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8 April 1966

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN APPRAISAL

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JACK T. PINK

Lieutenant Colonel, Adjutant General's Corps



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Communist China's Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa:
An Appraisal

by

Lt Col Jack T. Pink
Adjutant General's Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	iv
CHAPTER 1. THE SETTING AND ITS DIVERSITY	1
Introduction	1
Area and Population	1
Western Influences.	3
Post-World War II	5
2. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND ITS PATTERN	6
Mao's Influence	6
The Beginning	7
Trend of Foreign Policy (1950-1957)	8
Trend of Foreign Policy (1958-Present).	9
The Second Afro-Asian Conference.	10
3. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA.	12
Political Value	12
Geographical Value.	14
Economic Value.	15
Congo (Leopoldville).	17
4. STRATEGY, OBJECTIVES, AND POLICIES.	18
Global Priorities	18
Basic Strategy and Objectives	19
Policies.	21
5. A DISCUSSION OF POLICIES.	22
Diplomatic Recognition.	22
United Nations Membership	24
Red China's United Nations Options.	27
Aftermath of Recent Events.	28
Wars of Liberation.	29
6. ECONOMIC AID AND OTHER PROPAGANDA MEASURES.	35
Economic Aid.	35
Guinea: An Economic Agreement.	36
Mali: Acceptance on Its Own Terms?	37
Cultural Exchange and Other Propaganda Measures.	41
7. VULNERABILITIES	46
Coups d'Etat.	46
The Coups in Sudan.	47
Ghana and Pan-Africanism.	48
Nigeria	50
Other Coups	52
White-Controlled Southern Africa.	53
8. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE STRATEGY	56

9.	UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND POLICIES.	59
	Global	59
	Africa, South of the Sahara.	61
10.	CONCLUSIONS.	64
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	68
ANNEX	A. Eight Principles of Chinese Development Aid. . .	73

SUMMARY

The diversity prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa combined with the youthfulness of its countries and corresponding dependence on outside assistance has created a condition which could easily lead to Communist encroachment. Red China foresaw this possibility several years ago, and is in the position of vying with the Soviet Union for dominance in the region. Competing also are many nations of the Free World through major efforts by former colonial powers as well as international organizations.

Communist China's strategy in the region evolves from her basic goals of extending Red Chinese hegemony over Asia, attaining status as a major world power, and achieving leadership over the world Communist movement. Africa stands second in terms of Red China's global priorities with the objectives there of increasing political influence, supplanting Russian influence where prevalent, and ejecting any Western oriented type of political system.

These objectives have been refined into broad policies which include:

- a. Acquiring diplomatic recognition on a "One-China" basis in order to attain the option of achieving membership in the United Nations.
- b. Supporting "wars of national liberation."
- c. Establishing rapport through aid and propaganda techniques.
- d. Encouraging other Red Chinese Bloc countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam to assist in fulfilling its goals and objectives.

Programs to implement the above policies have been executed on a selective basis, country by country. Diplomatic recognition was achieved with thirteen countries of the area by 1965 but this number declined to ten as a result of recent coups in Dahomey and Central Africa, in addition to the suspension of ties by Burundi. Although the gap continued to narrow in favor of Red China during the 1965 vote on the United Nations admission resolution, this trend can be altered significantly depending on actions taken as a result of current events.

Control over the Congo was one of Communist China's chief aims and illustrates the manner in which "wars of liberation" are supported.

Congolese insurgents were aided by the Chinese embassies in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi. This aid consisted of arms, money, and guerrilla warfare training based on the doctrine of Mao.

Economic aid and technical assistance has amounted to commitments totaling some \$300-400 million but much of these have not yet materialized. Most of these programs and their allied propaganda measures have been concentrated in such countries as Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Tanzania. Aid has been promised on easy repayment terms and within light manufacturing or agricultural enterprises. Accompanying technical assistance in these fields has led to the presence of many hundreds of Chinese and other Red dominated orientals within recipient countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa's diversity is the cause of current dissatisfaction and unrest, and will remain the source of future concern. The topical trend of upsetting existing regimes through coups is symptomatic of this dissatisfaction and fragments the essential process of nation-building. Equally important, the concept of Pan-Africanism and the aid its proponents furnish dissidents can negate its longer range economic benefits of regional amalgamation. Added to these vulnerabilities which can make the area susceptible to Communist manipulation, is the white dominated "redoubt" which exists in the southern portion of the region. Hopefully, the peaceful pattern being followed in Rhodesia will prove to be a valid model upon which future actions can be based.

Despite Africa's geographic and economic strategic value, it lies outside the United States orbit of containment around Russia and mainland China. Therefore, most of the countries of the area are excluded from sizeable unilateral commitments of United States economic and military aid. This strategy is sound when compared with the defeats recently sustained by Red China in this region. Nevertheless, perhaps more attention should be given to destroying the "Cult of Mao," the source of a militant China. The first step in such a policy is a sound victory in Vietnam. A deep reverse of this nature combined with recent rebuffs in Africa and elsewhere may warrant an agonizing re-appraisal of Mao's recorded maxims. It also might further fragment the Communist movement as it did when Khrushchev destroyed the "Cult of Stalin." Such fragmentation would best lead to a defeat in detail of Communism through a variety of means.

CHAPTER 1

THE SETTING AND ITS DIVERSITY

Introduction: If one were asked to suggest a single word which would best describe sub-Saharan Africa today, he might well choose--"diversity". Not only do the names of these countries range from A to Z--from Angola to Zambia, but differences are apparent in almost every facet of that region's society, as defined in its broadest sense. These variations range from existing historical, ethnic, and cultural roots through the elements by which national power is gauged, and into the future in so far as the potential is measured by the factors of economic wealth.

The presence of these diversities makes any generalization about this region difficult because exceptions can and do exist, frequently in abundance. Despite this recognized danger, a brief perspective of key features about the setting is necessary. It is in this very marked diversity and the de-stabilizing effect it can, and does have, that the machinations of international Communism are most frequently applied since it offers the best opportunities for success.

AREA AND POPULATION

Africa, south of the Sahara, as discussed here, refers to the countries located within the Southern portion of the continent,

falling below a line drawn roughly between Senegal on the west coast to the northeast corner of Sudan, including the adjacent islands, and the southeastern off-coast island of the Malagasy Republic. For conciseness, this region of Africa will be referred to frequently as the sub-continent. Tropical Africa, as used here refers generally to that portion of this area north of the colonies of Portugal and the country of South Africa.

It is an area about three times the size of the United States, containing 31 separate countries, three UN trusteeship territories, and 12 non-independent areas including the off-shore islands. It is populated by about 220 million inhabitants of greater ethnic and racial origin . . . "than one finds in any other region of the world of comparable size."¹ The population includes some four million who are of European descent, and about three million of Asian descent, who are largely from the western part of India. The predominately Negroid majority who "are usually classified as belonging to three major linguistic groups . . ."² have been further subdivided into hundreds of tribes and clans with separate languages and customs because of time and the isolations of geography.

¹American University, Special Operations Research Office, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 270

²Ibid.

Religion also varies throughout the region. Christian inroads started mainly in West Africa, and Islamic penetration began from the north and east. These two forces converged in many areas; therefore, in western Africa the northern tribes are traditionally Muslim while the southern ones along the coast are generally Christian. Christian converts are also found where heavy concentrations of European settlers occur. "The vast majority of Africans are pagan animists, conforming to the traditional tribal religious practices and belief patterns."³

WESTERN INFLUENCES

The impact the western European powers have had on this region has also differed, depending on its length and intensity, the numbers and location of permanent settlers, the difference in colonial policy, and the existing cultural conditions. Compared to other colonialized areas, the colonial period in most of tropical Africa has been relatively brief. It began in earnest as late as 1885, and the "scramble" of the late 19th century abruptly turned to "exodus" a short seventy years later.

The Europeans came primarily to the west coast, but as traders, not as colonial administrators. Their interests were slaves, gold, and ivory. Political influence was limited and

³Ibid.

confined largely to coastal forts and trading posts. However, in 1885, at the Congress of Berlin, agreement was reached on the partitioning of the vast unclaimed remaining areas and the floodgates were opened by Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany. Spain and Portugal retained their original holdings. After Germany's defeat in World War I, her new colonies were sub-divided between Britain and France. New possessions acquired through this means were treated as colonies by each of these powers, even though technically they were mandates of the League of Nations and, after World War II, continued in such status as UN trusteeship territories.

During the period between World Wars I and II, except for Liberia and Ethiopia, all of sub-Saharan Africa was under colonial administration. Ethiopia had been invaded by Mussolini in 1935 and remained an Italian colony until 1941. This period between the wars found the colonial powers consolidating their political, social, and economic influences; and for most of Africa, this meant primarily British or French influence. In substance, British colonial administrative policy called for a "dual-layer" system with British officials working side by side with indigenous officials through much of the hierarchy, thus permitting Africans to be governed through native rulers. The French occupied major administrative posts but Africans filled subordinate positions. France hoped to make Africans Frenchmen so that some day they would take their place in the French community.

POST WORLD WAR II

After World War II most of the area attained independence without the hard fought struggles of its neighbors to the immediate north since the colonial powers granted independence voluntarily. Britain proffered the advantage of joining its Commonwealth, while France conducted a referendum to determine if her colonies wished to seek membership in the French Community, with its allied trade benefits of association with the European Economic Community. Some chose these paths alongside their former colonial power, others decided to take the direct and complete road to full independence.

Despite these choices the region was balkanized and some 25 different countries emerged in the period 1960 through 1965. For most new governments, this meant control over an area consisting of a variety of tribes, with different religious backgrounds, and with economies which could only become viable with much outside aid.

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND ITS PATTERN

MAO'S INFLUENCE

"The key to the understanding of Communist China's foreign policy . . . lies in Mao's revolutionary strategy and its projection abroad."⁴ Hence, this policy is based on a combination of Marxist-Leninist Communist ideology and the Chinese up-dating which has emerged from the pen of Mao. The former is a political theory which holds that the world is inevitably headed toward Communism because of natural law, and that anyone who opposes this trend is combating the mainstream of reality. From the pen of Mao, however, one finds an interpretation of this ideology evolving from two components.

First, his experience as the leader of a faction which was successful in a long civil war. Secondly, the xenophobia resulting from the isolated Chinese view of the world, based on its two thousand years of primacy in Asia and combined with the equal realization of its failures to stop Western and Japanese encroachment from the latter half of the nineteenth century through World War II.

⁴Tang Tsou, and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX, Mar. 1965, p. 80.

Harnessing the deep-seated latent distrust of the West and or 'western imperialism and materialism', Peking has mobilized a formidable national device focused on a single theme: China resurgent as a strong Communist state. The revival of national pride--of national nerve--is the most intangible and the most dynamic aspect of Peking's foreign policy today.⁵

THE BEGINNING

Although the Bandung Conference which took place in 1955 is cited frequently as the beginning of the Chinese Communist penetration into Africa, this step merely formalized a long term strategy announced almost immediately after the Communist take over in China. On 6 November 1949, within the short space of one month after assuming power; Liu Shao-ch'i, then the second ranking leader of the Chinese Communist Party stated that the peoples of colonial and semi-colonial countries should follow the same path "in defeating imperialism and its lackeys."⁶ He added that this path should include a united front, armed struggle, and a strong party organization.

Liu Shao-ch's statement is not only remarkable for the thread of consistency it has woven in Chinese foreign policy over the years, but also as a measure of the messianic zeal and confident singlemindedness of Red China's leaders. For despite the immediate requirement for consolidating political and economic control over

⁵Chang-tu Hu, and others, China, p. 258.

⁶US Dept of Defense, Armed Forces Information and Education, "Maoism at Home and Abroad," Part 1, For Commanders, this Changing World, Vol. 5, 15 Oct 1965, p. 2.

the vast mainland of China after some twenty-eight years of civil war, the leaders of the party were publicizing the leading role they felt compelled to play in shaping the future of the international Communist movement. Again, somewhat later, on 1 July 1951, Peking focused attention on the international significance of its pattern for revolution by reiterating the thesis that the "Chinese revolution must be the model for all colonial and semi-colonial countries."⁷

TREND OF FOREIGN POLICY (1950-1957)

Subsequent internal and external events forced a cyclical pattern to evolve in Red China's efforts and approach to the leadership role it sought. First, came the direct confrontation in Korea with major United States' and other forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations. During this conflict Red China began to commit sizable numbers of troops in just a little over a year after the new government had taken control. In a period of two weeks, between one hundred eighty thousand and two hundred twenty eight thousand Chinese soldiers crossed into North Korea. In the final outcome of this action, Red China lost no face at the negotiating table, despite the state of her economy, the lack of a modern army, or the other normal prerequisites for national power.

⁷Hu, op. cit., p. 259

Nevertheless, In contract to the forthright posture of the early years, marked by belligerence and condescension, Chinese diplomacy of the post-Korean period became relatively moderate."⁸ Typical of this change in posture was the approach used in Bandung. "Then the prospect of those populous, though 'have not' nations joining to bargain collectively with the West captured enthusiastic support from their leaders . . ."⁹ Accordingly, Red China soft-pedaled its hard line strategy and concentrated on the theme that it too had resisted colonialism, and therefore had rapport with the new countries of Africa and Asia. This ingratiating style was ignited by the racial appeal of Sukarno, who upon opening the conference said, "This is the first inter-continental conference of colored peoples in the history of mankind."¹⁰

TREND OF FOREIGN POLICY (1958-Present)

During 1958-1959 Peking's foreign policy posture again hardened significantly in many quarters: toward other major Asian nations . . . toward deviants within the Communist bloc (Yugoslavia); and particularly toward the United States.¹¹

⁸Ibid.

⁹Albert Ravenholt, "A Note on Communist China," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Vol. XII, Jul 1965, p. 1.

¹⁰Premier Sukarno, as quoted by Vernon Bartlett, "The Awakening of the Afro-Asian Nations," an address delivered on 7 Jan. 1960, and printed in African Affairs, Vol. 59, Apr. 1960, p. 105.

¹¹Hu, op. cit., p. 260.

In the early 1960's the Soviet Union began to feel China's wrath. Africa, however, was spared from like indictments, because two significant events occurred which temporarily stifled the Chinese bid for a direct influential role in African affairs after Bandung. One of these factors was internal and the other external.

The first was the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" of 1957-1958 and the succeeding crop failures of 1959-1961, which forced China to expend some of its scarce foreign exchange for food, and to modify her policy of allotting primacy for capital goods to one of diverting more resources for agricultural production. The external factor in tropical Africa was the willingness of the colonial powers to grant independence without the need for armed revolution. Ghana was the first to be granted independence, in 1957, and was soon followed by the other countries now present there on the scene.

THE SECOND AFRO - ASIAN CONFERENCE

Red China's dissatisfaction with the policies of many newly independent countries became apparent at the swift turn of events which caused a postponement of the second Afro-Asian Conference, and its ultimate cancellation. Little doubt exists that Red China attached much significance to the conference and the positions it would formally resolve. Its planned delegation was to consist of both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, as

well as other high officials and ". . . several hundred Chinese technicians Peking's leaders made it abundantly clear that among their minimum objectives was excluding the Soviet Union"12 It is also apparent that a planned denunciation of the United States' role in Vietnam was among these objectives because on 29 September 1965 in Peking, Red China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, said that Red China "would participate if the Conference condemns American imperialism."13

The swift Algerian coup caught the Chinese leadership by surprise, but of even greater significance was

their use of political strong-arm methods in attempting to push through with the meeting after a majority of the 36 delegates more or less on the scene had become disenchanted. For in revealing both her insistence and methods, Red China convinced a great many Afro-Asians that the conference could no longer provide them with a free forum for exploring common problems . . . and the Chinese scheme to use Afro-Asianism as a cloak for Peking's purposes has been rent, revealing its red lining."14

The subsequent cancellation of the conference and the recent severing of diplomatic ties with Red China by certain African countries seem to confirm this observation.

12Ravenholt, op. cit., p. 2.

13Washington Post, 10 Oct. 1965, p. 105.

14Ravenholt, op. cit., p. 3.

CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA

POLITICAL VALUE

Red China's aspirations for a dominant role in sub-Saharan Africa are punctuated primarily by political motives rather than economic. China's immediate economic needs are for grain and machinery, neither of which are major exportable commodities of sub-Saharan Africa.

Fundamentally, the dogma of Communism is a call for political action on a world-wide basis. In Marxist terminology, political action is given the title of "revolution", or in twentieth century terms, "wars of national liberation". Africa's value in the strategic plan for international political action was clearly disclosed on 2 September 1965 within Lin Piao's lengthy manifesto which stated, "In the final analysis the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of Asian, African, and Latin American people who make up the overwhelmingly majority of the world population."¹⁵ This manifesto explained further that these three areas constitute "the rural areas of the world" and form the base from which the United States and western Europe are to be encircled.

¹⁵"Lin Piao's Manifesto," a translation published in Army, Dec. 1965, p. 48.

The recent spotlight this document cast upon Africa's political value was not new as viewed from Red China's eyes. Over four years before its release, the cadres of Red China's army as low as regimental level were informed of the potential there. "In 1961, Africa was regarded as the center of the anti-colonial struggle. . . . When the time is ripe, a revolutionary upsurge will engulf the African continent."¹⁶ In tropical Africa colonial independence had already been achieved by some twenty countries during the period 1956-60, and well before the date this prediction was made.

Aside from this notion of Africa's overall strategic value, other political motives exist there for Red China in varying degrees. In this sense, then, the assets derived from cultivating diplomatic recognition can be classified as "immediate"--but as a first step toward the longer range strategy of attaining political domination, it can be placed in the category of "deferred". It is in this context that any inroads should be evaluated and significant trends appraised; for in terms of national power or national interests, any insidious shift can ultimately tip the balance in favor of one side or another. Of equal importance is the option of achieving alternatives in terms of calculative by-products or taking advantage of the remote possibility of unforeseen "fallout". Hence, Red China's influence in the Congo (Brazzaville) furnished an alternate avenue into the Congo (Leopoldville) which achieved

¹⁶Tang Tsou, and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX, Mar. 1965, p. 83.

added significance when Burundi suspended its diplomatic ties. Similarly, the recognition of Red China by France had the benefit of "fallout" derived from the acquisition of favorable votes in the UN from many French speaking African countries.

These same categories can be applied in discussing sub-Saharan Africa's importance geographically and economically, in addition to adjudging China's overall goals and implementing objectives.

GEOGRAPHICAL VALUE

Sub-Saharan Africa's strategic value, from a geographical point of view, lies primarily within the deferred category. Strategically, its importance is derived from its mid-way position between the East-West sea and air traffic. The western portion of the sub-continent is astride important and well traveled sea lanes. Its east coast and the island of the Malagasy Republic oversee the historic trade routes which traverse the Indian Ocean. This latter area may consume more direct interest on the part of the United States and Red China if, as speculated, Britain intends to withdraw its contributions . . . in defending this vast and turbulent area from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan."¹⁷

Suez also is of major strategic value and the coasts of Sudan, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, and the Somalia Republic dominate its southern approaches through which "About 120 million tons of

¹⁷James Reston, "Washington: More Troubles in the Pacific," New York Times, 12 Jan. 1966, p. 20.

seaborne cargo, a sixth of the world's total, pass . . . in a normal year, as against 45 million through the Panama Canal."¹⁸ These same countries also are astride much of the Red Sea and surround a considerable portion of the Gulf of Aden which borders vital areas of the Arabian Peninsula.

Air distances and facilities also play a strategic role. Significantly, "Soviet aircraft could not use West African landing facilities during the Cuban missile crisis. . . . In addition we have important space-age ties with Africa. Our first manned space flight was reported on by two African tracking stations, and African tracking and control stations are essential to our current space experiments and operations."¹⁹ The air distance from Dakar in Senegal to Natal in Brazil is some 1800 miles, almost 50 percent shorter than the air distance from New York to Paris. In brief, Africa can indeed be considered a necessary and short stepping stone to Red China's announced ambitions for Latin American in terms of its global strategy.

ECONOMIC VALUE

With perhaps a few exceptions, the economic base of sub-Saharan Africa is devoid of any immediate strategic value to Communist China. Most of this region's trade is with western

¹⁸Andrew Boyd, An Atlas of World Affairs, p. 92.

¹⁹G. Mennen Williams, as quoted within "U.S. Policy in Africa," For Commanders, this Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Jul. 1965, p. 1.

Europe and some with the United States. Very little trade is conducted with Communist China.

The amounts of coal, iron, and oil are often the resource measurements used to assess global importance. Although coal and iron are being produced at increasing rates elsewhere on the sub-continent, South Africa is the only current major producer. The monetary value of coal production in South Africa increased by close to 30 percent in 1964 as compared with 1960. During this same period the value of iron ore production doubled. The other regions of Africa are not nearly so well endowed with these two basic minerals although coal mining does exist in such countries as Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia and Congo (Leopoldville). Iron ore is also being extracted elsewhere, including Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Limited petroleum resources have also been discovered recently. As disclosed by the following table, the tons extracted are on the increase, especially in Nigeria.

	<u>Crude Petroleum</u>				
	(in 1,000 metric tons)				
	1950	1960	1962	1963	1964
Gabon & Congo (Brazzaville)	--	852	950	1000	1100
Angola	--	66	480	800	1000
Nigeria	--	866	3371	3800	5600

Source: The Statesman Yearbook 1965-66, St Martins Press, New York, p. XXVII

Although the existence of the three generally accepted primary resources mentioned previously are essential, heavy

concentrations of other key minerals frequently assume strategic value in this era of highly sophisticated technology within industry and science. In so far as the non-communist world is concerned, sub-Saharan Africa produces ". . . nearly all the diamonds, two-thirds of all the gold and cobalt, a third of the manganese, and a quarter of the copper. . . ."20 Furthermore, within the category of rare minerals, Nigeria produces the greater part of the non-communist world's columbium; and South Africa, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia are major sources of beryllium and vanadium.²¹

CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

Within the sphere of strategic value, the Congo warrants special attention in light of its importance within all three of the categories discussed. Politically, it has played an active role internationally in the Communist-Free World conflict. Geographically, it is located at the core of sub-Saharan Africa and has contiguous borders with nine other countries. Economically, "mining flourishes, the chief minerals being copper, diamonds, gold, silver, tin, cobalt, uranium, radium, germanium, zinc, and iron."²² In brief, "Mao himself has repeatedly declared that . . . the fall of the Congo would bring with it the fall of all the rest of Africa."²³

²⁰Andrew Boyd, and Patrick van Rensburg, An Atlas of African Affairs, p. 42.

²¹Ibid.

²²"Congo," The Statesman Year Book 1965-66, p. 903.

²³Brian Crozier, "Chinese and Subversive Activities in Africa," Translations on Africa, No. 300, 14 Dec. 1965, p. 3.

CHAPTER 4

STRATEGY, OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

GLOBAL PRIORITIES

The importance of tropical Africa to Communist China, in terms of global priorities, must be assessed in light of geographical considerations as well as the policy made evident or confirmed by current events. Under both considerations, Asia comes first in primacy so that Red China's borders may have the maximum "cordon sanitaire" and at the same time fulfill the objective of extending Red Chinese hegemony over Asia. Fundamentally, China is an isolated land power striving for internal self sufficiency. She is not a major factor in world trade and hence lacks the requisite sea or airlift capability to extend her power globally.

As a result of these circumstances, Vietnam is of immediate concern and is the fulcrum of Red Chinese attention today. As indicated by Lin Piao, "The struggle of the Vietnamese people against United States aggression . . . is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against United States aggression."²⁴ There is little doubt, however, that Africa stands second in terms of China's global priorities and a limited victory within the continent would assist the main effort in Asia. By the same token, a defeat in Vietnam could retard the efforts in Africa.

²⁴"Lin Piao's Manifesto," Army, Dec. 1965, p. 51.

BASIC STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The framework for Chinese strategy within the African sub-continent is intermeshed with her strategic goal of attaining super power status in the world. "Since 1949, Peking's basic and continuing objective has been to establish and maintain the People's Republic of China as a major world power."²⁵ Closely allied with this pragmatic goal is the ideological thrust Red China has asserted in the desire to lead the forces of international Communism. "The Chinese aim is unmistakably to establish at some point a world communist movement, with headquarters in and under the leadership of Peking."²⁶

From these two fundamental and global goals, both political in design, it is evident that Communist China's strategy in the sub-continent of Africa is beamed toward the two major powers of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is an adversary because of the cloak awarded it by world Communism as the leader of the "imperialists". It also has thwarted Chinese expansion in the developing world and has withheld diplomatic recognition from Peking, thus prohibiting Red China's admission to the United Nations. The Soviet Union is the target because of its present posture in the Marxist-Leninist world.

²⁵Chang-tu Hu, and others, China, p. 258.

²⁶Mose L. Harvey, "How Real is the Russia-China Break?", US News & World Report, Vol. LVI, 15 Jun. 1964, p. 65.

This is not to suggest that China foresees an accord between the United States and USSR over the region; rather, the goal is to separate tropical Africa from both Soviet and American influence and place it under the influence of Peking. In implementing these goals in sub-Saharan Africa, however, two other major formidable foes are added by virtue of their ideological badge as members of the "imperialist" or "neo-colonialist" club. These are Great Britain and France who continue to retain considerable influence in the area and show little inclination to watch it subside. Belgium also has exerted influence, particularly in the Congo.

In the light of these goals and the existing threats to their attainment, Communist China's basic objectives in sub-Saharan Africa are to: (1) Increase political influence in selected countries, (2) Supplant Russian influence where prevalent, and (3) Thwart any United States or western oriented type of political system, or eject it, if present.

These basic objectives can be further refined into broad policies. From the discussion which follows, implementing programs and tactics can be discerned as well as the inter-play between Communist China's goals and objectives. Significantly, the discussion will also disclose a pragmatic approach for implementing policies in terms of capabilities when compared with China's lofty design for world leadership.

POLICIES

1. Acquire diplomatic recognition and thereby attain the option of accepting or declining membership in the United Nations.
2. Increase diplomatic ties on a "One-China" basis.
3. Support and promote armed "wars of national liberation" without direct intervention.
4. Establish rapport in selected areas by:
 - a. Providing economic and technical aid.
 - b. Increasing the use of propaganda techniques to include cultural relations.
5. Encourage the support of members of the Communist Chinese Bloc to assist in meeting Red China's goals, objectives, and policies.

CHAPTER 5

A DISCUSSION OF POLICIES

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

Red China currently has diplomatic relations with ten of the African countries located south of the Sahara. This number is a decrease of three since 1965 when it reached thirteen. Relations are currently being conducted with: Congo (B), Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Within the past year, diplomatic ties were suspended with Burundi in January 1965, and in January 1966 relations were severed with both Dahomey and the Central African Republic.

The number and extent of present direct ties omit the diplomatic influence being exerted indirectly through other members of the Red Chinese Communist Bloc. Diplomatic inroads within tropical Africa are being made in varying degrees by Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The impact of this tactic, in terms of Red China's overall objectives is illustrated by the events which took place since 1961 in the countries of Guinea and Mali.

Some three years after independence, Guinea was confronted with "near-disastrous results" in its continued attempts to implement Marxist economics, backed with strong Soviet Bloc "guidance." When popular dissatisfaction over the outcome broke out in 1961,

both bloc embassies and 'colonialist elements' were accused of fomenting unrest but the subsequent turn of events reflected particular disenchantment with the economic and political results of over-dependence on Soviet financial assistance and technical advice.²⁷

The breach which resulted in Guinea-Soviet relations partially restored former western relationships. However, it also provided an opening for Red China, and ultimately led to indirect but increased influence in Mali.

Shortly after the crisis, President Toure¹ of Guinea briefed Modibo Keita, the President of neighboring Mali . . ." on the causes of Guinean-Soviet tensions This briefing had a considerably sobering effect on Modibo Keita. At that time, he is reported to have told a newspaperman 'the Soviets are betraying Guinea.'²⁸

Despite the apparent conclusiveness of this statement, Mali's relationships with the U.S.S.R. continued, fundamentally, on much the same basis until the fall of 1964. At that time, Modibo Keita made a trip to the Far East and confirmed . . . "his preference for the Asian Communists over the Soviet Communists."²⁹ Shortly thereafter, in February 1965, Albania opened an embassy in Mali. In doing so it completed diplomatic ties with all members of the Chinese Communist Bloc. Red China and North Vietnam had

²⁷Helen Kitchen, ed., A Handbook of African Affairs, p. 55.

²⁸Joachim Voss, East Bloc Propaganda Activity in Mali, p. 12.

²⁹Ibid. p. 13.

already established embassies there, and North Korean affairs in Mali are being conducted from Conakry since its ambassador is accredited to both Guinea and Mali.

UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP

Much has been written about the effect that the increasing number of emerging nations have had on the issue of admitting Communist China to the United Nations. In brief, the result has been not only to increase the total number of votes but to narrow the gap in terms of votes "for admission," as compared to "against." The voting patterns of the countries of the African sub-continent on the issue, thus far, coincide with this general trend, but the correlation unfolds for different reasons.

For the fifteenth time, last year's Twentieth General Assembly again debated the issue, based on a resolution whose list of sponsors included the following tropical African countries: Burundi, Congo (B), Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Two votes were taken during the session. The first was over Article 18(2); the question of whether the two-thirds majority would prevail, and the second, over the issue of admitting Red China.

The question of a two-thirds majority was voted last in 1961, but the issue of Red China's admission was voted upon during 1963.

Votes on both issues were omitted during 1964. Below are the data concerning the 1965 vote, as compared with the last vote taken.³⁰

Issue: Two Thirds Majority Required

<u>Year</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Absent</u>	<u>Total Votes</u>
1961	61	34	7	2	104
1965	<u>56</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>117</u>
Trend	- 5	+15	+ 4	-1	+ 13

Changes in Voting Posture
Sub-Saharan Africa

From "For" two-thirds majority to "against": (3) Central African Republic, Congo (B), and Senegal.

From "against" to "abstained": (2) Cameroun, and Chad.

Issue: Admission of Red China

<u>Year</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Absent</u>	<u>Total Votes</u>
1963	41	57	12	1	111
1965	<u>47</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>117</u>
Trend	+ 6	-10	+10	-2	+ 6

Changes in Voting Posture
Sub-Saharan Africa

From "against" admission to "for": (2) Central African Republic, and Congo (B).

From "against" to "abstained": (3) Cameroun, Senegal, and Rwanda.

From "against" to "absent": (1) Dahomey.

Others: Burundi--"for" in 1963, "abstained" in 1965
 Congo (L)--"against" in 1963, "absent" in 1965
 Ethiopia--"absent" in 1963, "for" in 1965
 Nigeria--"abstained" in 1963, "for" in 1965
 Sierra Leone--"abstained" in 1963, "for" in 1965

³⁰Data extracted from narrative published in Ta Kung Pao, Peking, 22 November 1965 as published by China News Analysis, Hong Kong, No. 592, 10 Dec. 1965, p. 7.

Of those who joined the United Nations after the 1963 vote occurred, two voted "for," Kenya and Zambia; one voted "against," Malawi.

Consistent Positions
Sub-Saharan Africa

Always voted "for" two-thirds majority and "against" admission: (8) South Africa, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Upper Volta, and Liberia.

Always voted "for" admission: (4) Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan.

The correlation between the "Two-China" problem and the voting positions taken on the issue of United Nations membership for Red China is striking indeed. Whether the inclinations of Communist China toward such membership bear any relationship with its actions to increase diplomatic ties is more difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the diplomatic recognition accorded Taiwan has had an impact on the "for" or "against" votes.

The Taiwanese government maintains diplomatic ties with thirteen countries of the African sub-continent: Cameroun, Chad, Congo (L), Gabon, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malagasy, Niger, and Rwanda. Of this number, only one, Sierra Leone, voted for the admission of Red China during the 1965 session, it abstained in 1963. Eight of the thirteen have consistently voted for the two-third majority requirement and against the admission of Red China. The other four either abstained or were absent in 1965. Furthermore, of the three sub-Saharan African countries which joined the United Nations after the 1963 vote on admission, only two, Kenya and Zambia, voted on behalf of Communist

China. Both have accredited diplomatic relations with Red China. Malawi was the third country to join the United Nations since the 1963 vote and during the 1965 session voted "against" the admission of Communist China. Malawi has withheld diplomatic recognition from both Taiwan and Red China.

Although absences and abstentions are not positive indicators of a voting alliance, a good case could be argued for the position that the major shifts during the 1965 session resulted from France's posture. France created diplomatic ties with Communist China during 1965 and voted "for" admission. Hence, many leaders of sub-Saharan Africa were confronted with the dilemma caused by membership in the French Community and their own diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

RED CHINA'S UNITED NATIONS OPTIONS

Many observers are convinced that Red China's admission to the United Nations is inevitable, and, is likely to occur in the next few years. This conclusion will probably prove valid, but only if an assumption is made that Red China desires to take advantage of a favorable vote on her behalf. The evidence suggests that China will continue to consider the options of accepting or declining membership depending on judgments made at the time a decision is required.

During the Twentieth session, Communist China hailed Indonesia's departure as a courageous move. Furthermore, in April 1965 its Premier stated that "we are now considering creation of a new

world body progressive and revolutionary in nature."³¹ Later pronouncements insisted that the United Nations be reorganized and that it refute its early 1950 actions in Korea.

Although conditions have changed appreciably since the above positions were stated publicly, still unresolved are the fundamental questions concerning the status of Taiwan and the future policy of the United States concerning recognition, or, at least remaining "neutral" on the question of admission.

AFTERMATH OF RECENT EVENTS

Recent events and the diplomatic maneuvering which has evolved, highlight other aspects of the existing situation in Africa, south of the Sahara. Among these factors are Burundi's sponsorship of the admission resolution while abstaining from the vote, Dahomey's absence, and the Central African Republic's decision to change and vote this time in favor of the Chinese Communists both issues.

In January 1965, the Prime Minister of Burundi was assassinated. Although the extent of the involvement of Red China is unclear, it resulted in the suspension of diplomatic ties between that country and Burundi.³² In January 1966, the United States ambassador to

³¹Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Issues Before the 20th General Assembly," International Conciliation, No. 554, Sep. 1965, p. 41.

³²Brian Crozier, "Chinese and Subversive Activities in Africa," Translations on Africa, No. 300, 14 Dec. 1965, p. 4.

Burundi was expelled. The Burundi expulsion order said the American diplomats were suspected of having made contacts with "conspirators."³³ The interaction between these two incidents, combined with the status of Burundi's diplomatic ties and its impact on future United Nations voting postures remain concealed.

Dahomey voted against the admission of Red China in 1963, but was absent in 1965. In January 1966, two months after the United Nations vote was taken, Dahomey broke relations with Communist China after an army coup d'etat. A similar situation occurred some ten days before in the Central African Republic. These breaks can be regarded as less serious to Peking than the loss of its diplomatic bridgehead in Burundi. Mao affirmed that Burundi was necessary to take the Congo.³⁴

WARS OF LIBERATION

To fulfill the ideological goal of world domination, both the Soviet Union and Red China embrace the concept of "wars of national liberation." This policy is the current means for implementing the Communist doctrine of revolution as it applies to the so-called "inevitable international conflict with capitalism." Both countries have resorted to these means, however, because of different reasons. Whereas the Soviet Union defends this mode as the

³³Burundi Expels U.S. Ambassador," New York Times, 11 Jan. 1966, p. 2.

³⁴Crozier, op. cit., p. 3.

acceptable alternative to nuclear war, Communist China chose to accept it because it is reasonable in terms of cost, and the only alternative within its current capabilities for projecting national power.

A variance exists also in the moderation expressed within public releases concerning this pseudomorph for Communist revolution. Quite typically, Communist China's pronouncements contain a denunciation of Russia's "coexistence." They are also bellicose, more militant, and draw upon any number of Mao's tenets as a source of legitimacy. These characteristics are confirmed by the recent Lin Piao manifesto which contained the following significant maxims as they relate to Red China's African revolutionary policy:

. . . peoples war--a protracted war; Mao's theory . . . is the . . . theory of stages; namely the national democratic and socialist; . . . the national democratic revolution can be fulfilled only through long and tortuous struggles; . . . revolution cannot be imported. But this does not exclude mutual . . . support on the part of revolutionary peoples.³⁵

A synthesis of these tenets affords an insight into the hard line tactics of Red China. In brief, adherents to Mao's brand of Communism are asked to subscribe to long hard struggle armed with some Chinese support. Since the ultimate goal must be reached in two stages, the first step requires the "disciples" to lead all available forces in overthrowing non-Communist regimes. This force, a "United Front" will necessarily be composed of Communist,

³⁵"Lin Piao's Manifesto," Army, Dec. 1965, pp. 47-51.

as well as non-Communist elements opposed to such regimes. The second stage culminates in a socialist government which will lead the country to pure Communism.

The "two-stage" tactic makes an assessment of this policy difficult because the makeup of the "United Front" can include any opponents to the government in control. Despite the benefits of this innuendo, in terms of detection, Red China's leaders have been more forthright on recent visits in sub-Saharan Africa. On 4 June 1965, Chou en Lai visited Tanzania enroute to the ill-fated conference in Algiers and said " . . . an exceedingly favorable situation for revolution prevails today . . . in Africa" ³⁶ Two days later, a Kenyan government spokesman said it was not clear " . . . what form of revolution the Chinese Premier had in mind. At any rate, Kenya wishes it to be known that it intends to avoid any revolution irrespective of its origin, whether from inside or external sources." ³⁷ Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania made his country's position clear when in Chou's presence he said, "We have to guard the sovereignty and the integrity of our United Republic against anyone who wishes to take advantage of our current needs in order to get control over us." ³⁸ In making policy

³⁶New China News Agency, 6 Jun. 1965, as quoted in Chinese Frustration in East Africa, Research Material prepared by Radio Free Europe, 28 Jul. 1965, p. 1.

³⁷Ibid., Reuter from Nairobi, 6 Jun. 1965.

³⁸Brookings Institution, Crisis in the Congo, by Ernest W. Lefever, pp. 133-134.

statements such as these perhaps the leadership within many sub-Saharan countries recall certain past Chinese actions in such areas as the Congo and Burundi.

Red China's actions in the Congo clearly indicate the tactics employed, bases used, and China's interest in taking advantage of any unstable situation. It also is proof of the direction in which Red China's leadership aspirations are headed.

A recent Brookings Institution study on the United States and United Nations roles in the crisis stated, that in the spring of 1964,

The peacekeeping effort had run its course. No government . . . urged the Security Council to undertake a new initiative to counter the threat to peace or to the territorial integrity of the Congo posed by the three insurrections encouraged and partly led by Red China. As of June thirtieth, the rebels dominated areas totaling one-fifth of the Congo. Jenmin Jih Pao publicly hailed the 'excellent revolutionary situation' in the Congo and expressed the hope that it would follow the pattern of the Communist war in South Vietnam. The insurgents were receiving some direction from the Chinese embassies in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi.³⁹

Before it suspended relations with Red China, the experience of tiny Burundi is illustrative of the means employed to promote Mao's doctrine of armed struggle. Although Burundi is a small agricultural state, after it established diplomatic ties with Communist China.

. . . the staff of the Chinese Embassy . . . rapidly reached about twenty members--a number far higher than

³⁹Brookings Institution, Crisis in the Congo, by Ernest W. Lefever, pp. 133-134.

that of normal diplomatic needs. Soon, the Embassy was organizing film showings setting forth the techniques of guerrilla warfare. They went on to distribute weapons and money, along with the discussions. It is believed that the arms had been unloaded at Dar-es-Salaam, and then brought by road and rail as far as Bujumbura. Money was poured out with a lavish hand.⁴⁰

Further insight into the tactics employed within the Congo was revealed recently by a priest who lived for a year and a half among the rebel faction led by Pierre Mulele. Mulele was a former member of Lumumba's cabinet and it is said that he studied subversion and the techniques of guerrilla warfare in China.⁴¹ In an unsigned article the priest stated that,

First of all, mulelism is not a political religious sect . . . Pierre Mulele was not presented at any time as a religious chief. He is a revolutionary affiliated to the CNL of Brazzaville . . . Mulele will make every effort to win the people over to his ideas. All the regions which are under his jurisdiction are reorganized for that purpose. Political commissars visit the villages and give political lectures to the popular masses. The authority in a village is exercised by a committee which has been elected by the people The Committee sees to it that things go smoothly in the village, . . . receives passing strangers and arrests counter-revolutionaries.⁴²

There is little doubt of Burundi's importance in meeting the objectives of Red China in the Congo. However, the later expulsion of the Chinese diplomats located there stresses the "fallout" advantage and the benefits derived from courting Congo (Brazzaville). Not only did it provide an alternate infiltration

⁴⁰Crozier, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²"Mulelism Vis-A-Vis Christianity," Translations on Africa, No. 300, 14 Dec. 1965, pp. 17-18.

route to the Congo, but it became a focal point for training. Furthermore, Communist inroads for the purpose of subversion have not been confined to these two countries. Secretary McNamara admitted before Congress that "the Soviets and the Chinese Communists have gained control of the advisory, training, and supply activities for the military forces of Zanzibar and have established at least temporary military ties and military supply programs in Tanzania"43

The pattern of the Chinese efforts for its so-called "wars of national liberation" within Africa is therefore evident. It consists of armed struggle by individuals trained and supported from several bases under the aegis of Red China. Furthermore, the former colony known as the Belgium Congo is a prime target.

The methods used to organize the rural population follow the classic Mao model. These tactics serve the purpose of providing intelligence, controlling the populace, and converting it to an ideology which will culminate in overthrowing a non-Communist regime. In short, within sub-Saharan Africa, the role of Red China is to provide the doctrine of Mao along with funds and small arms.

⁴³Robert S. McNamara, The Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, p. 20.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMIC AID AND OTHER PROPAGANDA MEASURES

ECONOMIC AID

Historically, China has experienced the type of economic rivalry which has led to politically motivated investments.⁴⁴ However, Red China's efforts to utilize this tactic on her own behalf are impeded by her economic posture, including the shortages of foreign exchange and industrial output. To overcome these shortcomings and make its aid more palatable, Communist China has wisely resorted to a program offering easy repayments and technical assistance in light manufacturing or agricultural enterprises.

Although the precise amounts of Red China's aid and assistance are difficult to assess, the trend clearly is toward increased commitments. The summary presentation to Congress for the fiscal year 1966 MAP and AID programs stated that Communist aid and presence within Africa was expanding, partially because of the competition between the Soviets and Communist Chinese. It observed that during the period 1962-1964, when total free world aid was declining from \$1.7 billion to \$1.2 billion, Communist aid offers were being doubled. The amounts increased from

⁴⁴Chang-tu Hu, and others, China, p. 382.

about \$200 million to \$400 million ". . . with major increases coming from Communist China."⁴⁵

One account cites a figure of three hundred million dollars as the amount of economic commitments by Red China to the countries of Africa, but adds that only a fraction has ever materialized.⁴⁶ Based upon the itineraries and published speeches by Red China's delegations returning from visits to Africa, it is reasonable to conclude that the largest of these commitments have been made to the countries of Guinea, Congo (B), Mali, and Ghana.⁴⁷ Tanzania also probably has been a major recipient because of its ties in the military supply field.

In order to acquire an insight into the terms of the formal agreements signed and the manner in which economic, cultural, and propaganda programs are implemented, the cases of Guinea and Mali will be discussed.

GUINEA: AN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT

On September 13, 1960 the governments of Red China and Guinea were joint signatories to three documents: a Treaty of Friendship, an Agreement on Trade and Payments, and an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation. The latter agreement will be discussed here.

⁴⁵David E. Bell, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs FY 1966, p. 122.

⁴⁶Stanley Karnow, "China Meets Rebuffs in African Ventures," Washington Post, 7 Jan. 1966, p. 3.

⁴⁷Liu Ning-i, "Report on the Visit to the Five Countries of Guinea, Mali, the Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana by" Translations . . ., No. 287, pp. 10-15.

Under the terms of the economic agreement, Guinea was granted a twenty-five million dollar non-interest bearing loan. This loan was to be repaid over a period of ten years, 1970-1979, with one-tenth of the principal due each year. The proceeds of the loan were to be granted Guinea by June 30, 1963. Its purpose was to supply technical assistance, equipment, materials and training. Additionally, the agreement provided that the living expenses of the Chinese technicians working in Guinea were to be paid out of the loan on the condition that their standard of living should not exceed those of comparable grade in Guinea.⁴⁸

Although the agreements with Guinea were the first of their kind ever negotiated with an African country they conform closely to the eight announced principles upon which the development aid of China is based (Appendix I). In brief, these principles call for economic loans bearing little or no interest with easy repayment features, and foreign aid projects which concentrate on a minimum of investment. The situation in Mali illustrates the techniques through which these principles are executed within the programs involved.

MALI: ACCEPTANCE ON ITS OWN TERMS?

The awareness of Guinea's experience with the Soviet Union is but partial explanation of Mali's willingness to accept

⁴⁸Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Communist China in Africa, pp. 23-24.

Communist China's aid and its allied programs of cultural exchange and propaganda. Among the other reasons are Mali's economic posture, the positions of its leadership, and its foreign relations outlook.

Mali is a poor country with a literacy rate which is among the lowest in Africa. The country is agriculturally self-sufficient but about ninety-five percent of the population is engaged in agriculture. The main export commodity is peanuts, however, to make any strides above the subsistence level, continued help is needed from outside sources. Mali is an associate member of the Common Market, and France contributes much financial aid, in addition to technicians and teachers. Soviet Bloc and Communist China credits totaled about eighty million dollars by 1963.⁴⁹

Politically, Mali is a one-party state and its leadership is concentrated in the party's Political Bureau, with a membership designed to "cut across" regional and tribal ties. It has embarked on the announced policies of eliminating colonial ties, establishing a Marxist patterned economy, and non-alignment in the Cold War. Self confidently,

The government affirms that it will accept development aid from any source, public or private, domestic or international, bi-lateral or multi-lateral, so long as the terms are adaptable to Mali's clearly enunciated socialist framework. On this, says Mali, there can be no compromise.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Helen Kitchen, ed., A Handbook of African Affairs, p. 87.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 88.

Mali became one of the focal points of the Sino-Soviet split sometime during 1963. One indicator was the change made in the dates for an industrial exhibit in which both Red China and the Soviet Union originally were scheduled to participate jointly. As a result of the change, Red China opened its exhibit in late December 1963, and the Soviet Union in January 1964 after the Chinese exhibit closed. During the course of its exhibit, negotiations were successfully concluded which called for Red China to construct a number of industrial facilities to include a cigarette factory, a match factory, a sugar refinery, a rice factory, and a cotton gin. Since then, a bamboo furniture factory has been planned in addition to an irrigating pump station, and a joint textile plant. North Korea has assisted with the construction of a porcelain factory. Earlier, in 1961 it began to assist in the development of rice plantations.⁵¹ North Vietnam's contributions lie mainly in the fields of education, public health, and administration.

Although the exact number of Communist Chinese in Mali has not been revealed officially, one Taiwanese source states that seven hundred Chinese were assigned for the sole purpose of constructing the sugar, cigarette, and textile plants.⁵² Notwithstanding the omission of official statistics, the total

⁵¹Joachim Voss, East Bloc Propaganda Activity in Mali, p. 56.

⁵²Patrick Pichi Sun, "Peipings Diplomatic Activities and Tactics," Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, Dec. 1965, p. 27.

present must be considerable, since the 1963 agreement with Red China promised that the facilities would be turned over "ready for use."⁵³ Exact determinations of the size of the contingency are further complicated by the presence of North Koreans and North Vietnamese. In the eyes of many Western observers, it is frequently difficult to differentiate between one Oriental and another.

One indication of the number present can be drawn from the variety of occupations made known publicly of those specialists in Mali during the earlier years of the agreements, 1963 and 1964.

These were:⁵⁴

<u>Red China</u>	<u>North Vietnam</u>	<u>North Korea*</u>
Rice experts	Technicians	Technicians
Sugar refining engineers & specialists	Teachers	Construction workers
Sugar cane specialists	Public health personnel	Porcelain workers
Tea planters	Banking personnel	Rice farmers**
Cotton planters		
Cabinet makers		

*Excludes fourteen additional known who arrived on 9 October 1963

**Some present since 1961

The breadth of these known occupations is also of interest because of the level of personal contacts made with the people of Mali. Most of the specialists presumably are those who spend many working hours outside of the urban areas either in close

⁵³Voss, p. 56.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 57-58.

association with agricultural workers or middle-class managers. In addition to the favorable impression made as a result of the relatively low living standards they are willing to sustain, this is the type of personnel base which completely meets Mao's theory of revolution. The ruling elites may, or may not, be amenable to the militant Red Chinese dogma; but it is from among the radicals in the middle class, even though in a minority, that much of the past unrest in tropical Africa has occurred. To date, violent dissatisfaction from within this broad grouping has caused considerable turbulence. Perhaps this type of rapport is partial explanation for the observation of many African leaders who reputedly feel that ". . . support for their regimes has not inhibited Chinese attempts at subverting their governments."⁵⁵

CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND OTHER PROPAGANDA MEASURES

One of the basic purposes of calculating and establishing rapport is, of course, to influence a secondary party in one's aims and ideals. Besides utilizing the means of personal contacts in the host countries, additional measures are resorted to internationally, such as cultural exchanges and other propaganda means. Here, too, Mali has shown a ready willingness to accede.

⁵⁵Karnow, op. cit.

Cultural agreements are usually broad in scope, and finite details as to programs are consummated annually, or as propitious opportunities occur. In May 1963, Mali and Red China negotiated a cultural cooperation agreement which was supplemented twice during 1964. The supplements called for an exchange program and film cooperation. During 1963, a supplemental agreement was also reached with North Vietnam to implement an earlier, 1962 accord.⁵⁶

As a result of these agreements, several activities have occurred. One of the most successful was the Chinese industrial exhibit, mentioned earlier, which ran from 28 December 1963 to 21 January 1964. This exhibit was visited by an estimated one hundred seventy thousand persons and reputedly was far more successful than the Soviet exhibit which followed immediately. Over twenty items were displayed including optical equipment, x-ray machines, dentists' offices, toys, cameras, and watches. At the end of the exhibit the buildings and some of the display articles were presented to the government of Mali.⁵⁷

At least nine other exhibits were conducted by the Red Chinese Bloc during the period 1963 through 1964. Five of these were held by Communist China and both North Korea and North Vietnam each had two exhibits. A majority of these exhibits consisted of painting and photographic arts.

⁵⁶Voss, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

On at least two occasions, during 1964, Red Chinese representatives from the performing arts were presented in Mali, in addition to one presentation from North Korean artists. Two Chinese films were also offered in 1964, both dubbed in the native Bambara tongue by Mali actors. Other Red Chinese efforts along these same general lines consisted of aid to refugees from other African countries, cooperation in certain sports, and scientific conferences on public health. Many ventures of this type call for reciprocal visits to Red China.

By the very nature of the widespread publicity intended, overt propaganda is more easily calculated and analyzed than almost any other foreign policy adjunct. Although its impact is much more difficult to assess, it frequently offers an insight into the "face to face" appeals made within the ruling elite. The government of Mali has acquiesced to most forms of this technique.

Red China's propaganda efforts in Mali have ranged from supplying transistor radios for outlying villages to wooing such officials as the Mali Minister of information and Tourism who said that it would be an "inadmissible oversimplification to call him a Communist." Nevertheless in an April 1964 journalists' conference in Algiers this same individual said that the Sino-Soviet" . . . quarrel was on the verge of sapping

the energy of all men of good will and hindering the organization and development of the revolutionary struggle throughout the world."⁵⁸

In light of the high illiteracy rate in most of Africa, radio plays an important role in propaganda efforts. It is also a relatively reasonable avenue for influence because of low cost transistor radios. A London source adjudged this overall effort as follows: "The Soviet Union and Communist China are outpacing the West in a radio war for the African mind."⁵⁹

Red China's efforts in Mali differ from the Soviet Union's because broadcasts are made in the Hausa tongue rather than Bambara. This approach has the advantage of adding Nigerian listening audiences and others to that of Mali. On 31 May 1963, when radio broadcasting began, the Mali press publicized Radio Peking's broadcasting times and frequencies. At that time these amounted to an hour each day, during the prime hours from eight-thirty to nine-thirty each evening. The announcement disclosed that the broadcast was simultaneously beamed to Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria.⁶⁰

In August, 1964, a step toward increasing the listening audience was taken when large numbers of transistor radios were given to Mali by Red China, along with the materials necessary

⁵⁸Ibid., pp.38, 78.

⁵⁹Granville Watts, "Red Radio Beams on Africa," The Harrisburg Patriot, 16 Dec. 1965, p. 62.

⁶⁰Voss, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

to construct loud speakers in four villages.⁶¹ Other propaganda devices used are advertising in the Mali press, distributing leaflets and brochures during exhibits, and providing low subscription rates for Chinese periodicals which are translated for local consumption.

Aside from the direct actions and policies of Red China as discussed in the previous two chapters, several other specific conditions prevail in the African sub-continent which make this region vulnerable to the type of turbulence which could lead to Communist encroachment. Among these are the coups d'etat, Pan-Africanism, and the White Redoubt.

⁶¹Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

VULNERABILITIES

COUPS D'ETAT

The melange composed of almost every aspect of sub-Saharan African society culminates in the topical trend towards the coup d'etat. This technique is one way in which an elite can reorient the sources of dissatisfaction, or provide a facade of change without disturbing their own faction's status quo. Other reasons range from a clear premeditated attempt to achieve the political purpose of securing power down to the parochial dissatisfaction emanating from the amount of money budgeted for a specific coercive agency. Regardless of its symptomatic causes, any abrupt change in political stability can either directly or indirectly assist Communist goals because it fragments the process of nation-building. As a consequence, there is little reason to suspect that Red China would prefer that the current trend cease.

The Brazzaville coup in 1963, and the 1964 overthrow in the Sudan are examples of the way in which Red China was aided indirectly in its attempt to attain an immediate objective within the Congo (Leopoldville). The earlier coup within Sudan in 1956, on the other hand, as well as the recent overthrow in Nigeria illustrate again, as it did in the Congo, how intrusion by a third country can assist any de-stabilizing forces.

The benefits which accrued to Red China as a result of the Soviet Union's attempts to intrude into the politics of Guinea has already been discussed. However, there have been at least two additional African participants in this "third country" aspect. These countries, Egypt and Ghana have consequently, albeit perhaps unwittingly, assisted the Communist cause as a result of the personal drive of their own leaders for regional amalgamation.

THE COUPS IN SUDAN

Sudan has a deep and fundamental Egyptian heritage. Upon gaining its independence in 1956, a parliamentary government was formed. In 1958, after unrest and vigorous anti-government complaints by its free press, Egypt's intrusion in the form of "Nasserism" became evident as a force against the government in power.

Thus, there were in reality two revolutionary sources in the Sudan: one characterized as radical and Nasserist which never developed into an overt revolutionary movement, and the other a conservative revolution designed to ward off the radical revolution before it occurred by replacing a vulnerable parliamentary regime with a strong military regime, which would neutralize revolutionary ferment and preserve the status quo.⁶²

As a result of these two forces, a typical Latin American type or coup d'etat took place without much popular concern.

⁶²American University, Special Operations Research Office, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 416.

For the following six years, a small military elite ruled the country, and their private lives were characterized as austere and remarkable incorrupt. Furthermore, the group reputedly was accessible, efficient, and appeared to be convinced that the majority of the Sudanese would prefer not to exchange the governmental inspired economic stability it had attained for a return to the "free for-all party life".⁶³

Despite these virtues and the progress made, in October 1964 ". . . the Abboud government was overthrown, following student riots in which the Sudanese Communist Party, few in numbers, but well organized, took part."⁶⁴ This change in government also had an impact on the Congo rebellion because Abboud's policy of denying transit rights was reversed and ". . . air shipments to the Congo began".⁶⁵

GHANA AND PAN-AFRICANISM

Ghana's attempted inroads reach deeper into tropical Africa and are evidently rationalized by the zeal which has accompanied Nkrumah's concept of Pan-Africanism. According to one report, at the time of the Upper Volta coup, its President said that

⁶³Helen Kitchen, ed., A Handbook of African Affairs, p. 156.

⁶⁴Brian Crozier, "Chinese and Subversive Activities in Africa," Translations on Africa, No. 300, 14 Dec. 1965, p. 6.

⁶⁵Ibid.

". . . the government had evidence that Ghana and China were supporting Mr. Ouedraogo", a dissident leader who was charged with returning to the country from exile and fomenting unrest.⁶⁶ This was not the first time that Ghana had been criticized by the President of Upper Volta. During a visit to the United States some eleven months earlier, Mr. Yameogo attacked Nkrumah

. . . for what he described as attempts to impose "arbitrary socialism" on the rest of Africa and for his ties with Communist China. He accused Ghana of sending subversives into neighboring countries.⁶⁷

During the month preceding the Nigerian coup, Ghana was also implicated in the outbreaks and disturbances then prevalent. Nigeria's late Prime Minister Balewa told a western politician that he knew the Ghanian government was sending funds to anti-government leaders and had encouraged bands of toughs that had terrorized wide areas of Nigeria since the elections last October.⁶⁸

Whether or not these accusations are valid, the experience in the Congo discloses that certain African leaders have no compunction against becoming directly involved in the unfortunate circumstances of their neighbors. As Secretary McNamara said in

⁶⁶"Action by Army in Upper Volta Reported in Wake of Mob Rioting," New York Times, 4 Jan. 1966, p. 2.

⁶⁷"Upper Volta Declares Emergency and Bars Strike Due Today," New York Times, 3 Jan. 1965, p. 2.

⁶⁸Lloyd Garrison, "Power Struggle Rages in Nigeria," New York Times, 19 Jan. 1966, p. 8.

commenting on the Congo before Congress, ". . . some of the more radical and militant African states have intensified the present internal disorder by aiding the rebels with personnel and equipment."⁶⁹

NIGERIA

Although there may have been some outside impetus, there were other causes behind the Nigerian coup which emphasize the lack of insight Westerners have for adjudging the delicate balance in tropical Africa between political strength and the support it receives by coercive forces. Most observers agree that one major factor was the unrest caused by the results of the October 1965 election in the Western Federation, one of the four semi-autonomous regions within the loosely controlled political structure of Nigeria. The advantage of hindsight, however, reminds us that the structure itself and other factors may also warrant partial blame.

Below is a chart, compiled from a variety of sources which depicts some of the political, economic, and tribal diversity prevalent in this, the largest country in Africa in terms of population. Its total population of roughly fifty-six million people, over thirty million of whom are Moslem, rank it as the tenth largest country in the world.

⁶⁹Robert S. McNamara, The Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, p. 20.

SOME KEY FACTORS IN NIGERIA: BEFORE COUP D'ETAT

<u>Region</u>	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Tribes</u>	<u>Major Product</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
North	NPC	Hausa--but leaders are Fulani	Peanuts	Larger than other three regions combined. Dominated Federal Coalition Government. Regional Premier was also Islamic spiritual leader of more than half the population.
West	NNGP	Yorubas	Cocoa	Once the richest and best educated area in Nigeria. Dislike Moslems and Ibos. NNGP is a new party. Old Action Group Party (AG) split in 1962, and its leader, Awolowo, was jailed for trying to overthrow Federal Government.
East	NCNC	Ibos	Crude Oil Palm Produce	Industrious. Dislike Moslems and Yorubas.
Midwest	NCNC	Mixture-- Bini, Itsekiri, Urhobo	Crude Oil	Was part of Western region until 1964.

Sources: Primary: Anthony Astrachian, "Nigerian Unrest Mounted After Disputed Elections," Washington Post, 16 Jan. 66, p. A 16.

Other: Helen Kitchen, ed., A Handbook of African Affairs, pp. 103-106.

The complications evident from the above data, when combined with recent actions on the part of the new military government, are testimony to some of the causes of the coup and the difficulties ahead. Presumably the coup was started initially

by middle grade officers and was joined sometime later by the current head of government, General Ironsi. The new military leader is from the Ibo tribe, but among his first acts was the placement of a highly regarded military governor within each region. Each governor was a member of the local majority tribe. Ironsi also took harsh steps to eliminate the officers who began the coup. In his first public speech, General Ironsi stressed that tribal and regional ties must give way to the urgent tasks of national reconstruction.⁷⁰ His program also called for an abolishment of several governmental ministries and there was an indication that past incidences of corruption would be investigated. Thus, by concentrating on the internal affairs of Nigeria, most experts believe there will be little change in foreign policy or outlook towards Pan-Africanism.

In the past, Nigeria has been cool to Nkrumah's plans. Although Ghana was the first African country to recognize the government, there is doubt whether the result of the coup will be what President Nkrumah may have preferred.⁷¹

OTHER COUPS

The extent of the role played by outside interference has not been proven definitively. Moreover, serious internal factors

⁷⁰Donald H. Louchheim, "New Leader Outlines Nigeria Action Plans," Washington Post, 29 Jan. 1966, p. 19.

⁷¹Garrison, op. cit.

were present in each of the countries in which the coups occurred. Two days before the Upper Volta coup, the National Assembly cut all governmental salaries by twenty percent. In Central Africa, the Army budget was reduced, but at the same time, the civil police budget was increased.

Underlying these factors were serious economic problems, including a general discontent with living conditions. This was aggravated in some cases by widespread corruption, ostentatious high living by officials, nepotism, and alleged fraud in elections--the latter in Nigeria.⁷²

In analyzing the impacts of the recent coups, certain European observers in the United Nations expressed concern that the most serious consequence of African instability is that it opens the door for subversion by Red China.

A highly placed European source remarked that he knew of at least three African Cabinet ministers who were receiving regular financial payments from Peking.

Peking's interest is to foment and keep alive what Marxists call a revolutionary situation in a period of African political development roughly comparable to that of Europe at the close of the Middle Ages, when national states were emerging.⁷³

WHITE-CONTROLLED SOUTHERN AFRICA

Within the six countries of Southern Africa, less than four million "whites" have retained political control over close to

⁷²Max Harrelson, "Experts on Africa say five Coups Were Linked," Washington Post, 19 Jan. 1966, p. 3.

⁷³Drew Middleton, "Blow to African Envoys," New York Times, 20 Jan. 1966, p. 13.

thirty million members of the black race. Furthermore, within this enclave there exists almost the last of the remaining vestiges of European colonialism. Both situations are completely intolerable to the African countries, which are neighbors to the north, and most of the remaining countries of the world as well. Although the other countries of Africa, south of the Sahara, largely achieved independence without the violence prevalent elsewhere, the situation in the "white redoubt" could convert this preferable course to one of bloodshed and grief.

Hopefully, a rational pattern will be followed of the type which seems to prevail in the current Rhodesian problem. Here Britain's formula of economic sanctions is being applied under what initially were trying circumstances. The British dilemma was caused by the natural reluctance to use force against its citizens, and the emotional demands of a few African leaders for a quicker defeat of the rebellion. The impatience and immaturity of these leaders reached such a high peak that the Organization of African Unity resolved to break diplomatic ties with Britain unless the revolt was put down by 15 December 1965. Later, some twenty-four representatives of African governments walked out of the United Nations rather than listen to the British Prime Minister's explanation of the reasoning behind his government's chosen course of action.

Although there are indications that sanctions will work in Rhodesia, if similar measures were taken against South Africa it would seriously damage the British economy. Also, to be effective, sanctions would have to be imposed for a much longer period of time, a situation which would surely test the patience of African leaders.

CHAPTER 8

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE STRATEGY

In analyzing the effectiveness of Chinese strategy in Africa, south of the Sahara, it is evident that major global goals have been established, based upon the interfacing of the forces of Communist ideology, Chinese heritage, and current national interests. Since the leaders of Red China today are pragmatic, however, the attainment of these goals, even though they are charted, is not necessarily expected to be achieved in the immediate future. They will be opposed by those countries that are clearly within the western camp, or influenced by western ideas.

In order to progress toward its ultimate goals, Red China has embarked upon a variety of programs designed to fulfill basic policies. Among these is the cultivation of fully accredited diplomatic recognition. This policy has been implemented on a "One-China" basis, to gain the option of either accepting or declining membership in the United Nations. In either event, although not within the purview of this paper, it is difficult to ascertain how the purposes of the United Nations' Charter can be fulfilled by any Communist state. Rhetorics along similar veins suggest that membership may be desired for the sole purpose of converting the institution into one of amoebic existence.

Since all Communist Chinese strategy and tactics emanate from the recorded experiences of Mao, one could logically conclude that Red China's foreign policy and implementing programs also stem from this same simplistic rationale. On this basis, then, political domination begins in the rural areas. It, therefore, not only coincides with capabilities, but also may be another reason behind the heavy orientation of developmental aid towards agricultural projects. Credence to such a proposition is warranted by the anomaly that such projects have required the extended absences of qualified agricultural technicians during a period when Communist China has been importing foodstuffs for domestic purposes.

The same pattern is evident in the policy of promoting and supporting "wars of national liberation". Here again, the policy is explicitly economical and feasible since its "two-stage" approach encompasses all zealous dissident factions which may be opposed to the government in power. The palatable commodities in terms of the recipient are the valid doctrine of Mao and the training necessary to fulfill its prescribed techniques, which have proved to be so successful in achieving control over the most populous country in the world.

The "selected areas" approach used in the policy mechanism for Africa conforms with the need to gain a foothold. This foothold, in turn, permits a base area to be developed from

which other operations can be expanded. This tactic was successful first in Burundi and later in the Congo (Brazzaville).

There is little doubt that in recent months Red China has sustained several serious set-backs in the African sub-continent. Among these were the failure of the Afro-Asian Conference to convene, and the severing of diplomatic ties with Burundi, Dahomey and the Central African Republic. The later two instances resulted from coups, a trend which is likely to continue and thereby contribute to a further decline in Communist Chinese influence. In brief, Red China's strategy of increasing her influence has failed, but important footholds remain.

CHAPTER 9

UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND POLICIES

GLOBAL

The strategy of containment coupled with a credible deterrent continue as the cornerstones of current United States foreign policy. To implement this strategy, the United States has a system of world-wide alliances or bilateral agreements which are designed to serve as a barrier against expansion by either Red China or the Soviet Union. Reinforcement of the strategy has taken the form of a forward defense posture constructed through sizable commitments of United States' forces and military aid to the countries bordering the Iron and Bamboo curtains.

Since the early 1950's, when this strategy was first being implemented, many of the countries contiguous to these "curtains" have prospered and attained increased military strength. Therefore, exclusive of Vietnam, dollar amounts of United States' military aid began to decline rapidly in 1955. At about the same time, allied American economic aid programs shifted from Europe and the Far East, but the total amount has remained relatively constant since about 1951.

The total package for both aid programs during the past ten years has ranged consistently between three and four billion dollars. Military aid has amounted to between one and two

million dollars, while economic aid has tended to increase gradually from about \$1.6 billion to \$2.2. In terms of Gross National Product, however, both programs combined have declined from about 1.2 percent in 1955, to just over .5 percent in 1965.⁷⁴

Unfortunately, the strategy of building a containing wall on the peripheries of the two major Communist powers will not, and has not, stopped "wars of national liberation". Also, an emerging nation is not impervious to dissident movements or the instability which results from any abrupt change in political power. Vietnam, Cuba, and the coups in tropical Africa are but a few of the many examples which confirm these assertions.

For some time the United States has been aware of the weaknesses of its basic strategy, and has added the military alternative of flexible response. However, the impact of this additional alternative has been felt primarily within the United States' forces, since the bulk of our military assistance for fiscal year 1966 was programmed to eleven of the forward defense countries. It, therefore, is largely incumbent upon economic programs, both national and international, to thwart Communism outside the arc of containment.

⁷⁴David E. Bell, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs FY 1966, pp. 1-6.

AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Since this area is outside the Communist periphery, United States' strategy and policies are oriented differently. This strategy and its policies have been revealed by at least three official sources within the past year. Two of these sources are contained within the testimony furnished Congress in connection with the FY 1966 budget, one by Secretary McNamara and the other by David Bell of the Agency for International Development. The third source is a public address by Hon. G. Mennen Williams.

With reference to the area defined in this paper, Secretary McNamara stated that United States security interests are focused on Ethiopia because of its important communication facilities. He added that the government was concerned with the countries of Somalia and Ethiopia which guard the southern approaches to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The Soviet Union also is cognizant of these strategic waterways, according to Secretary McNamara, because it is providing "major military assistance" to Somalia. Accordingly, over half of the "very modest" military assistance programmed for the entire continent of Africa was allocated to Ethiopia during FY 1966.

Secretary McNamara also commented on U.S. policy towards the emerging societies in tropical Africa. He stated that the United States, in conjunction with other friendly powers, was interested in supporting the tasks of "nation-building" and that the small

amounts of military aid programmed were oriented toward internal security.⁷⁵

Mr. Bell highlighted the Congo as an example of the fact that the Communists will "feed on civil strife wherever they find an opening". He also emphasized the policy of concentrating economic aid to certain countries, but stressed that such aid is tied to self-help and performance. He added that United States policy was to seek to put more free world aid on a coordinated multi-lateral basis. Mr. Bell admitted that much of the development aid for Africa is furnished by Western Europe, although he acknowledged that international agencies and private investments also played a significant role. Under these criteria, the lowest request in the history of foreign assistance was submitted to Congress for FY 1966. It amounted to .5 percent of our Gross National Product and the principal recipient nation in Africa was Nigeria which was one of the seven countries included among those programmed to receive 74 percent of the development loan expenditures.⁷⁶

In his public speech, Mr. Williams cited the following five pillars of United States policy toward Africa:

a. First, and foremost, the support of self-determination to include their choice of the type of governments, foreign policies, and measures toward unity.

⁷⁵Robert S. McNamara, The Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, p. 20.

⁷⁶Bell, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

- b. Support of African solutions to their own African problems.
- c. Support of economic development through aid and trade.
- d. Discouragement of arms buildup beyond the needs of internal security or legitimate self-defense.
- e. Continuance of the policy to encourage other countries, principally the former colonial powers, to recognize their responsibilities toward Africa.⁷⁷

⁷⁷G. Mennen Williams, as quoted in "U.S. Policy in Africa," For Commanders, This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Jul. 1965, pp. 2-4.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

As a prelude to larger undertakings, Red China's strategy of increasing her influence is designed to achieve political domination over one or more countries of sub-Saharan Africa. To fulfill this strategy, however, Communist China must overcome basic economic deficiencies in addition to cultivating a less bellicose foreign policy.

Execution of the strategy is in consonance with Red China's goal of leading the Communist call for world domination and a corresponding defeat of the West. To this end, a broad spectrum of activities and programs have been consummated within certain countries of the region. Diplomatic recognition has been achieved with thirteen of them. Some three hundred to four hundred million dollars in credits have been extended, although much of it has not materialized. Furthermore, in conjunction with North Vietnam and North Korea, Red China has expanded the number of technicians present. It has also increased the use of propaganda weapons such as radio broadcasting, publications, and cultural exchanges. Other undercover forms of subversion include training in the guerrilla tactics of Mao, as well as the supply of arms.

The growth of these activities has increased Red China's presence and can likewise promote an increase in the number of dissidents. However, this reality seems to be accompanied by a

growing awareness on the part of many African leaders of the intentions of Communist China. Impetus to this concern can be attributed partially to Chinese public statements as well as the positions taken internationally, to include the tactics used during the ill-fated second Afro-Asian Conference.

United States' global strategy is sound, as are its policies for Africa, south of the Sahara. Most people recognize that containment does not necessarily repel the type of Communist aggression being applied in this half of the twentieth century, yet for political reasons, economic aid cannot be increased.

Africa has the advantage of geographical detachment which makes this form of aggression more difficult. Equally important, our responses to the various crises in the area displayed the flexibility necessary for meeting the conditions as they exist. Moreover, to give the slightest appearance of intrusion may create more difficult problems than those being experienced today.

Although the "white redoubt" situation could become more critical at any moment, perhaps the greatest danger to United States' interests could come from a new type of "imperialism" under the guise of regional amalgamation. Properly led and nurtured, the force of African unity could ultimately lead to a strong and viable union. Yet to attain even this desirable objective, Americans should remember that they had to fight a long and costly civil war. It is this challenge to man's intellect which hopefully, will lead to a rational solution.

Despite the publication of Red China's grand design for the future of the world and the rebuffs sustained recently, perhaps more importance should be attached to the task of destroying the source of the emergence of a militant Communist China.

This source, of course, is Mao-tse Tung; and the projection of his thinking has already had internal and external implications. Red China is currently in the process of mass ideological and philosophical indoctrination on a scale that rarely, if ever, has been equalled anywhere.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Mao's doctrine and tactics are among her major exportable commodities. If these efforts to promote the "Cult of Mao" are successful, little change can be expected in either Communist China's foreign policy or her armed revolutionary strategy for world domination.

As the first step toward destroying the myth and invincibility of Mao's thoughts, it is essential for the United States to achieve a sound victory in Vietnam. It is only by sustaining a deep reverse of this nature that the doctrine of Mao will be challenged enough to warrant an agonizing but thorough re-appraisal. This re-appraisal in turn, might fragment the Chinese segment of the world Communist movement in the same way that Khrushchev drove a wedge into its monolithic structure when he destroyed the "Cult of Stalin." As a result of this further fragmentation, the

⁷⁸Albert Ravenholt, "A Note on Communist China," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Vol. XII, Jul. 1965, p.3.

threat of Communism would best lend itself to defeat in detail
through a variety of means.

Jack T. Pink
JACK T. PINK
Lt Col AGC

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ANNEX A

EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT AID

1. The Chinese government is unalterably committed to the principle of equality and mutual benefit in the granting of aid to other nations. It never looks upon this aid as a unilateral hand-out. In its estimation, the aid is always reciprocal.

2. The Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of the nation to whom it provides the aid. It makes no conditions and demands no advantage.

3. The Chinese government bestows its economic aid in the form of loans either without interest or with a very low interest rate. When necessary, it extends the loan repayment period in order to make it as easy as possible for the receiving country.

4. The Chinese government aids other nations with the aim of helping them to a gradual, independent economic development based on their own resources. It is not the goal of the Chinese aid program to make the recipient nations dependent on China.

5. The Chinese government foreign aid program concentrates on those construction projects requiring minimum investment but yielding maximum results. We do this so that the governments of the recipient nations may increase their income and accumulate capital.

6. The Chinese government supplies--at world market prices--the best equipment and materials that China produces. Should this

equipment and material fail to meet the specifications and the agreed-upon standards of quality, the Chinese government pledges their replacement.

7. In its technical aid program, the Chinese government sees to it that indigenous personnel are instructed in new technology so that they themselves might master this technology.

8. The experts sent to the recipient lands to render assistance must maintain the same living standard as the indigenous experts. They are not allowed to make special requests or to lay claim to any particular comforts.

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