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**THESIS**

**REORGANIZING FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE**

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December 2009

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## **ABSTRACT**

A thorough understanding of Irregular Warfare (IW) and the principles of organizational theory and design will enable the Department of Defense (DoD) to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment, while maintaining its conventional capabilities. We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages. First, we define irregular warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through the development of our critical success factors. We introduce organizational theory and design in order to incorporate the critical success factors. We conclude that the DoD should reorganize certain elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command by incorporating existing capabilities, focusing on conducting operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment, and implementing our critical success factors.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conflicts within the Irregular Warfare (IW) environment require a population-centric, holistic, long-term, and nonconventional, approach. The misunderstanding of IW and the improper organizational structure within the DoD has hindered its ability to succeed within IW environments. The DoD is using organizations designed to defeat conventional threats instead of organizations selected, trained and equipped to succeed in Irregular Warfare. This concept is reinforced in Joint Publication 3-0: “(Irregular) warfare that has the population as its “focus of operations” requires a *different mindset and different capabilities* [emphasis added] than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I-6)

This thesis states that a thorough understanding of IW and the principles of organizational theory and design enables the DoD to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment (IWE), while maintaining its conventional capabilities. We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages. First, we define Irregular Warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through the development of our critical success factors. We introduce organizational theory and design in order to incorporate the success factors. Next, we analyze options for future change and finish by providing recommendations for implementation.

A widespread misunderstanding of Irregular Warfare has led to a desire to elevate IW to becoming “as strategically important as traditional warfare.” (United States Department of Defense, 2008) This elevation of IW has challenged all of DoD to adapt to this important lesson learned at the expense of maintaining our balance of capabilities. By understanding the differences between Irregular and Traditional Warfare, and the key factors that enable success in both, it becomes obvious that an organization suited for one is sub-optimal when operating in the other. To better prepare the DoD to meet future challenges in both environments, the DoD should establish a separate organization, incorporating existing capabilities, focused on conducting operations within the IWE, and implementing our critical success factors.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A&A BCT	Advise and Assist Brigade Combat Team
ADM	Admiral
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BG	Brigadier General
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CMO	Civil-military operations
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COL	Colonel
CP	Counter Proliferation
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSBA	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Direct Action
DoD	Department of Defense
EUCOM	European Command
FID	Foreign internal defense
FM	Field Manual
GEN	General
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HN	Host Nation
HR	Human Resources
IA	Inter-Agency
IO	Information operations
IW	Irregular Warfare
IWE	Irregular Warfare Environment
JIWC	Joint Irregular Warfare Command
JOC	Joint Operating Concept
JP	Joint Publication

GCC	Geographic Combatant Commands
GPF	General Purpose Forces
MAJ	Major
MoE	Measures of Effectiveness
MARSOAG	Marine Special Operations Advisory Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OEF-P	Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines
OSS	Office of Strategic Service
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PSYOP	Psychological operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SC BCT	Security Cooperation Brigade Combat Team
SF	Special Forces
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	Special Reconnaissance
SSTR	Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
U.S.	United States
USASOC	U.S. Special Operations Command
USFORSCOM	U.S. Forces Command
USMCCDC	U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional warfare

## I. INTRODUCTION

*Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.*

*–Joint Publication 3–0 (Joint Operations)*

### A. BACKGROUND

A new administration in Washington, D.C., a nation weary of eight-plus years of fighting, almost 5,000 deaths, over 30,000 casualties (Fischer, 2009, p. 1) and huge defense spending in the middle of an economic slowdown, all lead us to agree with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who believes that the next conflict will not be another Afghanistan or Iraq. More appropriately, he believes future success for the military comes “primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention” (Gates, 2009).

Before shifting our focus, this thesis began as a search for a “better” and more efficient way in which General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) could interact and integrate on the battlefield, given the complexities involved in combat, as experienced through both operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The research team, which consists of two Special Forces Officers and an Armor Officer, brought a wealth of recent combat experience from both theaters that drove our research and debate.

It became evident that, while SOF–GPF integration is an important topic for research, the paramount issue to overcome when dealing with the population-centric focus of the current and, arguably, the future threat to our Nation is that of utilizing our forces in the most effective manner. In other words, it is imperative to identify the elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) that maintain the comparative

advantage<sup>1</sup> to succeed in the current and future situations we face. We take it as given that the United States Military GPF are second to none on the conventional battlefield. Their organization, training, equipment, and culture ensure they maintain the capability to deploy, fight, and defeat any *conventional* opposition.

Our nation has expended precious time and effort debating how best to prepare for our future threats by focusing too much on our current problems. The belief that traditional or conventional warfare has evolved and even possibly been replaced by other forms of warfare such as “Hybrid,” “Fourth Generation” “Unconventional” or “Irregular,” continues to be debated at the executive level (United States Army, 2009, August). In line with this, many agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s comment about a perceived “requirement for all services to be SOF-like” in order to best prepare for what they see as a new form of warfare, either at the expense of, or in addition to, our current conventional capabilities and dominance (BG Sacolick, 2009, April). Indications from within the DoD are that this “SOF-like” transition stems from a false linking of irregular threats with Irregular Warfare (United States Army, 2009, August). There are also those who are adamant in their belief that warfare has not changed much over the course of human civilization and, more importantly, that IW does not represent some new evolution to the way in which wars are fought (United States Army, 2009, August). An April 2009 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) White Paper summarized this argument by saying,

The Army does not view [Irregular Warfare] as a distinct, unique category of conflict: warfare is warfare. The same capabilities developed for regular, symmetric adversaries can and must be adapted for use against unregulated ‘irregular enemies.’ (United States Department of the Army, 2009, p. 6)

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<sup>1</sup> In reference to DoD, we use this term to explain the ability of a given unit or organization to conduct a certain type of operation, or to conduct operations within a certain environment, with a higher degree of efficiency and effectiveness than another unit or organization.

In a recent *Military Strategy* article, Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon argue against the shift of focus from traditional to irregular warfare for the DoD as a whole. They identify the need for separate organizations that are equally good at performing missions within their respective environments. A synopsis of this argument is included below:

Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term. (Horowitz & Shalmon, 2009, p. 302)

We believe that changing our current conventional military forces, and making them as proficient in the IW environment (IWE) as in the traditional environment, is a flawed approach. This will lead to the loss of conventional capabilities, creating an environment in which the favored enemy strategy will be whatever we are least prepared for.

Conversely, maintaining our conventional prowess, while balancing it with a strong indirect capability, leaves our adversaries with fewer options. This indirect capability exists, but needs to be bolstered and enhanced in order to balance the force. Within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) exists forces that are specially selected, trained, organized, and equipped to thrive in the IW environment. By adjusting the management and utilization of these forces, the nation can achieve dominance within the IW environment that is on par with the dominance it holds in conventional warfare. While making GPF more adaptable and able to conduct IW-type missions during major operations is prudent, refocusing them away from their core tasks in order to make them *IW experts* is detrimental to their conventional war-fighting capabilities.

Given this background, the DoD should update its approach to IW by reorganizing the forces best suited to operate in that environment, and refocus on long-term, relationship-based partnerships to help our allies identify and combat problems without large-scale U.S. troop involvement. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed during his address to the October 2007 meeting of the Association of the United States Army, “The most important component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries” (Bluesteen, 2009). This is consistent with the proposal submitted by Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that deploying forces should return to the same areas, “to build and sustain stronger relationships with local leaders” (McMichael, 2009, May, p. 8), and with the guidance for the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), that is looking at potential conventional threats of North Korea and China (Castelli, 2009).

## **B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION**

Since the beginning of the “War on Terror” in 2001, the DoD has been unable to maintain the advantage over our adversaries to the degree necessary to win. Many successes have been achieved and battles won, but eight years later, the United States is still at war and making, as some would argue, many of the same mistakes. Why? Our group has learned through research and experience that the DoD does not understand IW and, therefore, cannot effectively or efficiently organize for it.

Conflicts within the IW environment require a population-centric, holistic, long-term, and non-conventional, approach. As experienced in Iraq’s “Sunni Awakening,” these approaches can eventually be exploited, but, more often than not, it takes time, resources, and the needless death of numerous people, both civilian and military, before the knowledge to develop the proper strategy emerges. If the U.S. government had an organization designed to thrive within this environment, developed using the appropriate organizational design elements, and able to implement the most appropriate strategy from the beginning (or even better, before the conflict expands beyond the host nation’s capability), success would be more rapidly achievable. It would also be more effective

and efficient. That is the problem as it relates to this thesis. The misunderstanding of IW and the improper organizational structure within the DoD has hindered its ability to succeed within IW environments. The DoD is using organizations designed to defeat conventional threats instead of organizations selected, trained, and equipped to succeed in Irregular Warfare. This concept is reinforced in Joint Publication 3-0, “[Irregular] warfare that has the population as its ‘focus of operations’ requires a *different mindset and different capabilities* [emphasis added] than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I-6).

### **C. THESIS**

A thorough understanding of IW and the principles of organizational theory and design will enable the DoD to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the IWE, while maintaining its conventional capabilities.

### **D. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the terms associated with Irregular Warfare, develop several critical success factors associated with IW, and to provide recommendations for reorganization of select DoD elements that are focused on conducting the unique activities within the IWE. We will make evident the contrasts between Irregular and Traditional Warfare in order to illustrate the need for a separate organization with a separate focus.

### **E. RESEARCH AND SCOPE**

The research associated with this thesis revolves around Joint Doctrine and organizational theory and design. We use these to clarify what Irregular Warfare is and what its subordinated activities are. Once clarified and defined, the activities are used to specify Irregular Warfare requirements and analyze the organizational-environment critical success factors necessary for their execution. This builds on previous research arguing for the creation of an IW Command, and furthers it by providing factors that will



enable the successful employment of such a command. To the extent possible, this thesis avoids using cliché, or hot-button and non-doctrinal, terms and definitions.

The scope of this thesis is focused on the DoD and not the inter-agency (IA) community. While we briefly address, and acknowledge the importance of, the inter-agency component of operating in the Irregular Warfare environment, our recommendations are for the DoD specifically. The military must define its organizations, missions, responsibilities, and purposes before addressing how the DoD participates in what must be a holistic approach to Irregular Warfare. As Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said in an address to the Marine Corps War College, “The interagency needs to get better and stronger, frankly, to match our capabilities, so that our capabilities have the proper context in terms of the whole-government objectives” (Kruzel, 2009). The end state is to reorganize select elements of the Special Operations community under one organization focused on Irregular Warfare.

## **F. CHAPTER REVIEW**

We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages. First, we define Irregular Warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through the development of our critical success factors. We introduce organizational theory and design in order to incorporate the success factors. Next, we analyze options for future change and finish by providing recommendations for implementation.

Chapter II establishes the doctrinal definitions of both Irregular Warfare and its sub-tasks. We assert throughout this chapter that IW is an environment in which specific activities are conducted, synchronized with the DoD, IA and the host nation (HN), in order to gain or maintain legitimacy and influence over a relevant population. As defined, we show that while the term “IW” is relatively new, the concepts it represents have existed throughout the history of armed conflict.

In Chapter III, we explain why IW is an extremely complex, long-duration, and population-centric environment, which requires a different form of organization to operate efficiently and effectively. We further differentiate IW from traditional warfare,

with the primary difference being a long-term, population and state-legitimacy focus versus a short-term enemy-centric focus. These differences demonstrate that organizations designed to conduct attrition warfare are sub-optimal in comparison to those specially designed and organized specifically for IW. This is not to say that General Purpose Forces (GPF) cannot operate in the IWE, rather, that these aspects may be organizationally limiting to fundamental changes required to operate effectively in the IW environment.

We then develop seven external and ten internal critical success factors that organizations must incorporate when operating in the IW environment. These environmental factors further highlight the differences of IW versus traditional warfare, and illuminate why organizations established for one type of warfare are sub-optimal in other environments.

In Chapter IV, we incorporate the complexities and uniqueness of IW discussed in Chapter II, and the critical success factors developed in Chapter III, with the principles of organizational theory and design. This evaluation of organizations using the five components of organizational theory and design (Structure, Environment, Work Processes, Human Resources, and Culture) show how incorporating each element of the theory with the success factors is necessary for success in the IW environment.

In Chapter V, we evaluate the two basic options for change. Using business process redesign as a model, we assess the feasibility of creating a new organization versus modifying an existing one. We argue that building a new organization duplicates current capabilities and increases expenses without appreciable increases in efficiency or effectiveness. Therefore, a new organization is not a viable option. We then argue that since the DoD has sub-organizations better suited and already manned with personnel that are specifically selected, trained, and educated to succeed within the IW environment, they should be reorganized under one organization outside of USSOCOM. This will ensure a common purpose and mission, while preventing misuse and limiting redundancy of effort, capabilities, and money. This reorganization of specific capabilities

will allow an IW organization to best utilize the operational-environment and organizational-environment factors to select, train and manage elements operating within the IWE.

Finally, Chapter VI reviews pertinent information from each of the five preceding chapters, and concludes that the DoD should establish a separate organization, incorporating existing capabilities focused on conducting operations within the IWE. We make five recommendations that enable the successful implementation of our research findings. Lastly, we identify several future research possibilities.

## II. COMPLEXITIES OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

*Traditional Warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.*

*–DoD Directive 3000.07*

*What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations—a relevant population—and its strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the population as its “focus of operations” requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.*

*– Joint Pub 3–0 (Joint Operations)*

### A. BACKGROUND

In 1962, the DoD focused on the term “Special Warfare” as an all-encompassing term to operationalize the indirect approach to fighting communist expansion throughout the Cold War. During this time, the Soviet Union’s strategy involved spreading communism by enabling resistance movements and insurgencies throughout third world countries; this was Unconventional Warfare. The U.S. strategy to counter this involved the use of Special Warfare, which included Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological activities (General Decker, 2009).

Forty-plus years later, the U.S. is faced with similar challenges. The Soviet Union has been replaced by transnational terrorist organizations and criminal networks, as well as a myriad of other entities, set on shifting the balance of power within their regions. In order to counter these threats, the DoD has re-emphasized indirect strategies and coined the term “Irregular Warfare” to characterize this environment. Although there is debate within the DoD and other U.S. government agencies on whether this term is appropriate, or even needed, the fact remains that a DoD directive places the conduct of

“IW” to be equally important as traditional warfare. Since then, the use of the term “IW” has become en vogue to the point that it seems that anyone even remotely related to the Global War on Terror is “conducting IW.”

Although the concept of IW has increased in popularity, the continued misunderstanding of the term has led to confusion. As evidenced by a United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM) sponsored IW study in 2006, the term Irregular Warfare is being used as a catch-all term to represent anything nontraditional:

IW is used loosely as a synonym for unconventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, nontraditional warfare, low intensity conflict, insurgency, rebellion, revolt, civil war, insurrection, revolutionary warfare, internal war, counter insurgency, subversive war, war within a population, intrastate war, internal development, internal security, internal defense, stability, law and order, nation building, state building, small war, peacemaking, peacekeeping, fourth generation warfare (4GW), and global war on terror. (GWOT) (United States Joint Forces Command, 2006, pp. II-3)

## **B. WHAT IS IRREGULAR WARFARE?**

The Joint definition of Irregular Warfare is

... a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 282)

As with the term, the definition itself has created skeptics who believe the definition should identify *who* conducts it, or *how* it is done, instead of *why* the nation engages in IW (Coons & Harned, 2009, p. 98). Adding to the controversy, the term “Warfare” indicates a level of violence that is not conducive to the interagency community’s normal operating environment. As Colonel Joseph Osborne, the former USSOCOM J10 (Irregular Warfare), states, our interagency partners “Don’t do warfare” (2009, p. 1). In the end, definitions are important to facilitate a common understanding, but the critical concept is that at the operational and strategic levels, IW uses indirect methods to gain or maintain the support of the relevant population.

There is also a divide amongst the DoD and interagency community over whether IW is an environment or an operation. According to the initial IW Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) published in 2007, IW can be conducted, thus being an operation, but after further analysis, the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and USSOCOM believe IW is an environment in which operations are conducted. In other words, it is not an operation in and of itself (United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2009). This concept of an environment over task is reinforced by Joint Publication 3-0 (Joint Operations) which states, “What makes IW “irregular” is the *focus of its operations*—a relevant population—and *its strategic purpose*—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods (emphasis added)” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I-6). The final clarification that IW is an environment is illustrated by comparing its counter-environment, traditional warfare. A commander does not “conduct” traditional warfare, it is an environment that,

... typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment. (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I-5)

Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, IW refers to an environment in which population-centric operations are conducted in order to achieve U.S. objectives. This builds on an acceptance and an understanding of the difference in the *focus* of the operations as depicted in the picture below.




Figure 1. Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare (From USSOCOM; USMCCDC 2007, p. 8). Originally derived from Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond” Model.

The focus on the relevant population is what sets IW apart from traditional, “conventional” approaches to warfare. Within the IW environment, “indirect” refers to approaches that:

... focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population...disrupt, dislocate, and defeat adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting ... empower, enable, support, or leverage interagency and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or non-militarily...take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries...and to subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations. (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 20)

### C. IW ACTIVITIES

Since IW is an environment, there are many activities conducted within it. Similar to the concept that traditional warfare has operational and tactical tasks, the IW JOC outlines the 14 activities conducted within the IW environment (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, pp. 9–10):

- Insurgency
- Counterinsurgency (COIN)

- Unconventional warfare (UW)
- Terrorism
- Counterterrorism (CT)
- Foreign internal defense (FID)
- Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR)
- Strategic communications
- Psychological operations (PSYOP)
- Information operations (IO)
- Civil-military operations (CMO)
- Intelligence and counterintelligence activities
- Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW
- Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries

Of these 14 activities, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (Irregular Warfare) establishes five primary activities of Irregular Warfare: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter Insurgency (COIN), Counter Terrorism (CT), Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, and Unconventional Warfare (UW) (United States Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2). The Joint definitions of each are below.

- **Foreign Internal Defense (FID):** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- **Counter-Insurgency (COIN):** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
- **Counter-Terrorism (CT):** Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism.
- **Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR):** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure



environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

- **Unconventional Warfare (UW):** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area (United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2009).

The first four of these activities (FID, COIN, CT, and SSTR) are ways that the U.S. can enable a HN to counter an existing or potential threat of insurgency. These activities seek to maintain a low U.S. troop signature, which protects or enhances the legitimacy of the HN. UW is the only activity that does not seek to protect or enhance the legitimacy of the existing government within the HN. It is conducted in order to “coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power” (United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2009). Within the IW environment, FID, COIN, CT and SSTR are used to counter an adversarial actor conducting an Unconventional Warfare campaign against another nation (Maxwell, 2009, April).

In line with *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu, you must “know your enemy” in order to defeat him; therefore, in order to efficiently plan for and conduct the core tasks that are associated with IW, one must understand both the enemy and what he is trying to do. Understanding how to conduct the hardest IW task—UW—greatly enhances one’s ability to achieve success conducting any other IW task. This concept was reinforced when (former) Director of Central Intelligence and now Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at the 1992 dedication of the OSS Memorial, said, “It has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that if you can do the UW missions, you can do all others” (Quoted in Maxwell, 1995, p. 122).

#### **D. SUMMARY**

As a term, IW is new, but the concepts it represents have endured throughout the history of armed conflict. This chapter establishes the doctrinal definitions of both IW

and its sub-tasks. We assert throughout this chapter that IW is an environment in which specific activities are conducted, synchronized with the DoD, IA and the HN, in order to gain or maintain legitimacy and influence over a relevant population. Of these activities, FID, COIN, CT, SSTR, and UW are the primary focus. The first four of these activities are done out of a strategic necessity and provide assistance and support to willing partner-nations. As a strategic option, UW provides support to resistance movements or insurgencies in support of U.S. objectives.

This doctrinal understanding allows us to proceed into the operational-environment and organizational critical success factors that must be addressed in order to operate within the IW environment.

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### III. CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

*Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military, and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.*

– President John F. Kennedy

#### A. INTRODUCTION

Developing and implementing successful strategies to address threats in the IWE require a better understanding of the situation as a whole. Acknowledging that IW differs from conventional warfare, experts such as David Galula, David Kilcullen, and Gordon McCormick, as well as other key authors and public officials, have all publicized that a different approach is required to succeed.

In his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, David Galula details four laws of successful COIN warfare that must be understood and implemented (1964, pp. 52–55).

These laws are:

- Support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent
- Support is gained through an active minority
- Support from the population is conditional
- Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.

In his most recent book, *The Accidental Guerilla*, David Kilcullen reinforces these laws through his discussion of the current GWOT. Building upon Galula’s lessons, Kilcullen states that, “this will be a protracted conflict” in which we will “need to use military force extremely sparingly.” He argues further that, “nonmilitary means need to receive greater emphasis,” and that, “we need to emphasize the primacy of virtue, moral authority, and credibility” (2009, pp. 284–286).

Analyzing the works of numerous counterinsurgency theorists during his time with the RAND Corporation and as the head of the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School, Professor Gordon McCormick developed a model to illustrate how to apply these different approaches in IW. Specifically, part of his “Diamond” model emphasizes the importance of securing the population first, in order to overcome the state’s initial information disadvantage (i.e., who and where are the insurgents) before the insurgents are able to overcome their initial force disadvantage (McCormick, Horton, & Harrison, 2007, pp. 327–328).

In keeping with these recognized experts, USSOCOM recently released its version of the laws and characteristics discussed above. According to USSOCOM, activities conducted within the IW environment are, more often than not, indirect, enduring, persistent, proactive, and population centric. Additionally, they must respect legitimate sovereignty and be linked to an over-arching U.S. strategy (Osborne, 2009).

The IW JOC incorporates these same concepts in its description of the operational-environment of IW. It states IW environments can exist within friendly, hostile or non-belligerent states. It describes the key elements of IW as taking an indirect approach, on a global scale that is focused on the will of the people and unified action. IW requires a persistent presence, based on interpersonal relationships, fusing operations and intelligence, expanding the role of the GPF, and developing alternative command and control systems (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 2).

Taken together, joined with the extensive writings and commentary on the current Iraq and Afghanistan wars and combined with our personal experiences, we have developed seven operational-environmental and 10 organizational-environmental factors that are critical to success in IW. These critical success factors are summarized in Table 1, and discussed at length throughout the rest of this chapter.

<b>Operational-Environment</b>	<b>Organizational-Environment</b>
Account for U.S. and Host Nation Political Situation	Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy
Foster a Home Grown Solution	Develop Regional Focuses
Develop a Population-Centric Approach	Reinforce Relationship Building
Region Requires Long-term Commitment	Maintain a Long-term Focus
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security Forces	Influence through Multiple Methods
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential Services	Operate With and Through HN Forces
Do not rely Solely on Military Force for Success	Enhance Small Unit Operations
	Decentralize Decision Making
	Foster Innovation and Creativity
	Focus Rewards System on Long term Effects

Table 1. Irregular Warfare Critical Success Factors

In general, these factors provide insight on what the operational-environment looks like within IW and what an organization operating within IW must be capable of in order to be successful

**B. IW OPERATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS**

The operational-environment is defined as, “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 398). The success factors presented below illustrate the differences in those conditions, circumstances, and influences affecting a commander’s decision making in the IW environment. Organizations operating in the IW environment must understand and integrate these factors into their operations in order to be successful.

## **1. Account for U.S. and Host Nation Political Situation**

The decision to deploy forces, or allow another nation's military forces into a host nation,<sup>2</sup> requires a level of political and public acceptance in both nations. For example, it is hard to believe that the United States would enter into another protracted and large-scale nation-building attempt after the recent issues of Afghanistan and Iraq.

By understanding the local and foreign political situations, one can better choose the appropriate strategy that is acceptable to all parties and will result in the most support both at home and abroad. For example, the persistent support provided to the Philippines as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is purposely designed to incorporate a small footprint and limited U.S. intervention due to the domestic pressures on the Philippine government. Referencing the complex environment within the Philippines, COL David Maxwell, said that it would “undermine Philippine military and government legitimacy if U.S. forces conducted direct or unilateral combat operations (Maxwell, 2008).

The political sensitivities associated with maintaining the will of the American people is essential when waging traditional warfare. However, no consideration is given to the political sensitivities of the enemy's population. Conversely, within IW both the political sensitivities of the U.S. and host nation populations must be taken into account. That is, support must be gained and maintained both at home and abroad in order to succeed.

## **2. Foster a Homegrown Solution**

With an appreciation for the political situations at home and within the host nation, IW activities must seek to empower the host nation and local population to create their own solution and allow them to have true ownership of it. As long as the IW activities focus on long-term engagement through indirect approaches that build capacity for military and civil services, these homegrown solutions are more likely to last. On the

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<sup>2</sup> The use of the term “host nation” typically refers to the legitimate government in power. However, throughout this thesis, we will use this term to refer to whatever indigenous organization that the U.S. is sponsoring, either the resistance movement or insurgency as in UW or the legitimate government as in COIN, FID, SSTR, and CT.

other hand, if the solutions and implementations appear to be merely exported, or worse, imposed from the United States without consideration of the local population, they are doomed to failure.

This understanding will allow forces to properly develop and support (or undermine if conducting UW operations) the sociological, political, and governing structures to enable the host nation to succeed. Conversely, disregarding the accepted social, political and governing methods within IW is self-defeating as it will be viewed as being imposed by the U.S. One example of this is the natural inclination of foreign governments to provide aid directly to the people of another country without incorporating the local governance systems. While this aid and support may be well intentioned and provided in the name of the host nation's government, it rarely is seen as such by the local population. In Afghanistan, coalition and Non-governmental Organization (NGO) actors provided support thinking it would increase support for the Afghan government, but the tribal leaders were forced to pledge allegiance to the Taliban who, while being oppressive, provided "the order and predictability it crave[d] in the deeply threatening, uncertain environments of insurgency" (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 68–69).

While acknowledging the need for external military forces to help provide security, the IW JOC recommends against the widespread use of direct military action within the IW environment because of the damage done to the legitimacy and credibility of the host nation government (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 18). The home-grown solution thus follows T. E. Lawrence's concept of, "Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war and you are to help them, not win it for them" (Lawrence, 1917). Once external forces understand this concept and learn to step back from full control, they realize that, "Local initiatives afford less control but carry greater likelihood of success" (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 16). In the end, this locally refined approach allows our partners to send a powerful message to their own people (BG Sacolick, 2009, April, p. 2), which is essential to the creation and maintenance of an enduring state (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 9). Although the widespread use of military force is frowned upon as a default action, at times it is required to build and reinforce the HN morale and will to fight.



In contrast, traditional warfare requires neither a homegrown solution nor a particular focus on the populace. In fact, it is generally assumed that, “The indigenous populations within the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 8).

### **3. Develop a Population-Centric Approach**

The environment that IW represents is not new; it has historically shaped warfare as competing entities struggle for legitimacy and influence over people. As mentioned above, the population can be mostly ignored in traditional warfare, but “IW focuses on the control of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territories” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I–6). The relevant population must be understood to the degree that is required to support internal change with respect to its governance. This concept is explained by David Kilcullen in his 2009 book, *The Accidental Guerilla*. In short, he demonstrates that understanding the population is the key to developing control. Without the support of the population, the insurgents will be less able to operate within a given area for a protracted amount of time. Thus, as stated above, support of the population is vital to success. When enemy-centric approaches are adopted within the IW environment, they are often counterproductive and tend to alienate the population. Knowing they are being hunted, insurgents will go into hiding, and the “innocent” population inadvertently becomes the recipient of direct military action and collateral damage, which further alienates them from the U.S. and strengthens the insurgency (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 32).

In order to utilize a population-centric approach, particular attention must be given to each geographical area within the host nation in order to prevent categorizing all relevant populations as the same. Each ethnic, religious, tribal, provincial, or other key divisional group may require a different approach to the overarching population-centric campaign plan to gain or maintain the desired control level as it relates to the individual sects of the population.

The Joint definition of key terrain is, “Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 303). In traditional warfare, key terrain is typically that position on the ground from which it is easiest to control or defeat the adversary. However, within IW, key terrain is best thought of as population since their support is what provides a force a marked advantage.

#### **4. Region Requires Long-Term Commitment**

With growing trans-national terror organizations operating throughout the world and with a focus on ungoverned or under-governed areas, it is in the best long-term interests for the U.S. to help others defeat threats before they grow. In an article addressing the doctrinal and most effective role of Army Special Forces, BG Bennett Sacolik said Special Forces (SF) Soldiers “assist the indigenous security forces of troubled countries and to build their capacity to defeat terrorism *before these conditions become a threat to our country* [emphasis added]” (2009, April, p. 2). If we fail to address these problems, we risk allowing the threat to grow to the point where confronting it is deemed vital to our national interests. At this point, our strategic option to use a small force and a long-term approach risks being reduced as U.S. domestic pressures may force politicians to use a large force in hopes of a “quick fix.”

As with most IW concepts, this “fix it early” approach is not new. In his 1999 paper on Regional Engagement, COL (Ret.) Hy Rothstein, PhD, advanced the benefits of “Continuous and proactive regionally oriented military activities conducted to gather information or influence international conditions in order to protect or advance United States national security interests abroad” (1999, p. 4).

Traditional warfare seeks to defeat an adversary in the least amount of time possible through the use of overwhelming military might. Success in traditional warfare typically comes by directly attacking the enemy to either destroy him, or force him to surrender—in other words, there is a definitive end point. The approach and end point differ in the IW realm because threats are best defeated using an indirect approach of home-grown and population-centric solutions that deny the enemy the support of the

population. This indirect approach requires a long-term focus through which relationships are built, cooperation fostered, and success realized.

## **5. Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security Forces**

In order to legitimize the host nation in the eyes of its people and the international community, it is imperative to utilize the host nation's security forces to secure both their physical borders and the population. Successfully accomplishing this security mission is vital to long-term success as there can be no effective governance without security.

Due to the rise in threats from transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, the security forces of some nations are inadequate. As the IW JOC explains, "many states are *unable* or unwilling to exercise control over their territory or frontiers, leaving them open to exploitation (emphasis added)" (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 11). In some instances, this inability or unwillingness may come from an absence of a legitimate and capable security force, or as seen in Iraq, an existing apparatus may have been dismantled or significantly depleted.

When indigenous security forces are "unable or unwilling," we must have the foresight to help build their capacity to defeat terrorism "before these conditions become a threat to our country" (BG Sacolick, 2009, April, p. 2). Developing this increased capability within an "unable" host nation security force is preferred for U.S. intervention because the willingness to improve already exists. On the other hand, an "unwilling" state or security force is the most difficult situation because any action by outside forces will be viewed as an imposed versus a home-grown solution. As evidenced by the U.S.-led coalition's recent experiences in Iraq, dismantling and rebuilding security forces should only be considered as a last resort.

In traditional warfare, we seek to defeat an adversary's military forces through direct application of military might. The war is over when the enemy's military is ineffective. Conversely, IW seeks to defeat an adversary through the use of the host nation's capabilities, amplified by support from the U.S.; it is over when the host nation has the unilateral capability to secure its borders and population and its governing

structure is functional and viewed as legitimate through its own population. Success in the IW environment directly relates to the degree by which the host nation can utilize its security forces to secure both its borders and population.

## **6. Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential Services**

All societies require varying levels of essential services, and governments are expected to provide an acceptable standard of living for the people. These include food, potable water, power, waste management, medical care, education, law enforcement, etc., (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. C-4). If the state fails to provide adequate essential services it opens an avenue for insurgents to exploit, and win the support of, or even legitimacy amongst, the population (key terrain).

Perhaps the most relevant example of this can be found in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. After more than 50 years of conflict, the Israel-Palestinian peace process slowly transformed the terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the state-like Palestinian Authority (PA) (Makovsky, 1996, pp. 2, 8-9). As the PA attempted to exert control over Gaza and the West Bank, its inability to provide essential services, such as hospitals and post-Israeli attack reconstruction assistance, allowed the still-extremist terrorist group HAMAS to supplant them as the state-like actor in the region (Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. xiii). Providing these essential services later allowed HAMAS to gain continued popular support as a legitimate organization, win seats in the 2006 elections, and use legitimate political power in conjunction with their extremist philosophy to extend the Palestinian issue.

In other regions, this lack of essential services by the host nation provides a starting point for extremist groups' information operations against the host nation. Understanding how terrorists use essential services to garner support and the long term nature of IW, Secretary Gates said:

Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It

will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies. (Gates, 2009)

In Traditional Warfare, essential services (hospitals, water treatment facilities, etc.) are often neglected and not considered acceptable targets because of the effect they have on the population. Essential services that directly support the enemy's military (as opposed to the general population), or those used by the enemy in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict, may be targeted in order to increase the likelihood of his defeat. In IW, essential services are seen as a key line of operation through which to gain the support of the population, the key terrain, and increase the host nation government's legitimacy.

## **7. Do Not Rely Solely on Military Force for Success**

IW is an environment in which "the decisive effort is rarely military" (United States Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009, p. Preface), and as seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, an emphasis on military force may even hinder success because the military may be viewed as an occupying force instead of liberators (United States Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 2–11). Within IW lie underlying social and political issues that, if allowed to fester, can be manipulated by adversaries in order to gain or maintain an advantage. Military force is necessary to provide initial security and degrade an enemy's ability to act, but it is not, on its own, sufficient to solve the problems that enabled the adversaries to gain a footing within the population.

The greatest challenge to the U.S. military is achieving initial U.S. objectives, and then transferring leadership roles to the HN as soon as they are capable. This critical shift of power, if done improperly, can be seen as an externally-manipulated arrangement instead of a home-grown solution. This may cause the solution to either fail or simply be seen as temporary, "because many governments...resent U.S. interference in their internal affairs or cannot, because of domestic public opinion, accept direct U.S. counter-terrorism assistance, making overtly U.S. controlled or funded approaches unacceptable" (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 15).

Even the Army's main field manual on operations, FM 3-0, differentiates traditional from Irregular Warfare. It states that IW is about political power, not military supremacy, and that in this role, "military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert their influence." Additionally, the manual focuses on avoiding direct military confrontations, and instead, use "indirect [and] unconventional methods" (United States Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 2-8).

### **C. IW ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS**

The identification of the key operational-environmental factors necessary to succeed in the IW environment requires analysis. The understanding that combating threats in the IW environment are different from in the conventional warfare environment was alluded to by the Joint Forces Command in April 2009, when they responded to a request by the European Command (EUCOM) to improve their ability to defeat irregular threats, (Inside Washington Publishers, 2009). This section identifies organizational (i.e., internal) critical success factors that enable organizations to excel in IW.

#### **1. Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy**

The organization has to understand their focus is to support the host nation government. Relating back to the operational-environment factors, organizations in the IW environment must help develop homegrown solutions that are focused on the target population, utilize the internal security forces, and bolster essential services. This focuses the primary effort on other-than-military force and supports both the U.S. and HN long-term interests. General George W. Casey Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Army, furthered this concept by saying that most nations we work with are, "not going to be in a position where they can be openly seen with American Soldiers running around the country" (GEN Casey, 2009, p. 18).

U.S. Army FM 3.0 (Operations), in describing counter-insurgency operations, states that, "Operations *should reflect and promote the host-nation government's authority*. This undermines insurgent attempts to establish an alternative authority. It also *reduces the tendency of the population to view the units conducting counterinsurgency as*

*an occupying force* (emphasis added)” (United States Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 2–11). Success relies not only on understanding this concept, which the U.S. military has demonstrated, but in the proper implementation of its principles. As discussed previously, while these concepts and principles are not new, “implementing them effectively would be” (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 114).

## **2. Develop Regional Focuses**

Regionally focused organizations are best able to tailor solutions by understanding and incorporating local or regional norms. As Kilcullen states, “There are many forms of intervention, and choosing how to intervene—ideally in such a way as to minimize local backlash—is just as critical as deciding to intervene in the first place” (2009, p. 37).

The Department of the Army recognized the need for increased cultural and language in its “Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict.” This concept paper recommended, among other things, that traditional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) be designated during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle as Security Cooperation BCTs (SC BCT) which, “when formed, will be regionally allocated to ensure appropriate training focus on the culture and institutions for the region within which they will operate” (United States Department of the Army, 2008, p. 22). Further building on this concept, the Army announced in April 2009 that it was forming the first of several “Advise and Assist” BCTs (A&A BCT) with a training plan that incorporates regional focus (Brannen, 2009). While a good step, the SC BCT and A&A BCT concepts are currently only designated for one deployment cycle, which is too short of a focus to obtain true regional knowledge.

This short-term focus by BCTs is important, and may be used out of necessity (i.e., for one deployment cycle); however, deep regional, cultural, and language understanding only comes after years of study. This is best supported by a long term regional focus that incorporates multiple deployments into the target region. Focused and

repetitive interaction also leads to the development of effective and personal relationships based on trust, respect and the sharing of a common goal—the betterment of the host nation. This will ultimately satisfy long-term U.S. regional objectives.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen acknowledges that units must understand the complex tribal environment if they are to succeed (McMichael, 2009, May). Cultural understanding and the knowledge needed to deal with the complex tribal networks requires time to develop. Training is important, but actual experience on the ground and immersion in the environment is essential to the development of a level of understanding that can be used to formulate effective, long-term solutions. This concept is addressed in the Army’s new manual, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24.2), where they show time spent in an environment allows a transition from cultural awareness, to understanding, and finally, expertise (United States Department of the Army, 2009, pp. 1–24).




Figure 2. Changes in Cultural Capability over Time

### 3. Reinforce Relationship Building

In many parts of the world, power and prestige are tied less to the position, and more to the relationships, an individual has: Sometimes it is not *what* you know, but *who* you know, that counts. Relationships can provide an avenue to implement strategy. Kilcullen illustrates how to find effective local leaders in his Sunni Awakening case study. Essentially, he explains how local sheiks who have spheres of influence in



multiple areas (religious, tribal, business, government, criminal, police) are more apt to be *able* to help, than those who have fewer spheres of influence (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 158).

The interjection of U.S. forces into an area will be better received and more effective if they have already developed a long-term relationship with the locals. When necessary, relationships can be formed in short time periods, but meaningful relationships with local leaders oftentimes cannot be created after emergencies occur.

As the Army attempts to develop a better way to approach the Afghanistan conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are trying to establish plans to ensure units *deploy to the same areas* continually, albeit on shorter tours, to help develop a longer-term approach and to build long-lasting relationships between U.S. and local leaders. A planning officer associated with this remarked, “One potential outcome of this approach—as we have seen with such success with [special operations forces], is that the names and faces are familiar. In this part of the world, relationships matter most” (McMichael, 2009, May, p. 8).

#### **4. Maintain a Long-Term Focus**

The requirement for regionally focused and relationship-based solutions can only be achieved by also having a long term focus on success. This requires the organization to disengage from the western concept of immediate gratification. Unfortunately, the advent of high-technology and precision-guided weapons allowed the U.S. to conduct Operation Desert Storm and the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 with lightning speed; this short-term, “quick fix,” approach is appropriate as it was used in a conventional fight. However, it is counterproductive when the environment changes to a civil war or insurgency. Countering an insurgent threat requires the understanding that, “IW historically has required a prolonged and persistent effort of at least a decade to achieve a political outcome” (USSOCOM; USMCCDC, 2007, p. 20). This long-term approach is a key element of counterinsurgency theory, based somewhat on Mao’s concept of protracted conflict in which the insurgent seeks to outlast, instead of defeat, the more powerful opponent. Gordon McCormick explains that the guerilla only has to “stay the

course” because the conventional player loses if he does not win, but the guerrilla wins as long as he does not lose (2008).

While discussing if the U.S.’s experience in the Philippines could be applied to Pakistan, Secretary Gates said, “We will move with these various countries at a pace that is comfortable with them,” he said. “The stronger the foundation we can build under these relationships, the longer they are likely to last and the more effective they are likely to be” (Aben, 2009). This fundamental understanding, reinforced by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), must be implemented by our military to develop a long-term focus to all countries.

## **5. Influence Through Multiple Methods**

Organizations in the IW environment must develop homegrown solutions that are both population-centric and account for potentially inadequate or insufficient host nation essential services. This is best done by strengthening and integrating the multiple agencies of the U.S. government to assist the host nation. While this is an ideal solution, the SECDEF has already acknowledged that, “The interagency needs to get better and stronger, frankly, to match our capabilities, so that our capabilities have the proper context in terms of the whole-government objectives” (Kruzel, 2009).

The Taliban maintain a forceful military presence within portions of Afghanistan, and its true success lies in the fact that it is providing some form of consistent local governance and control outside of the reach of the central government. Devenny states that, “Force certainly plays a part as the Taliban conquers new territory. But it’s the insurgents’ management structure—one that supplements rather than supplants existing tribal structures—that explains the Taliban’s staying power. NATO and Kabul aren’t being outfought in Helmand; they’re being outgoverned” (2009). Being “outgoverned” by our enemy, begs for a solution that does not rely on military force alone. Organizations should incorporate the applicable elements of national power to achieve success.

In his briefing to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2006, Chris Lamb explained how, historically, the U.S. attempted to pursue national security through

use of either military force or other elements of national power—but rarely both. In the post 9/11 world, this has changed as, “it has developed into an article of conventional wisdom to note that measures short of war that involve the use of force require close coordination of all instruments of national power.” Further, he believes that there is “almost unanimous agreement on why interagency collaboration is important for national security and the war on terror in particular: because national security issues require the application of all instruments of national power to be efficiently and effectively resolved in our favor” (Lamb, 2006, p. 2).

## **6. Operate With and Through HN Forces**

In the IW environment, developing the host nation security forces’ ability to use military force is critical to their internal security. However, as mentioned previously, the use of military force to establish security is a necessary beginning, but not sufficient for long-term stability.

The primary goal of U.S. assistance to this effort is assisting these forces, both military and police, to secure their borders and population. Assisting the security forces, which may involve building them from scratch, must be done in a way that keeps them “in the lead” in order to maintain the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population. If U.S. forces fail to think through the political, credibility, and legitimacy sensitivities while aiding or establishing the host nation security forces, it can quickly lead to failure due to a lack of support from the key terrain—the population.

The ability to increase the capacity of host nation security forces is the first step in securing the population. Once basic security is established, the forces must be mentored and developed into an independent force that is capable of conducting unilateral operations that are efficient, and also respect human rights. The only way to effectively mentor them is by operating through and with them. Some of the most effective resources to assist in this development are the interagency partners of the U.S. government. They help bring all the instruments and expertise of our national power to assist the host nation, but due to their civilian backgrounds, they require a certain degree of training and security before they can assist.

Assisting the host nation to build its security forces' capacity helps that nation resolve its own conflicts. However, this assistance must be provided by an organization that, "Clearly excels in training, leading and motivating an indigenous population of a troubled foreign country to prevent the next insurgency or failed state" (BG Sacolick, 2009, Jan/Feb, p. 8). Applying this concept of working through and with the local security forces in the Philippines, the lead U.S. commander said that it helps them to "assume ownership of the problems down there" (Barnes, 2009).

## **7. Enhance Small Unit Operations**

Assisting the host nation requires all U.S. interagency elements to understand the legitimacy issues surrounding the HN government. As discussed above, to avoid looking like an occupying power or damaging the credibility of the HN government, U.S. assistance must be provided by a small footprint. The military and interagency personnel have to be highly trained, regionally focused, and able to build relationships that enhance their ability to succeed. The concept of embassy country teams, demonstrates the capability of a small team focused on strategic partnership.

Deploying a large footprint helps provide logistical and force protection support to the U.S. assistance effort, but it can create more problems than it solves. Using a larger force can fuel the enemies' IO that the U.S. is an occupying force and the host nation forces are merely U.S. proxies or surrogates. Additionally, the host nation's government and security forces lose that vital perceptibility of being credible and legitimate in the eyes of the population.

Working in small teams helps reinforce the necessity of developing close working relationships based on trust with the host nation forces for security and support. The smaller force<sup>3</sup> increases the credibility of the assertion that the assistance is *with and through*. However, this force must be substantial enough that, when partnered with HN forces, it can provide the necessary security. This force must be able to thrive in this minimal-support environment and be able to operate without specific and continual guidance or protection provided by U.S. forces (BG Sacolick, 2009, Jan/Feb, p. 8).

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<sup>3</sup> The use of the term "small force" is relative to a conventional Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

Using their superior Soldier skills in conjunction with building on already-established relations for protection, the smaller force is able to be more effective at assisting the host nation and its security forces.

## **8. Decentralize Decision Making**

An organization in the IW environment must be able to trade operational control of its subordinate elements in exchange for increased effectiveness. This concept is similar to the U.S. giving up control over the host nation forces in order to foster the local, homegrown solutions discussed previously. Once the subordinate elements have the leeway to operate using commander's intent and initiative, they will be much more effective (McMichael, 2009, June).

While "letting go" may be hard, many have argued for flexible and adaptive forces combined with "a decentralized and de-layered command and control structure" (Wilner, 2005, p. 15). Allowing assistance forces to make key decisions shifts them from a top-down organization to more decentralized and bottom-up organization. Additionally, providing the lower level commanders the authority to make decisions increases their credibility to make agreements with local leaders, thus increasing their effectiveness.

In their book, *The Starfish and the Spider*, Brafman and Beckstrom use several relevant examples to show the effectiveness of fighting decentralized organizations with another decentralized organization (2007, pp. 140–142). Given that the primary threat in the IW environment comes from decentralized organizations like local insurgencies, trans-national terrorist and criminal groups, this ability to operate without continual guidance is critical.

## **9. Foster Innovation and Creativity**

Small units that operate in a decentralized manner and rely on their host nation counterparts for force protection, logistical capabilities, and overall success must be resourceful. To do this, they must incorporate the concept of thinking "outside of the box" to identify the problem and determine a viable solution without relying on the

traditional support from U.S. military organizations and capabilities. This means the small units should be both innovative and creative at problem solving.

Organizations and key interagency partners must be innovative and creative when operating in the IW environment. They must incorporate cultural attributes when developing solutions that bolster the inadequate or non-existent essential services mentioned previously. Like in the security realm, imposing a U.S. solution will not work if HN legitimacy is to be gained or maintained, but the interagency partners can integrate both the elements of U.S. national power with local charities and NGOs. This multi-pronged approach helps the host nation solve its own problems, increase its credibility and legitimacy, and garner increased support from the population.

#### **10. Focus Rewards System on Long-Term Effects**

We believe one of the most important organizational-environmental success factors is that organizations operating within the IW environment must have a long-term focused rewards system. The rewards and promotion system must be designed to recognize and reward efforts whose results may not be fully realized until months or years later. While this change is necessary for success in the IW environment, it is not sufficient only to change an organization's rewards system.

This long-term focus is in direct opposition to the current rewards and promotion system of the U.S. military, which is designed around 12-month evaluation report cycles, 6–18 month deployment cycles, and 2–4 years time-on-station unit assignment cycles. These evaluation and reward systems are designed to show the effectiveness of individuals and organizations in “completing the mission” and ensuring that the most qualified and effective personnel are advanced in rank. The current organizational culture of the U.S. military has translated this task into a listing of quantifiable accomplishments that do not reflect the qualitative nature of IW.

The measures of effectiveness (MoE) used by the military tend to be enemy-centric and geared toward easily quantifiable metrics (i.e., numbers of killed and captured). This approach does not meet the requirements within the IW environment. Understanding this, commanders in the successful IW campaign in the Philippines (OEF-

P), developed a population-centric rating scheme for judging the success of their operations within a given area. It did not measure numbers of killed, captured, etc., but instead rated the effects of their operations as they related to the populace. Much emphasis was given to the population's perception of the government and the operations being conducted. Additionally, the overall legitimacy of the government was rated using various standards that were developed in synchronization with cultural norms and behaviors. These measures are not easy to develop, but they are feasible and essential if success is going to be realized (Maxwell, 2009).

Measuring the operational effects, as was done in the Philippines, is a step in the right direction. This needs to be taken a step further, though; rewards and evaluations of the personnel operating in this environment must be set up to reward and solidify these practices as a part of the organizational culture.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

IW is an extremely complex, long-duration, and population-centric environment, which requires a different form of organization to operate efficiently and effectively. As shown throughout this chapter, IW differs greatly from traditional warfare, in which our military is currently designed and organized to Excel. Although many differences exist, the population-centric versus enemy-centric focus stands out as the dominant one. Control over the relevant population is the basis of all the other differences.

Joint Publication (JP) 3.0 states that “warfare that has the population as its ‘focus of operations’ requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, pp. I-6). Thus, organizations designed to conduct conventional warfare are sub-optimal to those specially designed and organized specifically for the IWE.

Although General Purpose Forces have demonstrated their ability to conduct important IW activities like stability operations and FID, their enemy-oriented organizational culture, large footprint, core competencies, and rewards systems inhibit efficiency. These organizational aspects limit fundamental changes required to operate effectively in the IWE. The IWE requires a dynamic organization in which indirect and

long-term approaches are favored to help the host nation gain legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant population. In this environment, an emphasis on military might and force will have both a short and counterproductive effect.

These seven operational-environmental and ten organizational-environmental critical success factors, shown in Table 2, provide a glimpse of what an organization must be able to take into account when operating in the IW environment. We will use the environments discussed thus far, in conjunction with organizational theory and design, to establish the organizational principles necessary for DoD to maintain an equilibrium between traditional and irregular warfare.

<b>Operational-Environment</b>	<b>Organizational-Environment</b>
Account for U.S. and Host Nation Political Situation	Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy
Foster a Home Grown Solution	Develop Regional Focuses
Develop a Population-Centric Approach	Reinforce Relationship Building
Region Requires Long term Commitment	Maintain a Long term Focus
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security Forces	Influence through Multiple Methods
Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential Services	Operate With and Through HN Forces
Do not rely Solely on Military Force for Success	Enhance Small Unit Operations
	Decentralize Decision Making
	Foster Innovation and Creativity
	Focus Rewards System on Long term Effects

Table 2. Irregular Warfare Critical Success Factors



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## **IV. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND DESIGN OVERVIEW**

*It requires, in those situations where we encounter it, a whole new strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.*

*–President John F. Kennedy, 1962 USMA Commencement Address*

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we introduce the basics of organization theory to identify the domains used in our analysis. We then incorporate the operational and organizational critical success factors developed in Chapter III and discuss their implications for organizations operating within the IW environment.

### **B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND DESIGN IMPLICATIONS IN IW**

In this section, we focus on five domains that frame our organizational analysis:

1. Structure
2. Environment
3. Work Processes
4. Human Resources
5. Culture

We then determine the implications that these domains have on organizations operating in the IW environment by explaining which environmental success factors apply and why they are crucial to success.

Structure, work processes, human resources and culture are analyzed using the organizational success factors to explain what should happen within the organization. The environmental factors describe the forces affecting the organization and will be used to analyze the organizational theory principle—environment.

#### **1. Structure**

The DoD was designed and organized to operate within the traditional warfare environment. This is an environment in which centralized decision making and mechanistic structures can operate efficiently and effectively. The IW environment, as

established in Chapters II and III, differs from traditional warfare in being more complex and dynamic. For an organization to thrive within the IW environment, an entirely different structure is required.

How an organization is designed to facilitate information flow and complete its work (tasks) defines its structure (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, pp. 124–125). While the end result appears as the boxes and lines of an organizational chart, structure is more realistically viewed as a combination of vertical and horizontal linkages between the subordinate elements (Daft, 2003, pp. 125–126).

The basic components defining an organization's structure are: Formalization (standardization of training and work processes), Centralization (of decision-making authority), Specialization and Complexity (of workers' tasks), Hierarchy (reporting system), Span of Control (number of subordinates reporting to a single manager), and Rules (ensuring coordination and consistency for repetitious situations) (Daft, 2003, p. 48).

The vertical linkages coordinate the actions of the workers in line with the leader's goals and provide those leaders with information on how the work or tasks are being performed. Among other things, vertical linkages include dividing tasks and sub-organizations into different departments; establishing the hierarchy and spans of control; and establishing rules and plans to formalize everything from training to ensuring a consistent response to repetitive tasks or situations without continually providing guidance. The horizontal linkages are designed to ensure communication flows between the individual departments in the organization (Daft, 2003, pp. 126–129). These include utilizing a combination of information systems, including computers and varying levels of liaisons to ensure unity of effort. In general, the more standardized or routine the work is, the more vertical linkages will prevail. The more complex the work is, the more horizontal linkages will prevail (Daft, 2003, pp. 126–129).

The departmentation of an organization is its most visible structural component, and can be Functional, Divisional, or Matrix. Generally speaking, a functional structure is used to centralize expertise in certain functions together. Within the DoD, the

functional commands are: Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (United States Department of Defense, 2009, p. 2.9). This is because they have worldwide responsibility for their areas. Divisional structures are used when an organization has varying products, customers, or geographic locations to serve. The divisional commands within DoD are the six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) that maintain responsibility for all operations within their assigned areas. A matrix organization combines both functional experts with divisionally focused organizations to build a team serving two bosses. An example of this structure is a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) where USSOCOM personnel (a functional command) operate in a specific geographical area under a GCC (a divisional command). The TSOCs work and report for both headquarters.

*a. Structural Implications for IW*

Applying the organizational success factors from Chapter III, an organization operating in the IW environment must develop a regional focus, the ability to influence the host nation through multiple methods (i.e., interagency approach), enhance small unit operations, and be empower decentralized decision making.

The regional focus allows the organization to create institutional and personal expertise in the areas it operates. In accordance with organization theory, this suggests that the organization has a divisional structure for its subordinate elements based on the regions they serve.

Incorporating all capabilities of the U.S. government, through an interagency approach, allows the organization to exert influence through multiple methods. Organization theory suggests that this need for multiple agencies operating together requires multiple liaisons and increased horizontal linkages. Combining these integrated teams together also helps create more organic, open and free-flowing organizations (Galbraith, Downey, & Kates, 2002, pp. 138–141).

Enabling the organization to enhance small-unit operations requires an integrated human resources approach that includes a highly formalized selection, education, and training process. This produces professional, educated, and highly trained workers who increase the capability of the organization to work in a complex environment without requiring continual guidance and support from a higher headquarters.

Finally, these small units operating independently can only be empowered to be successful if the organization supports decentralized decision making. This relates to a structure that has as few vertical linkages as possible, minimizing the intermediary levels of bureaucracy found in other organizations.

## **2. Environment**

An organization's environment is defined as, "All elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of [it]" (Daft, 2003, p. 48). Daft further divides the environment into two dimensions: simple versus complex and stable versus unstable (2003, p. 52).

The IW environment is highly complex, interactive and continually changing. Organizational theory suggests that an organization operating within such an environment must be both decentralized in its decision making, and organic in its structure.

A simple environment only has a few external influences on it, while a complex environment has many. Complex environments tend to favor decentralized decision making so that constantly shifting problems do not overwhelm higher-level decision makers (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 101).

The environment's stability refers to the frequency of change in these external influences, so stable environments have predictable influences over long durations, while unstable environments experience continually shifting influences. Unstable or hostile environments tend to favor organic structures that are "looser, free-flowing, and adaptive" (Daft, 2003, p. 58).

In combining these two dimensions, the more complex and unstable the environment, the more uncertainty the organization experiences. This affects the organization's ability to process incoming information, risks overloading its decision-making abilities, and makes efficiency much more difficult (Jansen, 2009a). A visual representation of this concept is illustrated in Figure 3 and shows that decentralized decision making is better suited for complex environments, and organic structures are better for unstable environments (Daft, 2004, p. 152).




Figure 3. Environmental Effects on Organizations

*a. Environment's Implications in IW*

Using the environmental success factors developed in Chapter III, all seven<sup>4</sup> of the operational-environment factors meet Daft's definition of existing outside the organization's boundary but having the ability to affect either parts or the whole of it.

<sup>4</sup> Seven operational-environmental critical success factors from Chapter III are: Account for U.S. & host nation political situation; foster a homegrown solution; develop a population-centric approach; region requires long-term commitment; increase capacity of host nation security forces; increase capacity of host nation essential services; do not rely solely on military force for success.

Thus, any organization operating in the IW environment must incorporate these critical success factors into its guiding principles in order to be successful. The difficult, unique, and constantly changing aspects of the IW environment make it both unstable and highly complex. This high level of uncertainty lends itself to organizations that are both decentralized in their decision making, and less bureaucratic organizational structures.

The organization design concepts explained above would classify most military organizations as machine bureaucracies due to their mechanistic (formalized) structures and reliance on centralized decision making. These characteristics hamper an organization's ability to succeed in the IW environment.

### **3. Work Processes**

The reason any organization exists is to transform some "input" or raw material into some "output." In a business environment, this is akin to the transformation from raw materials to an end product, like a car. An organization's technology comprises the "tools, techniques, and actions" it uses during the transformation process, and it includes the technical systems (physical infrastructure and machinery used), and the work process itself (Daft, 2003, p. 73).

The IW environment requires personnel working within it to deal with non-routine, complex, and interdependent tasks. To accomplish their missions, organization theory suggests it is best accomplished by minimizing formalization of job accomplishment, incorporating extensive training and experience requirements for workers, increasing span of control for leaders, and ensuring unity of effort through extensive horizontal linkages between groups.

An effective organization is designed so the multiple steps, or tasks, that must be accomplished within the transformation process are as efficient as possible. When the tasks are evaluated, each has a unique level of variety and analyzability. A high task variety indicates frequent, unexpected events throughout the transformation process, and a low analyzability indicates the process cannot be reduced to simple, mechanistic, and repetitive steps (Perrow, 1970, pp. 76–77). The more varied and less analyzable a transformation process' tasks are, the more non-routine the work process. Therefore, the

organization operates with increased uncertainty. It then follows that, the more non-routine the work, the greater the need for workers who have the experience and technical knowledge required to solve problems while dealing with the uncertainty.

Another component to the work process accomplished by an organization is the level of interdependence between departments within an organization. If a product (output) is transformed independently of other groups, as in a divisional organization, Thompson refers to the process as being pooled (independent) or sequential interdependence (Thompson, 1967, p. 54). However, if the transformation requires the interaction of multiple elements within different sub-organizations, Thompson refers to the process as reciprocal interdependence. This continual interaction between sub-organizations is similar to the work found in functional organizations where expertise is maintained in different units, and they must work together to produce the output. This interaction requires extensive horizontal linkages in the form of liaisons to coordinate activities. These non-routine work processes that utilize interdependent horizontal sub-organizations are best accomplished in organic structures with: low formalization (standardization) of work processes, decentralized decision making, extensive training and experience requirements for workers, fairly moderate span of control of subordinates, but extensive horizontal linkages between groups to ensure unity of effort (Daft, 2004, pp. 159–160).

*a. Work Process Implications in IW*

The increase in uncertainty in the IW environment requires the personnel operating within it to have enhanced small unit operations, maintain a long-term focus, develop relationship-based operations, operate through and with the host nation's forces, influence through multiple agencies, be innovative and creative, and be empowered by decentralized decision making. These requirements reinforce the need for extensive education and training.



The reliance on multiple sub-organizations working together to achieve success in the IW environment leads to reciprocal interdependence amongst them and the host nation forces. In this type of environment, organizations that are able to build relationships with their counterparts and interagency partners are more likely to succeed.

When supporting a host nation to build or maintain their legitimacy, it is imperative to respect and allow them to build their own formalized work processes. Operating with and through the host nation's forces allows them to develop work processes that they are a "fit" for their culture.

The need for trained personnel with expertise and technical knowledge in environments with high uncertainty requires a long-term focus by organizations in the IW environment. When building reciprocal interdependence between U.S. and HN elements, a long-term focus enables the required horizontal linkages to formalize.

The complex and unstable environment also requires organizations to influence our host nation partners through multiple methods. No single sub-organization will bring about the desired endstate, and they all must work together, in reciprocal interdependence, in order to succeed. Additionally, the multiple sub-organizations must be enabled by decentralized decision-making power so precious time is not wasted waiting for the higher headquarters to receive, review, and approve plans.

In the IW environment, organizations must be resourceful in order to deal with the ever-changing situation. To deal effectively with this, organizations and personnel require extensive training, experience, and small group ingenuity to accomplish complex tasks with minimal guidance or support.

#### **4. Human Resources**

The human resources (HR) component of any organization is the critical link between knowing what "has" to be done, and enabling people so they "can" get it done. In general, incorporating HR into the design of an organization involves four components: *Selecting* the right people, *Training* them to accomplish the work, *Placement* in a job or position best suited to match their talents with the organizations

goals, and a *Reward System* to reinforce positive behavior through promotion and retention (Jansen, 2009b). If not designed appropriately, these HR functions can cause a “misfit” between the people and the organization, which may eventually lead to failure.

When selecting the right person, the recruitment function aims to ensure that the required aptitudes and abilities needed for the work are demonstrated by the recruit. For example, the military has basic physical condition (height and weight) and ability (fitness tests) requirements. Additionally, how recruits are attracted to a job should later be incorporated into how they are evaluated (Von Glinow, Driver, Brousseau, & Prince, 1983, p. 25). Recruiting a computer expert to join the Army despite a lack of physical fitness or ability, and then evaluating him on fitness, will quickly lead to problems.

Once selected, the worker must be trained to accomplish the required tasks. This also introduces the first step of the rewards system, defining what is considered good behavior. Reinforcing what “right looks like” helps ensure desired results later.

Once trained, the worker must be placed in a job that maximizes his or her utility to the organization and satisfies internal expectations and desires. This can be defined as: do they have the *ability* to do the job? Are they *motivated* to do the job? Do their *expectations* about the successful end state match the organizations?

Finally, the worker must be rewarded for the work. This can be defined as, “A complex set of formal and informal incentives that connect individual motivation, behavior, performance, and ultimately results to the various forms of pay or compensation received in exchange” (CoastWise Consulting, Inc., 2009). This reward system must help motivate the worker to do the work needed by the organization. A failure to connect the desired work with the reward system, the less-desirable behavior will emerge (Kerr, 1995, p. 13). While it is true that some workers gain intrinsic rewards from their work, unfair or inconsistent rewards system can erode this satisfaction and reinforce undesired behaviors. In other words, the rewards should provide positive reinforcement, not an obstacle, to achieving the organization’s desired behavior (Kerr, 1995, p. 13). Effective rewards systems establish a cycle of *defining* acceptable or desired behavior through setting of goals and expectations; *identifying* good or desired

behavior during performance appraisals; and *rewarding* desired behaviors with feedback that may include bonuses, pay raises, promotions, prestige or status symbols, job security and benefits, or increased influence in the organization (Kerr, 2009).

A failure to incorporate the attributes used to recruit workers into their evaluations and rewards will likely lead to career problems (Von Glinow, Driver, Brousseau, & Prince, 1983, p. 24). Likewise, basing rewards on quantifiable measures of evaluation in a qualitative environment, or attempting to focus only visible measures of success when other measures are more important to the organization, will lead to a mismatch between what the organization is rewarding the worker to do, and what they want him or her to do (Kerr, 1995, p. 12).

*a. Human Resource's Implications in IW*

Understanding the HR domain of an organization is critical. The military has developed a long-standing ability to select, train, place and reward its members who are operating in the traditional warfare environment, but it has failed to do so for the IW environment. The following critical success factors are essential to HR: reinforce relationship building, operate with and through the host nation's forces, enhance small unit operations, foster innovation and creativity, and decentralize decision making.

To enable the organization to keep a regional focus, personnel must be selected by their aptitude to learn languages, trained to recognize and understand nuances in different regions, and then placed in units that can take advantage of these skills.

Personnel conducting operations within IW should be recognized and rewarded based on their skills and performance at developing and maintaining relationship-based interactions with partner nations.

Training personnel to operate with and through the partner nation's forces is a critical first step in building the capacity of that nation. The focus should be on increasing the host nation's performance. The personnel reward systems for organizations within IW should be related to the degree of improvement in the host nation's capabilities.

Selecting, training and rewarding personnel who are able to effectively operate in small units is necessary to allow a small footprint in the partner nation. While this helps to maintain that nation's legitimacy, it increases the complexity of conducting operations without a robust command and support structure.

An integrated requirement to operate effectively in small units is the power to make decentralized decisions and be resourceful. Organizations must train their personnel not to be dependent on higher headquarters or support structures to accomplish missions. Then, those personnel who, to use the cliché, "think outside of the box," should be recognized and rewarded to encourage others to do the same.

These criteria are the "good behaviors" as they relate to the IW environment. Once established, metrics should be developed and implemented that enable a qualitative assessment of achievements from the individual to organizational levels. This will require a long-term focused reward system vice the immediate results system currently being utilized.

## **5. Culture**

One of the hardest things to define is an organization's culture. Merriam-Webster defines it as, "The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization." Although an organization's mission defines its purpose for existence, its culture reflects what it values most. In fact, an organization's culture can grow so strong that "it is best referred to as an 'ideology' that dominates all else" (Quinn, Mintzberg, & James, 1988, p. 344). This ideology is the compilation of the organization's structure, work processes, and HR practices. If the organization is not careful, the mission and culture will be out of sync, and its efficiency will be deteriorated.

An organization should foster a culture that is able to operate in the IW environment by instituting effective HR policies that provide direction and enable success. Leaders must identify, prescribe, and reinforce what "good" is, to the point that it becomes normal behavior within the organization. The "good" behavior cannot be the exception. Instead, it must be the norm if success is to be realized.

Missions designed to produce quantifiable results (e.g., kill or capture missions) are inherently favored within DoD. Additionally, these types of missions provide immediate gratification to those who execute them. However, due to its long term and protracted nature, success in IW may not be known for many years, offering few to no immediate or tangible results.

A new metric must be adopted by the DoD that takes into account the focus of operations within the IWE in order to foster the desired culture. Reward systems and cultures within the DoD that fail to support the requisite IW competencies, can create an environment where different types of warfare are required, but only one is reinforced. This is akin to what CoastWise Consulting found in the corporate world where, “Despite the fact that different parts of the organizations require different behaviors and results, most corporations insist that their reward systems be consistent across the organization” (2009).

*a. Culture’s Implications in IW*

An organization’s culture must be compatible with its primary mission, and will ultimately determine whether it succeeds or fails in achieving its goals. While the previous components of organization design (structure, work environment, work process, and HR policies) are necessary for success, none of them are sufficient by themselves. A failure to accomplish any of these will result in an organization that does not “fit” its assigned tasks. However, if an organization incorporates the other aspects but fails to develop a long-term culture consistent with its missions and goals, it will still fail in the IW environment.

The culture within the DoD supports advancing U.S. objectives within a host nation. In IW, the culture must have a second driving force; a focus on enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation in order to gain or maintain influence over the relevant populations. Recognizing that an organization’s culture should enable it to accomplish its mission, and is a product of all its components and practices, an organization must incorporate all of the organizational-environmental critical success factors throughout the

five organizational design principles. This all-inclusive approach will develop and grow a culture that reinforces success in the IW environment.

A culture that maintains and fosters the capabilities required in the IW environment must begin with an organization that is focused on enhancing host nation legitimacy. This foundation will enable a long-term focus that requires enhanced small units to conduct decentralized operations while working with and through host nation forces. As the relationships are built, maintained and reinforced by a reward system focused on long-term effects, the culture of the organization will become so strong that it truly represents “an ‘ideology’ that dominates all else” (Quinn, Mintzberg, & James, 1988, p. 344).

### C. SUMMARY

The complexities and uniqueness of IW developed in Chapters II and III led to the establishment of operational-environment and organizational-environment critical success factors affecting any organization operating within IW. Evaluating an organization against the five components of organizational theory and design, (Structure, Environment, Work Processes, Human Resources, and Culture), shows that each element of the theory is necessary, but not sufficient by itself, for success in the IW environment.

Based on organizational theory and design, there are several differences between traditional and irregular warfare organizations, as summarized in the Table 3. The key distinction is the focus by the rewards system and organizational culture. Traditional warfare organizations focus on enemy-centric, short term, and quantifiable results instead of the population-centric, long term and qualitative results essential in IW. This requires a separate rewards system and culture for all elements working in the IW environment.

	<b>Irregular Warfare</b>	<b>Traditional Warfare</b>
Structure	Horizontal	Vertical
Environment	Complex and Unstable	Simple and Stable
Work Processes	Non routine	Routine
HR Reward Focus	Long term	Immediate
Culture	Focused on HN Legitimacy	Focused on defeating an enemy

Table 3. Organizational Comparison in Differing Environments

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## V. IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

*The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.*

—Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates

### A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background upon which the United States can best organize itself to combat threats in the IWE—ideally, by acting to prevent the threats from ever emerging. Of note, with the understanding that within the U.S. government, most, if not all, of the agencies play a role within the IWE, the DoD oftentimes plays the largest role. While broad changes within the IA will be mentioned, the focus for this thesis will remain within DoD.

This chapter will identify and analyze the two basic options available to organizations that are unable to meet the demands of the environment: create a new organization from scratch or improve an existing organization through reorganization. We begin by highlighting a business decision to improve or innovate internal processes based on changing needs. This will provide a brief, conceptual introduction into options available in the IW environment.

We then outline the two basic options (improve existing or innovate new) for establishing an organization that can excel in the IW environment. However, the most important aspect of reorganization is to identify what capabilities are needed (organizational-environmental success factors) and what organizations or agencies currently provide those capabilities. We argue that the necessary and available capabilities are not being used correctly. This is similar to Professor Rothstein's comment, "We have the tools but lack the blueprints for executing forms of warfare that



do not conform to standard warfare conventions” (2006, p. 171). Once these assets are identified, the U.S. government must decide on the level of change that is required to meet the environmental demands.

This chapter concludes by recommending which approach best suits the U.S., and highlights some key decisions that must be incorporated into establishing this organization.

**B. APPLICATION OF BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE: INNOVATE OR IMPROVE**

In discussing how a business decides on the scope of change required to maintain relevancy in its market, Davenport identifies two basic approaches: improve (i.e., change existing) or innovate (i.e., create new) (Malhotra, 1998). The Table 4 summarizes some of the key considerations that, if accurately assessed, facilitate an organization’s ability to maintain relevancy and succeed in its current and future markets.

	<b>Improvement</b>	<b>Innovation</b>
Level of Change	Incremental	Radical
Starting Point	Existing Process	Clean Slate
Frequency of Change	One-time/Continuous	One-Time
Time Required	Short	Long
Participation	Bottom-Up	Top-Down
Typical Scope	Narrow, within functions	Broad, cross-functional
Risk	Moderate	High
Primary Enabler	Statistical Control	Information Technology
Type of Change	Cultural	Cultural/Structural

Table 4. Business Process Improvement vs. Redesign (After Davenport, 1993, p. 11)

Table 4 refers directly to business organizations where demands for products and services change often. Businesses are focused on making money by providing those goods and services, so they must be adept at recognizing and responding to those changing conditions. It is this requirement, to be responsive, that illustrates how this thought process relates to the government as it adapts to the ever-changing threat environment.

In discussing how businesses redesign themselves, Chris Worley explains the importance of designing organizations that are capable of handling future change, “To change rapidly and maintain critical configuration and dynamic alignment, organizations need to be designed to change and be capable of high velocity change. They need to be able to change elements of their strategy, competencies and capabilities, and organization design when the environment calls for it” (Lawler & Worley, 2006, p. 52). The military is currently faced with a multitude of options to adjust its configuration to meet the changing threat environment. However, these changes must be implemented judiciously to ensure the U.S. maintains its relevant traditional warfighting abilities.

Businesses can change or innovate more easily than governmental organizations because they are not constrained by the bureaucracy inherent in government. When dealing with warfare, either traditional or irregular, the “goods or services” required (i.e., the capability to deal with most threats within these environments) already exists, although they reside in multiple organizations. Within the government, leaders must decide the level of change that is needed by assessing what capabilities and mindsets currently exist, compare these to what is required, and determine what the gaps are. Additionally, by looking at the future of perceived threats and the known competing demands, the government must assess the gap between the time available to organize for new threats and the time required to implement changes. Lastly, the government must identify the level of acceptable risk it is willing to accept while reorganizing or building to address these future threats.

Utilizing current IW capabilities to reorganize existing organizations proves to be a much wiser course of action than creating a new organization. While creating a new organization from scratch is an option in many instances, creating a new organization to operate within the IW environment makes little sense. The following section will address many of the key attributes of this course of action which make it neither suitable nor feasible.

### C. WHY INNOVATING WITH A NEW ORGANIZATION IS NOT AN OPTION

The option to “innovate” relates to the establishment of a new organization from scratch. For definitional purposes, this means the creation of a new headquarters element (either under an existing or as a separate command), and developing the forces, equipment, legislation, authorities and funding necessary for success. It is important to clarify that this option does not borrow from, use, reorganize or transplant existing personnel, organizations or systems. We outline the advantages and disadvantages of creation of a new organization without exploring whether it exists within or external to the DoD.

Starting from scratch initially appears to be an ideal scenario because of the ability to fully incorporate the environmental success factors (Chapter III) with the organizational theory and design implications (Chapter IV) from the start. This allows the new organization’s structure to be designed as a product of its operational-environment instead of its bureaucratic environment. Therefore, a new organization can be tailored to *fit* the IW environment without being constrained by existing organizational norms.

However, designing from new overlooks the fact that both the DoD and IA partners already have sub-organizations with personnel specifically selected, trained, and equipped for the IW environment. Therefore, creating a new organization creates a large duplication of existing capabilities, funding, and resources for the government and military. Duplication of effort relates to more than just a duplication of operational capability, it also includes the resources required to select, train, and educate personnel for effectiveness in the IW environment.

Another benefit to starting from scratch allows the organization to establish good behavior by using the proper organizational theory human resource concepts in the early phases of development. This enables the organization to develop its manning by selecting personnel who have the aptitude and motivation to succeed in this type of environment. These personnel are then trained to enhance their ability to excel through key personnel attributes (i.e., language proficiency, cultural understanding, educated to

conduct problem solving in a decentralized environment, etc.). Once the training is complete, each individual is placed in the sub-organization that best utilizes their skills. Finally, these personnel can be rewarded to reinforce desired behaviors instead of being subjected to pre-existing bureaucratic values.

However, much like the appropriate sub-organizations that already exist, the IW-relevant human resource processes are already in place in many DoD organizations, such as select elements within the U.S. Marine Special Operations Advisory Group (MARSOAG), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which includes Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces. While force projections are tailored for the nature of current and future threats to the U.S., a duplication of the training capabilities that reside in these units is not only wasteful but will cause greater changes in the current roles and missions of these specialized units.

Building a new organization is a costly option that requires major human and physical infrastructure. Both the military and IA partners are struggling to adequately resource their existing requirements, and are in no position to stand start? up a new organization. The creation of a new organization with duplicate capabilities will amplify the already existing funding fights among government agencies. A new organization would duplicate the IW-relevant assets within the services and IA partners and increase costs without a proportional increase in operational efficiency.

Developing a new organization provides an avenue to establish a new *ideology/culture* of good behavior without the historic shortfalls of “this is how we used to do it.” While the culture of the organization can be built and strengthened by establishing its mission, goals and desired end states up front, the government must first recognize the many sub-organizations that have already done this. The shortfalls to these organizations reside in their inability to institutionalize a rewards system that recognizes and reinforces IW capabilities.

If a new organization is created and resourced, it has to establish internal operating procedures and then begin the process of building credibility with other U.S. government agencies and foreign governments. This process dramatically increases the time required to truly establish a new organization that can effectively do what it was designed for.

Existing organizations possess area expertise and have established credibility, in the U.S. and abroad. Trying to reestablish those characteristics with a new organization places both of those in jeopardy.

### **1. Summary of Why a New Organization Is Not an Option**

The most compelling reason to build the organization from scratch is if the desired capabilities for the organization are currently non-existent. The most compelling reason to not build an organization from scratch is the duplication of pre-existing human capital that possess specific capabilities and infrastructure. Credibility of an organization is something that is established over time and through successes, which is a hurdle that would be difficult to overcome. For these reasons, a new organization, that duplicates current capabilities, is not a viable option.

An understanding of the environmental critical success factors demands the U.S. government reassess its current organizations that were originally purpose-built for operations in the IW environment. Once assessed, it is imperative to resist the urge to build from scratch. The government must select the capabilities that come closest to meeting these requirements and reorganize them.

### **D. WHY REORGANIZATION IS THE ONLY OPTION**

The option to better exploit existing capabilities through reorganization, whether within or external to DoD, is the only option that is viable considering the assets the U.S. government already possesses. Reorganization includes: reassigning multiple sub-organizations under one headquarters element, separating a sub-organization from a parent organization, or establishing a new headquarters element and populating it with existing sub-organizations.

The primary advantage of reorganization is that capabilities and resources to excel in the IW environment already exist. However, the greatest issue the government faces is organization centrality. The centralizing of these forces under a single organization is not to be confused with their need to operate decentralized. Currently, the organizations best suited to operate in the IW environment are centrally managed under USSOCOM, which historically has favored direct over indirect approaches. What is needed is a parent organization that is solely IW-focused. As long as USSOCOM maintains both direct and indirect cultures, the direct culture will dominate.

Reorganization of these specialized capabilities under one organization will significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of indirect options. Furthermore, it will significantly reduce the misuse of indirect assets by enemy-centric focused commands.

The bureaucratic nature of our government leads each military service or governmental department to try to justify their relevancy, mission, size, budget, and power. While this is rational, the allocation and use of money dedicated to countering threats in the IWE is sub-optimal when dispersed to parent organizations that have a purpose and culture that is the antithesis of irregular warfare. Reorganizing IW-relevant sub organizations will alleviate competing demands for status, power, and money throughout the military.

The primary disadvantage of reorganizing is the comprehensive change required to adequately outline, recognize, and reward behavior critical to success in the IW environment. This means that organizational ideologies and promotion/reward systems must be drastically modified to support the long-term and population-centric behaviors associated with proactively assisting partner nations.

Despite the vast amount of infrastructure already in place to select, train, and manage personnel within these IW-focused sub-organizations, capabilities and capacity will never be sufficient as long as these forces are centralized under a non IW-focused command. The need to create these forces is eliminated by effectively reorganizing the

existing capabilities under a central organization. The end result is an organization with sufficient capability and orientation to meet the demands of the IW environment.

The need to use military force to provide and maintain security in areas of conflict, as well as a shortage of critical IA partners, has placed the DoD in the lead during previous IW campaigns. Organizational changes to better direct IW-focused actions increase effectiveness of the applicable DoD forces while enhancing the coordination with those limited, but critical, IA partners.

While considering reorganization of critical military capabilities under a parent organization, it is important to note that the IA lacks an organization that could realistically manage multiple agencies effectively in the IWE. The DoD is the only U.S. government agency that has the capacity to manage the IWE. This leads us to believe that a DoD-based element must be in charge of an IW-focused organization for the foreseeable future.

If done correctly, reorganization can incorporate the critical success factors for IW (as discussed in Chapter III) while instituting the necessary cultural and ideological changes (Chapter IV). Once the correct sub-organizations are identified, the DoD must enable the IW-focused organization to establish a reward system that supports the IW mission and environment by allowing a focus on long term, population-centric, and host nation legitimacy metrics.

### **1. Summary of Why Reorganization Is the Only Option**

The U.S. government must overcome the institutional reluctance to reorganize the assets necessary to counter threats in the IW environment. Capabilities that are specifically designed to operate within the IWE can and should be reorganized under one organization. This will ensure a common purpose and mission focus while preventing misuse, without creating redundancy of effort.

The option of reorganization does not come without costs. Reorganization requires a fundamental shift within the DoD to allow these capabilities to be moved from their existing organizations. This push for reorganization must be directed from outside of the DoD to overcome the natural resistance to change.

#### **E. HOW TO REORGANIZE ELEMENTS FOR THE IWE**

As stated previously, the IA and DoD need to change in order to more efficiently and effectively meet the demands of the IW environment. The specific changes within the IA community, beyond the production of better IA/DoD coordination mechanisms, are beyond the scope of this thesis, and require additional research and expertise. Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs will concentrate on initiating change within the DoD.

The first challenge in reorganizing is to decide where to start. Attempting to find a pre-existing organization that closely matches the desired organization design<sup>5</sup> elements minimizes both the cost and time for implementation. Starting with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) appears to make the most sense for the DoD because it already owns the preponderance of IW capabilities; however, this choice does not come without significant changes.

At first glance, USSOCOM is a wise starting point because its core tasks<sup>6</sup> encompass the DoD's IW primary activities. The personnel within many of the various sub-organizations are specially selected and trained to effectively conduct IW tasks. However, some elements of its organizational structure, human resources, and culture impede its ability to excel in the IW environment. Specifically, its history is based on direct action missions that have created an initial focus and environment on that type of warfare. The special operations community has excelled in direct action and conventional style missions with such precision, they have been called a "hyper-conventional" force (Rothstein, 2006, p. 102).

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<sup>5</sup> As outlined in Chapter IV, these elements are: structure, environment, work process, human resources, and culture.

<sup>6</sup> The 2009 SOCOM Fact Book lists them as: DA, SR, UW, FID, CA, CT, PSYOP, IO, CP, SFA and COIN (United States Special Operations Command Public Affairs, 2009, 7).



This focus on traditional warfare-type tasks is further exacerbated by USSOCOM's functional sub-organizational structure.<sup>7</sup> While this specialization lends itself to horizontal collaboration amongst the various services within USSOCOM, it forces a prioritization of critical and limited resources between supporting indirect and direct mission sets. Due to the higher perceived payoff, immediate gratification, and shorter duration of enemy-centric missions, it is easier to support them instead of the longer duration indirect, population-centric missions.

Further, the focus on human resources within USSOCOM to select and train its forces initially creates a sense of "eliteness" for its operators. However, the prioritization of critical and limited resources, combined with perceived preferential treatment and rewards provided to forces conducting enemy-centric missions, quickly creates a "second-tier" mentality toward operators in the IW environment. This unbalanced human resource reward system and organizational culture throughout USSOCOM that favors the direct over the indirect, makes it a "misfit" to be the overall operational headquarters overseeing Irregular Warfare.

An additional disadvantage of using USSOCOM as the starting point for reorganization is its designation as a functional command. The direct action units USSOCOM provides to the Geographic Combatant Commanders operate effectively in part because their culture and focus are more in line with the enemy-centric mindset of GCC commanders. The uniqueness of the IWE requires an organization to have the ability not only to provide forces to conduct operations within the IWE, but to influence the GCC commanders to ensure the capabilities are utilized effectively as part of the greater GCC theater engagement plan. This allows the organization to reverse the current trend of sub-optimal use of those IW-focused capabilities.

While these shortcomings make USSOCOM appear less than ideal, there are significant benefits to using it as a starting point for reorganization. We believe that specific sub-organizations within USSOCOM maintain a comparative advantage in

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<sup>7</sup> As explained in Chapter III, a functional organizational structure refers to a type of division based on functional expertise as opposed to a divisional structure which is based on a type of brand or geographic location.

conducting operations within the IW environment due to specially selected, trained, equipped, and organized forces. These sub-organizations, which include Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have traditionally conducted operations within the IW environment, and have established critical long-term relationships with key partner nations that also result in instant credibility when working with new partner nations. With the recent addition of the MARSOAG within the Marine Special Operations Command, and the additional SF Battalion within each of the five active duty SF Groups, the indirect capability within USSOCOM has grown significantly.

In addition to the selection and training of the individuals within these specific sub-organizations, the elements themselves have established cultural norms, metrics, and internal rewards systems that are relatively in line with the “7 and 10” environmental success factors addressed earlier, but are currently being hindered by the overarching direct focus inherent within USSOCOM. Although not perfect, these specific sub-organizations are the closest match that exists, and would provide an excellent starting point for DoD reorganization. Organizational centrality focused on these elements, but outside of USSOCOM, would enable the institutionalization of IW-relevant cultural norms, metrics, and internal rewards systems, while creating a legitimate “proponent for special operations approaches to irregular warfare more broadly” (Martinage, 2008, p. 43).

An organization working proactively to balance the direct and indirect effort of our country has been recommended several times and notably in the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments’ (CSBA) “Strategy for the Long Haul.” The reorganization of indirect assets under USSOCOM is a topic of discussion for the 2009 QDR, in which the CSBA recommends “creating a three-star, sub-unified operational command under SOCOM focused on indirect warfare—a Joint Irregular Warfare Command (JIWC)” (Martinage, 2008, p. 43). Although this change is a step in the right direction, the greatest concern is the continued presence of two distinctly different cultures within one organization. Much like the difference between conventional forces and SOF drove the requirement for USSOCOM’s establishment; the difference between SOF’s indirect and direct assets makes it evident that reorganization is needed.

## **F. SUMMARY**

Businesses decide on the scope of change required to maintain relevancy in their market by identifying two basic approaches: improve (i.e., change existing) or innovate (i.e., create new) (Malhotra, 1998). This process is useful in illustrating the DoD's current options for dealing with the changing environment.

Building a new organization will duplicate current capabilities and result in additional expenses. Because the DoD has the capabilities necessary to succeed within the IW environment, they should be reorganized under separate organization that is focused solely on IW. This ensures a common purpose and mission focus while preventing misuse, and limiting redundancy. The reorganization of IW-specific capabilities outside of USSOCOM will allow an IW organization to best utilize the operational-environment and organizational-environment critical success factors to select, train and manage elements operating within the IWE. Of great importance, the reorganization suggested by the CSBA for a JIWC must be established outside of, instead of within, USSOCOM.

In our final chapter, we will discuss that while USSOCOM owns the preponderance of capabilities necessary for successes in the IWE, it remains a misfit. By reorganizing the critical indirect assets, we will balance our indirect and direct capabilities, while increasing our strategic options and capabilities for future threats.

## VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

*Throughout history, military organizations—like all large organizations—have been noted for their resistance to change. The U.S. military establishment shares the resistance to change inherent in the military profession.*

*– 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee*

### A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis concludes by summarizing the highlights of previous chapters and stating our conclusions on how the DoD should organize for Irregular Warfare. We then recommend changes that are critical to implementing our recommendations. Finally, we identify some areas of future research to expand on this thesis.

### B. REVIEW

Chapter II establishes the doctrinal definitions of both Irregular Warfare and its sub-tasks. We assert throughout this chapter that IW is an environment in which specific activities are conducted, synchronized with the DoD, IA and the HN, in order to gain or maintain legitimacy and influence over a relevant population. As defined, we show that while the term “IW” is relatively new, the concepts it represents have existed throughout the history of armed conflict. Of the fourteen doctrinal activities within IW, five are considered to be primary activities for the DoD: FID, COIN, CT, SSTR, and UW. The first four of these activities are strategic necessities that provide assistance and support to willing partner-nations, while UW is a strategic option to provide support to resistance movements or insurgencies in support of U.S. objectives.

In Chapter III, we explain why IW is an extremely complex, long-duration, and population-centric environment which requires a different form of organization to operate efficiently and effectively. We further differentiate IW from traditional warfare, with the primary difference being a population and state-legitimacy focus versus an enemy-centric focus. These differences demonstrated that organizations designed to conduct traditional warfare are not as effective as those designed and organized specifically for IW. This is

not to say that General Purpose Forces cannot operate in the IWE; rather, these aspects may be organizationally limiting to fundamental changes required to operate effectively in the IW environment.

We then develop seven external (operational-environmental)<sup>8</sup> and ten internal (organizational-environmental)<sup>9</sup> critical success factors that organizations must incorporate when operating in the IW environment. These environmental success factors highlight the differences of IW versus traditional warfare and illuminate why organizations established for one type of warfare are sub-optimal in other environments.

In Chapter IV, we incorporate the complexities and uniqueness of IW discussed in Chapter II, and the environmental success factors developed in Chapter III, with the principles of organizational theory and design. This evaluation of organizations using the five components of organizational theory and design (Structure, Environment, Work Processes, Human Resources, and Culture) showed how incorporating each element of the theory with the environmental success factors is necessary for success in the IW environment. In summary, the rewards system and organizational culture elements of organizational theory and design proved to be the most important when operating in the IWE.

Finally, in Chapter V, we evaluated the two basic options for change. Using business redesign as a model, we assessed the feasibility of creating a new organization versus modifying an existing one. We argue that building a new organization duplicates current capabilities and increases expenses without the required increases in efficiency or effectiveness. Therefore, a new organization is not a viable option. Then we argue that since the DoD has existing capabilities to succeed within the IW environment, they should reorganize these capabilities outside of USSOCOM. This will ensure a common

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<sup>8</sup> Seven operational-environmental Critical Success Factors: Account for U.S. & Host Nation Political Situation; Foster a Home Grown Solution; Develop a Population-Centric Approach; Region Requires Long-term Commitment; Increase Capacity of Host Nation Security Forces; Increase Capacity of Host Nation Essential Services; Do not rely Solely on Military Force for Success.

<sup>9</sup> Ten organizational-environmental Critical Success Factors: Focus on Enhancing HN Legitimacy; Develop Regional Focuses; Reinforce Relationship Building; Maintain a Long-term Focus; Influence through Multiple Methods; Operate With and Through HN Forces; Enhance Small Unit Operations; Decentralize Decision Making; Foster Innovation and Creativity; Focus Rewards System on Long Term Effects.

purpose and mission focus while preventing misuse, and limiting redundancy. This reorganization of specific capabilities will allow an IW organization to best utilize the operational-environment and organizational-environment factors to select, train and manage elements operating within the IWE. While this reorganization supports the CSBA recommendation for a JIWC using existing elements, it differs in that the new organization would not be subordinate to USSOCOM.

### **C. CONCLUSION**

Recent experiences both in Afghanistan and Iraq have combined with a widespread misunderstanding of what Irregular Warfare is and consists of, has led to a desire to elevate IW to becoming “as strategically important as traditional warfare” (United States Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2). This elevation of IW has challenged all within the DoD to adapt at the expense of maintaining a balance of capabilities. By understanding the differences between Irregular and Traditional Warfare, and the key factors that enable success in both, it becomes obvious that an organization suited for one, is sub-optimal for the other. To better prepare the DoD to meet future challenges in both environments, the DoD should establish a separate organization, incorporating existing capabilities, focused on conducting operations within the IWE.

### **D. RECOMMENDATIONS**

After writing this thesis, our group feels there are several things that must happen in order for the U.S. to maintain its presence as the premier military force in the world. Acknowledging that there is some institutional resistance to any change, this short list helps better prepare us for the future. While we recognize that our proposed reorganization is drastic, it is essential to understand the recommendations and implement as many as possible.

First, this process begins with a better understanding of what Irregular Warfare is. This not only includes knowing the definition, but understanding the nuances of IW, and how they differ from traditional warfare (Chapters II and III). The recognition that IW requires a different mindset and capabilities for success helps illustrate that certain organizations are better suited for IW than others. This enables our senior military and

civilian leaders to realize that the key to success lies not in making everyone equally capable at doing everything, but in adjusting our organizations to better develop a balanced approach to defeat all future threats.

Second, to allow the DoD to fulfill Secretary Gates' goal of balancing traditional and irregular warfare, the military must acknowledge that not everyone is equally proficient at conducting the five core activities of IW. Moreover, some organizations are incapable of fully integrating the seven external and 10 internal factors (Chapter III) critical for success in the IWE.

Third, the core of this new organization includes those elements uniquely suited to conduct the five core IW activities and most capable of integrating the critical success factors. As identified previously, these elements are: Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Marine Special Operations Advisory Group. This core must be unified under one headquarters outside of USSOCOM and supported by other elements from across DoD to ensure it can fully support the GCC's IW campaign plans.

Fourth, once the core elements of this new organization are identified, they should be evaluated according to the "7 & 10" critical success factors to identify what organizational changes must be made. Some of these changes may be minor, such as regional orientation. Some, however, like adjusting the human resource components to better reinforce positive behavior or establish a new culture, are significant in their scope and impact.

Finally, this reorganized composition of forces requires the support of the nation's civilian leadership. Such a large reorganization of forces must be directed and championed outside of the military leadership. Legislation must require this organization not only to provide IW-focused capabilities, but to also have the authority to plan and implement IW campaign plans in support of the GCC. A failure to force this change will hinder implementation and effectiveness of this reorganization. This is because, "Throughout history, military organizations—like all large organizations—have been

noted for their resistance to change. The U.S. military establishment shares the resistance to change inherent in the military profession” (United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1985, p. 8).

## **E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

This thesis has been an arduous journey of research, analysis, and application, but by no means does it provide the absolute answer to the problems that the Irregular Warfare Environment places on the United States. Our research has produced a recommendation that, if followed, will put the Department of Defense on track to produce a fully balanced approach to warfare that will serve us well into the next millennium. To further refine this recommendation, we have identified several key areas that should be studied in the near future.

The first area of future research is the further assessment of what capabilities exist within the DoD that may be useful within the IWE. Although we have identified the core elements that must be a part of an IW organization, there are other elements that already exist that may prove to be beneficial. These elements may need to be permanently assigned as core elements, or they may be task-organized, based on the needs of a given situation.

The second area of future research involves examining the current DoD force structure to identify redundant or excess capacity in order to create an IW headquarters without adding additional force structure. This may require the reorganization or reassigning of responsibilities and assets of multiple existing headquarters.

The third area of future research deals with two aspects of the interagency. First, what changes need to be made in the IA to enable them to play a more productive role within the IWE? Second, how can the DoD and the IA better coordinate in order to produce the desired effects?



Lastly, the fourth area of future research deals with funding and legislation. Specifically, what legislation is required for reorganizing? Additionally, what special funding legislation is necessary in order to give an IW organization the authorities and resources it requires?

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