

The Engagement of Military Voice

CHARLES D. ALLEN and BREENA E. COATES

Distinctive operational competencies from the civilian and military sectors provide usable knowledge to both.¹ When military voice (in the form of counsel, advice, guidance, and suggestions) is given appropriate credence, unique capabilities flow easily back to the civilian leaders of the armed forces. When voice and counsel are muted or constrained, the information flow will entropy and valuable knowledge will be lost. Using military experience as case studies, this article discusses the principal form of error occurring due to the principals' ineffective engagement of the military voice. This is referred to as "The Error of the Third Kind—E_{III}."² This article examines two sources of E_{III}: principal-agent dynamics and administrative structures. We then apply the construct of organizational justice to the process associated with engagement of military voice. Providing examples of cases that examine the consideration of the military voice will inform leader-follower, advice-and-consent dynamics in the private and nonprofit sectors of enterprise.

Knowledge Transfer and Sharing

It is important for the public administration community—academic scholars as well as civilian and military practitioners—to take account of, understand, and appreciate the realities of leader-follower relationships with respect to voice dynamics. The military is the largest public-sector organization in the United States in terms of personnel and funding. There are over 1.5 million active-duty service members and 800,000 supporting civilians, with defense accounting for more than 50 percent of discretionary funding in the federal budget. As a public entity, it has significant impact on a number of the managerial and operational aspects of other organizations. In diplomatic and security endeavors, the military is the globe-spanning arm of the nation vis-à-vis its operations around the world. It often plays a critical role in terms of its contributions to best practices in public and business administration, as well as a number of other disciplines. It experiments with new technologies and innovates. The military has a strong training and ed-

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 2010		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2010	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Engagement of Military Voice				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College,ATTN: Parameters ,122 Forbes Ave,Carlisle,PA,17013-5238				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 15	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ucational component that develops its professional personnel (officers, senior enlisted, and civilians) throughout their careers. The organizations in the military are heavily invested in after-action-reviews (AARs). The AAR tools of the military are arguably among the best of their kind when it comes to “organizational learning.”³

The military’s distinctive competencies set it apart from ordinary organizations and establish it as unique. From the revised resource-based view of the firm presented by organizational researchers Jay Barney and William Hesterly, the distinctive competencies of valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally integrated (VRIO) capabilities of the firm are necessary for competitive advantage.⁴ Transferring this concept to the military, we see that it has distinctive capabilities unmatched by other organizations. These are:

- **Rare and Inimitable Operational and Tactical Planning Expertise:** This competency is found in the military’s unique ability in technical planning and executing operations. When given an assignment, the military will invariably perform the task with unmatched and inimitable efficiency and effectiveness, which can be challenging for any large organization.⁵ This expertise is developed through education and deliberate practice in the application of military force to achieve task, mission, and policy objectives. As noted by civil-military relations scholar James Burk, the military exercises professional jurisdiction “defined by the boundaries of the domain within which expert knowledge is applied” and that is acknowledged by the stakeholders in national defense.⁶ The legitimacy of military professionals is derived from development of objective and abstract knowledge for the field of military science. This legitimacy derives from the Constitution and has remained intact for over 200 years.

- **Organizationally Integrated Economies of Scope and Scale:** The newly restructured brigade combat teams with the supporting units reflect these economies in today’s Army. The Modular Force, along with the command and control elements within joint force headquarters, are distinctive organizational structures that create economies of scope by enlarging possibilities without a greater demand for resources. These organizations also create economies of scale in per-unit costs primarily achieved through an exchange in the types of equipment and manpower required for specific deployments and in combat operations. These mobile and reconnecting com-

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plex organizational structures provide lessons for matrix organizations in the corporate and public sectors.

- **Inimitable Competitive Advantage:** In this instance a distinctive competency of the military lies in its bargaining power over suppliers and buyers that is rare in other militaries and militias. The American military, in general, has the opportunity to access the best research and development (R&D) the world has to offer, resulting in a minimal threat of substitution of products and services.

- **The Inimitable Strength of America's SMART Power:** The application of R&D in both soft and hard elements of power provides the military an advantage. The soft elements are reflected in the diplomatic strategies of kinship, friendship, cooperation, accommodation, exchange and mutual harvest, and collusion; and are combined with the hard entrepreneurial elements (e.g., science and technological innovations) to provide the public and private domains with additional advantages. The power and prestige of the military to the nation can be captured in the term SMART power.⁷

Some scholars are concerned that these VRIO competencies give the military undue power and influence in the civilian policy formulation process. Israeli scholar Kobi Michael asserts that his military inappropriately led the civilian arm to make choices that eventually determined strategy for Israeli-Palestinian security coordination.⁸ It is Michael's assessment that when competencies of military leaders are highly valued by their civilian masters, there is a danger of the military filling the vacuum left by ineffective policy development.

It is clear that the military has much to offer in terms of knowledge gained from operations that provide input for the practical aspects of strategic decision-making. Scholars utilize such knowledge to theorize about events that do not necessarily fit into present-day assumptions, thereby creating new realities. Yet, the public administration community has yet to effectively engage, academically or practically, in a direct exchange with its military counterparts. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen commented on the need for dialogue: "One of the challenges for me is to somehow prevent a chasm from developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy-makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and so unrelenting."⁹ In the best tradition of democracy—i.e., many voices—all parties should be invited into open discussions, with the accompanying responsibility that they actively participate in good faith. From such dialogue, *metanoia* or transformative change may well ensue, particularly in the arenas associated with strategic decision-making.¹⁰

As observed by management scholar Peter Drucker, practical knowledge comes first and then theory: “Intellectuals and scholars tend to believe that ideas come first, which then lead to new political, social, economic, psychological realities. This methodology does exist, but it is the exception. As a rule, theory does not precede practice.”¹¹ Theory, for Drucker, was a creature derived from symbiosis of observations from praxis into an approximate blueprint or code for understanding military and foreign relations issues. Hence, it is not far-fetched to say that praxis could be the senior factor of knowledge advancement. Security strategies (or public policies), especially our most formal ones, are in many cases theories of how the world should be; they are abstract codifications, until tested in the field. Building on Drucker, policy-makers in the security arena need to take heed both *ex ante* and *ex post* of military observations and direct experiences. This will provide them with an understanding of how the world is from those who have experienced it and know it intimately as Participant/Observers in local (emic), case-based (idiographic), and hermeneutical conditions. Senior military professionals bring practical, usable knowledge (providing internal validity) in discussions related to national and global public management concerns.

The practical problems of management for military leaders are both different and similar to that of other public administrators. Where they are different lies in the context—from their embedments within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. The lessons from VUCA, however, flow back in diverse streams to inform public and private management. Where the challenges of management are similar is that leaders in both the military and the public sector deal with quandaries, dilemmas, puzzles, and paradoxes stemming from principal-agent tensions and organizational structures.

Voice in Principal-Agent Dynamics and E_{III}

The Principal-Agent Problem

Viewed through the lens of the principal-agency theory,¹² the informational asymmetries between civilian leaders in the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and Congress (the principals), and senior military professionals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and within combatant commands (the agents) can be examined and understood. The interests of the two entities never completely overlap. The principal has access to a wider and more global ambit of information on national security, while the agent has deeper, more specialized knowledge of the application of military force. Conversely, there is limited knowledge and expertise in the integration of other elements of national power. Each knowledge set has its own ideological ar-

rangements. It is not uncommon for one group to create unnecessary agency costs associated with resource consumption due to disconnects between the worldviews. The need for power, described as N-pow by David McClelland,¹³ explains how agents may create situations of excessive resource consumption for their own power maximization. Such manifestations often exist in weapon procurement programs as portrayed in the comedic tale of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in the film, *Pentagon Wars*. The principal may also wish to impose his will and maximize power for socio-political reasons or simply because of hubris, as was the case with a number of former Secretaries of Defense. This article will examine the asymmetries in the civil-military relationship. While it is not realistic to completely eliminate agency conflicts, given the nature and importance of the civilian military relationship, the exchange and acceptance of usable knowledge remain paramount.

E_{III} and the Principal Agent Issue

A central issue in problem structuring is how well structure correlates to the original problematic situation. Because of the complex nature of the public sector, particularly within DOD and DOS, there are quandaries, conundrums, and other problematic situations, for which no single solution suffices. In other words, as systems theorist Russell Ackoff has argued, these problematic situations are composed of systems of interdependent complexities which he calls “messes.”¹⁴ Also known as “an ill-structured problem”¹⁵ or “wicked problem,”¹⁶ they represent a complex problem with many actors and problematic conditions—often in conflict with one another. Public policy scholars Ian Mitroff and Frederick Betz observed that conceptual structures indicate a strong dedication by a particular decision-maker or policy adviser to a particular conceptualization of reality.¹⁷ It is at this juncture that there may be a strategic disconnect between the views of the advice giver and policy decision-maker. As shown by decision theorist Howard Raiffa, an intense dedication to a particular ideology by one or the other party results in error—the Error of the Third Kind (E_{III}).¹⁸ Raiffa notes that the analyst commits this type of error by providing an incorrect substantive representation of a problem when required to provide the correct one, or the decision-maker may reject the correct problem structure, for his or her own preferred ideology. Thus, says Raiffa, “Practitioners all too often make errors of a third kind: solving the wrong problem.”¹⁹

Does E_{III} Relate to the Principal-Agent Issue?

In the dynamics of civil-military relations, examples of E_{III} abound and their impacts are substantial. In our exploration of military voice, we

offer two manifestations of E_{III} —subsets that we term E_{IIIa} and E_{IIIb} in the principal-agent relationship. The first type of error, E_{IIIa} , occurs when the military agent takes advantage of the information asymmetry, refrains from providing advice or imperfectly offers voice, and pursues actions that are not aligned with the strategic direction of the civilian leaders (principals). This type of error can happen when laissez-faire leadership is exercised by the civilian principal or when a powerful, self-interested military agent is involved. An example of E_{IIIa} with powerful military leaders and inattentive civilians took place during the British Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914-16.²⁰ With the outbreak of hostilities during World War I, the British deployed forces on the Arabian Peninsula to protect strategically important oil fields. The military commander experienced a series of tactical successes that eventually evolved into a campaign to seize Baghdad. That campaign was not part of the Allied or British strategic intent for the conflict and resulted in a significant defeat at Kut-el-Amara. The defeat required a strategic commitment to rescue the British forces, resulting in more than 23,000 casualties. The military commander's actions at the lower levels of command to take advantage of tactical successes solved the wrong problem, forcing civilian leaders to become more involved in military operations and the development of strategic plans for the region.

The second error, E_{IIIb} , occurs when the civilian principal directs by fiat, omitting any exchange of information. In this case, policy is determined without discourse with military professionals. Although military advice may be proffered, instead the ideology of the civilian leader is used, resulting in E_{IIIb} . H. R. McMaster provided such a case study in *Dereliction of Duty*, when he examined how President Lyndon Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara co-opted the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War.²¹ The problem as seen by Johnson was to keep Vietnam off the political landscape in an effort to protect his Great Society initiatives. McNamara reportedly prevented the hard advice from the Joint Chiefs, along with any forecasts related to the scale of resources required, from reaching Johnson. In this case, the information asymmetries of the agents—the military leaders—were evident. It is conjecture that if Johnson had been receptive and engaged in legitimate discourse with the Joint Chiefs that different decisions regarding America's role in Vietnam may have been made. When there is a lack of exchange between the civilian principal and the military agent, the military voice is not available to inform policy formulation and strategic decisions. Without this professional voice, E_{IIIb} occurs and the strategic impact can be significant. A manifestation of this type of error was the result of micro-management of the war effort when the President and Secretary

of Defense assumed roles more appropriate for military professionals—the planning and execution of tactical and operational missions.

Eliot Cohen in his book *Supreme Command* offers four case studies of wartime heads of state (Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion) and their relationships with senior military commanders.²² Lincoln's struggle to hold the Union together and Ben-Gurion's devotion to the survival of Israel were inherently ill-structured, complex situations. These leaders were provided with military advice that was not supportive of their visions. Lincoln's generals sought reconciliation with their Confederate brothers in the American Civil War, and Ben-Gurion's generals were willing to sacrifice Jerusalem in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The military leaders focused on tactical and operational problems not connected to achieving the strategic goals of the civilian leadership. Focusing on tactical problems that were not supportive of the strategic vision is an excellent example of E_{III} decisions by military leaders. In each of these cases, the civilian leaders engaged the military commanders to communicate their strategic intent. The military commanders were given their voice, advice was acknowledged and considered, and then civilian leaders decided on a different strategy. When civilian principal-leaders monitored their military agents to ensure compliance with the selected strategy, it effectively vaccinated against E_{IIIa} .

Administrative Structures, Conscience, Voice, and E_{III}

Administrative structures and institutions determine the differentiation of roles and responsibilities of principals and agents, both to the organization as a whole and to each other. Political scientist Risa Brooks has argued that administrative processes within which civil-military dynamics are played out are fraught with tensions between politics and administration.²³ A number of dilemmas arise from these demands of structure and the political nature of civil-military relations. First, there is the dilemma of administrative accountability and subordination, in which principals and agents experience tensions in their duties, obligations, and loyalties. In the military sector, these conflicts are purposefully built into the accountability structure by the Constitution as a requirement of the principles of democracy. Nowhere is this tension more apparent than that faced between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their reporting chain, which is to the President; his designee, the Secretary of Defense; and the Houses of Congress. While the first principle is military subordination to civilian control, the nature of the civilian-military relationship often requires senior military officers to serve their civilian leaders and the nation, by providing advice that may not complete-

ly align with existent policy. Tension is inherent in this relationship, especially when the principal does not defer his favored ideology to the counsel of a more experienced adviser. This was often the case with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's leadership of DOD; there were numerous disagreements between him and his senior military advisers.²⁴ A specific case that has reached legendary stature within the military occurred when Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki was pressed during congressional testimony regarding the number of soldiers that would be needed during post-combat operations in Iraq. Shinseki's "several hundred thousand" reply was summarily dismissed by Rumsfeld erroneously, as events have played out. Experience has revealed that managing the peace in Iraq was much more involved than civilian decision-makers had initially foreseen.²⁵ At this level of policy analysis and decision-making the principal is required to recognize who should lead and who should follow, i.e., the roles of "influencer" and "deferrer" are not easily separated or defined.²⁶ They flow from one to the other. As former Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn once observed, "You cannot be a leader, and ask other people to follow you, unless you know how to follow too."²⁷ Not being cognizant of this relationship will in all likelihood lead to a decision-making error.

Second is the issue of the dictates of conscience stemming from personal values, beliefs, and standards. In a democratic society such as the United States, there is the moral responsibility of "many hands,"²⁸ i.e., conscience and moral beliefs of key agents in decision-making practices. In this relationship, a conflict between exit, voice, and loyalty inevitably prevails. Economist Albert Hirschman provided these general tenets for consideration, and we can overlay the military experience on them for the purpose of examination.²⁹ In the military it is accepted that loyalty is instilled from the beginning of an officer's career. Likewise they have invested a great deal in their initial acceptance and continuation in the profession. Related to this investment is the high cost for any "defection" or exit. In terms of voice, two theories prevail. On one side, "defection" in the form of dissenting voice is viewed as treason or disloyalty, even after the officer has retired from service. The antithesis to this position is that the dissenting voice may be viewed as an expression of loyalty to the Constitution and the American society. These dilemmas of conscience, obligation to duty, responsibility to the profession, and accountability to the Constitution have proved to be issues invoking tremendous consternation for members of the military profession, especially at the higher levels of command. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not reveal the extent of their internal discussions with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld related to the strategy for combating the Global War on Terrorism, other leader voices were heard. A series of revelations by retired

military officers captured the attention of American society in what was to be known as the “Revolt of the Generals.”³⁰ In the following section on organizational justice, we examine the dilemmas of administrative accountability and of conscience and the impact military voice has in the principal-agent relationship, and how this relationship can be related to an Error of the Third Kind.

Organizational Justice, Voice, and E_{III}

The lack of consideration of professional voice in military decision-making creates a strong perception of organizational injustice and a lack of fairness in the minds of military commanders. It also contributes to the E_{III} problem. For example, in “The Revolt of the Generals,” two retired major generals, former division commanders, expressed consternation with the Defense Secretary’s dismissal of military advice and honest dissent. In their opinion, it was this lack of an appreciation for the military voice that led to bad decisions in Iraq, or an Error of the Third Kind. Organizational justice is a complex construct involving three embedded concepts.³¹ In Figure 1 below, OJ_a denotes procedural justice; OJ_b distributive justice; and OJ_c interactional justice. The figure also reflects the relationship of these concepts to E_{III} . The diagram explains perceptions of many military commanders regarding:

- Procedural justice; the fairness of procedures that permit real participation and teamwork between principals and agents.
- Distributive justice; the neutrality of the distribution of resources and evaluation of outcomes between principals and agents, i.e., the attention and fairness shown by principals to agents’ voices.
- Interactional justice; the impartiality in judgment of organizational interactions made by the principals with regard to their own ideologies and advice given by agents.




Figure 1. Organizational Justice and E_{III}

Of the organizational justice concepts, perhaps the most important for military professionals is procedural justice. That military voice is heard is a value, as well as a concern, for military officers. A positive case of procedural justice, OJ_a, occurred during World War II within the iconic principal-agent relationship between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall.³² While Marshall was his most trusted military adviser—Roosevelt stated he could not “sleep at ease” with Marshall outside of Washington—Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Rick Atkinson documents numerous occasions when FDR’s executive direction ran counter to the military’s professional advice.³³ A classic example was the decision to employ US forces in North Africa rather than conduct cross-Channel operations into Europe in 1942. Through it all, there was a healthy discourse where President Roosevelt received the benefit of General Marshall’s considered professional judgment and made strategic decisions with the “bigger picture” in mind. Marshall as the dutiful agent ensured the decisions were forwarded and that the appropriate planning and resources were applied.

If the FDR-Marshall relationship is the exemplar of OJ_a, then the antithesis would be the relationship between Secretary Rumsfeld and his generals. In both eras, the nation had been attacked and was preparing for a “global” war. In Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, officers complained “their best advice is being disregarded” and that the Secretary was “eager to slap down officers with decades of distinguished service.”³⁴ In the latter case, military voice was not perceived to be given its due, resulting in a disaffection of support of the Secretary—the civilian principal. As captured in organizational literature, senior military professionals were faced with choices of “exit, voice, or loyalty.”³⁵ While the professional military officers continued to be “loyal,” the instances of dissenting “voice” by those who took their “exit” in the form of retirement from military service garnered the attention of American society.

From legal precedents regarding institutional obligations, there evolves a notion of the obligation of the organization, and the expectation of its constituents to view the job as a “property right” of organizational participants. This is a belief that is known in practice but has been largely ignored in the behavioral sciences and management literature.³⁶ In analyzing the elements of this property “right,” one can readily argue that high-level participants in organizations (such as senior military commanders) are actually partners of the institution.³⁷ As such, they have the right and obligation to express their voice on issues where they have professional knowledge and expertise. The other partner in the equation, the civilian bosses, have a concurrent obligation to pay close attention to such advice, even if it contradicts a particular ideology of the leader. Not to do so violates one or more principles of orga-

The military has much to offer in terms of knowledge gained from operations that provide input for the practical aspects of strategic decision-making.

nizational justice (procedural, distributive, and interactional). When leaders ignore, take-for-granted, or overlook their partners' professional expertise and make unilateral decision-making and errors of cognition, then adverse results such as E_{III} can ensue, even when no injustice was intended.³⁸

The organizational justice constructs are informative in the examination of contemporary events where the military voice was appropriately offered and engaged. Specific cases are the strategic decisions for Iraq in 2006 and for Afghanistan in 2009 made by US principals. Two *Washington Post* journalists, Tom Ricks in *The Gamble* and Bob Woodward in *The War Within*, provide accounts of how the "clear-hold-build" strategy for Iraq emerged through a process that included the engagement of military voice. Their separate accounts explored the disconnect between two specific fields of thought. The strategy of US Central Command's General John Abizaid, endorsed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, was to reduce US military presence and transition as quickly as possible to Iraqi security forces. That strategy was balanced against the concepts that evolved from the successful measures taken by then-Colonel H. R. McMaster's 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar and developed further by the commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno. That latter strategy required an increase of military forces with a "surge" to establish security and stability before turning responsibility over to Iraqi forces.

The fact that a debate on the strategic direction occurred, allowing for conflicting and dissenting points of view, is characteristic of procedural justice (OJ_a). Senior military officers—theater and operational commanders as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff—were engaged in a discourse with the goal of developing a winning strategy. The military as an institution supported the process and the outcome as just. Advocates of the former strategy had their "voice" and the opportunity to exercise "loyalty." Secretary Rumsfeld resigned following the 2006 mid-term elections. General Abizaid retired after a full command tour (and is still held in high regard), and the Multi-National Forces-Iraq commander, General George Casey, was appointed as the Army Chief of Staff. General Casey would later reflect that he suffered from a disconnect from the strategic intent of senior civilian leaders, especially President George W. Bush. While it is too soon to tell if the success attributed

to the surge in Iraq is sustainable, it is clear that engagement of the military voice resulted in a more effective strategy, at least in the short-term.

With regard to Afghanistan, a new President and Defense Secretary faced a challenge of divining a successful strategy for the “necessary war.” Prior to his inauguration, President Barack Obama conferred with senior military officers on the way ahead in Afghanistan. After a preliminary review, he essentially revalidated the strategic goals and concepts from the previous administration, and in March of 2009 “Strategy for Victory in Afghanistan” was published. The spring of 2009, however, witnessed the resurgence of the Taliban, challenges from within the Afghan government, and unacceptable numbers of Afghan civilian casualties attributed to US combat actions. When pressed on a perceived lack of results, the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, provided a candid assessment and numerous recommendations to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates during his visit to the theater in May 2009. General McKiernan exercised his “voice” based upon his professional judgment. He would later refuse to quietly “exit” via retirement and was subsequently forced to resign. While civilian control is a bedrock precept for America’s military, the Army as an institution was taken aback by the abrupt dismissal of General McKiernan, with many viewing this event as a challenge to procedural (OJ_a) and interactional (OJ_c) justice.

The appointment of General Stanley McChrystal as commander of International Security Forces, Afghanistan, replacing General McKiernan, led to new assessment and recommendations for revision of the strategy executed in Afghanistan. When the McChrystal report was leaked by Bob Woodward in *The Washington Post*, some pundits suggested that this act was a tactic by the military to force the administration principals to accept the recommendations of its military agent. Certainly, those professionals within the military viewed this leak of information as an inappropriate use of military voice if it arose from lack of confidence in organizational justice.

As the process for determining a “new” strategy for Afghanistan unfolded, the American public witnessed a vigorous discussion and debate leading to the integration of the other elements of national power in consonance with the military effort. It is apparent that while the military recommendations were not totally implemented (e.g., providing 30,000 of the 40,000 requested forces), a comprehensive government approach was used to develop a “clear, hold, build, transition” strategy. As with Iraq, military voice was appropriately considered and made a major contribution to the strategic decision-making process. That process was accepted as just by military agents in support of civilian principals.

Conclusion

Distinctive operational competencies from the civilian and military sectors create useful synergies. When military voice is given appropriate credence VRIO can flow easily back to the civilian principals. When voice and counsel are muted or constrained, however, then the advice systems entropy, mainly due to a perception of organizational injustice by military leaders, and valuable knowledge and expertise can be lost. Using the military enterprise as case studies, we examined the principal-agent relationship, and how administrative structures and dictates of conscience can change how voice influences decision-making, or in some cases cause an error. We highlighted the principal form of error, known as “The Error of the Third Kind (E_{III}),” and the role that it played with disregard of military voice. We offer two sources of E_{III} for strategic decision-making:

- Principal-agent dynamics.
- Administrative structures.

In the national security community, discourse is essential. Military officers have distinctive competencies in their professional jurisdiction. As partners in the principal-agent relationship, it is critical that the voice of military professionals be offered, heard, and considered by the civilian principals in the decision-making process. Failure to consider military voice can lead to violation of organizational justice and may even lead to dysfunction, perceptions of injustice, and “Errors of the Third Kind.” Understanding these cases of error, especially those where there was indifference to military voice, can help inform leader-follower, advice-and-consent dynamics not only in the military but also in the private and nonprofit sectors of enterprise.

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 23 October 2009 in Chicago, Illinois.

1. A competence is a bundle representing how organizational resources are turned into capabilities. A distinctive competency is one that provides unique strategic competitive advantage.

2. Ian Mitroff and Tom Featheringham, “On Systemic Problem Solving and the Error of the Third Kind,” *Behavioral Science*, 19 (November 1974), 383-93.

3. See Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday Publishers, 1990) for concepts of learning organization. For AARs, see Marilyn Darling, Charles Parry, and Joseph Moore, “Learning in the Thick of It,” *Harvard Business Review*, 83 (July/August 2005).

4. Jay B. Barney and William S. Hesterly, *Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage: Concepts and Cases* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2006), 79; and Jay B. Barney, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” *Journal of Management* (March 1991), 99-120.

5. It is, however, the strategic aspects of planning in which there is often a disconnect and relates to the principal-agent issue.

6. Burk suggests that the military's distinctive competencies lie in two areas: professional jurisdiction and legitimacy. See James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," in Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing, 2005), 49.
7. Term borrowed from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Security and Smart Power," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 51 (May 2008), 1351-56. The term "soft" power indicates tools that a country uses for attraction to itself, such as diplomacy, intercultural communication, etc. Nye has argued that hard power is characterized by coercion, and soft power is characterized by persuasion, and together they become "SMART" power. Nye has argued, "I think there is an awakening to the need for soft power as people look to the crisis in the Middle East and begin to realize that hard power is not sufficient to resolve it." Nye explains that "solving global problems will require smart power—a judicious blend of the other two powers."
8. Kobi Michael, "The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations: The 'Discourse Space' Model and the Israeli Case During the Oslo Process," *Armed Forces and Society*, 33 (July 2007), 518-46.
9. William S. Cohen, "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen Yale University New Haven Connecticut September 26, 1997" (New Haven, Conn.: 26 September 1997), <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=1459>.
10. Senge.
11. Peter Drucker, *The New Realities: In Government and Politics, in Economics and Business, in Society and Worldview* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).
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