

THE ORIGINS OF MARSHAL LYAUTEY'S
PACIFICATION DOCTRINE IN MOROCCO
FROM 1912 TO 1925

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ABSTRACT

THE ORIGINS OF MARSHAL LYAUTEY'S PACIFICATION DOCTRINE IN MOROCCO FROM 1912 TO 1925 by MAJ (P) Grégoire POTIRON de BOISFLEURY, 148 pages.

The work achieved by Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854-1934) in Morocco between 1912 and 1925, while he served as the *résident général*, occupies a special place in French military history. Lyautey's work still applies today, and is seen as a model in the difficult domain of counter-insurgency operations. Far from conquering with raw strength alone, Lyautey acted as a statesman and pacified the country while strengthening the authority of the Sultan. Based on the principles of peaceful penetration and the "oil drop" theory, his actions allowed the simultaneous development of infrastructure and economy, while facilitating the reform of Moroccan institutions, decisively contributing to the birth of modern Morocco. Simple but effective because of its flexibility Lyautey's doctrine is the joint fruit of his experience and of the progressive maturation of colonial thought, which he knew how to apply and promote better than anyone else.

From the numerous documents written by Lyautey himself, his detractors, his critics and modern historians, this thesis examines the doctrine which guided Lyautey's actions in Morocco. The primary aim is to determine the value and relevance of what Lyautey accomplished in Morocco, by examining the origins of Lyautey's doctrine and design.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In every country there are existing frameworks. The great mistake for European people, coming there as a conqueror, is to destroy these frameworks. Bereft of its armature, the country falls into anarchy. One must govern with the mandarin and not against the mandarin.¹

—De Lanessan

In a recent interview,² General Stanley Mc Chrystal, current commander of both American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, suggested a return to Galula³ and Lyautey's lessons on counterinsurgency in order to put an end to the seemingly everlasting conflict there. Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854-1934) is not as famous in the U.S.

¹Jean-Louis de Lanessan in André Maurois, *Lyautey* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1931), 44. [Dans tout pays...il y a des cadres. La grande erreur, pour le peuple européen qui vient là en conquérant, c'est de détruire ces cadres. Le pays, privé de son armature, tombe alors dans l'anarchie. Il faut gouverner avec le mandarin et non contre le mandarin.] Note: Jean-Marie Antoine Louis de Lanessan (1843-1919) was a deputy of the Radical Party, and a freemason, then governor general of Indochina in 1891. He was called back in 1894. He had a quick but great influence on Lyautey. He published around forty books about botanic and his studies, thinking and colonial experience, among those: *L'expansion coloniale de la France* (1886), *L'Indo-chine française* (1889), *La colonisation française en Indo-chine* (1889) and *Principes de colonisation* (1897).

²Renaud Girard, *Mc Chrystal: "Comment nous allons gagner en Afghanistan"* ["How we will win in Afghanistan."], *Le Figaro*, 29 September 2009.

³David Galula (1919-1967) was a French officer, born in Tunisia and raised in Morocco. He graduated from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr in 1940 and fought in France, North Africa, Italy, and France again. In 1945, he served as a military attaché in China, then with the United Nations as a military observer in Greece and as military attaché again in Hong Kong from 1952 to 1956. He fought against the insurgency in Kabylie, Algeria and resigned his commission in 1962, when France left Algeria. He came to the United States for studying and published his most famous book in 1963: *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

Army than David Galula is, but his actions in Morocco between 1912 and 1925 were far different from any other contemporary colonial adventure.

Lyautey was a French Army officer, a writer, who was member of the French Academy⁴ and a statesman, who was served as *résident général*⁵ in Morocco from 1912 to 1925, with only a brief interruption during the First World War.⁶ During that period, Lyautey implemented an original strategy of pacification and development that is known as the “*tache d’huile*”⁷ [oil stain or oil drop] theory.⁸ In this particular context, “pacification” might be defined as a package of actions, aimed at isolating and defeating an insurgency, while appeasing the population by respecting the local culture and bringing essential economic development to the country. Lyautey’s theory relied upon acting simultaneously in various places, which will expand and join like oil stains. These actions have to be performed with minimal use of force and indirectly, relying as much as

⁴*Accadémie Francaise*. Lyautey was elected to the French Academy in October 1912, but, due to his work in Morocco and then in World War I, he joined it officially only on 8 July 1920. The French Academy was founded in 1635 under the reign of Louis XIII by Cardinal Richelieu in order to improve and standardize the French language. It has since its beginnings forty members, who are elected for life from among the most famous writers in French language. They are nicknamed the “Immortals.”

⁵In a country placed under Protectorate status by a treaty, the *résident général* is the official representative of the French government. He had all powers in the domains of the foreign affairs, defense of the territory and the administration of the protectorate.

⁶He became Minister of War for four months, from December 1916 to March 1917 and just replaced General Gallieni, his previous chief in Tonkin and Madagascar.

⁷Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, vol. 1 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1920), 113. [Tache d’huile].

⁸The United States Army used its own version of this theory during the Vietnam War, called “ink blot.”

possible by native officials. Pacification prefigured the current ideas of “winning hearts and minds” and “state building.”

Pacification, stabilization and state (re-) building will remain critical missions for western forces in the coming decade. If Lyautey’s work is still revered in Morocco more than eighty years later, it may contain some useful ideas which could be helpful today in counterinsurgency.

This study focuses primarily on the actions of Marshal Lyautey in Morocco, and delves into the reasons for his actions and his sources of inspiration. What results did he actually achieve in Morocco? Does official legend match reality? Have his actions been embellished and do his ideas still have value? What were the various influences on his doctrine and what led Lyautey to design and implement such a policy in Morocco? Was it an original design or did he benefit from others’ experiences? Did he only follow political orders or did he have his own vision?

Far from conquering with raw strength alone, Lyautey acted as a statesman and pacified the country while strengthening the authority of the Sultan. Based on the principles of what he called “peaceful penetration”⁹ and the “oil drop” theory, his actions allowed the simultaneous development of infrastructure and economy, but also facilitated the reform of Moroccan institutions, both of which decisively contributed to the birth of modern Morocco. Simple but effective due to its flexibility, Lyautey’s doctrine is the joint fruit of his experience served by his own character and ambition, and of the

⁹Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc, Lettres du Sud Oranais (1903-1906)* (Paris: Editions Colin, 1937), 38. [Pénétration pacifique].

progressive maturation of French colonial thought, which he knew how to apply and promote better than anyone else.

Marshal Lyautey's voluminous correspondence and books, as well numerous secondary sources help to determine some of his influences and his way of thinking.¹⁰ It must be mentioned that Lyautey and his actions inspired great passion in many people, so the author has found more than four hundred documents on varying topics, some very fair, others with a hidden agendas: promoting their own vision on counter-insurgency, criticizing French colonial policy, encouraging respect for other cultures and religions, and so forth. For this reason, primary sources are used as much as possible.

Primary sources are abundant, but must be used cautiously. Some of them were probably corrupted by Lyautey himself. As reported by his nephew Pierre Lyautey,¹¹ the Marshal worked on his own archives or rewrote some of the documents. These archives were partially destroyed at the beginning of the First World War when the Germans intentionally burnt Crévic, Lyautey's family estate where his archives were stored. So he had to reconstitute them and stored them in his property of Thorey, where they are still today. At the end of his life, when he started to publish some of his letters, Lyautey claimed they remained untouched and unchanged.¹² But while he might have been "selective," there is evidence that he was not. Some authors even claimed he was busy,

¹⁰The author translated most of those being in French. Any material found already in English will be directly used. The original material in French will be attached between brackets.

¹¹Arnaud Teyssier, *Lyautey "Le Ciel et les Sables Sont Grands"* (Paris: Perrin, 2004), 18.

¹²Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, vol. 1, Foreword, vii.

organizing “his own legend”¹³ and preparing his entry in history. Some of the letters today available were gathered and published after the author’s death in 1934 by two of his nephews, Pierre Lyautey and Roger d’Amécourt.¹⁴ The works of André Le Révérend, however, mostly in his *Un Lyautey inconnu*¹⁵ [*An unknown Lyautey*], based on his intensive research in public and private archives, has uncovered previously unpublished correspondence, which has confirmed much of Lyautey’s published materials.

Secondary sources, as mentioned above, must be approached with equal caution. For French people, Lyautey remains a national hero, who was initially buried in Rabat (Morocco), was then enshrined in the Invalides (Paris) with military honors under the presidency of the General de Gaulle. The majority of French writers, particularly the contemporaries of Lyautey, are thus generally favorable to him. The comment of the English speaking authors is often more critical. The approach of more recently published historical works is more qualified.

It would have been useful to consult other primary documents to confirm Lyautey’s writings. Lyautey’s papers in the French national archives, French military archives in Vincennes, the French Foreign Ministry Diplomatic archives, stored in Nantes, the overseas archives, located in Aix en Provence, the Moroccan national

¹³Teyssier, 18 [organisé sa propre légende].

¹⁴The books published were: Lyautey, *Lettres du Sud de Madagascar* (Paris: Editions Colin, 1935); *Vers le Maroc* (1937). Pierre Lyautey, in Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 5.

¹⁵André Le Révérend, *Un Lyautey inconnu: correspondance et journal inédits 1874-1934* (Paris: Perrin, 1980).

archives or private collections like the one in Thorey-Lyautey,¹⁶ were out of reach for this study, which hence relies on other authors works to check Lyautey's thesis.

This thesis focuses on Marshal Lyautey's actions in Morocco from 1912 to 1925, but only in the territories under French control.¹⁷ It will, however, be necessary to examine Lyautey's previous experiences, education, travels throughout the world and studies, social influences and political evolution in order to gain a more complete understanding of his background. It will as well sometimes be enlightening to compare what occurred in the area under Spanish control, or in other French possessions.

¹⁶On the request of its inhabitants, the village of Thorey (Meurthe et Moselle), located in Lorraine, near Nancy, was renamed Thorey-Lyautey after the death of the Marshal.

¹⁷By that time, the northern part of Morocco near the Mediterranean Sea, and southern desert part were under Spanish control. (See map of Morocco in Appendix E, figure 1).

CHAPTER 2

LYAUTEY'S POLICY IN MOROCCO

Lyautey's policy in Morocco can only be appreciated in light of the situation which existed there before the establishment of the Protectorate. A quick comparison of the situation in 1912 and that in 1925, when Lyautey finally left Morocco, highlights the amount of change accomplished and that the reforms implemented were led with respect for the Sultan and the Moroccan government, the Muslim religion, and the Moroccan customs. While historians disagree over Lyautey's governance,¹⁸ the scale of the changes he led there cannot be denied.

Morocco is an excellent example of the pacification of a country with the "oil stain." The population is the main target of this doctrine. Its support is won by the visible improvement of its security and its living conditions, whether it is by the development of infrastructures, institutions or economy. This support is facilitated by respect for its traditions, underpinned the visible strength of the opponent, which convinces the insurgent of the uselessness of a conflict lost beforehand.

It would be impossible to try to examine in detail all the changes; they are too numerous. This chapter provides a quick outline and explains the particular circumstances which allowed the implementation of these multiple reforms.¹⁹

¹⁸Philip S. Khoury's foreword to Moshe Gersovich, *French Military Rule: Colonialism and its Consequences* (Oxon: Frank Cass Publisher, 2000), vii.

¹⁹For the various reforms accomplished in Morocco, the most exhaustive sum is the work in three volumes of Daniel Rivet: *Lyautey et L'Institution du Protectorat Francais au Maroc (1912-1925)* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1988).

Situation of Morocco in 1912

A Quick Introduction to Moroccan History

In spite of its geographical proximity to Europe, from which she is separated by the Strait of Gibraltar, Morocco managed to protect herself from attempts at intervention by the European countries²⁰ until the end of the nineteenth century. Populated initially by the Berbers, the country was annexed by Roman Empire in 42AD, invaded by Vandals tribes in 429AD and finally conquered by the Arabs at the end of the seventh century. The definitive conversion of the population to Islam and the monarchy both date from this period.

The situation changed dramatically at the end of the nineteenth century as the interference of European countries grew stronger and they quarreled to determine which would have the right to extend its domination over Morocco. Various events²¹ ultimately saved Moroccan sovereignty through the establishment of a French Protectorate by a treaty²² signed on 30 March 1912. The French government assigned General Lyautey as the first *Résident général*.

²⁰The exceptions are Ceuta and Melilla. In 1414, the Portuguese conquered the Ceuta, which stands in opposite to Gibraltar on the straight. In 1498, Spain took Melila. Ceuta was turned to Spain in 1578. These two north-African towns remain Spanish.

²¹For more details, see Appendix A: Chronological marks: The way to Protectorate.

²²The English version of the Protectorate treaty might be found in Alan Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco: Protectorate Administration 1912-1925* (Berkley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1970), Appendix 1, 209-212.

General Overview

In 1912, the situation in Morocco was at best disturbed. If the country was to remain independent, it had to face numerous foreign interventions in its internal affairs, amplified by the successive treaties with European countries (See Appendix A: Chronological marks: the way to Protectorate). For example, the system of capitulation gave foreigners resident in Morocco and their associates extraterritoriality, and did not subject them to the Moroccan justice.

The actual authority of the Sultan in his empire was limited, sometimes only nominal. The Sultan's greatest power was then religious, as he was a direct heir of the Prophet Muhammad. The tribesmen accepted his religious headship, but were less prepared to pay taxes. Morocco was thus traditionally divided into two zones whose extent constantly changed over time depending on the Sultan's strength and the local tribes' loyalty: the *Bled el Makhzen*, generally including the local populations in the plains regions, recognized the authority of the government and paid taxes. In the *Bled el Siba*, the Sultan's authority was spiritual only.²³

The system of dynastic succession was well established, but was often contested violently, supported by some local leaders. By custom, the Sultan nominated his heir, but after his death, this heir had to establish himself on the throne against his rival pretenders, or *Roghis*. The by the *Oulemas*²⁴ of Marrakesh and Fez nominated new sultan, the old Sultan normally secured this nomination before his death. Once proclaimed, the new

²³Cecil Vivian Usborne, *The Conquest of Morocco* (London: Stanley Paul & Co. Ltd., 1936), 22.

²⁴Council of the wise men.

Sultan then had to travel throughout the country to assess his government and defeat his opponent's armies.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Sultan's authority was disputed by various movements which agitated Morocco. Abd el Aziz' brother Moulay Youssef violently disputed his authority in the South. Another pretender to the throne, Bou Hamara, also called the *Roghi* [Pretender] operated in the area of Taza from 1902 to April 1909.²⁵ The area of Tangier²⁶ was threatened by a brigand: Moulai Ahmed el Raisuli. In 1911, various tribes of central Morocco, around Meknes, protesting against tax collection, repelled the Sultan's army and put Fez under siege, provoking a French intervention. Finally, another insurrection led by El Hiba occurred in May 1912 in the Sous area, and he was able to capture Marrakech and some European hostages in August.

The Moroccan army was the main supporter of the Sultan's authority. But it was itself subject to doubt as the *askars*²⁷ rebelled in April 1912 against its French instructors. As noted by Usborne, "the summer of 1911, then, found Moulay Hafid once more firmly established, with French money and French advisers, while the French army held for him the whole of the country between Casablanca and Fez, and Spain was similarly occupied²⁸ further north."²⁹ As a direct consequence of this ambient anarchy, despite the

²⁵Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 53.

²⁶Due to its particular geographical strategic situation, Tangier gained an international status in 1906, its protection relied then on international protection, granted by France, Spain and United Kingdom.

²⁷Moroccan soldiers of the Sultan regular army.

²⁸Spain began her expansion in Northern Morocco in 1908, initially around Ceuta and Melilla, then in the Riff area.

fact that the country possessed numerous assets to benefit from the ongoing economic revolution, its economy stagnated and infrastructure was poorly developed: it had no railways, few roads, essentially tracks, undersized and underexploited seaports.

The Extension of Control

As it used mainly the peaceful penetration method, the extension of the control³⁰ of the Makhzen over Morocco was slow but decisive. It lasted until 1934.³¹ After an initial vigorous conquest by military means, which broke the tempo of the dissidence, the country was progressively pacified despite the ongoing First World War and various following events, until the Rif War years occurred.

Initial Extension

Before the signing of the Protectorate agreement, the French had control over the West the Chaouia area, around Casablanca and to the East, over the Oudja area,³² close to the Algerian border (see map in Appendix E, figure 3). Now acting in the Sultan's name, French troops started a symmetric military pacification of the country and (re-)conquered successively Fez, Marrakech and the western coastal area. By the end of 1913, most of the *Bled el Makhzen* was secured. The junction of the east and west portions of Morocco was achieved in May 1914, when two forces, attacking from both directions, joined in the Taza corridor.

²⁹Usborne, 152.

³⁰For more, see Gershovich, *French Military Rule*; Douglas Porch, *The Conquest of Morocco* (New York: Fromm International Publishing Corporation, 1986).

³¹Porch, 8.

³²Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 50.

Expansion Despite the First World War and After

As war with Germany became more likely on July 1914, the French government required Lyautey to withdraw his forces to the coast and to send back to France the majority of available troops, as “The fate of Morocco will be determined in Lorraine.”³³ Lyautey and his subordinates agreed that an evacuation would result in the final loss of the entire Morocco.³⁴ Instead, Lyautey decided to strip the peaceful areas in order to keep real troops in areas where the authority of the Sultan was still contested. In his own words: “We stripped rather Coast cities that will stay quite. I will drain the lobster but I will keep the shell.”³⁵ Four mobile groups were created with the remaining forces, in order to react quickly to any dissident attack.

Lyautey implemented a new strategy of “active defense.”³⁶ The first-class troops, sent to France, were replaced in Morocco by territorial units, then by wounded or convalescent personnel unable to continue to fight on the European front. Based on deception, this strategy consisted mainly in conducting “business as usual,”³⁷ thus showing to the natives that France, despite the war in Europe, did not intend to leave

³³Philippe Cenci and Louis-Bernard Koch, *Avec Lyautey de Nancy à Rabat* (Paris: Editions du Triomphe, 2007), 33; Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 102.

³⁴Usborne, 217.

³⁵Lyautey in Cenci and Koch, 33 [Nous dégarnirons plutôt les villes de la côte qui ne bougeront pas. Je viderai la langouste mais je garderai la carapace.]

³⁶Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 102.

³⁷Usborne, 222.

Morocco³⁸ but instead continue to contribute to their prosperity. This idea was supported by an extensive program of infrastructure development, employing as much local manpower as possible. The road network dramatically expanded, as Lyautey considered that: “A road-gang is worth a battalion.”³⁹ As well, it was supported by the organization of various fairs in Casablanca (September 1915), in Fez (October 1916) and in Rabat (September 1917). These exhibitions of European and Moroccan products also demonstrated to the French officials who came to visit these fairs the usefulness of Moroccan resources in wartime. According to Lyautey, the exposition in Casablanca even succeeded in convincing a dissident leader to surrender.⁴⁰

It seems this policy was efficient, as most of Morocco remained quiet during the First World War. German attempts to support various rebellious leaders, mainly Abd el Malek,⁴¹ all failed. The Turkish effort to launch a *jihad* against the French failed as well,

³⁸Lyautey, *Paroles d'action* (Paris: Ed. Colin, 1927, ed., Imprimerie Nationale, 1995), 177.

³⁹Usborne, 218 Note: The development of an efficient road network was a classic idea for pacifying areas. It allowed the quick circulation of messengers, troops, supply, then of merchandises, etc. It was used by the Roman Empire, then by Napoléon against the royalist insurgency in Vendée (1793-1815). For securing the main crossroad there, Napoléon created a new town: Napoléon-Vendée, today La Roche-sur-Yon.

⁴⁰Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 177. Note: This information is used by several authors, but no one mentioned the name of this leader. It would have been more convincing if Lyautey had given his name.

⁴¹Usborne, 224-229.

because the Sultan, being the undisputed Moroccan religious authority, publicly supported the French effort.⁴²

So *Bled el Makhzen* continued to expand slowly during the war and in October 1918, only “the far South, the Middle Atlas and the Riff [were] retaining their independence.”⁴³ The only failure was the Taffilalet area which was conquered in July 1918 but abandoned a few months later in October.⁴⁴

After the First World War, Lyautey continued to face shortages of military forces and restricted his ambitions to the occupation of the “useful Morocco.”⁴⁵ His idea was to occupy, in the remaining dissident areas, only the regions which were needed for the further economic development of Morocco, for instance, one for building dams. He pursued this policy until the Rif war.

The Worst Case Scenario: The Rif War in 1925⁴⁶

French and Spanish areas in Morocco were separated by the Ouergha River (see map in Appendix E, figure 1) and under two different administrations, which did not

⁴²The Ottoman Empire had extended its control over the whole North Africa, save Morocco. The First World War gave it another occasion to try to achieve its long lasting goal and expand its religious authority over Morocco.

⁴³Usborne, 236.

⁴⁴Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 111.

⁴⁵Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 393 [Maroc Utile].

⁴⁶For more details, see Frédéric Danigo, “France and the Rif War: Lessons from a Forgotten Counter Insurgency War (Northern Morocco - April 1925-May 1927)” (Thesis, Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, 2010).

really cooperate.⁴⁷ From 1921, the French observed with a growing concern the successes of Abd el Krim's rebellion against the Spanish. He proclaimed an independent Rifian Republic and threatened to include tribes in the French zone. This threat became reality when his troops attacked the Beni Zeroual tribe in April 1924. The tribe repelled the attack and asked for the support of French troops, which crossed the river and occupied defensive positions on the heights to the North.

By that time, French troops in Morocco had been reduced from 91,000 in 1921 to 59,000 in 1924,⁴⁸ some of them having been used in the Ruhr valley or in Syria.⁴⁹ Lyautey himself was weakened politically as well as physically. He had lost most of his political supporters, while the French Communist Party and other left-wing groups⁵⁰ were openly supporting Abd el Krim. Furthermore, he suffered from a liver disease, which forced him to go to France for surgery on several occasions beginning in 1923. But his messages, requests to be replaced, for military reinforcements in December 1924 and his prediction of a Rifian attack in spring 1925 were all ignored. One of the reasons for this refusal might be Lyautey's reports themselves, as they led the readers to believe the majority of Morocco was quiet. According to Gershovich: "The illusion that Morocco

⁴⁷Lyautey had personal relationship and frequent contact with the king of Spain, Alphonso XIII, to whom he paid numerous visits when travelling from Paris to Morocco or back. But, despite her neutrality, Spain favored Germany more than France during the First World War, which created tensions between the two countries. Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*.

⁴⁸Usborne, 261. The number given by Greshovich (62,000 men) is similar, 112.

⁴⁹At the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was sliced up and divided among the victorious countries, in accordance with the secret Picot-Sykes agreement of 1916, and the treaty of Sèvres signed on 10 August 1920. France received a mandate from the new League of Nations to administer Syria and Lebanon.

⁵⁰Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 129.

had been militarily secured and stabilized remained in the minds of most metropolitan decision makers through April 1925, although Lyautey himself may never have held such a conviction.”⁵¹

When Abd el Krim’s troops resumed their attacks in April 1925, they advanced some 25km, threatening the town of Taza, Tafrant, Tanouat and the road to Fez (see map in Appendix E, figure 4). After two months of hard fighting, and thanks to reinforcements, French troops stabilized the front in July. As Lyautey asked for more reinforcements in order to retake the lost ground, he received a visit from the Prime Minister Painlevé who ordered an inspection mission by Marshall Pétain,⁵² who arrived with members of his personal staff on 17 July 1925. Pétain was then appointed commander in chief of the military operations, on 12 August while Lyautey was asked to return to Paris as an adviser for the government policy in Morocco. He left on 28 August and came back on 15 September, discovering changes made by Pétain. He wrote a letter

⁵¹Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 117.

⁵²Philippe Pétain (1856-1951), Marshal of France, attended the French military academy and had an average career, until 1914. His successes at the beginning of the First World War were brought him quick promotion. He managed the victorious defense of Verdun in 1916. He was named commander-in-chief of the French armies in 1917, ended the mutinies and was promoted marshal in 1918. Sent in Morocco to fight the rebellion of Abd-el-Krim in 1925, he became Minister of War in 1934, then ambassador to Spain. Called to be the head of the state during the defeat of 1940, he signed an armistice then obtained by a vote of the National Assembly the full powers to promulgate a new constitution. As head of the French State, he collaborated with Germany and remained in charge until August 1944, when he was taken by the Germans to Sigmaringen. After he had surrendered to the French authorities, his trial opened in July 1945. Sentenced to death, then pardoned, he was interned up to his death in 1951 on the island of Yeu.

of resignation⁵³ on 24 September, which was accepted on 29 September by telegram. He left Morocco on 5 October and never returned.

Remaining Uncontrolled Areas

The control centered essentially on “useful Morocco,” more than three fourths of the country. Some areas, of lesser economic interest or more difficult to access, remained rebellious: the Riff and the Atlas Mountains, and the desert to the far South. The pacification operations in the French zone officially ended only in 1934. There were several reasons why control was not achieved in 1925, when Lyautey left Morocco. First, Lyautey’s doctrines of “progressive penetration” and the “oil drop” was effective in the long-term, but required time. Secondly, the First World War deprived the *résident général* of most of his combat troops, and so slowed operations. The demobilization of the troops after World War I, and the scale of the financial effort granted to bring the final victory in Europe, had left France and her government adverse to new military expenditures. Finally, the military occupation of the Ruhr⁵⁴ in 1923 took strength from an already over-extended resource.

When Lyautey left Morocco, the main part of the territory was under the authority of the Sultan, who controlled all the big cities, the coastal zones and the road networks. In the area under French Protectorate, only the south of the Rif Mountains, some desert

⁵³The text of his letters to the Prime Minister [Président du Conseil]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was published in Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 470-477.

⁵⁴The occupation of the Ruhr by French and Belgian troops in 1923 and 1924 was the consequence of the delay taken by the government of the Weimar Republic, for the payment of the war indemnities required by the Treaty of Versailles.

zones to the south and a part of the Atlas Mountains were not yet pacified (see map in Appendix E, figure 2).

Diplomatic Actions and General Strategy

Lyautey's strategy aimed at strictly applying the status of "protectorate," that is, at protecting at least the appearances, if not the reality, of the sovereignty of the Moroccan State in order to calm possible tensions in the country or on the diplomatic scene. Inspired by the treaty of 1881 concerning Tunisia, the Protectorate status granted the Sultan sovereignty over Morocco and ensured the perpetuation of the Muslim character of her institutions, but allowed French administration to reform and operate through the Makhzen. From 1912 to 1925, Lyautey implemented and maintained this policy, which he defined in a speech on 24 November 1919 as: "Morocco is an autonomous state whose security is insured by France, but which remains under the sovereignty of the Sultan, with its own charter. One of the first conditions of my role is to ensure the integrity of this scheme and the respect of this status."⁵⁵

Internal

Within Morocco, the *résident général* ruled indirectly through the Sharif government, whose administration was controlled and progressively changed. But everything was done to avoid hurting native sensitivity. Lyautey always paid sincere respect to the Moroccan sovereignty, the Sultan and gave orders to his subordinates to do

⁵⁵Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 335. [Le Maroc est un Etat autonome dont la France assure la protection, mais qui reste sous la souveraineté du Sultan, avec son statut propre Une des premières conditions de mon rôle est d'assurer l'intégrité de ce régime et le respect de ce statut.]

as well. As evidences of this respect, all the ceremonies and rituals surrounding the Sharifian throne were restored, including the Friday prayer. “All action, both military and political, was taken in the name of the *Makhzen*.”⁵⁶ Anytime a place was pacified, the Sultan was the first to make his triumphal official entry, as in Marrakesh in 1912.⁵⁷ All the changes were countersigned by the Sultan and proclaimed by *dahirs*.⁵⁸ Lyautey always portrayed himself as one of the Sultan’s subordinates. Using the local manner for instance, he explained his status to native officials in a speech in Rabat on 28 September 1917:

While representing here the government of France, I feel pride to be the first servant of *Sidna* [our Lord]. You know all the feelings of respectful attachment that I carry Him, not only because they are owed to His Sacred Person, but because I find in Him the most constant support, the most sensible advices, a love of His peoples and a sense of justice which we can only admire, and also the deep desire to see His Empire developing in the order, in the peace and in the progress.⁵⁹

After the First World War, when some people believed it was time to change the status of the Protectorate and implement a direct administration, Lyautey refused to do so and defended this in respect of the international treaty.⁶⁰ For the same reasons, Lyautey

⁵⁶Usborne, 211.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 194.

⁵⁸Decrees of the Sultan.

⁵⁹Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 276-77. [Tout en représentant ici le gouvernement de la France, je m’honore d’être le premier serviteur de *Sidna* [notre Seigneur]. Vous savez tous les sentiments de respectueux attachement que je Lui porte, non seulement parce qu’ils sont dus à Sa personne sacrée, mais parce que je trouve en Lui l’appui le plus constant, les conseils les plus judicieux, un amour de Ses peuples et un sentiment de justice qu’on ne peut qu’admirer, et aussi le vif désir de voir Son Empire se développer dans l’ordre, dans la paix et dans le progrès.]

⁶⁰Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 334.

rejected the claim of some French *colons* to have political representation, and restricted it to professional organizations only: “The French political institutions have no place in Morocco. Our national can have bodies and professional representation there, but cannot have political representation.”⁶¹

But some authors continue to claim that this respect for the Moroccan sovereignty was just a show, and that, in reality, the Sultan had been deprived of all of his real power, and was “more or less a figurehead, the real ruler of the country being the *résident general*.”⁶² As proof of this idea, they highlighted the role played by Lyautey in choosing Moulay Youssef to succeed to his brother Moulay Hafid when he resigned, instead of one of the latter’s son as he wished.⁶³

External

Outside of Morocco, France cautiously secured her position by gaining the support of the other European countries before and after the signature of the Protectorate agreements in 1912. As mentioned earlier, various treaties advocated France’s particular interests in Morocco, while giving her the responsibility “to maintain the security for Europeans and Christians living in Morocco.”⁶⁴ And that, “In a series of treaties with Great Britain, Italy and Spain, he [the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé]

⁶¹Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 335. [Les institutions politiques françaises n’ont pas de place au Maroc. Nos nationaux peuvent y avoir des organismes et une représentation professionnelle, mais ne peuvent y avoir une représentation politique.]

⁶²Scham, 58.

⁶³Usborne, 186.

⁶⁴Scham, 1.

waived French claims in Egypt, Libya and the Mediterranean region of Morocco to obtain their support.”⁶⁵ The British policy of securing the sea road to India by preventing any power from gaining a hegemonic preponderance over the Straits of Gibraltar was cautiously managed by giving responsibility of northern Morocco to Spain. During the First World War, Morocco officially remained neutral, even if Moroccan troops fought in France. This status was maintained until 1956.

Military Resources, Measures and Tactics

Military force was the key to the pacification program: this force was to be sufficient to convince the opponent of the futility of further resistance, and if required was to be capable of overcoming it. Lyautey and his subordinates adopted tactics using joint fortified posts and mobile troops in the zones to be pacified achieved traditional military tasks while also creating development and administrative programs.

Use of Fortification

In support of the oil drops strategy, the fortified military posts served as point of anchoring the pacification in dissident areas. Their fortifications, their firepower and their garrisons made their quick conquest impossible by a simple raid and allowed them theoretically to hold long enough to be saved by reinforcements.

These posts were also used to support the policy of local development and as a point of attraction for native populations, through the establishment of markets, of a free

⁶⁵Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 149.

medical dispensary, and other such local improvements. Their garrisons were often composed of a mix of French and native forces.⁶⁶

Use of French, Native Regular and Irregular Units

Together French⁶⁷ and Moroccan units⁶⁸ achieved the pacification of Morocco, both being equally important for implementing the oil drop strategy. They used their own skills in accordance with the strategy.⁶⁹ European units were employed for building and securing the posts, whereas local units were far better at conducting raids and intelligence missions. French forces provided their modern firepower, discipline, and technical expertise. Moroccan units were essential for providing their knowledge of their native country, their understanding of the local situation and a precious supplementary manpower. They were even more useful to convince local populations that pacification operations were not just a bold conquest. These units were either regular or irregular units.

The Moroccan Army was placed under French control by an agreement on 15 August 1911; it was disbanded in May 1912 after rebelling on 17 April. The *askars* were allowed to re-enlist on an individual basis in the newly created Moroccan Auxiliary Troops. Either cavalry or infantry, the new units fought initially in Morocco only, then

⁶⁶Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc* and *Paroles d'action*.

⁶⁷By opposition to the Moroccan units, the term French units covers here all units under French orders, regardless of their origin: Foreign Legion, Senegalese *tirailleurs* [riflemen], French native units, etc.

⁶⁸For more details on the Moroccan units, see Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 167-205.

⁶⁹Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 282.

during the First World War⁷⁰ in France, where they gained their reputation of first class troops and were integrated within the regular ranks of the French Army. Regular units were then used either in Morocco or overseas in the Rhineland, Syria and Turkey. They numbered 32,000 professional soldiers,⁷¹ recruited for a four-year contract.

Conversely, irregular units, or *goums*,⁷² were mainly used locally. Native Affairs officers were in charge of an area where they had to administer local life, collect intelligence, draft levies for the *goum* unit under his command, and lead them into combat.

Light Columns Tactics

Light columns⁷³ circulated between or acted from these fortified posts. These columns had minimal equipment, far from the usual burden of the normal French soldier.⁷⁴ The usual artillery tubes were replaced with mountain guns, lighter but just as

⁷⁰Altogether, around 45,000 Moroccan soldiers fought for France during the war, according to Lyautey, *Paroles d'actions*, 440; Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 81; Usborne, 227.

⁷¹Lyautey always refused the imposition of an obligatory service on Moroccan population. Gershovich, *French Military Rule*.

⁷²*Goums* were completely transformed in 1940 and gain fame during the Italy and France campaign in 1943-45.

⁷³For more details on this tactic, see: Colonel Fabre, *La Tactique au Maroc* (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle & Cie, 1931).

⁷⁴French Army was divided into two different groups: the units serving and having their garrisons overseas (among which the colonial units, the French Foreign Legion and locally recruited units with regular and irregular status) and the units having their garrison and normally serving in French mainland. French mainland is also called *Métropole* by opposition to the French overseas possessions, hence the adjective *métropolitain* to designate these units in French texts. To make comprehension more complicated, these *métropolitaines* units were sometimes deployed overseas on

effective. The heavy equipment was carried by pack animals, mules or dromedaries as required by circumstances. The light cavalry, the *Spahis* or *Chasseurs* equipped locally, were largely used for reconnaissance missions and in-depth actions. The purpose was to be capable, by coordinated concentric actions, to sweep down on the target zone or to be also as fast as the raids led by the local tribes.

As skilful as it was, the use of military force was not enough for enduring or actual pacification of the country. Military action had to be supported by political action and a significant improvement in the local population's living conditions.

Political, Cultural and Religious Issues

Although defeated, the population had to be especially convinced to join the *Makhzen* definitively by seeing the concrete profit of the cessation of hostilities. But no improvement could be long lasting without the authority to protect it. Military action must thus be pursued by a restoration and modernization of the governmental structures. In order to avoid hurting or urging the population to join the dissidents again, the reforms had to be implemented with strict respect for the cultural and religious traditions of the country.

Government⁷⁵

The three French possessions in Northern Africa (by chronological order: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) were governed by three separate administrations.⁷⁶ The

temporarily basis. "Normal" will be used in this thesis to designate units having their garrison in France, and European warfare equipment, by opposition to the overseas units.

⁷⁵For more details, see Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*.

governmental apparatus Lyautey developed in Morocco consisted of introducing reforms of the pre-existing system. It met strictly the classical definition of the Protectorate, which required that institutions and local elites remain in place and the protecting power, France in this particular case, assumed the management of diplomacy, trade and eventually the army or the defense of the protected state.⁷⁷ This was clearly defined in the treaty of Fez⁷⁸ and summarized by Lyautey: “A country conserving its own institutions, governing and administering itself through its own organs, under the simple control of a European Power which deals with foreign affairs, administers the army and directs finance and economic development. It is the expression ‘control’ as opposed to direct administration which dominates and characterizes this conception.”⁷⁹

As the monarchy was guaranteed, the Sultan remained the head of the government and the supreme religious leader of the Moroccan population. He signed the *dahirs* [decrees] at the request of the *résident général* and invested or dismissed officials with the approval of the latter, but, in fact, had no real authority in foreign affairs.⁸⁰

The *Makhzen*’s structure was progressively modified, starting in 1912. The main result was the reorganization of the authority of the various *vizirs* [ministries], who were

⁷⁶In 1871, Algeria was divided into three departments; and became an integral extension of the French State, whereas Tunisia was a Protectorate.

⁷⁷Scham, 56.

⁷⁸The English version of the Protectorate treaty might be found in Scham, Appendix 1, 210-211.

⁷⁹Usborne, 211.

⁸⁰Scham, 58.

placed under the supervision of the Protectorate administration, then under the *Direction des Affaires Chérifiennes* [Directorate of the Sharifian Affairs], created in 1920.

The *résident général* played a key role in that structure, as he was directly connected with the Sultan, the *Makhzen* through the Protectorate administration under its various forms, the French government and had command over the armed forces deployed in Morocco.⁸¹ Some authors, like Scham, described his powers as “quasi-dictatorial.”⁸²

Administration

At the regional and local level, the Moroccan administration was transformed as well and the authority of the Sultan firmly established over the *Bled el Makhzen*.

Until 1912, the administration of Morocco was decentralized and still a semi-feudal system, managed by representatives appointed, sometimes under duress, by the Sultan:

Each district known by the name of the tribe which inhabited it was ruled by the Caïd, or head, and it was for him to maintain order in its territory, and to collect taxes for the Sultan, not forgetting to retain a share for himself. In certain cases, a number of Caïds were grouped under a Pasha. Every Caïd might have a number of Caliphas, or deputies, to represent him in the divisions of his territory, and these caliphates were sub-divided into smaller parts, administered by sheiks.⁸³

The new system, established by Lyautey in Morocco was a centralized administration, with local representatives counseled by French officials. These representatives of the *résident général*, civilian or military, had to know the culture,

⁸¹The text of the decree of 11 June 1912, defining the attributions of the *résident général* is available in his French original version in Scham, Appendix 8, 249-250.

⁸²Scham, 61.

⁸³Usborne, 22-23.

language and customs of the tribe or the areas where they assigned. To prepare them, Lyautey established a school of ethnography, which collected the necessary data. As strict as it might appear, this organization left room for some local adaptations, in order to respect the local customs. “Arab law and the Muslim religion were supported in every way in the plain where they prevailed, but in the mountains where the Berber tribesmen with a different language, dwelt under a different law based on custom, they were enabled to live under their own code.”⁸⁴

A similar structure was established for the main towns, with the creation of *Services Municipaux* [Municipal services] which had administrative and technical authority over each city.⁸⁵ The chiefs of these services were the true mayors of these towns.⁸⁶

Between the central and the local levels, Lyautey introduced a regional administration under his control. Morocco was divided into numerous regions, territories and *cercles* [areas]. During Lyautey’s tenure, this division was reviewed in accordance with the progress of the pacification.⁸⁷

This centralized system was the exact opposite of the one existing in Algeria at the time, where two governments existed. The military territory, still disputed, was

⁸⁴Usborne, 211.

⁸⁵For more details on the development Municipal Services, see William A. Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*.

⁸⁶Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 235; Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 67.

⁸⁷Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 67.

administered mainly by the *Bureaux des Affaires Indigènes*⁸⁸[Native Affairs offices]. Once pacified, the territory came under a civil administration, modeled on the one existing in France. For Bernard Lugan,⁸⁹ the model of a successful relation between Europeans and those colonized was the Protectorate of Lyautey in Morocco, because it was respectful traditions of this country. The reverse model was the colonization of Algeria, based on contempt of the population and on the utopia of assimilation.

Judicial Organization⁹⁰

The guarantee of the property rights and personal safety was an essential aspect to win the trust of the people and by the same way to incite them into a long-lasting economic activity. The reform of the justice system was thus a priority and the first one achieved in 1913, with the installation of the first Court of Appeal in Rabat on 15 October.⁹¹ The system of consular justice implemented previously and on which the Westerners relied, was replaced by a system unified under French authority. For the Moroccans, the pre-existing system was modernized but maintained separate courts for the Jews and the Muslims.

⁸⁸Under various names, the most known being *Bureaux Arabes*, the Natives Affairs Offices were the backbone of the administration in the military territories in Algeria. Each office consisted of a few officers, often speaking Arabic or Berber, and interpreters. These offices regulated financial, administrative and judicial affairs with the local tribes' chiefs. They were progressively replaced by civilian administration, when the areas were pacified. These were the ancestors of specialized administrative sections (SAS) in place during the war in Algeria (1954-1962).

⁸⁹Bernard Lugan, *Histoire de l'Afrique des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Ellipses, 2009).

⁹⁰For more details, see Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*.

⁹¹Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 124.

Property

One of the essential reforms was that of property rights. It was necessary to protect the interests of the Moroccans, sometimes trampled in the past by colonists, but also to offer possibilities of acquisition or rent to these colonists. This conservation of local property was, according to the colonial experience of Lyautey, stated in a speech on 4 April 1923, one of the essential conditions to make a success of the pacification of the country:

These subdued populations work with us more and more, in a complete agreement, because, peaceful, laborious, trading and especially agricultural, they have the certainty today that the ownership of their property will remain in them guaranteed, while at the beginning, the fear of the dispossession, which pressed on her as a threat, was, I so often noticed it, one of the main obstacles to our penetration.⁹²

However, Moroccan land law was in a very complex, as described by Lyautey during a speech on 29 February 1916:

There is no country where the landed property offers a more complicated status. There is hardly ground in Morocco which has at least two owners, when it is not four. Some bring ancient titles, the others call upon the right of user, and, while we get ready to untangle the hank, appear the other carrier thieves of titles granted by the successive sultans, aspect so valid some that the others. I assure you that there is no more thankless task for an administration than to see clear in such confusion.⁹³

⁹²Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 438. [Ces populations soumises marchent avec nous de plus en plus, en un accord complet, parce que, pacifiques, laborieuses, commerçantes et surtout agricoles, elles ont aujourd'hui la certitude que la possession de leur bien leur restera garantie, alors qu'au début, la crainte de la dépossession, qui pesait sur elle comme une menace, était, je l'ai si souvent constaté, un des principaux obstacles à notre pénétration.]

⁹³Ibid., 204-208. [Il n'y a pas de pays où la propriété foncière offre un statut plus compliqué. Il n'y a guère de terrain au Maroc qui n'ait au moins deux propriétaires, quand ce n'est pas quatre. Les uns apportent des titres anciens, les autres invoquent le droit d'usage, et, alors qu'on s'appête à débrouiller l'écheveau, surgissent d'autres larrons porteurs de titres octroyés par les sultans successifs, d'aspect tout aussi valable les

One of the elements that had to be taken into account was that, according to their ancient customs, some tribes, nomadic or home-bodies, kept a collective property system. They had to be convinced of the need for individual property in order to transform the collective land into individual lands.⁹⁴

The success of this process was obtained through the establishment of a land registry and clear rules,⁹⁵ by protecting the property or the rent of soil but also establishing *a posteriori* compensation for despoiled individuals through a revaluation of sale prices.⁹⁶

Respect for Religion and Local Culture

One of the most important aspects, if not the most important, in order to win the long-lasting reunification of the native population and avoid hurting it, was to show in acts, and not only in words, a real and constant respect for the religion and Moroccan culture. Beyond supporting the maintenance of the Sultan, both spiritual and temporal leader, on his throne, Lyautey always showed a deep respect for Islam⁹⁷, for instance forbidding non-Muslim people access to the mosques.⁹⁸

uns que les autres. Je vous assure qu'il n'y a pas de tâche plus ingrate pour une administration que de voir clair dans une telle confusion.]

⁹⁴Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 445; Usborne, 215.

⁹⁵Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 149.

⁹⁶Usborne, 215.

⁹⁷The epitaph of his grave in Rabat, drafted during lifetime, is more than demonstrative: "Here rests Louis-Hubert Lyautey who was the first general resident of France in Morocco, 1912-1925, died in communion with the Catholic religion from which he received in full faith last rites, profoundly respectful of the ancestral traditions and the Moslem religion kept and practiced by the inhabitants of the Maghreb." [Ici

Lyautey also took numerous measures to protect the Moroccan culture. As soon as he arrived in May 1912 he created a directorate of the Fine Arts and Monuments⁹⁹ and appointed Maurice Tranchant de Lunel¹⁰⁰ as its superintendent. The latter assumed this function from 1912 to 1924, restoring many monuments, like the door Oudaya Kasbah¹⁰¹ in Rabat in 1916. This particular administration had agents in each town.¹⁰² Lyautey was also generated laws of general classification and protection of the medieval city of Fez in 1914, which was threatened by partial destruction or modernization on the European model. Thus, he saved the imperial city, leaving intact the architecture of houses, fountains and other important structures. Among other numerous examples, Lyautey also supported the creation¹⁰³ of the *Congrès des Hautes Études Marocaines*¹⁰⁴ [Congress of

repose Louis-Hubert Lyautey qui fut le premier résident général de France au Maroc, 1912-1925, décédé dans la religion catholique dont il reçut en pleine foi les derniers sacrements, profondément respectueux des traditions ancestrales et de la religion musulmane gardée et pratiquée par les habitants du Maghreb]. In Teyssier, 12. Note: After national funerals in France, Lyautey was, on his own request, buried in Rabat, Morocco, on 30 October 1934. Since 10 May 1961, he is interred under the Dome of the Invalides in Paris, not so far from Emperor Napoleon.

⁹⁸Cenci and Koch, 31

⁹⁹Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 488; Usborne, 176; Cenci and Koch, 27.

¹⁰⁰Maurice Tranchant de Lunel (1869-1944) was both an architect and a painter. As a teenager, he studied at Eaton and Oxford. Later he became a friend of Rudyard Kipling. In 1888 he was admitted to the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, to study architecture. After his action under Lyautey in Morocco, he continued to travel a lot. He brought back beautiful watercolors of his many travels in the East and Far East, which made him famous.

¹⁰¹This door had been walled up and served as a prison.

¹⁰²Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 499.

¹⁰³This was the idea of M. Hardy, director of the Public Instruction in Morocco. Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 383.

the High Moroccan Studies], which was intended to save and preserve native traditions, antiquities, fine arts, folklore, history and linguistics.¹⁰⁵

Education of Local Elites

In the longer term, the continuation of French influence was perpetuated by the education of the future local elites. Numerous elementary and secondary schools, like the French style *Lycée Lyautey*--which still remains today in Casablanca--were created all over the country for supporting this effort and diffused the French language throughout the native population.¹⁰⁶ The most striking example of this education was the founding of the Military School of Meknes¹⁰⁷ by Lyautey in late 1918. This school recruited students from the elite of Moroccan society only. This modern institution, unique in North Africa and the Sahara, trained Moroccan officers to oversee the Moroccan troops, infantry and cavalry, in the French Army. They then exercised civilian administrative functions in different regions of the country. Dar el-Beida helped train young Moroccan military officers who were used in the various campaigns of “pacification” within their native country, and in many external conflicts that the French Army fought.

¹⁰⁴It was created by order of the vizir on 1 February 1920 in order to provoke and encourage the studies on Morocco, to coordinate them and to centralize their results. After a unique bulletin in 1920, it published, from the first quarter 1921, a quarterly magazine named *Hesperis*, which under the title *Hesperis Tamuda* lives the dean of the scientific journals of North Africa today. Note 223 in Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action* (1995 edition), 523.

¹⁰⁵Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 384.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 144.

¹⁰⁷Today Royal Military Academy (RMA), precisely located in Dar el-Beida.

Development and Building of Infrastructure

The military action having overcome the dissidents, reforming the institutions and demonstrating respect for Islam and the Moroccan culture were necessary conditions to gain the population. But this one especially had to see an immediate profit in its reunification with the government. It was brought to it by the development of all necessary infrastructures. Their construction allowed at the same time to hire local manpower, thus to improve their living conditions, encourage the circulation of goods and troops and facilitate their provisioning.

Development and Improvement of Towns

Colonists' arrival and European influence combined since 1912 to change the face of the main cities of Morocco, leading to their uncontrolled expansion. Worried about protecting the authentic character of these cities, Lyautey appealed to one of the first town planners, Henri Prost,¹⁰⁸ to draw a real master plan guiding the expansion of the cities of Casablanca (1914), Fez (1916), Marrakesh (1916), Meknes (1917), and Rabat (1920). The speech of Lyautey at the University of Annals on 10 December 1926 summarized his conceptions and what was carried out. His main idea was to avoid the destruction of the native city by setting-up an increasing number of European style buildings inside. On the contrary, new constructions were according to modern standards,

¹⁰⁸Henri Prost (1874-1959) was a French town designers and architect who joined Lyautey in Morocco for ten years and designed the expansion of the main cities. Cenci and Koch, 30; Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 148, 496, and 500.

outside the native city, on vacant grounds, and organized in districts with different vocations: housing, administration, business, industries, and so on.¹⁰⁹

This approach was intended to preserve the authentic character of the native cities, and not to achieve a hidden segregation between Europeans and natives, as is sometimes suggested by authors like Hoisington, who uses words “urban segregation” or “apartheid” to describe this conception.¹¹⁰

To further preserve the character of these cities, the majority of the new constructions were done in a particular Arabic style, described by Lyautey:

There is a point, in particular, of which we honor ourselves. It is to have constrained us to preserve one of the best characteristics of the Arabic construction, the outside sobriety. Too often, formerly, in Algeria in particular for the romantic tasteless period, we believed to make some Arabic art by dressing the buildings of an excessive outside ornamentation. This is a heresy. The Arabic construction makes it a point of honor to show itself outside only by the line, the simplicity of outlines and fronts.¹¹¹

Development and Improvement of Ports

Beyond town planning, Lyautey especially worried about the development of infrastructures to allow the expansion of the Moroccan economy through the safe and easy circulation of people and goods. According to his words in a speech to the French colony of Rabat on 14 July 1914: “The most urgent, it is to be able to enter into the

¹⁰⁹Lyautey, *Paroles d’Action*, 495-97.

¹¹⁰Hoisington, 109.

¹¹¹Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 495. [Il y a un point, notamment, dont nous nous faisons quelque honneur. C’est de nous être attachés à l’une des meilleures caractéristiques de la construction arabe, la sobriété extérieure. Trop souvent, autrefois, en Algérie notamment dans la période de mauvais goût romantique, on a cru faire de l’art arabe en revêtant les édifices d’une ornementation extérieure excessive. C’est une hérésie. La construction arabe met son point d’honneur à ne se manifester à l’extérieur que par la ligne, la simplicité des contours et des façades.]

house, that is to say in Morocco, to *open seaports*.”¹¹² He thus outfitted a certain number of ports: Casablanca, Mogador, Mazagan, and Rabat, in the modern standards, for example building quays or dredging the harbor. The biggest accomplishment in this domain was the construction of the port of Kenitra, on the mouth of the river Sebou, the only navigable waterway of Morocco.¹¹³

Railroad and Road Extension

Morocco is one of the rare countries where the development of automobile transport preceded the development of the railroad. The strategic importance of the railroad had successively been demonstrated by the American Civil War, the Austrian-Prussian war of 1866 and then the French-Prussian war of 1870-71. Strictly supervised by diverse international conventions, the development of any new railroad with normal gauge (1,44m of width) in Morocco was subordinated to the preliminary realization of the Tangier-Fes line by a French-Spanish consortium, whose establishment was delicate.¹¹⁴

¹¹²Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 140. [Le plus pressé, c'est de pouvoir entrer dans la maison, c'est-à-dire au Maroc, d'y *ouvrir des ports*.] Note: The words were italicized in the French version of the text.

¹¹³Cenci and Koch, 31.

¹¹⁴Notes 78 and 201, in Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 515 and 530. A secondary letter to the French-German agreement of 1911 imposed the realization of the line Tangier Fes by a French-Spanish joint venture, before any other realization. Long negotiations with Spain ended in the agreement of 27 November 1912. The French-Spanish company was created only in June 1916. It had a 15 million franc initial capital among which 60% was French capital and Spanish 40%.

Development of Roads Network

The road was thus initially the preferred method for movement. In 1912, the network was even non-existent and consisted mainly in caravan tracks.¹¹⁵ Its development thus became a priority, to allow the covering of the country by military units, the circulation of military convoys and goods, thus permitting the development of the business and the exploitation of the immense resources of the country, one of the foundations of the doctrine of Lyautey's "peaceful penetration" and "oil drop."

The units of the army were then logically put to work in developing the roads of the country, resuming the custom of the Roman legions. First, it was necessary to precisely map the unsurveyed country before determining a precise plan of roads. After the initial construction of tracks by the army units, the completion of the road network was entrusted by public calls to various civil companies. Lyautey's speech to the French colony of Casablanca, on the occasion of the national day in 1914, is a long speech of twenty-one pages on general policy, in which he reviews completed and future developments. He raised the particularly poor situation of roads and then mentioned the creation of 1,500km of new roads, connecting together the main cities and seaports of the country, then Morocco itself to both Algeria and Tunisia.¹¹⁶

Seven years later, Lyautey's speech at the Automobile Club of Casablanca in 1921, during the banquet closing the first racing circuit in Morocco, highlighted "the evident consecration of the viability of our young road network."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Porch, 29.

¹¹⁶Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 141-142.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, 378.

Railroad System

The development of the railroad was always an issue of priorities for Lyautey, who qualified it on numerous occasions as the “modern economic way.”¹¹⁸ Subjected to the preliminary completion of the Tangier-Fes way, the development of the railroad network with normal gauge (1.44m of wide) arrived late in Morocco. The preliminary studies for other ways started in 1914 and were largely completed by military engineers. The line from Rabat to Fes was for example only inaugurated on 4 April 1923 and opened to the public on 1 June 1923. The majority of main French railroad companies of that time: Company Paris Lyon Marseille, General Company of Morocco, Company of Orléans and Moroccan Company, took part in the construction then the exploitation of the network, which even included electrified sections.

While awaiting the completion of the normal lines, 1.300 km of an alternative military system,¹¹⁹ named “Decauville,” was built between 1911 and 1921. It was narrower gauge system (0.6m of wide), based on a reduced number of crossbars, and not subjected to the international regulations.

Development of Telecommunications

Due to their importance in a modern economy, the systems of communications were not neglected, and, of course, this facilitated military communications as well. The various European national networks of post offices and telegraphs were gradually

¹¹⁸Ibid., 144.

¹¹⁹Scham, 23.

eliminated¹²⁰ and replaced by a sharifian post office, whose main building was inaugurated in Rabat on 28 May 1921.¹²¹

Development of Medical Structures

The most concrete way to show a true concern for the population was established by the development of a medical network, with hospitals, dispensaries, and vaccination campaigns, among others.¹²² In the areas being pacified the army medical service played an essential role in attracting the native population by providing a free medical care.

Economic Development

The economic development of Morocco was critical to the process of pacification and definitively reuniting the population with the governmental authority. The development effort generally allowed each inhabitant to see his living conditions improving in a significant way, having access to new products or new services and thus to encouraging their definite interest in the pacification of the country. This economic boom, financed by a Government loan, was not only due to the creation of infrastructure. It was also obtained by a general policy of establishing new structures, intended to encourage, to improve and to regulate economic life and private enterprise.

¹²⁰The German post offices had been closed in August, 1914, and those of the Spanish post office eliminated by an agreement concluded in Madrid on 16 July 1915. No other stayed next to the sharifian post office, except the English offices, the preservation of which was justified by the existence of the French post offices in Alexandria and Port Said. Note 224, *Paroles d'action*, 533.

¹²¹Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 387.

¹²²Cenci and Koch, 31; Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*.

Financial and Monetary Policy

Until the establishment of the Protectorate, the poor state of Moroccan finances led France to grant several loans to the Sultan, the first one being in 1902.¹²³ In order to be able to finance the development of the country, Lyautey appealed to private enterprises, to which concessions were granted for the creation of railroads or the exploitation of mines. Of course, he also oversaw the system of the Government loans from France to Morocco. From his appointment as governor general, Lyautey went on numerous trips to Paris to advocate for these loans in the Parliament.¹²⁴ The development of the economy, the reform of the fiscal and monetary institutions, and the extension of zones paying the taxes allowed payment of these loans.

To reduce the monetary crisis following the First World War and to avoid rampant speculations, the Moroccan Franc, tied to the French Franc, was created by a *dahir* on 19 March 1920 and replaced the former sharifian currencies.¹²⁵

Creation of New Structures

Finally, many economic structures were created to encourage the development of the economic life in areas under French control. In the agricultural realm, they made headway by establishing new farming techniques, spread by the colonists or by the army in zones being pacified, but also through equipment imported from Europe. Farmers' associations, fairs and the implementation of sanitary and veterinarian services were also

¹²³Usborne, 79.

¹²⁴Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action* and Teyssier.

¹²⁵Daniel Eustache, *Corpus des monnaies alaouites* (Rabat, 1989) in note 195, Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 529-530.

achieved. In a similar way, new chambers of commerce and industry encouraged business growth by the creation with supervised by a service of fraud repression. This exploitation of the Moroccan resources also allowed the conservation of certain zones by the creation of the first national parks, such as the forest of Mamora, which was protected from logging.¹²⁶ These demonstrate that Moroccan natural resources were used for the betterment of the country, while simultaneously providing returns for investment.

A Particular Historical Context

Lyautey's actions in Morocco were certainly impressive, but were only possible due to a particular political situation in France.

Weak Political Guidance

The Third Republic was characterized by political instability. The governments had to submit their plans to the Parliament, and were frequently removed as a result. The *résidents généraux* appointed overseas often had longer tenure than the government that appointed them. The result of governmental weakness was often a lack of political guidance. Even worse, the centralization of the executive power in Paris gave enormous power to the administration. The people in charge made decisions in Paris, often without being aware of the local situation. When he arrived in Morocco, Lyautey fully knew these facts, as he had already dealt with and suffered under them while acting on the Algerian border. So he fully exploited this initial wide freedom of maneuver, due to the Moroccan instability and then the coming war with Germany. When the war finally erupted, this

¹²⁶Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 144-47.

freedom expanded as Morocco became a less important concern for the government. Yet, in this, he always decided what was right, and followed his own path.

Some Political Support

Lyautey benefited from the support of a coalition in favor of colonial expansion, known as *Parti Colonial*.¹²⁷ These people were influential politicians, members of parliament and industrialists, organized in various groups similar to the modern political lobbies.¹²⁸ They considered Lyautey as a colonial action specialist in general, due to his writings and actions in Indochina, Madagascar and Algeria, and Morocco particularly when he worked on its Algerian border and conducted diplomatic missions inside the country.

Lyautey also had direct relationships with some of the most prominent French politicians of the time. As shown by his letters and speeches, he was in close contact with

¹²⁷Their opponents were supporting the thesis that every French effort had to be devoted to the preparation of the war of revenge against Germany, to the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine, and therefore had their eyes focused on the 'blue line of the Vosges Mountain.' Any colonial expansion was for them a waste of funds and energy.

¹²⁸The colonial group, created by Eugène Etienne, had members elected in the Chamber of Representatives and in the Senate and leaned on associations such as the Committee of French Africa, created in 1890, or the Colonial Union, created in 1893. It broadcasted its ideas through friendly newspapers and by the organization of multiple conferences. Teyssier, *Lyautey*, 194-197. Note: Eugène Etienne (1844-1921) was not only vice president of the Chamber of Deputies, he was as well deputy of Oran, which gave to Lyautey a perfect opportunity to write to him, as the subdivision of Aïn Sefra he just had been assigned to was depending on the division of Oran. Etienne was as well an influential freemason and supported the policy of conquering Morocco from the Algerian border, according to Jean-Louis Miège, in his preface to the 1995 edition of *Paroles d'Action*, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1995), note 18, 47.

Deschanel,¹²⁹ Etienne, Millerand,¹³⁰ Poincaré,¹³¹ amongst others,¹³² so they suggested and agreed easily on his name when a *résident général* was to be nominated in Morocco.

Communication Policy

Throughout his career Lyautey developed a communications policy to support his actions, convince his opponents or at least to avoid criticism. He used all available means: official speeches, his letters, the newspapers and even photography or staging of his personal actions, to expand his fame, support his ideas and convince his opponents.

His letters first circulated to a wide group of readers affecting many politicians and can be seen as the ancestor of the modern blogs. Friendly and worldly relations were equally useful to him. His old friends, many of whom he met through the Parisian literary

¹²⁹Paul Deschanel, (1855-1922), was successively prefect, then deputy, from 1885 to 1920. He was president of the Chamber of Deputies from 1898 to 1902 and from 1912 to 1920. Elected to the Presidency of the French Republic in 1920, he resigned for health reasons and was elected to the Senate. He was the author of several works on French foreign policy and on the social questions, which were worth to him being elected to the *Académie française* in 1899.

¹³⁰Alexandre Millerand, (1859-1943), lawyer and journalist, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from 1885 to 1919. His political opinion shifted from the extreme left to the right, while he performed different ministerial jobs. Appointed President of Council and Foreign Secretary in 1920, he was elected to the presidency of the Republic on 23 September, after the resignation of Paul Deschanel. He resigned in June 1924 and was elected Senator in 1925, up to his death.

¹³¹Raymond Poincaré (1860-1934) was then Prime Minister and one of the firmest supporters of Lyautey with the War Minister, Alexandre Millerand. Poincaré was a French statesman who had a brilliant political career: he was elected to the House of Representatives, and then to the Senate, was several times chosen as minister in various realms, head of governments and President of the French Republic from 1913 to 1920. He was elected to the *Académie française* in 1909.

¹³²Evidence of these useful relations are stated in numerous books: Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action, Vers le Maroc*; Le Révérend, Miège, Teyssier and Osborne.

circles,¹³³ were admirers of his actions and opinions, and became, effectively, his “active agents”¹³⁴ while he was overseas. Lyautey sent them frequent messages, as demonstrated by Paul Desjardins in one of his letters to Lyautey on 20 September 1897: “I look forward to the continuation of your journal. We left with you in Indochina, on the brink of returning towards us. . . . Every mail of Madagascar is the occasion of fascinated quarrels; the way of proceeding of your leader [Gallieni] is admired by some, it revolts the others.”¹³⁵

His experience and his political friendships in particular, provided him relative peace of mind and initially allowed him freedom of action in Morocco.

These letters were not only a way to spread his ideas and influence: Lyautey also used his messages as a direct and insistent means for achieving his aims and influencing political decisions in his favor. In 1903 for instance, despite being only colonel, he wrote directly and repeatedly more than ten pages letters to both the vice president of the

¹³³He met them while he was assigned as captain in the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, near Paris from 1887 to 1893

¹³⁴Teyssier, 180.

¹³⁵Paul Desjardins, in *Le Révérend*, 209-210. [J’attends avec impatience la suite de votre journal. Nous vous avons laissé en Indochine, à la veille de revenir vers nous. . . . Chaque courrier de Madagascar est l’occasion de disputes passionnées ; la façon de procéder de votre chef [Gallieni] est admirée par les uns, elle révolte les autres.] Note: Paul Desjardins (1859-1940) was arts teacher at the Stanislas school in Paris. Passionate for social and moral action, he gained fame by publishing articles in the *Journal des Débats* (from October 1891 to November 1892) entitled *Le devoir présent* [The present duty]. He founded the *Union pour l’action morale* [Union for the moral action] and exchanged numerous letters with Lyautey. Note: Joseph Gallieni, (1849-1916), Marshall of France, was both a serviceman and a French colonial administrator. He spent the majority of his career in colonial operations, in Senegal, Mali, Niger, Tonkin where he got acquainted with Lyautey and Madagascar. He finished his career during the First World War and played a decisive role in defending Paris in September, 1914. He was made marshal posthumously in 1921.

Chamber of Deputies, Eugène Etienne, as well to the cabinet director of the governor general of Algeria, to accelerate the decision to give him the hierarchical independence he wished to act on the Algerian border:

I wished I would have been able to say to you that I had begun to make some job; now here is one lost month, and despite the promises which had been made to me in Paris and also in Algiers, no solution fixing my situation, giving me the indispensable independence and the slightest initiative, still intervened.¹³⁶

Lyautey also used both newspapers and journalists to disseminate his ideas.

Before his appointment as governor general, Lyautey enjoyed a certain celebrity status, thanks as much to his papers as to his past campaigns. So, when he married¹³⁷ in October, 1909, he used deception to escape the journalists and the photographers. Announced in the church Saint Honoré d' Eylau, in Paris, the marriage was actually celebrated in Sainte Clotilde church.¹³⁸

Lyautey knew how to use his fame and friendly journals, to deal with journalists and broadcast his ideas. When he arrived in Aïn Sefra and pronounced an “improvised speech,” this speech was published in *Le Temps*, a friendly newspaper, the same day and on almost the same moment and despite the distance between France and Algeria.¹³⁹ He was always cautious of his dress for his public appearances, for instance using a

¹³⁶Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 9. [J’aurais pu vouloir vous dire que j’avais commencé à faire quelque besogne; or voici un mois de perdu, et malgré les promesses qui m’avaient été faites à Paris et aussi à Alger, aucune solution fixant ma situation, me donnant l’indépendance indispensable et la moindre initiative, n’est encore intervenue.]

¹³⁷Lyautey married Inès de Bourgoing (1862-1953), widow at the age of thirty-eight of Colonel Fortoul. They met in 1907 as she came back from Casablanca, where she organized the Red Cross section.

¹³⁸Cenci and Koch, 25.

¹³⁹Miège, preface to *Paroles d’Action*, 13.

traditional black *gandoura* in order to reinforce the majesty of his appearance.¹⁴⁰ Lyautey even acted sometimes as a star. He always had photos of him and sent or offered them with an autograph to his collaborators or other people. (See autographed pictures in Appendix D, figure 1 and 2).

When he was *résident général*, his fame increased. People wrote books in honor of his policies, both French and foreign writers and journalists. The books of two of the first female journalists and novelists, Edith Wharton¹⁴¹ and Berthe George-Gaulis¹⁴² should be counted among such works, even if they are also interesting testimonies. It is

¹⁴⁰See picture of Lyautey in Figure, appendix D, figure 3. Note: A *gandoura* is a traditional outfit, a kind of horsemen mantle, worn in French Army by the Spahis. It harkens to the mantle of the kings in traditional portraits of the French monarchy.

¹⁴¹Edith Wharton, *In Morocco* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920). This book is a classic travel report on a trip she took to Morocco in 1917. It is full of praise for the French administration and for Lyautey and his wife in particular. The dedication of the book is explicit: "to General Lyautey, *résident général* of France in Morocco and to Madame Lyautey thanks to whose kindness the journey I had so long dreamed of surpassed what I had dreamed."

¹⁴²Berthe Georges-Gaulis Berthe. *La France au Maroc - L'Œuvre du Général Lyautey* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1919). The title of the book itself is explicit. It was published by Librairie Armand Colin, headed by an old friend of Lyautey, Max Leclerc. This publishing house issued a year later *Les Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*. Berthe Georges Gaulis published in 1937 another book on the same character: *Lyautey intime*. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1937). Note: Max Leclerc (1864-1932) was altogether a journalist, an economist, a traveler and a sociologist, but also the son-in-law of the publisher Armand Colin. He met Lyautey through Vogüé in 1891. He corresponded with him during numerous years and supplied him with books during his stays in colonies. Note: The viscount Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé (1848-1910), writer made famous by publishing *Roman Russe* [Russian Roman] in 1885, was as well a novelist and a literary critic at the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. He exercised influence on captain Lyautey he met in 1887. He introduced him into the intellectual and liberal center of Paris. Their correspondence was published in the *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, and in *Vers le Maroc*.

also worth mentioning that Lyautey's first bibliography by André Maurois was written and published in 1931, while Lyautey was still alive and collaborating with the author.¹⁴³

Beyond these possibly interested friendships, Lyautey showed great loyalty to his former colleagues, who seemed to reciprocate it. His correspondence with Henri Doyen, who served under him as lieutenant in 1912, illustrates this as Lyautey never lost an opportunity to respond to his letters.¹⁴⁴ Similarly in a letter written to him by Paul Desjardins on 20 September 1897, the latter admitted: "you always replied to me."¹⁴⁵

Fidelity and empathy are traits he shared with his wife Inès, whom he called his "best collaborator." Even after his departure from Morocco, Lyautey continued to correspond with and receive visits from those who still served,¹⁴⁶ including the first of them, Sultan Moulay Youssef, who visited him in his estate on 26 July 1926, accompanied by his son, the future Sultan Hassan II. This focus extended even to the families of officers killed in combat, as evidenced by his letter to the young widow of Captain de Bournazel when he died in 1933.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³Teyssier, 15.

¹⁴⁴Marshal and Mrs. Lyautey to Henri Doyen, on the occasion of his decoration of the Legion of Honor (1916), for his engagement (1920) and the baptism of his daughter (1921) in Rabat (Private collection of the author). Henri Doyen (1896-1976) was assigned to Morocco twice in 1915-1918 as an infantry and intelligence officer, then as a cavalry officer in 1921-1923.

¹⁴⁵Paul Desjardins in *Le Révérend*, 210. [Vous 'avez toujours répondu.]

¹⁴⁶Letters of Lyautey to Henry de Bournazel (1898-1933), on 29 October and 9 December 1931 (Private collection of Bournazel family).

¹⁴⁷Marshal and Mrs. Lyautey to Mrs. de Bournazel, on 3 March 1933 (Private collection of Bournazel family).

This habit of excessive communication was the cause of much criticism in his lifetime. He was for example accused of fabricating the truth to the politicians, as shown in his speech pronouncing the inauguration of the railroad from Rabat to Fez on 4 April 1923. “I was not without hearing that I was above all a skillful director, excelling at the art to indoctrinate his visitors, to give them the illusion of appearances which did not answer the reality to be, all in all in brief, a highly skilled ‘barnum.’ I do not even know if one was not up to suggesting that, as Potemkine for the Great Catherine, I placed on their passage cardboard villages and artificial works.”¹⁴⁸

These reproaches are still extant today among some commentators, like Gentile, who, basing his opinion on the work of Douglas Porch,¹⁴⁹ claims that pacification operations were just “storytelling” to hide the ugly truth to the French public.¹⁵⁰ This is clearly not the case.

Sub Conclusion: A Lasting Work

Lyautey’s actions were beneficial for Morocco: they secured the throne while modernizing the institutions and developing the economy for the very benefit of the native population. This is doubtless why his actions are still revered today in Moroccan

¹⁴⁸Lyautey, *Paroles d’action*, 435 [je n’ai pas été sans entendre dire que j’étais avant tout un habile metteur en scène, excellent dans l’art d’endoctriner ses visiteurs, de leur donner l’illusion d’apparences auxquelles ne répondait pas la réalité d’être, pour tout dire en un mot, un «barnum» émérite. Je ne sais même pas si l’on n’a pas été jusqu’à suggérer que, comme Potemkine pour la grande Catherine, je plaçais sur leur passage des villages de carton et des ouvrages artificiels.]

¹⁴⁹Douglas Porch, *The conquest of Morocco* (New York: Fromm International Publishing Corporation, 1986).

¹⁵⁰Gian P. Gentile, “*Les Mythes de la Contre-Insurrection et leurs Dangers: Une Vision Critique de l’U.S. Army*,” *Sécurité Globale*, Hiver 2009-2010, 22.

official history. Even contemporary British authors like Usborne paid tribute to the action of Lyautey saying, “what might have been a an ugly and brutal conquest, exploited by capital, with scant consideration for the human beings whose lives and loyalties would have been shattered in the process, has been redeemed and beautified by the ideals and convictions, by the innate sympathy and love for the Moorish people, of one great man.”¹⁵¹ Lloyd George himself wrote that people should seek inspiration in Lyautey’s actions.¹⁵²

Unlike her neighbor Algeria, Morocco has never raised the issue of France apologizing for its actions there. Today, the statue of the marshal on his horse is still standing in the gardens of the French Consulate in Casablanca. It is facing the Mohammed V Square, where it was originally built before independence.

It is now necessary to have a deeper look at the doctrine which inspired such masterful and long-lasting work.

¹⁵¹Usborne, 7.

¹⁵²David Lloyd George, Foreword, in Usborne, 15.

CHAPTER 3

AN EVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE?

“In appointing General Lyautey as the first *résident général* of Morocco, Raymond Poincaré chose more than a man. He chose a definite and well known policy.”¹⁵³

As reported by several authors, this choice of Lyautey had been prepared by a long term and clever campaign, which discredited other potential candidates to the newly created position of *résident général* in Morocco.¹⁵⁴

Yet, the policy of which Lyautey was made champion was not new, but known for years, having successfully been used in Indochina, in Tunisia and in Madagascar, with or without Lyautey. The principles of indirect control rather than direct administration and peaceful penetration rather than rough conquest, had convinced the Colonial Party and all those who were interested in the colonial business in Europe. Lyautey’s strength was, after having advocated these ideas in his books, in knowing how to put them into practice in a coherent way in Morocco, while especially making the results famous through a smart communication policy.

Lyautey’s method relied on a smooth pacification, or “peaceful penetration,” which expand progressively like an “oil stain.” It was supported by basic principles: lasting unity of command and effort, show of strength with restricted use of violence, respect for local customs and religion. An initial show of force was sometimes necessary.

¹⁵³Robin Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas 1912-1956* (London: Franck Cass, 1973), 12.

¹⁵⁴Usborne, 174; Miège, preface to *Paroles d’Action*, 32.

Their own interests drove native populations to reconciliation as they saw the obvious advantages of aligning with a powerful enemy who demonstrated a sincere respect for the local customs and religion.

When reviewing Lyautey's ideas on colonization over time, his principles scarcely changed. He kept almost the same opinion as that he held as a young lieutenant during his first assignment in Algeria (1880-1882), in his books on the colonial role of the Army,¹⁵⁵ in the report he published after his mission in Madagascar¹⁵⁶ and as a general acting on the Algerian border. But his strategic approach changed once appointed as *résident général* in Morocco.

An Unwritten Doctrine

Despite the fact that he wrote a lot and made himself the apostle of the policy of "peaceful penetration" and "oil stain," Lyautey never published a manual or methods about pacification operations. He claimed to be first a man of action; thus, his motto, which he wore in an engraved ring provided by his sister Blanche,¹⁵⁷ was a line from the English poet Shelley: "The soul's joy lies in doing."¹⁵⁸

Lyautey was hostile to any doctrine, theories and all made recipes which he accused of being insults to one's intelligence. Despite this, his theory did rely on a few

¹⁵⁵Lyautey, *Du Rôle Colonial de l'Armée* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1900).

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, *Dans le Sud de Madagascar. Pénétration militaire. Situation politique et économique (1900-1902)* (Paris: Editions Lavauzelle, 1903).

¹⁵⁷Blanche Lyautey (1867-1932), younger sister of Hubert, became countess de Ponton d'Amécourt after her wedding.

¹⁵⁸Scham, 9; Cenci and Koch, 16.

principles. It was therefore bended to action and adapted to the local area to be pacified, what he called a “working organization.”¹⁵⁹ Although he claimed: “I have no doctrine. I know only the action, the man, this human pulp that the leader must learn to animate with heart, by the creative and social action,”¹⁶⁰ there are discernable elements of a theory. Several hypotheses can explain this absence of any written theory. They succeed one another throughout his life, and could explain, at the end, why such a work was never written.

The first hypothesis, applicable until his departure from Tonkin in 1897, was the fear of experiencing again the problems Lyautey met after the publication of his essay *Du Rôle Social de l’Officier dans le Service Militaire Universel*¹⁶¹ [On the Social Role of the Officer in the Universal Military Service], in 1891. This essay earned him the hostility of part of the military hierarchy while making him a fast popular celebrity.

The second hypothesis focuses on Lyautey’s experience. While a capable writer, it is possible that he was uncertain as to the universal applicability of his theories and felt he initially lacked the credibility to espouse them. What he saw in Tonkin could have been a particular case only, such as the formula “govern with the Mandarin and not against the Mandarin.” But were these theories and policies transposable into another

¹⁵⁹Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 144. [Une organisation qui marche.] Note: the verb “marcher” means in French equally walking, working and evolving.

¹⁶⁰Lyautey in website of the Association Nationale Maréchal Lyautey, <http://www.lyautey.mosaiqueinformatique.fr/content/blogsection/1/57/> (accessed 4 March 2010). [Je n'ai pas de doctrine. Je ne connais que l'action, que l'homme, que cette pâte humaine que le chef doit savoir animer avec cœur, par l'action créatrice et sociale.]

¹⁶¹Lyautey, “*Du Rôle Social de l’Officier dans le Service Militaire Universel*,” *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 September 1891. Note: This essay was then turned into a book which was reedited several times.

country, where the traditional administrative structure for example, would be less developed. His first Algerian experience as a lieutenant allowed him to observe what occurred there, offered him a comparison, but did not yet allow him to draw mature conclusions. Furthermore, Lyautey still lacked experience when compared to other already famous colonial general officers and was not the one who had been truly responsible for the successes achieved. So he might have thought of not being credible enough to convince others. This second hypothesis is supported by what he said to one of his collaborators: “Everything depends upon the time and the place. You tried one method in Indochina and it succeeded; that does not mean it is going to work in Madagascar or Morocco. What is suitable for some is not necessarily suitable for others: climate, religion, history—so many elements can change the problem.”¹⁶²

When the theory learnt and applied to Tonkin was confirmed by the actions he led in Madagascar, Lyautey then had enough colonial experience to defend his ideas. His past celebrity status allowed him to publish two works in 1900, then in 1903. The first one, *Du Rôle Colonial de l’Armée* [On the Army Role in the Colonies] was published in a particular context, as France debated the status of her colonies. It could also be seen as a first short attempt to sound out public receptivity to his ideas, before issuing a more important work. Or as a way to associate his name to the new colonial theory more deeply, as the title of this work, similar to his previous essay’s title: *Du Rôle Social de l’Officier*, left no doubt as to the identity of his author. In this work, Lyautey explained the theories of his predecessors, to whom he paid tribute--possibly to avoid their fury--

¹⁶²Robert Garric, *Le Message de Lyautey* (Paris: éditions Spes, 1935), 177.

and the achieved actions. He testified thus of the success of what he called the “Gallieni-Lyautey school”¹⁶³ in a letter to Joseph Chailley-Bert¹⁶⁴ on 7 November 1911.

The third hypothesis is that his military status prevented him from really theorizing. The regrets he expressed in a letter on 21 May 1903 are revealing:

Yes, you are right to say it, I did not make a book, I did not want to make one. I was already too much suspected of "literature" and, as serviceman, as state employee, as subordinate, I had no right to make a narrative, to look for approval; I could only say: “here are the parts, the orders received, the orders issued, the material profits, please conclude.” It was the only attitude in compliance with my status, and it could only take out of this something dry, indigestible and cold, among which only those who indeed wanted to conclude, as you made it, could pull something practically useful.¹⁶⁵

Thus, his fame came with a price, not being able to accept the praise of his work for fear of causing political offense.

Lyautey’s action in Algeria then in Morocco, his fame, his election to the *Académie française*, his rank of general and his age allowed him altogether, after the First World War, to be free from his statutory constraints and to publish some of his old papers

¹⁶³Lyautey in Le Révérend, 245. [. . . l’école Gallieni-Lyautey]

¹⁶⁴Joseph Chailley (1854-1928), was the son-in-law of Paul Bert, the republican Minister. Economist and explorer, he published studies of colonial sociology from 1887 to 1904, which fascinated and influenced Gallieni and Lyautey in Tonkin and in Madagascar. In 1904, he took part to the creation of a Comity of Morocco [Comité du Maroc]. He was representative of Vendée from 1906 to 1914. He always supported Lyautey and put him in touch with some of his powerful economical contacts.

¹⁶⁵Lyautey in Le Révérend, 229. [Oui, vous avez raison de le dire, je n’ai pas fait un livre, je ne voulais pas en faire un. J’ai déjà été trop suspecté de «littérature» et, comme militaire, comme fonctionnaire, comme subordonné, je n’avais pas le droit de faire un récit, de chercher l’agrément; je ne pouvais que dire: «Voici les pièces, les ordres reçus, les ordres donnés, les résultats matériels, concluez.» C’était la seule attitude conforme à mon état, et il ne pouvait en sortir que quelque chose d’aride, d’indigeste et de froid, dont seuls ceux qui voulaient bien conclure, comme vous l’avez fait, pouvaient tirer quelque chose de pratiquement utile.]

he had preciously archived. But, the fourth hypothesis of being too occupied by his governmental responsibilities in Morocco, and diminished by health problems, he did still not draft a doctrine. He might very well have thought that his “missed appointment”¹⁶⁶ with the war did not put him in a favorable position to publish any doctrine. His resignation in 1925 and the coolness of his reception when he returned to France hurt his pride, hence his motto: “Morocco, never heard.”¹⁶⁷ This left him especially worried about the defense of his legacy and would explain, for example, the publication of *Paroles d’Action* [Words of action] in 1927.

To see his theory and his ideas evolve, it is necessary to examine his writings, especially those that escaped his control, and array them in chronological order of writing, not of publishing.

A Global Strategy, of the Private Individual to the Collective

Lyautey’s actions in Morocco were driven by a simple but efficient pattern of pacification he had designed and improved upon during previous campaigns in Tonkin, Madagascar and Algeria. These measures joined in an ambitious general approach. The sum of multiple actions at the local level had long term repercussions on the whole country, which gradually modernized and calmed down as a result. In a more military

¹⁶⁶Teyssier, 10. As shown later (See Chapter 5) Lyautey was ambitious and dreamt of a national destiny, but, when he was promoted War minister during the First World War, in December 1916, he did not achieve significant results and resigned in March 1917 after having choked the Representatives by refusing to discuss some technical aspects of the War in Parliament.

¹⁶⁷Lyautey in Le Révérend, 12 [Le Maroc, connais pas.]

realm, the pacification at the local or tactical then operational levels served a vaster French intention, of strategic importance.

Lyauteys method of joint action will all the ministries, or inter agencies according to the current fashionable term in the USA, playing on the whole range of possibilities to reach the required result. For Lyautey, success required several simultaneous actions at all levels, as he described it in a letter on 28 October 1903:

You know what are my doctrines, my processes of application of the colonial penetration; I consider that all the political and economic consequences of the occupation of a country ensue, necessarily, from the way it is proceeded to this occupation, by uniting, from the beginning, in a most narrow way, the preparation and the political action for the military occupation, and never by losing sight of the political and economic purpose of the coming day. This is the Gallieni's doctrine.¹⁶⁸

Besides his usual military function, the role of the colonial officer was to accompany the development of the native peoples economically and morally, thus giving them reasons to support the French presence because it supported their own interests. The officer had to be a teacher, administrator and political rolled into one.

The long lasting efficacy of Lyautey's method of pacification relied on its ability to address simultaneously the three classical reasons for war identified by Thucydides: fear, honor and interests. As these three motivations were driven out, people had no rational cause for war. Using a medical metaphor, Lyautey's method provided a diagnosis, cured immediate symptoms and provided long-term rehabilitation. The

¹⁶⁸Lyautey in Le Révérend, 10. [Vous savez quelles sont mes doctrines, mes procédés d'application de pénétration coloniale; j'estime que toutes les conséquences politiques et économiques de l'occupation d'un pays découlent, forcément, de la manière dont il est procédé a cette occupation, en unissant, dès le début, de la manière la plus étroite, la préparation et l'action politique à l'occupation militaire, et en ne perdant jamais de vue le but politique et économique du lendemain. C'est la doctrine Gallieni.]

diagnosis was provided by the intelligence service; the armed forces had an immediate effect on security, and the long-term rehabilitation was insured by a mixture of economic and infrastructure development, reform of the institutions and popular adherence.

Taking into account that this doctrine was always adapted to the particular local situation to be more efficient and effective, Lyautey's ideas on pacification might be roughly synthesized, in various essential principles supporting the "progressive penetration" and the "oil stain" theory.

Invariant Principles

Pacification could not be achieved without using some easy but essential principles, which set the stage for the action: demonstration of strength but minimum use of violence, respect for the natives, and unity of command and effort in time and space.

In pacification operations, having superior strength was a prerequisite to gain the respect of the opponents and convince them that fighting is not their best option. As Lyautey defined it: "the strength . . . is respected and . . . only allows talking usefully."¹⁶⁹ In order to establish local security, without which no drop of oil can spread, using military force was always a possibility, but never a necessity. Thus, one will "Show force to avoid employing it."¹⁷⁰ The "peaceful penetration" was an attractive formula, but stays an oxymoron: it was based upon the presence, otherwise the use, of some overwhelming military strength, allied to political action and economical development.

¹⁶⁹Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 105. [La force qui se fait respecter et qui permet seule de causer utilement.]

¹⁷⁰Usborne, 123; Maurois, 164.

When and where it was possible, pacification had to be achieved with a minimum of violence, thus preserving the local population's honor. The fewer the losses, the less the desire for vengeance and the easier the negotiations would be. It is important to note that the opponents were always called "dissidents," and not "enemies." This "open hand"¹⁷¹ policy led the way to the process of honorable reunification or reconciliation by traditional ways such as the *aman* [mercy],¹⁷² avoiding unnecessary violence. In sum, military action is a necessary means, but as Lyautey wrote in a letter on 26 March 1898: "do not fire a gunshot which does not represent a re-exploited rice field."¹⁷³

The local population's honor was also preserved through the second prerequisite of respecting local religion, culture and customs,¹⁷⁴ thus avoiding offending the local population or causing their traditional chief losing the face publically. This was especially true in countries where religion was intimately linked to and organizes daily life. It was always possible to negotiate with a stronger enemy, as long as he was respectable. But insults to the religion or people's honor had to be washed with blood.

The third principle was to have unity of command and thus of effort in order to use sometimes limited resources on the most efficient way. Lyautey always refused to act

¹⁷¹Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 93. [. . . main ouverte.]

¹⁷²For such a ceremony, see picture in Appendix D, figure 4: Lyautey during a surrender in 1906.

¹⁷³Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 212. [Ne pas tirer un coup de fusil qui ne représente une rizière réexploitée.]

¹⁷⁴For more details on this particular idea, see Patrick Steiger, "Cultural Awareness Matters: The Real Lasting Legacy of General Lyautey in Morocco 1912-1925" (Thesis, Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, 2003).

with “lashed hands,”¹⁷⁵ as he stated with regards to the situation on the Algerian border in 1903: “if the current situation, of multiplicity and contradiction of command, had to last, I shall not certainly stay.”¹⁷⁶

The last principle emanated from the previous. Having unity of command was not enough; the method required, in addition to having sufficient time to succeed, under the same leader, or under leaders sharing the same vision and implementing the same policy. As Lyautey mentioned in a speech in 1915: “If a useful work for Morocco was realized for three years, it is not because she has general Lyautey at her head, but because there was a leader and only one, and because this leader is the same for three years, it is because, so, this country benefited from the unity of view and from the continuation in the action.”¹⁷⁷ This required commitment of the individual and the government. Once these principles had been implemented it was possible to use the “oil stain” method. It starts with a drop and expands progressively.

The Local Effect of the Oil Drop

Consider first the actions of conquest and pacification at the local level. Everything begins with the installation of a military post and its garrison: this is the drop of oil, which is going to expand. This post is settled either after a military victory and the

¹⁷⁵Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 8 [. . . mains ligotées].

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 6-7. [Si la situation actuelle, de multiplicité et de contradiction de commandement, devait durer, je ne resterais certainement pas]

¹⁷⁷Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 198. [S’il a été réalisée une œuvre utile au Maroc depuis trois ans, ce n’est pas parce qu’il avait à sa tête le général Lyautey, *mais parce qu’il y avait un chef et un seul, et que ce chef est le même depuis trois ans*, c’est parce que, ainsi, ce pays a bénéficié de l’unité de vue et de la suite dans l’action.]

conquest of a new territory, after a treaty, or when the intelligence service has determined that the natives' mind is ready to accept a post. It is preferably implanted in a previously populated area, or on the border, near the zone which must be influenced. This choice is important because it strengthens the idea within the local populations that the new power either improves, or restores what existed before its arrival.

The period of "peaceful penetration" or of expansion of the oil drop follows. From the military post previously mentioned, the economy resumes or spreads, attracting people who come close to the opened or newly established market. They are attracted by interest: either by the possibility to safely sell their goods, or by access to the new goods coming by road, inland waterway or lately the railroad.

Hence people see an immediate benefit to the presence of the new power through safety and a substantial improvement of its living conditions. In addition to the market, the troops build a clinic, a school; teach new agricultural techniques,¹⁷⁸ create new roads,¹⁷⁹ and so on. The launch of major infrastructure works can intervene later, once a thorough knowledge of the country is achieved. But working for the people must immediately follow the military action, to make it switch to the side of the victor. In the words of Lyautey, therein lies the difficulty: "Any officer knows how to seize a village at

¹⁷⁸This helped also in improving the living conditions of the soldiers and in easing the logistical supply, through the use of local resources, for food, clothing, shoes and saddler, horses, etc. instead of importing everything from far away.

¹⁷⁹As already mentioned, the creation of new road is an old military technique. It facilitates the survey of the desired area, the travel of messengers, and if needed the quick arrival of reinforcements.

dawn. I'm looking for officers who know as well having the market reopened at noon.”¹⁸⁰

This type of action requires that the officer in question has, at least initially, a wide degree of discretion and that all jurisdictions work together under a common direction, left to act first and then to stabilize.

The Extension: From Drop to Oil Stain

This oil stain extension is made simultaneously in various places. Prosperity and security extends from one place to another. Dissidents might see it in their interest to benefit from these changes. And as their freedom of maneuver becomes more and more limited, it becomes more obvious that their only choice is to submit or to be soon defeated. This is facilitated by the fact that the new authority respects the local customs and cultures, often even leaving the traditional chiefs in their previous positions.

Defeating the enemy militarily is not enough. He must be especially convinced that it is in his best interest to collaborate with a force greater than he is capable of defeating. Therefore, local elites must be reenrolled in order to benefit from their knowledge of the land, its administration, and rally more people. That was what Lyautey, echoing the words of Mr. de Lanessan, former Governor of Indochina under whom he served; called: “Governing with Mandarin and not against the Mandarin.”¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰Lyautey in website of the Association Nationale Maréchal Lyautey, <http://www.lyautey.mosaiqueinformatique.fr/content/blogsection/1/57/> (accessed 4 March 2010). [N’importe quel officier sait s’emparer d’un village à l’aube. Moi, je cherche des officiers qui sachent en plus rouvrir le marché à midi.]

¹⁸¹Jean-Louis de Lanessan in Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, vol.1, 71 [Gouverner avec le mandarin et non contre le mandarin.]

When the area is pacified and the population is supportive of French interests, it becomes possible to arm and recruit local self defense units. These partisan units are counseled and trained by French troops. The auxiliary troops support the local actions of the regular units with their improved understanding of the country or by performing local security tasks. The regular troops can then be redeployed in another sector, where they begin again from scratch the same type of actions.

A Visionary Strategic Design?

Lyautey had a special strategic vision for Morocco that he never stated before. His final goal was to contribute to the development of the administered country gently, considered initially as at the stage of “childhood.”¹⁸² Once arriving at maturity, the independence of the country became inevitable for Lyautey. But he considered that if the modernization of the country had been gently executed and with respect for the local culture, the former Protectorate would see keeping narrow links of cooperation with her former guardian as being in its best interest. This intent is summarized in a letter on 14 April 1925:

It is to be foreseen, and I believe it as the historic truth, that, in a more or less distant time, an evolved, civilized North Africa, living on its autonomous life, will get loose from the *Métropole*. At this particular moment- and this must be the supreme purpose of our policy- this separation must be made without pain and the glances of the populations have to continue to turn with affection to France. African people shall not turn against her.¹⁸³

¹⁸²Lyautey, *Paroles d'action*, 408.

¹⁸³Lyautey in Patrick Garreau, *Lyautey et le state building.*” *Le Casoar*, N°90, Juillet 2008, 28. [Il est à prévoir, et je le crois comme une vérité historique, que, dans un temps plus ou moins lointain, l'Afrique du Nord évoluée, civilisée, vivant de sa vie autonome, se détachera de la Métropole. Il faut qu'à ce moment-là-et ce doit être le suprême but de notre politique-cette séparation se fasse sans douleur et que les regards

Thus, for Lyautey, the ultimate goal was a long-term, healthy relationship with independent Morocco that was only possible if he exercised extreme caution.

Changes Over the Time?

Lyautey's method, at tactical and operational level, varied slightly over time. The main change was at the strategic level, where Lyautey's vision on colonial design dramatically evolved.

An Almost Constant Tactical Conception

Lyautey's methods did not change significantly. Minor alterations were made according to the local circumstances and as his military and colonial experience improved. The processes remain generally the same described previously: "peaceful penetration," "oil stain," etc. Various abstracts from his letters show an almost constant tactical design.

In a letter on 26 March 1898 for instance, his statement on his action in Madagascar resembled previous comments on what he achieved in Tonkin and describes his usual methods, focused on the population's interests: pacification through reconciliation with local leaders, economical development and education:

To make cities, roads, markets, to arouse the life on the ruins of yesterday, not fire a gunshot which does not represent a re-exploited rice field; it is the good human work. . . . A week ago, I returned for the first time on the scene where Rabezavana [the former rebellion leader] made me his submission, eight months ago; then, not an inhabitant, not a house up, the uncultivated fields for two years, the scattered herds. Today, population celebrating, more villages than before the insubordination, the overproduction of rice, three schools of French, a sewing

des populations continuent à se tourner avec affection vers la France. Il ne faut pas que les peuples africains se retournent contre elle.]; George Spillman, *Du Protectorat à l'Indépendance: Maroc 1912-1955* (Paris, Plon, 1967), 26-27.

room, a teaching farm, the initiation already made for so much real progress at instigation of one of our best sector's commanders and with the cooperation of the same leaders who fired, one year ago, at my avant-garde and at my pennant.¹⁸⁴

Later in 1904, Lyautey wrote similar comments on his action of pacification of the Algerian-Moroccan border. In a letter to a friend, he shared some ideas which he prized; development of the country rather than mindless usage of military strength and joint political, economic and military organization:

I professed that, to be effective, they [military means] must be doubled by a whole political and economic organization, that the occupation of some well chosen points, natural centers of attraction, is otherwise effective that all the raids and that all the columns of the world and that the development of railroads, markets, the resumption of the deals, the appeal to the material interests, the creation of medical care (on condition that all these means are doubled by sufficient military force to make this being respected) constitute the best mode of action on the hostile tribes of our neighborhood where, even to the most turbulent, there is always a wise and peaceful party.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 212. [Faire des villes, des routes, des marchés, susciter la vie sur les ruines d'hier, ne pas tirer un coup de fusil qui ne représente une rizière réexploitée, c'est du bon travail humain. . . Il y a huit jours, je retournais pour la première fois sur les lieux où Rabezavana me faisait sa soumission, il y a huit mois; alors, pas un habitant, pas une maison debout, les champs en friche depuis deux ans, les troupeaux dispersés. Aujourd'hui, population en fête, plus de villages qu'avant l'insoumission, surproduction de riz, trois écoles de français, un ouvroir, une ferme-école, l'initiation déjà faite à tant de progrès réels sous l'impulsion d'un de nos meilleurs commandants de secteur et avec le concours des mêmes chefs qui tiraient, il y a un an, sur mon avant-garde et sur mon fanion.]

¹⁸⁵Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 116-117. [Je professais que, pour être efficace, ils doivent être doublés de toute une organisation politique et économique, que l'occupation de quelques points bien choisis, centres d'attraction naturels, est autrement efficace que tous les raids et que toutes les colonnes du monde et que le développement des voies ferrées, des marchés, la reprise des transactions, l'appel aux intérêts matériels, la création de soins médicaux (à la condition que tous ces moyens soient doublés de force militaire suffisantes pour le faire respecter) constituent le meilleur mode d'action sur les tribus hostiles de notre voisinage ou, même chez les plus turbulents, il existe toujours un parti sage et pacifique.]

A Change in Strategic Vision

The final purpose of colonial action underwent considerable change between the beginning of Lyautey career in Algeria and Tonkin and its end in Morocco. In Algeria, Tonkin, Madagascar and on the Algerian border, it was indeed about a frank colonial conquest for France, regardless of the status granted to the conquered country, whatever was made by the military action and the organization of the colony. As a lieutenant in Algeria, Lyautey criticized the policy of assimilation and of direct administration, but did not question the idea of colonization. In Indochina and Madagascar, he had the opportunity to learn new ideas, then to implement and improve them. On the Algerian-Moroccan border, it is a question, under the pretext of protecting the border, to make a progressive conquest of the Moroccan territories through the reunification of the nomadic populations which occupy this area.

This perspective changed after the installation of the Protectorate in Morocco in 1912. This Protectorate was initially intended to protect French interests there and, some authors believe, mainly for the protection of Algeria¹⁸⁶. It turned into an intended action of development from 1920 and the so called “*coup de barre*”¹⁸⁷ [change of direction] directive on 18 November. It aimed at preparing for the future independence of Morocco by attaching her interests to those of France. The origin of this idea remains vague. It could be original to Lyautey or from an awareness of the evolution of the world situation after the First World War. The notion of the “right of people to self-determination,”

¹⁸⁶Gershovich, *French Military Rule*; Porch and Osborne.

¹⁸⁷Miège, preface to *Paroles d'Action*, 36; Cenci and Koch, 36. Note: The proper translation of the nautical expression “*coup de barre*” is literally “quick move of the helm.”

developed by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points to find a solution to the first world conflict, possibly had an influence on Lyautey, who was well informed about what took place in Europe. There is no direct evidence of this found as yet. Other authors like Miège saw this directive as a translation of a growing discontent among the colonists, leading the *résident général* to attempt gaining the support of the native population's leaders.¹⁸⁸

Sub-Conclusion: A Debatable Efficiency?

When Lyautey left Morocco in 1925, he had been in charge for thirteen years but Morocco was not completely pacified. The Rif War had extended from the Spanish zone to the French Protectorate and the French government had to send Marshal Pétain with military reinforcements, including tanks and aircraft, to end the rebellion. Must this be seen as illustrating the ineffectiveness of the peaceful penetration method or should it be considered as a necessary slowness in achieving results by acting smoothly with native people? Or, as Lyautey sometimes denounced it at the time, as a lack of means?

Lyautey's method might appear slow. This was one of the main criticisms addressed to this method by General Mangin when he returned to Paris in 1913.¹⁸⁹ But it must be remembered that, due to the climate, the campaign period was limited to around four months a year. These methods achieved impressive and lasting results in Morocco at minimum expense for the French government. Furthermore, it succeeded in keeping

¹⁸⁸Miège, preface to *Paroles d'Action*, 33.

¹⁸⁹Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 99. General Mangin was one of the Lyautey's subordinate in Morocco. After his defeat in June 1913, Lyautey reassigned him to Casablanca then authorized his request for a leave to France which was extended indefinitely. In revenge, Mangin launched a campaign to discredit Lyautey in Paris.

Morocco under French influence during the First World War, when government officials thought Morocco had to be evacuated. So this method might ultimately have been a mutually beneficial policy. On one hand, the respect for the Sultan and the *Makhzen* led them to support the French policy actively, providing legitimacy, troops and influence to the French efforts. On the other hand, France secured the Sultan's throne and contributed to the development of his country, contributing to her own economical advantage.

Lyautey's potential failure during the Rif War must be cautiously examined. He warned against the coming danger, and succeeded in stabilizing the front with available means. Marshal Pétain's victory relied on massive reinforcements and a convention offensive, with inherent heavy casualties. Lyautey bitterly claimed: "One does not fight Abd el-Krim as one fights Marshal Hindenburg."¹⁹⁰

Finally, another difficulty related to the omnipotence Lyautey enjoyed, through the unity of command and his authority on both military and civilian administration. Having personalized the French authority for such a long period in Morocco, he was replaced only with difficulty. His successor as a *résident général*, Théodore Steeg, was a civilian who decided to demilitarize most of the functions within the Protectorate administration. He thus put an end to a unique experience and making comparison difficult.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰Geshovich, "Collaboration and 'Pacification': French Conquest, Moroccan Combatants, and the Transformation of the Middle Atlas, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 24.1 (2004), 140.

¹⁹¹General Gouraud's tenure, when he temporarily replaced Lyautey during the First World War, was too short to be really significant.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY EXPERIENCES

Lyautey's actions in Morocco from 1912-1925 were the result of the evolution of his thinking throughout his life. This reflection formed gradually from his childhood through various influences. His main source of inspiration was obviously his military experience. The choice of a military career led him to be assigned to various French overseas possessions. It allowed him to accumulate observations on various situations under different climates and test his theories. Finally, it resulted in the "oil stain" and the "peaceful penetration" methods he used in Morocco. The easiest way to study these experiences is to follow his career chronologically.

Military Education: Saint Cyr and Staff College

From the very beginning of his military career, Lyautey showed specific character traits and struggled to find his place. After having succeeded at the selection exam, Lyautey joined the *Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint Cyr*,¹⁹² for a two-year course in 1873. Lyautey's first year in Saint-Cyr was difficult and disappointing, as described in a letter to his close friend, Antonin de Margerie,¹⁹³ on 26 March 1874: "I work mostly to

¹⁹²The French military academy or *Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr* was created by Napoleon Bonaparte on May 1st, 1802, to replace the previous *Ecole Royale Militaire*, and then located in Fontainebleau. The school moved in 1806 to Saint-Cyr l'Ecole (Yvelines), in the buildings of a former school for girls of the French nobility. That school has been disbanded at the time of the Revolution. The school was there when Lyautey studied. After World War two, as the old school had been severely damaged by an Allied bombing during the *Libération* campaign in 1944, it was resettled in the military camp of Coëtquidan (Morbihan), where it is still located. Since 1802, about 65,000 *Saint-Cyriens* have been trained, along with more than 2,000 international cadets.

¹⁹³Antonin de Margerie (1875-1914) was a childhood friend of Lyautey in Nancy and always stayed his safest confidant. He attended the *Ecole Polytechnique* and became

rise above what surrounds me, to reach my career, military life, the pettiness that seems to stifle his beginning, to consider the above.”¹⁹⁴ According to Le Révérend: “He worked hard but endured the state of confinement to which he was reduced by boarding as a torture, moreover promiscuity, group life tested continuously this independent boy who, because of his illness, has long lived and worked at home in an elegant atmosphere, surrounded by charming women, loving, sensitive.”¹⁹⁵ Lyautey's words in a letter to his childhood friend, Antonin de Margerie, describing his appreciation of his daily life, were revealing: “the drum that will batter, the boots he'll have to polish, the gun that he'll have to dismount, the intelligent gymnastics that go claim me, hundreds of pages of interesting theory that I will have to absorb, and finally bestial stories that I heard for the umpteenth time and no less bestial figures on which my eyes fell at every step.”¹⁹⁶

During his first year of study at the academy, he underwent a crucible experience which shaped his mind for the coming years. He was introduced to the idea of social

artillery officer. Monarchist and a devout Catholic, he was scratched from the promotion in 1905 by the Ministry Combes-André, after the split between State and Church in 1905.

¹⁹⁴Lyautey in Le Révérend, 31. [Je tâche surtout de m'élever au-dessus de ce qui m'entoure, de dégager ma carrière, la vie militaire, des petites gens qui semblent l'étouffer à ses débuts, pour l'envisager de plus haut.]

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 27. [Il travaille avec acharnement mais endure comme un supplice l'état de claustration où le réduit l'internat; plus encore la promiscuité, la vie collective continuelle éprouvant beaucoup ce garçon indépendant qui, du fait de sa maladie, a longtemps vécu et travaillé à la maison, dans une atmosphère raffinée, entouré de femmes charmantes, affectueuses, délicates.]

¹⁹⁶Ibid., 30. [le tambour qui va battre, les bottes qu'il va falloir cirer, le fusil qu'il va falloir démonter, les intelligents exercices de gymnastique qui vont me réclamer, les centaines de pages intéressantes de théorie que je vais devoir absorber, et enfin les bestiales histoires que je vais entendre pour la énième fois et les non moins bestiales figures sur lesquelles mes yeux tombent à chaque pas.]

Catholicism through a conference given by Albert de Mun¹⁹⁷ for former students of the Jesuit preparatory College of the *Rue de la Poste*, in Paris.¹⁹⁸ As a captain, de Mun had participated in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and witnessed the atrocities of the *Commune* of Paris.¹⁹⁹ He called for the establishment of justice and social peace and for the reconciliation of the sons of aristocrats and bourgeois youth workers, encouraging them to live an authentic Christianity. Lyautey and his friends engaged enthusiastically in the Work of Circles of Catholic Workers.²⁰⁰ He continued this work during the first year of his military career.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷Lyautey called him: “Our great Mr. Mun” [notre grand M. de Mun] in a letter to Antonin de Margerie on 26 March 1874, In *Le Révérend*, 31.

¹⁹⁸This prestigious school still exists today in Versailles. It is now the *Ecole Sainte Geneviève*, thus nicknamed “Ginette” by the students. The *rue des Postes*, in Paris, was then renamed *rue Lhomond*.

¹⁹⁹This insurgency lasted about two months in Paris and its immediate surroundings, from 18 March 1871 until the resumption of the town by government troops during the “Bloody Week” from 21 to 28 May. This uprising was directed against the Thiers’ government, from the National Assembly who had been elected by popular vote to decide the continuation of the war, after the defeat of Emperor Napoleon III against the Prussian and German states allied. The repression and killings of hostages by supporters of the *Commune*, including religious and the bishop of Paris, Mgr Darboy, convinced many Catholics to pursue a policy of reconciliation and re-Christianization.

²⁰⁰The Work of Catholic workers [*Oeuvre des Cercles Catholiques d’ouvriers*] was founded in Paris in 1871 by Albert de Mun, officer then deputy of the Third Republic, René de La Tour du Pin, a former colonel of cavalry, who resigned after 1871 and Maurice Maignen. Measuring the gap between the working populations and tenants of economic liberalism, they advocated the union of classes in the form of the corporation. Organized in circles, the Work expanded rapidly. The circles allowed members of the ruling class (industrial, community leaders, and army officers) and workers meet in order to arrive at a better understanding, with the Christian desire to provide assistance to the underprivileged. This is an early manifestation of social Catholicism, culminating in 1891 with the publication of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII.

²⁰¹Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 42.

After Saint-Cyr, Lyautey was appointed Second Lieutenant and joined the Staff School in Paris for two years. These studies did not seem the most enjoyable. He ended up “absolutely exhausted” according to his own words.²⁰² Early 1878, he joined his friend Keller on a six-week study tour of the three departments of Algeria. The notes of his travel (February and March 1878) reflect his personal discovery of North Africa and the beginning of his fascination for the people, language and countries there. They also demonstrate the beginning of his thought on colonization, the emphasis on construction, the actions needed and mistakes to avoid, such as the “soldierly methods towards sheiks and others, which often result in insurgencies.”²⁰³

This trip also afforded an opportunity to write a journal for his relatives back home. As noted by Le Révérend,²⁰⁴ writing an open journal eventually became a habit for Lyautey and allows one to follow the path of his thoughts. Previously, while studying at Sainte Geneviève and Saint-Cyr, he wrote journals for personal use only.²⁰⁵

Early Career: Provincial Disappointment and First Colonial Experience

The disappointment Lyautey experienced while attending the military academy did not disappear when he joined a regiment, but rather increased. The only period he

²⁰²Lyautey, *Notes de voyage en Algérie*, in Le Révérend, 41. [...absolument éreinté].

²⁰³Lyautey, *Notes de voyage en Algérie*, in Le Révérend, 55. [...les procédés soldatesques à l'égard des cheiks et autres, d'où viennent souvent les insurrections.]

²⁰⁴Le Révérend, 39.

²⁰⁵These “*Notes de jeunesse*” [youth notes] (1875-1877) have since been published by Patrick Heidsieck in his book *Rayonnement de Lyautey* [Radiation of Lyautey], published by Gallimard in 1947.

really liked was his two-year assignment to Algeria, during which he discovered his taste for colonial action, and determined that he deeply regretted when he was back on the mainland of France, in remote areas garrisons.

First Provincial Assignments: A Disappointment on Military Routine

Following his studies at the military school, Lyautey attended a training assignment in the 20th Regiment of *Chasseurs* in Rambouillet then Châteaudun and was promoted to Lieutenant. At the dissolution of the Joint Staff in 1877, he was reassigned to the cavalry and assigned to the 2nd Regiment of Hussars in Sézanne. The military career of which he dreamed as a child, however, did not seem to satisfy him completely. As noted by Le Révérend: “He bored deep into the small garrison towns, cold and gray, the routine of military life weighs on him. . . . Nothing went well, physically nor morally. He sunk into skepticism and spleen.”²⁰⁶ His letters and travel notes are interspersed with little kindness on military routine or some of his comrades. He preferred to study or discovery to their conversation.²⁰⁷

After his return to metropolitan France in 1882, things did not improve, whether he was in Bruyères (Vosges) or in Commercy, as one of his letters to his grandmother on 4 December 1882 demonstrated:

My days and my evenings especially take place in this village, sad and boring; it is good to read, to work, but finally, is needed some diversion, some shaking, social satisfaction; eternal days completely folded up on myself are very bad,

²⁰⁶Le Révérend, 65. [. . . s’ennuie profondément dans ces petites villes de garnison, froides et grises; la routine de la vie militaire lui pèse. . . Rien ne va plus, physiquement ni moralement. Il sombre dans le scepticisme et le spleen.]

²⁰⁷Lyautey, *Notes de voyage en Algérie*, in Le Révérend, 50.

especially since my service, which forces me simply to make here act of presence, gives me nothing or about to make, so that, at the end of the quite active, so healthy and interesting and varied life which I have just led, this is the terrible fall. Really, I am not lucky with my garrisons: Châteaudun, Sézanne, Bruyères, it is too much, and my parents are inspired really hardly well by wishing so much my return of Africa, which benefits them hardly and will not certainly make a success of me.²⁰⁸

First Assignment in Algeria (1880-1882)

In October 1880, the regiment to which Lyautey belonged received orders to deploy to Algeria. This assignment is essential to understand the later career of Lyautey, as it laid the foundations of his colonial action, either as he gained inspiration, or rejected what he saw.

First, the prospect of a prolonged absence from metropolitan France made him resume his correspondence in another form. There was no question of a travel journal being released after his return to France. So he wrote letters, particularly to two childhood friends, Antonin de Margerie and Joseph de La Bouillerie,²⁰⁹ who were asked to exchange his letters: “do me the pleasure to communicate them [the letters].”²¹⁰ This was

²⁰⁸Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 146-147. [. . . mes journées et mes soirées surtout se passent dans ce village, mornes et lassantes; il est bon de lire, travailler, mais enfin, il faut quelque diversion, un secouant quelconque, une satisfaction sociale; les éternelles journées complètement repliées sur moi-même sont bien mauvaises, d’autant plus que mon service, qui me force simplement à faire ici acte de présence, ne me donne rien ou à peu près à faire, de sorte que, au sortir de la vie toute active, si saine et intéressante et variée que je viens de mener, ceci est la chute terrible. Vraiment, je n’ai pas de chance avec mes garnisons: Châteaudun, Sézanne, Bruyères, c’en est trop, et mes parents ne sont vraiment guère bien inspirés en désirant tant mon retour d’Afrique, qui ne leur profite guère et ne me réussira certes pas.]

²⁰⁹Joseph de la Bouillerie (1855-1887), was the other close friend of Lyautey. Being a cavalry officer, he died in 1887 after a horse fall.

²¹⁰Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 77. [Vous me ferez le plaisir de vous les communiquer.]

the beginning of his system of multi-recipient match he was to perpetuate during his later overseas assignments.

His letters to his family and friends reflect a complete change of personality in the hot sun of Algeria and confirmed his love for colonial countries: “The heat affects the body as a balm and he, who suffered so much moisture and cold, felt relieved, liberated.”²¹¹ Lyautey expressed his enthusiasm and passion for Algeria on several occasions, such as a letter he wrote in December 1880: “This country fascinates me and interests me.”²¹²

This attraction led him to study Algerian society and its culture, an experience which helped him in the understanding of other cultures and in avoiding ethnocentrism. He carefully observed Algerian people, learnt their customs and their language.²¹³ He studied their religion and tried to understand their problems. He defined himself as a “French man of the nineteenth century, involved in the current fight and everything related to political and economic interests of my country, decided to take my exile to see through this mysterious Algeria.”²¹⁴

The exploration of the hinterland and the different cities where he was posted gave him a taste of Moorish architecture. He appreciated the old alleys of the Casbah of

²¹¹Le Révérend, 66. [La chaleur agit sur son organisme comme un baume et lui, qui souffrait tellement de l’humidité et du froid, il se sent soulagé, libéré.]

²¹²Lyautey in Le Révérend, 78. [Ce pays m’intéresse et me passionne.]

²¹³Ibid. in Le Révérend, 66.

²¹⁴Ibid., 78-79. [Français, homme du XIXème siècle, mêlé à la lutte actuelle et à tout ce qui touche aux intérêts politiques et économiques de mon pays, décidé à profiter de mon exil pour voir clair dans cette mystérieuse Algérie.]

Algiers and the old houses, but rebelled against the modernization along the European style, which, he felt, progressively disfigured the country: “The more I see of Algiers, the more my impression...is maintained. The local color has completely disappeared, it is absolutely surrendered to the English, Russians and French millionaires tourists, shops, boulevards, tall houses of Paris, with much noise and dust.”²¹⁵ And, “As for the local interest [of Algiers], useless: a Gallicized city, asphalt and stores; some Arabs still, but impenetrable, unaffordable and, besides, completely polluted by our neighborhood.”²¹⁶ One need not look any further for the reasons which pushed him to protect the authenticity of Moroccan cities and their architecture when he became general resident.

During his travels, he also studied the already achieved works and his comments recommended possible improvement to develop the country further. He was not indifferent to political problems and studied the way the country was administered, particularly in the area under the control of the Army, through the Arab Office. He regretted the French policy of direct rule and assimilation of Algeria. He thought it ridiculous to establish institutions foreign to the customs and traditions of indigenous peoples. He much preferred the solution of the Protectorate. According to Hoisington, Lyautey thought that Algeria “should be placed in the hands of a ‘firm and competent’ leader who would give a ‘vigorous push to economic, industrial, financial, and

²¹⁵Lyautey in Le Révérend, 87. [Plus je vois Alger, plus mon impression...se maintient. La couleur locale a complètement disparu, elle est absolument livrée aux Anglais, aux Russes et aux touristes français millionnaires, magasins, boulevards, hautes maisons de Paris, avec beaucoup de bruit et de poussière.]

²¹⁶Ibid., 95. [Quant à l’intérêt local, nul: une ville francisée, asphalte et magasins; quelques Arabes encore, mais impénétrables, inabordables et, du reste, complètement viciés par notre voisinage.]

commercial projects’’²¹⁷ and yet not neglect the human side. For Lyautey the road toward that sort of rule centered on contact with the local population, specifically with those leaders of society willing to commit themselves to the French.²¹⁸ These observations constituted the first frame of his future action in Morocco.

Later, in March 1881, Lyautey was assigned to the staff in Algiers, a posting he tried in vain to oppose. This new job pleased him far less, and he lived a few difficult months. His words in a letter on 23 March 1881 were clear: “I’m suffocating in this office, I congratulate myself more and more not to have asked for anything in order to seize the first opportunity to leave: my health in body and mind before anything else.”²¹⁹ This posting lasted until May 1882 and prevented him from participating in the conquest of Tunisia²²⁰ with his previous companions, an experience which affected him profoundly and drove him to consider resigning his commission.²²¹ This staff assignment did however open new horizons. To live in Algiers allowed him to gain new contacts and deepened his reflection by gaining a better understanding of the strategic as on the

²¹⁷Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 107. [. . . ferme et compétent.] and [....une impulsion vigoureuse aux travaux économiques, industriels, financiers, commerciaux.]

²¹⁸Hoisington, 4.

²¹⁹Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 87. [J’étouffe dans ce bureau, je m’applaudis de plus en plus de n’avoir rien demandé, de manière à saisir la première occasion d’en sortir: ma santé de corps et d’esprit avant tout.]

²²⁰In the spring of 1881, following the raids of Khroumirs in Algeria, the French army occupied Tunisia. The treaty of Bardo was signed on 12 May 1881. It established a French Protectorate on Tunisia. All powers in the domains of the Foreign Affairs, the territory defense and the reform of the administration were given to the general resident of France.

²²¹Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 113.

tactical level. This is illustrated by a letter to his father on 23 March 1881, in which he evocated the way to crush an endemic rebellion: “If then we want to act, it must be done with overwhelming strengths as in Tunisia; it is stupid to have small columns being defeated separately by an enemy who has on us the advantage of the mobility, the total abstinence, the simplicity of convoys, the secret relations in the country and especially the training, the physical vigor, the courage! and of the enthusiasm.”²²² These ideas were used later in Morocco.

His contemplation of the errors committed both by the politicians and by the press gave him a more profound understanding of the factors that insulted the Arabs, as he described in the same letter to his father:

There is in the country an undeniable deaf excitement. Besides, how the Arab would not be irritated? There is not a single day when this shameful and vile thing, which is the Algerian press, reviles him, promises him the extermination, denies him any feeling of honor, loyalty, any intelligence, any capacity in whatever it is, announces him only the disappearance and the pseudo-slavery are the real purpose...All these newspapers are in the hands of the Arabs, that so much arrogance, insults...irritate. And because we promise them anyway the extermination or the servitude, instead of this famous participation in our prosperity, for which the army at least tried to a certain extent to make them take, they risk everything, preferring to give still some knocks of shoulders, So as to be beaten, rather than to wait as sheep for the pleasant future which the R.F. promises them. . . I conclude that from it, as long as we shall not return to a more civilized, more human, more polite system towards them, the uprisings will be renewed in fixed periods.²²³

²²²Lyautéy in *Le Révérend*, 106. [Si alors on veut agir, il faudra que ce soit avec des forces écrasantes, comme en Tunisie; il est idiot de faire battre en détail de petites colonnes par un ennemi qui a sur nous l'avantage de la mobilité, de la tempérance, de la simplicité des convois, des intelligences dans le pays et surtout de l'entraînement, de la vigueur physique, du courage! et de l'enthousiasme.]

²²³*Ibid.*, 106-107. [Il y a dans le pays une agitation sourde indéniable. Du reste, comment l'Arabe ne serait-il pas exaspéré? Il n'est pas de jour où cette chose honteuse et infecte, qui est la presse algérienne, ne le vilipende, ne lui promette l'extermination, ne lui dénie tout sentiment d'honneur, de loyauté, toute intelligence, toute aptitude à quoi

This appears to be his earliest written comment about the care which he was to later demonstrate in handling the press, and about the need to show an ostentatious respect for his opponent.

Back to France (1882-1894)

Promoted to Captain, Lyautey returned to metropolitan France in October 1882. He was assigned to Bruyères (Vosges), then as aide-de-camp of General L'Hotte in Commercy then in Tours, where he resumed the writing of his journal. This time was for him, according to the terms of *Le Révérend*: “a black period of ten years”²²⁴ and of profound internal turnovers. He bitterly regretted the past years’ action, which seemed to him the ultimate solution of its agonies.²²⁵ In this provincial solitude, the celibacy of his thirty two years weighed him more, despite the comfort of his “home” of which “gets too fast free a big sadness, that to be alone, and the bitter space not to be able to make share to a friend, or better still to a friend, this sudden and too fast impression of warmth in the soul which in two we would fix so well.”²²⁶

que ce soit, ne lui annonce que la disparition et un pseudo-esclavage sont le vrai but. . . Tous ces journaux sont entre les mains des Arabes, que tant d’arrogance, d’insultes...exaspèrent. Et puisqu’on leur promet de toute façon l’extermination ou la servitude, au lieu de cette fameuse participation à notre prospérité, que les militaires au moins cherchaient dans une certaine mesure à leur faire prendre, ils risquent tout, préférant donner encore quelques coups d’épaules, sauf à être battus, plutôt que d’attendre comme des moutons l’avenir aimable que la R.F. leur promet. . . j’en conclus que, tant que nous ne reviendrons pas à un système plus civilisé, plus humain, plus poli à leur égard, les insurrections se renouvelleront à époques fixes.]

²²⁴Le Révérend, 143. [. . . une période noire de dix années.]

²²⁵Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 150.

²²⁶Lyautey, *Journal de Tours*, in *Le Révérend*, 161-162. [. . . de cette sensation confortable se dégage trop vite une grande tristesse, celle d’être seul, et le vide amer de

He had the opportunity to undertake some journeys, which influenced his ideas on religion and policy. After a quick sojourn to Austria to visit the Count of Chambord,²²⁷ he stayed in Italy from February till May 1883 to draft an account of the Italian cavalry, and in Rome from 20 March until 16 April. He took advantage of this trip to be received in private audience by Pope Leo XII, who told him his ideas concerning Catholic reconciliation with the French Republic. These ideas destroyed some of Lyautey's illusions. In 1893, for his own leisure he made another two month trip through Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Turkey followed by Greece and Italy.

From a political point of view, the hope of the restoration a legitimist monarchic power progressively disappeared in France, with the death without heir of the Count of Chambord in 1883, and the law of exile of the Princes, voted in of 1886.²²⁸ By 1891 Lyautey eventually gave up his royalist convictions as he stated in a letter to Léon de La Brière: "I so much loved King that I bleed not to dare any more to say to me royalist, and really I do not dare it anymore."²²⁹

ne pouvoir faire partager à un ami, ou mieux encore à l'amie, cette subite et trop rapide impression de chaud à l'âme qu'à deux on fixerait si bien.]

²²⁷Henri-Charles-Ferdinand-Marie Dieudonné d'Artois, Count of Chambord (1820-1883) was the posthumous son of the assassinated Charles-Ferdinand, Duke of Berry, and grandson of King Charles X. He was the last heir of the elder branch of the Bourbons. As "Henry V," he pretended to the French throne from 1830, as he was forced to flee from France, when his cousin Louis-Philippe seized the throne. He spent most of his young life in Austria, where he ended his life as well.

²²⁸By the law of 23 June 1886, the pretenders to the throne of France and their lineal heirs were banished from the national territory, the access the public offices and to the army was forbidden them.

²²⁹Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 177. [J'ai tant aimé le Roi qu'il me saigne de ne plus oser me dire royaliste, et vraiment je ne l'ose plus.] Note: Léon de la Brière (1845-1899) was a royalist writer, a former papal Zouave, an outgoing sub-prefect in 1876, and an

On the spiritual plane, Lyautey was overcome by doubt. He gradually lost his Catholic faith despite a desperate struggle he described to one of his friends in a letter on 5 September 1884: “I wait for nothing more of the books, I wait for a return of blind faith, the one who blocks eyes, there cannot be others.”²³⁰ He even threw off the ideas of his youth about social Catholicism and blamed de Mun who was accused to have “absolutely falsified our spirit and sent on a false way, which is as a matter of fact a simple dead end.”²³¹ Of social Catholicism, which he found at that time too conservative and stiff, he kept only the interest of the human being: its social character. This was evidenced afterward in his papers, as in his desire to develop human being or at least to improve their condition.

The Parisian Life (December 1887-March 1893)

In December 1887, Lyautey was assigned to the 4th Chasseurs, in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, near Paris. This new garrison gave him the opportunity to resume a brilliant social life he missed so much, and changed his destiny. Through old family friends from Nancy, Mr. and Mrs. de Guerle, he gained knowledge of Eugène Melchior de Vogüé, a successful writer, who introduced him “into the intellectual, bourgeois and aristocratic

opponent of Mac-Mahon. Note: Patrice de Mac-Mahon (1808-1893) was Marshal of France, and the first elected president of the third Republic.

²³⁰Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 151. [Je n’attends plus rien des livres, j’attends un retour de foi aveugle, celle qui bouche les yeux, il ne peut y en avoir d’autres.]

²³¹Lyautey, *Journal de Tours*, in *Le Révérend*, 165. [De Mun nous a absolument faussés l’esprit et lancés sur une voie fausse, qui est en somme une simple impasse.] Lyautey later reconciled with de Mun, who became one of the political supporters of the colonial policy.

environment, of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, where fermented the new ideas.”²³²

Attending the Parisian literary salons during three years, he got loose gradually from traditional conceptions inherited from his family and understood "the necessity of allying the progress to the tradition.”²³³ Fascinated above all by social questions, he went definitively away from politics and from religion and defined himself as “a social [man]”²³⁴ in a letter to Paul Desjardins on 15 November 1892.

This personal evolution and further circumstances offered him a desired but unexpected fame. Facing the German threat, the national service was widened to be universal in 1899.²³⁵ At the request of his friend Vogüé, who was thinking about the consequences of this law, Lyautey drafted an article on this very subject and on the inherent reforms to be adopted. But instead of being used as a pattern to a publication of Vogüé, this one convinced Lyautey to publish his original article, under the cover of anonymity, in his newspaper, *La Revue des Deux Mondes. Du Rôle social de l'officier dans le service national universel*, [On the Social Role of the Officer in the universal

²³²Le Révérend, 145. [. . . dans le milieu intellectuel, bourgeois et aristocratique, de la *Revue des Deux Mondes*, où fermentent les idées nouvelles.]

²³³Ibid., 145. [. . . la nécessité d’allier le progrès à la tradition.]

²³⁴Lyautey, in Le Révérend, 183. [Je suis un social]. Note: Paul Desjardins, after the foundation of the *Union pour l'action morale* [Union for the moral action], proposed the management of his campaign to Lyautey. This one, conscious not to be an example, refused it and specified in the letter quoted above: “I am a social and not a morale: I have no right of being it.” [Je suis un social et pas un moral: je n’ai pas le droit de l’être.]

²³⁵The law of 18 July 1889 eliminated the drawing lots of the draftees quite as the possibility of finding (more often in fact: paying) a replacement, and fixed to three years the duration of the military service. This practice of the drawing lots among the single men, formalized by the Jourdan’s law of 1798, was inherited from the militias of the Middle-Ages.

national service] defended the idea of using the compulsory passage of young citizens in the army to give them a civic and social education to supplement their military training. The role of the officer was to pursue the education initiated at home then at school, not just to teach to them how to fight. It is a question of both “making of the army an effective tool in wartime and a ferment of national unity in peacetime.”²³⁶ The publication of the article in March 1891 made Lyautey famous at once, his anonymity being very quickly annihilated. This gave him new enemies, but also new friends and opened new doors to him. These new contacts were afterward to provide some precious support for his policy of personal communication and the promotion of his actions in Madagascar, Algeria and then Morocco.

The Colonial Experience

In 1894, another event definitively changed his life: Lyautey was appointed to the staff of the troops of Tonkin.²³⁷ The reasons for this posting continue to be disputed. For some, it is a question for some of a kind of late penalty for his article published in 1891 without authorization,²³⁸ for others an opportunity for those in high authority to forget about him through an overseas assignment.²³⁹ For others, this new assignment was made

²³⁶Le Révérend, 174. [. . . faire de l’armée un outil efficace en temps de guerre et un ferment d’unité nationale en temps de paix.]

²³⁷Since the treaty of Tien Tsin with China in 1887, the French Protectorate extends over the *Union Indo-Chinoise*, constituted by Cochin China, by Annam and by Tonkin, placed under the responsibility of a general resident. Laos became a Protectorate in 1897.

²³⁸Scham, 6-7.

²³⁹Le Révérend, 195; Maurois, 42. The Chief of Staff of the Army was General Boisdeffre, whom Lyautey knew as he met him during his first trip in Algeria in 1878.

on Lyautey's request, with various explanations: either because he tried to flee an intimate situation with Louise Baignères²⁴⁰ or because of the boredom of his successive provincial assignments to Gray (Haute-Saône) then to Meaux. All explanations are equally reasonable. His letters in 1894, published by Le Révérend, accredit the hypothesis of a request of Lyautey, as he evoked about "estrangement"²⁴¹ and about "resolution"²⁴² inside. Three years later, in a letter to Louise Baignères which appears as a late justification, he claimed he required this assignment because of her: "In such case, there is for the man only one thing to do, because only he has his life, go away and disappear."²⁴³

Whatever the reasons were, Lyautey met people there who changed his life by explaining to him the theory of the new colonial school and giving him the opportunity to experiment with these theories on a broad scale.

Tonkin under Lanessan and Gallieni

After a long cruise through the Suez Canal, "Lyautey arrived in Saigon in 1894. The French had already staked claim to most of Indochina: Cochin China had been a

²⁴⁰Louise Baignères, (1864-19??) was twenty four years old when she met Lyautey in 1889. He was a regular visitor to the Baignères' salon, in General-Foy's street, where frequented artists and famous writers. Lyautey made a commitment in a relation which led to a failure and not to a marriage, as she hoped for it. She never married. Their correspondence lasted from 1892 to 1934, with a long interruption between 1909 and 1932.

²⁴¹Lyautey in Le Révérend, 186. [. . . vous aider à oublier en m'éloignant.]

²⁴²Ibid., 189. [. . . résolution.]

²⁴³Ibid., 205. [En tel cas, il n'y a pour l'homme qu'une chose à faire, puisque seul il dispose de sa vie, s'en aller et disparaître.]

colony since 1862 and Annam a Protectorate since 1885. The governor-general, Jean-Marie de Lanessan, ruled these areas with a philosophy that he explained to Lyautey on a boat trip to Hanoi.”²⁴⁴

In every country there are existing frameworks. The great mistake for European people coming there as a conqueror, is to destroy these frameworks. Bereft of its armature, the country falls into anarchy. One must govern *with* the mandarin and not *against* the mandarin. The European cannot substitute himself numerically; but he can control. Therefore, don’t disturb any tradition, don’t change any custom. In every society there exists a ruling class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done. Enlist that class in our interests.²⁴⁵

This later became the basis of Lyautey’s policy. Lyautey always tried to keep the local elites in place, as long as they collaborated with the French authorities. In Madagascar, he reappointed Rabezavana, the previous *Hovas* governor after he surrendered.²⁴⁶ In Morocco, everything was always done in the name of the Sultan.

Lyautey was first the chief of staff of General Duchemin, in replacement for the previous incumbent who became ill. In Hanoi, he re-discovered the enjoyment of responsibilities and the concrete reality of the work, as demonstrated in a letter to his cousin Gustave Michelot on 6 January 1896.²⁴⁷ He also commented on his local circle of acquaintances: “all those whom I frequent here interest me, men of action, willingness, production, so far away from the dilettantes by whom I was saturated.”²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History*, vol.1. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 151.

²⁴⁵Maurois, 48.

²⁴⁶Teyssier, 183.

²⁴⁷Lyautey in Le Révérend, 198.

²⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 198. [Et puis, tous ceux que je fréquente ici m’intéressent, hommes d’action, de bonne volonté, de production, si loin des dilettantes dont j’étais saturé.]

Lyautey regretted the quick departure of Lanessan, from whom he had so fast learned of the necessity of politico-military cooperation.²⁴⁹ Observing Lanessan's efficient working relationship with General Duchemin and Colonel Gallieni, Lyautey doubtless determined, beyond the political fitness of the protagonists, the necessary unity of effort to achieve any work. In Algeria then in Morocco, he was to make things even simpler by asking to have all the civil and military administrations under his orders.

By that period, the French had managed to pacify most of the southern areas and most of the Tonkin Delta, but their rule did not include the northern province of Tonkin, ceded by China to France by the treaty of Tien Tsin. These provinces were declared "military territories" and administered by senior French officers. One of these officers was Colonel Gallieni, whose style and philosophy of action had a profound influence on Lyautey. Their friendship was profound and long-lasting.²⁵⁰ Lyautey's first impressions of the one who would become later his future chief and his work were excellent. He portrayed Gallieni in eloquent words:

He is of those to whom I would hang on with most enjoyment: it is a dream to work with a man of this tempering, anti formal, accessible to any wide and general idea and absolutely exempt from prejudices of narrow minded of junior non-commissioned officer and from barracks spirit. I estimate nicely that the general adds me to him for this inspection of the 2nd territory that he [Gallieni] organized with a method so sure and so effective.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹Ibid., 200.

²⁵⁰When he came back from Madagascar, Lyautey spent some days in Gallieni's house, in Saint Raphaël (Var) as stated by a letter he wrote to Paul Desjardins on 26 March 1900, in *Le Réverend*, 214. He visited him again during two days in July 1908, according to a letter to his sister on 1 July 1905, in *Vers le Maroc*, 219. Finally, Lyautey dedicated *The Letters of Tonkin and Madagascar* to his mentor.

²⁵¹Lyautey in *Le Réverend*, 200. [Il est de ceux auxquels je m'accrocherais avec le plus de joie: c'est un rêve de travailler avec un homme de cette trempe, anti formaliste,

Lyautey succeeded in being assigned under the Colonel Gallieni. The latter quickly explained to him his doctrine of civilizing conquest. “To this military work, colonel Gallieni unites a simultaneous work of organization, roads, telegraph, market, European and native concessions, so that with the pacification move, as an oily mark, a big strip of civilization.”²⁵² With him, Lyautey learned how to seize, secure, administer and develop areas previously under enemy control or threat. The principles of his doctrine concentrated on the well being of the local population, providing them with security in their everyday life, and administering their affairs with understanding, respect and generosity.²⁵³ All these elements Lyautey used later.

Madagascar under Gallieni²⁵⁴

At the request of Gallieni, named *résident général* in Madagascar, Lyautey joined him in January 1897. Under his orders, he pacified the northwest of the island, again testing and implementing the ideas of his chief. Lyautey improved the idea of penetration

accessible à toute idée large et générale et absolument exempt de préjugés de caporalisme et de caserne. J’apprécie joliment que le général m’adjoigne à lui pour cette inspection du 2^{ème} territoire, qu’il a organisé avec une méthode si sûre et si efficace.]

²⁵²Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, 112-113. [A ce travail militaire, le colonel Gallieni unit un travail simultané d’organisation, routes, télégraphe, marché, concessions européennes et indigènes, de sorte qu’avec la pacification avance, comme une tache d’huile, une grande bande de civilisation.]

²⁵³Scham, 8.

²⁵⁴For further details, see Marc Conruyt, “The Pacification Campaign of Madagascar (1896-1905)” (Thesis, Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, 2002); Edward F. Knight, *Madagascar in War Time* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896).

by progressing like an oil stain.²⁵⁵ This method gave impressive results, as he described in one of his letter on 9 September 1897: “For months, my days, my nights are used to bring back inch by inch the life into the region which separates in the North Tananarive of the sea, to return to the business the road of Majunga. I established a ‘city’ which is called Ankazobé, where there was no cabin up when I entered it and where today there is more than one hundred, with a market of 1,200 persons.”²⁵⁶

But the results were still did not reach his expectations, as he explained it to his friend Max Lazard on 26 March 1898:

Here, I get tipsy on action; it is not worth that of Tonkin; Gallieni is always Gallieni, but I do not like the circle of acquaintances, which sees small and makes smaller. It will take out of this a very good material work, a cleansed country and a rudiment of organization. But I would have better wanted, I would have wanted that the unhopd-for chance of a lifetime which brought here my chief made it bring out a doctrine, a proclaimed and formulated colonial method, and a staff. It would have been necessary for this to gather around him more serious and better prepared group; they are kids. I had conceived, in brief, of very big, very vast and distant expectations on what would go out from here, with very big and general consequences. I am afraid that this will not occur.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵Teyssier, 186.

²⁵⁶Lyautey in Le Révérend, 207. [Depuis des mois, mes jours, mes nuits se passent à reconquérir pied à pied à la vie la région qui sépare au nord Tananarive de la mer, à rendre au commerce la route de Majunga. J’ai fondé une «ville» qui s’appelle Ankazobé, où il n’y avait pas une case debout le jour où j’y suis entré et où aujourd’hui il y en a plus de cent, avec un marché de 1.200 personnes.]

²⁵⁷Lyautey, In Le Révérend, 211-212 [Ici, je me grise d’action; elle ne vaut pas celle du Tonkin; Gallieni est toujours Gallieni, mais je n’aime pas l’entourage, qui voit petit et qui rapetisse. Il sortira de ceci une très bonne œuvre matérielle, un pays purifié et un rudiment d’organisation. Mais j’aurais voulu mieux, j’aurais voulu que l’aubaine inespérée qui a amené ici mon chef en fît sortir une doctrine, une méthode coloniale proclamée et formulée, et un personnel... J’avais conçu, en un mot, de très grandes, de très vastes et lointaines espérances sur ce qui sortirait d’ici, avec de très grosses et générales conséquences. Je crains que cela ne soit pas.]

Following this experience, Lyautey became more famous among the colonial circle and was ready to follow his own path. He gathered his experience and ideas in an essay, published in 1900: *Du Rôle Colonial de l'Armée*²⁵⁸ in which he explained the particular role he saw for the Army in the colonies. It was followed three years later by a technical book on his action in Madagascar: *Dans le Sud de Madagascar. Pénétration militaire. Situation Politique et Économique (1900-1902)*. Despite Lyautey paid tribute to his master, Gallieni, in this two books and later, the student started to perform better than his teacher.

Algeria (again) under Jonnart, on the
Algerian-Moroccan Border

In July 1902, Lyautey was appointed as commander of the 14th Hussars Regiment, stationed in Alençon. During fifteen months, he despaired again, until the events of Algeria allowed him to escape.

I am tormented by unemployment. In this dead town, where no idea is exchanged, without companion, I rack brains for absolutely nothing. The command of a poor small regiment occupies hardly a few hours a day, and, the rest of the time, I turn as a bear in a cage, imploring some light, an activity, a work to do, some food in all that I feel bubbling in me of sap, youth, still, of thirst of direct, concrete, specific action...who will open me this prison?²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸The title of this article, then turned into a book, is close to the title of his previous: *Du Rôle Social de l'Officier*, which gave him instant fame. This title is intended to leave no doubt on the author's name.

²⁵⁹Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 231. [Je me ronge d'inemploi. Dans cette petite ville morte, où pas une idée n'est échangée, sans compagnon, je me bats les flancs en pure perte. Le commandement d'un pauvre petit régiment occupe à peine quelques heures par jour, et, le reste du temps, je tourne comme un ours en cage, implorant de la lumière, de l'activité, une œuvre à faire, un aliment quelconque à tout ce que je sens bouillonner en moi de sève, de jeunesse, encore, de soif d'action directe, concrète, précise. . . qui m'ouvrira cette prison?]

Presented to Charles Jonnart,²⁶⁰ general governor of Algeria, he explained him his colonial theses. In September 1903, after the battle of El Mounzar,²⁶¹ Jonnart made him appointed as commander of the Aïn Sefra subdivision,²⁶² on the border with Morocco, to restore the situation.²⁶³ He obtained emergency powers for accomplishing his task. As André Le Révérend summarized it, the situation there was complex: “The border to be watched is so badly drawn since 1845 that it leaves the Algerian populations and the roads unprotected. The purpose of Lyautey consists in fixing it to the Moulaya, the only natural barrier, reached by Bugeaud²⁶⁴ in 1844, and he will reach this goal.”²⁶⁵

²⁶⁰Charles Jonnart (1857-1927) was elected to the Chamber of Deputies at the age of thirty two, became minister of the Public Works being thirty five-year-old then Senator at thirty-seven. He was appointed governor general of Algeria in 1900. He met Lyautey in 1903 and made him appointed in Aïn Sefra to save the situation. He always covered Lyautey from 1903 to 1910 in the most difficult affairs.

²⁶¹In 1903, the attacks of the nomad tribes from South of Oran intensified in Algeria. On 31 May, even the governor general himself, Charles Jonnart, was attacked during one of his tours. At the end of August, the Berabers’ tribe failed in seizing the Taghit’s post and imposed it to take a revenge for saving its honor. On 2 September, they attacked a supply convoy of more than one thousand dromedaries, protected by a mixed detachment of Legionaries and Spahis. The attack was repelled with heavy losses (36 killed in action and 47 wounded) and provoked a reaction of the governor general, who asked for Lyautey’s appointment as chief of the local military forces.

²⁶²The Aïn Sefra subdivision was located to the South of the Oran division, along the Moroccan border.

²⁶³Pierre Lyautey, in Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 5-6.

²⁶⁴Thomas Robert Bugeaud (1784-1849), Marshal of France and duke of Isly, was appointed governor of Algeria from 1840 to 1847. He put an end to the uprising of Abd el Khader and achieved a work of colonization, by employing the military manpower at his disposal for work of construction. His motto was: *Ense et aratro* [by the sword and the plow]. He also won the battle of Isly over the Moroccans.

²⁶⁵Le Révérend, 220. [La frontière à surveiller est si mal tracée depuis 1845 qu’elle laisse à découvert les populations algériennes et les voies de communication. Le

The secret intention of Lyautey was to take advantage of the weakness of the Sultan and of the pretext of the raids led by the rebel nomadic tribes to conquer gradually Morocco from the Algerian border. He dreamt of establishing a Protectorate on Morocco, what would be the ideal solution to protect the Algerian border definitively. He envisaged a slow penetration relying on direct agreements with tribes and on progressive setting of military posts. But he collided with much opposition. Certain French members of parliament, grouped around Jaurès,²⁶⁶ were unfavorable to any military action of retaliation to the raids launched from Morocco and made the government hesitate. The diplomats of the Quai d'Orsay and Tangier established a negotiated solution with sultan Abd el Aziz. Finally, the German and Spanish governments were opposed to the installation of French posts in Morocco, as being in flagrant contradiction with the 1906 agreements of Tangier. Lyautey described this complicate situation in a letter to Albert de Mun on 29 April 1909:

Here, it becomes pathetic. We are lashed, restricted to the point not to be able to replicate to the provocations anymore, not to spread the slightest attacks anymore. . . . More and more restrictive instructions succeed one to the other. The troops are immobilized in the posts. . . . The evil is in Tangier, in Fes, in the *Quai d'Orsay* [French State Department], it's all one, where they live in the slowness, the utopia, in the conception of theoretic Morocco, strong Makhzen, which does not exist.²⁶⁷

but de Lyautey consiste à la fixer sur la Moulaya, seule barrière naturelle, atteinte par Bugeaud en 1844, et il y parviendra.]

²⁶⁶Jean Jaurès (1859-1914), professor of philosophy and journalist, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1893, then served without interruption from 1902 until he was murdered. He participated to the foundation of the French Socialist Party in 1902 then to the foundation of its newspaper, the *Humanité* in 1904. Pacifist, he tried vainly to oppose to the First World War.

²⁶⁷Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 240-241. [Ici, cela devient pitoyable. Nous sommes ligotés, férulés, au point de ne plus pouvoir répondre aux provocations, de ne plus écarter

Facing these difficulties with the French government, Lyautey benefited however from the constant support of the governor general of Algeria Jonnart, as shows in some of his letters, like the one he wrote to his sister on 3 October 1903: “My support is obviously the governor.”²⁶⁸

Later, in 1908, he was appointed, by means of skill and of intrigue with the support of the Colonial Party, to the post which he made create for him: High Commissioner of France for the Moroccan-Algerian borders. The difficulties persisted:

On order, we wade in a ridiculous posture there. I am lashed by rough and contradictory orders. There is no agreement between the diverse concerned ministries, and I have on this question the most beautiful concrete case of governmental anarchy. On the spot, I report personally on very simple and effective measures to be taken, and every time I want to take one I am reminded to my order.²⁶⁹

This situation certainly influenced his ideas on the necessary unity of command and action. However, through the negotiation and the palaver with the chiefs of tribes, as through the military action against bands of marauders, he embodied French strength which protected tracks, caravans and water sources. The peace returned, the business

les moindres agressions . . . Les instructions de plus en plus restrictives se succèdent. Les troupes sont immobilisées dans les postes . . . Le mal est à Tanger, à Fez, au quai d’Orsay, c’est tout un, où l’on vit dans l’inertie, l’utopie, dans la conception d’un Maroc théorique, d’un Makhzen fort, qui n’existe pas.]

²⁶⁸Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 6-7. [Mon point d’appui est évidemment le gouverneur.]

²⁶⁹Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 235. Note: In this letter, Lyautey referred to the difficulties he had in dealing with Clemenceau’s government, until he succeeded to convince Clemenceau when they met in Paris in 1908. [Par ordre, nous y pataugeons dans une posture ridicule. Je suis ligoté par des ordres brutaux et contradictoires. Il n’y a aucune entente entre les divers ministères que cela regarde, et j’ai sur cette question le plus beau cas concret d’anarchie gouvernementale. Sur place, je rends compte en personne des mesures à prendre, fort simples et efficaces, et à chaque fois que je veux en prendre une je suis rappelé à l’ordre.]

started again, Lyautey saw the success of his method. But there was still the rest of Morocco to conquer, and as other actions began without him in the west near Casablanca, Lyautey felt worthless and thought again of resigning, using the pretext of the previous difficulties. “Paris will never have wanted to understand which simple, effective, French, fast and definitive job we would make here with the united action, the freedom of movement, a clear-cut and well assured situation. Now that I realized our program until the Moulaya, I acquired the right to cross the hand.”²⁷⁰

Morocco in 1907 and 1908

In 1907, Lyautey went to Rabat on order of the French government for an extraordinary diplomatic mission in September with Eugène Regnault, then French Minister to Fez, and to inspect the expeditionary force of General Drude, which landed in Casablanca and encountered difficulties achieving its mission. He returned there in 1908, to inspect the force of General d’Amade. During this second troop’s inspection, he took the initiative to seize part of the Chaouïa region and the town of Settat, in order to protect the town of Casablanca, presenting the government with another *fait accompli*. These two missions gave him the opportunity to assess the real situation of the Moroccan government, the weakness of the Sultan and the quick progresses of the penetration in Morocco from the western seashore.

²⁷⁰Lyautey in Le Révérend, 244. [Paris n’aura jamais voulu comprendre quelle besogne simple, efficace, française, rapide et définitive on ferait par ici avec l’unité d’action, la liberté de mouvement, une situation nette et bien assurée. Maintenant que j’ai réalisé notre programme jusqu’à la Moulaya, j’ai acquis le droit de passer la main.]

Sub Conclusion: A Key Element

Lyautey's military experience is essential to understand his doctrine of pacification and the principles he used in Morocco. Disappointed by the garrison life in small French cities, he discovered alternatives to it. The first one was the Parisian intellectual life which offered him his first fame and some troubles as well, when he published *Du Rôle social de l'Officier*. The colonial life then seemed far more desirable to him and gave him the opportunity to quench his thirst for action. Altogether, his overseas deployments led him to some observations on what should or should not be done, when dealing with local population, and put him in contact with a theory established by people he appreciated. He improved their theory progressively, throughout his military career, and turned it theory in a coherent doctrine.

But this military experience is not enough to explain the ideas of Lyautey. They were also prepared by various influences which combined with his military career to achieve a unique design.

CHAPTER 5

VARIOUS INFLUENCES

Lyautey's doctrine also came from other influences, which must be found in his personal life, and mixed with his military experience (See Appendix C: Pattern of influences on Lyautey). His family, his social environment, his Catholic faith had a great influence on his career as well as on his philosophical orientation and shaped his character. These social origins also facilitated his connection with the intellectual and military elites, who held great influence on the evolution of his ideas and career. It is, for instance, impossible to understand why the oil drops theory is focused on the local population and the importance Lyautey gave to people, if one ignores the influence of the social Catholicism in his life, then his interest for social problems. All these influences combined with his military experiences for achieving a unique result and an original doctrine.

Familial, Political and Religious Background

The first determining influence for Lyautey was obviously the family within which he grew up and which educated him, passing on to him its Christian values and his first political beliefs.

Conservative and Royalist Family

Lyautey's first political opinions were determined by his family, as well as a taste for public service and personal ambition. Lyautey was born on 17 November 1854, in Nancy, and was named after his paternal grandfather.²⁷¹ Although his grandfather was

²⁷¹Cenci and Koch, 4.

general of the first Empire, Lyautey was raised in an upper-class family of Royalist and Legitimist traditions. Two of his great-uncles reached the rank of general as well.²⁷² At aged 14, he wrote a Legitimist confession of faith with his friend Antonin de Margerie. During his trip to Rome in 1883 he even made a detour to Görlitz, Austria, to meet the Count of Chambord, legitimate pretender to the throne of France. Despite the choice of an army career for serving his country, this family tradition²⁷³ probably influenced his lack of consideration for the Republic and its politics. In one of his letters to his father in 1881, he exploded and talked about Tunisia of the “flat-belly lying policy of the R.F.”²⁷⁴ [For *République Française*]. This lack of esteem applied also to certain senior officials of the Third Republic, with whose orders he took significant liberties, since he was confident of being right or to defend higher interests. Furthermore, his royalist background gave him, compared to some other French officers, no reservations in contributing to preserve and reinforce the Moroccan monarchy.

²⁷²Scham, 3.

²⁷³Many Catholic families remained wary of Republic and attached to the monarchy, until a toast in Bizerte in 1892 by Mgr. Lavigerie (1825-1892), archbishop of Algiers, who claimed the allegiance to the Republic. The law of separation of Church and State in 1905 did not call into question this rally, despite many problems and public unrest.

²⁷⁴Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 91. [. . . la politique à plat-ventre de la R.F.]

Catholicism and Mystic Influence

Lyautey was raised in a traditional Catholic family. Although he lost his faith later in early 1880,²⁷⁵ before a reconversion at the end of his life, this monotheistic education certainly promoted a better understanding of Islam that he discovered in Algeria, then Morocco. The faith his youth also led him to appreciate the theories of the social Catholicism, from which he just kept an interest for social problems during his period of agnosticism.

Lyautey had a deep faith throughout his youth. As a teenager, he had a kind of revelation on God's existence and experienced a "mystical night" in December 1871.²⁷⁶ He received most of his education in a Catholic high school in Nancy then in Dijon after the transfer of his father in 1864. Similarly, he prepared for the entrance exam to the military academy of Saint-Cyr at the Jesuits School of *rue des Postes* in Paris, which was by that time led by a Jesuit, Father du Lac.²⁷⁷ This influence of the Jesuits had effects on him during numerous years. One of his letters to his father showed it in 1882: "The officer [of the *Bureau Arabe* of Chellala] was taught by Jesuits: we smelt each other; half an hour later, we were fixed and the sympathy was complete; pupil of *Saint Clément de Vaugirard*, friend of all mine; nothing is worth such meetings, especially when for

²⁷⁵Various explanations have been given on the reasons why Lyautey lost his faith. Some pretends it was due to his political opinion, stronger than his faith, others even to a possible homosexuality.

²⁷⁶Teyssier, 50; Cenci and Koch, 6.

²⁷⁷Teyssier, 54.

months we were surrounded that of indifferent or unpleasant, at least hermetic people in all that we like.”²⁷⁸

Whilst studying in Saint-Cyr and at the Staff College, he made two retreats at the monastery of *la Grande Chartreuse*, in December 1875, then 1876 with his friend Prosper Keller. According to Le Révérend, he was tempted by the Cloister²⁷⁹ and left the monastery with great “trouble.”²⁸⁰ Some authors said he really had a religious vocation, others claimed he was more attracted by the institutional power of the Catholic Church rather than having a real religious vocation.²⁸¹

During a trip to Rome in 1883, he was received in private audience by with Pope Leo XIII and discovered, to his amazement, that the Pope supported the Republic and not the restoration of the previous monarchy. This might have been the beginning of his period of doubt which led him to a period of agnosticism.

Disabled Childhood and Family Background

An accident in his youth had a tremendous importance in forming his character and increased the influence of his family in the very first years of his education.

²⁷⁸Lyautey in Le Révérend, 130-131. [L’officier (du bureau arabe de Chellala) sort des Jésuites: nous nous sommes flairés; au bout d’une demi-heure, nous étions fixés et la sympathie était complète; élève de Saint Clément de Vaugirard, ami de tous les miens; rien ne vaut de telles rencontres, surtout quand depuis des mois on n’a été entouré que de gens indifférents ou antipathiques, tout au moins hermétiques à tout ce que nous adorons.]

²⁷⁹This is the title of first chapter of his book: “Les souffrances du Cyrard et la tentation du cloître” [The Sorrows of a Cyrard and the temptation to cloister (1874-1876)], Le Révérend, 25.

²⁸⁰Lyautey in Le Révérend, 33.

²⁸¹Teyssier, 53.

A Disabled Childhood

In May 1856, as he attended with his family a military parade held in Nancy in honor of the birth of the *Prince Impérial*, on the first floor of the mansion of his grandparents, he fell from the railing. His fall was cushioned by a passing cavalryman, but he received a spine injury. Professor Velpeau operated on him successfully but he was bedridden until he was seven years old and then had to wear a steel brace to fourteen. This youth accident prevented him from leading a normal childhood and had a deep influence on his future. Unable to participate in the normal physical activities of children his age, he developed a taste for reading and study which influenced him his entire life. Through reading, he escaped mentally from his bed by reading adventure novels and books of geography that gave him in advance a taste for travel and vast horizons he discovered as an adult. He trained hard to recover and become physically fit. But when he achieved that goal, he kept his previous habits and continued reading and studying his entire life, as shown by his letters²⁸² written during the voyage which led him to the Tonkin. Lyautey lost no opportunity to learn, whether by reading or through conversations with other travelers, who already knew the country they were about to visit.

He received also art instruction from his mother, and showed a particular talent for drawing, as evidenced by the geographical survey conducted during his first visit to

²⁸²Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1920), Vol 1.

Algeria, which earned him the congratulations of his superiors in 1881,²⁸³ or his original drawings that accompany the *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*.

He also kept from that spoiled childhood a somewhat homely taste, which led him to seek comfort, or at least to rebuild around him a familiar world. As he wrote to his father on 14 December 1880 about his first installation in Orléansville (Algeria): “If you could see me through the miles that separate us, you would not believe me beyond the seas: the same installation, the same ornaments, the same tables in a word the same framework.”²⁸⁴ His greatest concern during his assignment in Algiers was to find a house²⁸⁵ matching his taste to install its “home.”²⁸⁶

Finally, this ordeal gave him the occasion to exercise his determination, as he had to fight hard to overcome his disability and enjoy normal physical activities. This success certainly gave him a great self-confidence in his will.

Father's Influence

His father had not followed the family military tradition, but continued to serve his country, as an engineer of bridges and causeways. His subsequent assignments lead him with him and his family in Nancy and Dijon. This attentive father encouraged his son in his creative games, for example when he built entire miniature cities on a pile of sand

²⁸³Lyautey in Le Révérend, 84.

²⁸⁴Lyautey in Le Révérend, 76. [Si vous pouviez me voir à travers les lieues qui nous séparent, vous ne me croiriez pas au-delà des mers: la même installation, les mêmes bibelots, les mêmes tableaux, en un mot le même cadre.]

²⁸⁵Lyautey in Le Révérend, 95.

²⁸⁶As Lyautey called it himself, in English

in Crévic, property of his grandmother: “Encouraged by his father, he built imaginary railroads, houses, and bridges he plays the engineer, no less than military.”²⁸⁷ Later, as an adult, he realized larger projects, in Madagascar, Algeria and ultimately in Morocco where, with the help of Prost, he draw the plans of the major cities’ extension.

Useful Family Relations

Lyautey grew in a relatively privileged upper class family. Through his family, he gained access to numerous high-ranking personalities. As demonstrated by Le Révérend about his journey in Rome, in 1883 “the extent of his family relations opened him the most closed doors.”²⁸⁸ This remained true during the first part of his life. In Algiers, he visited Mgr Lavigerie, friend of his family.²⁸⁹ While he was in garrison in Saint Germain en Laye, he was for example invited by Mr de Guerle,²⁹⁰ friend of his family in Nancy, who introduced him to Vogüé. His cousin Cecile Michelot married to General Edmond Bichot, to whom Lyautey sent letters.²⁹¹ By the way, this general had been former commander in chief in Tonkin, then inspector of Marine troops in the War Ministry in 1895.

²⁸⁷Teyssier, 43. [Encouragé par son père, il édifie des chemins de fer, des maisons, des ponts imaginaires. Il joue à l’ingénieur, tout autant qu’au militaire.]

²⁸⁸Le Révérend, 143. [. . . l’étendue de ses relations familiales lui ouvrent les portes les plus fermées.]

²⁸⁹Lyautey in Le Révérend, 70. Note: Mgr Lavigerie was former bishop of Nancy (1863-1867) then archbishop of Algiers in 1867.

²⁹⁰Edmond de Guerle, former general paymaster in Nancy, invited Lyautey in his house in Le Pecq, a village close to the limits of Saint-Germain en Laye in 1888, where he met Vogüé. Le Révérend, 203.

²⁹¹Lyautey in Le Révérend, 199-201.

A Different Serviceman

Lyautey always considered himself as being different from his military companions. As mentioned previously, this difference appeared when he studied at Saint-Cyr and remained during his various affectations in province, where he was bored and even despaired. Contrary to many of his contemporaries, the preparation of the revenge against Germany, which defeated France during the 1870s war, did not interest him, or very little. He considered the next probable European war was madness and only praised definitively chooses the colonial action as he wrote in 1897:

The obnoxious routine of the life in the services in France had sterilized me during for twenty years and brought to doubt, for lack of penalty, communicative faculties of action that I believed to be in me. . . I found for three years a reason for being for my life. The war, which I did not understand under its purely destructive shape of Europe, had eventually revolted me against my uniform. In Tonkin and here, I saw and waged war under its only noble and fertile shape, the producing war of life.²⁹²

His opinion on the Dreyfus affair,²⁹³ which separated France in two clans pushed him further aside of his companions. He observed it from the colonies, and did not

²⁹²Ibid., 207. [L'odieuse routine de la vie militaire en France m'avait stérilisé pendant vingt ans durant et amené à douter, faute de sanction, des facultés d'action communicatives que je croyais être en moi. . . J'ai trouvé depuis trois ans une raison d'être à ma vie. La guerre, que je ne comprenais pas sous sa forme purement destructrice d'Europe, avait fini par me révolter contre mon uniforme. Au Tonkin et ici, j'ai vu et fait la guerre sous sa seule forme noble et féconde, la guerre productrice de vie.]

²⁹³The Dreyfus affair began on 1 November 1894, when *Le Figaro* revealed the arrest of an officer, suspected of espionage to the benefit of Germany. Accused wrongly, Captain Dreyfus was condemned the penal colony and deported, in Guyana. The partisans of Dreyfus, who considered him innocent, and his opponents, who kept to the interest of the country, gathered in two organizations: the Human Rights League and the League of the French Homeland. The public opinion divided and tore durably, sometimes within families. The affair lasted twelve years, until the rehabilitation of Dreyfus on 22 July 1906. It had huge political consequences, as it conducted to a full reorganization of the French political landscape.

understand it.²⁹⁴ He preached instead the national unity in front of the approaching danger, considering that this internal divide was doing nothing good but for Germany. He regretted the positions taken by the staff in this affair and was conscious of his differences of opinion.²⁹⁵ He asserted his difference and defined himself, far from the current existing divisions in the French population, due to the Dreyfus' affair, as a "professional colonial."²⁹⁶

So why did he stay in this Army? He obviously did not like his various metropolitan assignments and only appreciated his time in Paris or overseas. Various hypotheses, supported by Lyautey's letters, may be found. First, he had no personal fortune, so he had to work, as he liked his personal comfort, as previously mentioned. He mentioned this problem on a very off-handed manner in a letter on 19 November 1905 to Antonin de Margerie: "Ah! I assure you that my career, which created so the envy and the isolation, has hard backhands. I'm tired of it. If I had the slightest fortune, I would have twenty times retired."²⁹⁷ Marriage was for him an alternate solution, but only if the bride possessed a certain fortune, or, according to the French full of imagery expression,

²⁹⁴Lyautey in Le Révérend, 213.

²⁹⁵Ibid., 233. In this letter, Lyautey mentioned the consequences of the Dreyfus' affair. By that period, the Radical government was supported by the Freemasonry, and the War Minister established index cards on the Catholic officers, most of whom were taken out of consideration by the promotion board.

²⁹⁶Ibid., 215. [. . . Professionnel colonial]

²⁹⁷Ibid., 235. [Ah! Je t'assure qu'elle a de rudes revers ma carrière, qui crée ainsi l'envie et l'isolement. J'en ai soupé. Si j'avais la moindre galette, j'aurais pris ma retraite vingt fois.]

“sits on a bag” (of gold). It was one of criteria which he clearly indicated to his mother in 1881, when he asked for her help.²⁹⁸

This marriage came late, when he was already general and famous. His taste for action, his personal ambition and pride are the best hypothesis to explain why he finally never quitted.

A Personnel Ambition

Lyautey always had a certain ambition, which grew with his age. According to his confession, “My oldest mistress is the ambition of my fifteen years.”²⁹⁹ After his colonial successes, the ambition of Lyautey grew and he dreamt even about a national destiny. In 1911, he felt having the required capacities, without knowing how to find the opportunity:

Whereas I belong to the generation which holds reins, that I feel all the necessary power to handle them, that I believe to hold good methods and to be capable of piloting the boat, and that seals in a tunnel of a career without horizon, I suffer to bleed it of my impotence. I do not console that a grave circumstance of politics or war does not put me in posture to take the affairs in hand. I feel the life which passes, in the evening which comes, the boat which touches and I am lashed down in the hold.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸Ibid., 115.

²⁹⁹Lyautey in website of the Association Nationale Maréchal Lyautey, <http://www.lyautey.mosaiqueinformatique.fr/content/blogsection/1/57/> (accessed 4 March 2010). [Ma plus vieille maîtresse est l'ambition de mes quinze ans.]

³⁰⁰Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 244. [Tandis que je suis de la génération qui tient les rênes, que je me sens toute la puissance nécessaire pour les manier, que je crois détenir de bonnes méthodes et être en mesure de piloter la barque, et que calfeutre dans un tunnel d'une carrière sans horizon, je souffre à en saigner de mon impuissance. Je ne me console pas qu'une grave circonstance de politique ou de guerre ne me mette pas en posture de prendre les affaires en main. Je sens la vie qui passe, le soir qui vient, le bateau qui touche et je suis ligoté à fond de cale.]

This ambition was among others expressed by the repeated employment of the possessive pronouns: “my army, my generals, my administration, my work” and even “my persons killed” to evoke the military losses in his speeches, as exactly noted by Miège in his presentation preceding the 1995 edition of *Paroles d’action*.³⁰¹

This ambition is however broken twice, when Lyautey resigned his duty as War Minister in March 1917, then after his resignation in Morocco in September 1925. The writing relieved then partially the action may have been as justification, or to look after his wounded pride. Instructions joined by Lyautey to his speeches published in *Paroles d’Action* in 1927 contain on several occasions comments such as: “the facts demonstrated that the [my] conception which prevailed was appropriate.”³⁰²

Writings and Original Thoughts

Instead of being a regular well-disciplined Army career officer, Lyautey had particular traits and habits which could further explain the way he implemented his method in Morocco.

Learning Disobedience

One of Lyautey’s most original traits, especially for an officer, was his ability to disobey, if one considers this trait negatively; or in a more positive manner, to take the initiatives. He even lied to his chiefs or feigned obedience. So in Morocco, he did what he believed was justified and followed his particular designs.

³⁰¹Miège, preface to *Paroles d’Action*, 13. [mon armée, mes généraux, mon administration, mon œuvre] and [mes tués]

³⁰²Lyautey, *Paroles d’Action*, 160.

One of the most famous examples occurred when he was acting on the Algerian border and was ordered not to conquer a strategic place called Bechar. He instead created a post close to it and called it Colomb to deceive the politicians.³⁰³ Today, the place is still named Comb-Bechar to avoid confusion.

Learning disobedience began in Tonkin, where, under the direction of Colonel Gallieni, he learned how to find quick creative solutions to expand French influence and fix a situation as needed. The colonial administration either asked for an authorization, but the lack of response obtained in proper time led the responsible officer to take a decision, or it was informed later, and then systematically placed before a *fait accompli*, given the distance and communication difficulties.

Thus, when in 1925 Marshal Petain politely tried to explain his arrival in Morocco by claiming it was due to the orders he received, he continued, claiming to have obeyed orders during his whole life, thus deserving his marshal's baton. Lyautey replied bitterly that it has won the same distinction because he disobeyed during his whole life.³⁰⁴

Writing and Archiving

Lyautey's fame was certainly due to his ability to write and express his ideas. In a time when no other media than newspaper existed, he knew how to use them and how feed the debate in his favor.

Lyautey wrote prodigiously, either in his personal journal or letters in which he shared his thoughts, discoveries and actions to his friends and family. As already

³⁰³Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 14; Usborne, 68

³⁰⁴Cenci and Koch, 36.

mentioned his first public attempt, *Du Rôle Social de l'Officier*, was published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* on 15 March 1891 and gained him instantaneous fame. This first paper was followed by many others and books, which ultimately led him to join the *Académie Française*.

His first published journal was written for his relatives during his study tour in Algeria in 1878. Back in Algeria, he continued to write long letters and asked his two best friends to share his letters with each other. This network was expanded when he left France for Tonkin in October 1894. He wrote letters to a small selected circle of relatives and friends, who circulated these letters between them. According to Lyautey, these letters were spread out the initial circle of recipients and reached a wider audience,³⁰⁵ particularly the supporters of colonial expansion. As mentioned by his nephew Pierre Lyautey,³⁰⁶ these private letters to his friends were sometimes accompanied with additional notes on his action, doubtless intended for a more general distribution. Lyautey finally decided to publish these letters, starting in the 1920s. His nephew Pierre continued their gathering, sorting and publishing after the Marshal's death in 1934.

These letters allow the tracking of Lyautey's ideas, how they were developed, as he wrote almost everything that happened to him: incidents, discovery and even change of mood. They also give a perfect illustration of the cyclothymic temper of Lyautey, whose developments are intimately related to those of the weather. The bad weather depressed and physically affected him, while the heat and sun make him radiant: "I grind

³⁰⁵Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1920). Vol 1, préface.

³⁰⁶Pierre Lyautey in Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 5.

a little black, ten days ago when I wrote: the weather was gray and rainy and a little cool, yet I work according to the thermometer, and the mere tone of my letters can indicate what time is it: sun, 30°, steam bath, stove and enlightenment of nature, I see everything nice and pink but when the mercury drops even slightly, I saddens me.”³⁰⁷

What made the real difference was Lyautey’s habit of archiving his papers. As stated by his nephew Pierre, Lyautey kept a copy of everything. He was thus able to give material for publication, when the Colonial Party had some authors publishing material on their overseas experience, or when he started to work on his own legend after having left Morocco.

Some Original Points of View

Far from being a revolutionary disregarding the past, Lyautey tried to reconcile modernization and tradition. This was exactly what he achieved in Morocco, by modernizing the country while preserving her culture and traditions. This might be partially explicated by his family conservative political opinions, but this is not enough. Lyautey really praised continuity and smooth transition, as shows the letter in which he described the philosophy of his recently died friend Vogüé: “He realized the formula the most cherished by my spirit and my heart: the constant search for the conciliation between past and the future, between the tradition and the evolution, between the thought

³⁰⁷Lyautey in *Le Révérend*, 85. [Je broyais un peu de noir, il y a dix jours, quand je vous ai écrit: c’est qu’il faisait gris, pluie et un peu frais; or je tourne au thermomètre, et le simple ton de mes lettres peut vous indiquer quel temps il fait: soleil, 30°, bain de vapeur, étuve et illumination de la nature, je vois tout en beau et rose; dès que le mercure descend tant soit peu, je m’assombris.]

and the action, the doctrine of the ‘bridge’, which is dear to me among all and which is, moreover, so much opposed to all the current intransigencies.”³⁰⁸

The Inputs of a Curious and Learned Man

As already mentioned, due to his childhood disability, Lyautey loved to read and study. The methodical work on his general knowledge allowed him, as general resident in Morocco, to make sensible decisions for the development of the country in domains where the servicemen are traditionally little qualified, as the town planning or development of the economy.

On the General Knowledge

Lyautey always praised general knowledge and encouraged people to look out of their domain of expertise, as in a speech in Lyon on 29 February 1916: “The one who is only military is just a bad serviceman, the one who is only professor is just a bad professor, the one who is only industrial is just a bad industrialist. The complete man, the one who wants to perform his full fate and to deserve to lead men, in brief to be a chief, that one has to have his lanterns opened on all which honors of the humanity.”³⁰⁹

³⁰⁸Ibid., 242 [Il (Vogué) réalisait la formule la plus chère à mon esprit et à mon cœur: la recherche constante de la conciliation entre le passé et l’avenir, entre la tradition et l’évolution, entre la pensée et l’action, la doctrine du «pont», qui m’est chère entre toutes et qui est, d’ailleurs, si contraire à toutes les intransigeances actuelles.]

³⁰⁹Lyautey, *Paroles d’Action*, 213. [Celui qui n'est que militaire n'est qu'un mauvais militaire, celui qui n'est que professeur n'est qu'un mauvais professeur, celui qui n'est qu'industriel n'est qu'un mauvais industriel. L'homme complet, celui qui veut remplir sa pleine destinée et être digne de mener des hommes, être un chef en un mot, celui-là doit avoir ses lanternes ouvertes sur tout ce qui fait l'honneur de l'humanité.]

He put into practice these words all his life. He was encouraged in this way by General Béziat, who replaced General L' Hotte after his promotion to the rank of inspector of the cavalry. Lyautey reported his words in his personal diary, as he was consolidated by them in his own opinion: “the profession profits of the general knowledge.”³¹⁰

His vast culture had besides allowed him to be inspired by the other ideas and not to limit his insight to the colonial thinkers only. His ideas are close for example to theses developed in the *Prince* of Machiavelli, even if there is no real proof of this hypothesis. But the resemblances between the policy of Protectorate, of smooth penetration, of respect for the local institutions or use of force are striking when compared to Machiavelli's theory on how to conquer new provinces in “hereditary principedom”³¹¹ and the way to deal with populations in “mixed principedoms.”³¹²

The Knowledge of his Colonial Predecessors

Lyautey's action in Morocco benefited from the previous French colonial experience in other countries, and allowed him to avoid committing some mistakes. He knew the history of the colonization of Algeria, enlightened by his missions there. He also found some inspiration in the ongoing thinking about the colonial experience and

³¹⁰Lyautey, *Journal de Tours*, in Le Révérend, 157. [Le métier bénéfice de la culture générale.]

³¹¹Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translation by Thompson, Hill (Norwalk, Connecticut: Easton Press), 28: Of hereditary Principedom. Note: The Prince was completed in 1513 and first published in Italy in 1532, then translated and republished many times.

³¹²Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 30-31: Of mixed principedoms.

past French experiences. In his speeches and writings, he often paid tributes to some of his predecessors.

In a chronological order, the very first were the soldiers of the Roman Empire, who brought peace, development and prosperity to barbaric countries. Lyautey registered his action in the civilizing tradition of the “*pax romana*”³¹³ and referred to it on several occasions. In a speech in 1904, for instance, he compared the role of his troops to the action of the legions: “The officers who surround you this evening, they are all belonging to the new colonial military school. They resume the tradition of the Roman legionaries, city founders but always ready to walk to the enemy, tomorrow, as, they walked against him yesterday.”³¹⁴

Lyautey also paid tribute to the major figures of the colonial conquest which inspired his action, particularly to Marshal Bugeaud. The filiations of ideas are evident. Quite as Bugeaud, Lyautey refused the extensive use of the fortifications to occupy the terrain. He preferred the action of the light columns, capable of matching the natives’ speed of execution, and to exploit the results obtained by operations of development: “Bugeaud’s flying columns won a number of important tribal submissions, which the general hastened to exploit with constructive occupation: ‘The sword only prepared the way for the plough.’ A mere punitive column advancing into the desert ‘. . . left no more

³¹³Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc*, 253.

³¹⁴Lyautey, *Paroles d’Action*, 65. [Les officiers qui vous entourent ce soir, ils sont tous de la nouvelle école militaire coloniale. Ils renouent la tradition des légionnaires romains, fondateurs de villes mais toujours prêts à marcher à l’ennemi, demain, comme, ils y marchaient hier].

lasting effect than the wake of a ship in the sea.’³¹⁵ Lyautey also resumed the ideas of Bugeaud, on the value to the natives of a protection which would enable them to get rich, or on the purpose of the colonial war:

The war in Algeria can only have one object, colonization. Without that, what would this war be? It would be without end and without result, a tournament in which the discipline of the French infantry would be seen fighting against the mobility of the Arab cavalry. We must aim at a definite object, and end by founding a French province. . . We must found something which is vital and prolific. . . The cultivation of the country is of the first order of importance. . . We will build villages.

Lyautey referred as well to the action of General Lamoricière, for his clear-sightedness as the head of the first Arabic office in Algeria, for the respect which he always showed for his opponent and for his vision of the colonial conquest as described in a speech on 8 May 1910: “our officers of the Native Affairs pursue the rough and fertile work the first ranging-pole of which Lamoricière had planted in the modest office of Algiers. . . . Nobody had a higher and clearer conception of this pioneer role of the civilization than Lamoricière. . . . He fought the Arabic opponent--with a value you know--but he liked him and knew that there is no lasting conquest if he does not become attached to us.”³¹⁶

³¹⁵Asprey, 99.

³¹⁶Lyautey, *Paroles d’Action*, 83-84. [. . .nos officiers des Affaires indigènes poursuivent l’œuvre rude et féconde dont Lamoricière avait planté le premier jalon dans le modeste bureau d’Alger. . . Nul n’avait une conception plus haute et plus claire de ce rôle pionnier de la civilisation que Lamoricière. . . Il combattait l’adversaire arabe - avec quelle valeur, vous le savez - mais il l’aimait et savait qu’il n’y pas ici de conquête durable si on ne se l’attache.]

Even if there is no evidence about it, Lyautey could as well have found inspiration in the actions of General Faidherbe³¹⁷ when he conquered Senegal. His efforts were based on the triptych: peaceful conquest-administration-penetration. By respecting the faiths, the customs and the hierarchy of the local population in a spirit of moderation and equity, Faidherbe conquered gradually a vast territory and its inhabitants themselves. He recruited among the inhabitants and created the first companies of Senegalese infantrymen in 1857. His administrative system leaned on leaders of African canton, the local authorities, the traditional local elites, their courts and the common law.

Finally, Lyautey found his main source of inspiration among his previous chiefs, Lanessan and mainly Gallieni. The ideas of Lanessan, gathered in his book *Principes de colonisation* [Principles of colonization] certainly had an influence on Lyautey, as he stated himself in the *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*. But his main source of inspiration was definitely Gallieni, reason why he called him his “master”³¹⁸ and referred to the doctrine he used as “doctrine Gallieni.”³¹⁹ When he arrived in Tonkin in 1892, Gallieni himself might have been inspired by the methods of one his classmate at Saint

³¹⁷Louis Faidherbe (1818-1889) spent the largest part of his military career in the colonies, in Algeria then in Senegal. Appointed from 1854 to 1861 then from 1863 to 1865 as an administrator of Senegal, he laid the foundations for the future French West Africa, developed its economy and widened the French influence. Promoted general in 1863, he participated in the war of 1870 against Prussia. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, then Senator in 1879. He wrote numerous works of ethnography and geography on West Africa

³¹⁸Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, 95.

³¹⁹*Ibid.*, *Vers le Maroc*, 65.

Cyr: Colonel Théophile Daniel Pennequin.³²⁰ The latter used as much as possible the local tribes' rivalry and said that drawing the ethnographical map of a sector is having it already half pacified. Lyautey knew his methods and mentioned them several times in the *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, in association with the method of Gallieni. In his preface of the 1995 republishing of *Paroles d'Actions*, Professor Miège summarized thus the development of these ideas: "Pennequin invented, Gallieni applied, Lyautey imitated. And asserted."³²¹

The Clever Choice of Subordinates

Lyautey was not only an imitator. Acting on an vaster scale, in Indochina, in Madagascar, in Algeria then in Morocco, Lyautey used his previous experience for improving the doctrine of Gallieni. He cautiously chose subordinates who could help him; this demonstrated his ability as leader. Lyautey mentioned them on several occasions in his speeches or his letters papers and awarded them all the merit of his actions: "I am only for a very small part there; I had the good fortune to have a team of

³²⁰Teyssier, 160. Note: General Théophile Daniel Pennequin (1849-1916) was a French officer belonging to the Colonial Infantry, who achieved most of his career overseas in Madagascar, Guyana and mainly in Indochina. Original and nonconformist spirit, he proposed the creation in Indochina of a native army called "yellow force," which was worth to him the disapproval of the military authorities. For more details see his biography by Colonel Maurice Rives, the website of the Association Nationale des Anciens et Amis de l'Indochine et du Souvenir Indochinois: http://www.anai-asso.org/NET/document/mission_et_conquete/conquete/pennequin/index.htm accessed on 11 April 2010.

³²¹Miège, preface to *Paroles d'Action*, 20.

admirable co-workers whom you saw at work.”³²² In *Paroles d’actions*, he paid a particular tribute in four of his closest co-workers, who were with him from 1903: generals Henrys and Poeymirau and colonels Berriau and Delmas.³²³

For Professor Miège, it is the co-workers of Lyautey, illustrious or unknown, that were the real authors of the doctrine of pacification that Lyautey was embodying:

Thanks to them, by their action, by their teaching sometimes, and their papers sometimes, almost always establishes a “Moroccan corpus” of political and military practices that Lyautey, uses, illustrates, makes known by shock sentences. . .

Lyautey knew how to, by strong sentences, condense the expression. Many of these formulae are however awarded to him wrongly: “the oil drop” is of Gallieni, “to show strength not to use it” of d’Amade . . .³²⁴

The Attentive Study of the Territories to be Administered

Besides knowing how to choose effective subordinates, Lyautey took care to obtain as much as possible information on the territories where he had to act. It was for example the case of Indochina that he studied through the books of Joseph Chailley-Bert. When Lyautey published his book *Dans le Sud de Madagascar*, Chailley wrote a laudatory article on it in the newspaper *Journal des Débats* on 17 May 1903. Lyautey

³²²Lyautey, *Paroles d’Action*, 403. [Je n’y suis que pour une très faible part, j’ai eu la bonne fortune d’avoir une équipe de collaborateurs admirables que vous avez vus à l’œuvre.]

³²³Ibid., 310.

³²⁴Miège, preface to *Paroles d’Action*, 22. [Grâce à eux, par leur action, par leur enseignement parfois, et leurs écrits parfois, presque toujours se constitue un «corpus marocain» de pratiques politiques et militaires que Lyautey, utilise, illustre, fait connaître par des phrases choc. Lyautey sut, par des phrases fortes, en condenser l’expression. Beaucoup de ces formules lui sont cependant attribuées à tort: «la tache d’huile» est de Gallieni, «montrer sa force pour ne pas s’en servir» de d’Amade...] Note: The interest of professor Miège has to defend the memory of the co-workers of Lyautey could be explained by his filiations: he is the son of Émile Miège who created and managed the agronomic research institute in Morocco from 1918 to 1940.

thanked him in a letter in which he admitted the influence the reading of Chailley's work had on him: "Being sharply your pupil, you will judge if I am happy that the maitre gives me a good point."³²⁵

The reading did not constitute the only information source. Lyautey never lost an opportunity to discuss with travelers having crossed parts of the world that he did not know. The *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar* so report the time he took discussing, during its crossing towards Hanoi in 1892, with a certain number of interlocutors he considered interesting.³²⁶

Sub-Conclusion: Structuring Influences

Lyautey's military experiences were essential to explain his particular doctrine in Morocco, but they became a complement of a particular mindset and character formed throughout Lyautey's life. His Catholic faith prepared his attention for social problem and his focus on people, his disability forged his determination, his taste for studying and travelling, his family situation gave him some key for his future.

³²⁵Lyautey in Le Révérend, 229. [Etant nettement votre élève, vous jugerez si je suis heureux que le maitre me donne un bon point.]

³²⁶Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, vol. 1.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: A LIVING EXAMPLE?

Following this study, it appears that the work achieved while Lyautey was *résident général* in Morocco is impressive in both its magnitude and its diversity. Regardless of various appreciations intending to defend particular ideas, Lyautey deserves rightly to be regarded as the “builder of modern Morocco”³²⁷ and as a precursor of what is now called “state building.”³²⁸ He succeeded in pacifying the country while strengthening the authority of the Sultan. Far from conquering with raw strength alone, Lyautey acted as a statesman and ruled indirectly through the Sultan and his *Makhzen*. His actions facilitated the reform of Moroccan institutions, but fully respected the Muslim religion while allowing the simultaneous development of infrastructure and economy. This provided immediate and tangible benefits to the local population which was thus convinced that its reunification with the *Makhzen* was its best option.

Lyautey did not create the whole doctrine of pacification, and never claimed it as he recognized it having been inspired by other people, the most famous being General Gallieni. But Lyautey improved this doctrine, either by himself or with the help of some of his subordinates, and turned it into a coherent but flexible pattern, made of various simple principles and achieving long lasting results. Lyautey was certainly the best performer of pacification, Morocco being his considered as his masterpiece. His

³²⁷Teyssier, back cover. [. . . le constructeur du Maroc moderne.]

³²⁸Général Patrick Garreau, “Lyautey et le state building,” *Le Casoar*, N°90, Juillet 2008, 24-28.

communication skills made this masterpiece even more famous and attached his name to Moroccan history forever.

Lyautey's doctrine of pacification and peaceful penetration was the joint fruit of the progressive maturation of the French colonial thought during the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century and of Lyautey's own experience. The evolution of colonial theory preferred Protectorate and association to direct colonization and assimilation. The familial and military influences as well as his own life shaped Lyautey's mind and gave him the ability to combine various elements in a coherent scheme which he knew how to apply and promote better than anyone else.

The modernity of the ideas of Lyautey are worthy to consider him today as being a source of inspiration for the French Army, as much in term of doctrine as in term of ideas to follow on the ground. His name was chosen to be used as of the 2009-2010 promotions of the Joint Staff College.³²⁹ Lyautey is also quoted in the two new Field Manuals recently published by the French land forces. FT-01 contains several extracts of the *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*,³³⁰ FT-02 encloses a quote and an example of Lyautey's actions in Morocco.³³¹

³²⁹Jean Dominique Merchet, "Une promotion Lyautey au Collège interarmées de défense." <http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2009/10/une-promotion-lyautey-au-coll%C3%A8ge-interarm%C3%A9es-de-d%C3%A9fense.html>. (Accessed on 26 April 2010).

³³⁰FT-01, *Gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix*, Centre de doctrine et d'emploi des forces, Paris, January 2007, 45.

³³¹FT-02, *Tactique générale*, Centre de doctrine et d'emploi des forces, Paris, July 2008, 17.

These ideas of moderate use of the military strength, of respect for the populations, of united action, of combined employment of the military force and the economic development still inspire the action of the units operating in Afghanistan. The method of “oil drop” was recently used again in Afghanistan, by General Pierre de Villiers. This officer possesses, among others, a recent Afghan experience as he was chief of the Regional Command-Center in 2006-2007, and implemented the policy of the “oil stain,” which gained widespread acceptance since.”³³² At tactical level, this method seems to achieve better results than the use of raw kinetic strength.³³³ Outside of the French Army, the “focused district development program” in Afghanistan, or the “clear, hold, build” concepts for counter-insurgency are very similar to the oil drop theory that Lyautey supported.

As relevant as it is, this doctrine, or this set of principles, does not at all constitute an ideal solution to be reproduced anywhere in its entirety. As Lyautey claimed, the actions must be adapted to the local situation. It is necessary to remind that Lyautey always opposed himself to the mechanical reproduction of plans. Time flew and values evolved, what was approved or admitted yesterday must be understood in a particular historical context and be adapted to today’s situation. For those who see it as the ultimate solution for the conflict in Afghanistan, despite some similarities, significant differences between the situation of Morocco then and that of Afghanistan today must be evoked. Lyautey was *résident général* in Morocco for almost thirteen years and was almost

³³²According to the journalist Jean-Marc Tanguy in a post called, “CEMP: en courte finale,” <http://lemamouth.blogspot.com/> (accessed 18 February 2010).

³³³Adrien Jaulmes, “Le 2ème REP pacifie la vallée de Tagab,” *Le Figaro*, 25 April 2010, 2.

omnipotent. So he had time for acting in depth and was not under pressure. It must be mentioned again that he had politicians to support his action, in France. But he did not have to cope with international public opinions or any similar type of pressure. The strategic situation was also different. The bordering territories were either a desert or under Spanish or French control, but had no real interferences in the pacification operations. Lyautey had the benefit of a complete unity of effort, as every administration, either military or civilian, fell under his authority. There was no ideological or religious ideology supporting the dissidents, who were never united under a centralized leader. The Sultan remained still in place, he was commander of the faithful, and prayers were made for him every Friday, thus avoiding any attempt of *jihad*. Finally, the *résident général* and his administration were officially there only to give some advices to the Sultan and his ministers.

GLOSSARY

Aman (Arabic). Protection granted by a victorious power to a defeated enemy. Under Lyautey, *aman* ceremonies were ritualized signified the passage of a tribe from dissidence to obedience to the Sultan.

Askhar (Arabic). Moroccan regular soldier.

Bled (Arabic) Country or area.

Dahir (Arabic) Decree of the Sultan.

Goum (French). Coming from the Arabic *qawm*, a small irregular unit, composed mostly of native Moroccans soldiers, often under the command of French officers.

Gandoura (Arabic) Traditional horsemen mantle.

Harka, *mahla* (Arabic). A local gathering of native troops, forming a various size army, either friendly

Jihad (Arabic) Holy war against non Muslim people.

Makhzen (Arabic). Official title of the Moroccan government and its administration, including police agents called *mokhzanis*. By extension, an area under the control of the Sultan, or *bled Makhzen*

Oulemas (Arabic) Council of the wise men.

Métropole (French). France's mainland in Europe, by opposition to overseas possession. Adjective *métropolitain* comes from this word.

Résident général (French). In a country of Protectorate, the official representative of the French government, responsible for the implementation of the agreements

Sharif (Arabic). A descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. The Sultan legitimacy depended upon his Sharifian lineage, hence the other name of Morocco: the *Sharifian Empire*.

Siba (Arabic). Anarchy or dissidence, by extension an area out of the control of the *Makzen*

Spahis (Arabic) Cavalrymen belonging to light units, equipped on the local manner.

Tirailleurs (French) Riflemen belonging to units recruited in French colonies or Protectorates, Algerian, Moroccan, Senegalese, Tonkinese or Tunisian.

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGICAL MARKS: THE WAY TO PROTECTORATE:

Various events ultimately concurred to the establishment of the French Protectorate on Morocco and deserve to be reminded here for a better understanding:

- 1880: The conference of Madrid widens the capitular advantages granted hitherto only to the French and English nationals, to all the European nationals in Morocco: preservation of the right of protection and tax exemptions for the nationals and the protégés of the foreign powers.
- 1894: After the death of Sultan Hassan 1st, his young son Abd el-Aziz is proclaimed Sultan of Morocco.
- 1901: Following various hostile incursions from Moroccan tribes in Algeria, France was authorized by the Sultan Abd el-Aziz through a written agreement signed in Paris to pacify the Algerian-Moroccan border.
- 8 April 1904: Signature of the treaty of Cordial Agreement between Great Britain and France. The treaty allowed among others the resolution of the disputes on Egypt and Morocco: Great-Britain received free hands to expand in Egypt and France in Morocco. Both countries recognized Spanish interests in Morocco and agreed on further diplomatic negotiations with this country.
- 31 March 1905: Visit of the Emperor Wilhelm II to Tangier. Enraged by the balance paid by Great Britain to France in Morocco, he held to make a spectacular landing to support the sovereignty of the Sultan.

- 16 January to 7 April 1906: An international conference in Algeciras (South of Spain) gathered representatives of thirteen countries³³⁴ having contradictory interests in Morocco. The participants confirmed the sovereignty and integrity of Morocco but gave to France and Spain the authorization to maintain order in Moroccan ports, open to international commerce. Germany recognized the particular interest of France in Morocco.
- July 1907: Insurgency in Casablanca against the construction of the new harbor. The French workers were besieged in the consulate until they were rescued by sailors of the *Galillée* on 5 August. During the following days, French troops landed and seized the port and neighboring lands or Chaouïa region, using a national very particular interpretation of the Algeciras agreement.
- 29 August 1907: Moulay-Hafid, younger brother of Sultan Abd-El-Aziz, was proclaimed Sultan by the *Oulemas*³³⁵ in Marrakech. Lyautey was sent as ambassador extraordinary in Rabat.
- November 1907: Morocco-Algeria border operations: The tribe of Beni-Snassen left Morocco and attacked French positions in Algeria. Lyautey received from Clémenceau the mission to pacify the region and obtained the surrender of the tribes in a fortnight.

³³⁴Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

³³⁵Traditionally, the Sultan was proclaimed by the *Oulemas* or council of the wise men of Fez and Marrakech respectively. The proclamation of Moulay-Hafid was a rebellion which further jeopardized his brother's authority.

- November 1908: Moulay Hafid was recognized Sultan of whole Morocco, replacing his brother Abd-El-Aziz who had resigned.
- April-May 1911: Fez was besieged by rebellious tribes; General Monier operated a rescue operation from Kenitra on the request of the Sultan Moulay Hafid³³⁶, than conquered Meknes. To protest against the French intervention in Fez, inconsistent with the Treaty of Algeciras, Germany sent the gunboat *Panther* in the harbor of Agadir on 1 July. An agreement was signed on 4 November: France received from Germany the freedom of action in Morocco in exchange for part of the Congo, adjacent to Cameroon.³³⁷
- 30 March 1912 Treaty of Fez, signed by Sultan Moulay-Hafid: creation of the Protectorate and subsequent rioting in Morocco. Lyautey was appointed first *résident général* of France in Morocco, landed in Casablanca in May and arrived in Fez on 27 May.
- 27 November 1912; French-Spanish agreement establishing the Spanish area of influence in Northern Morocco (See map in Appendix E figure 1).

³³⁶Usborne, 144

³³⁷Cameroon was by this time a German possession, since the agreements of 1884. In 1911, France gave up some of her territories of equatorial Africa to Germany. These territories, renamed *Neukamerun*. [New Cameroon] by the Germans was nicknamed “beak of Duck” by the French, as they gave access to the River Congo. France received in exchange a portion of German terrain near Lake Chad (See map of Cameroon, figure 4, appendix B). After the First World War, during which Cameroon was conquered by the French-British forces, the German colony was split into territories confided by mandates of League of Nations in 1922 to France for four fifth and the rest to Great Britain.

APPENDIX B
BIOGRAPHY OF LYAUTEY:


- 1854 17 November: Birth in Nancy of Hubert Lyautey.
- 1856 Spinal injury.
- 1858 Operation of the vertebral column
- 1872 After high school graduation, prepared the entry exam of Saint-Cyr in a
Jesuit College in Versailles
- 1873-1875 Attended the military academy and met Albert de Mun in 1874.
- 1876 Attended the Staff school in Paris.
- 1878 February-March: First trip to Algeria, related in a journal.
- 1878-1880 Second-Lieutenant in the 20th Regiment of *Chasseurs* in Rambouillet then
Châteaudun.
- 1880-1882 First Lieutenant in 2nd Hussars Regiment sent in Algeria. Wrote *Lettres
d'Algérie*.
- 1882 Promoted to Captain and assigned to the 4th Regiment of *Chasseurs* in
Bruyères (Vosges).
- 1883 Sent to Italy where he wrote a rapport on the Italian Cavalry. Met the
Comte de Chambord and Pope Leo XIII, visited Italy.
- 1883-1887 Aide de camp of General L'Hotte in Commercy then Tours. Wrote
Journal de Tours (1886).
- 1887 Appointed to the 4th Regiment of *Chasseurs* in Saint-Germain en Laye.
Attended the Parisian literary salons.

- 1891 15 March: Published an anonymous essay in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*:
“*Du Rôle Social de l’Officier dans le Service Militaire Universel.*”
- 1893 Promoted to Major and assigned to Gray (Haute-Saône). Travelled
through Germany and Eastern Europe. Appointed to Chief of Staff of the
7th Cavalry Division in Meaux.
- 1894 Assigned to Staff of Tonkin. Met Colonel Gallieni and soon became his
chief of Staff. Wrote *Lettres du Tonkin*.
- 1897 Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel. Joined Gallieni in Madagascar and
pacified the North West of the island. Wrote *Lettres de Madagascar*.
- 1900 Promoted to Colonel and published another essay: *Du Rôle Colonial de
l’Armée*. Appointed as commanding officer of the southern territories in
Madagascar he pacified in two years. Wrote: *Lettres du Sud de
Madagascar*.
- 1902 Appointed as commanding officer to the 14th Regiment of Hussars in
Alençon.
- 1903 Published a technical book: *Dans le Sud de Madagascar. Pénétration
militaire. Situation Politique et Economique (1900-1902)*. In October,
appointed as commanding officer of the Aïn Sefra territory and promoted
to Brigadier General. Wrote *Lettres du Sud Oranais*.
- 1907 Appointed to the command of the Division of Oran and promoted to Major
General. Inspection mission in Rabat. Wrote *Lettres de Rabat*.
- 1908 Second extraordinary mission to Morocco. Promoted to High
Commissioner of France for the Moroccan-Algerian borders.

- 1910 Promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned to Rennes.
- 1912 Appointed as first *résident general* in Morocco. Elected to the *Accadémie Française*.
- 1913 Official mission in Spain. Wrote *Voyage en Espagne*.
- 1916 Appointed to War Minister in December.
- 1917 Resigned from the War Minister and came back to Morocco.
- 1920 Published *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar* (Editions Armand Colin).
- 1921 Elevated to the distinction of Marshal of France. Published *Lettres d'Italie* (1893) on 15 February to 15 March and *Lettres de Rabat* (1907) on 15 July, both in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*.
- 1925 Resigned from his post of *résident general* and choose Thorey as his main residence.
- 1927 Published *Paroles d'Action* (Editions Colin).
- 1929 Appointed as High Commissioner to the Colonial Exhibition.
- 1931 Colonial Exhibition in Vincennes. Published *Lettres de Jeunesse (1883-1893)* (Editions Grasset)
- 1934 27 July: Death in Thorey.
- 1935 30 October: Inhumation in Rabat. Publication of *Lettres du Sud de Madagascar* (Editions Colin) and *Voyage en Espagne* in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* on 15 June.
- 1937 Publication of *Vers le Maroc: Lettres du Sud-Oranais* (Editions Colin)
- 1961 10 May: New inhumation in the *Invalides* (Paris).

APPENDIX C

PATTERN OF INFLUENCES ON LYAUTEY



APPENDIX D
ILLUSTRATIONS



Figure 1. Autographed photos by Lyautey to Henry de Bournazel
Source: Private collection of the Bournazel Family.



Figure 2. Autographed photos by Lyautey on 17 July 1926
Source: Private collection of Colonel Jean-Claude Bréjot.



Figure 3. Portrait of Lyautey by De Lazlo, photographed by Braun
Source: Cecil Vivian Usborne, *The Conquest of Morocco* (London: Stanley Paul & Co. Ltd., 1936), 2.




Figure 4. Lyautey during a surrender in 1906
Source: Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, Paroles d'action (Paris: Ed. Colin, 1927), 4.

MAPS




Figure 5. Map of Morocco

Source: William A. Hoisington Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), x-xi.




Figure 6. The stages of the French occupation in Morocco
 Source: Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, *Paroles d'action* (Paris: Ed. Colin, 1927), 158.




Figure 8. The northern front (April-July 1925)

Source: Moishe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco* (Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 132.

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