

Intelligence Reform in Colombia: Transparency and Effectiveness against Internal Threats

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Introduction

Colombia's approach to intelligence over the past two decades has focused on improving public security by combating the real and active threat posed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), drug traffickers and the illicit activities in which they participate. In Colombia's more recent past, the security sector has made significant strides in achieving success against the aforementioned illegal armed groups.

This paper will briefly look at the Colombian security environment, discuss how the security and intelligence apparatus has changed over the last decade and a half to accomplish their mission, and look at the mechanisms for providing control of the intelligence services.

In so doing I will highlight some existing tensions in Colombia at achieving transparency of their intelligence services and increasing those services' effectiveness.

Strategic Environment

Colombia's armed conflict has involved Colombian government forces, insurgents of the FARC and the smaller ELN, the groups constituting the AUC, and powerful drug lords. The highly lucrative drug trade from which all the armed groups profit and attempt to control in the regions in which they operate has exacerbated this conflict. These illegal groups have used Colombia's porous borders to support their illicit transactions, as arms supply routes, and to provide safe haven from Colombian security forces, whose primary focus remains in combating these illegal groups and the drug trade in order to provide public security. The ongoing fight has lasted for decades and has ebbed and flowed within what many identify as a culture of violence particular to Colombia.

The ability of drug cartels to challenge the central government increased significantly in the 1980's and 1990's as revenue from the drug trade, kidnapping and extortion enabled them to expand their capabilities and to act with impunity. Indeed, during the heyday of the Medellín and Cali Cartels in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the likes of Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers in Medellín and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Cali seemed to have more control over parts of Colombia than did the government.^[1]

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As the Colombian security services focused on and began to succeed against the drug cartels in the early to mid 1990s, the FARC was able to improve its strength, gaining control of significant amounts of territory in the mid-to-late 1990s due to increased revenues from the drug trade, increasing tactical capabilities against the Colombian armed forces and the establishment of the *Despeje* a 42,000 square kilometer territory “cleared” of government forces granted to the FARC from November 1998 to February 2002 by former President Andrés Pastrana as part of an attempted peace process.[2] At the height of the FARC’s strength, they were said to exercise some degree of control over 40% of the country.

It should be noted that the AUC and the central government agreed in December 2002 to a cease-fire and demobilization. The demobilization process was legalized after a lengthy and contentious debate and embodied in Colombia’s Justice and Peace Law (law 975 of 2005). The law’s implementation, however, did not end the controversy as many citizens and observers claimed it was nothing more than a handout to the AUC and demanded more accountability. Colombia’s supreme court rectified many of the most problematic issues, in May 2006, rendering portions of the law unconstitutional.[3] Despite the ongoing issues that will not likely be resolved in the near term, more than 30,000 members of the AUC had been ‘demobilized’ as of last August.[4] However, a recent Organization of American States (OAS) mission has observed some ongoing problems with the demobilization process: Some units of the AUC have not been dismantled, the re-emergence of some groups in regions previously controlled by the AUC, being led by mid-ranking AUC members (some demobilized, some not) and recruiting former AUC combatants. According to the OAS, “These groups are expanding and taking control of illegal economic activities.[5] In addition, there have been documented reprisal killings.

Colombian Intelligence Services[6]

Colombia has a total of seven intelligence organizations providing analysis to governmental and military agencies.

The DAS is designated as the primary intelligence service in Colombia. It is responsible for producing strategic intelligence and counterintelligence; investigating crimes that threaten state security such as terrorism, kidnapping, drug and human trafficking; and all issues concerning immigration. It coordinates and executes personal security of the president, his ministers, and persons at risk and is Colombia’s link to INTERPOL.[7] DAS employs about 7000 personnel of which little more than 800 work specifically on intelligence or counterintelligence issues.[8] A civilian, Andrés Peñate, who reports to the executive branch’s administrative department, heads DAS. Its annual budget is about \$100 million, though not all of that is focused on intelligence matters.

The military services, Air Force, Army, and Navy each have their own intelligence organizations which specialize in their area of expertise. The Army is focused on the military structures and operations of the illegal groups in Colombia. The Air Force specializes in interdicting aircraft operating illegally in Colombian territory, while the Navy concentrates on controlling waterways that illegal armed groups use to support operations and traffic drugs. All three services run human intelligence programs.

The military also has a joint intelligence organization, (the *Centro de Inteligencia Conjunto* or the D-2), which is responsible for coordinating all military intelligence and a joint intelligence center at Tres Esquinas Military Base, which is primarily focused on drug-related intelligence.

The National Police, which fall under control of the Defense Ministry, also have an intelligence unit known as DIPOL (*la Dirección de Inteligencia de la Policía Nacional*). DIPOL works the intelligence problem primarily in urban areas, attempting to curtail organized crime, break up insurgent cells and stop kidnapping, drug trafficking and other illicit activities.

The Treasury's UIAF (The Unit of Information and Financial Analysis or UIAF) was created in 1999 and was formed to combat money laundering. The UIAF has broad powers to investigate illegal activity related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, rebellion, extortion, and illicit enrichment. In addition to its investigatory practices, the UIAF analyzes illicit transactions and advises the Colombian Government on how to develop policies to deter and defeat illicit activity.

Finally, the independent Attorney General's Technical Corps of Investigations (CTI), is not an intelligence organization in the strictest sense; however, it does collect and analyze information in order to bring criminals to justice and does manage some HUMINT sources.^[9]

Democratic Civilian Control of Intelligence Services in Colombia

Democratic control of intelligence is exerted through the processes of direction and oversight. Direction is the guidance that civilian authorities give to their nation's intelligence community regarding its overall mission. Such guidance can be embodied in day-to-day orders and feedback as well as in a written national-security strategy. Oversight is a systematic process of reviewing an intelligence community's actions, organization, budget, internal policies, and legal constraints with the goal of improving effectiveness as well as ensuring democratic civilian control. There are five key elements where control of an intelligence community occurs: executive, legislative, judicial, internal, and through various external means.^[10] While some assert that democratic accountability only stems from bodies outside of the executive branch, this argument negates oversight mechanisms available to executive, such as the President's oversight board in the United States, and within the intelligence community itself such as professional and ethical standards.

The following paragraphs will document the changes in control over the intelligence community that have occurred in Colombia since 1990. I use this date because it is the starting point of the presidential term coinciding with the 1991 reformation of Colombia under a new constitution.^[11] In each segment discussed here, improvements in democratic control have generally improved effectiveness and have led to increased transparency as well.

Executive

President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), amongst myriad other reforms under his tenure, embarked on a policy to become more involved in security matters. His focus was on the security threat posed by drug cartels and he ordered intelligence and security services to focus their efforts on the drug lords. He reactivated the Presidential Advisory Council for Defense and National Security, a group that had been largely idle for 20 years, and organized a special advisory committee for coordinating national intelligence.^[12] Gaviria also tasked the Ministry of Defense, the Advisory Council, the DAS, and the National Directorate for criminal affairs to make policy recommendations on Colombia's security strategy. Gaviria attempted to strengthen the intelligence capabilities of both the DAS and military/police intelligence by acquiring technical equipment and providing training in order to make the organizations more effective.

Gaviria also instituted departmental security councils throughout the country in order to integrate intelligence at the local, regional, departmental and country-wide levels. Gaviria allowed the Ministry of Defense to continue its reorganization of military intelligence networks, which added a wide array of urban and rural intelligence networks, better integrated intelligence into military operations, and allocated additional resources for the military's intelligence organizations.^[13]

The presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was beset by corruption and poor relations with the United States. While Samper was able to dismantle the Cali Cartel under his watch, he and members of his government were alleged or proved to have had ties to funds from drug traffickers.^[14] This led to the U.S. "decertification" of Colombia as an ally in fighting drugs in 1996

and 1997, thus significantly reducing aid. The cutback in U.S. financial support, Samper's mismanagement of the economy and poor national strategy were contributing factors to the Colombian Military's ignoble defeats at the hands of the FARC from 1996 to 1998.[15]

President Samper did reorganize Colombia's intelligence community through Presidential Decree 2233 of 1995, which created the National Intelligence System or SINAI. SINAI included representation from the Minister of Defense, Minister of Justice; the heads of the DAS, and DIPOL; and the directors of the military services including the Colombian Joint Staff (though in practice, the intelligence heads of the military organizations were the participants). Its purpose was to unify and coordinate intelligence policy at a national level, strengthen cooperation, increase efficiency, and create new systems for the planning, collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.[16] Unfortunately, SINAI rarely met because Samper did not emphasize its importance, and it never really became effective.

When President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) took office, his focus was twofold: first, pursue peace with the FARC and, second, improve the security sector, which was in great need of repair by 1998. To achieve the first goal, Pastrana instituted the *Despeje* in November 1998. Later, Pastrana launched Plan Colombia as a way to simultaneously promote peace, combat narcotics, revive the economy and strengthen democracy in 2000.[17]

Pastrana pursued military restructuring aggressively and included its intelligence services. Indeed, improvements in military intelligence were given the second highest priority in the military's transformation plan.[18] Advances were made across the board to include collection, analysis, counterintelligence, training and military intelligence's ability to integrate into operations.

President Pastrana reorganized intelligence under Decree Law 218 of February 2000. The executive decree tasked the intelligence organization to "produce intelligence the state requires to make decisions and formulate policy related to the interior and exterior security of the country" and specified DAS functions and offices.[19]

Despite the reforms in the military and intelligence sectors, most would argue that Pastrana pursued peace blindly and the reforms he made in the military and intelligence sector were not well integrated into his national strategy.

The election of President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 and his reelection in 2006 significantly altered the security landscape in Colombia. Uribe was the benefactor of two important changes in Colombia. First, President Pastrana officially ended the *Despeje* in February 2002, depriving the FARC of its main sanctuary and disrupting critical logistics and troop mobility corridors. Second, the United States altered its policy that previously limited the use of U.S.-provided equipment to anti-drug operations, freeing it up for use in counterinsurgency operations.

Uribe promulgated his Defense and Democratic and Security Policy in 2003. This policy was a detailed plan for consolidating state control of the country, improving security, fighting the drug business, and fostering good governance.[20] It remains in effect today and is arguably the most coherent security strategy in Colombian history.

Building on his 2002 election victory and his national security policy, Uribe began to reassert state authority under a military campaign known as *Plan Patriota*, launched in mid-2003. Colombian government forces began by securing the region in and around Bogotá where the effort was largely successful.[21] By the end of 2004, the government was able to meet its goal of establishing a presence in each of the country's 1098 municipalities while just three years prior nearly 200 lacked any central government presence. Other security indicators were very positive in the first half of 2006 compared to just three years prior: homicides down by 30%, massacres down by 57%, kidnapping down by 73%, overall terrorist attacks down by 33%.[22]

President Uribe also made vital changes in the Colombian intelligence community. He established a Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) made up of all the state's intelligence bodies "responsible for producing consolidated intelligence analysis to provide the President and the Minister of Defense the necessary information to make decisions; to translate the government's security policies into intelligence requirements; and to coordinate the distribution of work, providing for specialization and avoiding duplication."^[23] The JIC meets twice a month, but lacks a permanent staff and, in practice, has limited authority.

Uribe also placed his personal stamp on a legal framework for the DAS, signing executive decree 643 of 2004, outlining the objectives, functions, direction and integration of the state. However, the decree does not clearly state roles and missions of any other intelligence organizations. Uribe continued reform of the DAS following a series of scandals that will be detailed later in this paper.

Uribe also reinvigorated the practice begun under President Gaviria incorporating the civilian populace into the security process. He instituted regional, district and municipal security councils composed of government officials, the business community, academics and other civil society actors and has attempted to ensure the information these councils provide feeds into the National Security and Defense Council.

A final point worth mentioning is that one of the most crucial aspects of President Uribe's Democratic and Security Policy focuses on transparency. His administration has held every government sector accountable for their activity and one can easily find information in Colombian government websites on administration effectiveness, including those of the intelligence community.

Other Oversight Entities

While the executive branch is the primary purveyor of control in Colombia, some mechanisms of oversight exist within the services themselves, from NGOs, the media and independent organizations within the Colombian government. The legislative branch plays only a very small oversight role.^[24]

Internal Oversight

As is often the case, intelligence services come under increased scrutiny following scandals or intelligence failures; Colombia is no exception. The DAS has suffered from a spate of public embarrassments in the past few years. Between February 2003 and June 2005, various parallel offices were discovered in Colombia where DAS personnel cached arms and munitions and held secret meetings with criminals. In June 2004, a DAS agent met with the chief assassin of one of the most notorious drug lords in Colombia and provided information on one of the kingpin's rivals. In September 2004, a senior DAS official was discovered to have erased the records of two top drug traffickers with AUC links in order to hamper extradition hearings. Finally, in the fall of 2005, a scandal broke linking a secret organization within the DAS to the AUC resulting in the resignations of then DAS director Jorge Noguera and his top intelligence official, Enrique Ariza as well as the dismissal of José Miguel Narváez, who was the deputy director. And while the scandal was pure internal politics, according to Jane's Intelligence Review, "the DAS remains heavily infiltrated...by the AUC."^[25]

In response, newly appointed DAS chief Andrés Peñate instituted a number of reforms that appear to improve internal oversight mechanisms and have largely been made public. Peñate's first act was to undergo a lie detector test and enforce the same provision on all his top officials. He has subsequently made the polygraph a recurring requirement. Peñate drew up a 'risk map' to show the areas of the DAS that were most vulnerable to infiltration. He reassigned the director of counterintelligence from a position subordinate to the director of intelligence to Peñate's personal

staff. He instituted a promotion system based on merit making all but the three top positions, which are presidential appointments, open to competition. Peñate also has begun to introduce business practices to return the DAS to its core functions of intelligence and terrorism prevention. Finally, he has started a process of integration with other intelligence agencies, already sharing more than 170 dossiers for joint investigations.[26] These changes have been well received within the DAS and agents are optimistic about Peñate's leadership.[27]

Legislative Oversight

The *Comisión Segunda* is a committee within the legislature responsible for international policy, national defense and public force - functions that would support legislative oversight of intelligence;[28] however, the legislature plays only a very small oversight role. Since the fall of 2006 the legislature has been working on a law designed to protect the identities of intelligence operators in the field involved in surveilling Colombian citizens and to formally legalize these activities, some of which are forbidden by the Colombian constitution.[29] However, it took another scandal for the Colombian congress to offer its first foray into overseeing the intelligence services. In late 2003, it was discovered that senior members of the security sector misappropriated the *Gastos Reservados*. In response, legislators passed a law in December 2003 making the *Gastos Reservados* account public and providing some scrutiny over spending.[30]

An additional scandal in which these reserve funds were misused surfaced in September 2006 when officers operating in a Bogotá army HUMINT unit used a demobilized FARC bomb expert to plant and defuse bombs in order to gain points toward promotion. From June – August 2006, there were seven bombs planted, however, one was not defused, exploded, killed a civilian and wounded 19 soldiers. This succession of discoveries, coupled with President Uribe's August 7 inauguration, led to the deployment of more than 40,000 troops in Bogotá, some patrolling strategic points in tanks. The Army was investigating the matter as of fall 2006.[31]

NGOs the Media and Other Oversight Entities

Other independent organizations play a role in overseeing intelligence functions. Colombia's highly respected think tank, *Fundación Seguridad y Democracia*, routinely analyzes security and intelligence policy and in 2004 published a very thorough and thoughtful book, in Spanish, *Intelligence reform: A democratic imperative*, by Andrés Villamizar. *Fundación* also held public a forum in November 2004 with important representation from the public and private sector debating key issues of control and transparency in the intelligence community.

Colombia's press plays a very active role in overseeing Colombia's intelligence services. Virtually every large-circulation daily and weekly covered the scandals outlined above. Colombia's press also routinely covers intelligence failures, for example the lack of good intelligence that led to the return to Colombia from the United States of an extradited alleged FARC member, Nelson Vargas Rueda and successes like the capture of FARC finance chief Simón Trinidad, the highest ranking FARC member ever captured. The media also routinely prints leaked intelligence documents such as the UIAF's thorough review of FARC finances.[32] This reporting caused such a stir that the JIC was forced to respond publicly. This effort by the media clearly led to increased transparency.

Colombia's constitution specifically provides for a somewhat unique oversight process of the intelligence services (and other agencies) through the *Contraloría* (Comptroller General) an entity independent of the executive, legislative or judicial branches. The comptroller's office conducts monthly, quarterly and annual audits of the DAS; however, these audits are focused on the overarching hiring processes, expenses and actual numbers of DAS personnel. Representatives

do not have access to classified information and do not have the expertise to make balanced recommendations for improving intelligence.

NGOs based inside and outside of Colombia also play a prominent role in bringing information regarding Colombian military and intelligence to the public domain. These organizations include Human Rights Watch, the Washington Office on Latin America, Center for International Policy, and Amnesty International, to name just a few.

Public Inquiries

Besides the change in leadership at the DAS following the rash of scandals detailed above, President Uribe appointed “The Special Commission for the DAS” to analyze the causes of the institution’s crises. The commission produced a report that is one of few, if not the only, publicly available government sponsored investigations of the intelligence community. Some of the more important findings included: a lack of institutional stability; no coherent policy for choosing leadership; confusion between personnel matters in general and counterintelligence; and a recommendation for “radical reform” of the DAS. The commission was favorably impressed with the steps taken by DAS director Peñate to implement greater internal control and to better integrate with national security policy.[33]

The commission also weighed in on greater issues regarding the Colombian intelligence community. It called intelligence work duplicative, functionally contradictory and uncoordinated, especially regarding operations. The commission noted these problems led to failures in actions of great importance to the state. It further called for a high commission to define a national intelligence strategy, develop institutional responsibilities, identify priorities and coordinate (*not centralize*) the intelligence activities without losing the autonomy of respective agencies.[34]

Specific recommendations for changes within the DAS were also presented. They included: the divesting of the DAS’s special protection mission but maintaining its role in INTERPOL and migration; a focus on recruitment (and minimum skills for entry), training, and personnel development plans; an increase in intelligence analysts; and emphasized treating intelligence as a profession highlighting four elements: specialized skills, meritocracy, democracy and a new culture of intelligence. The report also recommended changing the name of the department to the Administrative Department of Intelligence.[35]

While the commission represented a truly significant step in establishing accountability in the intelligence community and was lauded for many of its recommendations, it was roundly criticized for turning the investigation of AUC infiltration of the DAS over to the Attorney General’s office, thereby relieving the commission of perhaps its most relevant duty. Detractors also lamented the report’s findings that DAS’s institutional problems were based on constant personnel shuffles and blurred lines of authority rather than any larger structural issue.

Conclusion

In reviewing the democratic control regime in Colombia, one can conclude with three key points:

1. Colombia’s Intelligence Services are under more democratic control, and are at the same time more transparent, today than they were at the beginning of the 1990s.
2. Colombia’s intelligence community has also become more effective over the last two decades, though much of this improvement is due to the entire Colombian governmental apparatus emphasizing and improving their strategic focus and coordination, primarily under the watch of President Álvaro Uribe.
3. Although the intelligence services are both more transparent and effective than they were say 15 years ago, Colombia has sacrificed some transparency in lieu of effectiveness in

fighting its myriad internal threats, particularly by not implementing any legislative oversight mechanisms. This is especially so when comparing Colombia to other democracies. Regardless, one has to be impressed with the strides Colombia has made in a little more than a decade, especially since this has occurred while the state faces threats from internal actors.

So is there a tradeoff between transparency and effectiveness? Yes, of course. Clearly an intelligence community cannot make available to the public sources and methods. When taking into account the case of Colombia, as well as other countries that have reformed their intelligence communities such as Taiwan, Romania, Argentina, Brazil and even the United States, one might conclude that transparency actually improves effectiveness, at least up to a certain point

While this is true for a whole intelligence enterprise, it would be worthwhile applying this model to the each of the intelligence disciplines. Here, we might find how transparency impacts collection, analysis, security intelligence and covert operations. To emphasize the point, increased transparency, which generally begins with increased democratic control, will lead to improved effectiveness.

Thus, rather than asking *if* there is a tradeoff between transparency and effectiveness, we should be asking:

- *what* needs to be transparent (training, professionalism, organization);
- *to whom* (executive, legislative, judicial, internal, press); and
- *how much* transparency is enough so that the balance between transparency and effectiveness is at a peak.

About the Author

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References

1. For a brief yet thorough summary of impact of the drug cartels see Bruce M. Bagley, "Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 1990s," *Mama Coca*, January 5, 2001. One example of Escobar's strength was his organization's bombing of the DAS headquarters in 1989.
2. The *Despeje* was often referred to as a de-militarized zone, but that was a misnomer because it implied that no armed actors were operating in the area. Although the Colombian government did not maintain a military presence within the zone, the FARC most certainly did.

3. Key provisions in the law that were amended: AUC members wishing to benefit from reduced jail sentences had to confess their crimes, do so truthfully, or face trial later without the reduced prison sentence provisions; granted more time for investigators researching AUC crimes; required turnover of all AUC assets and reparations to victims; and ensured victims could participate in all aspects of prosecution.

4. See ICG, "Demobilizing the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?," *Latin America Report* No. 8, August 5, 2004; ICG, "Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice," *Latin America Report* No. 16, March 14, 2006; "Court Fixes Flaw in Demobilization Law," *Human Rights Watch*, May 19, 2006; and the July 27, 2006 edition of *Semana*, an issue dedicated to issues about the Justice and Peace Law.

5. "Seventh Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA)," Organization of American States, 4-5.

6. The information in this section is adapted from Steven C. Boraz "Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Colombia," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 19, No. 2, Spring 2006, 84-109. Further information is available at the websites of DAS; the Colombian Army; the Colombian Navy; the Colombian Air Force; and the UIAF.

7. Decreto 643 of 2004.

8. Carlos P. Gusatvo Arrieta et al, "Informe Final, Comisión Especial Para El DAS," Bogota, March 2006, 5.

9. Andrés Villamizar, *La Reforma de la inteligencia: Un imperativo democrático* (Bogota: Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia, 2004), 63.

10. Further detail on this concept can be found in Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz eds., *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin, University of Texas, 2007) which looks at the development of intelligence agencies in ten countries, especially in terms of democratic, civilian control.

11. Colombia's 1991 constitution established a wide range of freedoms and democratic norms typically identified as prerequisites in democratic transition including: civil and economic society freedoms, direct elections of departmental governors and the vice president, legalizing new political parties, giving Congress veto powers over cabinet nominees, and ensuring civilian control of the military. The Constitution also reorganized and defined specific roles for executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and added autonomous and independent organizations to monitor electoral processes, television, and finance.

12. A 1972 executive decree by President Misael Pastrana organized a National Security Council to coordinate national security issues. The Interior Minister was charged with running the organization which had representation from the DAS, and the ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Justice. The advisory committee on intelligence included the Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense; the Armed Forces Commander; Directors of the National Police and DAS; the Attorney General; the Country's Prosecutor and the President's Advisor for National Defense and Security.

13. The Colombian military relied on U.S. advisors to support this reorganization. See Order 200-05/91, Colombian Ministry of Defense.

14. Samper allegedly accepted \$6.1 million in contributions from the Cali Drug Cartel during his 1994 campaign for president and his defense minister, Fernando Botero, was sentenced to prison for illicit enrichment.

15. There were myriad other factors that contributed to the military's defeats including the Colombian Military's unwillingness to take the FARC and the ELN seriously, poor training, poor military equipment, a lack of any real air mobility assets, among others.

16. *Decreto* 2233, December 22, 1995.

17. See the U.S. Embassy to Colombia website.

18. The top priority was given to improving the quality and talent of the military forces through personnel and institutional development.

19. *Decreto* 218 of February 2000.

20. See *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática* (Bogotá: Presidencia de la República, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, República de Colombia, 2003).

21. Securing Bogotá was both important and symbolic as the FARC had set off bombs and fired mortars near the inauguration site and the Colombian congress building on the day of Uribe's inauguration.

22. The statistics used here are projections based on official government statistics through May of 2006. Statistics for 2003 are contained in *Informe Anual de Derechos Humanos Y Derecho Internacional Humano 2004*, page 228. Statistics for 2006 may be viewed at: <http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/index.php?newsecc=observatorio>.

23. *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática*, 35.

24. For a discussion on types of intelligence control mechanisms see Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau, "Reforming Intelligence: Democracy and Effectiveness," *Journal of Democracy* 17, No. 3, July 2006, 28-42.

25. "Colombian Secret Police under the Microscope," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 1, 2005.

26. See "Interview: Andrés Peñate, Director of Colombia's Department of Security Administration," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1, 2006; and "Los movimientos poco inteligentes en el DAS," *La Semana*, April 16, 2006.

27. Author's correspondence with Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau following a September 2006 seminar he conducted in Melgar, Colombia on intelligence and democracy for The Center for Civil-Military Relations at Naval Postgraduate School, October, 2006.

28. See Secretaria del Senado, República de Colombia, Comisión Segunda at: http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/Comision_segunda.htm. (Link currently inactive.)

29. Proyecto de Ley No. 216/04 Senado – 008/04 Cámara.

30. See "Gastos reservados de las Fuerzas Armadas no serán secretos," *El Pais*, December 10, 2003.

31. See "Dos Oficiales de grupo elite del Ejército, tras falsos atentados terroristas en Bogotá," *El Tiempo.com*, September 9, 2006 and Constanza Vieira, "COLOMBIA: Bombs Explode in Government's FACE," *Inter Press Service News Agency*, September 18, 2006.

32. See for example; "Guerrillero regresa a Colombia," *El Universal*, July 8, 2004; "Captura de Simon Trinidad," *El Tiempo*, January 4, 2004; and "Las cuentas de las FARC," *Revista Semana*, January 31, 2005.

33. Carlos P. Gusatvo Arrieta et al, "Informe Final, Comisión Especial Para El DAS," Bogota, March 2006.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*