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**EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT TRAINING AND ADVISING
IN PAKISTAN**

by

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EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT TRAINING AND ADVISING IN PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

When we think of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), we most often think of conducting missions “by, with and through” a Partner Nation’s government and patrolling alongside partner nation security forces who are embroiled in yet another conflict in a “bad” region of the world. But, in some conflicts, this very direct method of training and advising is inadvisable at best, and foolhardy at worst. In Pakistan right now, “by, with, and through” represents just such a foolhardy approach.

This thesis will not only substantiate that assertion but by presenting the “menu” of training and advisory choices the United States and other nations have will point to a “third way”—a method of training and advising that should not be as unfamiliar as it seems to be, since the United States used it very effectively just thirty years ago, and in the same general vicinity.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	PAKISTAN: TRACING THE PROBLEM	7
	A. THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS.....	9
	B. THE FRONTIER CORPS	11
	C. THE ENEMY	15
	D. U.S. INVOLVEMENT.....	21
	E. PAKISTANI CONCILIATION	23
III.	TRAINING AND ADVISING.....	27
	A. WHAT IS TRAINING AND ADVISING AND WHY DO IT?	27
	B. WHO CONDUCTS TRAINING AND ADVISING?	32
	C. HOW CAN A FORCE TRAIN AND ADVISE?.....	34
	D. “BY, WITH, AND THROUGH”	35
	E. “BY AND THROUGH, BUT NOT <i>WITH</i> ”	40
	F. “INDIRECT–TRAIN THE TRAINER”	45
	G. SUMMARY	55
IV.	RECOMMENDED METHOD.....	57
	A. HISTORY OF SUCCESSFUL INDIRECT FID AND UW	57
	B. WHAT TO DO?	57
	C. A SOLUTION: MINIMIZING THE U.S. FOOTPRINT	61
	D. SUMMARY	61
V.	CONCLUSION	69
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	73
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	81

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Map of Pakistan (Available from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/pakistan.html , accessed February 15, 2010).	5
Figure 2.	Map of the FATA (From Roggio, 2008)	11
Figure 3.	Bridging FID and SA with SFA (From FM 3-07.1, p. I-7)	30
Figure 4.	Types of FID (From FM 3-07.1 p. I-6)	34
Figure 5.	U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course Phase V Program of Instruction	65

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ANA	Afghan National Army
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BATTs	Battalion Augmentation Training Teams
CAA	CAFGU Active Auxiliaries
CAFGU	Civilian Auxillary Force-Geographic Unit
CHDF	Citizen Home Defense Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CVO	Civilian Volunteer Organization
FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Cuban Army)
FATA	Federal Administered Tribal Areas
FC	Frontier Corps
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FSF	Foreign Security Forces
GHQ	General Headquarters (Pakistan Army)
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GPF	General Purpose Forces
HN	Host Nation
IA	Iraqi Army
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JSOTF-P	Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines
JUSMAG-THAI	Joint United States Military Advisory Group – Thailand
JUSMAG-P	Joint United States Military Advisory Group – Philippines
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MITT	Military Transition Teams
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MPLA	Movimento Popular di Libertacao di Angola
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OEF-A	Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan
OEF-P	Operational Enduring Freedom – Philippines
OPATT	Operational Planning and Assistance Training Teams
PMT	Pre-mission Training
PN	Partner Nation
PNP	Philippine National Police
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTP	Royal Thai Police
SA	Security Assistance
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SC	Security Cooperation
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha
SFQC	Special Forces Qualification Course
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSG	Special Service Group
TTP	Tehrik e Taliban
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USSF	United States Special Forces
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) form a buffer between Islamabad-controlled Pakistan and the rough border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The FATA is considered by many to be the most dangerous place in the world. It is especially dangerous to Westerners, even more so to Americans, and incredibly dangerous to American service members. It is a place where even Pakistani soldiers do not go unless they are moving as a part of a unit—and even then, very carefully.

American operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan and, more specifically, what is perceived to be our puppet-like control over Islamabad, makes even being seen by the FATA populace extremely dangerous. These operations have been like gas thrown on the fire of militant Islamic hatred toward the West and Western policies. More specifically, our presence fuels hatred among the Pashtun tribes in the FATA, peoples whose cooperation the United States may need in order to achieve its goal of finding Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) measures inside Pakistan began in late 2001, with small teams of intelligence personnel and some special operations troops working in cooperation with the Pakistani government to get a “feel” for what was taking place on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border. Over time, these efforts have led to a relatively large U.S. footprint inside the Northwest Frontier Province and even the FATA, and consist of U.S. unilateral direct action raids, drone aircraft launches (often from within Pakistan), and U.S. training programs for the Pakistani Special Service Group (SSG) and the Frontier Corps (FC). See Figures 1 and 2 for maps of Pakistan.

Since 2009, the United States has conducted more drone strikes than in any period prior.¹ Sometimes these have been effective, when senior Taliban leaders are killed. But sometimes, they have proven to be catastrophic, when there are innocent civilian casualties. Regardless of the effectiveness of these operations, or of the U.S./Pakistani cooperation they require, they have enraged the populace, not only in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, but also throughout comparatively liberal Punjab and Islamabad itself.

U.S. Army Special Forces teams currently train with SSG personnel on SSG bases in Attock Fort, Tarbela, and Cherat, NWFP, outside the FATA.² Special Forces also trains Frontier Corps units, but *within* the FATA in an attempt to help bring the insurgency down to an “acceptable” level. The United States’ hope is that soon it will be able to conduct joint U.S./Pakistani operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the FATA—something the Pakistanis will never accept the U.S. military attempting unilaterally.³

Every member of U.S. Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs has been indoctrinated with the idea that, when conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID), it is imperative to operate “by, with, and through” local forces. After all, this is what makes Special Forces *special*. It is the only trait that distinguishes U.S. Army Special Forces from other Special Operations Forces (SOF). To conduct a raid, ambush, or airfield seizure, the United States has the Rangers. To find a specific enemy personality in the middle of a heavily populated Third World city, the United States has special mission units. To conduct quality maritime or waterborne missions, the United States has the SEALs. All of these are Special Operations Forces. But, none is Special Forces.

¹ Peter Bergen, “Pakistan Drone War Takes a Toll on Militants—and Civilians,” *CNN: Opinion* (2009), <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/OPINION/10/29/bergen.drone.war/> (accessed February 20, 2010).

² One of the authors of this thesis was the Special Forces Detachment Commander who, in 2006 and 2007, coordinated and conducted two cycles of this training with the SSG in Pakistan.

³ Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S., Afghans and Pakistanis Consider Joint Military Force,” *The Washington Post*, sec. A, September 23, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/22/AR2008092203036.html> (accessed February 28, 2009).

No unit other than Special Forces in the U.S military has the level of specific training necessary to conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW), and although the DoD has chartered other special operations and conventional units to conduct FID, no unit but Special Forces has the level of training *tailored* to the FID mission. When people think of FID, they primarily think of a twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) training and advising a partner nation (PN) battalion against an internal or external threat.

Typically, U.S. military commanders constantly tell their units to “put an [insert partner nation] face” on their missions. This, of course, means the commander expects his unit to make sure the partner nation’s security force is out front, with U.S. troops barely visible, in order to demonstrate to citizens the effectiveness of their own national forces and, more importantly, to demonstrate the legitimacy of their national government. Another aim is to ensure the perception that the PN remains sovereign, without it appearing to be under U.S. control—a principle that U.S. Special Forces should indeed reinforce.

But, what if the situation is too politically sensitive—too politically sensitive for U.S. troops of *any* kind to operate inside the partner country, in a specific area of that country, or even in that region? What if the concern is not so much the dangers posed by the enemy, as the dangers that inhere in the presence of outsiders inciting the population itself? What if the population’s reaction to outsiders will make the FID mission counterproductive and worsen the insurgency? Under these circumstances, instead of diving right in and “taking charge,” or attempting to emulate T.E. Lawrence on a massive scale, by using thousands of U.S. troops to “advise” a foreign security force, it might well be better to stand back and lead from the rear.

Such is the case with Pakistan’s FATA. The U.S. presence in the FATA is inflammatory, and actually contributes to the spread of violence in the form of suicide attacks against the Pakistani military and other government targets, to include Islamabad, the capital city of a nuclear power.

The argument this thesis makes is that the United States has catalyzed a bad insurgency and is making it worse. The questions this thesis poses are: why are we training the Frontier Corps in the FATA, and to go even further, why are we training the Frontier Corps at all?




Figure 1. Map of Pakistan (Available from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin, <https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/pakistan.html>, accessed February 15, 2010).

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II. PAKISTAN: TRACING THE PROBLEM

In the wider context of post-World War II decolonization, Pakistan, which gained its independence in 1947 and declared itself an Islamic Republic in 1948, was literally born of conflict, carved as it was at the eleventh hour out of the former British India Empire.⁴ At the time of independence in 1947, South Asia was transformed from the jewel in the British crown to the two dueling independent nation-states, India and Pakistan. The latter was itself then torn apart between East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now Pakistan), a country that shares a long border on one side with India and a disputed and, in many places, ungoverned border with Afghanistan.

By any measure, contemporary Pakistan has been located since its inception in an extremely turbulent area of the world, bordering not only Afghanistan, Iran and India, but also China and the Indian Ocean. Contributing to Pakistan's turbulent character are four provinces: Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The NWFP, in particular, consists of tribal areas so fiercely independent that they were never governed in the British colonial era and remain formally and informally beyond the control of the central government to this day. This situation is particularly marked in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas located within the wider NWFP.⁵

This sliver of Pakistan is home to one of the world's most significant insurgencies, and one that poses special dangers to the United States. The 9/11 Commission identified the FATA region of Pakistan as one of six primary regions in the world that either serve or could serve as terrorist sanctuaries.⁶ It is in this location that al-Qaeda operatives have had the "opportunity and space to recruit,

⁴ William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations: The International Order since 1945*, 2nd ed. (UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 452.

⁵ Noor Ul Haq, *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005).

⁶ Philip Zelikow, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2002).

train and select operatives ... move money and transport resources (like explosives) where they need to go... [and] opportunity to test the workability of the plan.”⁷ Launching from the FATA, militants move freely back and forth across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight and to rest, resupply and recuperate, and they do so with only minimal resistance from security forces on the eastern side of the Durand “Line.”

For this reason, the United States cannot ignore the FATA. To do so would be to ignore a terrorist sanctuary from which another attack on U.S. or European soil could spring. It would also be to ignore what might happen should the insurgency brewing there engulf Pakistan, a nuclear state.

At the moment, the only control mechanism permanently in place within the FATA to quell and contain non-state and anti-state actors is the Frontier Corps, a predominately Pashtun paramilitary unit, poorly equipped and untrained for counterinsurgency. Consequently, U.S. Army Special Forces teams in Peshawar and elsewhere in FATA are training Frontier Corps units in counterinsurgency tactics. But, with already intense levels of hatred for the United States, and resentment of U.S. “meddling” in the region, this mil-to-mil engagement between growing numbers of U.S. Special Forces and the FC in the FATA makes little sense.

So, how might the United States better assist Pakistan to guard against extremists finding and taking sanctuary in the FATA? How might the United States better assist Pakistan to thwart the cross-border flow of foreign fighters into and out of Afghanistan, while also helping Pakistan remain strong and sovereign? To answer these questions, we will draw on examples from relatively recent history when external forces were able to achieve a positive outcome while seldom having to set foot inside the conflict zone. We will examine how, in the case of the FATA, the United States has the ability to borrow from these examples, play a less visible role, and develop the capabilities of an intermediary

⁷ Thomas H. Kean, *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Public Report (Washington D.C.: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 268.

—one that is more ethnically and culturally aligned with populations in the FATA, and one that could both train and advise the FC without further fueling hatred and resentment of the West. This force is the Special Service Group (SSG), the Pakistan Army’s elite special operations unit. Currently, the SSG does not train or advise the FC. Instead, U.S. Special Forces is doing this directly. For reasons that should become clear after we examine conditions in the FATA—in the remainder of this chapter—the United States should fall back on a more indirect approach.

A. THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS

The FATA is a tribal belt made up of Pashtun, or *Pathan*, tribesmen who, for as long as recorded history, have lived by a code known as *Pashtunwali*. This code consists of what many refer to as rules, but are really a set of norms dealing with honor, respect, revenge, forgiveness, and hospitality.⁸ These tribal norms govern individuals and demand strict adherence at the village level, which is where most enforcement occurs. The Pashtun people themselves are subdivided into many tribes, and are locally governed by *jirga* councils made up of tribal elders. No outside force has ever successfully governed the Pashtun tribes in the FATA.⁹ Instead, the tribes govern the tribes; the Pashtuns govern the Pashtuns.

FATA represents a compromise, but administratively is still an independent tribal region self-governed through *sharia* law, and a part of the NWFP of Pakistan. The Provincial Assembly of the Northwest Frontier Province in Peshawar acts as a liaison between the 124 districts that make up the province, and the central government in Islamabad. “The British gave the Areas the clearly defined geographical shape that has more or less been maintained till today and incorporated the territory as an autonomous hedge between

⁸ Shuja Nawaz, *FATA: A most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).

⁹ Ul Haq, *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan*, 17–19.

Afghanistan and India to avoid the friction between neighbors caused by a common border. The FATA is an “*llaqa ghai*, or a state within a state.”¹⁰

For its part, the Durand Line, which demarcates the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, looks very little like a traditional border with razor wire fences, manned checkpoints, and spotlights. In some places, a line of white painted stones along a mountain ridge or in the sand is the only sign that one is crossing from one country to the other. Often, nothing marks the crossing at all; it is as if the line has been drawn across water, and disappeared as soon as it was drawn. Tribal peoples, predominantly Pashtun, freely flow between these two halves of what was, at one time, theirs and no one else’s.

At the same time, this area is among the geographically roughest on the planet. When seen from above, the terrain resembles a crumpled sheet of paper with all its clefts and divides. Mountain peaks up to 20,000 feet form ranges stretching miles, through territory so steep and rough that most of its inhabitants climb it only to fight, smuggle, or hide. The southern border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is lower in altitude, but rocky, brown, trackless, and inhospitable, especially to government troops who require constant logistical support from hundreds of miles away.

Troops securing the FATA require resources such as food, water, fuel, wood, ammunition, spare parts, and building supplies. They also have to secure the roads in order to obtain these supplies. Permanent bases such as Khar and Bajaur Forts, situated near the Afghan border, require a logistics tail that is chronically vulnerable to ambush in this harsh, desolate terrain. Use of the Frontier Corps helps mitigate some of these logistical needs in that the FC is able to operate by drawing many of its resources from the local economy and markets in the FATA.

¹⁰ Ul Haq, *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan*, 17–19.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER REGION




Figure 2. Map of the FATA (From Roggio, 2008)

B. THE FRONTIER CORPS

The Frontier Corps is a paramilitary unit made up of ethnic Pashtuns established by the British in 1949 from within the Pakistani Interior Ministry. Current opinion is that it is a “poorly armed and untrained police force”¹¹

¹¹ Associated Press, “U.S. Training Pakistani Forces to Fight Taliban,” October 24, 2008, MSNBC.com, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2736320/> (accessed January 30, 2009).

traditionally responsible for border control and counternarcotics operations. But, since September 2001, Islamabad has heaped much more responsibility on the FC. FC units historically spent their years of service patrolling vast, sparsely populated areas of western Pakistan, or sitting in tiny observation huts on the Afghan border. In the last few years, however, Islamabad, partly in response to U.S. pressure, has pushed for the FC to act in roles similar to those of regular army infantry units. Consequently, FC units have been conducting offensive operations in areas where militants have established strongholds. From their main headquarters at Bala Hissar Fort in Peshawar, FC troops now move in company- and battalion-sized elements to conduct offensive operations from outposts farther west.

Many FC troops' extended families live near the outposts the troops protect. Almost all FC troops are Pashtun, and, therefore, relate more closely to local civilians than do the more ethnically mixed, but predominately Punjabi Pakistani Army units. This ethnic sympathy sometimes causes FC troops to turn their heads when fellow tribesmen cooperate with Taliban forces. The isolated and remote nature of the FC troops' stations can also help make the troops receptive to insurgent influence, especially since, by design, the Islamabad-based government has very little real control in the FATA. Even if this influence does not stem from shared beliefs, it is still quite potent in that the troops are literally surrounded by tribes who do not recognize Islamabad as their capital, with some who do not recognize Pakistan as their nation, either.

The FC and other Pakistani soldiers until recently referred to those who stirred up trouble in the FATA as "miscreants" and not "terrorists," which is the term the West uses.¹² The problem with "miscreant" as a label is that it implies security forces are involved in a policing function against misguided members of

¹² Frontier Corps Headquarters, *Guide for Newly Posted Officers* (Balla Hissar Fort, Peshawar, Pakistan: Headquarters, Frontier Corps, 2004), 1–38.

their own society—something that reveals quite a bit about the government's view of the larger problem, and further diminishes the impetus for the FC to conduct proactive aggressive operations.

Up until recently, too, the FC was trained to simply guard the border and keep the peace in a tribal region, and to be ready should the Pakistan Army need its help in fighting conventional battles. Less well recognized, but almost as important, was another task described in the *Frontier Corps Officer Manual*: to raise, arm and direct local tribal militias, known as *lashkars*. *Lashkar* militiamen work side by side with the FC and the Army. For instance, the Salarzai Tribe in East Bajaur formed one of the largest of these civil militias in late 2008, claiming to have 4,000 fighters.¹³ The Salarzai once supported the Taliban, but turned against it when the Taliban started killing Salarzai tribal leaders. In areas where the *lashkars* have worked with the FC and the army, shops have remained open and people walk the streets as freely as they did before the militant violence began. Synergies like this are not a new phenomenon in the FATA.

Tellingly, the FC has proved capable of raising *lashkars* on its own, without U.S. intervention or “help.” Indeed, *lashkars* have been used for centuries during periods of emergency. Their potential effectiveness signals how much can be achieved when security forces (e.g., the FC) have ties to the populace. Still, by itself, the Frontier Corps is a weak deterrent when it comes to preventing foreign militants from finding sanctuary in the FATA, just as they have not effectively stopped the cross-border flow of fighters in and out of Afghanistan. With support from the Pakistani military and a thoughtful, indirect campaign to tailor counterinsurgency for the FATA, an improved FC would stand a much

¹³ Al Jazeera, "Pakistan's War: On the Frontline," http://www.linktv.org/programs/witness_pakistans_war_frontline (accessed October 15, 2009).

better chance of reducing militancy and bringing the FATA back to a state of normalcy.¹⁴ Meanwhile, without the FC, it is doubtful any counterinsurgency campaign will succeed.

To further highlight why the United States needs to reassess its role in the FATA and with the FC more carefully, consider: before every major operation in 2008, General Tariq Khan, the Frontier Corps Commander at Bala Hissar Fort in Peshawar, gave a pep talk to his men. Other Pakistani military commanders in regular army units feel they must do the same, ensuring their men understand why they are fighting fellow Pashtuns, fellow Pakistanis, and fellow Muslims.

In the years immediately after 9/11, many Pakistani officers and soldiers asked to leave the military knowing they would have to fight other Muslims and their fellow tribesmen. Most were sympathetically allowed to resign or cancel their contracts. The military now pre-screens enlistees and officer candidates for unwillingness to fight inside their own country against their own countrymen. This dynamic is especially poignant for the FC because in addition to facing fellow-Muslims and even fellow-tribesmen, the rank and file in the FC are all local; they are interacting among their neighbors. Leaders of the FC continuously have to convey to their troops the message that the militants “have taken Islam into their own hands.”¹⁵ Before missions, commanders ask their troops if it is “fair that these militants should decide who is or is not a good Muslim.” The troops answer “No Sir!” in unison.¹⁶

These are just a few indicators of how difficult this fight is for Pakistanis, and particularly for those who serve their country by having to serve against their fellow citizens. This is only further exacerbated when the government is viewed as doing the bidding of the Americans.¹⁷

¹⁴ Albeit normalcy for a rough, tribal region where “law” is built into cultural norms and not central government.

¹⁵ Al Jazeera, “Pakistan’s War.”

¹⁶ Al Jazeera, “Pakistan’s War.”

¹⁷ Christine Fair, “Confronting the Pakistan Problem,” Public Broadcasting System, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/pakistan/fair.html> (accessed September 3, 2009).

C. THE ENEMY

The Afghan Taliban and U.S. Action

The Taliban in Afghanistan is a Sunni Islamist organization formed in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's rapid retreat after its bloody ten-year occupation of the country. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan with an incredibly heavy hand, performing executions without juries in the streets over petty crimes and meting out an extreme and very literal form of *sharia* law. The Taliban in Afghanistan is comprised of a number of ethnicities and nationalities, including Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns, Punjabis, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Arab volunteers, and others. Initially, these forces operated and governed inside the vacuum that was Afghanistan, not venturing outside Afghanistan's borders, though they did garner support from the Pakistani government and others as a means to further Pakistan's "strategic depth" against Indian encirclement from the west.

The Afghan Taliban has numerous sub elements throughout Afghanistan and is headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar, though he has been in hiding since late 2001. Many believe he is hiding in or near Quetta, Pakistan, where he and others continue to "direct" operations through what has come to be known as the *Quetta Shura*.¹⁸

The U.S. military destroyed the Afghan Taliban's governmental infrastructure in late 2001, and those Taliban who did not flee to Pakistan dispersed into small bands throughout Afghanistan or, in some cases, simply put down their Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers and went back to farming. Even so, not long after the initial invasion, the United States was forced to take more seriously the safe haven provided over the Afghan border in Pakistan. The Coalition could not "finish" the Taliban in Afghanistan if all the insurgents needed to do was to escape a few kilometers into the mountains and across the Durand Line into the FATA, finding refuge and support

¹⁸ K. Alan Kronstadt, *Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34763.pdf> (accessed November 17, 2009).

in tribal areas which also rendered them “untouchable” by the United States. Eventually, through cooperation with the Pakistanis, the United States proved able to operate more aggressively across this border.

In late 2003, the U.S. government announced to the Pakistanis that U.S. intelligence sources had hard evidence that al-Qaeda members were taking refuge in South Waziristan, and Washington went on to warn Islamabad that if the Pakistan Army did not take care of al-Qaeda, the U.S. military would.¹⁹ The Pakistanis delayed, but early in 2004, they sent more than 80,000 soldiers into the FATA in an unprecedented move to root out the militants. These same militants, meanwhile, killed over 200 tribal leaders in order to establish their control over the area and repel the Pakistan government forces. After losing more than 250 troops, the Pakistanis withdrew, and the government came to an agreement with the militants. At the time, these groups were described locally as “Pakistani Taliban.”

Off and on through 2006, nearly 80,000 Pakistani troops continued to make incursions into North and South Waziristan, eventually ending with the Waziristan Accord. Throughout the fighting, the Taliban continued to insert their own leaders into the tribal structure and, in many cases, these leaders remain in power today. Each time the Pakistanis entered the FATA, the result was an increase in the numbers of militants, as *passive* followers of the Taliban became *militant* followers.

TTP Leadership

Contrary to all-too-popular belief, the Taliban is not a monolith. *Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) is an offshoot organization, distinct from what most in the West refer to as “Taliban.” The TTP was established by a *shura* of forty senior Taliban members in the FATA, drawing representation from all the FATA districts and from the settled districts within the NWFP. Baitullah Mehsud, an ethnic

¹⁹ “Barack Obama, Neocon,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 2007, <http://proquest.com> (accessed February 14, 2010).

Pashtun from the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, was designated the organization's *amir*.²⁰ Before this designation, Mehsud moved to and from Afghanistan and allegedly received training from Jalaluddin Haqqani, the highly respected Soviet-Afghan war veteran. Baitullah Mehsud's rise to power came, ironically, only after the targeted killing of rival militant leader Nek Mohammed of the Wazir tribe, a direct opponent of the Mehsuds, by a U.S. missile strike in 2004. The irony comes from the fact that Mehsud was himself replaced in the same way in late 2009 by Hakimullah Mehsud (alias Zulfikar).²¹ Mehsud's legitimacy grew as he began to have success after success in making Islamabad accede to Taliban demands and withdraw from the FATA. In August 2007, Mehsud and his forces were able to capture more than 250 Pakistani soldiers as bargaining chips for release of Taliban fighters from Pakistani prisons. At this time, Mehsud had a price on his head of \$5.6 million.²²

Outside Pakistan, the TTP's closest alliance was with the Afghan Taliban. Baitullah Mehsud made a point of formally swearing allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar.²³ Reportedly, though, Omar lost faith in Mehsud once the TTP's operations against the Pakistanis diverted forces from the Afghan campaign against the Coalition and the United States. Omar also knew that increased attention to a militant problem in the FATA would bring more pressure on his secret base of operations, and would likely lead to Omar being lumped together with the TTP in the minds of Pakistani security forces. Further widening the divide between the two groups was an incident in October 2009, when Afghan Taliban fighters killed six TTP militants in a dispute over an alleged kidnapping.²⁴

²⁰ Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 2 (January, 2008) <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss2.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2009), 1–4.

²¹ Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, "Aims and Objectives of Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)," *Jane's Defence*, November 13, 2009, <http://www.janes.com> (accessed November 15, 2009), 1–2.

²² Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, "Aims and Objectives," 1–2.

²³ Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, "Aims and Objectives," 1–2.

²⁴ Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, "Aims and Objectives," 1–2.

In a recent interview, Haji Muslim Khan, a spokesman for the TTP, claimed that there is “no difference between the TTP and Swat Taliban and the Afghan Taliban.”²⁵ However, while it may be to the TTP’s benefit to claim ties with the Afghan Taliban, the Afghan Taliban regard the TTP as a threat to their sanctuary within the FATA, and worry about drawing the ire of Pakistani security forces and attracting increased U.S. attention.

TTP Objectives

We do not want to fight Pakistan or the army, but if they continue to be slaves to U.S. demands, then our hands will be forced. There can be no deal with the U.S.

— Baitullah Mehsud²⁶

According to the TTP’s own stated objectives, the organization hopes to unite the various pro-Taliban groups active in FATA and NWFP, and to create a single channel for all negotiations. At the same time, the TTP hopes to support and assist the Afghan Taliban against U.S. and Coalition forces, and to “reproduce a Taliban style Islamic emirate in Pakistan and beyond, beginning in Pakistan’s tribal regions.”²⁷

In some areas of South Waziristan, the TTP has established governance and security for the local inhabitants through its tribal control mechanisms. Also, in efforts to recruit more personnel into the TTP, the organization has established its own *madrassas*, educating children and garnering support. In a region where security is so highly desired, many locals who may not agree with the TTP’s violent tactics nevertheless see the TTP as a beneficial alternative to a government whose reach is too limited.

²⁵ NEFA, “Interview with Haji Muslim Khan: Chief Spokesman for the Tehrik e Taliban, Swat Valley,” *NEFA Foundation*, <http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-intvu.html> (accessed November 12, 2009).

²⁶ BBC News, “Meeting Pakistan’s most Feared Militant,” *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7420606.stm (accessed November 12, 2009).

²⁷ Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center, “Aims and Objectives.”

The TTP's attacks center almost exclusively on Western interests, such as Coalition supply convoys, and Pakistani government installations. Its attacks against the Pearl Continental hotel in Peshawar in June 2009 and the three suicide bomber attacks against the Marriott in Islamabad in October 2004, January 2007, and September 2008, were meant to discourage a Western presence in the region. Attacks against Pakistani government and security forces are likewise designed to both punish Islamabad for its actions in the FATA and NWFP, and to coerce the government into not allowing the United States to dictate Islamabad's policies.

Pakistani Reactions

The Pakistani populace writ large does not approve of these violent acts within the country's borders. But, judging from recent Pew polls, the population also does not approve of its government's willingness to bend to U.S. will when 64% of Pakistanis consider the United States to be an enemy.²⁸ U.S. drone strikes, some of which have caused severe collateral damage, are highly inflammatory and strongly condemned, not only by citizens of the FATA, but also by urban liberal moderates living in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore who have no sympathy for extremists. It is apparent that much of Pakistan's population, especially those living in or near key cities, fears the TTP and its methods. However, this fear of the TTP does not necessarily translate into—and should not be mistaken for—support for the government's military efforts in the FATA.

Pakistanis want no U.S. influence in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. It is for this reason that the TTP, even if not directly supported by the populace, continues to be able to operate with relative freedom, certainly within the FATA, and increasingly within the Punjab.

For instance, on August 5, 2009, U.S. drone aircraft bombed and reportedly killed Baitullah Mehsud. On August 19, the TTP commander in Bajaur

²⁸ Pew Research Center, *Pakistan: Growing Concerns about Extremism, Continuing Discontent with U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009), <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1312/pakistani-public-opinion> (accessed November 17, 2009).

Agency, Faqir Mohammed, pronounced himself the group's temporary leader, but then retracted his statement when the group's *shura* named Hakimullah Mehsud as Baitullah's successor instead. In an ironic twist, Islamabad publically condemned the drone attack on the grounds that it violated Pakistani sovereignty, even though it killed the militant leader who had caused such unrest in Pakistan, and even though the drone took off from and landed on Pakistani soil, most certainly with Pakistani approval.²⁹ Events such as this typify the strange relationship the United States has with Pakistan, and further highlight the sensitivities of a population that may not actively support the Taliban, but certainly opposes U.S. action on Pakistan's soil.

Countermeasures Against the TTP

The primary counter to the TTP is the Pakistan Army and, to a much less extent, the Frontier Corps. The army has conducted numerous offensives in the FATA and NWFP, including its recent campaigns in the Swat Valley and Bajaur Agency. It has approached the TTP problem militarily, using conventional forces and conventional tactics. Although the government has subsequently claimed victory, arresting or killing hundreds of militants, it is unclear whether these actions will put an end to the militancy. As many as 3,000,000 civilians were displaced and forced to abandon their homes in these operations.³⁰

Unfortunately, Pakistan does not have a force capable of population-centered counterinsurgency on this large a scale. Consequently, the Army's tactics are often harsh and may create as many insurgents as are killed or captured. Nor, as previously mentioned, do the drone attacks help. The more drone attacks that are conducted, the more the populace backs the TTP or, at the very least, *backs away* from the government in Islamabad.

²⁹ Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Top Taliban Leader Baitullah Mehsud Killed in US Drone Attack," *Guardian U.K.*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/taliban-leader-baitullah-mehsud-killed> (accessed November 12, 2009).

³⁰ International Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Displacement Crisis* (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009) <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5149> (accessed January 17, 2010).

D. U.S. INVOLVEMENT

As noted, the U.S. government has stepped up its operations on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border since it began operations in the region in 2002. Initially, the United States limited itself to incidental “hot pursuit” scenarios; if Coalition forces were in pursuit of enemy combatants, they could chase the militants or engage them with indirect fires, artillery, mortars, or airborne firing platforms over the border into a 10-kilometer buffer zone of the FATA. Additionally, during the early stages of the war, the United States engaged in low-level, intelligence gathering missions in cooperation with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

However, the focus has changed, since U.S. Army Special Forces began training Pakistan’s SSG in 2006. Increasingly, the United States has sought to engage in combined intelligence gathering and FID, with much closer cooperation between U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence personnel, and increasing numbers of drone strikes. In September 2008, U.S. and Pakistani officials told the press that U.S. special operations forces had even conducted a direct action raid inside Pakistani territory, the first such operation without prior Pakistani approval.³¹ In other words, over time, U.S. military involvement has become *more* robust and overt. Also in September 2008, this involvement became public with a press release announcing that U.S. SOF were training Pakistan Army and FC units in the Northwest Frontier Province.³² In actuality, U.S. Army Special Forces had been training with the SSG since early in 2006,

³¹ Omar Waraich, “Pakistan vs. U.S. Raids: How Bad a Rift?” *Time*, September 18, 2008, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1842131,00.html> (accessed April 30, 2010).

³² David Montero, “US Military Prepares to Train Pakistani Forces,” *Christian Science Monitor*, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0416/p99s01-duts.html> (accessed February 28, 2009).

but these newer training missions with the FC were in preparation for—as the United States *hoped* and Pakistanis *fear*—bilateral operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda *in the FATA*.³³

Without question, the number of Pakistan Army raids and other military operations has increased steadily as the United States has increased its pressure on Pakistan. But, as we saw in the previous section, militant extremist activity has likewise gone up, and has shifted from tribal in-fighting to the targeting of Pakistani government installations. Numerous Pakistani military outposts have been brazenly attacked over the past three years, to include the suicide bombing of the officer's mess on the very tightly secured SSG commando post in Tarbela, NWFP. Nor has Islamabad itself been immune, with multiple bombings at the Marriott Hotel, a suicide attack at the arms factory at Rawalpindi, the explosive standoff at the *Lal Masjid* (Red Mosque), the assassination of presidential hopeful Benazir Bhutto, and the hostage situation at the Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in 2009, to name a few. Do all of these stem from U.S. pressure? It is impossible to say. But, if this is what has happened in the wake of predominately Pakistani-run operations in the FATA and NWFP, imagine the response were Americans to be involved *more* directly or in greater numbers. One thing that *can* be said with a certain degree of assurance is that there has been more militant anger at the Pakistani government over increasing Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps operations in the FATA, while what U.S. involvement represents is “gas thrown on the fire.” Nothing will signal to the Pakistani populace that Western desires trump Pakistan's sovereignty more vividly than the physical presence of U.S. troops in the FATA.

³³ STRATFOR, “Geopolitical Diary: Implications of Overt U.S. Operations in Pakistan,” *STRATFOR: Global Intelligence*, June 17, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_implications_overt_u_s_operations_pakistan (accessed March 8, 2010).

E. PAKISTANI CONCILIATION

Unfortunately, Pakistani military efforts to handle our mutual security problems have not been as successful as the United States would like. In several recent instances, Pakistan has attempted to *manage* the Taliban through the use of conciliation. Conciliation, a much more politically palatable word than “appeasement,” refers to an “attempt to remove tension between two states [or entities] by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them.”³⁴ Traditionally, conciliation has been a viable option for Islamabad since it has little to lose and much to gain from the practice; if the government simply stops fighting insurgents in the FATA, then it gains Pakistani popular approval by not being seen as a puppet of the United States. By reducing conflict in the FATA, Pakistan also loses fewer soldiers, spends fewer military dollars, and is able to focus on its *real* enemy—India.

In September 2006, Pakistani government negotiators and key tribal leaders signed a treaty known as the North Waziristan Accord. This accord required tribes to reject foreign militants and cross-border infiltration by Afghan insurgents. It also asked that local members of the Taliban stop spreading their Islamist message outside their tribal lands. In exchange, the government would reduce its checkpoints, reduce military activities and troops in the FATA, release certain key prisoners, and pay heavy compensation for innocent deaths. This agreement allowed the tribes to continue to govern their own territories, and even to remain armed as long as they did not harbor foreign fighters or attack government troops. The central government described the accord in the press as a victory for peace and stability in the region. Only later did officials realize that they had made these agreements with some of the militants, and not necessarily with actual tribal elders. Earlier in 2006, the Taliban had killed many of the tribal elders with whom the government intended to meet because the

³⁴ Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries,” *Comparative Strategy* 22, no. 5 (December 2003), 463, 466–468, <http://proquest.com> (accessed October 8, 2009).

Taliban suspected them of supporting the government. Reportedly, since the government's initial *jirga*, more than 100 pro-Islamabad additional tribal elders were assassinated.³⁵

In light of these breaches of the treaty, the military moved back to the FATA in full force with its campaigns in Swat and Bajaur in 2008. Finally, in February 2009, the Pakistani government signed a new truce with the Taliban in the Swat Valley. As part of this agreement, the Taliban were allowed to govern via *sharia* law. However, the treaty had been in force only one month when Taliban members publicly flogged a 17-year-old girl who they claimed had committed adultery, though, in fact, she had simply refused an arranged marriage. The event was televised and the video hit the Internet, sparking outrage in Islamabad and in the West. It also marked yet another broken treaty between the government and the militants.

Pakistan's penchant to make treaties with militants continues to frustrate U.S. diplomats, and even many Pakistani government officials who consider any concession to Taliban demands to be surrender.³⁶ Worse from an American perspective, while such treaties may help Islamabad gain favor in the eyes of some Pakistanis, they neuter U.S. efforts in the region.

Here, then, is a genuine source of tension between the United States and Pakistan: Pakistan is growing weary of fighting militants in the FATA, when it could have done just as well to leave the Taliban alone. It could have vigorously denied the United States access to the FATA, and suffered few consequences. The suicide bombings inside Pakistan likely would have been negligible. In fact,

³⁵ Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Counterterrorism, Regional Security, and Pakistan's Afghan Frontier," *U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Hearing*, (Washington, D.C., October 10, 2007) <http://www.insidedefense.com> (accessed January 27, 2009), 2.

³⁶ Farhan Bokhari, "Skeptics Voice Fear on Swat Valley Ceasefire," *Financial Times*, February 23, 2009, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed March 8, 2009).

the only consequence the Pakistani government might have suffered would have been the loss of billions of U.S. dollars earmarked for Pakistani military development.³⁷

The United States clearly does not want Pakistan to curtail its military efforts in the FATA or NWFP, since this would leave the U.S. military with only two unthinkable options: continue to try to fight alone from the Afghan side of the border, or proceed unilaterally into Pakistan's Tribal Areas. Both are unworkable.

Perhaps, then, it is worth turning to what many consider a "third way." Foreign Internal Defense. Indeed. But, as the next chapter should make clear, training and advising can be done by a number of different methods. Not all are appropriate for Pakistan, let alone the FATA. Or, to be blunt, there is smart training and advising, and then there is the kind of FID that has the potential to make a bad situation worse.

³⁷ Robert Menendez, "Virtually no Strings Attached to Military Money for Pakistan, According to New Government Report Unveiled by Sens. Menendez, Harkin," *US Federal News Service, Including US State News*, June 24, 2008, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed September 7, 2009).

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III. TRAINING AND ADVISING

A. WHAT IS TRAINING AND ADVISING AND WHY DO IT?

The United States Army has trained and advised indigenous forces throughout most of its history, with each military generation adding its own twist and flair to the basic concepts. Today, the United States Army is conducting training and advising missions on a scale not seen since the days of Vietnam. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained in 2007, “The most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.”³⁸

Among other things, training and advising foreign security forces not only enables other countries to better themselves, thereby enhancing U.S. regional security, but meets U.S. foreign policy commitments and eases the “burden” on U.S. military forces. According to doctrine, the United States will offer such support to a partner nation if one of the following three conditions exists: “the existing or threatened internal disorder is such that action by the United States supports U.S. national strategic goals; the threatened nation is capable of

³⁸ Robert Gates, Speech to the Association of the United States Army, Washington D.C., October 10, 2007, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181> (accessed February 14, 2009).

effectively using U.S. assistance; the threatened nation requests U.S. assistance.”³⁹ Simply put, the general concept is to “help others to help themselves.”

The strategic goal of any training and advising program *should be* to ensure the partner nation (PN) develops the capabilities to protect and defend a legitimate government. Operational and tactical training and advising goals may serve as intermediate steps toward achieving this broader strategic end-state. But always, intermediate goals should contribute to building the competency, capabilities, and legitimacy of the PN security force. In the end, PN sovereignty and governmental legitimacy are the decisive aims for any training and advising program.⁴⁰

The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to a “revival” of training and advising constructs from previous eras, and doctrine has paired new terms with old concepts. Today, most modern training and advisory missions can be categorized into two groups: Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA). Both FID and SFA fall under the broader umbrella of Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA), with each term reflecting differences in the type, funding, and nature of assistance supplied to a PN. For instance, Security Cooperation is a general term used to describe “all of DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests,”⁴¹ while Security

³⁹ The Department of Defense, *Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, 3rd ed. (Alexandria, Virginia: United States Department of Defense, 2008), II-1. In order to nest FID support within PN governmental capacities and capabilities, the proposed FID plan must support the PN’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy. As the Joint FID publication states, “the entire FID effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and to effectively interface[ing] with the HN [Host Nation] IDAD organization.” An IDAD strategy consists of the collective measures a nation takes to promote growth and guard against internal strife. The presence of an IDAD strategy is not only a necessary antecedent for a military FID program, but the success of a FID program hinges on the quality of that strategy. This implies that the recipient of FID is a legitimate PN governmental security force.

⁴⁰ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, III-9.

⁴¹ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, I-6. Security Cooperation activities provide most of the larger diplomatic framework required for FID and SFA activities. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Exercises, for instance, are Security Cooperation activities.

Assistance involves a different appropriation process that provides PNs with “defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives.”⁴²

Doctrinally speaking, FID refers to the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”⁴³ Although a primary mission for U.S. Army Special Forces, FID is by no means U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) or even Army-specific. Inherently interagency and Joint, FID is meant to build a PN’s capabilities and capacities in order to better enable a PN government to secure its people, stabilize itself, and promote peace within its borders. Although the military is the primary instrument of DoD’s FID efforts, U.S. FID doctrine mandates that other instruments of national power must be addressed during every FID operation. One problem with FID today is that it is to be conducted when a PN faces internal threats only.⁴⁴ Thus, as violent extremist organizations prove increasingly global in their reach and ambitions, they are outstripping what FID was designed to do. Arguably, this is the challenge we face in the FATA, which does not wholly belong to Pakistan.

Here is where SFA represents an improvement since it is defined as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional

⁴² United States Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-301: Building Partnership Capacity: Unified Quest 2008* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Army Capabilities Integration Center, 2008), 19. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 authorize SA, often through something called the Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). While Congress authorizes and funds SA and the DoS supervises the SATP, it is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that coordinates resourcing and manages military activities within the SATP. Programs within the SATP include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Education and Training (IMET). A Security Assistance Officer (SAO) usually administers these SATP programs abroad in a PN.

⁴³ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, I-1.

⁴⁴ Although subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency may have third party, external sponsors, US military doctrine views the overall effort to free and protect society as an internal effort—a point, we would submit, is debatable.

security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”⁴⁵ A by-product of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, SFA is designed to pull together the efforts of the DoD to address internal *and* external threats by building the capacity of a PN’s security forces.⁴⁶ It thus goes beyond FID by being able to incorporate Security Assistance activities like Peace Operations and International Military Education and Training (IMET), as illustrated in Figure 3. As Colonel David Maxwell describes the distinction:

SFA is a process that integrates the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission (which is inherently and by definition Joint and Whole of Government) with Security Assistance (SA) programs to be able to train, advise, assist, and equip the security forces (military, paramilitary, and police) a friend, partner, and ally (e.g., build partner capacity) in order to defend itself against internal and external threats.⁴⁷




Figure 3. Bridging FID and SA with SFA (From FM 3-07.1, p. I-7)

⁴⁵ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance*. (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), I-1.

⁴⁶ USA, *FM 3-07.1*, I-2.

⁴⁷ David Maxwell, “Random Thoughts on Irregular Warfare and Security Assistance,” *Small Wars Journal* (December 2008), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/159-maxwell.pdf> (accessed 10 October 2009).

In essence, both FID and SFA mandate “train and advise” operations that share many of the same principles; the main difference, again, is whether the threat to PN stability is internal or external. The coin of both realms is legitimacy, which is often a fragile commodity. Generally, legitimacy of a government is the by-product of a successful social contract between the people and their leaders. Central to most social contracts is the ability of a government to provide basic needs and some level of security to its citizenry. Over-reliance on outside forces to maintain and foster this social contract, or to provide security, inherently weakens a government in the eyes of its population. In principle, U.S. doctrine recognizes this when it acknowledges that training and advising success “hinge[s] on HN [host nation] public support...the sovereignty of the HN must be maintained at all times,” and when it points out that “the perception that the United States is running a puppet government” contravenes the basic tenets of training and advising.⁴⁸

Ideally then, training and advising missions for any given country should minimize the presence of U.S. forces as much as possible while also assisting to secure good relations between the PN’s security force and the population. The best way to do the former is to minimize the visibility of U.S. assistance. The best way to achieve the latter is to try to field a force that is not alien or *alienating* in locals’ eyes.

While a truism, it seems important to point out that the more hostile locals are to outside interference the more problematic it will be to introduce large numbers of outsiders into the area—particularly when the goal is to win over the local population. What makes more sense, instead, is to woo the population via acceptable intermediaries, ideally people from the local area who are already on the government’s side and who, through their actions, can represent the government as a force for good.

⁴⁸ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, IV-14.

Here is where Pakistan offers an ideal set-up. As we will explain in Chapter IV, the United States should not be training the FC directly *or* in the FATA. Instead, U.S. Special Forces should work with elements of the SSG, and should train and advise the SSG about how to train and advise the FC. Precedents for such an indirect approach not only exist but represent some of the most successful training and assist missions undertaken.

B. WHO CONDUCTS TRAINING AND ADVISING?

As mentioned, training and advising programs need to be locally tailored, since all countries face unique problems. Since the main effort in both FID and SFA operations is usually advisory, it is essential to choose the best advisors. The best program for planning, training, and equipping PN forces will be meaningless if those tasked with implementing it lack the necessary experience and skills. Not only are advisors responsible for passing on their expertise, but their role should also be to ensure that their entire program remains congruent with national strategy, thereby ensuring synchronization of effort.

With the emergence of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Training Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) in the 1960s, United States Army Special Forces has engaged in institutionalized advisory training for over four decades. Not only must soldiers volunteer for Special Forces training and pass a rigorous selection course prior to entering USAJFKSWCS, but once an Special Forces candidate passes selection, he is subject to a minimum 18-month curriculum that includes combat, FID, Unconventional Warfare (UW), advising, and cultural and language training. Although the capstone “exam” in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) is the month-long Unconventional Warfare *Robin Sage* exercise, which concentrates on the skills required to advise and train guerillas and auxiliaries, the difference between working with guerrillas and advising PN forces is only a matter of degree.

In contrast, the General Purpose Force (GPF) does not maintain an institutionalized advisory and training school. The Combined Arms Center (CAC)

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas recently established a school designed to mass-produce advisors and trainers for Iraq and Afghanistan. The results of this effort have been mixed. One reason may be that over the course of the two-month long curriculum, only ten training days are devoted to advising and culture classes.⁴⁹ Ironically, the U.S. Army Drill Sergeant School, which is ten weeks long, devotes more of its time to training and advising. Not only is the preponderance of the Military Transition Team (MiTT) train-up focused on unilateral combat training, but worse, there is no selection process for the MiTTs. Some individuals wind up on MiTTs due to inadequate performance in their functional areas. Others volunteer to earn the requisite “combat” time deemed necessary for promotion. The number of experienced and qualified trainers and advisors filling the MiTTs is estimated to be only 75%. Worse, according to post-deployment interviews, approximately 20% of the MiTT members coming out of Iraq and 40% coming out of Afghanistan considered themselves dysfunctional to the point that they felt their team achieved nothing credible over the course of their one-year deployment.⁵⁰

Clearly, Army Special Forces are better trained to conduct advisory FID missions than this. As the manual for Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for FID (JP 3-07.1) indicates:

FID programs may be conducted by a single individual in remote isolated areas, small groups, or large units involved in direct support (not involving combat operations) or combat operations. In almost all of these situations, U.S. forces will be operating in unfamiliar circumstances and cultural surroundings. The nature of FID programs indicates that the environment in which they are conducted may be unstable and dangerous. This inherent

⁴⁹ Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Combat Advisor Handbook,” No. 08-21 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2008), 17.

⁵⁰ The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) maintains a robust database of after action reviews (AARs) and interviews. These figures are representative of interviews conducted with approximate 3,000 MiTT team members through the 2nd fiscal quarter of 2009, provided to the authors by the JCISFA.

instability, combined with the stresses of operating in a foreign culture, may require training that is not routinely offered by the Services to conventional forces.⁵¹

Few Army leaders challenge such findings. As the Department of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command itself acknowledges, "the special operations community has always placed a premium on the qualities and skills required for effective engagement, and its culture, including accession, development, and assignment practices reflect this. The same cannot be said of GPF."⁵² However, while the current trend within the Department of the Army is to acknowledge ARSOF's expertise in FID, it also concedes that there is more training and advising required in Iraq and Afghanistan than ARSOF can manage. Thus, GPF must now conduct Special Forces-like FID. Unfortunately, the implication is that the only salient thing differentiating GPF and ARSOF foreign internal defense is numbers, not the quality or the type of the training or advising required, or the inherent skills and abilities of the individuals doing the advising.

C. HOW CAN A FORCE TRAIN AND ADVISE?




Figure 4. Types of FID (From FM 3-07.1 p. I-6)

⁵¹ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, V-1.

⁵² United States Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-301: Building Partnership Capacity: Unified Quest 2008* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Army Capabilities Integration Center, 2008), 4.

Generally, training and advising missions are categorized in one of three ways: as offering/providing indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), or combat operations. While conceptually neat, these categories are not necessarily discrete, as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, and the U.S. Army may find itself conducting all three types simultaneously within a single country. As a consequence, for the purposes of this thesis, we see greater utility in recategorizing training and advising missions according to whether it makes sense to conduct them: 1) “by, with, and through” PN security forces 2) “by and through, but not with” PN security forces or 3) via an “indirect–train the trainer” approach. Our three categories borrow from doctrine, but re-fit it for realities met on the ground in places like Pakistan.

D. “BY, WITH, AND THROUGH”

“By, with and through” training and advising directly pairs U.S. forces with PN forces. This type of training and advising includes combat support FID, direct support FID, and most SFA operations.⁵³ When conducting training and advising operations “by, with, and through” a PN’s forces, U.S. forces are highly visible. For instance, this is what U.S. troops conducting combat support FID, direct support FID and SFA operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom have been have been engaged in for the past decade.

Occasionally, “by, with, and through” training and advising operations come at the request of a PN in order to help it fight an insurgency. More often, however, these operations result from an effort to overturn a rogue or internationally defiant regime and/or to put in place and assist a government that will promote regional stability. Even if much of the populace supports this

⁵³ U.S. military doctrine defines combat support FID as operations where U.S. forces “support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support and service support means,” while direct support FID is conducted when a PN has “not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle.” For more information, see the Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, I–11.

process, there can still be resistance, and this resistance may become violent. The assisting force may then find itself in a situation where, while it is helping to build a new army and government, it must simultaneously fight an insurgency—a very difficult environment in which to train, advise, and grow a new force. This was indeed one of the challenges in Operation Iraqi Freedom when, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States failed to fully secure the population. In 2004, the U.S.-led Coalition had to then begin in earnest to raise and train an Iraqi Army (IA). Special Forces A-Teams, referred to as Battalion Augmentation Training Teams (BATTs), and conventionally manned Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) were aligned with IA battalions and brigades, and began training programs and immediate combat advisory duties in an effort to quell the insurgency and secure the cities and populated areas of Iraq.⁵⁴ The overall objective became to train the IA to a level whereby it could effectively conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, eventually allowing the United States to leave Iraq sovereign and democratic.

U.S. forces involved in this training and advising had the highest possible visibility, living on IA garrisons and outposts and openly operating with the IA on missions ranging from supply convoys to routine patrols to direct action raids. Special Forces soldiers stood side by side with their IA counterparts, inspecting vehicles, watching street corners, securing election sites and breaking down doors in pursuit of suspected insurgents and al-Qaeda members.

In most cases, IA soldiers were granted legitimacy by the populations they secured. Although some predominately Kurdish units operated in Arab neighborhoods and vice versa, the ethnic mix within the units themselves often reflected the demographic mix in their area of control. The IA and the populace

⁵⁴ James P. Hunter, "Strengthening Iraq's Army," *Soldiers* 61, no. 10 (October 2006), <http://proquest.com> (accessed 10 August 2009), 14.

spoke the same language, worshipped in the same way and, most importantly, shared the same goal of reconstructing a secure, stable Iraq.⁵⁵

Yet, while Iraqi forces may have been considered legitimate by Iraqis, the Iraqi people were not accustomed to Western, let alone *secular* or *Christian*, soldiers “invading” their homes, running civilian vehicles off the road, and rousing people out of bed at night in search of insurgents. Thanks to experiences like this, some Iraqis who previously had no interest in al-Qaeda or any sort of violence would later *become* insurgents, or at least be willing to accept \$50 to place a grocery bag loaded with an improvised explosive device (IED) in a key intersection, knowing Coalition forces would soon drive by. The presence of Western soldiers patrolling the streets, albeit in cooperation with Iraqis, proved unacceptable to many. In the Iraqi case, visibility was a problem. Americans were too alien and alienating.

Even when a force takes the visibility problem into account, outsiders being present can still pose problems. For instance, in the 1960s, the Cubans, with backing from the Soviet Union, attempted to spread their revolution into Africa.⁵⁶ Although Ernesto “Che” Guevara never succeeded at enlisting Congolese to pursue his revolutionary *foco* strategy, Cuba did find a communist rebel faction in Angola that was willing to accept its aid and intervention. The result was a 26-year long involvement in Angola’s civil war. Allied with the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), the Cubans helped wage war against the pro-Western National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) regime.⁵⁷

In order to effectively advise their Angolans, the Cubans realized they needed to blend in. As a result, the Cuban Army (FAR: *Fuerzas Armadas*

⁵⁵ Most all of the IA units spoke Arabic, except in the case of exclusively Kurdish units, which relied on certain unit members to interpret while operating in Arab neighborhoods.

⁵⁶ William J. Durch, “Revolution from a F.A.R.—The Cuban Armed Forces in Africa and the Middle East” (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977), 3.

⁵⁷ Cuban advisory operations would end in May 1991 with a cease-fire agreement between UNITA and MPLA one month after the MPLA abandoned Marxist-Leninism.

Revolucionarias) recruited only Cubans of African descent into the Angolan advisory corps, thinking that skin color would suffice to “hide” the Cuban advisors.⁵⁸ The FAR would eventually send up to 60,000 troops into Angola.⁵⁹ These troops would operate at the front lines of the conflict, often fighting next to MPLA soldiers. However, despite their dark skin color, the Cuban advisors were easily identified by the population as outsiders. Thus, even though the Cubans strove to operate “by, with, and through,” not even black Cuban advisers escaped their visibility as Cubans.

More ironic still, by using superficially disguised Cuban troops in a direct advisory role with the MPLA, Cuba’s involvement prompted South Africa to send in its own troops to join UNITA in fighting the MPLA. The fact that the MPLA was ethnically homogenous did not help; this prevented it from attracting members of other tribes. Consequently, the Cubans and the MPLA were caught fighting a losing war that was negotiated to a conclusion after the MPLA abandoned its political agenda, leading scholar in Cuban and Angolan history Edward George to conclude: “The [Cuban] operation in Angola achieved very little in the long-term, and might have been entirely in vain.”⁶⁰

“By, with, and through” is often tricky. Sometimes, a country can find that it is stuck “dragging along” a reluctant PN’s army, coaching and advising along the way. Operation Enduring Freedom—Afghanistan (OEF-A) highlights the dangers of operating “by, with, and through” a reluctant partner.

The initial U.S. special operations forces infiltrated into Afghanistan after 9/11 were part of a UW mission. Their task was to link up with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces and, with robust air support, bring down the Taliban government. As the Taliban was routed, and the Karzai government put

⁵⁸ Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (New York: Frank Case, 2005), 29.

⁵⁹ George, *Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 227.

⁶⁰ George, *Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 284.

in place in Kabul, the United States and the Coalition then began to develop an Afghan Army. At this point, what began as UW morphed into FID.

The challenges facing the Coalition were tremendous. Afghanistan had not had a real standing army since the 1992 fall of the Najibullah government, when many of the units and their equipment divided into separate warlord factions. Not only would the United States need to raise an Afghan National Army (ANA) from scratch, but it would have to involve itself in warlord politics, as representatives of militant groups from different corners of Afghanistan vied for power in the government. At the same time, the geography and virtually non-existent transportation system made raising an army logistically extremely difficult, as many of the men joining it had seldom wandered beyond walking distance of their own villages. Ethnic rivalries were also a factor, with Tajiks, Pashtuns, and even Pashtun sub-tribes maneuvering for power. Over the years, Afghanistan's central government had seldom been able to fully govern far beyond any city's center. Tribal and ethnic differences have always made it difficult to reach consensus within the government—that is, until invaders arrive.

In the early stages of the conflict, U.S. and Coalition forces were the sole sources of security, apart from warlords and tribal militias in areas the Coalition did not reach. This means U.S. forces were not just highly visible when they were present, but represented a stark contrast to indigenous security forces. Even as the ANA began to grow in size and competence, there was a notable contrast between Afghan patrols operating out of light-skinned Toyota pickup trucks and large, well-armored U.S. vehicles carrying platoons full of U.S. soldiers.

Because the ANA has had a difficult time recruiting enough men to provide security to all areas of the country, it has typically taken whomever it can get, regardless of ethnicity. The army is ethnically mixed, but has a disproportionate number of Tajik soldiers compared to the estimated Tajik

population of the country.⁶¹ This can work out well for predominately Tajik units operating in Tajik areas, but can lead to a great deal of tension in other areas, especially when the Afghan population is between 40% and 50% Pashtun, and the Taliban insurgency is at its strongest in the Pashtun areas. Tribal rivalries in these areas can divide families right down the middle. But, when outsiders arrive, intra-tribal feuds are usually temporarily set aside to address this new external “threat” to tribal sovereignty.

Military analysts, realizing that Afghanistan cannot be completely controlled from Kabul, currently debate about how to use the tribal system in Afghanistan to the central government’s advantage. The Afghan Army has had some recent successes, but most of these are as a result of American and Coalition support and prodding. According to President Karzai, it will be at least 2014 before the Afghan National Army will be able to fight the insurgency on its own, and fifteen to twenty years before it will no longer need U.S. and Coalition support.⁶² At the time of this writing, U.S. President Barack Obama has committed to current levels of support through July 2011, and then promises to begin a troop drawdown.⁶³ The disjuncture between these two leaders’ views about what can be achieved as the United States works by, with, and through the Afghans does not bode well for a resolution to the conflict.

E. “BY AND THROUGH, BUT NOT *WITH*”

The training and advising method of “by and through, but not with” excludes U.S. forces from participating with PN forces in tactical and combat operations, but not from working with PN forces in-country. “By and through, but

⁶¹ Obaid Younossi, *The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army* (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 2009) http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁶² Alissa J. Rubin and Mark Landler, “Karzai Starts Term Vowing Afghan Army Will Control Nation’s Security in 5 Years,” *New York Times*, November 20, 2009, <http://proquest.com> (accessed December 15, 2009).

⁶³ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Differing Views of New Afghanistan Strategy; Civilian Officials Focus on Drawdown; Military Planners Think Winning is Achievable,” *The Washington Post*, December 26, 2009, <http://proquest.com> (accessed January 10, 2010).

not with” programs include Civil-Military Operations (CMO), as well as logistics, communications, and intelligence gathering activities. Under this rubric, U.S. personnel may deploy to a PN to assist during a natural disaster or other calamity that threatens that government’s ability to secure its people.⁶⁴ Under such circumstances, U.S. personnel usually provide direct logistical support, communication and command and control infrastructure, and intelligence gathering assistance to the PN—effectively operating by and through, but not with local security forces. Typically, this kind of training and advising occurs in permissive to hostile environments, and U.S. forces operate under complicated Rules of Engagement (ROE) that only allow U.S. forces to use deadly force in self-defense. The advisory mission in El Salvador and Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) are two examples of training and advising “by and through, but not with.”

Over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, select U.S. Army Special Forces personnel took part in an advisory mission to assist the Salvadoran Army infantry brigades. At the time, the Salvadoran government was under attack from leftist guerrillas. In the wake of the Sandinista’s victory in Nicaragua in 1979, leftist guerrillas from Nicaragua and El Salvador joined forces to form the *Farabundo Marti* National Liberation Front, or FMLN. The FMLN proved unusually adept at insurgency.⁶⁵ In contrast, the Salvadoran Army had little prior experience with counterinsurgency. The FMLN was able to operate all over the country with relative freedom, influencing certain segments of the population and building insurgent numbers and support.

⁶⁴ IAW DoD 5105.38-M, p. 563, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action (HA/MA) Programs provide the Combatant Commands capabilities to respond to humanitarian disasters. These capabilities are collectively termed Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Programs. When a foreign country suffers a disaster and requests assistance from the U.S. Embassy or the U.S. Embassy declares a disaster, the Disaster Relief process is initiated. The Department of State validates the request and then requests DoD military assistance, if required. After ASD(SO/LIC) approves DoS’s request, the DSCA is notified, which then begins to coordinate transportation and logistics assets for necessary supplies. Finally, the CJCS tasks an appropriate agency (usually a Combatant Command) to provide assistance to the country.

⁶⁵ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, 2nd ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994), 1095–1107.

From 1985 to 1992 Special Forces's Brigade Operational Planning and Assistance Training Teams, or OPATTs, would train and advise "a 40-battalion army of 40,000 men scattered across the country in 14 garrisons with responsibilities for the security of dozens of critical sites and hundreds of civil-defense units."⁶⁶ This mission was significant in Special Forces history because a small number of advisors (55 at any one time) had such a major impact on helping improve a foreign army and stopping a violent insurgency.

American advisors taking part in the OPATT mission spent most of their time on the main garrisons of the brigades they advised, and were congressionally mandated not to take part in hostilities. All advisors were required to speak fluent Spanish, and many were Hispanic members of 7th Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. They were thus often able to blend in with the Salvadoran soldiers. Only three to four Special Forces NCOs or officers advised a brigade at a time. The level of visibility these soldiers presented was necessarily low. While it is not entirely clear that U.S. Army Special Forces advisors in El Salvador made *the* critical difference in defeating the FMLN, this operation illustrates how well a "by, through but not with" mission can work where 55 U.S. troops offer critical assistance while maintaining a very low signature.

More recently, a similar approach was initiated in the Philippines. To set the scene: in the 1970s, the Mindanao National Liberation Front (MNLF) posed a significant enough problem that President Ferdinand Marcos agreed to the Regional Autonomous Government in Western and Central Mindanao.⁶⁷ This eventually led to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, not everyone accepted this concession; those who did not formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF and the MNLF not only clashed violently with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but with each other

⁶⁶ Cecil E. Bailey, "OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador," *Special Warfare* 17, no. 2 (December 2004), 18–29.

⁶⁷ Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2002), 155.

throughout the 90s, with the MILF granting members of the kidnap-for-ransom terrorist organization *Abu Sayyaf* Group (ASG) and the Southeast Asian Islamic terrorist organization *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) refuge, sanctuary, and training in the ARMM.⁶⁸

By permitting the development of an autonomous region within its borders, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) could ignore growing problems and corruption in the ARMM. As long as the MNLF and MILF remained confined to the ARMM, the GOP seldom interfered. It was only once the ASG and JI began to kidnap and attack targets outside of the ARMM that the GOP sent in government security forces. However, thanks to the autonomy previously granted—and the neglect of the area that ensued—both the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) could gain little purchase with the local population and generated even less useful intelligence. This led the GOP to ask the United States to help train a Philippine national counterterrorist force on the latest techniques and equipment.

In March 2001, soldiers from the U.S. Army's 1st Special Forces Group deployed to the Philippines to do just this.⁶⁹ Once evidence captured after September 11, 2001, linked al-Qaeda with the ASG and JI, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and U.S. President Bush agreed on additional U.S. assistance.⁷⁰ In 2002, the United States sent a Special Forces Task Force to Mindanao to assist the AFP search for international terrorists and eradicate their hideouts.⁷¹ The Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P)

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process," *ICG Asia Report 80* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 13 July 2004), 2 <http://www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed 7 September).

⁶⁹ C.H. Briscoe, "Why the Philippines?: ARSOF's Expanding Mission in the War on Terror," *Special Warfare*, vol. 17, iss. 1, (September 2004), 2.

⁷⁰ Thomas Lum and Larry A. Nicksch, "The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (January 2009), 16 <http://www.crs.gov> (accessed February 26, 2010).

⁷¹ C.H. Briscoe, "Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines," *Special Warfare*, vol. 17, iss. 1, (September 2004), 18.

remains in place today.⁷² Consisting of approximately 600 personnel, the JSOTF-P is a small entity that is headquartered at Zamboanga City, Mindanao, but maintains liaison and coordination elements (LCE) co-located with key AFP task forces and units throughout the Joint Operation Area (JOA). Since the Philippines is a sovereign PN, the United States does not conduct unilateral operations in the Philippines. Nor does it participate in tactical operations with AFP units. Instead, the JSOTF-P trains, advises, and assists the AFP in its operations.⁷³

By most accounts, JSOTF-P has been successful in helping the AFP gain legitimacy and trust in the eyes of the Mindanao people. Since the Philippine Constitution explicitly forbids U.S. forces to conduct combat operations with the AFP, OEF-P is a classic example of training and advising “by and through but not with.”

One sign of success is that there have been only three enemy-caused casualties over the course of nine years; JSOTF-P has clearly benefitted from the generally warm and receptive attitude of the locals toward the United

⁷² JSOTF-P's mission is to “support the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their fight against terrorism in the southern Philippines. At the request of the Government of the Philippines, JSOTF-P works alongside the AFP to defeat terrorists and create the conditions necessary for peace, stability and prosperity,” from Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, “JSOTF-P Fact Sheet,” Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, (Wednesday, April 1, 2009), <http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com> (accessed February 25, 2010).

⁷³ JSOTF-P lists its key operations as: (1) bring humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected communities through Medical and Dental Civic Action, Veterinary Civic Action, and Engineering Civic Action programs (2) share information with the Philippine Armed Forces to assist the AFP in planning future operations and (3) build AFP capacity through subject-matter expert exchange programs (SMEEs) to exchange lessons learned on subjects such as: Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Tactical Combat Casualty Care, Marksmanship and Small Unit Tactics, Civil Military Operations Planning, Maritime Operations, and Casualty Evacuation.” For more information, see the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, “JSOTF-P Fact Sheet.”

States.⁷⁴ Because of this trust, JSOTF-P has been able to become more visible over time—using information operations to broadcast the positive effects of the AFP’s numerous civic action programs. Also, by using local constabularies, the AFP has made itself more accessible to the local population. The result is a highly effective training and advising activity that gives primacy to local sensibilities.

F. “INDIRECT–TRAIN THE TRAINER”

The “indirect–train the trainer” method of training and advising separates U.S. personnel from the PN security force by at least one degree. With this method, the United States does not operate by or with the foreign security force, and ideally is not even located in the PN. Rather, what it uses are indirect, low-visibility activities that support the legitimacy of the PN government by “building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.”⁷⁵ Indirect training and advising can include indirect support FID operations, such as JCETs and JCS exercises.⁷⁶ Many indirect training and advisory activities fall under the U.S. Security Assistance Training Program, to include Foreign Military Sales, Professional Military Exchange, Unit Exchanges, and International Military Education and Training.

⁷⁴ Of seventeen total fatalities, only three were caused by enemy action: SFC Mark Jackson was killed by a motorcycle IED in Zamboanga while eating at a local food stand on October 2, 2002; SFC Christopher D. Shaw and SSG Jack M. Martin III were killed on September 29, 2009, when their vehicle struck a pressure-plate IED on Jolo Island. Ten soldiers and aircrew were killed when a MH-47E helicopter crashed during training over the ocean on February 21, 2002. The remaining three died as a result of non-mission related accidents. See Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, “NCO honors fallen servicemen with painted memorial wall,” April 20, 2009, Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Web site, <http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com> (accessed February 25, 2010).

⁷⁵ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, I-6.

⁷⁶ U.S. Code Title 10, section 2011 authorizes a unified or specified U.S. combatant command to pay for “expenses of training special operations forces assigned to that command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country.” For more information, see “Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces,” Title 10, *U.S. Code*, Sec. 2011(a1), 2004, <http://vlex.com> (accessed February 15, 2010).

International Military Education and Training is an example of indirect training and advising that “assists U.S. allies and friendly nations in professionalizing their militaries through participation in U.S. military educational programs.”⁷⁷ Managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), this program exists to train and professionalize the militaries of foreign governments.⁷⁸ Through this program, members of PN militaries attend U.S. military schools and programs.⁷⁹ From 1950 to 2008, the United States trained over 707,592 international students.⁸⁰ Annually, approximately 4,000 courses are taught to 7,000 international students at 150 U.S. military schools.⁸¹ In 2009, the United States administered over \$94,793,000 worth of grants to students

⁷⁷ United States Department of State, “2008 Foreign Military Training: II. Description of Programs,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2008/126353.htm> (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁷⁸ United States Department of Defense, *DoD 5105.38-M: Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, (Washington D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2003), 437, <http://www.dsca.mil/samm/> (accessed February 8, 2010).

⁷⁹ According to the United States Department of State, the IMET program is specifically designed to: (1) further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries (2) provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces (3) increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic value and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military. The Security Assistance Managers Manual (DoD 5105.38) and the Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation outline the requirements and procedures required to enroll a foreign military officer or soldier in the IMET program. For more information, see United States Department of State, “2008 Foreign Military Training: II. Description of Programs,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2008/126353.htm> (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁸⁰ United States Department of Defense, *Defense Security Cooperation Factbook*. (Washington D.C., GPO, 2008) <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/FactsBook08.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2010).

⁸¹ United States Department of State, “2008 Foreign Military Training: Executive Summary,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 31, 2008, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2008/126350.htm> (accessed February 20, 2010).

from 128 countries.⁸² Under IMET, international military students receive everything from English-language training to flight training.⁸³

The United States is not the only country to use the IMET concept. The Soviet Union ran a very successful and productive IMET-style program, training Ho Chi Minh and his comrades from North Vietnam at venues in the Soviet Union. Once the Soviets supplied the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) with Air Defense Artillery (ADA) equipment, small numbers of Soviet Military Training Teams arrived in North Vietnam to advise the NVA on the use of these ADA batteries. Interestingly, the Soviets also trained elements of the NVA on guerrilla and revolutionary warfare outside of Vietnam and, upon returning to Vietnam, the NVA then trained the Viet Cong on these newly acquired skill-sets. Such a “train the trainer” concept is a hallmark of IMET programs, and represents a truly indirect approach to training and advising.⁸⁴

Currently, the United States uses such an indirect approach in instances when it recognizes (or is asked to recognize) that it stands a much better chance of successfully assisting the PN, if it operates “below the radar” and less visibly. A contemporary example of an indirect training and advisory operation is ongoing in Thailand.

When the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty divided the Malay Peninsula between British Malaya and the Buddhist Kingdom of Thailand, the treaty’s demarcation line left three provinces within Thailand that were ethnically Malay

⁸² United States Department of State, “International Military Education and Training Account Summary,” Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, October 22, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm> (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁸³ Federation of American Scientists, “International Military Education and Training,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html> (accessed February 2, 2010), 5. In 1990, U.S. Congress expanded IMET to include international civilian personnel and additional courses in resource management, judicial systems, and military codes of conduct. The expansion sought to institutionalize human rights vetting and instruction within the IMET program to ensure that the international students trained on U.S. soil were not past abusers of human rights or likely to become abusers following the completion of training.

⁸⁴ Federation of American Scientists, “International Military Education and Training (IMET),” Federation of American Scientists <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html> (accessed February 2, 2010).

and majority Muslim.⁸⁵ This gave rise to a secessionist movement that periodically flares into violence, most recently thanks to Islamist agitation. Consequently, the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) and the Royal Thai Police (RTP) find themselves embroiled in a counterinsurgency struggle with separatist and militant Muslim groups in Thailand's three southern provinces.

The United States maintains a long history of Theater Security Cooperation with the Kingdom of Thailand. Thailand is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), whose security is paramount to U.S. interests in the region.⁸⁶ Most recently, the United States has provided equipment and training venues for the RTARF and RTP in an effort to better prepare these security forces for the counterinsurgency fight in the South. Not wanting to further complicate the sensitive situation in the South, the U.S. and Thai governments have agreed that U.S. military personnel will not enter Thailand's southern three provinces.⁸⁷ The Thai government has been keen to avoid escalating or aggravating the conflict by bringing in the United States—a move that many feel would invite al-Qaeda and other global violent extremist organizations (VEOs) into the conflict.⁸⁸

Restrictions go even further. U.S. forces cannot participate in training or equipping any Thai security force that is currently conducting pre-mission training (PMT) for deployment to the South. U.S. military personnel may only work with Thai forces in the months before the Thais start their PMT block. As a result, the Joint United States Military Advisory Group–Thailand (JUSMAG-THAI) coordinates for 40–50 U.S.-Thai combined training events at RTARF and RTP bases located in central and northern Thailand under the provisions of routine

⁸⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 2.

⁸⁶ Gunaratna, *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand*, 15.

⁸⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Thailand: Country Specific Information," Bureau of Consular Affairs, February 27, 2010, <https://travel.state.gov> (accessed February 27, 2010).

⁸⁸ Gunaratna, *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand*, 9.

military-to-military/military-to-law enforcement exchange training.⁸⁹ This helps the United States maintain an extremely low degree of visibility. Better still, there is zero chance of a face-to-face encounter between a U.S. service member and a Thai from any of three southern provinces.

Also, all efforts, good and bad, conducted by the Thai government are seen to be Thai initiatives. This is important. But, the problem the Thai government still has is it uses a nationally conscripted army and police force with too little representation from the populations it is trying to secure. This lack of congruence between the security force and the local population has made intelligence collection and sharing difficult. So has the chronic lack of coordination among Thailand's security services. Both hamper the effectiveness of U.S. training and advisory assistance to the government of Thailand.

Where the United States had an easier time training trainers who were ideally suited for their operational environment was, ironically enough, along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border in the 1980s. In 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter authorized U.S. government funding for the mujahideen in Afghanistan in order to counter the Soviet invasion, which Carter at the time called “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.”⁹⁰ ⁹¹ Over the course of the next ten years, the United States channeled billions of dollars in equipment, weapons, and training to the mujahideen via Pakistan and other countries sympathetic to the Afghan cause. This project was known as *Operation Cyclone*, a 1979–1989 CIA effort to arm the mujahideen. The Carter Administration hoped to be able to give “to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War,” thereby, distracting the USSR and draining

⁸⁹ Joint United States Military Advisory Group–Thailand, “What is JUSMAGTHAI?” <http://www.jusmagthai.com> (accessed February 27, 2010).

⁹⁰ Chalmers Johnson, “Second Thoughts on Charlie Wilson's War,” *Asia Times Online*, sec. South Asia, January 8, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA08Df01.html (accessed January 20, 2010).

⁹¹ Jimmy Carter, *State of the Union Address, 1980* (Jimmy Carter Library, 1980) <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> (accessed January 20, 2010).

it of resources over time.⁹² After President Carter left office, the Reagan Administration used the CIA's Special Activities Division to continue assisting the mujahideen. One difference: the bulk of the training and support was channeled through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). The ISI was able to train an estimated 100,000 insurgents over the course of the occupation, and, perhaps even more significantly, it was also able to recruit support from other Arab states in order to counter the Soviets.⁹³

During this training and advising operation, the United States used methods that afforded it the least possible visibility. The CIA's Special Activities Division employed the fewest possible personnel as it engaged in extremely low-level communications with the Pakistanis and the mujahideen. With this approach, there was virtually no possibility of face-to-face contact between U.S. and USSR government or military personnel. The United States also avoided too much direct contact with the mujahideen by operating through the Pakistani ISI, who were much more acceptable to the Afghan tribes and the many Islamic foreign fighters who flocked to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. These indirect aspects of the U.S. operation in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 were instrumental to its success.

Worth pointing out is that the CIA's operations in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and occupation contributed to one of the most effective and efficient FID or UW efforts the United States has ever undertaken. They led to the eventual Soviet withdrawal and, many have argued, the Soviet quagmire in Afghanistan in turn precipitated the end of the Cold War. All the while, the CIA was virtually invisible in Afghanistan, working via the ISI who *matched* the mujahideen not only ethnically, but also shared locals' religion and objectives. This proved a deadly combination that altered the global landscape (for better or worse). It may be no coincidence that success occurred when the United States

⁹² L. Krauss, "Afghanistan: How We Got There," *New York Times*, February 8, 2010, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed February 26, 2010), 14.

⁹³ "Kashmir Imbroglio," *The Statesman*, December 15, 2005, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed October 10, 2009).

advised and trained a security force with which it already had connections in one locale, and then that security force went forward to advise and train a third force in another location. After all, the “train the trainer” concept is the most indirect method the United States can apply. With it, a PN cadre can adapt and implement its own “Domestic Internal Defense” programs and training. This is what we have done, for instance, in the Republic of the Philippines beginning in the 1980s.

As has already been noted, the southern island of Mindanao has a long “ungovernable” history. But even in Luzon, a large communist movement continues to lurk. Consequently, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) has needed a force that can respond with considerable flexibility.

In 1987, President Corazon Aquino initiated the Civilian Auxiliary Force-Geographical Units (CAFGU) program to “protect the people’s security against communist terrorism.”⁹⁴ The CAFGU program replaced the failing Citizen Home Defense Force (CHDF) with CAFGU Inactive and CAFGU Active Auxiliaries (CAAs). The CAA is an all-volunteer force of reservists who remain on active duty, unlike the CHDF or the CAFGU Inactive component. The initial mission for the CAA was to:

- Assist the local government authorities and the AFP Regular Force in the protection of life and property
- Secure vital facilities and public utilities
- Help facilitate the delivery of public safety services to villages liberated from insurgent control and influence⁹⁵

The AFP envisioned using the CAA as a “key player” in its “clear-hold-consolidate-and develop” counter-insurgency plan.⁹⁶ The CAA quickly became a

⁹⁴ Corazon C. Aquino, “State of the Nation Address,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 27, 1988, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed September 5, 2009), 4.

⁹⁵ Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Staff, *The Citizen Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGU)* (Quezon City, Manila: Office of the Secretary Joint Staff General Headquarters, 1993).

⁹⁶ Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Staff, *Citizen Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGU)*, 5.

significant force multiplier for the AFP. However, as the communist threat subsided in the late 1990s, so did the size of the CAFGU. AFP Chief of Staff General Abu put it, “the CAFGU had a strength of about 80,000 in the late 1980s but was reduced to 30,000 when the insurgent threat was thought to have diminished.”⁹⁷

Today, the AFP equips, trains, and advises over 3,246 detachments of CAFGUs, comprising over 52,000 personnel located throughout the Philippines, with the majority currently located in Mindanao.⁹⁸ The Philippine Special Forces advise and train 290 of these CAFGU detachments, providing an irregular warfare focus to the local volunteers.⁹⁹

The Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) are akin to a neighborhood watch that, unlike the CAFGU, the government does not subsidize. Occasionally, Philippine National Police (PNP) will offer training to the CVOs, but the PNP does not arm or equip them. Consequently, reliable numbers for how many CVOs exist are difficult to obtain. One of the benefits of having both types of forces lies in the fact that groups of volunteers from the same *barangay*¹⁰⁰ fill both the CAFGU and CVO. Often, too, the CAFGUs and CVOs operate close to home. As the Philippine Joint Staff explains:

The CAA’s effectiveness lies in the fact that they are natives of cleared barangays. As such, they are familiar with the inhabitants and thus they can easily identify the rebels among the people

⁹⁷ Robert Karniol, “Lieutenant General Efren Abu—Chief of the Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, (December 22, 2005) <http://janes.com> (accessed February 25, 2010).

⁹⁸ Joseph H. Felter, *Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to Counterinsurgency* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2008), 43.

⁹⁹ Felter, *Taking Guns to a Knife Fight*, 43.

¹⁰⁰ *Barangay* is a Tagalog version of the Spanish word *barrio*, meaning “district” or “neighborhood.” It is the lowest civil administration district in the Philippines, approximate to a village or ward. There are 41,995 *barangays* in the Philippines.

staying within the vicinity of their communities. Further, they are knowledgeable of the terrain in their locality hence the successful defense of territories.¹⁰¹

The ability of a local CAFGU to gather local information has greatly enhanced the AFP's ability to secure the population from insurgent groups. The CAFGU's inherent shortcomings in training and discipline are also offset when they can be teamed with a small, elite cadre from the AFP Special Forces. In his doctoral dissertation, *Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to Counterinsurgency*, U.S. Army Colonel Joseph Felter points out the success that comes with this CAFGU-AFP Special Forces union. In drawing on AFP situation reports collected over a thirty-year period, Col. Felter presents ample evidence that when the CAFGU has been paired with AFP Special Forces, fewer civilian and government casualties result, while greater rebel casualties are inflicted.¹⁰²

From the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1899 up until 1991, the United States provided external defense for the Philippines. The keystones to this relationship were the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the former allowing the United States to maintain numerous military bases on Philippine soil.¹⁰³ However, in 1991, at the conclusion of the Cold War, the Philippine Senate did not renew these defense treaties.¹⁰⁴ As a result, the United States handed over all its military bases in the Philippines to the GOP.¹⁰⁵ Despite the breakdown in negotiations over the MBA and closure of bases, however, the United States remained one of the GOP's

¹⁰¹ Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Staff, *Citizen Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGU)*, 9.

¹⁰² Felter, *Taking Guns to a Knife Fight*, 43

¹⁰³ Cheryl A. Walley, "A Century of Turmoil: America's Relationship with the Philippines," *Special Warfare*, vol. 17, iss. 1, (September 2004), 8. After the Philippines attained Independence post WWII, the USG and GOP signed multiple defense treaties that outlined U.S. responsibilities to provide external defense support to the GOP. The United States established the JUSMAG-P in 1947 to maintain this security assistance relationship with the Philippines.

¹⁰⁴ Lum, "The Republic of the Philippines," 16.

¹⁰⁵ Walley, "A Century of Turmoil," 10. The Philippine Congress's failure to ratify the MBA and the subsequent closure of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base (both in Luzon) resulted in a drastic reduction of U.S. security assistance. The United States has not maintained a permanent military facility in the Philippines since.

closest allies, continuing to conduct security cooperation activities and provide security assistance managed by the Joint United States Military Advisory Group-Philippines (JUSMAG-P).

Tellingly, the U.S. Army Special Forces and the AFP Special Forces each have a long and storied, but also shared, past that stretches back to the early days of both forces; the trust and mutual respect between these forces have been fostered over years of consistent engagement.¹⁰⁶ Today, U.S. Special Forces provide training to the AFP Special Forces at Fort Magsaysay and other AFP military bases.¹⁰⁷ These AFP Special Forces then deploy forward to provide training and advice to CAFGU and CVO units. As a rule, the United States does not accompany the AFP Special Forces on missions with the CAFGU/CVO. In fact, outside of the southernmost island of Mindanao, U.S. Army Special Forces rarely provide command and control or intelligence advisory assistance to the AFP Special Forces. Beyond the Joint Operational Area of OEF-P, U.S. forces are rarely, if ever, in direct contact with the CAFGU/CVO. As a result, U.S. visibility is low. Again, too, most of the individuals who belong to the CVO and CAFGU hail from the same barangays and clans and/or tribes that they volunteer to protect. This “home militia” concept ensures a high degree of congruence between members of local CAFGU/CVO and the local population of each barangay.

Worth mentioning is that neither U.S. GPF from PACOM, nor U.S. Special Forces, train the CAFGU or the CVO directly. Rather, AFP infantry battalions

¹⁰⁶ Walley, “A Century of Turmoil,” 10. In 1999, the GOP ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), essentially a version of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), providing protections for U.S. military personnel deployed to the Philippines. The VFA allows the two militaries to continue the large engagement activities and exercises reminiscent of the MBA period.

¹⁰⁷ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, “Security and Foreign Forces, Philippines,” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (May 14, 2009) <http://janes.com> (accessed February 20, 2010). The CJCS Joint Exercises Balikatan, Vector Balance Piston, and Balance Piston are some of the several training events that occur annually between U.S. SF and the AFP. These exercises are designed to improve both forces’ planning, readiness, and interoperability. Many of the AFP battalions that equip, train, and advise the various CAFGU participate in this annual CJCS exercise.

and AFP Special Forces do this. What U.S. Special Forces does do is to train the trainer: conducting security assistance and security cooperation events with the AFP, which then equips, trains, and advises the CAFGU. Not only does this keep U.S. personnel out of the mix in Luzon, but it ensures that people familiar *with* local sensibilities—people who are also familiar *to* locals—fulfill the GOP’s cardinal responsibility: providing security to Filipinos itself.

G. SUMMARY

To summarize, training and advising is not a new mission for the U.S. Army. A considerable amount of expertise and knowledge already exists. U.S. forces already conduct training and advising operations throughout the world, whether what they do falls under Security Assistance, Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance, or Foreign Internal Defense.

With this being said, one thing training and advising planners must do more consistently is suspend their U.S. frame of reference in order to better assess what equipment, training, and infrastructure is most suitable for our partners. As U.S. Joint FID doctrine states, “What worked for the United States or another nation may not necessarily work for a third nation. In addition, what worked yesterday may not be appropriate tomorrow.... The ability of planners to adapt ... to specific HN needs is an absolute imperative to success.”¹⁰⁸ Of critical importance is that planners remain aware that “the ultimate responsibility for IDAD rests with the HN.”¹⁰⁹

In this chapter, we have examined three methods of training and advising a PN. Short of invading and needing to dismantle an existing army, working “by, with, and through” a PN is the least *efficient* method for assisting another nation to deal with its internal security challenges. Operating “by, through, but not with” a partner nation can be more efficient, but still may not be optimal. This approach seems to work best when a PN will benefit by openly asking for direct

¹⁰⁸ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, III-9.

¹⁰⁹ DoD, *JP 3-07.1*, III-1.

assistance. Typically, “by, through, but not with” makes it difficult for the United States to hide its involvement. Even when a low profile is not essential and an American presence is not inflammatory, both the United States and the PN are almost always better served by a smaller U.S. footprint and the greater use of PN forces.

Best—still—is to train and assist without there being any possibility of inflaming sensibilities at either the local or national levels. Here is where the “Indirect—train the trainer” method represents a vast improvement over the other two options. It is the only means that enables a nation to develop its own *Domestic Internal Defense* program, and, thereby, ensures a government is fulfilling *its* social contract with *its* citizens. As it happens, this method also epitomizes World War I guerrilla advisor T.E. Lawrence’s maxim that it is “better to let the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly.”¹¹⁰ More to the point, it fulfills doctrine’s reminders about the importance of sovereignty.

¹¹⁰ T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” in Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography* (Atheneum, NY: 1990), 962.

IV. RECOMMENDED METHOD

A. HISTORY OF SUCCESSFUL INDIRECT FID AND UW

History offers several examples of an *indirect* approach to training and advising working well, especially when the presence of outsiders would have been either too inflammatory locally, or too politically sensitive for the PN government. For instance, the Soviets trained members of the North Vietnamese Army within the USSR who, in turn, trained the Viet Cong to fight against the United States.¹¹¹ The United States continues to train the Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Forces who, in turn, train the CAFGU who operate successfully against insurgents in the Philippines. United States success in supporting the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 represents yet another instance of successful training of the trainers. Ironically, during our incursion into Afghanistan 30 years ago, we funded Pakistan, whose ISI organized armies of mujahideen. Not only did the mujahideen feel far more comfortable working with Pakistanis than they would have felt, had they had to work with U.S. soldiers, but keeping U.S. personnel out of Afghanistan prevented the very dangerous possibility of a direct U.S.–Soviet confrontation.¹¹²

B. WHAT TO DO?

Surely, there are lessons in this for how we can best help the Pakistanis in the FATA today. For instance, should U.S. forces take on the role of serving as counterinsurgency trainers and advisors working with the Frontier Corps *directly*? Or should the United States take a more indirect role and back well away from the FC and the FATA?

¹¹¹ Dana Drenkowski, "Patterns and Predictability: The Soviet Evaluation of Operation Linebacker II," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 20 (2007), 559–607.

¹¹² Adam Stahl, "Al-Qa'ida's American Connection," *Global Politics*, <http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue6/Stahl/> (accessed March 28, 2010).

The Special Service Group

Enter the intermediary force. Pakistan's Special Service Group (SSG) is an extremely professional and capable special operations unit, stood up by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1956, and divided between Pakistan's Army and Navy, with a special operations air wing from the Air Force to provide support.¹¹³ It is designed as a direct action unit. It is comprised of four battalions (or *commandos*), which can be increased to six battalions of elite infantry, and with a top-tier section capable of surgical direct-action missions.¹¹⁴ This section, the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), consists of two companies, *Karrar* and *Zarrar*, and one supporting battalion, Third Commando. All have been trained extensively by U.S. Special Operations units, the British Special Air Service, and the CIA. The SOTF was the unit responsible for ending the standoff with extremists at the Red Mosque, or *Lal Masjid*, in Islamabad in 2007.¹¹⁵ Man for man, the SSG boasts Pakistan's best, brightest, and fittest soldiers.

Given the SSG's experience, it is more than capable of training the FC in infantry-type missions. What it cannot yet do is function as an advisory unit. That is because it lacks the organizational structure and specific training needed. Something else the SSG lacks is a tempered approach to counterinsurgency. Given its current dispensation, it would never perform a non-kinetic mission apart from reconnaissance in preparation for more direct action. Indeed, for the same reasons that the United States should not send a U.S. Ranger battalion to advise and train a foreign unit, Pakistan should not send the SSG in its current guise to train the FC about how to conduct sensitive counterinsurgency operations. Like U.S. Army Rangers, the SSG is very good at destroying things, but it is not designed (nor trained) to interact with the populace non-kinetically.

¹¹³ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars within* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 655.

¹¹⁴ Salman Masood and Ismail Khan, "Bomb at Pakistani Base Kills at Least 15 from Elite Unit," *New York Times*, September 14, 2007, <http://proquest.com> (accessed October 27, 2009).

¹¹⁵ Salman Masood and Ismail Khan, "Musharraf Defends Raid that Ended Red Mosque Siege," *New York Times*, (July 13, 2007) <http://proquest.com> (accessed December 14, 2009).

For its part, the FC will do as the regular army directs it to do. If, for example, the Pakistani Army wants to turn the FC into a strike force, it doubtless could. However, this would represent a waste of one of the FC's greatest strengths: its connections with the people. If Pakistan's army were to use the FC's connections and positioning *vis-a-vis* the local population and augment this with the infantry tools and tactics the SSG could provide—along with the wisdom to recognize when to apply force or finesse—the FC would be the ideal force for the FATA. At the moment, the FC is the only force with the right relationships with the populace.

This is where U.S. Army Special Forces can help. USAJFKSWCS is the proponent in the U.S. military for training U.S. and international troops to train other foreign troops or guerrillas. Special Warfare Center trainers have run the *Robin Sage* guerrilla warfare exercise in rural North Carolina for half a century; it remains the only exercise of its kind in the U.S. military.¹¹⁶ Special Forces does not just have its “train the trainer” approach to offer the SSG, but the infrastructure to do this well away from the FATA where a U.S. presence will only cause problems.¹¹⁷

The United States Special Forces has a long-standing training relationship with the SSG. As Pakistan's premier special operations force, the SSG already has an extremely selective screening process. This is apparent to any member of U.S. Special Forces who has trained with the SSG on its posts in Tarbela, Attock Fort, and Cherat, NWFP. SSG soldiers protect their U.S. Special Forces advisor guests with as much, or even more, care than they do their own troops.

¹¹⁶ Chip Cummins, “Play Fighting: A Mistaken Shooting Puts Army War Games Under Tough Spotlight—Folks Near Fort Bragg Play Roles of Guerrilla, Enemy in Green Beret Exercises—‘Gun Battle’ Behind the Citgo,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 26, 2002, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed June 14, 2009).

¹¹⁷ “Three US Soldiers among Nine Killed in Pak Blast,” *The Statesman*, February 4, 2010, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed February 16, 2010). A suicide bomber killed three U.S. Army soldiers in Lower Dir, Pakistan, in February 2010 while they were visiting the opening of a girls' school. Each U.S. soldier was dressed in *shalwar kameez*, the traditional local garb, in attempts to lower their signature. The soldiers were part of the U.S. Special Operations Training mission, and are among eleven U.S. service members who have been killed in Pakistan since 9/11.

But, there is also a very real counterinsurgency-related reason for this. The SSG recognizes that the presence of Americans as trainers is problematic as far as locals go. Therefore, during training missions, virtually all of the training takes place on fenced-in SSG posts, with no visibility from the outside.

Most of the training Special Forces is doing with the SSG focuses on small unit infantry tactics, with much effort spent in Close Quarter Battle in terrain virtually identical to that of the FATA. This direct action training plays to the strengths of the SSG as a very effective counter-terror force and an elite infantry unit. What is paid little attention to at present is any sort of *indirect* approach to counterinsurgency, while what receives no attention is how to *train* other forces, be they counter-insurgents or domestic paramilitaries.

In other words, what already exists between U.S. Special Forces and the SSG is a training relationship. What is missing is “train the trainer” training related to counterinsurgency. Because U.S. Special Forces already works with the SSG, it would be easy to extend the relationship to assist the SSG in how to conduct training themselves. Not only could U.S. Special Forces train the SSG in Domestic Internal Defense, but it could partner with them to organize and build a capability *within* the SSG, whereby the SSG could effectively train the Frontier Corps and other paramilitary forces. Americans could do this without ever having to set foot in the FATA. Arguably, they could even do this within the Continental United States by cycling Pakistani SSG officers and sergeants through specialized training programs established by U.S. Special Forces at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and other more remote posts or training centers.

Already, the U.S. military trains soldiers and officers from numerous partner nations via its IMET programs here in the United States. Not only are foreign officers and soldiers given access to our best military institutions, but also to some of our best training programs. U.S. and international students in these schools and training events form lasting friendships. These friends will often cross paths again over the course of their careers. At the moment, Pakistani

officers are few and far between. As it did several decades ago, the U.S. government should invite many more to the United States.

C. A SOLUTION: MINIMIZING THE U.S. FOOTPRINT

Currently, while the SSG is a highly capable commando unit, and is certainly capable of training its own forces and other forces within the Pakistani security structure for direct-action missions, it does not have a force specifically selected or designed to train and advise foreign troops or guerrillas. Pakistan does not have anything akin to U.S. Special Forces. Consequently, while U.S. Special Forces should continue to train with the SSG on its base in Tarbela, NWFP, on U.S. bases in Afghanistan, and even here in the United States, we should also try to help the Pakistanis build—either *within* the SSG, or as a unit put together *from* within the SSG—a force specifically designed to plan and conduct its own Domestic Internal Defense. In short, the United States should help Pakistan form a “Special Forces” capability—an element made up of small teams of trainers and advisors. With such a capability in-house, Pakistan’s army would be much better equipped to turn the Frontier Corps—a force of, by, and for the local people—into a far more effective counterinsurgency force *for* the FATA. Ultimately, this is what Pakistan and the United States both need. It would certainly be something the local population would prefer over a large U.S. troop presence, and it is what U.S. Special Forces does well.

D. SUMMARY

A successful outcome to countering the spreading insurgency in the FATA and the NWFP is important to U.S. national security. At first glance, it makes sense that many in Washington want Americans to have “eyes on” in the FATA. However, “eyes on” does not have to necessitate boots on the ground. Not only can the United States still monitor the FATA without *being* there in force—in much the same way U.S. intelligence personnel monitored the FATA in cooperation with the ISI immediately after 9/11—but by not being present, Americans cannot further alienate a population that is already anti-American. As

for whether the United States can contribute to *containing* the insurgency in the FATA without being present, this question should beg another: Could we contain the insurgency in the FATA if we *were* present? In the case of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, it is actually our presence that makes the insurgency so difficult to contain.¹¹⁸

The United States has contacts and sources operating in FATA; we are not totally blind there. It is clearly critically important that we maintain our intelligence connections with the ISI (even if there are some deviant bedfellows within its ranks who at times support the Taliban). This sort of relationship with questionable foreign intelligence services is nothing new. We should always be on our guard, just as we can expect other nations' intelligence services to likewise be on their guard regarding us. But, just as we should strive for nothing less than a fully cooperative relationship with the Pakistanis, what is equally important is that we strengthen our relationship without having it appear that we are trying to *manage* Islamabad.

If U.S. Special Forces continued to train the SSG, and helped the SSG to form a capable advisory unit, able to train and advise the Frontier Corps to effectively conduct counterinsurgency, the United States would not only be able to back away from the FATA, thereby easing tensions, but in doing so would perhaps generate enough calm to bring the FATA under some modicum of control. There is little doubt that the FATA will always remain somewhat *wild*, but this does not mean that it has to remain a training ground or sanctuary for our worst enemies or a planning base from which another attack on the United States can be launched. As this thesis contends, and contrary to what those less familiar with the FATA, the FC, and the SSG may advise, the United States can most effectively *operate from a distance* when it comes to the FATA. Only by

¹¹⁸ These questions are not meant to be hand-wringing over our enemy's perception of us. We should not worry about whether they will *like* us. After all, some of these people tolerated the Taliban and hosted al-Qaeda, allowing the planning and training that led to 3,000 American deaths inside our borders. Instead, these questions simply take reality into account—about a population that does not care either way about the United States, but does care about its autonomy.

operating more indirectly are we likely to extinguish some of the flames of anti-Western militancy, and thus reduce al-Qaeda's prospects for sanctuary in this region.

Taking Pakistani Sensibilities Seriously:

Just as we will not let Pakistan's territory to be used by terrorists for attacks against our people and our neighbours, we cannot allow our territory and our sovereignty to be violated by our friends.¹¹⁹

Pakistan seeks economic, technological, and logistical support from the United States to aid it in quelling militant violence. It does *not* want U.S. soldiers. This sovereign nation is not requesting foreign troops, save those capable of instructing its soldiers in these new technologies. Here, again, is precisely why U.S. Special Forces has a critical role to play. Special Forces is a force multiplier, designed specifically, though not exclusively, for situations where U.S. forces need to accomplish a very large job, yet maintain a very small footprint. But in terms of organizational design, U.S. Special Forces also offers a potential template for the SSG.

A twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA), or A-Team is, by doctrine, able to train and advise a foreign battalion-sized element.¹²⁰ Using this math, three SFODAs (36 men) are able to train and advise a brigade's worth of combat forces, while nine SFODAs (108 men) should be able to train a division. Each SFODA is designed to be self-sustaining, requiring very little support from its higher elements. SFODA's are commanded by a captain, with a master sergeant as the Detachment Operations NCO. A warrant officer serves as the Detachment Executive Officer, and coordinates the intelligence activities of the team, alongside the Detachment Intelligence NCO. Additionally, the team has junior and senior Weapons, Medical, Engineer and

¹¹⁹ Pakistan's President Zardari to the UN, as quoted in David Morgan, "U.S., Pakistani Troops Exchange Fire," *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE48O7II20080925> (accessed February 18, 2010).

¹²⁰ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 5-5.

Communications NCOs to round out the twelve-man structure.¹²¹ Occasionally, these teams are supported by Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, K-9 teams and other personnel depending on the nature of the mission.

Teams already *within* or formed *from* within the Pakistani SSG could be similarly configured to do “Special Forces-like” missions in the FATA, or wherever else Pakistan deems necessary. Without question, this capability would be useful in the FATA, but it could also be of use in training Afghan Commandos, for instance. In fact, in early February 2010, the Pakistani government offered its training services to the Afghan Army, perhaps in an effort to finally show the Americans how training should be done or, more likely, to monitor growing Indian presence and influence in the country.¹²² Regardless of where such teams might be used, however, first the capability needs to be developed.

Utilizing the IMET concept, the United States could bring select Pakistani SSG officers to Fort Bragg for three to five months of consultations through the Army’s Special Warfare Center. A tailored program could cover everything from how Special Forces does assessment and selection to how all phases of the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) are organized, to include the final exercise in the Special Forces training pipeline, *Robin Sage* (see Figure 5).¹²³

¹²¹ USA, FM 3-05.130, 5-5.

¹²² Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistan Says It’ll Help Train Afghan Army; Military Chief Kayani Says His Nation is Committed to Helping Stabilize its Neighbor,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 2010, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed 3 February 2010).

¹²³ United States Army Special Operations Command News Service, “International Military Eligible to Earn the Special Forces Tab,” The United States Army Special Operations News Service, no. 091014-04 (October 14, 2009) <http://news.soc.mil/releases/News%20Archive/2009/October/091014-04.html> (accessed February 19, 2010), 1-2. From early 2006 to 2009, the Army’s Special Warfare Center offered an International Special Forces Training Course designed to teach “SF-like” principles to other countries’ officers and sergeants, but with little to no U.S. student interaction. In the past, foreign officers and sergeants used to go through the entire SF Qualification Course with their American counterparts, but this process was halted in 2005 and continued as a separate course, designed solely for international officers. In October 2009, the Special Warfare Center brought international officers and soldiers back into the Qualification Course, recognizing the value of the interactions for both the U.S. and the international students.

PHASE V SFQC POI

<p><u>Special Operations</u> lesson plans per module:</p> <p>331-7666 Fundamentals of Unconventional Warfare 331-7668 Guerrilla Tactics 331-7670 Cross-Cultural Communications 331-7672 The Area Command/Complex 331-7674 Sabotage 331-7675 The Underground 331-7696 SOF Interagency and Interoperability Planning Considerations in a UW Environment 331-7705 Unconventional Warfare Exam 331-7723 Detachment Tactical Training 331-7731 Insurgency 331-7733 The Auxiliary and Logistics 331-7734 Guerrilla Operations 331-7735 Unconventional Warfare (UW) against Non-State Actors 331-7738 Negotiations 331-7739 Subversion 331-7741 Advanced Special Operations 331-7753 Target Analysis 331-7754 Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR)</p> <p><u>Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)</u></p> <p>331-7752 Mission Rehearsal Exercise</p> <p><u>Unconventional Warfare Field Training Exercise (FTX)</u></p> <p>331-7688 Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning (PE) 331-7689 UW FTX "Robin Sage"</p>

Figure 5. U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course Phase V Program of Instruction

The point of this multi-month program would not be to run Pakistani officers through U.S. training themselves, but to demonstrate in a comprehensive manner the way the United States Army *produces* Special Forces (note: *not* "commando") teams. By setting the program up as a consultative exercise, the Pakistanis would be able to provide input and receive instant feedback and, in the process, work out a *Pakistani* way to design its own advisory capability and form its own teams.

The Pakistanis have already demonstrated their ability to train and advise guerrillas and paramilitary forces. This is what the ISI did so effectively during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Also, there are the army's long-standing command relationships with the Frontier Corps and other paramilitary units used in Kashmir. The Pakistanis have also proven very capable of raising their own *lashkars* in order to *indirectly* counter militancy in the FATA and expel the Taliban

from certain areas. To argue that the Pakistanis would not be able to handle “training the trainer” would be to ignore their history, and to ignore what is already happening elsewhere in the country.

The advantage, meanwhile, to the United States helping Pakistan do more of this would be twofold: first, the United States could help *influence* without *imposing* itself; second, it would keep us out of the FATA. Otherwise, by coercing Islamabad to accept U.S. trainers in the FATA, the United States is in essence telling the Pakistanis that they are either not capable of training and advising their own forces properly, or that Islamabad’s view of how, and by whom, its forces are to be trained, does not matter. Both bespeak either arrogance at worst, or at best, a less than equal partnership. If these are the sort of patronizing messages the United States wants to send, so be it—but neither will help our cause.

Better, instead, is to provide Pakistan the tools it requests, the trainers it seeks, and then leave it to fight its own battles.¹²⁴ After all, Pakistan faces a much greater threat from terror than does the United States. The militants have left no part of the country unscathed. Pakistan has taken over 30,000 civilian and military casualties since 9/11, and a staggering average of ten soldiers a day have been killed since 2009.¹²⁵ According to its own reports, Pakistan has also captured or killed as many as 17,000 militants and terrorists from the Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda.¹²⁶ The Pakistani government has

¹²⁴ Under the train-the-trainer approach described, we envision that joint training programs between U.S. SFODAs and SSG units would continue, involving no more than two ODAs at a time in Pakistan, and venturing no farther “forward” than the NWFP. U.S. Intelligence personnel would continue to work with the ISI with a very low profile, seeking information leading to al-Qaeda and only the most important Afghan Taliban targets, and providing “outer ring” informational force protection for the ODAs training with the SSG. Only the most carefully selected and specially trained U.S. intelligence personnel, with ISI cooperation, would ever set foot in the FATA.

¹²⁵ “Global War on Terror Claims 30,000 Pakistani Casualties,” *The Economic Times*, sec. Politics/Nation, February 19, 2010, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Global-war-on-terror-claims-30000-Pakistani-casualties/articleshow/5590230.cms> (accessed February 19, 2010).

¹²⁶ “Global War on Terror,” *The Economic Times*.

consistently passed key intelligence to the United States regarding some of its own citizens, even though this has been an extremely unpopular thing for it to do. The Pakistanis have even cooperated and taken part in a series of joint CIA/ISI raids in which they apprehended Abdul Salam, the “shadow governor” of Kunduz Province, and Mullah Berader, the Afghan Taliban’s number two and the Taliban’s Operational Chief for Afghanistan.¹²⁷ There is no reason to doubt that the Pakistanis want to solve their own militant problem. If they are unable to meet the United State’s timeline, then this should be considered a political issue for Washington and Islamabad, but not one for the U.S. military to solve.

¹²⁷ Laura King and Alex Rodriguez, “Major Afghan Taliban Figure Caught; A Provincial Insurgent Chief is Captured in Pakistan, and Three Suspected Al Qaeda Militants are Arrested,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 19, 2010, <http://www.proquest.com> (accessed February 22, 2010).

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V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that sometimes there are better military solutions to training and advising missions than acting “by, with and through” a partner nation’s security forces. Without question, there may be a need for unilateral action: this is called an invasion. There are also times for working alongside a foreign government’s forces: this is called partnering. But then, perhaps more often than the U.S. government would like to believe, there are times and places when and where the United States should *not* participate in someone else’s fight because our presence will only make things worse—for *everyone*. This describes the FATA right now.

Understandably, the United States has had little patience since 9/11 for any nation that has dragged its feet in going after those who would threaten U.S. citizens. Today, however, most countries would like to address other pressing internal issues—the economy, education, health care and refugees—many of which fuel militancy. Clearly, the sanctuary afforded militants in Pakistan poses a threat to the stability of the region and is a *direct* threat to U.S., Coalition and Afghan soldiers working toward stability on the other side of the border. But, even when these problems affect Americans directly, there may be indirect ways to address them that are more effective than boots on the ground.

This study has described the militant situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, and how the Frontier Corps can be—and should be—bolstered to help Pakistan re-secure the FATA. Significantly, however, the enemy is not just confined to the FATA anymore. *Tehrik e Taliban* Pakistan has moved from Waziristan through the FATA into the Northwest Frontier Province and deep into Punjab, even striking Islamabad and Lahore, a border city with India. The extremist problem in Pakistan is not one for the Frontier Corps to handle alone; it requires involvement by police, politicians, clerics, military and paramilitary alike. Consequently, this study does not mean to imply that the Frontier Corps is the key to solving Pakistan’s militancy problem

per se. But, because the United States has chosen to directly support, train and advise the FC in a place where history has not been kind to outsiders, the United States has unnecessarily embroiled itself in a situation our presence will only make worse—and make worse for Islamabad, never-mind just the FATA.

The United States continues to conduct drone strikes against the TTP and against select al-Qaeda targets when those targets are foolish enough to expose themselves. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army does the dirty work, conducting large-scale, conventional clearing operations in Swat, Waziristan, and elsewhere in the Tribal Areas. Pakistan's army has the manpower and weaponry (with U.S. financial and technological support) to fight these large battles, while its local partner, the Frontier Corps, knows the lay of the land, the peculiarities and intricacies of the tribal system, and who is who within its patrol areas. Similar to a beat cop, the FC is indispensable for helping the authorities to see through the mass of the population and pick out those who do not belong. The Frontier Corps *does* need additional weaponry, night vision optics, new uniforms, better pay, protective equipment and better-armored vehicles. The militants have the FC outgunned in most engagements, and it is well worth the United States' while to provide these items. The FC also needs training and skilled, experienced advisors. There is no reason we should not supply these, too. But, we should do so bearing one important fact in mind: external forces have been most successful whenever they have correctly discerned just how close they needed to get to the conflict in order to help make a positive impact, while making sure they got no closer. U.S. Special Forces teams are undoubtedly training the Frontier Corps well. However, that does not change the reality that, at least when it comes to the FATA, the best advisor will always be a Pakistani, and the biggest *liability* an American.

The more the Pakistani government is pressured to allow the United States to operate in Pakistan, the more militants will swarm to the fight. The nest

has already been stirred and, if handled clumsily, these U.S.-Pakistani operations could spur even greater militancy, as resentment against the West and against Islamabad intensifies.

From any angle then, the only reasonable solution appears to be what has worked so well elsewhere, under similar circumstances—Americans need to stand back, train the right forces to move forward, and let *them* engage with the enemy. Not only will this help Pakistan (re)assert its sovereignty so that others (to include us) do not violate it, but it prevents us from getting caught in a place where no one wants us or thinks we belong.

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5. HQ USSOCOM Library
MacDill AFB, Florida
6. ASD SO/LIC
Washington, D.C.
7. USASOC
Fort Bragg, North Carolina