighting, and interpreting data is at the heart of assessment. Common mistakes are found in each of these areas, such as selecting measures that are not relevant or properly adapted to the culture or area. Another example is where inexperienced analysts fail to properly consider which
data to combine based on relationships, variability, deviation, and relevance, which can cause some sets of data to become much less useful or even misleading. Similarly, small mistakes in weighting can skew data significantly. Likewise, not understanding some of the cultural or social factors can cause complete misinterpretations of data results. Many areas or cultures do not think or make decisions like we do. Understanding their perception of their available options can be enlightening, because they may not perceive options that we believe are available to them.

(a) **Assessment analysts must recognize and consider differing levels of confidence in data and results.** One of the ways to increase confidence in assessment is to establish confidence factors. For example, “what people make” is a more solid measure than “what they do,” which is a much more solid measure than “what they say.” Likewise, recent history has shown that polling and survey data collection Afghanistan is a problem. Difficulties include translation, developing the questions so that they can be understood and answered truthfully and safely, participation inequalities by tribe or gender, and the perceived relationship of the surveyor to the survey participant. In this case, we can significantly increase the confidence/reliability of our data/results by reaching out/back to cultural/social experts and those experienced in high risk data gathering.

(b) Another method could be to determine relationships between metrics. Some metrics have natural and very solid relationships, while others are more variable. Confidence can be increased through data/result validation between measures with solid relationships.

(c) Finally, using tools that can provide network visualizations on geographic maps (discussed previously) can increase confidence by correlating data interpretations with results or changes in specific areas.

g. **CS Analysis and Assessment Successes in Iraq**. The MNF–I STRATEFF Communication Division partnered operations research analysts, media analysts, and cultural experts to create an assessment team tasked to develop innovative methods and practices to provide US Mission Iraq (USM–I) and MNF–I senior leaders with timely media situational awareness, analysis, and assessment. This partnership produced seven critical efforts used to ensure that strategic communication efforts were achieving the desired effects. These included: an understanding of the Iraqi and Pan-Arab media; media penetration of key themes; alignment of key messages; Iraqi perceptions; prevalence of misinformation and disinformation in media stories; resonance of press conferences and key themes and messages; and effect of embedded reporters.

(1) **Understanding the Iraqi and Pan-Arab Media.** From a February 2008 nationwide poll, television was the primary source from which Iraqis obtained their news (78%), followed by radio (10%), and newspapers (3%). Ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq make a detailed understanding of the identity-group alliance of each media outlet essential. MNF–I, USM–I, and MNC–I each had the assistance of Iraqis and cultural experts in assessing the level of bias to prevent an overtly Western view. In the West, media content analysis is greatly facilitated with Lexis-Nexis, Factiva,
TVEyes, and Vocus. These tools were used extensively by the Communication Division to gain a thorough understanding of how Western media were reporting and framing OIF. However, tools such as these did not exist for extensive Iraqi and Pan-Arab media cataloguing. A media monitoring enterprise was necessary to identify MNF–I and USM–I organizations conducting monitoring, how they were capturing, storing, and using information. A principal reason for establishing an enterprise was to reduce redundancy in monitoring. After collaboration, consensus was achieved as to which organizations could best monitor which media. From May 2007 until May 2008, redundancy was reduced by 41 percent. A common searchable database was created and all monitoring agencies found it acceptable.

(2) **Media and Key Themes.** MNF–I focused on four primary themes or threads: political, economic, diplomatic, and security. The stories in the databases were categorized under these four headings to assess trends in salience over time.

(3) **Alignment of Key Messages.** Message alignment or coordination, coupled with the requirement for accuracy, was central to the shaping of the media information environment. For the most part during May 2007 to May 2008, MNF–I leaders had strong message alignment and did not contradict each other’s message. This was facilitated by General Petraeus guidance that all MNF–I senior leaders were to either attend the daily operational updates, where General Petraeus gave guidance, or review the published notes from these updates. Additionally, each major organization in MNF–I had dedicated military public affairs officers that assisted their leaders by preparing talking points based upon this guidance. The Joint Campaign Plan stipulated that MNF–I and USM–I conduct strategic communication to convey its messages to Iraqi, Pan-Arab, and Western audiences. The essential element was that strategic communication was top-driven so that subordinates could then reinforce the same messaging. On a daily basis, key quotes were captured from MNF–I and GoI leaders. On a weekly basis, the best quotes for each of MNF–I and GoI were placed in a theme category (e.g. political progress, security, troop reduction). These best quotes were quite selective and limited to no more than one page each for MNF–I and GoI. The intent of these one-page documents was to frame events, highlight specifically the key messages that should be reinforced in media engagements, and disseminate them to senior leaders. This process contributed to robust message alignment and allowed tracking of major shifts in messaging.

(4) **Iraqi Perceptions.** Messaging that is unsupported by actual conditions is counterproductive and harks back to the days of media control of Saddam Hussein, thus the emphasis was on ensuring message accuracy to conditions. At the conclusion of each month, analysis was done to examine the key themes and messages that had appeared in the Western, Iraqi and Pan-Arab media, compare the messaging to facts on the ground, and examine Iraqi perception from existing polling information. Polling is arguably the best way to gain a systematic and comprehensive understanding of the attitudes and opinions of the Iraqis. Although the numbers by themselves might not be wholly reliable, the trends over time are important and give senior leaders an excellent perspective. However, in order for these trends to have meaning, it is important that the methodology and questions remain stable. If the methodology or question-set vary from survey to survey, then gaining meaningful insights is severely jeopardized. MNF–I did not directly poll Iraqis, because it was highly doubted that trustworthy responses would be obtained,
but they routinely analyzed polling results from outside agencies. Numerically determining the contribution of a message/action to a shift in perception will continue to be an inexact science, but identifying when a shift in perception occurs remains an important consideration and one that can be determined using survey data.

(5) Managing Erroneous Stories. Through the monitoring enterprise efforts discussed previously, there was real-time situational awareness to permit not only the identification of the story, but to then immediately contact the source and provide clarifying information. The second method of reducing erroneous stories and their effect is the use of timely and accurate press releases from MNF–I. These two methods of countering erroneous information rapidly and issuing timely press releases were critical to affecting the communication effort.

(6) Resonance of Key Themes and Messages. An analysis of media coverage of monthly press conferences was done to not only examine the number of references to those press conferences, but to determine which themes and messages resonated across multiple media outlets. In many instances, determining the effect is problematic because there are multiple factors that can influence the effect, thus making it difficult to determine the measure of effectiveness that answers the question of "Are we doing the right things?" In most cases, the focus was on ensuring that desired MNF–I themes and messages resonated in the media. In conjunction with the press conferences coverage, the top key messages were also examined each month through the enterprise described previously.

(7) Effect of Embedded Reporters. Embedded reporters were considered an excellent way to give a "boots on the ground" perspective. MNF–I has found that these embedded reporters gave readers an excellent first-hand perspective of what military members experience. Although not all of the material is flattering, it does offer a strong dose of realism of what military members are experiencing and feeling. Furthermore, even if the stories do not gain strong nationwide coverage, they do gain good regional coverage and, in many cases, this regional coverage is more appropriate because the embedded reporters are with units from a certain geographical area in the USA.

h. Reframing. Currently, design is defined as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex problems and develop approaches to solve them.”66 The two most useful outcomes of design, for planning and execution of operations, are to help make sure that we get it right the first time, and that we “reframe” when necessary. From a systems perspective, as we engage in the operational environment, our actions are designed to affect and change the system/situation. Likewise, the adversary is also acting on the system to cause change. Therefore, with the two main protagonists trying to affect change, both the environment and the problem are almost certainly going to change over time. History is replete with examples of failures in properly framing the operational environment, misunderstanding the problem, or failure to adapt when the environment/problem changed. For that reason, it is critical during the operational design and early joint operation planning process to identify indicators that will enable us to detect when significant shifts happen in the operational environment or problem. The quandary is that these indicators appear to be quite different from typical measures, like MOE or MOP, and will necessarily have to compete for resources. Likewise, it also appears that these indicators would probably not show significant movement in
the short term, thereby causing internal pressure to move assessment resources to measures that appear to be more productive. However, discipline may need to be exercised in keeping resources assigned to support these indicators, because the environment and problem will indeed change and it is critical for us to recognize those changes and adapt more quickly than the adversary.

“An ISAF unit was often taking rocket fire from nearby a certain village. Rather than raiding the village, the commander decided instead to find out more about them and the reasons for the hostility. The ANA commander suggested an ANA patrol to learn more about the village. The patrol discovered the village was upset about a night raid that occurred over two years ago. He also learned education was important to the village but they had no school or supplies. The commandners sent another patrol to the village a few days with a truckload of school supplies. The next day, the village elders came to the base to meet with the ANA and ISAF commanders. They delivered over 100 thank-you notes from the children. Soon, several projects were coordinated with the elders for the village – projects they owned. The rockets stopped.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643
CHAPTER V
OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

“The longer it takes to put a Strategic Communication framework into place, the more we can be certain that the vacuum will be filled by the enemy and by news informers that most assuredly will not paint an accurate picture of what is actually taking place.”

Former Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld

1. General

a. In order to integrate and synchronize CS efforts and capabilities, as noted in the QDR SC Roadmap, the joint community needs to publish SC/CS policy and expand joint doctrine. This effort should include identification of value-added emerging structures and practices, the scope and limits of SC/CS, supporting capabilities, and relationships. Training and education may be the key enabler to rapidly increase effectiveness of CS operations and facilitate the adoption of the more effective interim organizational methods. Training of commanders and staffs to better synchronize words and actions in planning can help the JFC close or avoid the “say-do gap” and influence audiences more efficiently and effectively.

b. More work needs to be done to identify an SC/CS end state for DOD, analyze existing doctrinal processes to determine needed modification, and provide organizational constructs to support the process changes. Appendix O is the first attempt to map the SC/CS process. This work could produce some efficiency for CS-related activities and organizations. Likewise, investigating ways to better reach out and coordinate CS with interagency, coalition, and other partners may provide significantly improved coherence in CS activities for achieving long-term CS-related objectives. A study of private enterprise or nongovernmental expertise in the areas of advertising, marketing, and progress measurement may be beneficial to help shift paradigms and to think of new ways to conduct CS as well as new ways to use military resources in the execution and assessment of CS.

c. Current interim CS-related solutions observed in the field range from creating new boards, cells, and working groups to sharing LNOs across traditional lines. Increasing command emphasis on CS has produced some degree of success; however, results vary widely and are somewhat hampered by resource issues, community stovepipes, immature policy, insufficient doctrine, and inadequate training. Full and effective implementation of CS in joint operations depends not only on sound policy, but also on integrating solutions across the areas of joint doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Continuing implementation and evaluation of CS should consider the consequences across DOTMLPF functional processes.

2. Policy

a. The draft DODD 3050.00, Strategic Communication, is a foundational SC/CS policy document, but it will not have its intended effect until signed. Likewise, some SC Roadmap tasks are progressing, including JIC development and continuing improvement
Chapter V

in JPASE capabilities. However, insufficient resources hamper progress and timely completion of other SC Roadmap tasks.

b. Although SC guidance templates are being submitted and processed above the combatant command level (through JS J-5, DASD (JC), USD (P), and ASD (PA)), Annex Y (Strategic Communication) processing is taking weeks in some cases. Some combatant commands have stopped using Annex Y in favor of placing two or three paragraphs in the commander’s intent section and referring to the IO and PA annexes. A more expedited process may be warranted.

3. Doctrine

a. Concurrently with approval of the SC Roadmap, joint doctrine was quick to address strategic communication in JPs 3-0 and 5-0, and later in JP 1. Since SC was a new construct at the time, these publications did not discuss SC/CS in depth, nor include detailed relationships between PA, DSPD, and IO as they relate to SC/CS. Considerations for further development or revision of doctrine should include:

(1) A more thorough discussion of CS integration into all operations including integration into the joint operation planning process (JOPP) may be beneficial in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. This discussion could include a CS vignette and considerations for making CS the main effort during certain phases of an operation. These key publications should address the growing importance of CS and its prevalent role in irregular warfare and stability operations.

(2) Clarification of the relationships between all CS-related capabilities, such as found in Appendix B, would help planners and operators in the field. JP 3-13, Information Operations, series and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, are current under revision and may benefit from incorporation of this material. JP 3-61, RFC, currently incorporates some of this material, JP 3-13 does not.

(3) Combatant commands have tailored organizational constructs that facilitate CS for their specific mission sets. A discussion of validated, value-added CS organizational constructs (such as the SCWG or the USSOUTHCOM Office of Strategic Communication) may be of value in JP 3-33 and other JPs listed below.

(4) To better support CS, joint doctrine must expand the understanding of the operational environment, largely through the JIPOE process, to provide more depth in CS-related areas. This expansion should consider cultural, cognitive, and communications network mapping. JP 2-01.3 has included some improvements, but more needs to be done.

(5) Identification and incorporation of value-added, compatible civilian communication assessment techniques and procedures may benefit CS assessment planning. The JP 3-13 series and JP 3-61 may benefit from this effort. Army and Air Force ORSA communities may be unique qualified to help advance this area.

(6) An outline of interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and NGO coordination requirements, with recommended processes, may speed and focus coordination efforts in crises.
(7) Identification of CS challenges that are unique to each level of war or type of operation may help planners to adapt to emerging circumstances more quickly.

(8) Validation of a process that focuses and synchronizes planning and execution of all communication activities within the staff, and provides a mechanism to coordinate with the broader USG effort, could enhance CS execution. This process is detailed in Appendix O.

(9) The importance, complexity, and breadth of CS-related capabilities and activities may validate the need for a new joint publication on CS. This handbook could provide the core content.

(10) Joint doctrine should consider a separate naming construct such as CS that recognizes the difference between USG-level activity and military implementation at theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A potential example is the “communication strategy” construct taught by the JWFC. One argument for this construct:

“While military commanders directly control PA and IO assets and direct the “M” in DIME, they do not direct the PD actors. Because of this, we draw a distinction between a military commander’s communication strategy and the interagency nature of strategic communication.”

JP 3-0, RFD, is currently attempting to establish the term "Communication Strategy."

(11) Doctrine must define relationships between SC/CS; PA; DSPD; and IO core, supporting, and related capabilities (Figure II-3 may provide some assistance). For example, doctrine states that relationships do exist, but does not discuss the direction of flow for support of those efforts. For example, visual information (VI) appears to support IO, PA, DSPD, and CMO; however, clarification of the two-way relationship between VI and others may add value. Likewise, counterintelligence should have a more clearly defined role in support of PA and DSPD. In the same vein, determining the relative importance of CS supporting capabilities in specific types of military operations could alter the relationships. For example, military support to stability operations appears to need PA, DSPD, CMO, and PSYOP in a primary role in CS. However, major combat operations appear to have physical attack, PSYOP, MILDEC, and PA in the primary CS roles.

(12) The current definitions of “theme” and “message” are inadequate for clearly communicating, developing CS-related products, and conducting CS activities. Likewise, there is no JP 1-02 definition for “narrative.” Consideration should be given to incorporating into joint doctrine the proposed definitions in this handbook of the terms: theme, message, and narrative. A discussion of how they must nest under and support each other may be useful. JP 3-16, RFC, is attempting to establish the term "Theme" and "Message". However, "Narrative" is currently being neglected.

b. The primary joint publications that likely need to add a more robust discussion of CS include the following:

(1) JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
Chapter V

(2) JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations

(3) JP 2-01.3, JTTP for Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(4) JP 3-0 Ch1, Joint Operations

(5) JP 3-13, Information Operations

(6) JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations

(7) JP 3-13.4, Military Deception

(8) JP 3-24, Joint Counterinsurgency Operations (in development)

(9) JP 3-26, Counterterrorism (in development)

(10) JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters

(11) JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations

(12) JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations

(13) JP 3-61, Public Affairs

(14) JP 3-63, Detainee Operations

(15) JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

4. Organization

a. When faced with a new requirement like CS, there is a natural tendency to jump to an organizational solution before fully understanding if organizational or process adjustments are necessary. Organizational changes might be necessary for some new requirements, but not for others. The detailed techniques and procedures for how the JFC should synchronize IO, PA, VI, CMO, and DSPD in support of higher-level SC themes, messages, images, and actions have not been decided, so organizational changes – particularly those that require more resources – are premature. Some have argued that if new organizational constructs are necessary, then we must “be sure to bring everyone over to the new way, and get rid of the old.” Otherwise, “The end result is that we now have about twice the [SC] force structure oriented around doing generally the same thing, without broad understanding of who does what, or more importantly, who has what authorities.”68

b. Whether or not organizational changes are necessary, those leaders responsible for implementing, coordinating, or directing CS-related activities for their command must be given the requisite authority, tools, and other resources to accompany the responsibility.
Operational Implications

c. Diminishing stovepipes, reviewing authorities, or bridging DOD organizations that overly segment missions or inappropriately restrain employment of capabilities may prove invaluable. While this may require some revision of staff process and procedures within joint organizations, the results should be a single coherent effort that can more effectively meet the challenge of conducting successful operations at all levels.

d. CS subject matter experts in the field have indicated that a “Center of Excellence” type organization for CS may be useful in developing CS doctrine, TTP, concepts, capturing lessons learned, and advocacy for warfighter CS issues.

e. Utilizing the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), in combination with representation from the CS-related capabilities, could facilitate the coordination of CS-related issues and activities across the interagency.

5. Training

a. The JWFC is providing more robust CS training and improving the fidelity of external CS entities during joint exercises. However, role-playing at the DOD/USG level has been limited. OSD, JS, and interagency participation in CS training activities, to include planning and communication integration interaction, would provide a significant benefit. This participation could be facilitated using reachback capability.

b. A review of Service and joint training indicates a need for more CS training to enable planners to incorporate CS more completely into the existing doctrinal joint operation planning process.

c. Reviews of joint and Service training and education programs across DOD indicates that there is a need to increase the amount of time and effort being put into preparing our staff officers to conduct assessments of progress. Assessment of progress in the cognitive dimension is singularly lacking. Interviews and surveys of staff officers at US and multinational headquarters at the operational level also indicate the existence of a significant gap between the current level of assessment training and education being provided and the real-world needs and requirements at operational headquarters.69

d. Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) training requires officers to be JPME Phase I trained in joint planning, and combines individual service capabilities with other service capabilities to produce an optimum capability greater than the sum of its parts (JPME Phase II). Finally the officer is placed in a joint billet (JPME Phase III) to apply the learning and gain practical experience in a joint force/staff before they can be JQO designated. CS proficiency appears to need to follow a similar path. Some training (Phase II) is necessary to help them understand the capability available from the other communication capability areas and how to best support JOPP, coordinate, and synchronize those CS-related capabilities with other CS-related activities and actions of the force. Finally, gaining experience in a joint CS billet (Phase III) would allow them to learn and gain practical experience in the field. Creating a JPME-like training track for CS may be beneficial, including requiring this training track for joint critical CS billets.
e. It may be useful to provide inexperienced analysts with a basic anthropological understanding of small-scale traditional societies, local/regional religions, primary communications systems, history, political background, economic factors, social/cultural values and mores of the country of interest. The new initiative, directed by the CJCS, for Services to adopt GEN McChrystal's COIN training proficiency standards is a step in the right direction.

f. Training young leaders to properly interact in the local environment to engage in dialogic communication (really listen, empathize, and understand) and/or deliver messages in a way that will resonate locally is critical to effective SC/CS. Appendix N shows an example of how the say-do gap can be generated, despite well-intentioned hard working leader’s best efforts, due to a lack of training and resources. Some possible factors that contribute to this ongoing problem include a lack of cultural training, not understanding tribal perspectives, lack of observation, socially unacceptable behaviors brought about by yielding to stress, inadequate interpreters, and not nesting with higher-level themes/messages to consistently resonate locally.

6. Materiel

Feedback from the field indicates that development of a machine translator that is dialectically accurate, agile, and culturally validated should improve the JFC’s ability to communicate with indigenous personnel. It would prove valuable in facilitating dialogue, enabling discussion, and improving understanding.

7. Leadership and Education

a. Feedback from ongoing DOD SC/CS education conferences indicates that there is value in bringing together SC/CS educators and key practitioners for thoughtful, productive discussions on SC/CS education and training issues. Value-added products of these venues could affect leadership and education in various ways to include those addressed below.

b. The application of CS-related capability, planning, and coordination may need to be strengthened in joint professional military education and Service education programs, including PINNACLE and CAPSTONE courses. This education could include planning considerations for early CS efforts. In the current global war of ideas, our military leaders may significantly benefit from training and education to inculcate CS and CS-related implications in their deliberate, analytic, and intuitive decision-making processes.

c. The Services’ disparate education programs may need to incorporate a broad knowledge of CS processes, including Service and JFC responsibilities.

d. The creation of dedicated SC/CS educational curriculum is in the infancy stage. The DOD Senior Executive Strategic Communication Workshop is a three-day course offered through the Naval Postgraduate School (Executive Education Center) and the University of Southern California Annenberg School for Communication. This course
Operational Implications

is considered a senior SC/CS planners course, but does not utilize, support, or integrate with the joint operation planning process (JOPP) and does not appear to provide or follow specific guidelines or processes. A revision of the course to better align content to support JOPP and provide/follow a process may significantly improve the course. Course designer review of Appendix O may be a good start.

e. Current distance education SC courses (J30P-US240, J6ST-US209, J30P-US209, J30P-US111, J30P-US362, and J30P-US406) seem to be duplications of the same “Commander’s Communication Strategy” PowerPoint presentation (normally delivered by the deployable training team as part of their academics) tailored slightly for specific audiences, such as OIF, HOA, or JTF. Development of more in-depth curriculum for various members of an SC/CS staff, especially planners, could significantly improve training and staff expertise of personnel assigned to SC/CS billets.

8. Personnel

a. The SC Roadmap assigns several tasks to determine resource requirements needed in the SC-related capability areas. Interviews with DOD SC experts have indicated that personnel shortages continue to affect SC/CS efforts significantly. In order to alleviate some pressure on the personnel resource system, intensifying the incorporation of SC/CS considerations into joint and Service planner development programs may be of value. Some factors for incorporation may include:

   (1) Consideration of CS implications in all planning efforts, to include IO, PA, VI, CMO, and DSPD capabilities

   (2) Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal activities and operations for maximum impact

   (3) Coordination with HN, interagency, IGO, NGO, multinational, private sector, and other organizations in the operational environment

   (4) Coordinating concepts with JS and OGAs during the early stages of planning and execution

b. A key enabler for many CS programs is an understanding of the local language, cultural and information environment. Development of regional and country experts to assist in intelligence preparation, planning, and executing CS-related tasks may prove valuable.

c. Systems analysts may need the following unique skill sets to best support CS efforts:

   (1) Anthropology (understanding the local culture)

   (2) Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/interest in the local population)

   (3) Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communications processes and products)
Chapter V

(4) Local and regional communications expertise (understanding the means, methods, and relative impact of local and regional communications)

(5) Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)

(6) US Embassy/DOS/USAID expertise (understanding coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)

9. Facilities

The US Navy recommends an expansion of the DOD Information School.

10. Conclusion

"ISAF’s mission is to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) defeat the insurgency threatening their country. Protecting the Afghan people is the mission. The Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we (GIRoA and ISAF) are in a struggle for their support. The effort to gain and maintain that support must inform every action we take. Essentially, we and the insurgents are presenting an argument for the future to the people of Afghanistan: they will decide which argument is the most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of success."

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

Strategic communication or communication strategy is a critical capability for winning the War of Ideas in support of counterinsurgency operations and “Other Contingencies Abroad.” Strategic communication is at the heart of USG efforts to influence key audiences to support US national interests, but is not a stand-alone process. CS integrated into all operations processes at the outset and synchronization throughout planning, preparation, execution, and assessment ensures the greatest effect in the information environment. KLE needs to shift from crisis engagement to building relationships over time that can support our interests during crisis. Synchronizing words and actions can help the JFC close the “say-do gap” and significantly increase the potential to influence intended audiences. Effectively employed CS ways and means can potentially achieve national, theater-strategic, and operational-level objectives in a manner that lessens the requirement for combat in many situations. Past operations have not demonstrated the best integration of IO, PA, VI, CMO, and other CS-related capabilities in support of CS themes, messages, images and actions. Recent experience proves that a more integrated, synchronized, holistic effort is both beneficial and required. To date, solutions have focused on inefficient parallel planning and organizational alternatives. While improvements have been significant, they do not approach the anticipated effectiveness of truly integrated and synchronized CS planning and execution. A review of all related processes and capabilities, with a clearly articulated CS end state in mind, should guide future DOTMLPF changes that produce a holistic CS solution set.
APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Definition of a principle: A fundamental tenet; a determining characteristic; an essential quality; an enduring attribute.

DOD Memorandum Principles of Strategic Communication Guide
15 August 2008

1. Caveat

   a. The nine “Principles of Strategic Communication” listed in Figure A-1 are included in the Principles of Strategic Communication Guide, signed by the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs 15 August 2008, Figure A-2.

   b. These principles are provided in this handbook to assist dialogue and instruction, promoting understanding of Strategic Communication. They are not listed in order of precedence.

2. Discussion

   a. Leadership-Driven—Leaders must decisively engage and drive the strategic communication process. To ensure integration of communication efforts, leaders should place communication at the core of everything they do. Successful Strategic Communication – integrating actions, words, and images – begins with clear leadership intent and guidance. Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the organization, command or joint campaign plan. The results are actions and words linked to the plan. Leaders also need to properly resource strategic communication at a priority comparable to other important areas such as logistics and intelligence.
b. **Credible**—Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties. Credibility and consistency are the foundation of effective communication; they build and rely on perceptions of accuracy, truthfulness, and respect. Actions, images, and words must be integrated and coordinated internally and externally with no perceived inconsistencies between words and deeds or between policy and deeds. Strategic Communication also requires a professional force of properly trained, educated, and attentive communicators. Credibility also often entails communicating through others who may be viewed as more credible.

c. **Understanding**—Deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems. What we say, do, or show, may not be what others hear or see. An individual’s experience, culture, and knowledge provide the context shaping their perceptions and therefore their judgment of actions. We must understand that concepts of moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the individual’s societal and cultural narrative. Audiences determine meaning by interpretation of our communication with them; thus what we say, do, or show, may not be what they hear or see. Acting without understanding our audiences can lead to critical misunderstandings with serious consequences.

d. **Dialogue**—Multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships. Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, engagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust. Success depends upon building and leveraging relationships. Leaders should take advantage of these relationships to place U.S. policies and actions in context prior to operations or events. Successful development and implementation of communication strategy will seldom happen overnight; relationships take time to develop and require listening, respect for culture, and trust-building.

e. **Pervasive**—Every action, image, and word sends a message. Communication no longer has boundaries, in time or space. All players are communicators, wittingly or not. Everything the Joint Force says, does, or fails to do and say, has intended and unintended consequences. Every action, word, and image sends a message, and every team member is a messenger, from the 18-year-old rifleman to the commander. All communication can have strategic impact, and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment; therefore, leaders must think about possible “Nth” order communication results of their actions.

f. **Unity of Effort**—Integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally. Strategic Communication is a consistent, collaborative process that must be integrated vertically from strategic through tactical levels, and horizontally across stakeholders. Leaders coordinate and synchronize capabilities and instruments of power within their area of responsibility, areas of influence, and areas of interest to achieve desired outcomes. Recognizing that your agency/organization will not act alone, ideally, all those who may have an impact should be part of communication integration.

g. **Results-Based**—Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated endstate. Strategic communication should be focused on achieving specific desired results in pursuit of a clearly defined endstate. Communication processes, themes,
targets and engagement modes are derived from policy, strategic vision, campaign planning and operational design. Strategic communication is not simply “another tool in the leader’s toolbox,” but must guide all an organization does and says; encompassing and harmonized with other functions for desired results.

h. Responsive—Right audience, right message, right time, and right place. Strategic Communication should focus on long-term end states or desired outcomes. Rapid and timely response to evolving conditions and crises is important as these may have strategic effects. Communication strategy must reach intended audiences through a customized message that is relevant to those audiences. Strategic Communication involves the broader discussion of aligning actions, images, and words to support policy, overarching strategic objectives and the longer term big picture. Acting within adversaries’ decision cycles is also key because tempo and adaptability count. Frequently there will be a limited window of opportunity for specific messages to achieve a desired result.

i. Continuous—Diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action. Strategic Communication is a continuous process of research and analysis, planning, execution, and assessment. Success in this process requires diligent and continual analysis and assessment feeding back into planning and action. Strategic Communication supports the organization’s objectives by adapting as needed and as plans change. The SC process should ideally operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries.
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Principles of Strategic Communication Guide

Strategic Communication has been viewed as an emerging and extremely pertinent joint concept in recent years. Several important review panels have addressed Strategic Communication (SC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated Strategic Communication as one of the CJCS Special Areas of Emphasis for joint education in 2007 and 2008.

Despite the interest and attention, Strategic Communication is still a developing concept. Contributing to the challenge is the lack of approved policy and doctrine.

As part of a larger DoD Strategic Communication education initiative, the Department held the first Strategic Communication Education Summit in March 2008, at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va. One of the most significant outcomes was the development of “Principles of Strategic Communication” to help standardize Strategic Communication education until policy and doctrine are published.

Through the collaborative efforts of DoD, State Department, and civilian educators and practitioners, the Principles initially developed in the Strategic Communication Education Summit have been refined into this guide. The purpose of this publication is to provide a tool to assist dialogue and instruction promoting understanding Strategic Communication.

As the Strategic Communication concept continues to mature, these Principles will be reviewed every two years until they are incorporated into formal doctrine. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication.

Robert Hastings
Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense of Public Affairs

Figure A-2.  Principles of Strategic Communication Guide Cover Letter
## APPENDIX B
### RELATED CAPABILITY RELATIONSHIPS

**Figure B-1. Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Visual Information Support to CS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND VISUAL INFORMATION SUPPORT TO CS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INFLUENCING/INFORMING POPULACE OF CMO ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing information from local and host-nation sources to support friendly knowledge of information environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous personnel and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)</td>
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<td>Supporting with feedback on themes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing news and information to the local people and communities</td>
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<td>Identifying, coordinating, and integrating media, public information, and host-nation support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Synchronizing communications media and messages with other IO capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinating with civil affairs specialists to verify facts and validity of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managing the release of key images through PA channels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinating for visual information coverage and access to key events and operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead crisis communication response efforts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| **DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY** |
| Providing a link to interagency for coordination and activities that affect public diplomacy |
| Providing coordination and sharing information with other IO capabilities |
| Synchronizing visual information support to public diplomacy and civil action projects |
| Conducting counterpropaganda and protection from misinformation |
| Establishing information assurance and protection procedures |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
| Coordinating with SC planners and interagency to ensure a consistent message and maintain OPSEC |
| Supporting counterpropaganda by countering misinformation |
| Providing assessment of effects of media and non-media coverage |
| Producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public |
| Coordinating with civil affairs specialists to verify facts and validity of information |
| Managing the release of key images through PA channels |
| Coordinating for visual information coverage and access to key events and operations |
| Lead crisis communication response efforts |

| **INFORMATION SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY** |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
| Providing coordination and sharing information with other IO capabilities |
| Synchronizing visual information support to public diplomacy and civil action projects |
| Conducting counterpropaganda and protection from misinformation |
| Establishing information assurance and protection procedures |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
| Coordinating with SC planners and interagency to ensure a consistent message and maintain OPSEC |
| Supporting counterpropaganda by countering misinformation |
| Providing assessment of effects of media and non-media coverage |
| Producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public |
| Coordinating with civil affairs specialists to verify facts and validity of information |
| Managing the release of key images through PA channels |
| Coordinating for visual information coverage and access to key events and operations |
| Lead crisis communication response efforts |

| **PUBLIC AFFAIRS** |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
| Providing coordination and sharing information with other IO capabilities |
| Synchronizing visual information support to public diplomacy and civil action projects |
| Conducting counterpropaganda and protection from misinformation |
| Establishing information assurance and protection procedures |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
| Coordinating with SC planners and interagency to ensure a consistent message and maintain OPSEC |
| Supporting counterpropaganda by countering misinformation |
| Providing assessment of effects of media and non-media coverage |
| Producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public |
| Coordinating with civil affairs specialists to verify facts and validity of information |
| Managing the release of key images through PA channels |
| Coordinating for visual information coverage and access to key events and operations |
| Lead crisis communication response efforts |

| **VISUAL INFORMATION** |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
| Providing coordination and sharing information with other IO capabilities |
| Synchronizing visual information support to public diplomacy and civil action projects |
| Conducting counterpropaganda and protection from misinformation |
| Establishing information assurance and protection procedures |
| Providing responsive information capability to support interagency for coordination and activities |
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| Coordinating with civil affairs specialists to verify facts and validity of information |
| Managing the release of key images through PA channels |
| Coordinating for visual information coverage and access to key events and operations |
| Lead crisis communication response efforts |
## Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts within Communication Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Conflicts within Communication Capabilities</th>
<th>OPSEC</th>
<th>MILDEC</th>
<th>PSYOP</th>
<th>Physical Destruction</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>DSPD</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Operations Security (OPSEC) Can Conflict By</strong></td>
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<td>Revealing information OPSEC normally seeks to conceal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting information that can be revealed to enhance deception story credibility.</td>
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<td>Limiting information that can be revealed to develop themes.</td>
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<td><strong>Military Deception (MILDEC) Can Conflict By</strong></td>
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<td>Revealing information MILDEC normally seeks to conceal.</td>
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<td>Limiting theme selection.</td>
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<td>Limiting information that can be revealed to develop themes.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Can Conflict By</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Revealing information PSYOP normally seeks to conceal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting deception story selection if deception story contains untruths.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Attack Can Conflict By</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Causing firing systems to reveal their locations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting selection of deception means by denying or degrading elements of adversary C2 infrastructure necessary to process deception story.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Warfare (EW) Can Conflict By</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Revealing EW assets prematurely.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting selection of deception measures by denying or degrading use of adversary C2 systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reducing frequencies available to convey themes.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Destruction</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting targeting of adversary C2 systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Protection (EP)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting targeting to allow survival and conduct of critical adversary command and control (C2) functions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Protection (EP) and OPSEC may have different goals.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting targeting to allow conveying of themes.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Attack (EA) targeting of adversary information systems (INFOSYS) to allow survival and conduct of critical adversary C2 functions.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Potentially destructive to relationships.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limited information which could diminish the appearance of transparency &amp; trust.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limited targeting of adversary C2 infrastructure to allow conveying of themes.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limiting targeting of adversary C2 systems.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Should be no conflict.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limiting opportunities for communications intrusion by denying or degrading elements of adversary INFOSYS.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limiting opportunity to dialogue or interact.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limiting communications means necessary for dialogue and interaction.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>Potential Conflicts</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Reinforcing the deception story.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack selected on enemy targets may result in friendly activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Rebalancing the deception story.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventing the enemy from receiving the message.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Reinforcing the deception story.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allowing for deception story to be revealed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSPD</td>
<td>Reinforcing the deception story.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Revealing CNA source that should be protected.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>Reinforcing the deception story.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revealing CND source that should be protected.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revealing EA source that should be protected.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Reinforcing the deception story.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revealing CNA source that should be protected.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Reinforcing the deception story.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revealing information normally sought to conceal.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Limiting targeting of adversary C2 infrastructure to allow conveying of themes.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure B-2**: Potential Conflicts within Communication Capabilities (cont'd)
**Desired Strategic Endstate**

**Narrative Description/Strategic Context**
- Frames the issue in the broadest terms by describing the background and situation applicable to the issue and desired goal(s).
- The narrative must contain the context, reason/motive, and goal/end state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Goal(s)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Themes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What the strategic plan is attempting to achieve</td>
<td>Key focus areas as a guide for more specific messaging. Provides overarching concepts or intentions, designed for broad application, to achieve specific objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Obstacles and Constraints</strong></th>
<th><strong>Key Assumptions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obstacle – Something you can improve on</td>
<td>Factors that are thought to be true and form the basis for the plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraint – Something you cannot change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Primary Audiences</strong></th>
<th><strong>Assessment Methodology</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups/organizations that are the focus of actions and words designed to achieve the goal</td>
<td>Key measures of effectiveness or progress toward identified goal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Way Ahead</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific steps to be taken to complete and implement SC/CS plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- [ ] Proceed as written
- [ ] Proceed IAW guidance
- [ ] Adjust

Figure C-1. Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy Guidance Template Format Example
Appendix C

Commander's Handbook for SC and Communication Strategy (Ver. 3.0)

As XXX’s international profile expands, the issue of YYY’s status will continue to play a significant role in political, economic, and military contacts. The U.S. remains focused on theater security engagement. XXX focuses on symbolism over substance unless its interests are directly affected. XXX’s military capabilities continue to improve. XXX’s economic requirements and need for natural resources continue to grow.

**Key Assumptions**

- Understanding of how XXX’s internal challenges and politics affect relations
- Proliferation of arms sales to states of concern
- XXX’s pursuit of competitive strategies in international affairs
- Significant restriction of access of U.S. personnel to XXX facilities and equipment

**Desired SC Endstate**

Shape XXX’s emergence in a constructive direction. Facilitate cooperation and foster patterns of responsible behavior in the area of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and increased safety of air and maritime forces operating in international waters and airspace. Reinforce policy objectives of increased transparency, improved non-proliferation behavior, cooperation on transnational threats, and more responsible approaches to states of concern (YYY, ZZZ). Use our information assets to shape XXX’s use of its expanding military capabilities in a responsible direction, and to communicate to regional and global audiences the purpose of our military cooperation with XXX.

**Obstacles and Constraints**

- Understanding of how XXX’s internal challenges and policies affect relations
- Proliferation of arms sales to states of concern
- XXX’s pursuit of competitive strategies in international affairs
- Significant restriction of access of U.S. personnel to XXX facilities and equipment
- XXX government, military
- U.S. and international media
- Partner nations
- Regional audiences

**Primary Audiences**

- XXX government, military
- U.S. and international media
- Partner nations
- Regional audiences

**Lines of Operation (Lead in Bold)**

- Policy: USD(P)/JS
- Public Information: ASD(PA)
- Mil-Mil Engagement: XXXCOM
- Legislative Outreach: ASD(A)
- Public Diplomacy: USD(P), SPD
- Interagency Communication: USD(P)/J-5

**Key Actions**

- Implementation of existing EXERCISES
- Consider increased POL-MIL along with MIL-MIL engagements
- Secure commitment with key coalition allies

**Key Messages**

- The United States welcomes the emergence of a peaceful and prosperous XXX that is a responsible partner in the international system
- The lack of transparency contributes to uncertainty. It raises questions in the U.S. and throughout the region over whether XXX will make the right choices to serve its real interests.
- XXX’s military capabilities continue to improve.
- XXX’s economic requirements and need for natural resources continue to grow.

**USG Strategic Goals:**

- XXX’s emergence as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is a key element of the international security environment. As XXX’s interests expand, its military is beginning to play a greater role as an instrument of foreign policy. The USG strategic goals for XXX’s emergency on the international stage are as follows:
  1. Increase XXX transparency, their openness to discussions, strategic intentions, and their readiness in terms of equipment/capability.
  2. Expand XXX participation in peacekeeping/HADR and SAR missions.
  3. Influence XXX’s foreign and security policy to contribute to the international community as a responsible stakeholder from past policy of hiding capabilities, maintaining low profile, avoiding leadership, etc.
  4. Demonstrate to regional audiences that the U.S. and XXX can have a cooperative relationship and manage differences, they don’t have to choose between U.S. and XXX (i.e., areas of common interest and expand relations in these areas).

**Way Ahead**

- JS/OSD draft para 1 of the SC plan
- Strategic Integration and Analysis Division (SIAD) develop MOEs for each audience
- Approve, issue, and designate leads for drafting an SC plan
- Pursue interagency co-employment through Deputies Committee
- DSD Guidance: Proceed as written

**Figure C-2. US-XXX Strategic Communication Guidance**
Commander’s Communication Strategy

Simultaneous Operations

Theater Objectives: The U.S. and Canada are defended, protected and secure from external threats and aggression; timely, effective civil support is provided

Overall Effects: Public confidence is maintained; domestic audiences and policy makers are informed; mission partners are assured; civil support requirements are anticipated; responses planned and missions executed

Intent: Inform public and mission partners of the scope of NORAD and USNORTHCOM operations

The top priority of NORAD and USNORTHCOM is the defense of the United States and Canada

NORAD provides the United States and Canada with aerospace warning and control and maritime warning

USNORTHCOM defends the homeland and provides simultaneous civil support when requested and approved

Military forces are trained, equipped and ready to perform their missions

Defense of the United States and Canada remains the top priority for NORAD and USNORTHCOM

NORAD and USNORTHCOM partner around the clock and remain vigilant in defending our homelands

USNORTHCOM defends against threats while responding to simultaneous natural or man made events

USNORTHCOM continues to anticipate requirements and coordinates in advance with federal, state, tribal and local governments to provide timely and effective civil support

NORAD and USNORTHCOM HLD missions unimpeded

USNORTHCOM draws upon forces provided by various services and provides a military headquarters staff capable of monitoring and directing military support operations in areas affected by natural or man made events

Natural and man made disasters

Public is informed and mission partners are assured of NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions, operations and capabilities

Consistent message pull-through in various forums and reporting is accurate and balanced

Congressional committees and State Delegations are informed

Mission partners’ feedback on support and collaboration is positive

USNORTHCOM messages are consistent with Primary Agency

Figure C-3. Communication Strategy Guidance Template Format Example for Simultaneous Operations
Appendix C

Commander's Handbook for SC and Communication Strategy (Ver. 3.0)

Figure C-4. Communication Strategy Guidance Template Format Example for NY Earthquake

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>GOALS</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop a comprehensive strategy for communication in response to disasters.</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM prioritizes communication efforts to support public safety and disaster response.</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM collaborates with State &amp; Federal partners to provide timely and accurate information.</td>
<td>Provides timely updates and guidance to emergency responders.</td>
<td>Reduces confusion and improves public trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance coordination and integration with other agencies.</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM supports the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster response.</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM has a dedicated team to coordinate with other agencies.</td>
<td>Facilitates seamless communication across multiple agencies.</td>
<td>Improves efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MESSAGES | DEEDS | PERFORMANCE INDICATORS | | |
|-----------|-------|------------------------| | |
| While Homeland Security is the primary priority, other Federal Agencies as part of the National Response Framework (NRF) also play a crucial role. | Support and enhance the capabilities of the NRF partners. | KeyWINDOW events occur if USNORTHCOM is prepared to respond to a disaster. | | |
| USNORTHCOM supports other Federal Agencies in their response to disasters. | USNORTHCOM anticipates needs and coordinates in advance with Federal, State, local, and tribal governments. | Greater Congressional understanding of USNORTHCOM’s role in disaster response. | | |
| USNORTHCOM supports civil authorities when requested. | |Positive feedback relating to USNORTHCOM’s role in disaster response. | | |
## COMMUNICATION STRATEGY SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Tasking Order Cycle or Date</th>
<th>Psychological Operations</th>
<th>Public Affairs</th>
<th>Civil-Military Affairs</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>AA or Day 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commando</td>
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<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Camera</td>
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<td>Conference</td>
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<td>Release</td>
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<td>Interview</td>
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<td>AB or Day 2</td>
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<td>AG or Day 3</td>
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**Figure D-1. Communication Strategy Synchronization Matrix Example**

Note: In operations that publish a supporting ATO, daily synchronization matrices typically utilize the daily ATO designation.
## COMMUNICATION STRATEGY PLAN EXECUTION MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Effects</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Measures of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Accurate understanding of international community’s efforts in host nation (HN)</td>
<td>• Multiple actors means multiple voices</td>
<td>• Message coordination within USG, with coalition, main HQ, HN Government</td>
<td>• Create and update quarterly a Master Narrative, synchronized with coalition’s Master narrative and HN Government messages to provide high-level messaging to all levels of command</td>
<td>P A</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>• Greater clarity on Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Comprehensive understanding of progress country-wide</td>
<td>• Coalition is a consensus-driven body made up of sovereign governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>• Greater understanding of progress and increased appreciation of HN’s strategic importance to international security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Comprehensive understanding of long-term challenges</td>
<td>• Media attention tends to be drawn to kinetic operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recognition of the strategic importance of HN to international security</td>
<td>• Difficult to develop a consensus strategic response to crisis events in such a fast-paced media environment</td>
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<td>State</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Extremely complex modern media environment</td>
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<td>Coalition MDC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop, coordinate, disseminate, and regularly update talking points and supporting materials/fact sheets on key issues related to HN</td>
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<td>P A</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Quarterly update of Audience Analyses to reflect current attitudes, prioritized list of methods by which audiences receive messaging (e.g., TV, traditional communications, etc.) and assessment of shifts in attitudes</td>
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<td>USD(P)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Regular operational coordination to deconflict and synchronize messages and activities</td>
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<td>J OWC</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>SOCOM</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure D-2. Communication Strategy Plan Execution Matrix**
APPENDIX E
FORMAT AND GUIDANCE FOR ANNEX Y TO AN OPERATION PLAN

ANNEX Y
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

References: List additional documents essential to this annex

1. Situation
   a. General
      (1) USG guidance. Provide summary of USG objectives and guidance relevant to the area of operations that effect the communication environment.

      (2) Strategic Communication Overview. Provide the strategic communication overview of the environment, outlining the overall objective of executing the strategic communication process through coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating the supporting communication capabilities.

      (3) Country/Regional Perspective. Provide an overview to the country or region’s perspective to the operation outlined in the Base Plan and as described through the strategic communication overview. Address primary strategic communication assets within the country or region that have the ability to execute strategic communication initiatives or strategies.

   b. Enemy. Adversary or Competitor Perspective. Identify primary opposing perspectives in the area of responsibility that will compete against US strategic communication efforts. Categorize the perspectives in descriptive subparagraphs as either an “obstacle” or a “constraint” to implementation of the strategic communication objective. Perspectives listed should not normally repeat supporting communication capabilities but the significant obstacle or constraint requiring coordination, synchronization, or integration through the strategic communication process.

      (1) Opposing Audiences. IO audiences/key decision makers and support activities who contribute to the establishment of obstacles and constraints through their influence of planning guidance, key policy decisions, and operational execution of their strategy. These key decision makers direct the development or allocation of resources to execute course of action that may be contrary to US and command strategic communication objectives. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment; identify their susceptibility to strategic communication messages and actions.

      (2) Information Systems. Identify primary information and collection systems that support opposing decision makers and their staffs. Summarize intelligence capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite references for detail.
Appendix E

c. Friendly

d. Assumptions. Address the overall assumptions necessary to execute the strategic communication process and list specific assumptions necessary for particular supporting communication capabilities in the respective annexes.

e. Lines of Operation. Identify the significant expectations to be coordinated, synchronized, and/or integrated to identify primary responsibilities and mission expectations of the various supporting communication capabilities.

(1) Friendly

(2) Neutral

(3) Adversary


3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Overview. State the Base Plan commander’s intent for strategic communication. Discuss the goal(s) of the strategic communication process and provide emphasis on how it contributes to the end-state of the Base Plan. Conceptually explain how combatant commands produce effects that contribute to the accomplishment of national objectives for the area of operations (AOR).

(2) Specific Guidance. Provide guidance for the various supporting communication capabilities, through subordinate command elements, to ensure coordinated execution of strategic communication objectives. (See Strategic Communication Planning Matrix at Tab A).

(a) Identify the strategic communication goal(s) to achieve the commander’s intent.

(b) Discuss the strategic communication themes, subsequent messages, and desired end state to achieve the strategic communication objective(s) throughout the AOR (Annex Y Appendix 1).

(c) Provide guidance on target audiences who are instrumental in achieving the strategic communication objective(s). Associate themes and subsequent messages to each identified audience. Generally associate performance expectations to provide guidance to the various communication capabilities in developing associated action (Annex Y Appendix 1).

(d) Address themes, subsequent messages, and actions to be avoided because of their potential to produce unintended consequences or harmful attitudes and behavior (Annex Y Appendix 2).
(e) Describe primary adversarial themes and messages directed at friendly audiences in the operational area that oppose US and combatant command strategic communication objectives. Strategic communication objectives should provide guidance for countering or minimizing affect of adversary operations (Annex Y Appendix 1 and Annex Y Appendix 2).

(3) **Relationship to Information Operations (IO) and Public Affairs (PA).** Cross-reference and demonstrate relationships between the effects, audiences, messages, and activities in various enclosures to the Basic Plan. This will include Annex C (Operations), Appendix 3 to Annex (IO), Annex F (PA) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination). Discuss the sequencing of messages and activities and refer to Tab A.

(4) **Measures of Performance (MOP).** Provide expectation as to methods expected for measuring performance, such as intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback; how will strategic communication requirements be assessed. Include measurement expectations to ensure the implementation of a selected MOP, by the supporting communication capability, confirms the delivery of the message, to the targeted audience, with the desired end state.

(5) **Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).** The primary measure of effectiveness in the communication environment is a change in behavior of the identified target audience that supports an objective. Measure of effectiveness, the result of an implemented “measure of performance,” may be a less stringent opposition to a democratic initiatives and/or an increased willingness to adapt improved humanitarian proposals. Such MOE must have established MOP and may require specialized reporting.

b. **Tasks.** Outline the tasks to be completed and divided into separate subparagraphs by supported and supporting commands and agencies. Each task should be a concise statement encompassing all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform. Assign responsibilities based on capabilities to reach the intended audience(s). Ensure that tasks clearly assign responsibilities, consider Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) and visual information, address interagency coordination, and provide for guidance on MOE and MOP.

(1) Public Affairs  
(2) Information Operations  
(3) Civil Affairs  
(4) Military Diplomacy  
(5) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy  
(6) Visual Information (Combat Camera)  
(7) Subordinate Commands  
(8) Supporting Combatant Commands
Appendix E

(9) **Specified Coordination with Higher Headquarters**

(a) Non-DOD agencies

(b) OSD/Joint Staff and defense support agencies

(10) **Other — Senior Leader Engagements**

c. **Coordinating Instructions.** List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of strategic communication execution and deployments. Also explain other operational terms required to lend clarity to the implementation of strategic communication throughout the AOR but are not defined in Joint Staff publications.

4. **Administrative and Logistics.** Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to strategic communication not covered in the Base Plan or another annex thereof.

5. **Command and Control.** Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the Base Plan or Annex K.

[Note: Discuss the role of the command’s strategic communication “governing body” by explaining the chain of responsibility through each higher command, and the processes and procedures regulating its interaction with the DOD Strategic Communication Integration Group.]
### PUBLIC AFFAIRS ENGAGEMENT MATRIX EXAMPLE

**Austere Challenge PAO Engagement Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Primary Message</th>
<th>Medium (Delivery Vehicle)</th>
<th>Key Audiences</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Specific Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 MAY C-162 UPDATE (Sorted by Time)</td>
<td>BECUTT Messages:</td>
<td>All Media Circs</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Media Embolden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition appealing for assistance from Blue and working with Blue background</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM高效国际</td>
<td>Press Conference Joint Information Bureau USA</td>
<td>International Community, Red, Blue</td>
<td>Support coalition cohesion &amp; support of audiences</td>
<td>Show we are invited guests of the Republic of Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition began to liberate Blue</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM, LDC-M (Blue)</td>
<td>USA Today</td>
<td>International Community, Red, Blue</td>
<td>Deliver C-162 Emphasis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition actions responding to Blue request for assistance and working to re-establish Blue forces</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM, Blue Today</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>International Community, Red, Blue</td>
<td>Media Embolden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition actions not in accordance with Blue</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM, Blue Today</td>
<td>Embed Media (MNN, LPI)</td>
<td>International Community, Support Blue</td>
<td>Develop Blue &amp; Red aggression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition efforts to minimize collateral damage</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM, Blue Today</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>International Community, Support Blue</td>
<td>Media Embolden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelming coalition power and taking decisive action to stop Red aggression</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM, Blue Today</td>
<td>Press Conference Joint Information Bureau USA</td>
<td>International Community, Blue, Red</td>
<td>Highlight different elements of the Coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelming coalition power and taking decisive action to stop Red aggression</td>
<td>C-MAY 162, EURCOM, Blue Today</td>
<td>Embed Media (MNN, LPI)</td>
<td>International Community, Blue, Red</td>
<td>Overwhelming Emphasis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure F-1. Public Affairs Engagement Matrix Example**
This appendix provides a series of questions that can be used to assist CS planning and assessment.

1. Information Gathering

   a. General

      (1) Who are the stakeholders other than partners?

      (2) How does the joint force model, simulate, and anticipate human behavior (individual and group) and response?

      (3) How does the joint force detect, analyze, and respond to incoming messages?

      (4) How do the joint force and partners make sure that information is flowing freely?

      (5) How does the joint force build an integrated and synchronized CS approach?

      (6) How does the JFC decentralize CS at each level within parameters established by higher authority?

      (7) How does the joint force anticipate direct and indirect effects (outcomes) of messages on intended audiences?

      (8) How does the joint force evaluate products from processes and technologies (polling, focus groups, modeling and simulation)?

   b. Means

      (1) How does the joint force selectively access, obstruct, override, or exploit communications channels?

      (2) What CS-related capabilities are available for this operation or already operate in the AO?

         (a) Joint force

         (b) Interagency

         (c) Coalition

         (d) Other partners
Appendix G

(e) Adversary

(f) Others

(3) What methods of communication will be effective in reaching audiences in denied areas?

(4) How does the joint force identify the right CS conduits and then access those conduits?

(5) What are the media support requirements for unilateral and embedded reporters?

(6) What methods will be effective to gain and maintain contact/access to key audiences?

(7) How are the joint force and partners connected to the external environment?

(8) How are the joint force and partners influencing the environment, the larger external systems?

(9) What CS-related capabilities are the joint force and partners creating for the near future?

c. Relationships

(1) Which interagency, foreign partner or stakeholders have long-standing and favorable relationships with the joint force and joint force commander?

(2) Who may become stakeholders and partners later on, how, and why?

(3) How does the JFC nurture relationships with potential stakeholders and partners in a deliberate manner and in a pending/actual crisis?

(4) How does the joint force seek/choose partners for the CS-related effort?

(5) How does the joint force assist each partner?

(6) How do the joint force and partners learn to trust each other more?

(7) How does the joint force build partnership capacity and relationships in the long term (build a reservoir of goodwill)?

(8) What is the appropriate joint force relationship with competitors, potential adversaries, or adversaries?

(9) What are the appropriate command, control, coordination, consultation, and support relationships within/beyond the coalition in order to achieve effective CS results?
Communication Strategy Planning Considerations

(10) How does the joint force connect with those who are critical to the success of the CS-related work (e.g., states, non-state entities, populations, private industry, and academia)?

d. Audience

(1) Who are the principle CS audiences affecting mission success?

(2) What is the audience(s) status?
   
   (a) Ally
   
   (b) Coalition member
   
   (c) Friend
   
   (d) Competitor
   
   (e) Neutral
   
   (f) Adversary
   
   (g) State
   
   (h) Non-state entity
   
   (i) Domestic

(3) What are the partners’, stakeholders’ and selected audiences’ interests, motivations, fears, biases, and attitudes?

(4) How does the selected audience acquire, process information and make decisions?

(5) How does the joint force segment key audiences (e.g., opinion makers, shadow audiences, those most vulnerable, and adversaries)?

(6) How does the joint force determine which audience segments affect the desired end state most?

e. Networks

(1) What are the audiences’ critical networks (formal and informal)?

(2) How does the joint force identify and analyze potential communication media and channels?

(3) How does the joint force identify physical and social communication networks?
Appendix G

(4) Does the joint force and partners understand the competitors, adversary, and their operating environment?

(5) Whom does the competitor or adversary have in its support network?

definition text

f. Language/Culture

(1) How does the joint force identify and gain access to qualified personnel who can provide cultural awareness, language, and alternative skills not sufficiently available in the joint force?

(2) What languages do the joint force and partners need for effective communication?

(3) How does the joint force acquire local and regional cultural/language expertise to join the team?

(4) How does the joint force form analytical communities of interest (cultural anthropologists, linguists, local academics, sociologists, economists, religious experts, etc.) to assist in CS-related activities via reach-back?

g. Collection

(1) How does the joint force persistently collect, analyze, disseminate, and access all-source external information, adversary CS efforts, and capabilities?

(2) How does the joint force gain and exploit CS-related intelligence derived from the physical domains, information environment, and cognitive dimension?

(3) How does the joint force incorporate information that supports CS into the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment?

(4) How does the joint force collect in-depth information on the perceptions, attitudes, motivations, etc. of a variety of audiences with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds?

(5) How does the joint force determine and understand adversarial CS interests, objectives, capabilities, methods, etc?

(6) How does the joint force identify and analyze who else (other than the adversary) is communicating with designated audiences – what they are communicating, why, intent, methods, capabilities, etc?

(7) How does the joint force reorient intelligence capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate human terrain information (attitudes, perceptions, culture, etc.)?

(8) What are the needs of the joint force and partners for additional intelligence, information, and insight?
Communication Strategy Planning Considerations

(9) What security classification issues affect the sharing as well as protection of intelligence and information?

(10) Do all partners know how to use and act on the intelligence and information once collected and shared?

(11) Can all partners actually read the intelligence, information, and appropriately secure it?

(12) Are the intelligence and information available in a timely way?

(13) How does the joint force identify other entities that have interests in the AOR, their goals, objectives, level of influence with key audiences, capabilities, and current activities?

(14) Whose CS-related work does the joint force know about that can be exploited?

(15) Who are the key leaders, subject matter experts, most credible sources and why?

h. Development

(1) How does the joint force conceive and coordinate physical actions to influence selected audiences?

(2) How does the joint force design, produce, and disseminate effective content for each distinct audience in a timely manner?

(3) How do joint force and partners conceive, produce, coordinate, and synchronize messages (physical and informational) across the various CS-related capabilities?

i. Assessment

(1) How does the joint force estimate the direct and indirect effects (outcomes) of potential signals on the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and actions of selected audiences?

(2) Is there sufficient feedback among the partners in the system?

(3) How does the joint force and partners know that the selected audience is listening and attentive?

(4) How does the joint force identify and analyze potential unintended effects (outcomes) on primary, secondary, and tertiary audiences?

(5) How does the joint force develop CS-related measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) to ensure they are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced?
Appendix G

j. Restraints

(1) What are the constraints, restraints, and barriers that affect CS?

(2) What are the CS-related issues affecting the joint force from outside the system (e.g., historical ties, religious underpinnings, US domestic opinion, Congressional oversight, US election cycle, media attention, international attitudes, etc)?

(3) What are the joint force CS-related rules of engagement and interaction?

(4) How much will CS-related activities cost?

(5) What are the US Government SC-related statutes, policies, regulations relating to the joint force and partners?

(6) What legal restrictions affect the CS effort?

(7) What are the joint force internal barriers to CS efforts?

(8) How does the joint force reduce or eliminate internal barriers?

k. Risk

(1) What are the relevant risks and mitigations means associated with the CS-related activities?

(2) How can the joint force and partners become deliberate targets of either competitor or adversary CS activity?

l. Information

(1) How will the joint force document joint force actions and disseminate this information in real or near-real time as required?

(2) Who needs to know about the joint force CS-related work?

2. Planning

a. General

(1) What is the end state?

(2) What are the facts and assumptions that affect joint force CS-related activities?

(3) What are the CS-related operational limitations?

(4) What is the commander’s guidance and intent concerning CS?
Communication Strategy Planning Considerations

(5) What is the JFC’s vision and CS philosophy?

(6) What are primary objectives that CS can affect for the USG, joint force, and partners?

(7) What are the short, medium, and long-term objectives that CS must address?

(8) What are the identifiable centers of gravity (partners, neutrals, competitors, adversaries, others, and ours), that CS can affect?

(9) How does the joint force determine CS implications of CCIRs?

(10) What measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) will the joint force and partners use, are they responsive and sufficiently resourced?

(11) How does the JFC maintain the perception of keeping his word in this dynamic, complex, chaotic environment?

(12) How does the joint force integrate all actions to maximize desired effects (outcomes) on selected audiences?

(13) How does the JFC coordinate with USG Agencies and other organizations?

(14) What joint force abilities/values need to be emphasized or de-emphasized?

(15) What joint force behavior needs to change?

(16) What audience(s) behavior(s) needs to change?

(17) How do key partners organize for CS-related work?

(18) How does the joint force develop and sustain a proactive and responsive multi-media CS capability?

(19) How does the joint force perform and integrate CS in a comprehensive process in order to seize and maintain the initiative?

(20) How does the joint force predict, anticipate, or realize strategic implications of tactical and individual actions?

(21) How does the joint force plan and execute CS with various USG Agencies, organizations, and partners?

(22) How does the joint force create, modify, and coordinate command, control, supported/supporting relationships, and CS actions across various USG Agencies, partners, and other organizations?
Appendix G

(23) How does the joint force manage a highly decentralized communication effort?

(24) How does the process verify the right message content, audience, timing, tempo, and delivery vehicle?

(25) How does the joint force rapidly exploit CS opportunities at each level of command?

(26) What is the joint force’s desired reputation as observed by selected audiences?

(27) How does the joint force synchronize actions with messages?

(28) How does the joint force coordinate to preclude miscues and misunderstandings?

(29) How does CS assist the joint force recover from mistakes?

(30) How is the joint force going to deal with deliberate deviations from established principles and standards?

(31) How does the joint force synchronize lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts?

b. Relationships

(1) How can we leverage joint force history, partners, and stakeholder past relationships / histories?

(2) Do the joint force and key partners agree on the Strategic Communication problems/challenges that exist at the theater-strategic and operational levels?

(3) What are the current roles and responsibilities of partners and stakeholders?

(4) How does the joint force assimilate new partners in its CS-related activities?

c. Restraints

(1) What are the USG and other partners’ policies that affect the CS problems / challenges and solution?

(2) How does the joint force anticipate and preempt competitor or adversarial CS actions?

d. Means

(1) How does the joint force identify and engage evolving New Media?
Communication Strategy Planning Considerations

(2) How does the joint force reach back or consult across various USG Agencies, organizations, and partners?

e. Assessment

(1) How will the joint force and partners get feedback and adapt to the changing environment and nature of the CS-related work?

(2) How does the joint force conduct assessment of CS-related activities?

(3) Are the MOEs and MOPs relevant, measurable, responsive, and adequately resourced?

(4) Are progress measurement resources synchronized and processes in place to utilize and share the information?

(5) How does the joint force establish causality?

f. Risk

(1) How is the joint force going to deal with bad news?

(2) How does the joint force pre-test signals to evaluate effectiveness prior to sending?

g. Themes, Messages, Images, and Actions

(1) What are the key strategic and operational themes?

(2) What are the main messages to support each theme?

(3) What are the primary images to support each message?

(4) What issues are at risk of opening the “say-do” gap for internal stakeholders?

(5) What issues are at risk of widening the “say-do” gap for external stakeholders?

(6) What mitigation measures are appropriate?

(7) Which media choices and sources are best suited as vehicles for each message?

3. Plan Review

a. Are CS MOP and MOE relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced?

b. How will the JFC conduct a continuous engagement program with selected key audiences?
c. How will the joint force conduct culturally reliable translation? Will this be sufficient to meet demand?

d. How will the joint force train personnel to a working proficiency in important languages?

e. How will the joint force exploit unplanned physical and virtual CS engagement opportunities?

f. What audience behaviors are the joint force and partners planning to reinforce?

g. What audience behaviors are the joint force and partners planning to change or eliminate?

h. How will the joint force and partners create necessary feedback loops?

i. How will the joint force and partners ensure all parties are listening to each other?

j. What delivery vehicles does the plan use to access desired media or other venues for reaching the selected audience?

4. Execution

a. What must the joint force do more, less, stop, or start doing in its CS work?

b. What are the joint force and partners learning from CS-related activities?

c. Do the joint force and partners really understand what is happening?

d. How does the joint force monitor, measure, and assess the effects (outcomes) of friendly messages on intended and unintended audiences in relation to desired outcomes?

e. What unanticipated CS-related questions and challenges are now surfacing?

f. Are the joint force and partners continuing the same planned CS cycle or performing a completely new assessment and planning effort based on new realities on the ground?

g. Does the joint force and partners need to narrow or broaden the scope of CS work?

h. Is there a particular issue that needs more CS attention or focus of effort?

i. What new information has surfaced that should cause a re-evaluation of the plan?

j. Who else needs to be involved now in the CS effort?

k. What new opportunities are developing for the joint force and partners?
1. What joint force or partner organizational changes could improve conduct of CS-related activities?

m. What is the truth on key issues from the primary audience perspective?

n. What is the truth on key issues from the adversary perspective?
APPENDIX H
COMMUNICATION STRATEGY VIGNETTE

This hypothetical vignette illustrates key points and provides examples of CS-related processes and products. It is not specific enough to cover every potential process step and product, but it should provide the reader with a clear idea of typical CS interactions and activities. Appendix O provides a detailed discussion of the CS focused engagement process.

The situation in this vignette requires crisis-action planning in anticipation of very near-term commitment of forces in a combatant command’s area of responsibility (AOR). The vignette progresses briefly into execution to address issues that are better exemplified there. The cycle of focused engagement during execution is detailed in Appendix O.

BACKGROUND

In a fictional combatant command’s (USXCOM) AOR, tensions over a border dispute between Country Red (Red) and Country Gray (Gray) have recently escalated. Although not an ally, Gray maintains a favorable US relationship, including economic trade and military-to-military contacts. Gray is a primary supplier of certain minerals important to the production of US military satellite systems. Gray is also strategically located adjacent to Country Green (Green), a US ally that controls a key seaport important both for military purposes and as a significant hub on ocean trade routes. Gray and Green have limited military capability.

Historically, Red has been less than friendly toward the US, although Red and the US maintain embassies and economic trade. The US is the primary supplier of essential machinery components used by Red’s manufacturing industry. However, a recent coup by Red’s military leader deposed the former Red President, who fled the country with his key advisors. US-Red relations have deteriorated during the past six months. During the last three months in particular, Red has sponsored anti-US demonstrations and has possibly supported terrorist acts against US and pro-Western facilities in the AOR. Intelligence sources indicate that the Red junta is seeking an alliance with certain competitor countries in an attempt to degrade US influence and freedom of action in the AOR. Indications of Red low-level infiltration of insurgent elements into Gray have been sporadic, but sources believe it has been underway for the last six months. Intelligence analysts believe that Red’s unstated strategic objective is control of Green and its seaport and that a Red attack is likely. The combatant commander (CCDR) of USXCOM (CDRUSXCOM) has advised the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) that indicators suggest Red can position sufficient capability in three weeks to attack successfully into Gray.

The President of Green has expressed concern over the deteriorating situation to the US President through diplomatic channels, and the Prime Minister of Gray has requested US military assistance. The US President has decided to assist, and tentatively agrees to deploy military capability to the region.
The US President convenes the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss options for responding to Red’s anticipated attack against Gray. CDRUSXCOM monitors by secure video teleconferencing. After lengthy discussion, the President provides guidance, including the following US strategic objectives:

1. Maintain the sovereignty of countries Gray and Green and reestablish conditions for a secure and stable region.

2. Defend Gray and Green from Red attack and defeat or eject Red forces from Gray.

3. Degrade Red’s offensive military capabilities and minimize the Red threat to other countries in the region.

4. Identify and degrade terrorist capabilities in Red and elsewhere in the region.

5. Seek opportunities to strengthen regional nations’ ability to defend themselves from future aggression by Red.

Shortly after the NSC meeting, the President issues an official statement that outlines the national strategic objectives for the current crisis. Concurrently, CDRUSXCOM consults with the SecDef, the Secretary of State (SECSTATE), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discuss the President’s objectives and guidance within the context of the AOR, global US objectives, narrative, and strategic communication themes. This discussion will help CDRUSXCOM focus the command’s planning effort to achieve a desired military end state consistent with the President’s strategic objectives for the impending crisis. SECSTATE verifies that the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will be the DOS lead for post-conflict planning and operations.

CDRUSXCOM notifies the XCOM J-5 and J-3 to lead the staff effort to conduct an analysis of the operational environment (JIPOE) and begin planning efforts to modify applicable portions of XCOM OPLAN 6153, which describes options for responding to three potential contingencies in the Red-Gray-Green region of XCOM’s AOR. Particular emphasis for the review is to ensure the plans reflect the guidance CDRUSXCOM just received from SecDef. The option that most closely matches the current circumstances requires responding with a JTF, formed around the headquarters of XCOM’s Army component. CDRUSXCOM notifies the Army component commander to begin planning accordingly and to have the JTF headquarters operational within 5 days of the “Prepare
to Deploy” order. The XCOM J-3 issues a commander-authorized planning order to OPLAN 6153 affected supporting and subordinate commands.

CS Director and small staff initiate a meeting of the CSWG to conduct plan review, focusing on CS-related issues, updating audience/node analysis, points of entry, assessment measures, Annex Y, and identification of strategic themes.

29 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-29)

Red and transnational terrorist organizations understand the importance of information and use it to influence both US and international opinions. “Las Jihadistas,” an anti-US terrorist organization in the region, issues a statement that calls for all regional terrorist organizations to unite against the impending American aggression against Red and occupation of Gray. To gain advantage in the war of ideas, the statement cites anticipated US strategic and operational movement and objectives as evidence of continuing US “imperialistic” intentions.

In separate events, an Islamic Extremist gunman killed eight students, most aged 15 and 16, and wounded ten others at a theological school in Green. Local police shot and killed the gunman, identified as Ala Abu Dhaim, a 25 year-old from Gray. These activities reinforce the terrorist organizations’ political and ideological position through escalated violence, support the theme that “the government cannot provide adequate security,” and represent continuing resistance against US “imperialistic” intentions.

In response to the terrorist events in the USXCOM AOR, the Interagency Crisis Communication Team (ICCT) initiates an interagency conference call to discuss the issue and coordinate a response. The GSEC captures the resulting coordination points, develops a response message, and relays appropriate official statements to cabinet secretaries, ambassadors and the military chain of command through the RRU at DOS. The GSEC also recommends the following CS-related actions to the SECSTATE:

1. The President and SECSTATE should issue official statements within 24 hours that condemn the massacre and outline US strategic objectives.

2. State Department and White House should raise the subject at their regular briefings.

3. The President should approve the following CS themes for the current crisis:
   a. As requested by the Government of Gray, the United States is ready to assist Gray in preserving the peace and is prepared to move forces to the region.
Appendix H

b. Gray continues to be a leader for stability in the region, and its record of helping its neighbors is unmatched.

c. Red’s recent actions benefit no one in the region; we call on its leaders to restore a democratically elected government, cease provoking tensions in the region, and end their support of terrorist factions.

d. We encourage all nations to support efforts to preserve security and stability in the region.

The DOS GSEC continues to consider and recommend appropriate counters to the Las Jihadistas statement and related future events.

In coordination with the State Department, the USXCOM staff identifies opportunities for their leadership to publically address the situation providing supporting “non-lethal fires” for what is being done at the seat of government. Additionally, they analyze anti-US and insurgent statements, US responses, and regional events with respect to adjusting combatant command CS-related activities during planning for the impending operation. Immediate action activities include PA developing a media engagement plan, scheduling Key Leader Engagement activities, and PSYOP conducts analysis to determine potential methods/products to influence Red key stakeholders and increase the legitimacy of the government of Gray.

28 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-28)

After assessing the terrorist statements and Red-sponsored events from the previous day, the US Ambassador to Red contributes to the US SC planning effort by sending a diplomatic cable to SECSTATE (with a copy to CDRUSXCOM) that provides an assessment of the situation in the region. The cable states that Red’s leader apparently believes the US will not intervene militarily due to the deployment challenge and other US commitments around the world. The cable also includes the Ambassador’s view of the current situation, Red’s primary contributors to the crisis, Red’s key media messages and their potential regional impact, and uncertainties among Red decision-makers.

27 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-27)

Intelligence sources continue to provide information on Red leadership’s activities and support of the growing insurgency in Gray. Red disinformation products attempt to establish a number of themes to convince audiences that "the Gray military will refuse to fight," "Gray’s economy is collapsing," and "the US lacks commitment to support Gray militarily." In response, the US Ambassador to Gray conducts several public events with the host nation leadership and the media to demonstrate US resolve to support Gray. The Gray leaders use these and other opportunities to counter Red’s efforts to undermine the Gray government.

The DOS RRU issues daily summaries of senior leader statements and coverage of the situation, including the events being conducted in Gray. These statements are a good source of approved CS material that USXCOM planners can use to develop CS-related products, activities, and provide CS inputs to course of action development.
Communication Strategy Vignette

DOS GSEC issues themes that provide a communication framework for highlighting the threat posed by religious extremists. CS professionals use these themes to develop op-ed pieces and speeches, talk with the public, and frame discussions on religious extremism with media professionals, politicians, and opinion-makers.

OIC Condemns Seminary Attack

The Islamic world’s largest political bloc, the 57-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), condemned the killing of eight teenagers in a seminary, saying it was “against any act of violence and terror anywhere in the world,” according to a statement released on its website on January 12.

OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu urged all parties “to act with calm and restraint in the face of this tragic event,” saying that “this vicious cycle of killing must be stopped.”

Ihsanoglu expressed his hope that the OIC condemnation would “open up the eyes of those who remained silent during the violence directed against innocent civilians, including children.”

Example GSEC Product

The USXCOM J-3/5 staffs begin consultation with the US Embassy Defense Attaché (DATT) and country team. Communication professionals from DOS, ASD (PA), DASD (JC), USXCOM, the Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE), and the embassies conduct ongoing informal coordination via VTC.

26 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-26)

The CS Director reviews the theater campaign plan to ensure military engagement has been focused on strengthening relations with various military and political leaders in the region. He recommends that USXCOM participate in numerous regional security conferences, some of which also include Red and Gray.

CDRUSXCOM provides additional CS-related planning guidance to the staff (picture on next page), such as “ensure we are not solely focused on getting our message out, we have to listen as well. Analyze what they are saying, why, what is the intended message, find common areas of understanding, and take advantage of every opportunity for dialogue.”

The USXCOM CSWG convenes, consolidates and disseminates information, determines CS-related tasks, and coordinates activities. Working group members include the following representatives: J-55, J-35, PA, IO, PSYOP, Service/functional components, subordinate commands, CMO, political advisor (POLAD), US Country Team rep, USAID, KLE cell and J-2. Other representatives are brought in as needed, such as the J-33, combat camera, staff judge advocate, chaplain, lethal fires (joint fires element), IA, OFDA, NGOs, HN, UN Mil rep, and others. The CSWG discusses the following information:
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1. Vetted senior leader statements, research, analysis, and other products from DOS INFOCENTRAL web site

2. Briefing on draft White House document sent from the NSC to OSD on the following USG desired strategic outcomes:
   a. Regional audiences support US intervention
   b. Cessation of Red hostilities
   c. Red stops support for terrorism
   d. Red stops support for insurgency in Gray
   e. Gray sovereign territorial integrity maintained/restored
   f. Red becomes responsible international partner by:
      1. Increased transparency
      2. Improved human rights
      3. Reduced belligerence to neighbors

3. The approved CS themes for the current crisis:
   a. As requested by the Government of Gray, the US is ready to assist Gray in preserving the peace and is prepared to move forces to the region.
   b. Gray continues to be a leader for stability in the region, and its record of helping its neighbors is unmatched.
   c. Red’s recent actions benefit no one in the region; we call on its leaders to restore a democratically elected government, cease provoking tensions in the region, and end their support of terrorist factions.
Communication Strategy Vignette

d. We encourage all nations to support efforts to preserve security and stability in the region.

4. Review of pre-existing country plan in support of ongoing theater campaign activities with Green and Gray.

5. Review of policy documents and the end state contained in the CCDR’s guidance.

6. Review of draft theater-strategic objectives from the CCDR’s guidance.

7. Review of draft desired effects (outcomes) from the CCDR’s guidance.

8. Review of key coordination points from the DATT and country teams.

9. Tasks to CSWG members:
   a. USXCOM CSWG request direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) to coordinate with JS, DASD(JC), IA, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
   b. POLAD determines USAID position on situation via the country team.
   c. J2 and assessment cell representatives determine:
      (1) Key issues the JTF needs to understand.
      (2) What are the leading indicators of those issues?
      (3) How will the J2/assessment cell collect on those issues?
      (4) Identify Key Audiences and their segmentation (culture, politics, ideals, religion)
      (5) Significant points of resonance
   d. Staff WGs and functional components (IOWG, CMOWG, PA, IO, PSYOP, etc) develop functional inputs to include messages, intended audiences, delivery vehicles, audience nominations, and actions for submission to CSWG. Staff working groups then convene to complete CS-related tasks assigned from the CSWG.

25 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-25)

The CJCS issues a WARNORD defining the objectives, desired effects, anticipated mission, pertinent constraints, command relationships, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning, and strategic lift allocations. The CJCS directs submission of the Commander’s Estimate in five days.

The CSWG reconvenes to consolidate and review proposed functional inputs, consolidate key audience segmentation/resonance information, examine CS lines...
Appendix H

of operations (LOOs), and outline the way ahead. Theater-strategic CSWG products identify the following:

1. Obstacles:
   a. Understanding Red’s view of end state
   b. Red internal politics/challenges
   c. International support of Red
   d. Red pursuit of competing international strategy
   e. Red support of growing insurgency in Gray

2. Primary audiences to engage:
   a. Red government and military
   b. US and international media
   c. Partner nations
   d. Audiences in the AOR
   e. Green government, military, and public
   f. Gray government, military, and public
   g. US military
   h. Insurgent elements

3. CS lines of operation:
   a. Key leader engagement
   b. Military support to public diplomacy
   c. Information operations
   d. Messages sent by maneuver and fires
   e. Public Affairs
   f. Counterinsurgency
   g. Civil-Military Operations

24 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-24)

The CSWG reviews, consolidates, coordinates, and approves:

1. Key Themes:
   a. As requested by the Government of Gray, the United States is ready to assist Gray in preserving the peace and is prepared to move forces to the region.
   b. Gray continues to be a leader for stability in the region, and its record of helping its neighbors is unmatched.
   c. Red’s recent actions benefit no one in the region; we call on its leaders to restore a democratically elected government, cease provoking tensions in the region, and end their support of terrorist factions.
d. We encourage all nations to support efforts to preserve security and stability in the region.

2. Messages:
   a. US forces are moving into the theater to help preserve regional security and stability.
   b. Red stop aggression; coalition military forces will commit and win.
   c. Gray and the international community welcome peaceful relations with Red.
   d. Preserving regional stability benefits everyone.
   e. Red can be responsible partner in international system and family of nations.
   f. Lack of Red transparency contributes to uncertainty.
   g. International relations with Red can improve through a peaceful resolution.
   h. Red support of insurgency is destabilizing the region.

The CSWG designates Assessment Cell as lead for assessing regional/ international perceptions of US activities for the following focus areas:

1. Coalition, Red, Gray, Regional (non-aligned), neutral perception of Red/Gray/US activity
2. Political positions of key stakeholders
3. US perception of Red/Gray activity
   a. US press reporting
   b. US reactions
4. Red perception of military activity (coalition and Red)
   a. Red press reporting
   b. Red reactions
5. Gray perception of military activity (coalition and Red)
   a. Gray press reporting
   b. Gray reactions
6. Regional perception of military activity (coalition and Red)
   a. Regional press reporting
   b. Regional reactions
Appendix H

23 TO 22 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-23) TO (C-22)

After the USXCOM CSWG develops and consolidates critical CS-related products, they coordinate draft themes, messages, and products with various interagency representatives in the region and OSD. The CSWG and other organizations accomplish a variety of actions during the following three days, to include the following:

1. The CSWG consolidates inputs including the joint engagement prioritized list (JEPL), and provides its input to the CS board for JFC approval and integration into the planning process. The CS board is chaired by the COS with the other directorate heads in attendance and supporting staff work provided by the CS Directorate.

2. To facilitate the approval process, CSWG develops the CS guidance template and execution matrix, then forwards draft (with JFC approval and an OPLAN Annex Y if time permits) to ASD (PA) Plans & Policy division for DOD coordination and approval at the Cabinet level. (Appendices C-E provide examples of CS guidance template format, synchronization and execution matrices, and Annex Y format, respectively) [NOTE: This is a spiral development process. USXCOM CS planners will conduct informal exchanges to coordinate themes, messages and product development with the DASD (JC) / ASD (PA) staff during development and the ASD (PA) staff will conduct similar informal exchanges at their level. Other inputs (senior leader statements, etc.) will drive refinements during further product refinement. Appendix O shows details of the entire process.]

3. ASD (PA) Plans & Policy staffs the template and execution matrix with DOD stakeholders, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) to include its respective desk officers and USD (P) Support for Public Diplomacy, DOD Office of the General Counsel, JS J3/5, and other DOD staffs as needed.
4. The ASD (PA) pursues interagency coordination through the Deputies Committee. [NOTE: Time demands may preclude formal staffing of the SC template and matrix through the IA; they may go directly to the ICCT for review and approval. The spiral development process supports this approach—staffs see draft products and provide input during product development, thereby reducing the staffing process and shaping products earlier in development.]

5. USXCOM CSWG continues development of Annex Y (as needed), refinement of products and JEPL, and development of new products until approval received.

6. KLE Engagement Plan begins development to include leader background, tailored messages, items of interest, and desired outcomes.

7. Themes and messages cards begin development. These are designed for distribution to individuals throughout the force, to facilitate individual understanding of US involvement, the objectives of the operation and their role in it. An example is found in Appendix K.

8. The draft communication strategy continues refinement.

**20 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-20)**

USXCOM submits the commander’s estimate, providing courses of action that include CS-related activities and content. The joint staff reviews the submission and provides recommendations to the CJCS, who approves the recommended COA, authorizes detailed planning, and directs submission of the OPORD for approval in seven days.

**19 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-19)**

USXCOM assessment results and recommended actions briefed to the USXCOM CSWG include the following:

1. Increased military activity will compel nations to re-assess their allegiances and national interests formally. This will generate coalition RFIs to determine stakeholder revised intent, posture, and shifts toward third-party nations or organizations (such as Russia, China, European Union, Organization of American States, etc.) for security.

2. Assessment: Red does not believe US will engage in fight. Action: US must engage all elements of DIME to reverse this belief. Possible additional actions include:
   a. Commerce Department support restrictions on the machinery Red wants
   b. World Bank limitations on financing
   c. Direct diplomatic contact at the Ambassador/SECSTATE level
   d. SecDef contact with the Red Minister of Defense
   e. Execution of flexible deterrent options

3. Assessment: Gray wants US commitment. Action: US can demonstrate commitment by USXCOM commander moving theater assets to more visible posture in support of Gray.
Appendix H

4. Assessment: Regional nations are wary of conflict. Action: US must express to regional countries our commitment to alliances, quick resolution, and return to regional stability.

5. Assessment: US public support is below desired levels. Action: Increase media engagement and public information efforts.

The CSWG develops the following additional messages in support of themes and messages developed on C-25:

1. Red is aggressor and responsible for escalation of tensions.
2. Gray and coalition want regional stability and peace.
3. US committed to allies, friends, and ready to uphold agreements.

28-18 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-28 to C-18)

The USARXCOM staff conducted planning activities during the past ten days, concurrently and in collaboration with USXCOM, per USXCOM planning order to OPLAN 6153. The USARXCOM CS representative was a participant at the USXCOM CSWG and has kept the USARXCOM staff informed on CS issues. CDR USXCOM receives a “Prepare to Deploy” order and tasks his Army Component Commander (USARXCOM) to stand-up the XJTF. USARXCOM requests augmentation of XJTF staff to support XJTF stand-up, to include capability from JPASE, the Joint Military Information Support Team, combat camera, Joint IO Warfare Center, and others.

During the previous ten days, the XJTF COS adjusted the battle rhythm to sequence staff processes and ensure integration of products from the entire staff into planning, execution and assessment (including CS). These battle rhythm events included IOWG, CSWG, and SCB (COS, J-5, PA, IO, DSPD). [Note: Small staffs often consolidate such coordination decisions at a Joint Coordination Board.] The XJTF CSWG convened, reviewed higher HQ guidance and products, and took the following actions:

1. Designated the PA as lead for media briefs and correcting misperceptions.
2. Determined:
   a. Key issues the JTF needs to understand.
   b. What are the leading indicators of those issues?
   c. How will the J2 or assessment cell collect on those issues or requests for information (RFIs)?
3. Designated Assessment Cell as lead for coordinating with USXCOM assessment cell and assessing local and regional perceptions of US activities.
4. Disseminated USXCOM-directed CS themes.
5. Each capability should weave major messages into their products as appropriate, support planning and assessment, and ensure synchronization between words, images, and action.

6. Established CS lines of operation:
   a. Key leader engagement
   b. Military support to public diplomacy
   c. Information operations
   d. Messages sent by maneuver and fires
   e. Public Affairs
   f. Counterinsurgency
   g. Civil-Military Operations

7. Requested DIRLAUTH to coordinate with IA and NGOs. CS-related cells/WGs met to coordinate their activities and consolidated planned activities into a capability-specific synchronization matrix, similar to the IO, CMO, or PA engagement synchronization matrices. For example, The IOWG (IO core, supporting, related capabilities, and components) coordinated products and developed the IO synchronization matrix. (Conflict considerations can be found in Appendix B. Appendix F provides an example of a PA engagement matrix.) The working groups used audio and video teleconference capabilities to coordinate their efforts with non-resident communication representatives from staff, components, and other key players.

   JTF CSWG consolidated CS-related cell/WG inputs for JTF SCB (or JCB) approval of the JTF communication strategy, and drafted a JTF CS synchronization matrix for coordination.

   Individual JTF CS-related capability areas (PA, IO, CMO, PSYOP, KLE, Medical, Chaplain) then developed specific messages, proposed products, and drafted planned actions, such as PA media events, EW targets, CNO targets, PSYOP leaflets, CMO projects, DSPD events, and key leader engagement. These messages and products support JTF mission analysis planning efforts, and themes/messages of higher HQ.

**17 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-17)**

The XJTF CSWG requests considerable systems analysis of both Gray and Red to identify key hubs or influencers in selected audience segments. The J-2 works with IO, PA, and Assessment Cell representatives to outline a collection plan. XCOM also receives assistance in development of a better CS-related understanding of the operational environment by bringing in an anthropologist from Green University, Gray CSWG
Appendix H

and Red marketing experts, linguistics experts, DOS regional representative, USAID representative, and Red, Gray, and Green defense attachés.

16 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-16)

The CDR XJTF approves planning guidance, including CS guidance with themes, messages, imagery acquisition, and actions. He further directs subordinate components to begin planning. CS LNOs on J-35 planning teams ensure inclusion of CS considerations and activities in the planning process. Products include proposed effects to support CS-related objectives, key audience lists, themes, messages, image acquisition requirements, coordinating requirements by phase for Annex Y, press release requirements, key leader engagement plan, CS synchronization matrix, update brief, senior leader engagement portal, country plans, audience nominations, and JEPL.

Product examples of leaflets, posters, and handbills

15 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-15)

XJTF CS planners determined that in this environment, metrics involve not only opinion tracking, but increasingly actions as well, including numbers of calls to telephone tip lines, numbers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) reported, numbers of children in schools, numbers of businesses open, levels of street trade, and internet patterns such as numbers of hits on various pro-government and pro-insurgent web sites.

Indicators and warning show heightened probability of an attack on Gray and the CICS issues an Execute Order, to begin deployment in accordance with the approved plan.
14 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-14)

Collection focuses on attitudes toward the United States, although Red attitudes toward Gray are still tracked. Unsurprisingly, the surveys show a dramatic improvement in the Gray opinion of America, but they also provide valuable information for making improvements. The surveys are cross-referenced to the existing JIPOE and other information mapping efforts. Survey questions are designed to assess the impact of themes and messages being used in the lead-up to operations, to learn which resonate with different audience segments and which do not.

KLE cells at XCOM and XJTF coordinate and review leader lists to ensure all key leaders in the AOR are covered. They update profiles for each leader, and develop a scheduled for engagement, including the requirements for periodic visits to maintain relationship strength. The list is matched with Coalition spheres of influence for appropriate assignment. Critical leaders are assigned to commanding generals at the appropriate levels. Non-critical KLE responsibilities are spread among the coalition leadership, at the appropriate level and sphere of influence, to ensure the impact on individual schedules is not onerous. Profiles and schedules are distributed and synchronized with planned activities for optimum impact. For those pre-execution KLE engagements, post-engagement debriefings are conducted and J-9 human terrain maps are continually updated.

13 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-13)

XJTF does considerable pretesting with ethnic-Red focus groups in other countries. The digital outreach team steps up its activities in the Red chat rooms and blogosphere, concentrating on moderate sites—the so-called “swing voters”—as opposed to the hard-line sites. One tack is to provide irrefutable factual evidence of long-standing Red efforts to undermine Gray sovereignty. This theme tests well with focus groups comprising Red overseas residents.

The XCOM submits the OPLAN, providing a concept of operations that include CS-related activities, content, and assessment. Annex Y provides details of synchronized CS-related activities, products, and assessment. The joint staff reviews the submission and provides recommendations to the CJCS, who approves OPORD 6153.

12 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-12)

This collection and assessment effort involves extensive opinion polling using a variety of methods such as telephone, internet, and personal interviews, as available. XJTF and other agencies have the capability to perform some polling themselves, but often hire independent polling organizations because these enjoy greater access and credibility. This effort makes extensive use of the Red Diaspora. PSYOP military information support teams (MIST) have deployed to Gray to conduct similar assessments among the local population.

Assessments result in a dramatically deeper understanding of Red and Gray perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and interests. Although XJTF planners have a good understanding of which messages are resonating, frequent pretest of specific messages with Gray (in country) and Red (Diaspora) focus groups ensures messages are on target.
The CSWG has established what it calls the “Red 70” and “Gray 50.” These are lists of the top 70 and 50 selected opinion leaders in Red and Gray respectively who are continuously monitored for indications of their attitudes. The Red 70 are composed of leaders resident in both Red and overseas locations. The lists include political, religious and social leaders who have been identified as representative of national attitudes. Their activities and statements in response to US actions are monitored in an attempt to correlate action and outcome. This information is fed into the focused engagement planning effort and result in JEPL refinement.

Indicators and warning have shown a reduced probability of Red attack into Gray, but the increasing insurgency and instability along the border areas has caused the President of Gray to request US counterinsurgency assistance. The CICS issues an Execute Order for OPLAN 6153, Branch A, with modifications including deployment orders.

**DEPLOYMENT (D-Day)**

Early in the deployment flow, priority CS-related capabilities are moved into theater to engage local and international media, key leaders, energize local communication activities, and engage selected audiences. The focused engagement cycle commences audience/node engagement in accordance with the approved JEPL, assessment, and re-engagement. The cycle continues during execution as a continual nomination, prioritization, approval, engagement, and assessment cycle. Details are provided in Appendix O.

![Synchronized engagement image]
As the Future Plans (J-5), Future Operations (J-35), and Current Operations (J-33) continue JOPP to develop, publish, and execute plans/orders, CS efforts (as outlined in figure IV-3 on page IV-13 and Appendix O) continue to support joint operation planning. The current concept of operations is to support "clear, hold, build" operations while building HN legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Assessment efforts include gathering extant information from HN, interagency, NGOs, and other organizations working in the unstable areas for extended periods. Assessment also requires initiating and gathering local polling information, NGO understanding, HN feedback, local CA perceptions, and information from local interactions with the joint force including KLE and patrols.

Opportunities to dialogue with the locals have been particularly helpful in understanding cultural issues, root causes of instability that Red has been able to manipulate, HN vulnerabilities to Red exploitation, and potential solutions that had not been considered. Assessment results have shown that a majority of the fight is in the cognitive dimension domain and the need for a focused communication strategy caused the XJTF commander to issue guidance to take the following initiatives:

1. Increase intelligence community reporting on communication networks, HN perceptions, key leaders, and cultural, social, and ethnic issues.

2. Fund contracts for polling of intended audiences, and leverage innovative communications means/methods.

3. Determine communication infrastructure needed to facilitate HN CS in destabilized areas and coordinate with USAID to deconflict efforts.

4. Determine requirements to support HN CS efforts at the provincial and local levels.

5. Stand up a US/HN combined Media Operations Center as a strategic enabler.

The XJTF battle rhythm settles into a weekly cycle where the preceding working groups (such as the IOWG, CMOWG, PA staff, and KLE cell meetings) sequence through the early days in the week and culminate at the cross-functional CSWG where individual capabilities are coordinated and synchronized into a coherent whole. The CS representatives take CS outputs into the operations planning teams supporting the J-5/35/33.

KLE management is ongoing and integrated into the planning effort through the CSWG.

The JEPL is adjusted weekly, based on plan changes, assessment, and additional nominations. It is then prioritized, submitted for approval, and executed in support of new or extant ORDERs/FRAGOs.
APPENDIX J
EXAMPLES FROM AFGHANISTAN OF THEMES, AUDIENCES, THEATER MISSION, AND STRATEGIC GOALS

The following examples show how themes from Afghanistan support higher-level directives.

1. USG GWOT Goals (National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, 26 June 2006):
   a. Protect and defend the homeland and US interests abroad.
   b. Deter/mitigate terrorist activity and their capacity to operate effectively in the United States and abroad.
   c. Counter violent extremism.
   d. Prevent terrorists’ acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction.
   e. Institutionalize domestically and internationally the strategy for the war on terror and violent extremism.
   f. Continue to nurture and expand foreign partnerships and partner capacity to defeat violent extremism.

2. USG Theater Mission (USCENTCOM Unclassified Website)
   a. Attack, disrupt, and defeat terrorism
   b. Deter and defeat adversaries
   c. Strengthen regional stability
   d. Build the self-reliance of partner nations’ security forces

3. USG Goals for Afghanistan (Afghanistan Strategic Review for Principals – Approved 1 February 2007)
   a. A reliable, stable, geo-strategically placed ally in the War on Terror
   b. Moderate, democratic, with a thriving private sector economy
   c. Capable of effectively governing its territory and borders
   d. Respectful of the rights of all citizens, including minorities and women
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4. NATO ISAF Goals for Afghanistan (NATO in Afghanistan: Master Narrative – 08 June 2007)

   a. The extension of government authority across Afghanistan

   b. The development of the Afghan government structures necessary to maintain security across the country without the assistance of international forces

   c. The establishment of a stable and secure environment in which sustainable reconstruction and development has taken hold

   d. The promotion by the Afghan government of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law

   e. NATO-ISAF provides indirect assistance to the Afghan authorities’ counternarcotics operations through training and logistic, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. NATO/ISAF also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter narcotics policy to its people

5. USG Counter-narcotics Goals in Afghanistan (US Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan – August 2007)

   a. Support the Government of Afghanistan’s eight pillar National Drug Control Strategy, with emphasis on the first five pillars: public information, alternative development, elimination/eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement/justice reform.

   b. Increase development assistance to incentivize licit development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations

   c. Increase coordination of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations.

   d. Encourage consistent, sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, our Allies, partners, and international organizations.

6. Themes in Afghanistan

   a. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO-ISAF, and the US are committed for the long term to ensuring a democratic, stable, peaceful Afghanistan that is inhospitable to terrorism. The Afghan people can rely on their allies, including the US government and NATO, to stay the course.

   b. Success in Afghanistan over insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and trafficking in narcotics is critical to the security of the Afghan people, the United States, our NATO Allies, Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, and the international community.
c. Afghanistan’s security, reconstruction, and development needs remain large but the country has come a long way since the overthrow of the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to make progress.

d. Success requires a comprehensive approach that includes both security and stability and reconstruction and development.

e. The Taliban are a destructive force that targets innocent Afghan civilians. They engage in criminal activity and brutal tactics for their own gain and cannot offer long-term security, stability, or development for the people of Afghanistan.


a. Afghan Population

b. Afghan Government

c. Government and Military of Pakistan

d. Pakistan Population

e. Governments of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations

f. Populations of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations

g. Enemy Leadership (AQ, AQAM, Taliban, criminal networks)

h. Taliban Rank-and-File

i. Governments of Central Asia

j. Central Asian Populations

k. IGO and NGO community

l. US domestic audiences
Appendix J

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### THEMES AND MESSAGES CARD EXAMPLE

#### SOUTHCOM SC Standing Themes and Messages
1. Security is a necessary condition for prosperity and lasting democratic institutions
2. Regional challenges require cooperative solutions
3. Southern Command is committed to lasting partnerships
4. The US, Latin America and the Caribbean share common interests

#### Related Themes and Messages
1. The US and Latin America are inextricably linked to the economic, political, historical, cultural and the security fabric of the region
2. The US values the strong relationship/friendship forged between our two nations
3. SOUTHCOM/AFSOUTH seeks to be a reliable partner whose promises can be counted on

#### Themes to Stress (through actions and/or words)
1. Spirit of cooperation between US and Chile
2. There is much we can learn from each other
3. Our nations working together allow for exponential and synergistic results

#### Themes to Avoid
1. Any actions or statement that could be construed as meddling/imposing
2. Attaching/connecting this exercise to unrelated US policies (don’t want appearance that exercise is being conducted as a front to support covert US initiatives)
3. Statements or actions that could be perceived as US only/US Centric (emphasis should be on partnership and cooperation)

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**Figure K-1.** Themes and Messages Card Example
APPENDIX L
CULTURAL SMART CARD EXAMPLE

Figure L.1. Cultural Smart Card Example
Appendix L

**CULTURE SMART CARD EXAMPLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Holidays</th>
<th>Clothes / Gestures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KEY RELIGIOUS DATES</strong></td>
<td><strong>MALE DRESS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Calendar follows the lunar cycle. Below are the approximate dates on a Western Calendar.</td>
<td>Black and White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004</strong></td>
<td>Red Checkered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan - 03 Feb 04</td>
<td>Has not made the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Feb 04</td>
<td>From a country with Presidential rule (I.E. Libya or Egypt) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Feb 04</td>
<td>has made the hajj.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb 04</td>
<td>Prayer: Many Islamic holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Mar 04</td>
<td>Islamic New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 May 04</td>
<td>Prayer: Most Islamic holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct - 13 Nov 04 Ramadhan</td>
<td>include public displays of p quota and prayer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Nov 04</td>
<td>Celebration: Eid al-Fitr is a three-day celebration at the close of Ramadan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Nov 04</td>
<td>Procession: Some Islamic holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>include public displays of p quota and prayer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-23 Jan 05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Apr 05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>05 Oct -</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>04 Nov 05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Nov 05</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CULTURAL CUSTOMS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HONOR AND SHAME</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitting “I don’t know” is shameful for an Iraqi. Constructive criticism can be taken as an insult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women often wear head scarves as a show of respect, even if wearing Western clothing. Women are rarely without a male relative or friend for escort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FAMILY</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family is the center of honor, loyalty, and reputation. Men are always the head of the family. No direct attention should be given to female relatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PERSONAL SPACE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis do not share an American concept of “personal space” in public situations, and in private meetings or conversation. It is considered offensive to step or lean away from an Iraqi. Women are an exception to this rule. One should not stand close to, stare at, or touch women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SOCIALIZATION AND TRUST</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When conducting business, it is customary to first shake the hand of all the male present, taking care to grip neither too firmly nor too weakly. Allocate plenty of time for refreshments before attempting to engage an Iraqi in business conversation. It is important to first establish respect and trust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CULTURAL HISTORY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancient Mesopotamia 18th - 6th Century B.C. Babylonian Empire seen as cradle of modern civilization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Modern Iraq 1958-Present** |
| Instability from 1958 to 1968 until Ba’ath Party takeover. Sunni Arabs dominate Iraq by oppressing Shia Arabs and Kurds. Following the 1979 Shia revolution in Iran, Saddam Hussein feared a Shia uprising. The Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988 exacerbated religious and ethnic tensions, leading to numerous Kurdish and Shia uprisings all were brutally repressed. |

**Figure L-1. Cultural Smart Card Example (Cont.)**
APPENDIX M
MESSAGING TECHNIQUES AND CONTENT EXAMPLES

“ISAF’s mission is to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) defeat the insurgency threatening their country. Protecting the Afghan people is the mission. The Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we (GIRoA and ISAF) are in a struggle for their support. The effort to gain and maintain that support must inform every action we take. Essentially, we and the insurgents are presenting an argument for the future to the people of Afghanistan: they will decide which argument is the most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of success.”

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF
ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
27 Aug 09 PR#2009-643

1. An Effective Psycho-Cultural Counter to Terrorism.

   a. An analysis of psycho-cultural foundations of contemporary terrorism can help provide some techniques for an effective counterterrorism program. Jerrold Post, MD, at The George Washington University completed the analysis and provides the following elements of an effective counterterrorism program: 74

   (1) Inhibit potential recruits from joining.
     
     (a) De-romanticize terrorists
     (b) Provide alternate pathways to redress grievances
     (c) Encourage moderate secular education
     (d) Assist in opening up autocratic societies

   (2) Promote dissention in the group
     
     (a) The underground group is an emotional pressure-cooker
     (b) Foster paranoia by injecting rumors of traitors in the ranks
     (c) Alienate followers from leader
     (d) Emphasize internal critics of extremist violence, e.g. Dr. Fadl

   (3) Encourage terrorists to leave
     
     (a) Amnesty programs
     (b) Reduced sentences for those who cooperate
     (c) Defector can be source of rumors to sow distrust

   (4) Reduce support
     
     (a) In society at large
     (b) In the recruitment pool

a. As stated previously, the enemy can get their story out within 26 minutes. One technique to get inside this rapid cycle of communication includes the development of trusted local communication conduits to quickly pass information. A real-world example from Afghanistan from combat outpost Zormat:

When trouble breaks out in the nearby village of Kowti Keyhl, as it dies often, 2nd Lt. Joseph Cardosi’s phone tree goes into action. Even as a firefight is blazing in the night or a truck burns from a roadside bomb, Cardosi dials up … the village elder, its respected voice of authority. The news will get out and will be passed on swiftly and accurately – and, Cardosi hopes, believably.

Cardosi’s phone tree is the latest weapon in the war of ideas and perception that is raging across Afghanistan.

The news will be pounded home in more strident tones over a local radio station financed by the US and housed within COP Zormat, and run by locally hip Afghan DJs. “The cowardly enemies of Afghanistan set off an IED today in front of the school … Thankfully, no one was injured … despite the fact that it placed innocent children in harm’s way,” said a recent message, sandwiched in between readings from the Koran, news from the BBC and locally popular music.

“Afghan national security forces,” Cardosi’s message continued, “were on a mission at this time through the area handing out radios, prayer rugs, school kits, newspapers and children’s clothes. Do not tolerate the crimes of the insurgents who place your families and children in danger.”

Whatever version of events they hear first, from a reliable source, is likely to be the one they believe.75

b. Another technique can include leveraging moderate voices, like the show “Death Making” on Al Arabiya and incorporating the resonating content into our messages:

The show is called “Death Making” in Arabic, hardly the way Al Qaeda probably wants itself described.

But that is how the powerful pan-Arabic satellite channel Al Arabiya casts the terror organization and its foot soldiers in its popular television program.

Hosted by female correspondent Rima Salha, the Dubai-based show is heading into its third year on Al Arabiya and aims to influence how the Arab world views Al Qaeda.
Messaging Techniques and Content Examples

“As we know, there are lots of Muslims who are brainwashed so they believe in terrorism but there are also bid sections of Muslims who sympathize with terrorists,” says Salha. “We are targeting those people and trying to explain to them that terrorism is not a good thing.”

c. Other techniques can include leveraging other credible sources, themes, and messages, like the recent report from the UN that indicated that more of the civilian deaths in Afghanistan were caused by the Taliban. Another example of a good recent source for content is the SecDef Gates interview on Al Jazeera:

The reality is also that al-Qaeda has killed many more Muslims than it has Americans, Europeans and others.

Clearly, we regret any loss of civilian life in Afghanistan, and I’ve addressed this issue while in Afghanistan as well in the United States. And one of the central themes of General McChrystal’s new approach in Afghanistan is significant change in our tactical approach to try and minimize the number of innocent civilians that are killed.

So he has changed the rules in terms of air power. He has issued a directive that convoys obey Afghan traffic laws, and, in fact, that our troops take some additional risk to themselves to avoid innocent Afghan casualties.

Part of the challenge here is that the Taliban actively target innocent civilians and they also create circumstances where they mingle among innocent civilians.

And they are willing to put innocent civilians at risk. But we are trying to figure out new tactics that minimize this.

But it is a challenge. Central to the success of the 42 nations that are trying to help the Afghan people and government at this point is that the Afghan people continue to believe that we are their friends, their partners and here to help them.

So civilian casualties are a problem for us and we are doing everything conceivable to try and avoid that.

We have no interest in a permanent presence in Afghanistan; no interest in bases in Afghanistan.

What our interest is, is in giving the Afghan people the capacity to protect its own people and to prevent Afghanistan from being a centre for violent extremists again. And then we’ll leave.

3. Informational effects: Summary of takeaways from the Israeli- Palestinian case studies

a. Never assume you are on the moral high ground, and that you therefore don’t need to message. (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)
Appendix M

b. An intervening armed state tends to be seen as “Goliath”, while non-state actors that resist are often cast as “David.” (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)

c. Targeting insurgent leaders won’t stop the resistance and the resulting informational effects may fuel further radicalization. (Tactics versus strategy)

d. Direct action against a threat may create positive informational effects with home audiences, but negative informational effects in the COIN theatre. (Informational effects: challenge of different audiences)

e. When a campaign’s strategic narrative contradicts the observed realities of your soldiers on the ground, it can hollow out the army’s morale. (Informational effects: challenge of different audiences)

f. Eliminating insurgents won’t stop the resistance or the terror tactics. (Tactics versus strategy)

g. When it comes to rumors of war-fighting gone wrong, the first stories onto the wire stick. Even if these stories prove to be exaggerated or false, the damage to your reputation, and moral legitimacy, is hard to erase. (Information sequel: perceptions of moral authority)

h. Humanitarian action undertaken to limit civilian casualties should be documented and communicated before, during and after action. (Informational sequel and prequel: perceptions of legitimacy; preempting and dispelling rumors)

i. Even if you don’t trust certain media, engage them. Restricting media gives an informational advantage to your adversary. (Information management: perceptions of legitimacy)

j. Western democracies have low tolerance for the moral ambiguities of kinetic action. This is especially so when, in the heat of battle, mistakes or civilian casualties occur. Kinetic action that violates the law of war creates informational effects that decrease domestic and Western support. (Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy)

k. Political messages that target domestic audiences can spillover to other audiences, and create detrimental informational effects in the COIN theater. (Informational effects: GIE and challenge of different audiences)

l. Cohesive all-of-government coordination can yield synchronization of the message, but not necessarily the effects. (Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy/perception management)

m. Information Operations need to keep going, even after the physical action is over. (Information sequel: perception management)
Messaging Techniques and Content Examples


a. Synergistic Capabilities. Personnel recovery (PR) strategic communication guidance considers the synergistic capabilities of public diplomacy, information operations, public affairs, and international broadcasting with the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power to ensure a whole of government approach and achieve the following objectives:

(1) Reduce the vulnerability of the capture, detention, and illegal seizure of US and Allied/coalition personnel and citizens.

(2) Mitigate the effects of attempts by adversaries to exploit isolated personnel as part of their larger strategic communication campaign.

(3) Increase the survivability of those held in captivity, detained, or illegally seized.

(4) Directly support the National Security Strategy by protecting the lives and livelihoods of US citizens, and indirectly by severing support to terrorist networks.

b. Methodologies. Communication strategy may be used to support PR preparation and response through the following methodologies:

(1) Targeting potential adversaries with focused communication strategy activities that disrupt attempts to exploit isolated personnel and citizens.

(2) Promoting dialogue with local leaders and the general public in specific areas to segregate adversaries from their potential support base and assist in PR responses.

(3) Establishing the conditions to prepare for, recover, and reintegrate or repatriate those who have become isolated from friendly control.

c. Messages. Communication strategy for PR is conducted before, during, and after an isolating event, requiring planners to account for an audience’s varying receptiveness to ideas, cultural environment, political realities, unfolding events, etc. All messages must account for cultural sensitivities and align with action taken by the USG.

(1) Accounting for cultural sensitivities should be based on an informed and detailed analysis (country, region, or operation specific) that accommodates the span of environments in which US personnel or citizens are at risk of becoming isolated.

(2) Although messages must directly support the requirements of a PR response, specific fundamental themes in US policy need reinforcement before, during, and after an isolating event. These policies include the following:

(a) The US Government (USG) holds those who capture, detain, or illegally seize US personnel or citizens directly responsible for their safety and security.
Appendix M

(b) The USG will not make concessions to individuals or groups holding US personnel or citizens hostage. It is USG policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

c) The USG will do everything practical to recover and/or secure the release of its captured, detained, or illegally seized personnel or citizens through diplomatic, military, or civil means.

d) The seizing of hostages is a violation of international and domestic law.

e) The USG will work with its Allied/coalition partners to address the threat of hostage taking that threatens our collective security.

d. Planning and Execution. Every facet of communication strategy planning and execution in PR must be directed toward the following:

(1) Striking the center of gravity of adversaries who hold captive, detain, or illegally seize US and Allied/coalition persons.

(2) Preventing adversaries from achieving their strategic goals by mitigating the effects from exploiting captive, detained, or illegally seized personnel.

(3) Reinforcing the USG position on “No Concessions” as described in NSPD-12, United States Citizens Held Hostage Abroad.

(4) Encouraging the humane treatment of isolated personnel should they become captured, detained, or illegally seized.

(5) Ensuring all diplomatic, military, and civil efforts in a PR response are coordinated and synchronized across the USG

(6) Unifying PR education and prevention efforts among all USG departments and agencies.
APPENDIX N
SAY-DO GAP EXAMPLE AND POSSIBLE CAUSES

The following is excerpted from a 13 October 2009 NightWatch commentary on the PBS Frontline one-hour special report on Afghanistan. It shows how a say-do gap can be generated, despite well-intentioned hard working young leaders trying to deliver approved messages to local populations. Some of the possible causes include lack of cultural training, not understanding tribal perspectives, lack of observation, socially unacceptable behaviors brought about by yielding to stress, inadequate interpreters, and not adapting a higher-level message to better resonate locally.

The one-hour special is important more for its visual images than for any words in the script or from interviews. The visual images add dimensions to understanding.

The script is about protecting people and establishing local rapport. The interviews with generals reinforce those messages.

... very young American men ... preach about survival to Afghans old enough to be their grandfathers. There is no respect for age shown in any of the local encounters PBS filmed.

The most startling segment of the telecast was a scene in which a Marine officer tried to persuade locals that the village was now safe because the Marines arrived. They wanted the locals to help them. The Afghans challenged how could the Afghans help the Marines? They did not even own a sword.

The setting was a village that was empty of inhabitants who fled when they learned the Marines were coming to save them from the Taliban. ... the Marine officer was interrogating a dozen or so Afghan men, using an interrogator who did not speak the local dialect.

The US officer got impatient with the Afghans because they were not being cooperative, the script indicated. He could not speak the language and his interpreter was not qualified but he directed his anger at the Afghans ... and the insanity of the situation, no doubt. The video showed him to be arrogant and disrespectful of the residents and especially of the elders in the group.

Neither PBS nor the Marine officer noticed that a significant portion of the men wore black turbans, the signature headdress of the Taliban. Who can know for sure, but experience suggests any men found in a Helmand village without children or women are Taliban. These facts raise a significant probability that the Marine officer was issuing orders to and expressing frustrations with the actual rulers of the village, who were Taliban or Taliban sympathizers and apparently was not aware.

Note: this comment is not a criticism of the American soldiers and Marines. It is a criticism of those who prepared them, or rather failed to prepare them.
Appendix N

Watching US helicopters sweep across the broad expanses of Helmand Province, the words from officials in Kabul about progress, protecting people, development and governance seemed otherworldly.
APPENDIX O
SC/CS PROCESS MAP

1. Introduction

a. This Strategic Communication / Communication Strategy (SC/CS) Process Map covers developing a communication strategy and supporting and leveraging extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and assessment. Communication strategy development must synchronize all communication capabilities (IO, PA, DSPD, CA, JPOTF, KLE, etc) and support the joint operation planning process from the beginning. This facilitates communication strategy integration throughout joint force planning and execution. These are the absolute minimum requirements for synchronizing words and images with actions across the force. The process map (Figure O-1) appears quite complex when viewed in its entirety, however, when broken down into stages, it is more easily understood and can be used as a tool for understanding individual tasks that are necessary to conduct each step, what entity has primary responsibility, and required inputs and outputs to support the critical path.

b. Beginning in paragraph 3 below, individual stages are broken out and some detail is provided about specific steps, tasks, flow of inputs and outputs, important products, key participants, and which entity has primary responsibility for each step. The dark thick arrow shows the critical path through the process, with diamond shapes showing decision points. The circled numbers take you from one stage to another. The hope is that this process map will help the warfighter to better plan, coordinate, organize, execute and assess the commander’s communication strategy.

2. Background

a. In visiting the combatant commands, viewing many exercises, and reviewing countless records/documents on the conduct of SC/CS, it becomes apparent that many different approaches to the conduct of SC/CS are being utilized, with uneven results. Processes are often quite different and integration into the planning process is not consistent. In discussing ongoing difficulties with some warfighters struggling to plan and execute SC/CS more effectively, some team members were told that “A process map for SC/CS would be very helpful.” Research has indeed shown that the process has not been previously mapped in any significant detail, which may have contributed to the fact that organizational approaches and results have varied widely. In the current global situation, units are forced to perform their SC/CS-related missions with less than optimal resources, including personnel and training. This unavoidable condition typically requires a more efficient prioritization of assets and activities. Establishing a process that leverages extant staff capability and processes, should cause that prioritization to occur with best results. To the casual reader, it may appear that the end piece of this process is assessment, but in fact it is a continual cycle. Assessment in support of communication strategy is difficult and has therefore too often become and economy of force effort. The temptation is to assume that once the product or action has been executed, the full effect will be experienced at some point in the future. In fact, there are at least three potential outcomes. First, the product is not seen/heard/experienced by the designated recipient. Second, the
desired recipient disregards the product. Third, the recipient internalizes, to one degree or another, the message. As a result, the assessment process is critical to both determine results and to feed back into the iterative process of re-engagement until the desired effect or outcome is created.
b. This process map also incorporates the best practices and ideas from the field to create a SC/CS process that is efficient, effective, complete, and that supports, and leverages extant core staff processes. Even those individuals that have been in the career field for some time don’t always know the processes others are using in different organizations or different levels of command. By outlining the entire process, it will be easier for individuals to identify the offices which have most sway over their particular
areas, provide understanding on how to best integrate their efforts, and see where to obtain support as needed.

c. The process described on the next few pages is one that is tailored for the JFC level. It includes a section dedicated to the Strategic Communication (SC) elements at the highest levels of government, but concentrates more on the process used by the Joint Force Commander and his staff to create and execute his communication strategy. It includes sections on Strategic Communication, Communication Strategy, Planning, Audience Selection, Prioritization, Capability Determination, Capability Assignment, Plan Issue and Execution, and Assessment.

3. Strategic Communication

a. Just like strategic policy and strategic objectives, SC originates from the White House and gets discussed and coordinated at the National Security Council (NSC), which is supported by the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC). Figure O-2 outlines these process steps and shows the critical path through the initiation of mission analysis and identification of the theater engagement objectives. The IPC is led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and is the overall mechanism by which public diplomacy is coordinated across the interagency community. A principle product of this committee is the *US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, which provides USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core messages under which DOD can nest its SC themes, messages, images, and activities. These committees set the Strategic Objectives that are discussed and approved at the
NSC. In the US Government, the Department of State has the lead for Strategic Communication. However, SC is an ongoing collaborative process that occurs both horizontally and vertically and involves a two-way flow of information at each stage.

b. At the highest level, the office of the President of the United States provides direction to the NSC and National Security Staff. Each agency provides input to and takes guidance from the IPC and relays that guidance to their respective agencies. The individual agencies also conduct ongoing coordination between themselves. The NSC creates sub-IPCs as necessary for SC planning and coordination on specific issues, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.

c. The Department of State has created a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy (DAS (PD)) at each regional bureau to ensure that bureaus and embassies incorporate Public Diplomacy considerations in all levels of policy development, to include SC. The DOS Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) supports interagency efforts on global engagement and strategic communication. Each regional DAS (PD) has a primary responsibility to guide SC for their region, and US Ambassadors lead US SC efforts within their assigned foreign country.

d. The Department of Defense conducts SC planning and coordination via the Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (GESCC), which is co-chaired by the Director of Joint Communication (JC) within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD-PA) and a representative from the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P). The GESCC meets biweekly, or more often as needed, to discuss policy and important Strategic Communication issues on a wide range of topics. While DOS does not have a formal seat at the GESCC, they do attend and DOD uses the committee as the preferred venue for conducting SC coordination with DOS, and seeks DOS input for issues under consideration.

e. DOD and DOS take the guidance from the GSEC, clear it through the NSC, and disseminate it to their subordinates. Following coordination through the DOD GESCC, the Director of Communication JS J-5 provides this guidance to the Combatant Commands in different products, such as guidance for development of the Theater Campaign plan, JSCP contingency planning tasking, or a WARNORD that directs crisis action planning. These products trigger the first step, “Initiation,” of the joint operation planning process (JOPP).

f. At the very earliest stages of preparations for planning, preliminary work is done to understand the situation, environment, and identify the related theater engagement objectives. This activity will ultimately provide input to the commander’s initial planning guidance. This effort also gathers as much information as possible, reviews the situation, assesses the actors, considers the desired end state, and makes some suggestions up-channel to DOD. This is all done within the constraints of complying with the DOD guidance concerning Theater Campaign Planning and extant USG policies. The inputs to this effort come from many and varied sources: the intelligence community (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)), DOS, the Ambassador and his country team, the Open Source Center, other agencies, multinational partners, and academia.
Appendix O

This initial analysis is not done in a vacuum, nor is any other part of this process. There are many organizations throughout DOD and DOS which have an input into the process:

1. Internal Information Programs. This DOS bureau runs the INFOCENTRAL website which serves as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, talking points, research, analysis, and other products for use by SC programs at all levels. Also available on INFOCENTRAL is the DOS Counterterrorism Communications Alert, which reviews media treatment of terrorist actions and messages and efforts to counter them.

2. DOS GSEC is an interagency organization housed at DOS, but with personnel also from DOD, the National Counterterrorism Center, the intelligence community, and other USG agencies involved with SC. The GSEC operationalizes decisions made by the IPC.

3. DOS Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). The mission is to foster mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries around the world through education and cultural exchange.

4. Public Affairs (PA). Within DOS PA, the DOS Rapid Response Unit (RRU) address high-profile, urgent issues by providing daily (Mon thru Fri) approved strategic-level statements by senior US officials. Military leaders can use these to develop military-oriented SC-related products.

5. Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center (OSC). Formally, Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service (FBIS) provides media reports and broadcasts from specific countries and regions.

4. Communication Strategy

a. Once the JFC initial planning guidance is issued, support to mission analysis begins in earnest. Figure O-3 outlines the process of developing the broad communication strategy, from the JFC initial planning guidance through CS Board approval of key effects, objectives, audiences, and themes that feed into the JFC planning guidance. In later stages, the communication strategy continues to be refined, detailed, and becomes more comprehensive. This includes both focused engagement and continuous efforts to “get the truth out” and generally inform and educate national and international audiences. Communication strategy development requires the inputs of all communication capabilities, and the CS working group to combine disparate inputs into an integrated effective coherent strategy. The process map does concentrate primarily on focused engagement efforts, because these require coordination deconfliction, prioritization of resources, and concentrated assessment. However, continuous efforts to inform and educate should not be overlooked, and must be an integral part of the communication strategy and JFC plan.

b. The very first part of mission analysis involves Design, and the CS-related capability owners need to support that effort. Design involves critical and creative thinking to develop a deep understanding of the situation, operational environment, and
challenge, to make sure we are in fact attempting to solve the right problem. Once the environment and problem frames are developed, a broad approach to solve the problem is created. This broad approach should also include the overarching narrative, which provides all audiences with the context, reason/motive for the intervention, and desired goal/end state. Throughout execution of the operation, themes and messages should be nested under and support this enduring narrative. (For more information about the “Battle of the Narrative,” see pages II-13 through II-15). The design effort produces a deep understanding of the environment including drivers of conflict, stresses, opportunities, and other factors within the system that have created and facilitate the situation, and keep it from moving toward the desired end state. Communication capability representatives’ support to the design effort is critical, because all operations deal to some degree with conflict (in the cognitive dimension) of the information environment. In Irregular Warfare, support of the local population is the center of gravity, making this battle (in the cognitive dimension) the main effort. Value-added input to the design effort could include providing an understanding of communication means within the operational environment, cultural and historical communication patterns and sense-making, key themes that resonate, hot buttons, key influencers, extant narratives, stresses, opportunities, means of dialogue, and feedback. Figure IV-3 on page IV-10 provides more detailed CS actions required to support mission analysis.

c. Conducting initial staff estimates provides an initial assessment of adequacy (the approach can accomplish the mission within the planning guidance parameters) and feasibility (with resources and time allotted). Initial staff estimates preclude pursuit of an inappropriate or unrealistic approach. Once the design approach is approved, mission
analysis continues and CS-related support should include a general review to determine entities that will need to be leveraged, engaged, and/or influenced. This preliminary work may involve all of the CS-related capability areas, intelligence, the POLAD, Civil-Military personnel, the JPOTF, and others as appropriate. The completed preliminary work is sent to each of the communication capability areas (IO, PA, CA, DSPD, KLE, or JPOTF cells/staffs) to assist and guide nomination of audiences or key nodes for more detailed review. These nominations must support the broad approach or options approved during the Design effort.

d. Due to typically limited resources in the CS Directorate, it is expected that most of the more detailed work will be done by the IOWG, the PA staff, the CA staff, and the JPOTF. Some support from the J-2 may also prove useful. This work and analysis helps determine key nodes within the audience, identify stand-alone nodes, relationships between nodes and the audience, and the highest value/payoff nodes/audiences. A high value node/audience is one that the opposition requires for the successful completion of their mission. A high payoff node/audience is one whose loss to the opposition will also significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. Therefore, focusing on high value nodes/audiences can cause the opposition mission to fail, but focusing on high payoff nodes/audiences should be the highest priority. What can’t be ignored at this point, however, are those high payoff individuals who are key influencers whose positive outlook will far outweigh others that we may try to convince. These high-payoff nodes may take more focused resources, but the results should be worth the effort. After all, any cultural or social group can influence itself from the inside much easier than we can from the outside.

e. Other points to identify are where stress or discord exists, important historical perspectives, communication means, existing themes and narrative(s), where specific ideas or approaches have resonance, and preferred and available means of dialogue. Dialogue, although not always available, is obviously the preferred means of communication, because dialogue is two-way communication and more intimate. Additionally, dialogue utilizes many means simultaneously, feedback is immediate, understanding and learning is enhanced, and emotions can be shared, such as concern, empathy, and respect.

f. Mass markets must be identified that cut across large segments of the society or the operational environment. Likewise, which mass media directly accesses each of the markets should also be identified. Above all, social and cultural considerations must be kept near the top of our thoughts and actions. It will do us no good to influence someone by methods or means which will reflect negatively on us and them.

g. After the desired audiences and nodes have been generally identified, they must be vetted and validated. Vetting is a check to ensure the information utilized for selection is current and that no restrictions prohibit focusing on the audience/node. Validation is a check to make sure that using the selected audience/node supports the approved broad approach. Significant audience segments are identified that may impact audience reception, approach, or resonance, including significant sub-groups or differences among various parts that must be taken into consideration, such as political faction, religion, tribe, etc. Based on the segmentation, general techniques are recommended to reach those segments.
Broad capabilities are then identified that can leverage extant means or access potentially new conduits.

h. All of this information and these proposals are distilled, coordinated, and synchronized in the Communication Strategy Working Group (CSWG) which has a number of issues to resolve. Foremost of these would be the desired overarching effects and objectives that would support the approved broad design approach. The recommended general audiences/nodes must be prioritized and proposed means/capabilities/actions considered, such as Key Leader Engagement (KLE). The support and coordination requirements must also be generally outlined. Much development at this point is related to these decisions: support, themes, assessment and coordination required to make this all work. These working group efforts result in the development of the initial communication strategy, which is presented to the CS Board for approval. If the Board disapproves the proposal, the project goes back to audience analysis and starts over; responding to the guidance the board has given. If approved, the CS Director presents the input to the Commander for inclusion of appropriate content into the JFC Planning Guidance, which drives the remainder of the joint operation planning process (JOPP).

5. Planning

a. The JFC planning guidance drives the JOPP, typically led by the J-5 or J-3/5 (depending on the time horizon). The CS Directorate needs to ensure that a CS representative is on each of the operation planning teams (OPTs), to deliver the consolidated CS perspective on all planning issues. Figure O-4 outlines the JOPP, key CS-support requirements, and the actions immediately following, such as audience system analysis and selection. The task of the OPT is to develop a course of action (COA) consisting of the following information: what type of military action will occur; why the action is required (purpose); who will take the action; when the action will begin; where the action will occur; and how the action will occur (method of employment of force capability).

b. To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions, using the information developed from mission analysis. The staff develops COAs to provide options to the commander. A valid COA is one that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete (see JP 5-0, Figure III-6). The staff should reject potential COAs that do not meet all five criteria. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, positions the joint force for future operations, and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. A good COA synchronizes “major muscle movements” of the force, including actions, words, and images in support of the overarching narrative and mission. Development of organizational constructs and tentative task organization must also include these considerations.

c. COA development starts with the military end state found in the Commander’s Intent, developed during mission analysis. The objectives, center(s) of gravity, critical factors, desired effects, undesired effects and assessment measures will be determined during planning; the CS representative needs to ensure that CS-related factors are identified and CS-related effects are considered. Likewise, the major themes for the operation need
to be developed to support the objectives and overarching narrative. To develop these themes, the CS planner needs to review the initial communication strategy and previously developed audience recommendations.

(1) In order to work most effectively and efficiently, the high value and high payoff individuals/groups must be identified. This does not mean that broader audiences are ignored; ongoing general actions are still taken to inform and educate them, such as PA broadcast and international media engagements. However, high value/payoff individuals/groups are specifically identified for focused attention. During this investigation, the critical factors (critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities) for each Center Of Gravity should be reviewed and how influencing each particular audience assists in affecting the COG(s). Some of the preliminary work of audience and key leader identification should have been done in the previous stages; now it is time to determine details of how they will be important in creating effects, affecting the COG, and achieving objectives. A more thorough examination of the audience will reveal key links/nodes that exist in the population and points of entry that will facilitate communication. Many of these key nodes will be excellent points of dialogue to gain immediate feedback (e.g. verify effects of messages/themes/actions), more rapidly develop an understanding of dynamic situations, and more quickly adapt to the changing environment.

(2) After the key individuals and groups have been identified, the major themes are crafted. These themes (an overarching concept which is designed for broad application
to achieve specific objectives) drive later development of messages (a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience) that must be designed to achieve the desired effects. Likewise, the themes should also be a significant consideration in determining actions during COA development, to ensure that words, images and actions are synchronized.

(3) Determining undesired effects is just as important as desired effects. For example, we might want to create the effect in the audience of supporting our efforts. To support this effect, we might want to foster the perception that “we are here to provide security, and helping us will improve security.” An equally important undesired effect that we want to avoid is local resistance to our efforts. Therefore, we will want to synchronize words, images, and action to avoid the creation of perceptions that “we are actually here to oppress or occupy,” or “we will not provide security in an even-handed manner,” or “we will only provide security for ourselves.” We will also need to put measures in place to alert us when these perceptions begin to emerge, or when the enemy is attempting to foster these perceptions, so that we can counter them.

(4) All of this requires a thorough understanding of the audience. Collaboration with interagency and other partners (such as the Ambassador, his country team, and other stakeholders, such as NGOs or PVOs), who have been immersed in the culture/audiences for some time, can greatly improve our understanding. An understanding of the culture will help minimize our actions that may be contrary to deeply held social and cultural mores. This is an area of very high risk, especially in the early phases of an operation, where understanding of the local audience and culture may be lacking. Improving cultural understanding across the joint force and other mitigation measures can help reduce this risk.

(5) In order to determine if we are doing things right, as well as doing the right things, measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) must be developed. These measures are crafted while developing desired/undesired effects. This is to ensure that chosen effects (or conditions) are measurable. If we cannot measure creation of an effect (or condition), it is not valid and must be reworked. Crafting of accurate MOEs and MOPs during COA development are critical to the assessment process. Pages IV-23 through IV-31 provides some additional detail on assessment and the use of MOE/MOP.

(6) Finally, where and how to deliver the themes and messages is another challenge. Dialogue is the preferred method of communication, but not always practical or possible. Therefore, an efficient and effective method of delivering the communication to the audience will be required. Questions that may need to be answered include: Are there stress points that can be affected by a particular news/TV story, What are the hot button issues to avoid, Is there a particular media means that has very general and widespread approval that may be used, What are the habits of the specific audience, Can they be affected by the message, and What type of message would resonate? Later stages will discuss assessment methods for gaining feedback on receipt, understanding and effectiveness.
d. The COA is then analyzed, war-gamed, compared with other COAs, and a final COA is selected by the commander. CS participation in this process is very important, because analysis and wargaming must be realistic, manifest audience reactions, and include CS concerns. Wargaming-generated outcomes often result in COA alterations, branches, and sequels. Likewise, COA selection criteria should include CS considerations, directly affect final COA selection, and can influence the common practice of the commander’s merging the best parts of several COAs into the final product. CS representative participation should include, as a minimum:

1. Assist in the identification of advantages and disadvantages of each COA, from a CS perspective. Examples include:

   a. How effectively does the COA utilize actions to send messages to purposefully influence key audiences to create desired effects/outcomes and achieve objectives?

   b. How effectively does the COA synchronize words, images, and actions to provide coherent and consistent communications?

   c. Is there a CS line of effort?

   d. Are all joint force communication capabilities utilized and integrated?

   e. Are operations conducted in a manner that considers cultural sensitivities?

   f. Does the COA organizational construct facilitate development of a learning organization that continues to develop a deeper understanding of the environment, audiences, and stakeholders during operations?

   g. Does the COA maximize opportunities for dialogue with key leaders, audiences, and other stakeholders?

   h. Does the COA focus on the friendly and adversary COG, which in IW will be the support of the contested population?

2. Assist in wargaming by providing input concerning expected audience perceptions, responses, and effects caused by significant events in each COA. Details of COA analysis and wargaming are provided in JP 5-0 pages IV-38 through IV-49.

3. As part of wargaming, identify high-value audiences/nodes for CS engagement or leverage.


5. Identify potential decision points for key CS activities and/or shifts required in the CS line of effort.
(6) Provide input to the selection of Governing Factors, utilized for discrimination between COAs during COA comparison.

(7) Provide input for potential Branches and Sequels, based on key audience perspectives, probable reactions, and effects.

(8) Provide input to COA refinement during this process.

(9) Revise the CS staff estimate, based on wargaming:

   (a) Identify how the COA mitigates risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level, such as information fratricide and the ability to get the messages out faster than the enemy does (<25 minutes).

   (b) Identify how the COA places the force in the best posture for future operations, such as the impact on strategic themes, theater strategic themes/messages, and narrative(s).

   (c) Identify how the COA provides the maximum latitude for initiative for subordinates.

(10) Provide data for use in the COA selection decision matrix.

e. The staff then converts the approved COA into a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS becomes the eventual centerpiece of the OPLAN or order. CS representatives need to ensure that the communication strategy is outlined in the CONOPS, the eventual main body of the order, and detailed in Annex Y of the final OPLAN or order.

f. Prior collaboration to develop an understanding of the operational environment (during previous stages) included the JIPOE, country studies, audience identification and analysis. This effort should have identified all significant audiences in the operational environment and captured that information in a Master Audience List. This list can be maintained by the J9 or CS Directorate, supported as needed by the J2. This list can help facilitate audience research and also serve as a tool to minimize duplication of effort by various CS-related entities, such as IO, PA, CA, and JPOTF.

g. After the CONOPS has been approved by the commander, Audience System Analysis begins. Audience system analysis is conducted on the audiences/nodes specified in the CONOPS, other audiences that have been researched by any of the CS-related partners (such as IO, PA, CA, JPOTF), and deemed important for supporting the plan. These additions would include any significant audiences that the communication community thinks may be important for focused engagement during execution of the operation. Audience system analysis develops folders on these audiences for future nomination into the engagement process. This analysis identifies specific important
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aspects of the audience, including significant nodes, high value influencers, high payoff
nodes, and materials needed for folder development. The Audience System Analysis
more thoroughly examines the previously segmented audiences to determine each segment
significant attributes, points of resonance, discord, and influential individuals within
each segment. More detailed study determines individuals out of each segment who are
influencers needed by the adversary for their mission success, and individuals from each
segment that could aid our success. Identifying these individuals is extremely important,
ot only to inhibit adversary and facilitate our success, but also because it is much easier
to influence a group from within than from without. Likewise, developing details on each
segment will expedite efforts later to match capabilities with these segments to create
desired effects or conditions. All this information is then placed into audience folders
(when fairly detailed information is available) or briefs (if information is limited). This
collection of audience folders creates the Candidate Audience List from which CS-related
partners can nominate audiences for focused engagement as part of the detailed plan
development or as part of the engagement cycle during execution.

h. The number of audiences in the operational environment, that require focused
efforts to achieve the desired results, typically exceeds the CS-related resources available.
This becomes most apparent when considering that effects in the cognitive dimension
often take time to manifest in measurable ways, such as changes in perceptions, attitudes,
and behaviors. Because of these limited resources, an efficient and effective prioritization
is required to determine which audiences will receive focused attention for a specific
period of time. This prioritization of engagement efforts continues in a cyclic manner
through feedback, assessment and re-engagement until desired effects are created. Later
development of the details of the communication strategy (during detailed plan
development) requires audience selection, prioritization, matching capabilities to audiences,
and capability assignment to ensure capabilities are focused against the highest priority
audiences to create required effects to support the plan. Later, when the detailed plan/
order is issued and execution begins, assessment is conducted and the results are fed
back into the cyclic engagement process that selects and/or re-engages high priority
audiences to create desired effects, within resource constraints. These stages are
discussed in more detail below.

6. Audience Selection

a. Any of the CS-related staff sections, components, or other partners can nominate
audiences or key nodes for focused engagement. Figure O-5 outlines this stage of the
process down through inclusion on the Focused Engagement List. Initial considerations
include options for communication input and expected communication propagation
beyond the audience. The most appropriate and effective means of delivery (input) may
be shaped by physical access, traditional and trusted means of communication for the
audience, their receptivity, and our desire for blanket simultaneous or viral engagement.
Likewise, CS-related planners must also consider how the communication will propagate
beyond the audience, because the interconnected global information environment often
picks up limited communications and multiplies their impact around the world.

b. Determining desired and undesired effects typically involves continuing
refinement of the CONOPS/plan effects (outcomes or conditions) and objectives that can

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be supported by CS-related activity. Likewise, it involves reviewing CONOPS operations/activities that may need reinforcement or mitigation through CS-related means. However, these activities should not be considered in isolation, but should be viewed from a holistic perspective and the impacts they will make together. In irregular warfare, support of the local population is the COG, and CS activities may in fact be the main effort.

(1) Required Points of Entry. Because there are many places and situations to inject CS products or conduct engagement activities, the specific point of entry is important. If the entry is selected incorrectly, the product might never meet with the intended individual(s), or the engagement may not have the correct context. Likewise, if the audience sees the product beyond the point of last usefulness, or the engagement is conducted on unfavorable terms, a similar negative result is obtained. The point of entry must allow the intended audience to observe the product within the time frame that allows audience recognition and action. Similarly, other engagement activities must be sensitive to necessary shaping conditions. All of these requirements need to be noted in the nomination package.

(2) Achievement of the desired effects may also require a specific set of entry points, such as the need to have simultaneous or sequential reinforcing inputs. If so, this needs to be part of the engagement nomination. Which points of entry should be used and necessary specific sequencing will be detailed later in the process as specific capability is matched to the nominated audience.
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(3) Undesired Effects Estimate. This estimate includes anticipating undesired outcomes, measures to detect them, and means of mitigation. If there is a sense for the probability of undesired effects, that information should be included.

(4) If creation of the desired effects, or minimizing undesired effects, requires specific CS-related capability use, that information needs to be included in the nomination. If creation of the effect provides a range of options, but restricts some other capabilities or options, that information should also be included. Any constraints (what we must do) or restraints (what we cannot do) need to be noted for later matching of capabilities and execution sequencing.

c. If audience nomination requires collection of additional information, the requirement can be added to the J9/J2 collection and exploitation requirements, and considered for the component prioritized collection list. Likewise, audiences can be nominated for inclusion on other important lists, like the High Payoff Node list, or for further detailed product development, as needed.

d. The CSWG then consolidates and reviews all nominations to remove redundancy, combine multiple desired effects for the same audience, eliminate conflicts, and create the Nominated Audience List. Each of the nominated audiences are then vetted and validated prior to inclusion in the Focused Engagement List. Vetting involves verification of information and intelligence used to nominate the audience to ensure it was accurate and up to date. This is a safeguard for audiences or nodes that are selected from previously developed folders, to ensure they are up to date when moving into focused engagement. If the information is not up to date, more accurate/updated information is reviewed to determine if the audience nomination is still desired. Likewise, validation involves a review of the nomination to ensure it still supports the JFC CONOPS/plan.

7. Prioritization

Because audience/node nominations for focused engagement typically exceed available resources, the difficult process of prioritization is now required. Figure O-6 outlines the steps in prioritization.

a. Engagement selections and solutions. The CS-related staff sections, components, and other partners review not only the joint force CONOPS and communication strategy, but their individual component scheme of maneuver, engagement strategies, and other pertinent documents/schemes in order to select (from the Focused Engagement List) specific audiences/nodes that require focused engagement to create desired effects during a definite period. During detailed plan development, this may include groupings of specific audiences/nodes by phase. During execution, a precise period will be selected for the engagement cycle. Some prefer to run the cycle daily, some weekly or semi-weekly, depending on the operation. These engagement selections must be tied directly and explicitly to creation of desired effects (or conditions) to achieve objectives in support of the plan. They must provide distinctive solutions to identified challenges. These selections are consolidated by the CS Directorate into the Engagement Nomination List.
b. Because the Engagement Nomination List typically exceeds available resources, a CSWG is conducted to allow each submitter to make their case as to why their selection should be placed above the “Cut Line.” The cut line is the line where the resources available for the specific engagement cycle (or time period) are expected to be sufficient to engage the approved audiences/nodes. The selections that fall below the cut line will probably not be engaged until another cycle. This prioritization affects not only engagements, but collection and assessment as well. Therefore, this working group can be quite emotional as each entity works to convince the group to place their selection above the cut line. The CS Directorate must work diligently to maintain discipline and order, and keep the meeting progressing smartly. As some selected audiences/nodes may overlap or be leveraged for creation of multiple precise effects/conditions, this effort must include consolidation of proposals. The final outcome of the CSWG is an integrated proposed Joint Engagement Prioritized List (JEPL). The CS Directorate provides the list to the CS Board for final adjustments of selections and the cut line.

b. The CS Directorate then forwards the JEPL to the JFC for final approval. If there were significant disagreements from one of the components or partners, that could not be worked out by the CSWG or CS Board, those concerns should be forwarded along with the list to the JFC for consideration. Once approved by the JFC, the CS Directorate finalizes the JEPL and disseminates the list. If the list is not approved by the JFC, it goes...
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back (with guidance) for readjustment at the engagement selections and solutions step. The list then cycles back through the integration and prioritization steps as normal.

c. After the list is published, the CS Directorate sends it to the J2 for inclusion in the joint force Prioritized Collection Requirements, and the Component Prioritized Collection List. The collection requirements generated by the JEPL compete with other collection requirements, at the Joint Collection Management Board, to clear their cut line and be included in the Joint Integrated Prioritized Collection List. Those collection requirements that do not make the cut line are then returned to the Collection and Exploitation Requirement board and, if required, go through the process again.

d. The CS-related staffs then use the approved JEPL for the next stage of the process: matching capabilities to each individual audience or node to create the desired effect. However, information is needed from the Joint Integrated Prioritized Collection List and the previous products developed during Audience Products Development, to properly match the appropriate capability to the audience/node.

8. Matching Capability

a. During this stage, the IO, PA, CA Staffs, the POLAD and JPOTF representatives match CS-related capabilities with each of the audiences/nodes on the JEPL. Figure O-7 highlights the methodology for doing this. Matching capabilities requires a review of the collection requirements needed for engagement and assessment, a determination of critical...
functions, probabilities of successfully influencing the audience/node, resources required, specific point of entry, timing and effectiveness, and what we hope to learn from the engagement (exploitation).

b. An audience/node may have more than one capability that may achieve the desired effect (or condition). It is important to list each capability separately, with the associated requirements and probabilities. This will provide a menu for use later in capability assignment just prior to execution.

c. Confirming the collection requirements (for each potential capability) involves verifying the information needed to enable effectual use of the capability and conducting assessment.

d. Critical functions must be verified for both using the capability itself, and audience internal functions needed for the capability to be effective and desired/undesired outcomes to be confirmed. A good example is the case during Desert Storm where leaflets were dropped on a unit with the desired effect being its surrender without fighting. One Critical Function was the accurate leaflet drop the previous day to tell them to look at the adjacent unit to see what would happen to them if they did not surrender. Another critical function was that the leaflets also had to include information that would help provide us immediate measurable assessment of the desired effect (influence), i.e. directing them to abandon their vehicles, point them in a certain direction, and stand in formation apart from the vehicles. Another critical function was the intense bombing of the adjacent unit at the designated time. Finally, the audiences internal critical functions included their ability to read the leaflets, see the other unit, maneuver the vehicles, and stand in formation as directed.

e. Next, the criteria necessary for effective influence must be identified, the probability of influence determined, and the required resources.

f. The specific point of entry needed to achieve this outcome must be noted, including details of which specific key influencing individual needs to be used, means, or other important parameters. If multiple points of entry can be used, they should all be listed, to provide options during capability assignment and execution.

g. Finally, a calculation must be made of the capability and timing effectiveness for each combination of audience/node, critical function, resource, and point of entry.

h. Documents must be produced, such as a matrix to show engagement options, with requirements and probable outcomes for each audience/node.

i. Lastly, any exploitation requirements must be identified and listed. Exploitation is very important in this process, because we must continually learn and adapt to the dynamic and ever-changing environment. Likewise, changes in the cognitive dimension may be difficult to assess in the short term, unless behaviors specific to the effect are manifest and measurable. Therefore, we should deliberately glean every learning opportunity from each engagement and make them part of the engagement package.
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9. Capability Assignment

a. The CS Directorate then consolidates these different options, requirements, and considerations for each of the audiences/nodes on the JEPL. A CSWG is then convened to assemble a joint force CS-related capability status for the time period under consideration. The CSWG then assigns specific confirmed-available capabilities and tasks for the designated time period/cycle, to create the desired outcomes. The result is an Engagement Plan and CS-related capability assignment/tasks for each JEPL audience/node for the designated cycle. Figure O-8 outlines this process.

b. The CS Directorate presents the engagement plan and recommended assignments/tasks to the JFC for approval. If approved, the detailed plan, assignments, and tasks go to the JFC Plan Issue and Execution stage of the process. If not approved, the material goes back to either the Capability Matching or Capability Assignment stages, depending on the JFC guidance provided with the disapproval. The engagement package then again proceeds back through the process until gaining JFC approval.

10. Plan Issue and Execution

a. Once capability assignment is approved by the JFC, this information is used to revise and finalize JFC plans and orders for JFC approval. Examples of directly affected parts of the plan/order are shown in Figure O-9, which outlines the remaining process through execution.
b. CS representatives on the operation planning teams need to ensure that CS-related issues are addressed throughout detailed planning. Specifically, areas of primary interest should include the commander’s intent statement, list of objectives, effects, and tasks to subordinates, scheme of maneuver (messages sent through actions), KLE tasks/list/schedule, IO and PA annexes, and the SC Annex Y. Depending on the time frame and whether this is a Crisis Action plan, approval time for Annex Y through the JS J5 and DASD (JC) may be problematic. Therefore early informal coordination is important for expediting the approval process.

c. Although component (and other partner) planning is typically done in parallel and in concert with JFC planning efforts, the final approved JFC plan/order is used to do final updates to the component (or other partner) plans. Then the orders are issued for execution.

11. Assessment

a. Four very important events must occur in this stage of the process, outlined in Figure O-10. The first is verification that the CS product has been delivered to the intended audience/node. Measures of progress, such as “were the leaflets dropped on target” or “was the key leader engagement conducted,” are typically used for this purpose. If the effort to deliver the product or engage the audience/node did not succeed, the engagement must be re-tasked.
b. The second event is confirmation of audience/node reception of the product or engagement. This is a critical step in the assessment stage, because if the message or engagement has not been received by the intended audience, there is no expectation that the desired effect or condition will be created. Many communication efforts fail through lack of attention to this step, because transmission alone does not guarantee audience reception. This step is, perhaps, where many SC operations fail for no obvious reason. There are multiple less-obvious reasons for lack of audience/node reception: poor timing, distracting environmental conditions, information fratricide, incompatible actions (say-do gap) and others. If reception is unsuccessful, then just as above, the engagement must be re-tasked. Again, timing is very important here from both an audience and resourcing standpoint. If resources are an issue, the nomination for engagement may have to go all the way back to the Prioritization stage to compete for limited resources again.

c. Thirdly, the results of a completed engagement must be gathered and analyzed. Although there is typically only one “Assessment Cell” on the joint force staff, assessment activities occur in many staff sections (such as in logistics and intelligence). Likewise, other organizations and partners conduct assessment activities, with significantly overlapping efforts. This causes multiple problems. First, the local population gets “Survey Weary” from having the same subjects surveyed multiple times. Second, it opens the assessment efforts to manipulation, because as the population continues to receive multiple queries for similar information, but does not see rapid changes in conditions commented on, they can get apathetic or hostile to future assessment efforts.
and purposefully provide bad data. Third, too often this information is not shared effectively, unless a conscious effort to do so is developed. Finally, overlapping efforts are extremely wasteful of resources. Gathering together stakeholders and developing a federated assessment effort is much more efficient, effective, and produces much better data than is typically available alone. Often, the Host Nation, United Nations, World Bank, or NGOs have data that precedes the intervention which can provide a very good baseline and may help in anticipating potential outcomes. A good example is a “media monitoring enterprise” that was created in Iraq, discussed on page IV-28 through IV-29 “Understanding the Iraqi and Pan-Arab Media.” If sufficient trust is developed among partners over time, not only can data collection be federated, but assessment and evaluation of the data can be federated as well.

d. Finally, the impact of the engagement must be determined. If the desired immediate impact is achieved, longer-term impacts need to be determined. If the single engagement is also part of creating a larger effect, this engagement contribution needs to be evaluated. For example, a KLE engagement with the local political leader, could have followed a town hall meeting, and preceded a meeting with local tribal leaders, then religious leaders. This sequence may have been during a simultaneous period of broadcast messaging in favor of supporting coalition efforts. If desired impacts are not created, assets may need to be reprioritized for re-engagement, if available. If resources are not available for immediate re-engagement, the audience/node may need to be nominated into the process again, for the following cycle. In like manner, mid and long-term impacts are evaluated to answer these type questions:

(1) Have the desired effects or conditions for this engagement been created?

(2) If the engagement was unsuccessful, were the assets reprioritized and was the task re-engaged?

(3) If desired effects or conditions have been partially created, would re-engagement using the same means, methods, and products result in completion?

(4) What alterations in the means, methods, or products would be necessary for creating the desired effects or conditions?

(5) Would the re-engagement be time-sensitive, due to the need for immediate reinforcement of the partial effect, looming changes in the operational environment or cognitive dimension, or because momentum is building for counter-messages that need to be opposed?

(6) If effects/conditions have been created and are expected to last for a period of time, can this audience be removed from the Focused Engagement List or plan?

(7) Will there be more potential need for influencing this audience in the future?

(8) Have all the data bases, including the Intelligence data base, been updated with the assessment information?
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e. If the immediate, mid- and long-term desired impacts have been achieved for the particular audience/node, then it should be removed from the focused engagement cycle. This does not mean that the audience/node is ignored at this point, it still receives information as part of the broad and general “inform” and “educate” effort. Although it is removed from focused engagement, the folder for that audience/node is retained as part of the Candidate Audience List for potential future nomination for focused engagement.

f. As with any audience/node, the folder will be reviewed and updated as future engagement is considered. Because resources are limited, folders are generally updated in one of two ways. When an audience/node is being considered for nomination for focused engagement, the folder is updated. Folders should also be reviewed and updated as part of a cyclic scheduled effort. Each folder should have a date on it, showing the last date of review or update. This allows a review/update of all folders on a schedule that is manageable with the resources available. This also allows those entities considering nomination of an audience/node to see the currency of the folder, so that important decision-making is not based on out-of-date information.

g. Updating of all databases used in the operation is an important ongoing effort. As assessment is completed and the audience/node is removed from the focused engagement cycle, the Modern Integrated Data Base (MIDB) is also updated. This is important for current, mid-term and future operations.
APPENDIX P
PRINCIPLES, CREDIBILITY, AND TRUST

1. Introduction

a. It’s impossible to not communicate. Everything one does – even an attempt to do nothing – communicates something to somebody somewhere. (Watzlawik, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). The powerful yet often overlooked implication of this fact is that communication is not merely a matter of what is said, it is also, perhaps primarily, a matter of what is done. For this reason communication cannot be treated as a discrete function within military planning and operations. Rather, it must be fully integrated into planning and operations to ensure consistent alignment between the military’s words and deeds. Simply put, the U.S. military must prove both more trustworthy and more credible than its enemies.

b. Senior leaders frequently emphasize the importance of trust and credibility with regard to military success in contemporary operations and related communication efforts. For example, during a speech on U.S. global leadership, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that success “…is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out-propagandize al-Qaeda, but rather through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.” (2008, italics added). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, likewise emphasized this point in a Joint Forces Quarterly article, asserting that nobody has “…proven more capable of establishing trust and credibility in more places than [the U.S. military.]” (2009, p. 3, italics added). Yet despite this persistent emphasis upon the importance of trust and credibility, the terms are not yet defined in the context of military operations nor has the way they fit into the greater operations planning process been formally clarified.

c. The purpose of this Appendix is to present a communication principles model to aid military leaders, planners, communication practitioners — and indeed all military personnel – who face the complex and potentially daunting task of integrating communication into operations in a way that establishes, preserves and strengthens public trust in and the credibility of the U.S. military. This model might also serve as a universal tool for use by the Departments of State, Department of Homeland Security, and other organizations and agencies with which the military conducts operations.

2. Why a New Model?

a. Two sets of principles related to communication already exist within official U.S. military publications, each insufficient for three key reasons: they are generally information-centric; they are oriented toward communication practitioners rather than universal application; and neither set of principles effectively prescribes how communication efforts might be integrated, planned and executed within military operations.

b. Information is merely one element of any given holistic communication model, yet the first set of current principles, identified in joint publications 3-61, Public Affairs, and 3-13, Information Operations, as Principles of Information, focus almost exclusively on the disposition of information. This focus on the information element of communication
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is indicative of the military’s current mindset toward communication as a technical or monologic process of information control and delivery and is further exemplified in the parlance of our times. For example, within the first page of JP 3-61, media outlets are identified as the primary avenue for dissemination of public information while the terms most commonly used to describe those with whom the military communicates are *audiences* or *target audiences* – terms that appear dozens of times in communication-related doctrinal publications including JP 3-61, JP 3-13 and JP 3-53, *Psychological Operations*. Note that a target is something to hit, an audience typically receives, and neither invites interactive engagement. Similarly the doctrinal purpose of communication is repeatedly identified as *to inform*, *to disseminate information*, or *to influence a target audience*, each being information-centric, one-way activities.

c. One might argue that official doctrine does not reflect contemporary thinking, but the focus on medium and information with disregard for other elements of holistic communication models is prevalent even among those who actively seek change. For example, leading practitioners from the Department of Defense, Department of State, the intelligence community, and experts from academia participated in a workshop on new media and the warfighter. During the workshop they repeatedly identified the need to engage in ongoing conversations within the “Blogosphere” and “Twitterverse,” yet in the report published after the event, other conversationalists were consistently referred to as *target audiences*. In the midst of a communication revolution that increasingly enables people to engage in an interactive communication process in which barriers and filters can be breached to allow interactive engagement to build trust and credibility, military leaders and practitioners remain focused on the medium and the message while collectively referring to the world around them as the “Global Information Environment.” (SecDev Group, 2009, italics added).

d. The Principles of Information – perhaps more accurately described as an expression of philosophy than a set of guiding principles – encourage information-centrism, reinforce habitual thinking, and may consequently inhibit success in the midst of a fast paced and rapidly changing communication environment.

e. The second set of principles – the Principles of Strategic Communication identified within Appendix A of this handbook – suggest a more holistic approach to communication than is evident in the Principles of Information. However, these principles are generally descriptive rather than prescriptive. They highlight characteristics of the communication environment and of a potential communication process rather than how to communicate, and might more appropriately be labeled *Characteristics* of Strategic Communication.

f. In contrast to the Principles of Strategic Communication and the Principles of Information, the communication principles presented in this Appendix are modeled upon the U.S. military’s Principles of War which are distinctly prescriptive and serve as a common frame of reference for every member of the military, not merely for people assigned to specific leadership positions or specialties. Note that Mass, Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security and Simplicity each represent specific actions *all warfighters* should take to achieve military objectives. Similar to the Principles of War, this communication principles model is provided as a universal tool for use not only by communication practitioners, but also by leaders, planners and personnel throughout the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government
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entities. Finally, this model is designed to foster an approach to communication as a holistic process of deliberate engagement and exchange rather than information control and delivery.

3. Overview of the Model

Figure P-1 below includes three main elements: trust, credibility and the principles themselves. Trust serves as the base or foundation of the model. Credibility is represented by a cone balanced point-downward upon the foundation of trust. Seven communication principles are represented by a set of spheres distributed evenly around the rim of the cone’s flat surface. The principles are Free Flow of Information, Accuracy, Timeliness, Security, Privacy, Unity of Voice, and Delegation of Voice. These principles were identified through analysis of communication-related doctrinal publications, orders, directives and policies as well as the U.S. Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Though not all are explicitly identified in existing public affairs, combat camera, information operations, psychological operations, and strategic communication texts, each is consistently implicit within these documents.

4. Trust and Credibility as Elements of the Model

a. In many historical cases the purpose of warfare was to crush the will of the enemy, but General Stanley McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, proposes something different. “The objective,” he said during a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “is the will of the Afghan people.” (2009,
Doctrinally, for irregular warfare, it is in fact the center of gravity. This assertion rings true in U.S. theaters of operation around the globe, from the strategic level to the tactical, and has direct implications regarding military communication practices including Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and most recently Strategic Communication (SC). In 2005, then U.S. Presidential hopeful Barrack Obama wrote, “Even more than was true during the Cold War, the struggle against Islamic-based terrorism will be not simply a military campaign but a battle for public opinion in the Islamic world, among our allies, and in the United States.” (p. 307-308, italics added). Robert D. Kaplan highlights this aspect of warfare at the tactical level in his book about the contemporary U.S. military and its operations worldwide. “We changed the way we were perceived,” one [U.S. Green Beret] told [him]. “When we arrived in Basilan, Muslim kids made throat-slashing gestures at us. By the time we left they were our friends. That led them to question everything the guerrillas had told them about Americans.” (P. 167-168).

b. Both trust and credibility are essential to military success: if either one collapses, the mission will predictably fail. Furthermore, preservation of both trust and credibility requires deliberate alignment of the military’s words and deeds. Yet even the most well-intentioned attempts to establish, preserve, and strengthen trust and credibility will quickly backfire if a given public decides it is being manipulated or deceived. For these reasons trust and credibility form the platform upon which this communication principles model is built. Trust is the foundation of the model, credibility the fulcrum upon which a core set of principles is balanced.

5. Trust

Within the context of this model, trust is defined as the perceived alignment of the military’s words and deeds. As noted by Bennis, Goleman and O’Toole (2008, p. 62), “When leaders are candid, open, consistent and predictable in their dealings with followers, the result will almost always be a condition of trust.” However, although the words and deeds of an organization have a direct effect on public trust, trust is not controlled through that alignment. It is subject to numerous influences including culture, history, education and language that may extend beyond the time, resources or expertise of the military to understand or anticipate. Perhaps most important, trust must be given freely – it cannot be mandated. While trust-building may be the desired outcome of communication efforts it should not be the operational goal, because when public trust shifts or weakens it cannot be repaired by outward demands or assurances but through inward focused, principle-based realignment of an organization’s words and deeds.

6. Credibility

a. Within the context of this model, credibility is defined as the literal alignment of the military’s words and deeds. Like trust, credibility is created through alignment of words and deeds, but it is a direct product of that alignment itself. Unlike trust, which must be freely given, credibility can be preserved and protected through deliberate action on the part of the military. That is, while the public cannot be forced to trust the military, deliberate actions can be taken to preserve credibility that in turn encourages trust over time.
b. Those familiar with the indirect approach to warfighting may recognize parallels in the process of building trust through credibility. Trust is developed by, with and through credibility-building actions. If the military lacks credibility it will not likely be trusted, but lack of trust does not prevent or restrict credibility-building actions. Figure P-2 provides a pictorial representation of shifting principles to preserve credibility despite shifts in trust due to outside influences.

c. This is critical to military communication efforts because it delineates the point at which plans and actions can be linked directly to outcomes: the center of gravity is the point at which organizational credibility and public trust converge (Figure P-3); the focus of effort as depicted in the model is the absolute preservation of the military’s credibility. The communication Center of Gravity is the point where Trust and Credibility intersect. Credibility is the Focus of Effort because it can be directly influenced by an organization whereas Trust cannot.

d. Credibility-building actions could include a public declaration of guiding principles; deliberate application of those principles to all military activities; deliberate alignment of the military’s words and deeds; and a bold challenge to key publics to compare and contrast how those principles are applied by the military and its communication competitors.

7. Trust, Credibility, the Enemy, and Key Publics

a. Though generally associated with morals and values, trust and credibility in the context of this principles model are morally neutral terms and are not associated with the matter of who is right, wrong, good or evil. The Taliban and al-Qaeda can be both trusted...
and credible among key publics despite their use of tactics that incite fear. For example, an Afghan farmer might be told his son will be killed and his fields burned if he grows wheat instead of poppy. If the farmer chooses to grow wheat and an insurgent group burns his field and kills his son then both words and deeds are in alignment. The insurgents have proven credible and the farmer will likely trust that the insurgents will do what they say. In contrast, if the U.S. military’s words and deeds do not align, it will be neither trusted nor credible despite its self-held belief that it is a force for good.

b. This is a central challenge for national militaries that highlights a key difference between traditional warfare and contemporary operations that struggle to gain support of the local population. The population typically falls into one of three categories: those who oppose the U.S. military’s activities; those who support the U.S. military’s activities; and those who have yet to decide. Similarly, there are those who will never trust the military, those who will trust without fail, and those whose trust might still be earned. The first group understandably becomes the traditional target of military plans and combat operations. In the context of communication, however, the enemy may in fact be a distraction. The key publics with which the military must establish its credibility and ultimately build trust are drawn from the third and generally largest group of those people who are struggling to decide not which force is right or wrong, but which is more credible and worthy of their trust. Key publics, therefore, are those people most likely to develop trust through demonstrated credibility.
8. Practical Application of the Principles

a. Recall that every action communicates something to somebody somewhere. (Watzlawik, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). In modern warfare, all activities are communication activities. The purpose of this model is to establish, preserve and strengthen credibility through equal consideration of the seven communication principles during planning and execution. This does not mean that all principles must be applied equally. None of the seven principles is either primary or absolute. Rather, sacrifices in one principle must be deliberately balanced against gains in one or more of the other principles, and this decision-making process must often be communicated clearly and openly to key publics in order to preserve and strengthen credibility. For example, timeliness, security, and delegation of voice might be sacrificed to ensure accuracy (Figure P-4), or freedom of information might be sacrificed in order to preserve security. Credibility is also strengthened through a willingness to explain such deliberate trade-offs.

b. Failure to communicate the rationale behind subordination of one principle to another may allow the public to assume the worst and reduce credibility, ultimately weakening trust.


a. Free Flow of Information means communication will be established with key publics, through appropriate avenues, to ensure information is readily available to those who want it. Likewise, appropriate information should be provided rapidly upon request.
to the greatest extent possible. The underlying assumption implicit in this principle is that the military’s activities are legitimate and that an informed non-hostile public will agree. While hostile publics may not agree, remember that the focus in counterinsurgency is the will of the people rather than the will of the enemy. Ultimate success in communication may occur when the enemy is rendered either unacceptable or irrelevant by the local population, rather than destroyed.

b. The principle of Free Flow of Information is also formalized in law by the Freedom of Information Act, which emphasizes the importance of transparency in U.S. military activities. However, this principle is not synonymous with transparency, as there are numerous legitimate reasons – including Security and Privacy – to limit Free Flow of Information.

10. Accuracy

Accuracy means that information provided to key publics regarding military activities is not only factual, but that it also portrays a correct picture of events. This principle, which is not synonymous with the relative term “truth,” will most frequently be in conflict with the principle of Timeliness.

11. Timeliness

a. Timeliness is defined in terms of the information interests and demands of a given key public. These interests and demands must be anticipated in order to effectively
Principles, Credibility, and Trust

balance the timing of communication against the other communication principles. For example, non-western cultures often do not require immediate information. Communication through key tribal and religious leaders may be more important locally than getting the story into the international news broadcast. Likewise, free flowing and timely communication must be balanced against the principles of Security, Privacy and Accuracy.

b. Timeliness must not be confused with speed achieved at the expense of Accuracy (Figure P-5). For example, insurgent groups in Iraq or Afghanistan may consistently release false or inaccurate information more quickly than the U.S. military, but this activity must be considered in context of Accuracy and long-term credibility. Additionally, insurgent timeliness can easily be bested during planned operations through deliberate communication activities before, during and immediately following operations. However, unexpected events pose the most significant point of conflict between Timeliness and Accuracy. During these crisis response challenges, three questions should guide the U.S. military’s concern regarding the speed of insurgent communication: First, do insurgent words match insurgent deeds? Second, in the case of inaccurate allegations about U.S. military activities, do insurgent words reflect the actions of the military? Third, who will be most credible and ultimately trusted over time? Figure P-6 shows how an overreaction or an imbalance can impact credibility and trust.

12. Security

Security means that the potential risk to military personnel, equipment, facilities and mission objectives must be anticipated and evaluated before communicating with key publics. This principle may be most familiar in context of Information and Operations
Security, but the overarching factor of national security must also be taken into account. Security is one of two principles that serve to limit communication and is most often in conflict with the principles of Free Flow of Information and Timeliness.

13. Privacy

The Privacy of individuals must be protected. The Privacy Act formalizes this principle in law. At first glance, this principle may appear to be an internal issue. However, keeping privacy within reasonable bounds can minimize vulnerability to individual attacks, manipulation, or disruptive public scrutiny. Privacy is the second principle that serves to inhibit communication and therefore becomes a factor that must be explained in order to preserve credibility. Like Security, Privacy will most often conflict with the principles of Free Flow of Information and Timeliness.

14. Unity of Voice

Unity of Voice means that all members of the military must know which information should and should not be communicated during their interaction with key publics. This principle includes both word and deed elements as both are communication activities that directly influence the credibility of the military. Traditionally, the military attempts to assure Unity of Voice by limiting the number of people authorized to act as spokespersons. In the modern communication environment, however, consideration must be given to the fact that all personnel will communicate to some degree with members of the public, including friends and family, in ways that are not constrained by time, distance or medium.

15. Delegation of Voice

a. Delegation of Voice equates closely to traditional kinetic Rules of Engagement. It means that to the greatest extent possible, all personnel must be prepared, allowed and encouraged to communicate freely and openly about military activities at the earliest possible time. Equally important, if personnel are restricted from communicating about a given issue, they must understand and be able to explain the rationale for this restriction and they must know where to refer those with questions on the topic.

b. Application of this principle does not mean that all personnel will have free rein to communicate at all times. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the fact that all service members will communicate with the public to some degree through either word or deed and therefore both the potential risks and benefits of their activities must be taken into account.

c. Additionally, while it may appear so at first glance, Unity of Voice and Delegation of Voice are not opposites in conflict with one another. To the contrary, the most successful application of these two principles will ensure Unity of Voice is preserved while the power of communication engagement is simultaneously multiplied through a combination of Delegation of Voice and Free Flow of Information. This is best accomplished by informing the force, so that they can auto-synchronize their words and deeds with desired effects.
Principles, Credibility, and Trust

16. Summary

a. Contemporary military operations, especially counterinsurgencies, will require deliberate integration of communication efforts into plans and operations for two reasons. First, as established by Watzlawik, Beavin and Jackson (1967), it’s impossible to not communicate; every action taken by the military communicates something to somebody somewhere. Second, renewed mission focus upon building the will of the people (rather than destroying the enemy) places greater emphasis on the importance of trust and credibility, which in turn increases the need to ensure alignment between the military’s words and deeds. Unfortunately, current guiding principles are insufficient to ensure success amidst a fast-paced and rapidly evolving communication environment.

b. The Principles of Information and the Principles of Strategic Communication generally reinforce the military’s mindset that communication is a process of information control and delivery. The former places emphasis upon the conditions that allow and restrict delivery of information to target audiences, while the latter describes the communication environment reasonably well, but does not guide activity within that environment. Both sets of principles are intended more for use by communication practitioners, rather than as universal guides.

c. The communication principles model presented in this Appendix is provided as a universal tool for use throughout the military and other organizations that partner with the military across the entire spectrum of operations and programs.

17. The Author and Graphics

Cliff W. Gilmore is an active duty U.S. Marine Corps Major currently assigned as Special Assistant for Public Communication to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He holds a Master of Science degree in Organization Management with a specialization in Leadership, is a doctoral learner in the same field with an emphasis on communication as a leadership practice, and was recently selected for participation as a Fellow in MIT’s 2010-2011 Seminar XXI on Foreign Politics, International Relations and the National Interest.

Graphics designed by: Christopher Jenkins.

Note: Communication Principles Model and images presented within this Appendix are the property of Cliff W. Gilmore and reprinted here with permission.

References

Appendix P


APPENDIX Q
REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

PART I—REFERENCES

The development of the Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication is based on the following primary references.

1. US Government Documents

   a. Dr. Michael Doran, DASD for DSPD, House Armed Services Committee testimony of 8 Nov 07.

   b. Duncan MacInnes, Principal Deputy Coordinator of the DOS Bureau of International Information Programs, 15 Nov 07 statement to the US House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats: “Strategic Communications and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism.”


2. Department of Defense Issuances

   a. DASD (JC) briefing, Institutionalizing Strategic Communication Through Education, 2008 DOD SC Education Summit 20-21 Mar 08.


   c. DODD 3050.00, Strategic Communication, draft dated 27 Nov 07.

   d. DOD, National Defense Strategy, June 08.

   e. DOD SC Integration Group (SCIG) memorandum from the DepSecDef, Washington DC, 31 Jan 07.


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3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives

a. CJCSI 8010.01B, Joint Community Warfighter Chief Information Officer, 8 September 2006.

b. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures, 29 Sep 06.

c. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats, 17 Aug 07.

d. CJC Memo to DepSecDef, Strategic Communication, 14 December 2007.

4. Joint Publications


f. JP 3-0 Ch1, Joint Operations, 13 February 2008.


k. JP 3-26, Counter Terrorism (in development).


m. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, revision draft.

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5. Service Doctrinal Publications


6. Combatant Command Documents


c. USJFCOM J-9, *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*, version 0.7, 20 June 08.


7. Other


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e. Goldman, Emily Dr., Strategic Communication Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Briefing: *Strategic Communication Theory and Application*, June 2008.


t. Wood, David, *Information Ops in Afghanistan: Call Haji Shir Mohamad ASAP?*, PoliticsDaily.com, 10 Sept 09
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4 Ibid, 92.


6 These senior level OPMEP education programs are for perspective joint/combined force commanders, selected flag officers and senior enlisted to understand: the fundamentals of joint doctrine and the Joint Operational Art; how to integrate the elements of national power in order to accomplish national security and national military strategies; and how joint, interagency, and multinational operations support national strategic goals and objectives.


8 The description of the operational environment in JP 3-0 encompasses a discussion of the information environment, including its physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.


11 JP 3-0 Ch1, Joint Operations, II-22.


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15 Gough, Sue, Acting Director of Joint Communication, DASD (JC), OSD Public Affairs, briefing: Strategic Communication Overview, 29 July 09.

16 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Implementation of the DOD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan, 12 September 2007. Note: This plan was developed and written out of OUSD for Policy (SPD) Dr. Emily Goldman, principal author. It created significant tension because this plan was not well coordinated amongst the community and assigned tasks to organizations which were not resourced to execute.

17 Interview with EUCOM Deputy SC Director, LTC Fiala, 3 Dec 07.

18 The US Army Wounded Warrior Program provides severely wounded Soldiers and their families with a system of advocacy and follow-up with personal support to assist them as they return to duty, or to civilian life.

19 Interview with Director DASD (JC), Col Julian, 9 May 08.

20 DODD 3050.00, draft dated 27 Nov 07. Highlights listed in the bullets that follow are from this document. This document is again on hold pending the sorting out of the transference of SCIG responsibilities, standing up of the DASD (JC) planning team, issues mentioned above, and others.

21 CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures, 29 Sep 06, page GL-29, defines the term military diplomacy as: The ability to support those activities and measures US military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships.

22 JP 3-0 Ch1, I-2.

23 The Joint Staff may shortly transition the JOPES manuals into Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) manuals. JSAPTasker JS-6266-09 called for JPEC input to change the JOPES Manuals, and the DJS is expected to approve the change in Oct 09.

24 Note: CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats, 17 Aug 07, provides a 24 page guide to writing Annex Y, enclosure E appendix Y.


26 Ibid, page B-18, para ‘a’.


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34 Urban Resolve 2015 Communication Strategy Board experimentation results indicated that (with proper training and direction from the JFC) SC objectives, themes, and messages were considered by all planners of the CSB regardless of Military Occupational Specialty or staff position.


37 Ibid, page 38.

38 GEN Mattis, Commander USJFCOM, during various venues 2008-2009.

39 Interview with BG Holman on 23 June 08.


41 Interview of CAPT Chesnut, USSOUTHCOM Plans, 17 June 09.

42 SC JIC version 0.7, 20 June 08, ii.

43 Ibid, iii.

44 Adapted from John R. Boyd, “The Essence of Winning and Losing” unpublished slides, 28Jun95, slide 4. This was the only diagram Boyd ever produced of the OODA loop.


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47 Mr. Rick Rowlett, COL USA (ret), Doctrine Support Team, Doctrine and Education Group, JWFC JFCOM, 2 April 2007.

48 JP 3-0 Ch1, pages II-22 through II-25. The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation.

49 The description of the operational environment in JP 3-0 encompasses a discussion of the information environment, including its physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.


52 JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, II-22.


54 Feedback from the field indicates that Human Terrain Teams are using social scientists and cultural analysts with good success. COL Arthur V. Jewett, Director Human Terrain System Assessment Team, TRADOC/DSCINT, Human Terrain Team Preliminary Assessment: Executive Summary July – August 2007, 1.


59 JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 16 June 09, pages II-31 through II-32.

61 The RAND Corporation conducted a research project to review social-science literature relating to counterterrorism and published the book in 2009, *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*. Michael Egner’s chapter nine entitled *Social-Science Foundations for Strategic Communications in the Global War on Terrorism* provides some fairly good insights and recommendations. It appeared to this author that the research was quite extensive, but some of the surveyed studies/reports, however, were conducted on purely domestic audiences and in some sectors that may not translate well to military application. Therefore, those conclusions and recommendations were not included. Accepted material adapted from this project played a large part in this section.

62 RAND, 351.


64 Examples taken from MNF-I material gathered during JFCOM April 08 assistance visit, and excerpts from daily CJ9 STRATTCOM BUA and CMS for 29 July 08 and 18 August 08.


70 Feedback from the field indicates that social scientists and cultural analysts are being used with good success in the Human Terrain Teams. COL Arthur V. Jewett, Director Human Terrain System Assessment Team, TRADOC/DSCINT, *Human Terrain Team Preliminary Assessment: Executive Summary July – August 2007*, 1.


72 Adapted from considerations developed by the JFCOM J-9 SC JIC development team.
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73 Goldman, Emily Dr., Strategic Communication Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Briefing: Strategic Communication Theory and Application, June 2008


75 Wood, David, Information Ops in Afghanistan: Call Haji Shir Mohamad ASAP!, PoliticsDaily.com, 10 Sept 09

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77 News Americas, Interview: Robert Gates, Aljazeera, 8 Sept 09


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80 AFCEA International (AFCEA), established in 1946, is a non-profit membership association serving the military, government, industry, and academia as an ethical forum for advancing professional knowledge and relationships in the fields of communications, IT, intelligence, and global security. NightWatch is an executive intelligence recap prepared by editor John McCreary and provided by AFCEA Intelligence as a free service.
## GLOSSARY

**PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>AMEMB</td>
<td>American Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
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<td>ASD (PA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs</td>
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<td>ATO</td>
<td>air tasking order</td>
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<tr>
<td>B2C2WG</td>
<td>bureaus, boards, centers, cells, and working groups</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BENS</td>
<td>Business Executives for National Security</td>
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<td>web log</td>
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<td>ballistic missile defense</td>
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<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force</td>
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<td>Commander</td>
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<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>combined force air component commander</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
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<td>DASD</td>
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**Glossary**

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<td>defense coordinating element</td>
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<td>dental civic action program</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities</td>
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<td>GEN</td>
<td>General GOI Government of Iraq GS government service</td>
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<td>HLD</td>
<td>homeland defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOA</td>
<td>horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>interagency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCT</td>
<td>Interagency Crisis Communication Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>infantry division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIP</td>
<td>Department of State’s Bureau of International Information Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOWG</td>
<td>information operations working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>interagency policy committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-33</td>
<td>current operations cell in the J-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-35</td>
<td>current plans cell in the J-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-55</td>
<td>future plans cell in the J-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ-NY</td>
<td>joint force headquarters - New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>joint integrating concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning &amp; Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPASE</td>
<td>Joint Public Affairs Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPME</td>
<td>joint professional military education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JQO</td>
<td>Joint Qualified Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTTP</td>
<td>joint tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWFC</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Center (USJFCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>military diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>medical civic action program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>military deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIST</td>
<td>military information support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Corps - Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Force - Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>media operations center; military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPICE</td>
<td>Measuring Progress in a Conflict Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>mobile training wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
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### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICCL</td>
<td>National Incident Communications Conference Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRCC</td>
<td>National Response Coordination Center (FEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAT</td>
<td>national satellite telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSE</td>
<td>national special security event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYTAG</td>
<td>the Adjutant General of New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>Operation NOBLE EAGLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OODA</td>
<td>observe, orient, decide, and act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>office of primary responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSA</td>
<td>operational research and systems analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Open Source Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>policy coordination committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>public diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>political advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ret</td>
<td>retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>revision final coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/PPR</td>
<td>Under Secretary, the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGSEC</td>
<td>Department of State’s Global Strategic Engagement Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRU</td>
<td>Department of State’s Rapid Response Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>strategic communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCB</td>
<td>strategic communication board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIG</td>
<td>Strategic Communication Integration Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCWG</td>
<td>strategic communication working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECASTATE</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>senior executive service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHSGAC</td>
<td>Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOTF</td>
<td>special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEFF</td>
<td>MNF–I Strategic Effects Communication Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TED</td>
<td>theater security cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>theater security cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army; United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCORG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEMB</td>
<td>United States Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USM–I</td>
<td>United States Mission Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS</td>
<td>United States Naval Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USGPA</td>
<td>United States Government public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ver</td>
<td>version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>visual information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNN</td>
<td>world news network (exercise)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called **AOR.** (JP 3-0)

**center of gravity.** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called **COG.** (JP 3-0)

**civil affairs.** Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA.** (JP 3-57)

**combatant command.** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 5-0)

**combat camera.** The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of combat, information, humanitarian, special forces, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations involving the Military Services. Also called **COMCAM.** See also visual information; visual information documentation. (JP 3-61)

**communication strategy.** A joint force commander’s strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support SC-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. (JP 3-0 RFD)

**computer network operations.** Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. Also called **CNO.** (JP 3-13)

**defense support to public diplomacy.** Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called **DSPD.** (JP 3-13)

**electronic warfare.** Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions. electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called **EW.** (JP 3-13.1)

**end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0)

**imagery.** A likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity, and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or
representation was acquired, including: products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and likeness and presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (except that such term does not include handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations). (JP 2-03)

**information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 3-13)

**instruments of national power.** All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1)

**intergovernmental organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0)

**joint planning group.** A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force HQ principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called JPG. (JP 5-0)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1)

**major operation.** A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. (JP 3-0)

**measure of effectiveness.** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 3-0)

**measure of performance.** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 3-0)
Glossary

**message.** A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a theme.

**military deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 3-13.4)

**military diplomacy.** The ability to support those activities and measures US military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships. (CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats, 17 August 2007)

**narrative.** Enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state.

**nongovernmental organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to. a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 3-13.3)

**other government agency.** Within the context of interagency coordination, a non Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called OGA. (JP 1)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 3-53)
**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 3-61)

**rules for the use of force.** Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called RUF. (JP 3-28)

**rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

**strategic communication.** Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 5-0)

**theme.** An overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives.

**visual information.** Use of one or more of the various visual media with or without sound. Generally, visual information includes still photography, motion picture photography, video or audio recording, graphic arts, visual aids, models, display, visual presentation services, and the support processes. Also called VI. (JP 1-02)
“Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks-political, economic, social, and military-to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy-measured in decades rather than months or years.”

Col Thomas X. Hammes, “The Sling and the Stone”