

Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I

DAVID JABLONSKY

War, like Gaul, is divided into three parts. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 introduced this three-part formulation to the Army, and the 1986 version builds upon the structure by defining strategy, operational art, and tactics as the “broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war.”¹ This separation is not, as it was in Caesar’s case, merely for organizational convenience. It is, rather, a recognition that war is a complex business requiring coordination from the highest levels of policymaking to the basic levels of execution. Without such a division, as General Glenn K. Otis has pointed out, “We will talk by each other even as professionals.”²

The intermediate or operational level is at the pivotal location in this structure. Simply put, the commander’s basic mission at this level is to determine the sequence of actions most likely to produce the military conditions that will achieve the strategic goals (as shown in the diagram on the next page). The operational commander, in other words, must be constantly interacting with the strategic level even as he gauges his adversary and determines how to use tactical forces to accomplish that sequence of actions. It is this interaction that makes strategy the key to the operational level of war.


The commanders and staff at this level must recognize, as Marcus Tullius Cicero did two millennia ago, that an “army is of little value in the field unless there are wise councils at home.”³ On a more modern note, Germany’s operational and tactical brilliance in World War II is often positively cited concerning the operational level of war. What is not so frequently noted is that this brilliance was no substitute for a sound and

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coherent strategy and that, in fact, Germany was defeated primarily because Hitler's strategic objectives far exceeded his military capabilities. To this strategic-operational disconnect, Hitler's field commanders responded, as one historian has noted, "like short-money players in a table-stakes poker game, concentrating on winning battlefield victories to demonstrate their *virtu* and avert the end as long as possible."⁴

Ends, Ways, Means

Strategic guidance is the link between the highest level of war and the operational commanders. This guidance should, in theory, contain a balanced blend of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources).⁵ The proper blending of these interdependent elements, however, has always been a difficult process, made even more so in the modern era where limited objectives and diffusion of military power are the norms. "In the past," Henry Kissinger has pointed out, "the major problem of strategists was to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary period, the problem more frequently is how to discipline the available power into some relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute."⁶

Ideally, the strategic ends, ways, and means provided to the operational commander should allow him to achieve a positive result without serious fighting as did Moltke's encirclement of the French army at Sedan in 1870 or Allenby's entrapment of the Turks in the Samarian hills in

1918.⁷ At the very least, there should be some harmonization of these factors that allows a successful operational outcome, no matter how protracted the struggle. Reflecting on the Vietnam War in this regard, General Palmer viewed it as the government's responsibility "to see that the ends and means are kept in balance—that the strategic objectives under the strategic concept adopted are achievable with the forces and other resources expected to be available."⁸

That there was an imbalance between these factors during the Vietnam War has become almost a cliché, particularly in terms of Clausewitz's injunction that no one should go to war "without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."⁹ Unlike Hanoi, Washington possessed no clearly defined political objectives, or, if it did, it never succeeded in impressing these firmly in the mind of the body politic. Without these objectives, there could be no overall grand strategic design. In the absence of such a design, the Joint Chiefs advocated a strategic concept that included partial mobilization, land and air actions in Laos and Cambodia, a naval blockade of North Vietnam, and the preparation of a US logistics base in Thailand to deter intervention by the People's Republic of China. The fact that these recommendations were never fully accepted consigned General Westmoreland to a protracted struggle of attrition at the operational level. As a consequence, the Chiefs became caught up in MACV requests for ever higher force levels that could only be reviewed, as General Palmer has pointed out, "in a strategic vacuum without a firm feeling for what the ultimate requirement might be."¹⁰

Ultimately, therefore, operational concepts must be designed to achieve political objectives. In World War II, the United States was able to finesse the problem of defining objectives somewhat by adopting the transcendent goal of unconditional surrender. No political directive, for instance, was ever issued to General Eisenhower by either his American superiors or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In fact, Washington consistently indicated to Eisenhower that "military solutions were preferred."¹¹ In Korea, on the other hand, the political objective was finally modified to bring it in line with the resources Washington was willing to expend. On a more limited note, the Falklands and Grenada actions are examples of fitting the operational concepts to the political objectives.¹²

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Nowhere is the interdependence between the strategic and operational levels more apparent than in the matter of means or resources, particularly since military strategy in the modern era has become even more dependent on logistics than in the 18th century. The 1.5 million artillery shells that were positioned for the 1916 British offensive on the Somme encouraged the adoption of static warfare at the operational level because the munitions could not be moved forward, laterally, or even backward.¹³ Logistical considerations, as one historian concluded in discussing General Eisenhower's decision for a broad thrust to the Rhine in September 1944, "exert a strong influence not only on strategic planning but also on the conduct of operations once the battle has begun."¹⁴

Certainly, this conclusion applies to the Eastern Front in the same war where the *Wehrmacht* fought with an antiquated logistical system.¹⁵ In this regard, it is often pointed out that Hitler should not have dissipated his forces in simultaneous operational-level offenses along three divergent axes, but instead should have concentrated them for a single thrust toward Moscow. This ignores the fact, however, that the road and rail networks available would not have allowed such a narrow concentration of forces.¹⁶ In a similar manner, the South lost the American Civil War primarily because its strategic means did not match its strategic ends and ways. No amount of operational finesse on the part of the South's great captains could compensate for the superior industrial strength and manpower that General Grant could deploy. Ultimately, the capability of the Union generals to bring the largest and best-equipped forces into their theaters meant, as Michael Howard has pointed out, "that the operational skills of their adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant."¹⁷

The Civil War also illustrates another aspect of the strategic ends-ways-means equation that had to be relearned as part of the Vietnam experience. The political objectives as well as the operational instrument are linked inextricably to the other part of the Clausewitzian trinity—the national will—or what Professor Howard refers to as the social dimension of strategy. That dimension on the part of the Union is what prevented the early Southern victories at the operational level from being strategically decisive and what ultimately allowed time for the enormous logistical potential north of the Potomac to be realized.¹⁸

Constraints, Restraints, and the Continuing Dialogue

Complicating the harmonization of ends, ways, and means is the fact that strategic guidance is heavily influenced by international and domestic political considerations. These considerations, in turn, determine actions or methods that can constrain commanders at the operational level. The present compromise concept of Forward Defense in NATO strategy is one example. In World War II, Hitler (unlike NATO's commander today)

had ample space to trade after his deep penetration of Russia stalled. But for psychological and economic reasons he ordered his forces on a continuing basis to hold ground at all costs. The military results were devastating to the German effort at the operational and ultimately at the strategic level.¹⁹ In a similar manner, actual restrictions may negate or narrow the range of a commander's operational alternatives. Some may concern the use of particular weaponry, as was the case with nuclear weapons in Korea and Vietnam. Others may prohibit operations either in certain areas, such as the North Korean frontier with the Soviet Union during the Korean War, or against certain targets, such as the Red River dikes in Vietnam.²⁰

Operational commanders should consistently examine the effects of such constraints and restrictions on the achievement of their goals. Where these political factors seriously threaten his success, the commander should seek either relaxation of the offending restrictions or adjustment of the goals accordingly. As Liddell Hart points out, "The military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily . . . impossible."²¹ It can sometimes be a very near call. In the fall of 1973, for instance, the Israeli Defense Force was in the dangerous position of depending on a reserve force that required a minimum of two days' warning for mobilization while faced with a situation in which there could be no real warning. From an operational perspective, the solution was to mobilize the reserves, wait, and then launch preemptive attacks against the large masses of troops deployed by Egypt and Syria on their frontiers with Israel. Full-scale mobilization, however, is an expensive proposition. Moreover, as Golda Meir's government well realized, Israel could no longer afford the political risk inherent in a 1967-like preemption, particularly in terms of the Soviet reaction, growing European neutralism, the new political threat of Arab oil diplomacy, and, above all, increased reliance on the United States, whose increasingly isolationist mood was already apparent.²²

There should thus be, in other words, a continuing dialogue between the strategic and operational commanders. The importance of such a process was demonstrated during the Vietnam War when US military leaders failed to advise the civilian leadership that the strategy being pursued was not working and that it would in all probability fail to achieve American objectives. In this context, to complain, as some have done, that the Vietnam War was won militarily but lost politically is to misunderstand the nature of the essential strategic-operational linkage—the same mistake made by the German military leaders in 1918 who attempted to separate the two interdependent political-military dimensions by blaming their defeat on a political "stab in the back."²³

Korea offers an equally instructive case in terms of a systematic continuing dialogue between the strategic and operational levels. On the

positive side, General MacArthur used such a process to bring about the Inchon landing, the great operational success of the war. In many respects, his personal intervention was much like that of Hitler's in 1940, which overcame the army High Command's resistance to the innovative Manstein plan and thus made the French Campaign possible. In MacArthur's case, of course, the intervention was made from the lower end of the strategic-operational connection against opposition that included Generals Bradley and Collins, who had been in the European Theater of Operations during the costly near-fiasco of Anzio and were thus doubly conscious of the high risks involved in amphibious operations.²⁴ Typically, the operational artist prevailed. "If they say it is too big a gamble," MacArthur told his courier to the JCS just prior to the operation, "tell them I said this is throwing a nickel in the pot after it has been opened for a dollar. The big gamble was Washington's decision to put American troops on the Asiatic mainland."²⁵

The darker side of MacArthur's dialogue with the strategic level is well known. Despite the change in conflict aims as the Korean War progressed, the civilian and military strategic leaders did not deviate from the concept of limited war. It is no reflection on MacArthur's great operational successes in World War II and at Inchon to question whether he fully appreciated the strategic implications of the limited war he was fighting—the type of conflict, as his successor pointed out, "in which the objectives are specifically limited in the light of our national interest and our current capabilities."²⁶ Certainly, the aura of those earlier successes, the rank and generational differences between MacArthur and the JCS, and the fact that he had been a virtual warlord in the Pacific for decades inhibited a functional and open dialogue between the operational and strategic levels.²⁷

Strategic Influence on the Operational Perspective

The strategic connection challenges the operational commanders to broaden their perspective, to think beyond the limits of immediate combat. Napoleon, for instance, was not the benefactor of any great breakthrough in technology. He was, however, willing to take chances in expanding the concepts of time and space under which military commanders had labored for thousands of years. In order to harness these two variables in terms of control and uncertainty, commanders had traditionally kept their forces closely concentrated. Napoleon, in contrast, reorganized and decentralized his *Grande Armée* so that its parts could operate independently over relatively extended time and space with a higher degree of uncertainty in order to achieve the operational whole. Matching that whole to strategic objectives, as Clausewitz recognized, was the key link in the process—one that was simpler for Napoleon since he was also the political leader for much of his later career.²⁸



Courtesy USAMHI

The operational coup at Inchon on 16 September 1950 reversed the tide of the war. Here, US 7th Division forces during the UN advance of 20 May to 24 June 1951.

“A higher commander,” Field Marshal Slim wrote, “must think ‘big.’”²⁹ Slim’s advice is particularly true at the operational level of war, for at this level the commander must deal, however derivatively, with strategic goals that require him to focus on broad but decisive operational objectives extended over time and space beyond the tactical realm. These objectives can range anywhere from destruction of committed forces or reserves to co-opting allies to even more abstract goals such as eroding the enemy’s public support. Neither Dien Bien Phu (1953) nor Tet (1968), for instance, was militarily crippling to the French and American armies, respectively; yet these events struck decisively at the popular and political support of both wars.

It is not always easy to pinpoint the decisive operational weaknesses of the enemy. But when the strategic link is present, what Clausewitz termed the enemy’s center of gravity stands revealed, and it is possible to take the initiative, even control of the war, by focusing on “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”³⁰ In the Punic Wars, for example, Scipio fought without success against Hannibal on the Italian peninsula. When the Roman general moved his campaign to North Africa, however, he forced Hannibal to abandon his successful campaign in Italy

and return to Carthage where he was eventually defeated. In a similar manner, the Confederacy set the pattern for much of the American Civil War by keeping its main weight in northern Virginia. Grant's campaign in the West put some counterweight along the Mississippi. But it was Sherman's campaign into the heart of the Confederacy that shifted the weight of the war. "I think our campaign of the last month," he wrote from Savannah, "as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though we were operating within the sound of his artillery."³¹

Broad objectives mean broad vision. "From the beginning of this campaign," General Eisenhower wrote in September 1944, "I have always *visualized* that as soon as substantial destruction of the enemy forces in France could be accomplished, we should advance rapidly on the Rhine by pushing through the Aachen Gap in the north and through the Metz Gap in the south."³² The operational commander, in other words, describes a concept that envisions, for the most part, the accomplishment of the strategic and operational missions despite the fact that he can seldom describe operations beyond the first tactical decisions. This is why campaign plans are divided into phases and why variations on the concept are essential as the campaign proceeds.³³ This is also why, ultimately, there must be a clear delineation of the operational commander's intent, an aspect that has grown even more important as technological advances, larger forces, and greater time and space considerations have increased the need for flexibility and initiative in subordinate commands.

There is, then, sufficient strategic canvas normally available for the operational artist to sketch out a broad, overall framework for the employment of his forces. Within that framework, Napoleon combined a vivid imagination with a formidable capacity for calculating space in terms of time to predict outcomes beyond the individual battles. In one case, he accurately foresaw the location of a decisive encounter several weeks before it occurred.³⁴ And in World War II, Field Marshal von Manstein believed that an operational commander at the army group level should be able to predict the general way operations would proceed anywhere from four to six weeks in advance.³⁵

Such prescience, of course, is of little use if it is not fully acted upon at the operational level and can, in such a case, adversely affect the strategy upon which it is predicated. In 1940, most of the attention the German High Command lavished on the plan for the invasion of the West was focused on the actual breakthrough, and very little on its immediate aftermath. The possibility that the plan would lead to total victory over France, as Alistair Horne has indicated, "seemed so remote that beyond the operation itself no thought whatsoever had been given to how a knockout blow might be administered to Britain."³⁶ Britain's successful evacuation at Dunkirk was the immediate consequence. And what appeared to be a

spectacular operational success in the French campaign actually meant that Hitler failed in his principal strategic aim of coercing Britain into accepting German hegemony on the continent.³⁷

The Continuum of War

The strategic level is dominant in the continuum of war because, as we have noted, it is here that the war's political goals are defined. It is the process of interacting with the strategic level, directly or derivatively, that causes the operational commander to form his unique perspective (again, as shown in the earlier diagram). For he alone, to be successful, must conceptualize a military condition or conditions that will ultimately achieve the strategic goals. As indicated by the two-way arrow in the diagram, this is a constant interactive process, normally requiring many refinements or revisions as he plans and executes his campaigns or major operations. These adjustments will affect, in turn, how engagements and battles are sequenced at the tactical level to achieve the operational military situation he desires. In this manner, as Clausewitz has written, "the commander is always on the high road to his goal."³⁸

In one sense, then, the operational artist is an impressionist. There is movement all about him. Strategic goals and guidance shift as do the individual pieces of the tactical mosaics. All of this is distilled over time and space to form a picture, a one-time impression of military conditions at the operational level that will achieve the strategic objectives. Strategy remains the dynamic and informing vision. If new elements enter the operational commander's ken, the operational picture will change to form a new impression of what must be created militarily to meet the strategic imperative.

When that imperative is not the dominant force in the process—when, in other words, operational and tactical considerations determine strategy—the result is usually disastrous. In late 19th-century France, for instance, the officer corps distrusted the trend by the Third Republic toward shorter terms of military service, which it believed threatened the army's professional character and traditions. Adopting an offensive operational doctrine and elevating it to the strategic level was a means to combat this trend, since there was general agreement that an army consisting primarily of reservists and short-term conscripts could be used only in the defense. The officers' philosophy was summed up by their leader, General Joffre, who explained that in planning for the next war he had "no preconceived idea, other than a full determination to take the offensive with all my forces assembled."³⁹ Under these circumstances, French doctrine became increasingly unhinged from strategic reality as it responded to the more immediate demands of domestic and intragovernmental politics. The result was France's ill-conceived strategic lunge in 1914 toward its former possessions in the east, a lunge which nearly provided a sufficient margin of

assistance for Germany's Schlieffen Plan (itself another misguided product of heeding operational needs at the expense of strategy).⁴⁰

An associated and equally important problem can occur when the operational perspective becomes so narrow or self-absorbed that there is a strategic disconnect. Ironically, this type of problem is illustrated by the desert campaigns of Field Marshal Rommel, normally considered a paragon of operational virtue. North Africa was not a major theater for Germany, which had entered the conflict there only because of Italian reverses at the hands of the British in the fall of 1940. Rommel repeatedly violated the intended economy-of-force strategy by attempting to advance beyond a reasonable distance from his bases. His initial successes in these forays prompted him in March 1941 to raise his sights to include the seizure of the Suez Canal and the eastern oil fields.⁴¹ Unfortunately for Germany, these operational goals were neither derived from, nor consonant with, Berlin's military strategy. The result was strategic resourcing priorities that never matched the operational sustainment needs of the *Afrika Korps*.⁴²

There may be times, of course, when strategic demands dictate an operational mission without full resourcing. A case in point is the World War II campaign at Guadalcanal, where in order to achieve the strategic aim of preventing Japanese expansion to the south, the Joint Chiefs directed the operational seizure of that island as a calculated risk under relatively unfavorable conditions.⁴³ Unlike Rommel's example, however, the decision was a strategic one. Operating in a similar strategic framework in the same conflict, General MacArthur accomplished the operational objectives of his island-hopping campaign with extremely limited resources in just one of several theaters of operations in a secondary theater of war.⁴⁴ This contrast to Rommel's narrow operational perspective would have been appreciated by Clausewitz. "A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius," he wrote, "by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little."⁴⁵

NOTES

1. US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, August 1982), p. 2-3; and revised version of FM 100-5 (May 1986), p. 9.

2. Interview with General Glenn K. Otis, 11 December 1985.

3. Quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Vietnam: Lessons Learned, Unlearned and Relearned," *The Art of War Quarterly*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., June 1983, p. 32.

4. Dennis E. Showalter, "A Dubious Heritage: The Military Legacy of the Russo-German War," *Air University Review*, 36 (March-April 1985), 7.

5. Henry E. Eccles, "Strategy—The Theory and Application," *Naval War College Review*, 31 (May-June 1979), 13; and Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, ed. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1986), pp. 3-7.

6. Henry A. Kissinger, ed., *Problems of National Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 5.

7. The operational commander should not seek battle so much as a situation "so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this" (B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* [New York: Praeger, 1967; 2nd ed.], p. 339; Hart's emphasis).

8. Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 45.
9. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 579. That this injunction has been taken to heart by the civilian and military leadership of the armed forces is amply illustrated. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, for instance, used the quote in his November 1984 speech in which he outlined six major preconditions for committing US combat forces. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense* 85 (January 1985), p. 10.
10. Palmer, p. 46.
11. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory* (New York: Viking, 1973), p. 492. As a consequence, Eisenhower reached his decisions regarding the Russian entries into Berlin and Prague on primarily military grounds. When viewed in this military context, as Professor Pogue points out, the decision was proper. By halting Allied troops short of Berlin and Prague, Eisenhower took the quickest way to end the European war with the fewest number of US casualties, leaving the maximum number available for deployment to the Pacific.
12. Interview with General William E. DuPuy, 30 October 1985.
13. Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), p. 233. On the importance of logistics as an integral link between strategy and tactics, see Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1965), p. 69.
14. Roland G. Ruppenthal, "Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy," in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1960), p. 419. General McClellan in 1862 poses a prime example of letting operational sustainment drive a campaign and thus the overall strategy. McClellan had been greatly influenced by the studies of logistical mismanagement in the Crimean War. As a consequence, he was so preoccupied with the technical logistical phase of maintaining the Army of the Potomac that "he would go down in history as a failure in strategy and grand tactics" (R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *Military Heritage of America* [Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1980], p. 207).
15. The system was "reminiscent of the Thirty Years War" (Showalter, p. 7).
16. Van Creveld, p. 175.
17. Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (Summer 1979), 977.
18. *Ibid.* See also Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1981), pp. 7-19.
19. This was certainly true from Stalingrad on. But when Hitler gave the initial order to hold before Moscow in December 1941, he probably saved his troops. See Earl F. Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin: The Great Defeat in the East* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1984), p. 15.
20. Richard H. Sinnreich, briefing on Army Doctrine and the Operational Level of War, 8 October 1985, delivered at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
21. Liddell Hart, p. 351.
22. Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 341-42.
23. Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 49; Howard, p. 981; Palmer, pp. 46, 201.
24. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 465. "We drew up a list of every conceivable and natural handicap," one staff member remarked, "and Inchon had 'em all" (p. 467).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 475.
26. Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 245.
27. General Collins commented after Inchon that MacArthur's prestige "was so overpowering that the Chiefs hesitated thereafter to question later plans and decisions of the general, which should have been challenged" (James, p. 485). In the fall of 1950, when General Vandenberg was asked by General Ridgway why the JCS did not simply order MacArthur what to do, the Air Force Chief responded: "What good would that do? He wouldn't obey the orders. What can we do?" (James, p. 537)
28. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 101-02. For Clausewitz's treatment of time and space, see Harold W. Nelson, "Space and Time in *On War*," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 134-49.
29. W. J. Slim, *Conduct of War* (London: The War Office, 1950), p. 22. In 1809, for instance, Napoleon carried a hand-drawn set of maps that covered all of Europe west of Russia (Van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 290).
30. Clausewitz, pp. 595-96.
31. Bruce Catton, *This Hallowed Ground* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 362.

32. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The War Years: IV*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1970), p. 2121. Emphasis added.
33. In discussing the individual actions that make up a campaign, Clausewitz pointed out that "most of these matters have to be based on assumptions that may not prove correct, while other, more detailed orders cannot be determined in advance at all" (Clausewitz, p. 177).
34. Van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 63.
35. Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 422.
36. Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 159. The problem with the plan was demonstrated the preceding March when Hitler asked General Guderian what he would do after establishing a bridgehead across the Meuse at Sedan on the fifth day of the campaign. "He was the first person who had thought to ask me this vital question," Guderian later commented. Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), p. 92.
37. After Dunkirk, Britain drew the United States even more into its war effort. With this first step in altering the balance, as Michael Geyer points out, "the strategic odds once again began to outrun operational successes" (Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare," 1914-1945," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986], p. 577).
38. Clausewitz, p. 182.
39. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 229.
40. Jack Snyder, "Civil Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914-1984," *International Security*, 9 (Summer 1984), 108, 133.
41. "My first objective," he wrote in early March 1941, "will be the reconquest of Cyrenaica; my second northern Egypt and the Suez Canal." Quoted in T. L. McMahon, *Operational Principles: The Operational Art of Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: USACGSC, 1985), p. 48.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 54, 125-27.
43. Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1965), p. 108.
44. Interview with General John R. Galvin, 28 October 1985. MacArthur, of course, had the same problem in Korea because of what was perceived as a worldwide, monolithic communist threat. The JCS, in effect, told MacArthur not to count on reinforcements from the general reserve in shaping his theater strategy (James, p. 179).
45. Clausewitz, p. 177.

In "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part II," which is to appear in the Summer 1987 issue of Parameters, Colonel Jablonsky will focus on the framework wherein US strategic goals are translated into operational missions on the battlefield. He will pay particular attention to strategic guidance in the theater of war, including its joint and combined dimensions.
