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

Leadership, Commandership, Planning, and Success

General Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army, Retired

General Bruce Clarke was one of the more successful combat commanders of World War II. In this piece, originally published in* Army Logistician *in 1982, Clarke discusses what he believes are the essential principles for planning successful offensive operations. Clarke's tenets of successful combat leadership are refreshing for their reliance on the human dimensions of combat leadership—discernment, intuition, shrewdness, and experience.

SINCE MY RETIREMENT, I have had a chance to reflect on experiences gained during my 40-year (plus) affiliation with the Army. Some years ago I surveyed, under an Army contract, the successful U.S. Army generals of World War II to determine the characteristics of outstanding commanders. Based on my experience, the survey, and my reflections, I concluded that the ability to plan with practicality and foresight is at the top of the list as most contributory to successful command. Planning ability is particularly crucial to success in conducting an offensive operation. Moreover, certain planning steps are more likely to bring success than others. These I call the principles for planning successful offensive operations. Defensive operations, where you are outnumbered, require just as meticulous plans and quick reaction as do offensive operations.

Plan Your Staff

When preparing for an offensive operation, the first thing to do is put together or coach a group of competent subordinate commanders and staff officers. Since the success of the operation will depend as much on your people as on your plan and equipment, select and coach leaders and commanders wisely. You will delegate authority to them so be careful not to select a boy to do a man's job.

There probably has been no commander who did not have blind spots. That is, there are important factors in an operation about which you are not familiar. These you must cover by relying on competent specialists. Otherwise, those blind spots might defeat your efforts.

Your command structure, like your plan, must be complete enough to get the job done but simple enough to be responsive to troop needs and changing circumstances. All branches or services need not play equal roles in the command structure of an operation. Command by committee is almost always ill advised during military operations.

How should you plan your staff? I believe the conventional chief of staff, G1, G2, G3, and G4 organization has too much staff inertia to react quickly during special tactical operations. A more effective staff structure would result from putting the G2 and G3 together into an operations sec-

tion directly under the commanding general and putting the G1 and G4 together into a logistics section directly under the chief of staff's control. When such a temporary organization was instituted during World War II, I found that the chief of staff and commanding general had no difficulties in coordinating operations. In times of crises, when there are more jobs than there are specialists, such flexibility improves the use of available personnel and enables the commander to achieve his goal more effectively. Consider this when planning your staff. Ensuring that tactics and logistics receive their due importance will help.

Make Your Plans

After you have selected and structured the staff, begin making concrete plans for operations. There are several factors to a successful plan.

Keep your plans simple. The great difference between actual combat and training for combat is the presence of real danger and great confusion. Since ancient times, writers have compared battlefield confusion to real-life pandemonium. In the presence of mass confusion, unpredictable circumstances, and often-irrational behavior, only simple and easily understood plans can succeed. Some brilliant plans are so complex that they require normal, controlled, almost classroom conditions for execution. Anticipate the more capricious conditions of actual combat when you make your plans, and keep the plans simple. Battlefield tumult makes even the simplest operations plans complex enough.

I will go one step farther. That your plans are simple and easily understood is not enough. They must be conceived, organized, and presented in a manner that no one can misunderstand them. What subordinate commanders and staff officers readily understand under normal conditions might be misunderstood or misinterpreted under the duress of battle. Anticipate this, and compensate for potential battlefield disorientation when you develop and present your plans.

Anticipate obstacles to your plans. Murphy's Law—if anything can go wrong, it will—is nowhere better illustrated than in a combat situation. Experience suggests that for every potential chance for success there are at least five potential chances for failure. Recognizing this, successful commanders make plans and preparations to circumvent obstacles. When planning alternatives, begin by listing the unchangeable factors that might adversely affect the operation. Then, project every possible tactical and logistic problem that could stem from those conditions.

When preparing for an offensive operation, the first thing to do is put together or coach a group of competent subordinate commanders and staff officers. Since the success of the operation will depend as much on your people as on your plan and equipment, select and coach leaders and commanders wisely. You will delegate authority to them so be careful not to select a boy to do a man's job.

I used to keep a notebook in which I listed problems anticipated—unfortunate events that might come up. Beside these, I would annotate short descriptions of possible solutions I would try if and when I found myself confronted with the problem. Frequently, the anticipated difficulties did occur, and I was able to respond with little hesitation. My colleagues and superiors would often come up to me and say, "Clarke, you reacted quickly in that crisis!" Little did they know that the main reason I was able to react so decisively and so quickly was because I had anticipated the problem in advance and entered it and several possible solutions to it in my little black notebook.

Similarly, anticipating problems and preparing solutions will be a great aid to you during times of pressure. Success in battle requires not only violent execution but deliberate planning. If you plan thoroughly before you are confronted with a situation, you will be able to act quickly and wisely. Be sure to avoid the opposite of this axiom. Violent planning and deliberate execution can be fatal!

Of the many instances in my Army career in which I anticipated difficulties and projected so-



1st Infantry Division battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Fontenot reviews the tactical situation with his staff during a lull in Desert Storm breaching operations west of the Rugi Pocket, 24 February 1991.

US Army

There is something to be said for personally following up orders. In spite of the progress of automated command systems and the use of mission-type orders as war becomes more complex and unpredictable, the need for the commander's presence at the scene of a crisis, where he can be seen and heard, will never be eliminated.

lutions, the one that first comes to mind is the liberation of the city of Nancy during World War II. As commander of the combat command that was leading General George S. Patton's Third Army across France, I had planned to take Nancy by rapidly crossing the Moselle River directly across from the city. When we arrived, we found the city too heavily defended. Having anticipated this difficulty, I turned my outfit 30 or 40 miles north, bridged the river at night, and continued east to get to the rear of the target. On the way, we attacked the city of Arracourt, destroying a German corps headquarters. Eventually, we took Nancy from the rear, largely because I had anticipated hurdles and made plans for varying situations.

Base your plan on locale. As an adjunct to my axiom about anticipated difficulties, I urge you to tailor strategic plans to specific geographical and political areas. Commanders need to identify areas of the world where action is most likely to occur well in advance of any action, then develop plans based on specific terrains, weather condition, customs, and all other factors associated with locale. Unless this is done, the Army will have neither the tactical and strategic plans nor the logistic support it needs when and where it needs it. Most of these plans require us to send a force across an ocean. This makes logistics an important consideration.

Do not make plans that are so generalized that the hypothetical operation could take place anywhere. Nor should you waste time making plans for operations in areas of the world where conflict is only remotely possible, such as with the United States.[1]

Locale should play an important role when making plans for special operations. Failure to adequately study and plan around locale was possibly one cause for the failure of the mission to rescue the hostages from Iran in 1980.[2]

Plan a balanced tooth-and-tail ratio. Much



Elements of the 1st SS Panzer Corps move to the front as members of the 99th Infantry Division march into captivity during the German's Ardennes offensive, Merischeid, Belgium, December 1944.

US Army

Before the German Winter counteroffensive of December 1944, General Manteuffel, who commanded the main effort of the German attack force, secretly assembled his troops at night over a period of weeks in a forest near the city of Pruem, where he kept them hidden. To preserve the secret of his planned action, he canceled, at the last minute, a previously scheduled artillery preparation. The net result was a surprise attack and the capture of 8,500 Americans.

has been written about the relative importance of U.S. Armed Forces tooth (fighting) and tail (logistic support) elements. Within the force limitations under which we operate, we must keep the two the combat and the supporting forces—in balance, even during offensive operations. To say that we must keep them in balance does not mean the two forces will be equal. The situation will dictate the varying balance, and it will change as the operation progresses.

We must have enough fighting forces to effectively conduct the offensive, but they will not be able to do their jobs without sufficient supporting forces, supplies, and materiel. Therefore, we must keep the tooth and tail elements in balance. Supplies, spare parts, and maintenance personnel are essential in these days of mechanical warfare.

An adequate logistics base must be established to support the mission if it is to succeed. The absence of such a logistics base prevented the tactical part of the plan to rescue the hostages in Iran from being launched.

Even during the violent-execution phase of an operation, you must not forget that logistics continues to play an important role. Logistics considerations, of paramount importance during the earliest stages of planning, continue throughout the operation and end only after the last troops have withdrawn from the area of operations.

Plan counterintelligence measures. When you are planning an offensive operation, you need to get information about the terrain and weather of the combat site. You also need to learn about the enemy and what he is planning to accomplish. Such information is often hard to get, since the enemy might have good counterintelligence plans. A lesson about effective counterintelligence can be found in

I used to keep a notebook in which I listed problems anticipated—unfortunate events that might come up. Beside these, I would annotate short descriptions of possible solutions I would try if and when I found myself confronted with the problem. Frequently, the anticipated difficulties did occur, and I was able to respond with little hesitation. My colleagues and superiors would often come up to me and say, "Clarke, you reacted quickly in that crisis!"

another incident from World War II history.

Before the German Winter counteroffensive of December 1944, German General Hasso Eccard von Manteuffel, who commanded the main effort of the German attack force, secretly assembled his troops at night over a period of weeks in a forest near the city of Pruem, where he kept them hidden. To preserve the secret of his planned action, he canceled, at the last minute, a previously scheduled artillery preparation. The net result was a surprise attack and the capture of 8,500 Americans during the first couple of days.

Manteuffel's plan contained all the desired elements of effective counterintelligence secrecy: cover, concealment, diversion, and deceit, all of which are designed to block or confuse the enemy's intelligence-gathering sources. Manteuffel's plans and counterintelligence measures should be carefully studied by every commander planning offensive operations or planning to defend NATO in case of attack.

Commanders also should study American Revolutionary War General George Washington's method in planning the offensive across the Delaware River to capture Trenton [New Jersey], at a critical time in the war. To avoid potential leaks of information, Washington and only two or three staff members planned the operation in secrecy some distance from his Valley Forge headquarters. Major General Lord Stirling, one of the planners, assembled in secrecy, the boats that would be used in the operation.

Not until time was ripe for the operation did Washington inform the rest of the Army about the plan. At 4 p.m. on Christmas Day 1776, he directed his troops to form for a parade, each person carrying one day's ration. Washington called his commanders forward, front and center, and gave them orders to move their units to the embarkation sites, where the troops entered the boats to cross the Delaware River. At that time they were briefed. The success at Trenton that Christmas night can be attributed greatly to effective counterintelligence measures.

Train Adequately

Even the most deliberate concepts need to be tested and perfected through training. Every successful commander knows that soldiers perform in combat no better than they have been taught and practiced in training. Prior training as a whole team is essential for mission success. Practice improves performance, but only *perfect* practice can make a perfect performance.

Training must be as realistic as possible, with unrealistic aspects eliminated. Such training must reflect as many of the conditions of the battlefield as ingenuity can conceive and safety rules will permit. I attribute many successes of World War II, including some of my own, to the fact that I had insisted on intensive training in darkness—frequently at 0400—and under adverse weather conditions.

Training develops good combat soldiers, and it lets you know what you can count on from your command in a crisis. As you detect special strengths in training, use them to perfect your plan.

Issue Orders

Once you have selected and coached your staff, made your plans, and trained your units, you are ready to set those plans into action. To do so, obviously you must issue orders. The question is what sort of orders should you give?

To make optimum use of people, weapons, and materiel, you must issue orders that are clear and flexible enough to work in rapidly changing situations. Consequently, you should give subordinates a broad picture of the general mission of your command in addition to giving them specific orders. Those who served in World War II, especially those of us who were in armored divisions, learned from experience the importance of mission-type orders.

Basically, a mission-type order states what you want accomplished, points out the controlling factors that must be observed, and describes the

available resources you can count on. A mission-type order is brief, general, and nonrestrictive rather than voluminous, detailed, and restrictive. Such orders allow competent subordinate commanders to exercise imitative, resourcefulness, and imagination in carrying out the mission. Patton was a master in using mission-type orders.

Follow Up on Your Orders

Once you make your plans and issue orders to your subordinate commanders, rely on them to use initiative and good judgment in carrying out the orders, but do not assume that your directives have been 100 percent understood. Even the simplest plans and best-worded orders can be misinterpreted. The English language is not technically exact enough to prevent misinterpretation. Therefore, follow up and make sure that nothing has been misunderstood before action begins. Only then can you be sure every commander knows exactly what he is to do and when and how he is to do it.

There is something else to be said for personally following up orders. In spite of the progress of automated command systems and the use of mission-type orders as war becomes more complex and unpredictable, the need for the commander's presence at the scene of a crisis, where he can be seen and heard, will never be eliminated.

The Safety, or Risk, Factor

Throughout our Army careers, we are taught and teach that a safety factor is a part of any plan. In combat, the factor of safety in planning should be as adequate and duly influenced by the importance of the success of the mission as the resources available to you will allow. Risk is inherent in any military operation, but it should not become foolhardiness. Failure to take reasonable risks, which leads to inaction, has caused many commanders to be replaced.

The Hammelburg, Germany, rescue attempt in March 1945, in which a small task force of approximately 300 officers and men from the 4th Armored Division was sent under great odds to rescue U.S. prisoners from a prisoner-of-war camp, is an example of a mission in which the safety factor was underemphasized in light of the significance of the mission. Not only was the camp 35 miles beyond U.S. forward elements, but also the small U.S. force was setting out against unknown enemy forces, which proved to be far superior in number and capabilities. Only 15 members of the task force returned. Not one of the prisoners was rescued. In execution, the risk proved too great.

The Hammelburg, Germany, rescue attempt in March 1945, in which a small task force of approximately 300 officers and men from the 4th Armored Division was sent under great odds to rescue U.S. prisoners from a prisoner-of-war camp, is an example of a mission in which the safety factor was underemphasized in light of the significance of the mission. . . . Only 15 members of the task force returned. Not one of the prisoners was rescued.

The successful commander of military operations in any future war, as in past wars, must weigh the mission, resources, obstacles, and other factors and come up with a flexible, balanced, effective plan of operations. I have closely observed commanding officers and commanding generals during World War II and the Korean war. Some were promoted, some were relieved, and some just hung on until the armistice. What one thing separated them? It was the extent to which they could constantly juggle the many factors involved in command without dropping any important ones. In 1951, U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur said it better and in fewer words: "There is no substitute for victory." ***MR***

General Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army, Retired, commissioned through the U.S. Military Academy in 1925, established an outstanding combat record during World War II as combat commander, 4th and 7th Armored Divisions. Subsequently, he served in progressively more responsible positions, including commanding general, I Corps, in Korea; commanding general, U.S. Army, Pacific; commanding general, 7th U.S. Army, in Europe; and commanding general, Continental Army Command. He was commander-in-chief of U.S. Army, Europe, and commander of the Central Army Group, NATO, when he retired in 1962. This article is adapted from Clarke's original article by the same name that was published in Army Logistician *(May-June 1981).*

Leadership

Writers on military leadership usually couch their discussions in abstractions: honor, duty, courage, sacrifice. However, this collection of leadership articles differs a bit from that norm. Holly O'Grady Cook, first-place winner of the 2002 MacArthur Leadership Award, points out pitfalls for military leaders who lead union employees. Steven Hart argues that lieutenants should be enrolled in unit-run schools for platoon leaders to better prepare them to lead platoons. Jonathan Negin considers how leaders foster unit cohesion. Martha Granger considers the challenge the Army faces in developing leaders who can think strategically despite years of honing tactical warfighting skills. David Wisyanski argues that leaders cannot lead effectively or honorably if encumbered with relativistic thinking. Scott Murray believes that information systems have given senior commanders such an encompassing view of the battlefield that subordinate commanders might be stifled from exercising initiative. Last, Jeffrey Drushal discusses how to develop team cohesion among widely dispersed information-based logistics teams.

Leader Development: TTPs for Working With Union Employees

2002 MacArthur Writing Award 1st Place

Lieutenant Colonel Holly O'Grady Cook, U.S. Army

CONGRATULATIONS! You have just become the corps commander at Fort Snuffy, a large Army installation. You are now responsible for 41,000 soldiers and 8,000 civilians assigned to the corps. As an officer with more than 30 years of military experience and schooling, you are confident in your ability to lead and develop your officers and enlisted personnel, but what about your civilian employees, 4,000 of whom have elected to have a union representative speak on their behalf?

Substitute a garrison commander, a sergeant major, or a brigade executive officer for the corps commander in this scenario and the question still exists: How prepared are commanders and senior leaders to lead and work with federal civilian employees represented by a labor union? In most cases, the answer depends on how much effort leaders devote to personal leadership development in the area of labor-management relations.

Army "leaders must be appropriately developed before assuming leadership positions" and "have a certain level of knowledge to be competent."[1,2] Part of that knowledge includes developing technical, conceptual, and interpersonal skills that enable them to know their people and how to work with them.[3] To develop leadership and occupational skills, Army officers and noncommissioned officers progress through a formal leader development system.[4] Throughout their careers they receive extensive institutional training at military schools.[5] They advance to operational assignments where they plan and execute complex missions worldwide, using the most technologically advanced equipment and technically skilled personnel available.[6] They carefully manage their careers, and as they progress in the ranks, they learn to develop subordinate officer and enlisted personnel—the uniformed side of the military services.

The Army does not teach leaders the rules involved with labor-management relations as part of its traditional military training. While military leaders can learn the rules at operational assignments, this is not a good alternative. Mistakes pertaining to labor relations often have legal consequences [and] adversely affect mission accomplishment. . . . To avoid these mistakes, leaders must therefore focus on the self-development part of leadership development.

[redacted] for military leaders who work with federal civilian employees represented by unions. The Army does not teach leaders the rules involved with labor-management relations as part of its traditional military training. While military leaders can learn the rules at operational assignments, this is not a good alternative. Mistakes pertaining to labor relations often have legal consequences. They can also adversely affect mission accomplishment and the command's relationship with its employees and their elected union representatives. To avoid these mistakes, leaders must therefore focus on the self-development part of leadership development.[7] At a minimum, Army leaders must learn the basic rules for working with union employees and ensure that other military and civilian personnel understand them too.

How many civilian employees actually have union representatives? As of 1999, the Army had 121,302 union employees, or 59 percent of its civilian workforce, working at over 300 Active and Reserve Component (AC and RC) commands or facilities.[8,9] The presence of union employees is not limited to the Army. Commanders working at joint jobs or other federal facilities will also encounter these

Astute mediators focus primarily on the parties' underlying concerns rather than on their specific demands. For example, a mediator chosen to hear the Fort Snuffy PT case focuses on the reason* why *the PT time change concerns the union. . . . This tactic gives the parties flexibility in brainstorming possible alternatives in addressing the union's concerns about employees being on time for work, while still allowing the command to make the change it wants to support soldiers needing childcare during PT.

employees since unions represent more than half of the civilian workforce the Department of Defense (DOD) employs.[10] Most of these employees work in the United States, but there are also union employees assigned to Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Panama, Guam, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Hawaii.[11] The Air Force has the largest percentage of union-represented employees at 72 percent, and the Navy has the lowest at 58 percent.[12]

Some commanders and senior leaders who have not worked with unions during the early part of their careers erroneously think that the issues of labor-management relations are insignificant. For most Army officers, the first 10 to 15 years of their military careers focus on company- or battalion-level issues involving military personnel. Not many civilian personnel issues arise during this time because there are generally few civilian employees assigned to these lower levels of command. When issues do arise, they usually involve sexual harassment or equal employment opportunity complaints, not labor disputes.

As commanders and leaders move to operational assignments at higher levels of command, there are more civilian employees, many of whom have union representation. Higher level leaders soon realize that labor-relations issues are some of the greatest challenges they face and that no one ever explained how to deal with such issues. The rules are not difficult; they are just different, and military leaders must familiarize themselves with them so they can exhibit the same leadership skills as when dealing with military personnel, which is part of becoming "the very best leader you can be: your [civilian employees] deserve nothing less."[13]

Following are seven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) Army leaders can follow to avoid labor-management issues when working with civilian employees who have union representation. TTP 1 advises Army leaders to learn the basic labor-relations processes and uses common scenarios and diagrams to illustrate how these processes work. TTPs 2 and 3 are practical tips for what leaders should do on arrival at facilities with union employees. TTP 4 focuses on training issues and explains ways commanders and leaders can obtain information on union-related matters for themselves or members of their organizations. TTP 5 contains a summary of the most common labor-relations rules Army leaders should know so neither they nor members of their staff inadvertently violates them. Union representatives also violate labor-management rules on occasion, and TTP 6 describes some of the union violations Army leaders might encounter. Despite the best efforts of the parties involved in the process, violations of the rules will still occur, and Army leaders must accept the consequences, as discussed in TTP 7.

TTP 1
Learn the Basic Labor-Relations Processes

Physical Training (PT) at Fort Snuffy used to begin at 0600 and end at 0700. Soldiers complained that the childcare center did not open until 0600 and they could not get to PT on time. The childcare center does not have the personnel needed to open earlier. As a commander who cares about soldiers, you changed the PT start time to 0630. The next day, the union filed an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charge against you for violating the rights of your civilian employees.

What is wrong in this scenario? Commanders can change PT times for their troops, can't they? If there are no union employees working on the installation, the answer is yes. If the change would impact a significant number of union employees, the answer is also yes, but the command must take additional steps to avoid violating the rights of union employees.

Federal labor-management relations law requires agencies to negotiate, or collectively bargain, with civilian employees through their elected union representative about most work-related changes or policies that affect union employees during duty hours.[14,15,16] Basic things like rearranging office furniture, canceling an office water cooler contract or newspaper subscription, and implementing parking rules where union employees work are all examples of working conditions that would be subject to negotiations.[17]

Not every work-related issue is negotiable. Things like mission, budget, internal security, hiring, firing, and assigning work are so key to



Prudence Siebert, *Fort Leavenworth Lamp*

Soldiers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conduct a unit run.

Delaying the PT schedule by 30 minutes might affect employees trying to get to work. . . . If employees are late for work, the agency could decide to discipline them. . . . The commander might have violated the rights of his union employees by unilaterally changing the PT start time without notifying the union representative and providing the opportunity to bargain over the effect that change would have on union employees.

being able to run a federal agency that Congress has exempted these management rights from negotiations by statute.[18] While the substance of these rights are not negotiable, the parties are obligated to negotiate over the impact of the application of these rights and the procedures for their implementation, if requested by the union.

Leaders who want to change day-to-day working conditions that will affect union employees must give the union representative notice of the proposed change and the opportunity to bargain about it, even if the change will affect only one union employee.

If the agency gives notice of a change and the union does not timely ask to bargain over the matter, then the agency may implement the change as proposed in its notice. If the union asks to bargain over the proposed change, then the agency must delay making the change until bargaining has been completed.

ULP process. At Fort Snuffy, the commander might have violated the rights of his union employees by unilaterally changing the PT start time without notifying the union representative and providing the opportunity to bargain over the effect that change would have on union employees.[19] Most civilian employees travel to work on military installations between 0700 and 0800. Delaying the PT schedule by 30 minutes might affect employees trying to get to work. Civilians might experience delays when having to slow down for soldiers running in formation or because of the increased traffic congestion immediately following the end of PT. If employees are late for work, the agency could decide to discipline them. Because union employees might encounter delays they had not experienced before and possibly face disciplinary action if they are late, the union representing them could argue that the PT schedule change affects their day-to-day working conditions. The union could also argue that the commander violated the law by not giving the union prior notice of the change and the opportunity to bargain over its impact. Under such circumstances, the union has the right to file a ULP charge at the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA).[20]

Once a union files a ULP charge against a command or agency, there are two ways to resolve it. The first and best way to resolve a ULP is for the command or agency involved to informally address the issues contained in the charge with

the union. In the PT scenario, this means that a Fort Snuffy representative and a union representative would meet and discuss the concerns of both sides in an effort to resolve the issues raised by the parties. For example, the parties could discuss proposals for alleviating traffic congestion during and after PT formations or designate roads or gates that civilians could use with less chance of delay. Another option might be for the command to temporarily give affected civilians an additional 15 minutes of administrative time to get to work on PT days. Regardless of the specific compromise reached, if the parties amicably resolve the issue themselves, the union can withdraw its ULP charge, and both sides will save time and money. Also, such efforts can promote positive labor-management relations that could positively affect overall mission accomplishment.

While laws and agreements provide structure for the [labor-management] relationship, it is the people who participate in the process who often lead to the success or failure of the relationship at any government facility. Army personnel rotating into leadership positions where union employees work must recognize the effect their actions can have on current and future labor-management relations.

If Fort Snuffy and the union cannot reach an informal agreement, then the second way to resolve the ULP charge is to have it processed through formal FLRA proceedings. Initially, the FLRA's general counsel will receive the charge at one of its regional offices and conduct an investigation. If the union's allegation that the command failed to bargain over a change in working conditions has merit, the FLRA general counsel (or a regional representative) can prosecute the charge before an administrative law judge at an administrative hearing. Lawyers representing Fort Snuffy and the FLRA general counsel (appearing on behalf of the charging party) will each present witnesses and evidence supporting their side of the case. After listening to the evidence, the judge will issue a decision resolving the matter. Either party may file exceptions to the judge's decision with the FLRA, and the FLRA will consider all arguments before making a final decision. Once the FLRA issues its decision, both Fort Snuffy and the union must comply with it. In limited circumstances, the decision may be appealed to the federal courts.

Impasse resolution process. You still want to change the PT start time. You have notified the union of the proposed change, and the union has asked to discuss the impact it will have on union employees. You have been negotiating the impact and implementation of the change for a week, but the union refuses to agree to any of your proposals. What happens now?

If Fort Snuffy and the union have fully discussed the issues that surround the PT start time but cannot agree on how to resolve its impact on bargaining-unit employees, they have reached an impasse. This scenario is different from the ULP scenario because no one has broken the law by refusing to bargain over an issue. In this scenario, both sides have complied with their duty to bargain, but they cannot reach agreement. If this happened in a civilian business, the employees could go on strike; however, the law prohibits union employees of the Federal Government from going on strike. Instead, federal impasses are raised to the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP).

Before going to the FSIP, the parties must first try to settle the impasse using the mediation process. The parties typically choose a mediator from the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service (FMCS) as a neutral third party to listen to their positions and help them resolve their dispute.

The mediator does not decide the case; the parties do. The mediator merely meets with the parties, together and separately, and allows them to vent their complaints and concerns. Using the information provided, the mediator seeks concessions from each side and relays that information to the opposite side.

The mediator has no authority to force either side to concede or agree to any particular language. However, parties participating in the mediation process should remember that mediation is their last chance to have direct input into the outcome of their dispute. If mediation fails, a third party will review each side's position, then direct specific binding contract language to resolve the impasse.

Astute mediators focus primarily on the parties' underlying concerns rather than on their specific demands. For example, a mediator chosen to hear the Fort Snuffy PT case focuses on the reason why the PT time change concerns the union, rather than on the time change itself. This tactic gives the parties flexibility in brainstorming possible alternatives in addressing the union's concerns about employees being on time for work, while still allowing the command to make the change it wants to support soldiers needing childcare during PT. Assuming

this give-and-take process successfully addresses the concerns of both sides, the parties sign an agreement or memorandum of understanding concluding their negotiations. If the parties do not reach agreement, the mediation ends.

Disputes not resolved during the mediation process proceed to the FSIP, which is the final step in resolving an impasse dispute. The FSIP is an entity within the FLRA that is designed to help agency and union counterparts resolve their negotiation impasses.[21] When negotiations fail, including mediation with a third-party neutral, FSIP will take "whatever action is necessary" to resolve the impasse.[22] This can include reviewing written submissions, having a hearing, or using any other method the FSIP deems appropriate for resolving the dispute.

FSIP's decision is binding on both sides and is generally not subject to review by a federal court. If either Fort Snuffy or the union fails to comply with FSIP's decision on implementing language regarding the affect of the PT change on union employees, the other party may file a ULP charge with the FLRA. This could ultimately lead to an expensive and time-consuming ULP hearing.

TTP 2
Read the Collective Bargaining Agreement(s) (CBAs)

You are a brigade executive officer who just arrived at Fort Snuffy. You understand the basic labor-management relations process, but you do not know how it applies to the union employees working in your office. What do you do first?

Commanders and senior leaders assigned to installations or facilities where union employees work must read the CBAs that apply to their employees. A CBA is the document written by command and union representatives during the negotiation process that establishes the rules applicable to a specific group of employees. While an installation will not designate every Army leader as an agency representative for labor-management relations, every leader must understand his or her responsibilities toward union employees. All levels of management are bound to comply with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement that affect their bargaining-unit employees. Reading the CBA is the first step to learning about labor relations in a new job because it identifies the employees covered by an agreement, the union representing those employees, and the rules governing the day-to-day working relationship between the command and those employees. For example, a typical CBA might have the following information in the first few pages of the agreement:

To avoid violations of the rules, Army leaders must first know what rules apply when working with union employees. The provisions negotiated as part of a CBA are clearly rules the parties must follow during the labor-management relationship. The only way to learn them is to read the CBA.

Cover Page:
Collective Bargaining Agreement between
Fort Snuffy and the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE)
1 January 2000

Table of Contents:
Applicability . . . 1
Management Rights . . . 2
Official Time . . . 3
Grievance Arbitration Procedures . . . 4
Leave Procedures . . . 5

Page 1:
This three-year contract governs all clerical employees working on Fort Snuffy.

Knowledge of these few pages alone tells an Army leader several things. First, these pages reveal that there is a CBA currently in effect, and AFGE represents all of the clerical employees working on post.[23] Fort Snuffy must comply with the CBA and work with AFGE on all labor-relations issues as they affect these employees. However, Fort Snuffy does not have to coordinate with AFGE on labor issues involving any of its other civilian employees where the clerical employees covered by the CBA are not affected unless another group has also elected to have AFGE represent them.

Second, the index highlights some of the specific areas where Fort Snuffy and the union have negotiated rules governing the working environment for the employees the agreement covers. Some of these rules repeat statutory requirements, while others are unique to the installation. Either way, leaders can only avoid violating these rules if they know what they are.

Last, these pages tell installation leaders that the agreement has been in effect since 1 January 2000 and will expire on 1 January 2003. New ne-

gotiations will probably begin around November 2002, meaning that preparations for the negotiations should begin now, unless both sides want the existing CBA to roll over without change.

The installation needs to identify a team to represent it at the bargaining table. This team should collect data from all levels of management on provisions in the current CBA that the agency wants renegotiated. The team should draft and coordinate revisions to those provisions and staff any new proposals the agency wants included in the next CBA.

Commanders need to budget and schedule training for members of their negotiating teams. If the installation does not have experienced agency representatives to negotiate a new agreement, it should coordinate with its higher headquarters for guidance.

On many installations, Army leaders work with several CBAs and unions representing civilian employees. For example, five CBAs apply to five different groups of employees working at Fort Bliss, Texas. Each CBA governs the day-to-day working conditions for the specific employees the agreement covers. One person serves as the primary representative for all labor-relations issues at Fort Bliss. However, all military and civilian leaders working there must understand the provisions agreed to in each of the CBAs as part of their leadership obligation to know their people and how to work with them. This will help ensure that neither they nor their subordinates inadvertently violate the rights of any of their union employees.

Federal law gives civilian employees the absolute right to join or to refrain from joining and participating in union activities. Army leaders must ensure that they do not take actions that either support or interfere with this right. For example, leaders . . . cannot penalize or discriminate against any employee because he or she filed a complaint against an installation or actively supported union activity.

How do leaders learn the rules or get access to the relevant CBAs? First, they can contact their servicing management-employee relations (MER) or labor-relations specialist and ask for a copy of all applicable agreements.[24] Army leaders working at RC units must contact a civilian personnel generalist working at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, for this information.[25]

After reading the CBAs, leaders should ask about the history of the relationship with the relevant union(s). Has it been a good working relationship or a bad one between the personalities involved? Have there been a lot of complaints filed against the agency? Are there any issues currently pending? If there is no MER specialist available to provide this information, Army leaders can contact the labor counselor at their servicing staff judge advocate office for assistance.[26] Labor counselors for RC units will be either at the servicing regional support command or at Fort McCoy.[27]

TTP 3
Know the Players

As the new brigade executive officer at Fort Snuffy, you have read the CBAs that apply to your union employees. What do you do next?

Developing the labor-management relationship is a people business. While laws and agreements provide structure for the relationship, it is the people who participate in the process who often lead to the success or failure of the relationship at any government facility. Army personnel rotating into leadership positions where union employees work must recognize the effect their actions can have on current and future labor-management relations. Knowing what the relationship has been historically will give new leaders insight into how to proceed from the moment they hit the ground.

On installations where the agency and the union have a longstanding relationship founded on trust and mutual respect, new leaders can focus on maintaining that positive working relationship. Where personality disputes and distrust have permeated the process, new leaders must focus on creating an amicable working relationship with union counterparts. This will not happen overnight. Trust and good working relationships take time and effort to build.

How can new leaders improve and maximize the effectiveness of a labor-management relationship? They can start by determining who the parties to the relationship are. The CBA will tell leaders the big picture players (such as AFGE and Fort Snuffy), but leaders must also learn who the actual spokespersons and representatives are.

Not every leader on an installation will serve as an agency representative to the union. Usually a garrison commander or a designated individual



An equal employment adviser meets with a 101st Airborne Division soldier to collaborate on a workshop presentation.

MSG Bob Haskell, *Soldiers*

If knowledge of the labor-management-relations process is a weakness that Army leaders want to turn into a strength, they need to add "self study, reading programs, and civilian education courses" to their personal leader-development program. [L]eaders can obtain general information about labor-management relations and specific labor issues by visiting the FLRA, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), or Army civilian personnel websites.

has that responsibility, and new leaders should ask their MER specialist or labor counselor who that is. When labor issues arise or a new leader wants to change a working condition that affects union employees, that leader should ask the agency representative for assistance. The agency representative will track any information sent to the union and any responses received, including requests to bargain over certain issues. The new leader should not contact the union directly unless specifically told to do so.

Garrison commanders and other leaders assigned as primary agency representatives must know their union counterparts. Predecessors, MER specialists, and labor counselors are great sources for information about union representatives. How long have they been there? How well has the command worked with them? What issues have concerned the union and the employees most in the last year? Are any still pending? For example, if Fort Snuffy has been downsizing because of a base realignment or contracting-out initiative, then job security may be of paramount concern to the union and the employees. New agency representatives will want to know this so they can work with the union to protect jobs and minimize stress to the employees.

After gathering information about the union and reading the relevant CBAs, new agency representatives should meet their union counterparts and try to make a positive impression early in the relationship. Army leaders must recognize that they will have to work harder at developing a successful labor-management relationship than the union will because they are new to it.

Most union representatives stay on an installation for years. Army leaders serving as agency representatives change frequently. Military turnover complicates every labor-management relationship because there is less time in which to develop the trust and respect that are so critical to it.

Using non-union civilian supervisors as agency representatives may help stabilize the relationship, but Army facilities should also have a military representative to ensure union employees know that the uniformed side of the house cares. Open and honest communication with the union on a regular basis is the greatest asset Army leaders have in developing a strong working relationship.

TTP 4
Ensure Training

Leaders have a duty to assess and develop themselves and their organizations.[28] If knowledge of the labor-management-relations process is a weakness that Army leaders want to turn into a strength, they need to add "self study, reading programs, and civilian education courses" to their personal leader-development program.[29]

This article highlights some common issues leaders might confront in operational assignments with union employees, but it is not exhaustive and still leaves many questions unanswered. There are books available on federal labor relations, but they are detailed and not user-friendly for agency officials seeking only to familiarize themselves and their subordinates with the process. As an alternative, leaders can obtain general information about labor-management relations and specific labor issues by visiting the FLRA, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), or Army civilian personnel websites.[30] Commanders and their subordinate supervisors can also attend labor relations or negotiation courses offered at local installations or at the Army's Civilian Personnel Operations Center Management Agency.[31] New battalion- and brigade-level commanders have the additional option of taking federal labor-relations classes during the Senior Officer Legal Orientation at The Judge Advocate General's School-Army or during pre-command courses at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.[32]

While the law requires the Army to invite the union to [weekly staff] meetings if they are formal discussions, it does not require the union to attend. If a union representative elects to go, he or she may speak if there is something relevant to say. The union representative may not, however, disrupt or use the meeting as a forum for irrelevant union business.

Besides training themselves and other military personnel on labor-management relations, Army leaders must also devote time and resources to training civilian leaders. Soldiers and civilians of the Active and Reserve Components are equally essential to the success of national security.[33] Some civilian employees do not understand the rules governing labor-management relations because either a union has never represented them or they have never worked with union employees. Army leaders must therefore ensure that these civilians have the same training opportunities in the labor-management relations area as military personnel.

TTP 5
Follow the Rules

Fort Snuffy is an installation in Korea. One of the union employees submitted a request to stay in Korea for another overseas tour. The command has granted other requests in limited circumstances, but it denied this one without a reason. Is this a problem?

To avoid violations of the rules, Army leaders must first know what rules apply when working with union employees. The provisions negotiated as part of a CBA are clearly rules the parties must follow during the labor-management relationship. The only way to learn them is to read the CBA. Statutes and government regulations contain other rules that commanders and leaders must also observe. Since reading all of the applicable statutes and regulations is a time-consuming process that most leaders cannot afford, a summary of rules frequently encountered follows.

Management neutrality. Federal law gives civilian employees the absolute right to join or to refrain from joining and participating in union activities.[34] Army leaders must ensure that they do not take actions that either support or interfere with this right.[35] For example, leaders cannot voice their dislike for a particular union or encourage employees to join a different union. They also cannot penalize or discriminate against any employee because he or she filed a complaint against an installation or actively supported union activity.[36] Applying these rules to the union employee's request for an overseas-tour extension, the command might have a problem. If the union can show that the command denied the request because of the employee's union activities, then the command interfered with an employee's statutory rights, and the FLRA will find it committed a ULP.

Duty to bargain in good faith. As discussed in TTP 1, Army representatives have a duty to bargain in good faith with their union counterparts. This duty arises at the beginning of the labor-management relationship when the parties negotiate their first CBA and also applies during the relationship when the command or the union wants to change something in the CBA or some aspect of the employees' working conditions.

When discussing changes in working conditions or other issues subject to bargaining, Army leaders

must work through the union representative and not go directly to the employees. For example, an installation that wants to modify leave policies for union employees cannot send a survey on this work-related issue to the employees unless the union says it can. If the installation sends the survey and bypasses the union, the union can file a ULP charge alleging the installation failed to bargain with it.

To properly represent civilian employees covered by a CBA, union officials will often need information from the installation where the employees work. They will therefore submit a request to the relevant Army office. The union's request must show a "particularized need" for the information, that is, a link between the information sought and their duty to represent the employees.[37]

Once the union demonstrates its need, the Army office receiving the request has a statutory duty to furnish the information in a timely manner.[38] Army officials cannot tell the union to copy the information itself, charge the union for the information, fail to reveal that the information no longer exists, destroy the information, or delay the release of the information.[39] If they do, the union can file a ULP for failure to furnish information as part of the agency's duty to bargain in good faith.

Representation rights. Once civilian employees elect to have a union represent them at an Army facility, federal law gives that union the right to attend two types of work-related meetings. First, the union has the right to be present at any formal discussion when an Army or DOD official is talking about any grievance or general work-related issue and one or more union employees in their bargaining unit are present.[40]

There is no clear definition of what constitutes a formal discussion in the statute, but ULP cases where the issue has been litigated provide some assistance. The FLRA looks at the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether a meeting is formal or not. Things like where the meeting was held, how long it lasted, who was present, was there an agenda, and were notes kept are all relevant to its analysis.[41] At most Army facilities, formal discussions can include weekly staff meetings where union employees are present, quarterly mayors meetings, and a final-step meeting with the commander as part of the CBA's negotiated grievance procedure.[42]

If the FLRA decides that a meeting is formal, it will look at whether the agency gave the union advance notice of the meeting and the opportunity to be present. Whether the employees wanted the union to be present at the meeting does not matter. The union has the right to attend or not attend. If the agency did not give the union notice or the opportunity to be present, the FLRA will find the agency committed a ULP by violating the union's representation right.

Army officials must invite a union representative to attend meetings that constitute formal discussions and must also allow the representative to speak.[43] For example, some Army leaders give the union representative a standing invitation to attend weekly staff meetings because issues affecting union employees often arise. While the law requires the Army to invite the union to these meetings if they are formal discussions, it does not require the union to attend. If a union representative elects to go, he or she may speak if there is something relevant to say. The union representative may not, however, disrupt or use the meeting as a forum for irrelevant union business.

Army leaders must work hard to build trust and good working relationships with their union counterparts. The conduct of every Army leader working with the union will contribute to the success or failure of that relationship. . . . Leaders who disregard these rights out of either neglect or intentional misconduct will adversely affect the employees' perception of the command.

The second type of work-related meeting where the union has representation rights is at an investigatory examination of a union employee. An investigatory examination is where an Army or DOD official talks to a union employee as part of an investigation, and the employee reasonably believes that discipline can result against him or her because of the discussion.[44] In that case, the employee can ask the questioning official to have a union representative present.

Once an employee asks for union representation, the questioning official has three options. First, the official can allow the union an opportunity to attend. Second, he or she can end the interview and continue the investigation without input from that employee. Third, the agency official can give the employee the option of either answering the questions without a union representative or having no interview at all.[45] If the employee elects to answer the questions, the interview continues. If not, the agency official ends the interview and continues with the investigation without input from the employee.

Unlike the formal discussion, the union does not have an absolute right to be present at an investigatory

examination. The employee must request union representation. If the employee does not ask for a union representative, then the union has no right to interject itself into the meeting. Agency officials do not have a statutory obligation to tell union employees of their right to have a union representative present before every investigatory examination.[46] However, they must remind the employees of these rights annually.[47]

Most installations notify their employees of their rights through either a paper notice or by email. An installation may also choose to remind union employees by scheduling an annual meeting they must attend, having them sign in, and telling them all at once. Because this type of meeting would constitute a formal discussion, agencies choosing to use this type of reminder must also give the union notice of the meeting and the opportunity to attend. Failure to notify the employees of their rights annually or to invite the union to a formal discussion may result in a ULP charge against the agency for violating the union's representation rights.

TTP 6
Know the Common Union Violations

You are the garrison commander at Fort Snuffy. You notice that one of the clerical employees covered by the CBA is at a ULP hearing with a union representative, but without a lawyer. Last week, you were at a ULP hearing where another employee covered by the agreement had both a representative from the same union and a union-provided lawyer. Is there a problem with this?

Army leaders are not the only ones who violate federal labor laws or the terms of the CBA. Union representatives do too. Army leaders must be able to recognize union violations, such as the following, and decide what to do about them.[48]

Duty to bargain in good faith. Union representatives have the same duty to bargain in good faith that Army representatives have. If a union improperly refuses to discuss an issue, refuses to cooperate in the impasse procedures, or signs a settlement agreement on an issue, but refuses to comply with the agreement, the agency can file a ULP charge against it at the regional FLRA office.[49] The FLRA will investigate and decide the case using the procedures described in TTP 1.

Duty of fair representation. Once a group of employees elects a union to serve as its representative, that union has a duty to represent all of the employees in the group fairly. Some employees in the group will elect to join the union and pay dues to it. Others may not pay dues, but they are still entitled to union representation as long as they are employees in the group covered by the CBA. Regardless of whether the employees pay dues or not, a union serving as an exclusive representative must give all employees covered by the CBA the same services and not discriminate against the nondues-paying employees to coerce them to join the union and pay dues.[50] Applying this rule to the ULP scenario above, there may be a problem with one employee having a lawyer present at the ULP hearing while another employee, also covered by the CBA, does not have a lawyer present.[51] If the union provides a lawyer only to those employees who pay dues, it violates its duty of fair representation and commits a ULP that the FLRA can investigate.

TTP 7
Accept the Consequences of Illegal Actions

A union files a ULP charge against Fort Snuffy for failing to extend a union employee's overseas-tour extension. The FLRA investigates and determines the command illegally denied the request because of the employee's union activities. What can the FLRA do?

Many violations in the labor-management relations arena occur out of ignorance rather than out of intent. Reading the CBA, establishing a good working relationship with the parties, obtaining sound advice from agency labor advisers, and understanding the rules from the beginning will help reduce the number of complaints new commanders and senior leaders face when working with civilian employees and their union representatives. However, recognizing that violations will still occur, by the agency and by the union, Army leaders must know and accept the consequences of them.

Unfair labor practices. Army leaders and union representatives who violate federal labor laws might face the ULP proceedings described in TTP 1. If the FLRA investigates a ULP charge and finds a violation of the law, it can take any remedial action necessary to resolve the case. This usually means the FLRA will issue a combination of five remedies.

First, in all ULP cases, the FLRA will order a public posting of its final decision for a specified period of time. If the FLRA decides against the agency, its decision will state that the agency violated the law and identify what it must do to remedy the violation.

If the case involves a continuing violation, the FLRA decision will probably include a cease and desist order requiring the agency to stop its illegal actions immediately. For example, if Fort Snuffy is disciplining union employees who are late because of the traffic caused by the change to the installation PT schedule proposed in TTP 1 without notifying the union first, the FLRA may order Fort Snuffy to immediately cease and desist taking such actions.

The FLRA might also issue a retroactive bargaining order requiring Fort Snuffy to go to the bargaining table to discuss the impact the PT time change is having on union employees and ways to implement change so the impact is reduced.

If Fort Snuffy disciplined any employees for being late to work as a result of the change, the FLRA could further issue a status quo ante order removing any disciplinary action taken and returning the employees to the position they were in before the illegal action.

Assume, in the denial of the overseas-tour extension scenario, that the employee flew back to the States. In such a case, the FLRA might order a public posting plus the following two remedies: the status quo ante order and a backpay award. Again, the status quo ante order would require Fort Snuffy to put the employee back in the same position he was in before the command illegally held his union activities against him. The employee would then return to Korea at government expense. The backpay award would require the command to pay the employee for any wages or overseas allowances lost because of the illegal move.

Grievance arbitration procedures. Every CBA contains grievance procedures negotiated by the parties to resolve complaints that stem from violations of the CBA itself. The parties may also use the grievance procedures instead of the ULP procedures to enforce compliance with federal labor laws and government regulations. Most grievance procedures have several steps that allow the union or an employee covered by the agreement to submit an oral complaint or a written complaint to specified members in the chain of command. If the parties do not settle the grievance within command channels, then the command or the union may invoke binding arbitration to resolve the complaint.[52] There is usually no appeal from an arbitrator's decision on a grievance unless the decision is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation or on other grounds similar to those applied by federal courts.[53]

Affect on working relationships. Violating the rules in the labor-management arena not only has legal consequences, it also has practical consequences. As discussed in TTP 3, Army leaders must work hard to build trust and good working relationships with their union counterparts. The conduct of every Army leader working with the union contributes to the success or failure of that relationship. Since conduct speaks louder than words, Army leaders must strive to comply with the rules, or they might permanently jeopardize an installation's labor-management relationship.

Similarly, employees who work at Army facilities will watch the command to assess its leadership example. Union employees will observe whether the agency supports their rights and understands the labor-management-relations process enough to work within the rules. Leaders who disregard these rights out of either neglect or intentional misconduct will adversely affect employees' perception of the command.

Non-union employees will follow their leaders' examples so they know how to work with union employees. If that example is one of disinterest or disregard of union rights, it will permeate the attitudes of others, thereby causing a morale problem that could take a long time to repair.

Leadership from the Top

Leadership begins at the top, and nowhere is that more true than in the labor-management-relations process. Since traditional military schools do not teach labor-management relations, Army leaders must devote themselves to learning about the process and how it applies to union employees.

Reading the seven TTPs discussed here is a good beginning, but Army leaders at all levels must do more to be successful. They must read the CBAs, meet the players, and aggressively work on the command's relationship with union counterparts to maximize its effectiveness. Army leaders need to train military and civilian leaders involved in the process. Civilian personnel advisory centers (CPACs) can provide this training. Leaders can also encourage subordinates to read available labor-relations information and be ready to answer questions. They need to recognize that despite everyone's best efforts, violations of the rules will still occur, and everyone must be ready to accept the consequences. Army leaders must be the standard bearers for the command when it comes to labor-management relations for the process to work as efficiently and amicably as it can. Only after commanders and leaders understand the process and abide by the rules will they be able to take care of union employees with the same degree of competence and confidence as they do military personnel. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 13 October 1994), 1.
2. U.S. Army Field Manuel (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1999), 1-7.
3. Ibid.
4. DA Pam 350-58, 1.
5. Institutional training is the first step in the Army Leader Development Model (ALDM) and focuses on basic job skills (DA Pam 350-58, 3). Officers usually complete a basic course, an advanced course, and the Command and General Staff Officer Course. Some officers also attend precommand courses and senior service schools. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) attend basic training, advanced individual training, primary leadership development training, basic and advanced NCO courses, and if selected, the Sergeant's Major Academy. Officers and NCOs also attend a variety of short courses designed to develop further the specific skills needed for their positions.
6. Operational assignments are the second step in the ALDM. They provide leaders the opportunity to translate institutional theory into practice in progressively more complex assignments (DA Pam 350-58, 3).
7. Self-development is the third step in the ALDM and is designed to fix weaknesses, reinforce strengths, and stretch and broaden an individual beyond the job or training (DA Pam 350-58, 3).
8. In this paper, the term "union employees" means a "bargaining unit" or group of federal civilian employees who have elected a particular union to serve as their exclusive representative. The fact that the union represents these federal employees does not mean that the employees pay dues to the union or that every employee in the group represented voted for the union. This paper addresses federal civilian employees represented by a union under public-sector labor laws. It does not address contractor employees covered by private-section labor laws or foreign nationals covered by unions under their host-nation laws.
9. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), *Union Recognition in the Federal Government as of January 1999* (Washington DC: Office of Workforce Relations, January 2000), 115-156.
10. Ibid., 48.
11. Ibid., 102-197.
12. As of 1999, the Air Force had 100,585 union-represented employees working at almost 90 facilities. The Navy had 112,579 union employees working at hundreds of facilities throughout the Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) (OPM, Union Recognition, 48, 50, 105-197).
13. FM 22-100, 1-1.
14. The rules for the labor-management relations process for the Federal Government are in the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) (USC, Title 5, Sections 7101-7135 [2001]).
15. The FSLMRS defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an agency and the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either party, a written document incorporating any collective-bargaining agreement reached, but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession" (Ibid., Section 7103a(12) [2001]).
16. National Association of Government Employees and Department of the Army, 5th Infantry Division and Fort Polk, 19 Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) (1985), 552. There is no duty to bargain with union employees about issues that affect them only when they are off duty, such as using a gym or recreational facility.
17. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7102(2) (2001) states that each employee shall have the right "to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through representatives chosen by employees." Section 7103A(14) (2001) defines conditions of employment that must be negotiated as "personnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions." Conditions of employment do not include prohibited political activities, the classification of any position, or anything prohibited by federal law. Even if something meets the definition of condition of employment, federal facilities do not have a duty to bargain over proposed changes that will have a minor or *de minimis* impact on union employees. See General Services Administration and National Federation of Federal Employees, 52 FLRA (1997), 1107 (deciding that an agency did not have to bargain over temporarily relocating a union employee from one building to another); and Department of Health and Human Services and American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), 24 FLRA (1986), 403 (changing an employee's title, but not his or her duties, did not create a duty to bargain).
18. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7106a (2001) states that management officials have the following rights that are not subject to negotiation: "(1) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal security practices of the agency; and (2) in accordance with applicable laws—(A) to hire, assign, direct, lay off, and retain employees in the agency, or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees; (B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted; (C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from—(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or (ii) any other appropriate source; and (D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission during emergencies."
19. The union would not have the right to bargain over the PT start time itself because unions have no authority to negotiate over conditions of employment for soldiers. The union would therefore focus the bargaining on the impact the start time change would have on union employees. Also, the agency would only need to give notice of a change in the PT start time if the change actually would impact a significant number of union employees.
20. The FLRA is the federal agency responsible for interpreting and administering the FLMRS. It also renders the final decision in all unfair labor practice cases (USC, Title 5, Section 7104 [2001]).
21. Ibid., Section 7119(c)(1) (2001).
22. Ibid., Section 7119(c)(5)(B)(iii) (2001).
23. While the CBA states which employees the CBA applies to, the parties to the agreement do not bargain over whom to include in the bargaining unit. When a union first seeks to represent a group of employees, it petitions the FLRA with the relevant information, and the FLRA decides which employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.
24. An MER or labor-relations specialist is a civilian employee assigned to advise Army leaders on labor-management-relations issues; to prepare civilian personnel documents relating to performance or discipline; and to participate in contacts with union representatives. He or she also maintains copies of CBAs for the command and is often the best source for historical information regarding the labor-management relationship at a facility. Labor-relations specialists are usually at the servicing CPAC.
25. Telephone interview with Kim Meyer, Fort McCoy CPAC, 6 February 2002. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel at the servicing Regional Support Command will have the name and phone number for a specific point of contact at the Fort McCoy CPAC.
26. A labor counselor is a judge advocate or civilian attorney responsible for advising senior leaders on the legal aspects of labor-management relations and representing the command or federal facility at third-party labor proceedings such as ULP hearings, federal mediations, and grievance procedures. The labor counselor also renders legal advice to the management team negotiating the CBA for the command or federal facility.
27. Telephone interview with Tim Johnson, Fort McCoy Labor Counselor, 6 February 2002. Personnel assigned to Reserve Component (RC) units that do not have a labor counselor at the regional support command can contact a labor counselor at Fort McCoy by calling (608) 388-2165.
28. FM 22-100, ix.
29. DA Pam 350-58, 3.
30. The FLRA website at <www.flra.gov> contains extensive information about rules and procedures for ULPs, impasses, negotiation disputes, and a variety of other labor issues. It also has copies of final decisions recently issued by the FLRA in labor-management disputes. OPM helps the Federal Government improve its operations by helping agencies work effectively with federal labor organizations. Its website at <www.opm.gov/lmr/> contains numerous resources that agency officials can read to improve their knowledge on specific labor issues. Army-specific information on labor-management relations is online at <www.cpol.army.mil/library/labor.htmc>.
31. The Army's Civilian Personnel Operations Center Management Agency (CPOC-MA) offers many different labor-relations courses several times a year at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, including one focusing on labor relations for executives. Army leaders wanting more information about these courses and when CPOCMA is offering them can visit <www.cpocma.army.mil/catalog/ list-alpha.htm>.
32. The Judge Advocate General's School—Army offers the Senior Officer Legal Orientation (SOLO) course four times a year in Charlottesville, Virginia. This 1-week course, offered to Army and Marine Corps battalion and brigade commanders, covers the full spectrum of legal issues encountered by most commanders in the field. Included in the electives for this course are classes on sexual harassment, labor-management relations, and civilian personnel law. Commanders interested in attending the SOLO course should contact their Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) representative to reserve a slot.
33. DA Pam 350-58, 3.
34. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7102 (2001).
35. Ibid., 7116(a) (2001).
36. U.S. Penitentiary (USP), Leavenworth, Kansas, and AFGE, 55 FLRA (1999), No. 1276.
37. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Kansas City, and National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 50 FLRA (1995), 661.
38. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7114(b)(4) (2001).
39. DA, 90th Regional Support Command, and AFGE, 1999 FLRA Lexis (1999), 200 (refusing to decide whether access to a government copy machine and giving official time to copy the requested documents would satisfy the statutory duty); Social Security Administration, Dallas Region, and AFGE, 51 FLRA (1996), 1219 (concluding that the agency violated duty to furnish information by destroying requested information and failing to tell the union that it no longer existed); IRS, Kansas City, and NTEU, 50 FLRA (1995), 661 (finding a three-month delay in responding to union request was unreasonable).
40. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7114(a)(2)(A) (2001).
41. Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California, and AFGE, 45 FLRA (1992), 1332.
42. There is no statutory duty to invite a union employee or representative to a command staff meeting. Commanders choosing to do so might create a practice that will bind successor commanders.
43. Department of the Army, New Cumberland Army Depot, and AFGE, 38 FLRA (1990), 671.
44. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7114(a)(2)(B) (2001).
45. Agency officials should carefully review the relevant CBA to determine if it imposes a more liberal notification requirement.
46. USP, Leavenworth, Kansas, and Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 46 FLRA, (1992), 820.
47. *USC*, Title 5, Section 7114(a)(3) (2001).
48. Ibid., Section 7116(b) (2001) (listing specific union ULPs).
49. Ibid., Section 7116(b)(5)–(6) (2001).
50. Ibid., Section 7116(b)(1) (2001).
51. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 800 Federal Reporter 2d (1986), 1165 (holding that the duty of fair representation applies only to matters related to the CBA).
52. Every CBA must have a grievance procedure negotiated by the parties in which the last step must be binding arbitration (USC, Title 5, Section 7121(a) [2001]).

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Enhancing the Platoon Leader Experience

2002 MacArthur Writing Award 3rd Place

Major Steven D. Hart, U.S. Army

IT IS WINTER at Fort Leavenworth, and the three strands of barbed wire that separate Kansas from the North Pole are doing little to slow down the Polar Express on its journey south. The children, in a rare display of excellent timing and good form, have gone to bed early and have yet to squawk. A fire burns in the fireplace of these fine Old Army quarters. On the parson's table beside my chair sits a glass of old Jameson's Irish whiskey and a glass of clear spring water. And, with a drink and a fire and a cold Kansas night come memories:

Of a lieutenant fresh from basic and airborne courses feeling prepared to be a lieutenant but not sure if he is prepared to be a platoon leader in this new unit in this strange, new place.

Of learning that it takes time to "get good" at a job, then time to "be good" and to know what "being good" feels like, and how much fun it can be when you and the platoon *are* "good."

Of overhearing a conversation as a junior staff captain: "Welcome to the Cav lieutenant. We ride hard and fast here, so stow your gear, draw your TA-50 (Table of Allowance), take your Advanced Physical Fitness Test (APFT), and get ready because we go to the field next week. Oh, by the way, here is our Lieutenant Certification Program. Make sure you get it done in the next 90 days."

Of recognizing that the Lieutenant Certification Program taught lieutenants good things if only they had the time to learn them.

Of a story told by General Bruce C. Clarke: "When a new regimental recruit was ready to be taken before the sergeant major, he was well turned out and formally presented. The sergeant major sat very militarily behind his desk, and the recruit stood at rigid attention. The sergeant major covered briefly the long, glorious history of the regiment. He then covered several things that all men in that regiment did and several things they did not do."[1]

The use of masculine pronouns in this article includes both males and females.—Editor

Since today's lieutenants have less platoon-leader time than in the past, the problem can be refined to "What can the Army do for a lieutenant before he receives his platoon that would maximize his development while he is a platoon leader?" The answer is that the Army should make lieutenants good at the technical aspects (many of which can be done without a platoon) of being trained platoon leaders

Of a conversation with a young second lieutenant whom I had taught as a cadet: "Sir, things are OK here at Fort Bragg. I've been here three months and don't expect to get my platoon for another two months. I'm the assistant S4 and not really happy about it. I don't do very much other than make copies and run errands."

Of my thoughts that, in the Army, we have ceased to make a "big deal" out of things that should be a big deal. Since we seldom wear Class A uniforms, we seldom put on unit awards, and we are lucky if anyone in the battalion knows what they mean. Organization days (if we have them) have become merely family and unit sports days with little, if any, mention of the history and traditions of the organization. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) assume, execute, and depart from difficult positions, and because it happens all the time to us collectively, we forget that it is a big deal to us individually.

Of Army promotion policies that have moved the pin-on date to first lieutenant to 18 months and captain to 42 months so that much less time is available for young officers to figure out how to be good lieutenants.

Of the question I believe all NCOs must ask, "Is this new platoon leader any good?"

Of conversations with officers recently departed from S3 and executive officer (XO) positions: "We try to ensure each lieutenant 8 to 12 months of platoon-leader time; they typically will only get one platoon."

From the battalion and company commanders the lieutenant learn[s] the meat and potatoes of soldiering—shooting, moving, and communicating. . . . He learns to dis-assemble, assemble, operate and employ, every weapons system . . . [and] all of the communications systems in the company. He learns how to use all of the peculiar items-specific models in the unit that he might never have seen before—night vision devices, mine detectors, new equipment recently fielded, or equipment so old it is no longer taught at the OBC.

"Getting Good"

With a drink and a fire and memories always comes a conversation with Conscience, who asks, "So what is the problem, Major, and what would you do about it if you were King for the Day?"

"Well, Conscience, the problem is this: given that today's lieutenants have limited platoon-leader time, how do organizational leaders set up lieutenants for success so they can quickly move through the "getting good" phase to maximize their time at "being good" platoon leaders?

To answer that question, we must first define what the lieutenant must "be good" at. Army leadership doctrine says that a lieutenant must "be" an officer of character and must "know" technical, tactical, conceptual, and interpersonal skills.

The technical aspect of the lieutenant's job includes, but is not limited to, weapons proficiency; vehicle operation, maintenance, and employment; and skillful handling of platoon paperwork. Tactical proficiencies address the employment of the platoon in its assigned mission, while conceptual and interpersonal skills relate to problem solving and interacting with other people.

Once the lieutenant can "be" and "know," Army doctrine states the actions he must "do": influencing, operating, and improving.[2] While precommissioning and officer basic courses teach some of these skills, the Army has always expected lieutenants to learn, to increase their knowledge, and to improve in all of these areas during the time they serve as platoon leaders. However, since today's lieutenants have less platoon-leader time than in the past, the problem can be refined to "What can the Army do for a lieutenant before he receives his platoon that would maximize his development while he is a platoon leader?"

The answer is that the Army should make lieutenants good at the technical aspects (many of which can be done without a platoon) of being trained platoon leaders before they receive a platoon. They would begin at a higher level of proficiency and could quickly begin working on the tactical, conceptual, interpersonal, influencing, operating, and improving aspects of platoon leading. They will spend less of their valuable platoon-leader time "getting good" and more of it "being good."

Conscience again: "OK, Major. Now how will you accomplish it?"

My answer? "We should run a School of the Platoon Leader."

The School for the Platoon Leader

Our precommissioning and officer basic courses are supposed to train lieutenants as platoon leaders, and to a certain extent, they do it well. However, they prepare the generic lieutenant for service in the generic platoon.

My proposal is about preparing a specific lieutenant for service in a specific platoon with a specific set of weapons, equipment, and vehicles. This is not a new or original idea. Clarke, while speaking of his time as a combat command commander in the 4th Armored Division during World War II, said, "Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams, a recent chief of staff, was one of my tank-battalion commanders. He filled vacancies in the tank platoon leaders by what he called their 'Basic Course,' *which he taught himself* [emphasis added]."[3]

I am sure Abrams' instruction followed no formal curriculum and that the course varied from week to week, but he produced outstanding leaders for his tank platoons from the NCOs he brought up from the ranks. Granted, that was a wartime situation, but the same concept, applied today, could achieve similar results. For example, when a new lieutenant arrives at a unit, he would be projected to fill a specific platoon and would be assigned to the School of the Platoon Leader.

Successfully completing the school would earn the lieutenant a platoon. In the school, the headmaster



Crew members swab the barrel of an M109 howitzer during a training exercise in Kuwait. Lieutenants should master such tasks while awaiting their platoon assignments.

US Army

The battalion XO, assisted by the company XO, would provide the lieutenant with an introductory course in logistics. First and foremost, the lieutenant would receive a set of coveralls and be to a mechanic with the task of performing a complete service on a typical vehicle in his projected platoon. . . . The lieutenant would turn wrenches, break track, change fluids, and probably get greasier than he has ever been in his entire life.

would be the battalion commander, ably assisted by the battalion XO and S3. The lieutenant's future company commander and company XO would be the principal assistant instructors.

What would the lieutenant learn? Instruction would be tailored to the individual lieutenant and would depend on what technical skills the lieutenant would need to succeed in his projected platoon. A general course curriculum might begin with the battalion command sergeant major as the keeper of the battalion's colors. He would teach the lieutenant the lineage and honors of the battalion, the standards that all soldiers are to uphold, and the things that are done and not done in the battalion. The lieutenant would learn the battalion's traditions, Medal of Honor winners, and the important dates in the battalion's history. He would learn what those little pieces of cloth over his right breast pocket and those shiny pieces of metal on his epaulet mean. And, he would learn the ideals to which the battalion aspires and what it means to be a part of the unit.

The battalion XO, assisted by the company XO, would provide the lieutenant with an introductory course in logistics. First and foremost, the lieutenant would receive a set of coveralls and be to a mechanic with the task of performing a complete service on a typical vehicle in his projected platoon. Like the assigned operator, this would be his only task for this time. The lieutenant would turn wrenches, break track, change fluids, and probably get greasier than he has ever been in his entire life.[4]

Through the XO's tutelage, the lieutenant would have the opportunity to obtain an operator's learning permit or license as appropriate and complete the unit's maintenance certification program. He would collect and review technical manuals, supply catalogs, and hand receipts that he would need to inventory and sign for his platoon so he can personally identify all of the components and not have to rely on others' opinions or interpretations. In this logistics

primer, the lieutenant would learn from the XOs to be knowledgeable, skilled, and comfortable in the motor pool and the supply room.

The battalion S3 would help the lieutenant obtain certifications, including external certifications such as Officer in Charge/Range Safety Officer (OIC/RSO) with range control, and internal certifications, such as demolitions, nuclear, biological, and chem-ical (NBC), or special equipment operations. Through members of his staff, the S3 would introduce the lieutenant to procedures and facilities for ranges, training areas, ammunition, simulations, and training support services.

As we get older, we forget what a big deal it was to get that first platoon, but if we talk with those young officers, we will again understand what a big deal it is to them. So let us make it a big deal. When the lieutenant proves his mettle, he should not simply be sent to his platoon. He should be presented to the platoon with the pomp, circumstance, and ceremony he deserves.

From the S3 the lieutenant would also learn more of the basic technical skills required of a platoon leader. From the battalion and company commanders the lieutenant would learn the meat and potatoes of soldiering—shooting, moving, and communicating. The lieutenant would be responsible for his own learning. The company commander would provide support, assistance, and expertise.

What does the lieutenant do? He learns to disassemble, assemble, operate and employ, every weapons system in the company.[5] He learns to operate all of the communications systems in the company. He learns how to use all of the peculiar items-specific models in the unit that he might never have seen before—night vision devices, mine detectors, new equipment recently fielded, or equipment so old it is no longer taught at the Officer Basic Course (OBC).

The lieutenant will practice planning a platoon operation using the soldiers, equipment, terrain, and circumstances peculiar to his unit. When he has learned all this, he will demonstrate his abilities for the battalion commander who will conduct the final exams—physical training, weapons skills, communications skills, and tactical decisionmaking exercises.

Making it a Big Deal

As we get older, we forget what a big deal it was to get that first platoon, but if we talk with those young officers, we will again understand what a big deal it is to them. So let us make it a big deal.

When the lieutenant proves his mettle, he should not simply be sent to his platoon. He should be presented to the platoon with the pomp, circumstance, and ceremony he deserves. The command sergeant major should introduce the lieutenant and welcome him to the battalion by presenting him with his unit crests and unit awards that, because he knows their meanings, are truly symbols of his unit rather than just pieces of cloth and tin.

The battalion commander, having tried the lieutenant and found him worthy, should say so and present him with his leader's green tabs, which are items he has earned, not simply purchased. The company commander should present the lieutenant with an item symbolic of being a platoon leader in his specific unit; for example, if it is an engineer unit, he should receive Field Manual (FM) 5-34, *Engineer Field Data;* a cavalryman might receive spurs; an infantryman might be given FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.*[6] During the ceremony, the company commander should make a big deal about the lieutenant joining the unit, demonstrating his basic skills, and assuming platoon-leader responsibilities.

Through training and evaluation, the lieutenant will have increased in knowledge and skill and be more confident as he assumes his duties as a platoon leader. Platoon NCOs and soldiers should have immediate confidence in the new platoon leader because they have observed the process and know the lieutenant has the stamp of approval. In sum, the lieutenant, as well prepared as the Army can make him, would be ready to move quickly through the "getting good" stage to maximize his time at "being good."

Assessing the Program

Conscience again: "OK, Major, assess your program. What benefits does it bring, and what are the drawbacks?"

"All right, Conscience, but it is getting late, and the Jameson's is almost gone."

Advantages. The School of the Platoon Leader would prepare the lieutenant by giving him the time and opportunity to raise his technical skills from the elementary level taught in precommissioning and basic courses to a higher level based on the specific equipment and conditions of his assigned platoon. Other approaches to lieutenant and platoon-leader development might offer similar results, but be-

US Army

Soldiers prepare to enter an NBC chamber. Certification* as an NBC range officer is one of several qualifications newly assigned lieutenants must receive.

The battalion S3 would help the lieutenant obtain certifications, including external certifications such as Officer in Charge/Range Safety Officer (OIC/RSO) with range control, and internal certifications, such as demolitions, NBC, or special equipment operations. Through members of his staff, the S3 would introduce the lieutenant to procedures and facilities for ranges, training areas, ammunition, simulations, and training support services.

cause they often lack dedicated training, time, opportunity, and leadership, the improvements are not available to the lieutenant before he begins his tenure as a platoon leader. Through this program, the lieutenant would begin his platoon-leader time with significantly increased skill and confidence in his abilities to employ the weapons and equipment in his platoon, supervise maintenance, and lead his platoon in the field.

From day one in the battalion, the new lieutenant would be able to interact with and be trained and mentored by senior battalion leaders. The program would demonstrate that junior officer development is one of the primary functions of battalion leaders.

The lieutenant would learn some technical skills before he received his platoon so that he could concentrate on the tactical, conceptual, interpersonal, influencing, operating, and improving skills that can only be learned with a platoon. The members of the lieutenant's platoon would have an additional measure of confidence in his abilities from the beginning. They would know battalion leaders had put the new platoon leader through his paces.

When a new lieutenant arrived at a unit, he would not feel he was wasting his lieutenancy as a deputy assistant staff officer. He would recognize that what he does will directly affect his ability to be a better platoon leader. This can only help his morale. By polishing his technical skills before becoming a platoon leader, the lieutenant prepares himself to move quickly through the "get good" phase and arrive sooner at the "be good" phase so he can spend more time enjoying being a platoon leader.

Disadvantages. The program would require leaders with the right skills, dedication, and personality; a significant investment of leader time; and money. Finger drilling a School of the Platoon Leader would be worse than having no school at all. Unless battalion and company leaders are willing to invest the time to teach, train, and evaluate future platoon leaders, the program will not work.

As proposed, the program assumes there are second lieutenants somewhere in the battalion waiting for platoons. Even if there were vacant platoons when a new lieutenant arrives, following these recommendations would mean that the lieutenant would have to complete schooling first. This is not necessarily bad. The purpose of the school would be to further prepare the lieutenant to be a platoon leader, not simply take up time. The vacant platoon-leader position might serve as a motivator for the lieutenant to complete the course of instruction quickly.

The program would require leaders with the right skills, dedication, and personality; a significant investment of leader time; and money. Finger drilling a School of the Platoon Leader would be worse than having no school at all. Unless battalion and company leaders are willing to invest the time to teach, train, and evaluate future platoon leaders, the program will not work.

What happens if the lieutenant finishes school, but there are no vacant platoons? In this case, the lieutenant would probably be destined for a staff job until a platoon opened. However, I expect that a bit of staff time after completing the course would, on the whole, be less detrimental to the lieutenant's overall morale.

Some lieutenants might not graduate. I have known only two lieutenants who never should have been commissioned and who never should have had platoons. They were a danger to themselves and their soldiers. This program would allow battalion commanders to ensure that all lieutenants have the basic qualifications to serve as platoon leaders and weed out the small percentage who do not. While this could be viewed as a disadvantage to the individual lieutenant, it would be an advantage to the battalion and the Army.

All lieutenants arrive with different experience levels. Some might complete the school in two weeks; others might take three months. This variance could make managing the platoon leader slate slightly more difficult, but it should be manageable once the program is in place.

How do we account for the School of the Platoon Leader on a lieutenant's Officer Evaluation Report (OER) In most units, the school would take about three to eight weeks depending on the particular lieutenant and his platoon. If, after completing school, he rolls right into a platoon, the time could be unrated or addressed in his rating as a platoon leader. If he spends more than 90 days in the school and a staff position awaiting his platoon, all of his time and performance would be accounted for in the OER for his staff position.

Most of the conditions in the Army have changed since current majors and lieutenant colonels were platoon leaders, but how we assign, train, and develop platoon leaders does not seem to have kept up with changing conditions. Some units might already be using programs similar to the school I propose. Others might still be doing business the same way as they did 30 years ago. For still others, this type of program might not work at all.

What Do Lieutenants Deserve?

Regardless of the exact conditions, the problem remains the same: the Army is expecting lieutenants to learn more stuff with less platoon-leader time. Field-grade officers and organization leaders owe these lieutenants some school, program, method, training, or mentoring that will allow them to maximize their learning, growth, and development while serving minimal time as platoon leaders. While it is not the only element in a program of lieutenant development, the School of the Platoon Leader could provide an excellent opportunity to develop lieutenants' technical skills, increase their confidence in their own abilities, and ensure they spend most of their platoon-leading time "being good." ***MR***

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army (DA), U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES), *Reflections: General Bruce C. Clarke's Thoughts on Creating Outstanding Soldiers and Units* (Fort Belvior, VA: USAES, date unknown), 33.
2. DA Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), August 1999), 2-1 through 2-25.
3. *Reflections,* 31.
4. Although a platoon leader should be and will be involved in platoon services anyway, he will be much more involved and be a much better supervisor if he has had the experience of performing the service himself from wash rack to test drive.
5. These are skills often learned in basic or other courses. Yet, how many times have we gone to school and learned the M16A1 only to arrive at the unit to find it is using the M16A2, or vice versa? The objective is to provide lieutenants with the opportunity to learn specific models of weapons and accessories present in the unit.
6. DA FM 5-34, *Engineer Field Data* (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 August 1999); DA FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad* (Washington, DC: GPO, 22 April 1992, Change 1, 1 March 2001).

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Building Brotherhood for Combat

Major Jonathan Negin, U.S. Army

Leaders should visibly love their people more than their positions—and prove their love with their actions.

—President Theodore Roosevelt

Love came to us unbidden on the battlefields, as it does on every battlefield in every war man has ever fought. We discovered in that depressing, hellish place, where death was our constant companion, that we loved each other. We killed for each other, we died for each other, and we wept for each other. And in time we came to love each other as brothers.

—Lieutenant General Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young*

I HAVE HEARD many leaders talk about how they love their soldiers, love the Army, and love their country, and I have heard stories of how the leaders' soldiers loved them. Do some leaders really love their soldiers and the Army? Why would soldiers love their leaders? How is love related to leadership?

Do these leaders really mean love? Is this love the same as the way in which they love their parents, their siblings, their spouse, their children, or their dogs? How is serving in the Army related to these relationships? Are they similar? Americans seem to accept that it is OK to love their country, but is it appropriate to love an organization and its personnel? Is it appropriate for them to love their leader? Do we really mean love?

This article will examine the process of leadership as it relates to love. It will first discuss how an Army unit is similar to a family and then discuss how leadership relates to love on individual, group, and organizational levels. The focus will be on scientific research of love as it relates to leadership and how love relates to leadership in combat.

A Military Unit as a Family

One second he was paralyzed with fear and pain and the next . . . he had stopped caring about himself. He would think about this a lot later, and the best he could explain it was, his own life no longer mattered. All that did matter were his buddies, his brothers, that they not get hurt, that they not get killed. These men around him, some of whom he had only known for months, were more important to him than life itself. . . . He had to keep fighting because the other guys needed him.

—Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*

We hear a lot about how soldiers become a band of brothers when they share the intensity of combat. Are they truly as close as brothers? Is a family a good model for a combat unit? Is this an effective way to fight in combat? If so, how does one develop such a close relationship in a military unit?

Anyone who has been in combat or experienced tough, challenging training in peacetime understands how close soldiers can become. It seems that relationships among soldiers can approach the same kinds of relationships that they feel for parents, children, siblings, or spouses. In this context, perhaps one might feel more comfortable using the word love when considering a unit as a family rather than in a romantic sense. Notice that military language is filled with terms like "parent unit," "platoon daddy," and "sister unit" and that leaders sometimes use the word "son" when addressing young male soldiers.

It seems that military traditions, daily training, and deployments encourage soldiers to think of their unit as an extended family, especially if the leaders foster this environment. It appears that the traditional military culture suggests that this is an effective way to build relationships and to train for combat. Leaders foster this environment by personally relating to soldiers and developing teams through tough, realistic, and challenging training, thus developing in a unit

a sense of family.

Given the importance of unit cohesion and a sense of brotherhood in combat, leaders should review personnel policies to try to establish as much stability as possible within their units. Yes, leaders have to balance unit readiness with the need for soldier development, but currently there seems to be quite a bit of turbulence in the Army personnel system. How close would a family be if its members changed every few months or years? Personnel stability may be less cost efficient, but commanders should consider the effectiveness that could be gained by allowing subordinate leaders time to shape the organizational climate and build small-group cohesion. Leaders need time to build the close personal relationships with soldiers and their families that lead to an effective fighting force. Granted, this is a challenge in a limited resource environment, but leaders should always look for ways to ensure they are building teams rather than just moving individuals through an organization. The resulting unit cohesion and the stability for families might justify some inefficiency. Many spouses would love to establish roots and hold the same job for more than 2 or 3 years, and this would further contribute to the cohesion between units and their families.

Leading with love helps foster the seven Army values and aligns with the Army's definition of leadership—influencing people by providing the purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Leaders who lead with love gain respect from their followers (be), understand people and how to interact with them (know), and are active participants in helping their followers develop and achieve the organization's goals (do).

Consider the earliest forms of human affiliation and military history, and note the many examples of extended families, clans, and tribes that formed the core of effective fighting forces. Modern examples might include the extended sense of family generated by the regimental system in highly cohesive military organizations. If the mission is to fight and win the nation's wars, soldiers and their leaders must be committed to each other beyond just a day-to-day working relationship. They need the close support of their brothers and families to fight, kill, and die while serving their nation and each other.

Can combat leaders actually love their soldiers? Although I do not consider myself particularly sentimental, I get a little misty when "God Bless America" plays, even though I have heard it many times following the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001. I love this country, I love the Army that defends it, and I love the soldiers who protect it. I even love many of the bosses I've had over the years. I might not have openly shown affection for my first sergeant, executive officer, or platoon sergeant, but I think they were some of the finest men I have ever met. I am proud to have served with them.

The Science of Love and Leadership

Intimacy rises from translating personal and corporate values into daily work practices, from searching for knowledge and wisdom and justice. Above all, intimacy rises from, and gives rise to, strong relationships. Intimacy is one way of describing the relationship we all desire with work.

—Max DePree, *Leadership is an Art*

The word "love" is used many ways, but the English language is somewhat restrictive when it comes to describing feelings. In contrast, Greek distinguishes several forms of the word "love"—eros, passionate love; mania, possessive love; pragma, logical love; agape, selfless love; storge, friendship love; and ludus, game-playing love.[1]

How does science differentiate love from like and other emotions? There is some debate among scientists regarding the nature of emotions. Many scientists argue that emotions are not differentiated—that people do not feel them differently—but that feelings are simply physiological arousals interpreted according to social cues in the environment. In other words, when there is a physiological response, one searches his environment for the stimulus and interprets it according to the social setting.[2]

According to this view, when observing the efforts of a soldier who has just completed a grenade assault course with an outstanding score or a tank platoon that fires a perfect score on tank table XII, or watch an entire battalion provide disaster relief, one interprets his emotions according to the available environmental cues. A leader might feel a mixture of pride, respect, and admiration for these accomplishments. If, over time, he sees all the great things that soldiers, units, and the Army do to serve the nation and understands veterans' past sacrifices, it is easy to see how one might love soldiers, the Army, and the country. Some people may interpret and express their emotions this way, while others may not; it depends on how they interpret the social cues. I love to watch soldiers and units get the job done and feel an immense wave of gratitude and love for the sacrifice my grandfathers' and father's generations have



Soldiers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, compete in a team tug of war. In competitions such as this, soldiers find relation, recognition, and achievement, needs that organizations must satisfy in its members to be successful.

It is generally accepted that people need affiliation—to be respected, liked, and loved by others. Of course, the degree may vary depending on personality and childhood experiences, but generally, by joining the Army, most people appear to satisfy these needs. If this is part of why soldiers join the Army, it seems that leaders have a responsibility to create an environment where soldiers can earn respect, find friendship, and develop a passion for their profession.

contributed to this country.

It is generally accepted that people need affiliation—to be respected, liked, and loved by others.[3] Of course, the degree may vary depending on personality and childhood experiences, but generally, by joining the Army, most people appear to satisfy these needs.[4] If this is part of why soldiers join the Army, it seems that leaders have a responsibility to create an environment where soldiers can earn respect, find friendship, and develop a passion for their profession. Does this passion translate into love for the Army? Some of the basic principles of attraction include simple association with others, reinforcement, and positive social exchange for accomplishments. All these are present within the Army. Leaders have ample opportunity, or should make the time, to associate with their soldiers and reward them through recognition, praise, and tangible rewards when they have done their job well.[5]

Researchers have also determined that people are attracted to individuals who exhibit trustworthiness, sincerity, honesty, loyalty, truthfulness, and dependability.[6] These are some of the traits and values that leaders and soldiers display. People are also attracted to others who exhibit warmth and competence.[7] Competence is certainly demanded from leaders and soldiers, and many soldiers and leaders are warm and likable individuals. Once again, it seems that the Army fosters and attracts the kind of people who are difficult not to like and who can develop strong affection for others.

Researchers have also determined that people are generally attracted to others who are somewhat similar to themselves.[8] This is also the case in the Army, or at least it can be if leaders take the time to understand both the diversity in their organization and the ways in which most people are similar. Most soldiers join the Army to serve their nation, to belong to a winning team, to better themselves, or to grow as individuals. If leaders take time to acknowledge these needs and to foster them through personal relationships within units, they will enhance the quality of the relationships and the units' effectiveness and cohesion.

How does this attraction and affection become love? Scientists have established that love is distinct from liking. Love is described as an attitude toward another person that involves attachment, caring, trust, and self-disclosure, while liking has more to do with someone's being intelligent and well-adjusted, and displaying good judgment. Liking is combining the feelings of affection and respect.[9]

Given the importance of unit cohesion and a sense of brotherhood in combat, leaders should review personnel policies to try to establish as much stability as possible within their units. . . . How close would a family be if its members changed every few months or years? Personnel stability may be less cost efficient, but commanders should consider the effectiveness that could be gained by allowing subordinate leaders time to shape the organizational climate and build small-group cohesion.

So, it seems that liking soldiers, units, and the Army may be a good start—it sounds OK to have affection and respect for soldiers and them for you. But what about love? Do soldiers need more of the attachment, care, and trust that are described as love to fight in combat, or is liking enough? Isn't being attached to one's soldiers, caring for them, and earning their trust all part of effective leadership?

Robert J. Sternberg describes another theory of love as the "Triangular Theory of Love."[10] According to his model, the three components of love include intimacy, passion, and commitment. Applying his model to the Army, are leaders intimate with their soldiers, passionate about the mission, and committed to their soldiers and the Army? Of course, there is a limit to how intimate leaders should be with their soldiers, but still, leaders must know the characters of those they lead. Leaders express passion through hard work, dedication, and devotion to soldiers and their missions. In fact, leaders should be committed to their soldiers, their missions, and the Army.

Richard Daft, author of *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, notes that organizations have traditionally used fear to motivate people and that fear can motivate people under certain circumstances, within certain limits.[11] Using fear to motivate inhibits contributions, enthusiasm, and risk-taking. People do not want to make mistakes, so they stay within approved limits. In contrast, leading with love uses more positive forces such as caring, listening, and developing personal relationships with followers. In this environment, followers can grow and learn, and will take more risks. The organization as a whole can greatly benefit from its members' willing and enthusiastic contributions.

Daft cites Jan Carlson, president and chief executive officer of Scandinavian Airlines Systems Group: "In my experience, there are two great motivators in life. One is fear. The other is love. You can manage an organization by fear, but if you do you will ensure that people don't perform up to their real capabilities. A person who is afraid doesn't dare perform to the limits of his or her capabilities. . . . But if you manage by love—that is, if you show them respect and trust . . . in that kind of atmosphere, they dare to take risks."[12] Daft contends that leading with love, by showing respect and trust, not only generates improved performance but also makes people feel more connected to the organization and feel better about their lives. Relying on fear to lead may reduce followers' performance, squash their enthusiasm, and limit the organization's productivity.

According to Daft, one problem with leading with love in organizations is that many leaders do not feel comfortable employing this type of leadership style and do not want to show any sign of weakness. This is particularly applicable to the Army because of the rough and tough image leaders believe they must present to be mentally and physically ready for combat and to give confidence to soldiers and the public. Daft cites former President Ronald Reagan as a leader who was tough but led with love through displaying open affection for his wife and demonstrating passion and emotion during a visit to Normandy and during funeral services for the *Challenger* astronauts.

Daft points out that there are many forms of what we term love and that there is certainly an appropriate way to express love as a leader. Consider the power that love can have over people. If soldiers know that leaders truly care for them, love their unit, love the Army, and love America, they are more likely to respect and trust their leaders, thus developing their own passion for the unit, the Army, and the nation. The results of this kind of leadership are soldiers and leaders who are fiercely devoted to their missions; leaders who will not employ soldiers carelessly to accomplish tasks; and followers who are devoted to their leaders, their fellow soldiers, the Army, and their mission because they understand that they are part of something bigger than themselves.

Leading with love helps foster the seven Army values and aligns with the Army's definition of leadership—influencing people by providing the purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Leaders who lead with love gain respect from their followers (be), understand people and how to interact

with them (know), and are active participants in helping their followers develop and achieve the organization's goals (do).[13]

Leadership and Love in Combat

. . . the men marched believing they were behind McClellan. He was the only general Chamberlain had ever seen who was truly loved. The Rebs loved Lee, no doubt of that. And we loved Mac. Chamberlain thought: two things an officer must do, to lead men. This from old Ames, who never cared about love: You must care for your men's welfare. You must show personal courage.

—Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels*

In combat, there are three primary factors that determine how a soldier will respond under duress. They can be described using the acronym TLC for training, leadership, and cohesion. When soldiers are under the stress of combat, TLC determines how they will react.

Training. In an effective combat unit, training, especially common skills tasks and battle drills training, should dictate a soldier's initial response to the stress and strains of combat. Training may seem as if it has little to do with love, but if a leader really loves soldiers, he will train them to be ready when they face combat. This is perhaps the greatest evidence that a leader genuinely cares for soldiers—he trains them as a team to do their jobs. Marksmanship, common skills tasks, and battle drills allow soldiers to survive and give leaders time to make decisions that will help the unit accomplish its mission. Soldiers and small units must know how to survive initial contact with the enemy, survive casualties, and survive prolonged combat. First aid, combat lifesaver, and medical evacuation training are key to taking care of soldiers and getting the job done. Physical fitness, field craft, and the cohesion and personal relationships developed during training will help soldiers endure the prolonged stress of combat.

Leadership. Soldiers naturally look to their leaders for direction and strength. In combat, this is even more the case. Soldiers must know their leader is competent, cares about the mission, and cares about them. The leader also has to know how to fight the enemy, how to keep his poise, and how to make effective and timely decisions. Effective common task training and battle drills give the leader time to assess the situation, analyze it, and formulate a plan based on experience and training. If the situation is dire and time is minimal, "follow me!" may be the appropriate response. If a leader has not shown he genuinely cares about the mission and soldiers, he may find that during combat few will follow, and the mission and unit will be in jeopardy.

Cohesion. W.D. Henderson, author of *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat*, observes: "The nature of modern war indicates that small-unit cohesion is the only force capable of causing soldiers to expose themselves consistently to enemy fire in pursuit of an army's goals."[14] In combat, soldiers should first respond to their training and look to their leaders for guidance, but their fellow soldiers' reaction and needs can powerfully influence their actions. These are the external cues that can rouse a soldier to act and emerge from intense fear and self-preservation. Junior leaders have a big influence on soldiers on the battlefield, but there will be times when a soldier only has contact with his buddy next to him. At these moments, they must trust each other and count on one another to do their jobs as part of the team. Most soldiers have some sense of the importance of cohesion, how to recognize it, and how to build it in units, but they should consider it the top priority. Effective training, good leadership, and building unit cohesion all go together.

Are leaders intimate with their soldiers, passionate about the mission, and committed to their soldiers and the Army? Of course, there is a limit to how intimate leaders should be with their soldiers, but still, leaders must know the characters of those they lead. Leaders express passion through hard work, dedication, and devotion to soldiers and their missions. In fact, leaders should be committed to their soldiers, their missions, and the Army.

Cohesion is similar to developing a sense of family in a unit. Effective training, arduous deployments, and personal leadership all contribute to building cohesion. Brotherhood can also be fostered through—

- Taking care of soldiers from the beginning with an effective sponsorship program that swiftly integrates them into the team.
- Opening communication with an effective, two-way counseling program that helps soldiers and units establish and reach individual and collective goals.
- Ensuring that information gets to soldiers and that soldiers' concerns are addressed through effective communication throughout the chain of command.
- Empowering junior leaders and soldiers to make decisions and take ownership of the unit.
- Establishing a fair system of rewards, punishment, and evaluation that reinforces unit values and standards.
- Generating friendly, healthy competition within

the unit and with other units that recognizes that, in the end, they all go to war together.

- Upholding and establishing unit traditions that foster patriotism and pride in the nation and the unit, its history, its heroes, and its symbols.
- Conducting unit social events that include families as much as possible.

Unit cohesion is not just about getting along. It is more a sense that everyone on the team understands his role, is competent, and is confident that the rest of the team will do its part. The unit can accomplish its mission as a cohesive force—each soldier knows his role and does his part.

Love the Army; Love the Nation

Joshua Chamberlain, listening, thought of the sound of Butterfield's Lullaby coming out of the dark, through a tent flap, with the campfires burning warm and red in the night, and Chamberlain thought: you can grow to love it.

—Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels*

In prison, I fell in love with my country. I had loved her before then, but like most young people, my affection was little more than a simple appreciation for the comforts and privileges most Americans enjoyed and took for granted. It wasn't until I had lost America for a time that I realized how much I loved her.

—Senator John McCain, *Faith of My Fathers*

It seems that more people are willing to admit that they love the Army and certainly that they love the United States. That is not quite as personal as saying a person loves soldiers, and one can still project the rough and tough image while loving the Army and the country.

The Army and this nation once again enjoy the respect and admiration of our citizens and the world after a string of successes and missions completed in the name of freedom and basic human rights. Grenada, Panama, Operation Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and our current fight against terrorism in Afghanistan are examples of missions dedicated to restoring freedom and protecting people's basic human rights throughout the world. The successes were not easy to achieve, and it is not easy to maintain a successful organization; however, the Army must never lose the respect and admiration of its citizens and the world again. It is easier to love an army and a nation that stand up for others and defend human rights.

Senior leaders must nurture and encourage an organizational culture that instills values, competence, and dedication to victory in its soldiers. An organization's culture may be complex, elusive, and hard to discern, but it influences how people perceive that organization. It takes great care and vigilance to understand, assess, shape, and change culture to sustain core competencies and values to ensure an organization's success and vitality. Although the Army has a reputation for competence, values, and success, senior leaders must consider the long-term effects of a high operating tempo, force structure, and personnel policies to ensure they maintain an army that soldiers can love.

Most citizens will admit their love for America, despite its faults and mistakes, as witnessed by vigorous and overt expressions of patriotism following the attacks of 11 September 2001. These attacks remind Americans that they must not take freedom for granted. Every day is Independence Day, not just the 4th of July, and every day is a day of thanksgiving, not just one Thursday in November. It may be possible for leaders to be effective if they simply like their soldiers, like their units, like the Army, or like the country, but to do it right, leadership requires passion—leaders who love their soldiers, love the Army, and love this country. ***MR***

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Restoring Duty and Honor to the Officer Corps

Major David D. Wisyanski, U.S. Army

THE OFFICER CORPS NEEDS a reformed leadership ethos to accompany the Army's transformation process. The principles of duty and honor must be part of this reform if the Army is to succeed institutionally during this transition. These moral principles, the need for which is not new, either have been ignored or neglected in the contemporary leadership ethos. Most would agree these principles are bedrock for an officer corps before, during, and after a transformation process. However, at the dawn of current transformation, the modern officer corps has habitually sought refuge in gray areas and situational ethics to overcome personal failure or to achieve personal success at the expense of institutional principle. For the sake of discussion, the term "safety of the gray" will be used to describe this phenomenon.

This article does not review or examine the merits of current trends in organizational leadership systems or leadership techniques that impact transformation. There is enough literature and instruction in the Army to adequately inculcate officers with the requisite knowledge and tools for the proverbial kit bag. Instead, the article addresses duty and honor as absolutes, neither of which should be carried out selectively nor employed situationally—principles of leadership that reject the safety of the gray.

Many dismiss duty and honor as being outdated, outmoded, or without utility. General (GEN) Douglas MacArthur thought otherwise when he delivered his farewell address to the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, in 1962. He believed the principles of duty, honor, and country were absolutes: "'Duty,' 'Honor,' 'Country'—those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying point to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn. . . . The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery or ridicule. . . . But these are some of the things they build. They build your basic character. They mold you for future roles as the custodians of the nation's defense. They make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid."[1]

> Among the outgrowths of this relativistic philosophy was the concept of self-esteem and, possibly, egoism. . . . [It] took root in American society in the 1960s and eventually entered the American business community's management philosophy. The thought was that if individual desires were met first, individuals would better contribute to group or organizational goals. Thus, an entrepreneurial ethos replaced a corporatist one. Not long thereafter, the concept also took root in military leadership practices.

The last decade of the last century proved tumultuous for the officer corps. Post-Cold War changes in the way the Army fought, different from previous postwar periods, presented a cumbersome leadership challenge. These changes, characterized by frequent deployments to conduct military operations other than war and stability and support operations, tested the Army's conventional leadership practices. More often absent than not were the moral foundations embodied in the principles of duty and honor that have historically sustained leaders faced with uncertainty.

These practices, which undergirded a mechanized force that would fight a quantifiable opponent on a sanitized battlefield, proved unworkable. Relying on utilitarian and structural approaches—a quantified battle drill and checklist mind-set—was insufficient to deal with the esoteric leadership challenges in the new environment. This leadership approach not only failed the Army in the field but also failed the Army in garrison. Having to adapt home station routines to support new and ill-defined battlefield roles added new stresses for leaders.

Leaders often emphasize training on measurable or procedural tasks such as preparing to fire an artillery piece.

The Cannoneer

The [War College] study found that "the ideal standards of ethical/moral/professional behavior . . . are accepted by the officer corps as proper, meaningful, and relevant for the Army of today." On the other hand . . . "the Army rewards system focuses on the accomplishment of short term, measurable, and often trivial tasks, and neglects the development of those ethical standards which are essential to a healthy profession." This contradiction could be explained away by and give credence to the fact that truth and standards are relative. . . . In essence, no harm is done if one is getting the job done.

Pressures to fulfill garrison maintenance and training requirements that a Cold War army still demanded presented the temptation to employ expedience over principle. Exaggerating unit status reports was but one example of this kind of expedience. Complicating this environment were social tumults. Senior military officers proved unfaithful to their wives, and company and field grade officers flinched at abuses their noncommissioned officers inflicted on basic trainees. Moral compartmentalization, self-preservation, and erosion of trust replaced what was once considered keystone traits of all officers—duty and honor. These principles became casualties to the tumults of the 1990s Army.

Values versus Principles

Principles are timeless. In the past when the Army transformed because of doctrinal evolutions or technological revolutions, moral leadership remained constant during the transformation. If current Army Transformation is to be successfully implemented, enduring leadership principles, not malleable subjective values, are imperative. Solving contemporary leadership challenges now and in the transformed Army demands an examination of what foundational principles—duty and honor versus subjective values—the officer corps should uncompromisingly adhere to.

Values are ideals and customs that arouse an emotional response, for or against them, in a given society or in a given person. Values tend to fluctuate with trends and conventional wisdom, whereas principles transcend time, feelings, and individual desires. Values can be easily changed because they are utility-based. Whatever is considered to be practical, workable, or expedient within a given community can be a value. In contrast, principles are permanent.

It can be argued that principles and values are the same, but another argument can be made that they are polarized. In the former, they are not antithetical to each other because one builds on the other. In the latter, principles and values would be considered to be incompatible. Principles are foundational, and values usually are derived from accepted norms whose underlying bases rely on contemporary wisdom or ideas of the day. Thus, in addressing leadership reform, a values approach most often relies on systemic or structural changes. Individual behaviors and their derivations more often are overlooked than considered.

The contemporary concept of values entered American society through the theosophical movement in the early 20th century. Its goal was universal brotherhood through establishing values within a society. However, Mohandas K. Gandhi, architect of the concept of values, states that values are based on relative truth. That is, there is no such thing as absolute truth. Truth is an individual experiential perception instead of an unchanging, inherent universal standard. Thus, truth is an inward interpretation, and self, above all, takes primacy in determining truth.[2]

Principles involve fundamental truths as the basis for reasoning or action instead of what might be considered expedient or useful in a given situation. Hence, principle-based leadership does not accommodate expediency as does leadership based on entrepreneurial motivations. Unfortunately, the latter can serve as the pretext for situational ethics which, in truth, is a retreat into the safety of the gray.

Entrepreneurial versus Principled Leadership

Among the outgrowths of this relativistic philosophy was the concept of self-esteem and, possibly,

egoism. Gandhi's concept of values took root in American society in the 1960s and eventually entered the American business community's management philosophy. The thought was that if individual desires were met first, individuals would better contribute to group or organizational goals. Thus, an entrepreneurial ethos replaced a corporatist one. Not long thereafter, the concept also took root in military leadership practices.

There are many factors that influence officers in their leadership actions. Unfortunately, entrepreneurial approaches seem to prevail as the primary motivation for what inspires most leaders' actions. Leaders' entrepreneurial motivations are self-serving. An unfortunate manifestation of such motivations is finding utility in the "perception as reality" approach to achieving standards. Rooted in relativism, entrepreneurial officers often rely on and/or accept appearance over substance.

An example of appearance over substance is the "PowerPoint Army." It often seems that more value is placed on a presentation's creativity than on its content. While this kind of ethos may be stimulating and may enhance one's image, it creates two problems. Appearance over substance encourages individualistic rather than principle-based ethics within officers. Also, appearance cannot hide lack of substance forever.

This leadership phenomenon within the officer corps is not new. It was prevalent during the Vietnam era and may have contributed to the Army's current leadership practices. In 1970, Army Chief of Staff GEN William Westmoreland commissioned the U.S. Army War College to study the state of the officer corps. An entrepreneurial ethos existed then just as it seems to now.

The War College study revealed a schizophrenia. The study found that "the ideal standards of ethical/moral/professional behavior as epitomized by 'Duty-Honor-Country' are accepted by the officer corps as proper, meaningful, and relevant for the Army of today."[3] On the other hand, the study revealed that "there are widespread and often significant differences between the ideal ethical/moral/professional standards of the Army and the prevailing standards. . . . [That is,] the Army rewards system focuses on the accomplishment of short term, measurable, and often trivial tasks, and neglects the development of those ethical standards which are essential to a healthy profession."[4] This contradiction could be explained away by and give credence to the fact that truth and standards are relative, and thus ethical gray areas indeed do exist. In essence, no harm is done if one is getting the job done.

The War College study also concluded that the disparity between ideal standards of principled behavior and manifested behavior was the result of "selfish, promotion-oriented behavior; inadequate communication between junior and senior; distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics, or officer efficiency; technical or managerial incompetence; disregard for principles but total respect for accomplishing even the most trivial mission with zero defects; disloyalty to subordinates; senior officers setting poor standards of ethical/professional behavior."[5] In addition to revealing schizophrenic entrepreneurial ethics, the study concluded that the Army was more focused on organizational structures and systems than it was on inculcating ethical principles within its officers.



General William Westmoreland, then commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, shows his soldiers the proper method of rigging a rifle, 1963.

US Army

Choosing the harder right over the easier wrong also parries moral compartmentalization, another form of the safety of the gray. . . . [General] Westmoreland pointed out: "Competence and integrity are not inseparable. The officer who sacrifices his integrity sacrifices all; he will lose the respect and trust of those he seeks to lead, and he will degrade the reputation of his profession. The good repute of the officer corps is a responsibility shared by every officer. . . . Dedicated and selfless service to our country is our primary motivation. This makes our profession a way of life rather than just a job."

Systems and Structures versus Principles

Another alternative that has replaced the principles of duty and honor are systemic and structural approaches to leadership. However, the history of warfare holds enough evidence that organizational structures and programs do not guarantee battlefield success; they are means rather than ends. The U.S. Army has a history of developing new systems or adjusting structures in lieu of changing behaviors when leadership fails. Currently, there is also an ethos whereby value is placed on leadership that uses systems, structures, and techniques. While quantifiable, thus providing credibility, this approach to leadership also finds safety in gray areas. It replaces personal accountability with seemingly tangible but benign approaches to overcoming or assuaging human weaknesses or personal failure.

Michel Foucault, a 20th-century French philosopher devoted to the history of societal systems, developed the idea of organizational cohesion by means of structures and systems in his work "Disciplines." On the surface, military leadership-organizational dynamics validate his philosophy. Foucault believed that cohesion—the feeling of belonging—could be created through systemic and structural techniques rather than through foundational leadership principles. He implied that programs stressing unity of effort and a common cause could develop organizational cohesion.[6] The U.S. Army's systems and structures also could claim success in building unit cohesion by similar means.

Despite history bearing out the effectiveness of building cohesion organizationally, Foucault says nothing of the intangible influence of those who lead organizations. What would happen to unit cohesion if subordinates witnessed lack of duty and honor in their leaders? A possible result would be dissension or disloyalty within the ranks, leading to unit disintegration. In combat, this could prove fatal.

In a principle-based ethos of duty and honor, a leader accepts responsibility for everything a unit does or fails to do, thereby accepting the consequences of the unit's failure regardless of the cause. On the other hand, building unit readiness on structural or programmatic means exempts a leader from personal or moral failure. Thus, solutions superficially reside in systemic or structural adjustments rather than alterations to personal failings, be they moral aberrations or errors in judgment.

Loyalty versus Integrity

Loyalty and integrity are two principles that are universally accepted as being necessary for effective military leadership. However, in the face of a truth-as-relative ethos, officers often find that these principles conflict with entrepreneurial leadership. Is loyalty truly loyalty at the expense of integrity? The current prevailing ethos seems to morally justify sacrificing one over the other, especially in stressful or time-constrained situations. To maintain loyalty to organizations and to leaders, "bending the rules" seems both expedient and efficient.

This begs to question whether such a compromise is borne of self-preservation and convenience or borne of a skewed sense of honor. President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, provides the result of such confusion: "Men may be inexact or even untruthful in ordinary matters and suffer as a consequence only the disesteem of their associates or even the inconvenience of unfavorable litigation. But the inexact or untruthful soldier trifles with the lives of his fellow men and the honor of his government."[7] It can be inferred that Newton spoke of the pitfalls one might experience in seeking moral sanctuary in the safety of the gray. Over time, it cannot stand on its own and will collapse at inopportune times, causing personnel to fail their leaders' and their subordinates' expectations. The ultimate results are failing the mission and suffering a blight on one's profession.

On the other hand, complaints among officers in the 1990s imply that external circumstances, rather than a lack of individual duty and honor, caused integrity compromises. However, moral principles, inculcated early and reinforced throughout an officer's career, will diminish such problems. Westmoreland believed as much when he cautioned against a lack of honor: "Inevitably, in the turmoil of the times, every officer will be confronted by situations which test his character. On these occasions he must stand on his principles, for these are the crucial episodes that determine the worth of a man. . . . While basic laws underlie command authority, the real foundation of successful leadership is the moral authority derived from professional competence and integrity."[8]

A correct sense of duty and honor constrains us to do what is right, no matter the intensity of uncomfortable situations. It ensures that personnel properly execute tasks and consistently meet standards. Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr. called this dilemma choosing the harder right over the easier wrong.

Moral Decisiveness versus Moral Compartmentalization

Choosing the harder right over the easier wrong also parries moral compartmentalization, another form of the safety of the gray. Moral compartmentalization not only includes no harm done if the job is getting done, but it also involves selective obedi-

ence. The ultimate effect of selective obedience, while personally convenient, is eroding unit cohesion. For officers, selective disobedience could affect the reputation of their profession and could contribute to unit disintegration. Westmoreland pointed out: "Competence and integrity are not inseparable. The officer who sacrifices his integrity sacrifices all; he will lose the respect and trust of those he seeks to lead, and he will degrade the reputation of his profession. The good repute of the officer corps is a responsibility shared by every officer. Each one of us stands in the light of his brother, and each shares in the honor and burden of leadership. Dedicated and selfless service to our country is our primary motivation. This makes our profession a way of life rather than just a job."[9] Selective obedience, then, is juxtaposed to integrity, which is defined as moral excellence and honesty. With such a standard, even inane, inconvenient, and irrational orders must be followed without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

The only kind of order the Army authorizes its personnel to disobey is an illegal one. Lieutenant William Calley ordering his men to fire on civilians in My Lai during the Vietnam war is one example of an illegal order that needs no further elaboration. A more contemporary example might be a battalion commander pressuring a staff officer to distort unit status reporting statistics. This is an illegal act that the staff officer can legally refuse to carry out, but he may feel compelled to comply with it for his own self-preservation.

Retired Lieutenant General Edward M. Flanagan, former commander of both the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 6th U.S. Army, incisively addresses the subject of moral decisiveness and moral compartmentalization and whether he feels there is a gray area between them. He states: "Integrity is a constant; it is not a sometime thing. It is rigid, complete, and unwavering. It brooks no deviation from honorable conduct. It requires total honesty in all things at all times. . . . In no other profession is integrity more important than in the profession of arms because in no other profession are so many men's lives at stake. No other profession bears the weight of the security of the nation. No other profession calls upon men to make life and death decisions for other men. Therefore, in no other profession are integrity, probity, and honesty so important. If an officer or NCO [noncommissioned officer] does not have integrity as his bond, his foundation, his core, no matter what else he has, he's a failure. There is no place for him in the military establishment."[10] In short, Flanagan emphasizes that duty and honor are paramount, and as such, moral decisiveness is not optional.

In the 1990s, duty and honor suffered degradation as foundational principles to internalize and manifest as absolute in being considered a complete leader. Even if moral failings become commonplace throughout the officer corps, the inarguable necessity to practice principled leadership is not invalidated. The ultimate purpose for reforming the Army's officer leadership ethos lies not only in the inherent correctness of it but also in building combat-ready units to effectively perform on future battlefields. Large-scale mechanized warfare, while the most lethal type of conventional conflict, will be the least likely. Systemic and structural approaches to leadership are effective in this type of environment. It is an environment in which quantifiable and equipment-based solutions are possible.

In the 21st century, leaders will face far more ill-defined, esoteric situations than they can deal with merely through quantifiable means. Principled leadership will help them make correct decisions regardless of the situation. Life, especially war, is too unpredictable to rely on expedient, benign, and antiseptic leadership methods. Uncompromising duty and honor will serve the officer corps well in decisionmaking amid an ambiguous modern battlefield. A reformed ethos, the foundation of which is based on the timeless principles of duty and honor, will see the U.S. Army through its Transformation in the 21st century. MR

NOTES

1. General Douglas MacArthur's farewell speech to cadets at West Point, New York, 12 May 1962.
2. J.S. Sethi, Gandhi Today (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1979), 34-35.
3. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 84-85.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Timothy Mitchell, "Limits of State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," American Political Science Review (March 1991), 84 and 92-93.
7. Lieutenant General Edward M. Flanagan, Before the Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 137.
8. Ibid., 111.
9. Ibid., 111-12.
10. Ibid., 112-13.

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Developing Strategic Leaders

Major Martha G. Granger, U.S. Army

The Army has no choice but to face change. It's in a nearly constant state of flux, with new people, new missions, new technologies, new equipment, and new information.

—Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*

REVOLUTIONS in military affairs (RMAs), whether spawned during peace or war, are accompanied by one constant—change. New enemies, new tactics, new uniforms, and new terminology, to name a few, will be scorned or embraced for whatever reason by whatever individual for centuries to come. During Vietnam, "killed in action" became "killed in hostile action" to make death more palatable for mothers and fathers at home.[1] Last year, the Army's recruiting slogan "Be All You Can Be" became "An Army of One" to make the Army more palatable for the daughters and sons at home. The 1980s also seem to have introduced the less palatable term "risk-aversion"—the supposed new mentality that is plaguing American leaders, civilian and military alike. In a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) leadership lecture, a major asked about this new phenomenon and how the leaders of tomorrow are expected to handle it. The hesitant response, that this question wasn't "useful," though seeming politically correct at the time, appears quite appropriate. Upon further reflection, the real question, and one more useful though difficult to answer, is whether risk-aversion is really the problem.

Today's military leaders operate in a complex politico-military environment, and their decisions involve quite a bit of risk. Their success is hampered by what some observers perceive as an aversion to risk instilled early in their careers. Furthermore, military leaders often do not fully or correctly appreciate the diplomatic or international ramifications of their decisions or actions. The fear of making mistakes or taking risks combined with a lack of understanding for politico-military situations often leads to doing the wrong thing. Doing the wrong thing, even at the tactical level, can mean strategic disaster.

Doctrine alone will not enable strategic military leaders to develop the necessary decisionmaking skills to make the right decisions; however, a study of historical examples might. History provides numerous examples of leaders who failed at international politics and war because they did not appreciate a situation's diplomatic or military subtleties or because they were not astute risk assessors. The Army's challenge is to grow young tactical leaders into mature strategic leaders who are capable of strategic thought and action in a complex politico-military environment but who do not fear making mistakes or taking risks.

Doing the Wrong Thing

American military leaders, of all services, are brought up in the belief that vigorous action saves the day, and it is always better to do something, even the wrong thing, than to take no action at all.

—T.R. Fehrenbach

If the root of the problem is, in fact, doing the wrong thing, the modern leader will not find solace in the old school of thought that preferred action over inaction. Contemporary soldiers and a sensitive society no longer condone a wrong action over inaction that preserves a status quo. Military professionals, like all professionals, have come to recognize two categories of wrong actions: wrong actions resulting from incompetence or blind ambition, or both; and actions assessed as wrong from the viewpoint of hindsight, "hindsight being 20/20."[2] With the processes of risk assessment and risk management ingrained in Army doctrine since the 1980s, the former sort of wrong action is unlikely.[3] Far more likely, however, is category two, "an error or fault, a misconception or misunderstanding," or more commonly, a "mistake."[4]

The Army accepts that its people will make mistakes: "Any time you have human beings in a

complex organization doing difficult jobs, often under pressure, there are going to be problems. Effective leaders use those mistakes to figure out how to do things better and share what they have learned with other leaders in the organization, both peers and superiors."[5]

However much inclined and trained to accept mistakes and learn from them, military leaders and the nation have a lot to lose when making either mistake, especially at the strategic level. T.R. Fehrenbach notes, "the one thing a democracy has in common with a dictatorship is that when there is a military failure, heads must roll." Interestingly, Voltaire adds that lopping off heads "is not a bad policy, since it tends to encourage the remaining leaders."[6] The problem with such a policy, however, is that it can encourage the remaining leaders in one of three ways: to engage in self-discovery and self-improvement to prevail in a similar situation, to avoid that situation altogether in the future, or to explain why the head rolled. The last seems not only to account for why military leaders lied about body counts in Vietnam but also how a climate of intolerance for mistakes—a zero-defects mentality—emerged 20 years later.[7]

Yes-Men and Zero Defects

The pragmatic man worries about today or tomorrow, never the day past tomorrow. He rarely seeks, and he seldom creates. Pragmatists create no new ways of life . . . they believe in balance, compromise, adjustment. They distrust enthusiasms; they trust what works. They make good politicians, excellent bankers, superb diplomats. They never build empires, either of the earth or of the spirit.

—T.R. Fehrenbach

Moral courage. Encouraging dissenting opinions. Are we doing better at this today? I don't think so. If you saw the Joint Chiefs testify before Congress on readiness, it was an eye-opener. They came on a bit bolder than before, but they still lost. This is at the top—and I think the problem is worse in the ranks.

—Retired Colonel Jack Kem

Whether during peace or war, U.S. military leaders have always sought potency, and potency requires daring; however, daring often results in heads rolling. Such a climate of intolerance for mistakes undermines moral courage; "No" becomes "Can do!"[8] Yes-men and pragmatists emerge—leaders who play it safe and say whatever appeases, regardless of the second- and third-order effects. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, warns against yes-men: "Strategic leaders can't afford to be surrounded by staffs that blindly agree with everything they say. Not only do they avoid surrounding themselves with 'yes-men,' they also reward staff members for speaking the truth."[9] Sir Winston Churchill maintained, "If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile-driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it a second time—a tremendous whack!"[10] Colin L. Powell, in *My American Journey*, agrees but offers a caveat: "When we are debating an issue, loyalty means giving me your honest opinion, whether you think I'll like it or not. Disagreement, at this stage, stimulates me. But once a decision has been made, the debate ends."[11] It seems, then, that truth is good until it isn't good anymore—identifying that point is the key. Retired General (GEN) Wesley K. Clark called it "balance," although he was obviously never able to achieve it.[12]

Just as the current FM 22-100 unequivocally states that a zero-defects mentality has no place in the Army, future editions of FM 22-100 may likely warn military leaders the same about risk-aversion. By its very nature, risk-aversion circumvents the Army's doctrinal risk-management processes. These processes are intended to reduce soldiers' exposure to risk but not to reduce the Army's ability to fight boldly and decisively.

It is difficult to say when a zero-defects mentality emerged in the Army, although clearly it was a peacetime development. It is also difficult to capture its multiple meanings and applications. An outside perspective, not surprisingly a British one, provides some help here. As the saying goes, "it is easier to identify in others characteristics which may be all too present but unnoticed in ourselves."[13] For example, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) D.T. Eccles, in an article published in the *British Army Review* in 1996, described four American military culture trends observed during a tour of duty in Sarajevo: nervousness concerning soldiers' physical safety, strict ties to political correctness, fear of making personal administrative errors, and reluctance to disagree with superiors. He goes on to say that these trends "combined to produce an intolerance for mistakes or what is known as a 'zero-defect culture' within the American Military."[14]

FM 22-100 also cautions against a zero-defects mentality: "There is no room for the 'zero-defects' mentality in a learning organization. . . . If the message you hammer home is 'There will be no mistakes,' or if you lose your temper . . . every time there's bad news, eventually your people

will just stop telling you when things go wrong or suggesting how to make things go right."[15] Even a leader who encourages a strict standard of excellence can unwittingly fall victim to the zero-defects mentality by saying, "Don't take any chances. Don't try anything you can't already do perfectly, and for heaven's sake, don't try anything new."[16] A zero-defects command climate

When many urged an offensive operation against Iraq, Powell advised the president that sanctions were just as viable an option. . . . Because of his counsel, Powell earned the label of "reluctant warrior." On this, he replied: "Guilty. War is a deadly game; and I do not believe in spending the lives of Americans lightly. My responsibility that day was to lay out all options for the nation's civilian leadership. . . . The sanctions clock was ticking down. If the President was right, if he decided that it must be war, then my job was to make sure we were ready to go in and win."

strangles initiative and stunts experience and judgment.[17] So, although zero defects significantly reduces the chance of mistakes, it simultaneously reduces the possibility of a positive development, thus breeding stagnation and reluctance.

Imagine the impact of zero-defects thinking if LTC Hal Moore had subscribed to it in the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam in 1965. This topic of discussion in a combat leadership class at CGSC led students to ask, "What would Moore have done if Second Lieutenant Henry Herrick had lived?" There are several possibilities: Moore could have relieved Herrick for being overeager and rash, separating his platoon from the company, and getting his soldiers killed; he could have retained Herrick in his position, thus teaching them both (and the company commander) a valuable lesson; or he could have cited Herrick for bravery in spoiling the enemy's massive frontal attack on the entire battalion.[18]

A zero-defects attitude would have forced Moore to relieve Herrick for his mistake. The platoon then would have stood a good chance of having to learn the same lessons over again under its next green and eager lieutenant. Unit initiative, morale, and motivation would have suffered. Judging by Moore's other actions at landing zone X-Ray, especially his forgiving reaction to the misplaced napalm strike, the logical assumption is that he would have retained Herrick as the platoon leader.[19] The platoon and Herrick would have learned valuable lessons to apply in future battles without significant loss of any more morale than had already occurred; however, option three remains a stretch even considering hindsight. Since Herrick did not survive his mistake, only Moore can answer the question. However, it appears safe to say that the trend in at least the last decade would have pointed to relieving Herrick.

Assessing, Assuming, and Averting Risk

Generations of US officers are growing up without being encouraged to exercise any autonomous authority and with little instruction in how to assess and then be prepared to take risks in pursuance of a military objective. Thus there is an erosion of the key virtue which underpins every military organization: the moral courage to take risks.

—LTC D.T. Eccles

FM 100-14 defines risk as "the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, an adversary, or some other hazardous condition."[20] Assessing, assuming, and averting risk, especially risk to soldiers' lives, is something leaders do everyday. Still, leaders must risk soldiers' lives everyday, everywhere, while training for or responding to everything from disaster relief to global war. Since 1989, the Army has deployed 35 times and "has been in Kosovo for a year, Bosnia for 5, Southwest Asia for 10, the Sinai for 18, Korea for 50, and Europe for 55 years."[21] Add to this high operating tempo the stress of a transitioning Army, dwindling resources, digitization, and inherent organizational and individual turmoil, notes retired Colonel Jack Kem, a leadership instructor at CGSC, and the possibility of loss multiplies quickly.[22] Although the United States has the most esteemed, most respected, and most feared military in the world—both persuasive in peace and invincible in war—the military is not impervious to loss.[23]

Despite the obvious risk the above situations pose, assessing risk appears to be conditioned by observation and experience. FM 100-14, *Risk Management*, states, "perception of risk varies from person to person. What is risky or dangerous to one person may not be to another. Perception influences leaders' decisions."[24]

Various perceptions of risk raised great debate about force-protection measures during Operation Joint Endeavor, the NATO peace enforcement operation in Bosnia. Because of different perceptions of risk to soldiers, force-protection measures differed among participating armies. French and British commanders relaxed their force-protection posture to berets and soft caps with no body armor, while U.S. commanders put their forces in "full battle-rattle."[25] Clark, at that time the director of

strategic plans and policy for the Joint Staff, attributed the U.S. decision to several factors: the Vietnam war; the extremely low casualties taken in the Gulf; and the failed raid in Mogadishu, Somalia. He found it interesting that "the same pressures were not operative on our European Allies. France, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, suffered loss after loss in peace keeping operations in the Balkans and elsewhere. Those risks, while regrettable, were considered part of the duty."[26]

LTC Alistair J. Deas, a British exchange officer instructing at CGSC, shed some light on the topic: "I had never heard of risk-aversion until I came to the United States. The British military and society see risk as part of a soldier 'doing his duty.' It may well include dying in battle, and this is accepted as the mere nature of the business. British soldiers are trained and operate as infantrymen first, and conduct autonomous mission estimates and risk management from corporal to captain to major. We never change our mission due to risk, and we accept risk in realistic and dangerous training and operations. If we take casualties, we regret them certainly but don't dwell on them with lengthy investigations or witch hunts."[27]

The differing perceptions, however justified or applicable, led to assumptions and accusations on both sides in Bosnia. Some NATO commanders believed the United States was timid and afraid, while some U.S. commanders believed NATO valued their troops' lives less or that American soldiers were more lucrative targets.[28] Regardless, the differing perceptions were never resolved or integrated.

FM 22-100 does not address how risk-aversion, especially aversion to casualties, might lead to overly cautious execution of military operations. This tendency to avert risk might be better termed "risk-avoidance" rather than risk-aversion, although the latter term is used for both. Similarly, casualty aversion and casualty avoidance have been added, and although these are notable topics for debate, they are not the same thing.[29] Some argue that President William J. Clinton withdrew troops from Somalia in 1993 as the direct result of the casualties suffered and the risk of incurring more just as President Ronald Reagan withdrew troops from

Lebanon in 1984 for the same reasons.[30] Does that make the U.S. military averse to risk and casualties? Not exactly.

Just as the current FM 22-100 unequivocally states that a zero-defects mentality has no place in the Army, future editions of FM 22-100 may likely warn military leaders the same about risk-aversion. By its very nature, risk-aversion circumvents the Army's doctrinal risk-management processes. These processes are intended to reduce soldiers' exposure to risk but not to reduce the Army's ability to fight boldly and decisively: "Risk management is not an add-on feature to the decision-making process but rather a fully integrated element of planning and executing operations. . . . Risk management helps us preserve combat power and retain the flexibility for bold and decisive action. Proper risk management is a combat multiplier that we can ill afford to squander."[31] It is not risk itself that makes operations "too costly—politically, economically, and in terms of combat power (soldiers' lives and equipment)" but the failure to manage risk effectively.[32] FM 3-0, *Operations*, drives home the same point: "Effective risk management results in mission accomplishment at least cost."[33]

Risk-Aversion and Strategic Operations

The nation expects military professionals as individuals and the Army as an institution to learn from the experience of others and apply that learning to understanding the present and preparing for the future. Such learning requires both individual and institutional commitments.

—FM 22-100

FM 22-100 attempts to provide guidance on how military leaders might think and act strategically. Chapter 7, "Strategic Leadership," is devoted to inspiring strategic military leaders in the politico-military arena of modern peace and war. The chapter provides positive guidelines, motivating quotations, and anecdotes from notable Generals of the Army George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur; Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Sir Winston Churchill; and GENs Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, Colin L. Powell, and Gordon R. Sullivan. One summary in particular recounts Marshall's success during World War II. Among his many qualities was his ability to stand up respectfully but firmly for his convictions: "He refused to be intimidated by leaders such as Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, or even the president. Though he was always respectful, his integrity demanded that he stand up for his deeply held convictions—and he did without exception."[34]

What chapter 7 does not seem to address is when or how the strategic leader should think and act as a soldier or as a statesman.[35] The distinction seems to turn on how to influence Washington without making official policy, how to influence policy-makers' minds without overtly or publicly making policy, or how to take action without that action being perceived as a statement of a policy that is, in reality, not espoused by the administration in power.

Clark found himself in this predicament, and he blamed Washington for it. In 1999, Clark explains, as Yugoslavia's military machine began ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, he was donning the dual hats of commander in chief, U.S. European Command, and of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. After assessing a viable threat in his region, Clark maintained constant pressure on both NATO and Washington to plan an air and ground offensive against the Serb movement. Although Washington balked and NATO was fully engaged in Bosnia, Clark persisted. Despite visible and verbal signs of discouragement and disapproval from the White House, he and his staff worked relentlessly behind the scenes in what he called a resistant medium to manage the often incompatible objectives of the 19 NATO governments and still plan the most decisive operation possible.

Ultimately, Clark's plan was executed as NATO's first armed conflict. Serb police and military were replaced with an international security force in Kosovo, and costly ground conflict was avoided. It had been a limited war with limited means and objectives but successful coercive diplomacy nonetheless. Clark viewed it as a victory, and although initially shocked to find himself relieved and retired in the aftermath, he reflected that the warning signs had been there all along: "Somewhere in the back of my mind I had been half expecting something. I had pushed very hard to make the strategy work in the Balkans. Almost from the start there had been frictions, and after [GEN John M.] Shalikashvili's retirement in September 1997, it had been a cool relationship with the Secretary and his team."[36]

Thomas L. Friedman, in *The Lexis and the Olive Tree,* cites globalization as the impetus for the conclusion to the NATO operation in Kosovo. He argues that the days of great powers fighting great wars are over. In today's globalization system, great powers seek to avoid civil or regional conflicts. If they do get drawn into a Kosovo-like situation, he explains, "they try to get out as fast as possible, because owning such places does not enhance their power, but diminishes it.[37] Of course, the assumption that this was the rationale of the Clinton administration is just that—an assumption.

Economic globalization is threatened by the new face of terrorism, and military leaders are having a tough time combating it. In an *Inside*

1st Cavalry Division troops respond to North Vietnamese fire at LZ X-Ray during the Ia Drang Valley campaign, November 1965.

Imagine the impact of zero-defects thinking if LTC Hal Moore had subscribed to it in the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam in 1965. . . . Judging by Moore's other actions at landing zone X-Ray, especially his forgiving reaction to the misplaced napalm strike, the logical assumption is that he would have retained Herrick as the platoon leader. . . . However, it appears safe to say that the trend in at least the last decade would have pointed to relieving Herrick.

the Pentagon article, Washington says the military is conventional and cautious in fighting the new enemy: "Several current and former defense officials say [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld remains 'frustrated' with the conventional mindset he encounters among many military officers leading the services . . . fresh thinking, creativity and ingenuity will be needed to fully understand the adversary and take it apart. Drawing that out of U.S. military leaders—for whom cautiousness and reliability, not risk-taking and out-of-the-box-thinking, are often regarded as desirable characteristics—has been like 'pushing on a noodle' for Rumsfeld as he undertakes this challenge."[38] Their cautiousness might arise from fear of repeating the mistakes of military history and from relying on doctrine and lessons learned.

In defense of cautiousness, Robert D. Kaplan, in *Warrior Politics*, argues that cautiousness may very well be essential for the statesman as well as for the military leader in the future: "More than in any previous epoch, perhaps, the statesman of the future will need to control his emotions, for there will be much to be angry about. Groups that refuse to play by our rules will constantly be committing outrages. Overreaction will exact a terrible price, as technology brings us closer, for example, to the Middle East than Europe ever was."[39] Whose assumptions, accusations, and decisions are right or wrong in these scenarios only scratch the surface of the struggle strategic leaders will face. What is important is how to resolve or achieve balance in these issues.

Growing Strategic Leaders

Some of the finest leaders in our country, military and civilian, public sector and private, learned what they know about leadership while in our ranks.

—GEN Eric K. Shinseki

This generation's Marshalls may need to employ more than just respect and firmness to secure political support for a particular course of action. Today, U.S. Secretary of State Powell enjoys a winning reputation, but he admits that the decisions he made and the decisions he accepted along the way were not always easy. One month after becoming the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1989, Powell saw the need for sweeping changes in U.S. military strategy. Drawing upon his own observations, years of experience, and informed intuition as a military leader, he predicted the events of the next 5 years: a strictly defensive Soviet force, a reunified Germany, and likely trouble spots for U.S. involvement in Korea and the Persian Gulf. He matched these projections to strengths and structures for each of the services, identified where cuts could be made, and prepared a briefing for then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.

Keenly aware of the difficulty he would have in selling his prediction and recognizing the competing demands on policymakers already engulfed in decisions regarding Panama, Powell waited. A few days later, the Berlin Wall fell, and Powell took that opportunity to make his proposal. Afterward, his proposal accepted, Powell returned to his office and asked for clean charts in preparation for a meeting at the White House the next day. "They looked stunned," he remarked, "and I could understand why. In the past, sea changes far less radical than what I was proposing took years rather than days to work their way through the Joint Staff labyrinth."[40]

In this situation, Powell garnered support for his course of action by influencing policymakers through his thorough and sound analysis, but he recalls a different response to his advice during the Persian Gulf war a scant year later. When many urged an offensive operation against Iraq, Powell advised the president that sanctions were just as viable an option. He presented the advantages and disadvantages of both options but believed if sanctions did not work, the offensive option was always open. Because of his counsel, Powell earned the label of "reluctant warrior." On this, he replied: "Guilty. War is a deadly game; and I do not believe in spending the lives of Americans lightly. My responsibility that day was to lay out all options for the nation's civilian leadership. . . . I had done my duty. The sanctions clock was ticking down. If the President was right, if he decided that it must be war, then my job was to make sure we were ready to go in and win."[41]

Powell was able to distinguish between his role as a soldier and his role as adviser to policymakers between "stimulating disagreement" and "loyalty."[42] In both scenarios, however, Powell was careful to consider personalities, current situation, competing demands on resources, conflicting interests, varying perceptions, and especially timing.

Another strategic leader, one who is spearheading the current RMA and who has put his career on the line to drive the Army's transformation from its post-Cold War mentality, is Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki. The most visible sign of this transformation has been the change in the Army's headgear, but the most controversial aspect has been Shinseki's determination to introduce equipment and organizations that bridge the gap between the Army's "magnificent light forces" and "magnificent heavy forces" to create "greater lethality, survivability and deployability all across the force."[43] Most military leaders would be hard-pressed to argue that this change is not long overdue, and they value Shinseki's foresight and outlook.

Kaplan notes that Shinseki's innovations will inevitably influence policy: "In an age when it took weeks to mobilize and transport armored divisions across the seas, it was possible for American presidents to consult the people and Congress about doing so. In the future, when combat brigades can be inserted anywhere in the world in 96 hours and entire divisions in 120 hours . . . the decision to use force will be made autocratically by small groups of civilians and general officers, the differences between them fading as time goes by."[44] One must argue, however, as we await the verdict, that Shinseki has acted in accordance with doctrine in his role as a strategic leader in innovating and creating change. As FM 22-100 explains, "the Army's customs, procedures, hierarchical structure, and sheer size make change especially daunting and stressful," but Shinseki is committed.[45]

The Future

It is time for the military in the United States, in particular, to put the legacy of Vietnam and even Somalia behind us. It will be necessary to take risks in war. It will be up to the military to mitigate these risks—by sound preparations, bold action, integrated political-military strategy—but we will not be able to escape them. And we cannot pass all the responsibility to the politicians above us.

—Retired GEN Wesley K. Clark

The challenge for today's aspiring strategic military leader will be to learn to connect effectively, perhaps even fuse, the role of strategic military thinker with the role of strategic diplomatic thinker. As Friedman puts it, "connectivity is productivity . . . connection enables, disconnection disables."[46] The U.S. Army War College echoes this message: "Strategic leaders also must shape regional security environments by fostering the development of democratic patterns and processes of civil-military relations. Thus, as the nexus between the statesman and the military professional becomes increasingly complex, strategic leaders must focus on developing complementary competencies and an understanding of both their shared and separate responsibilities in the national security decision-making process."[47]

Kaplan believes this commingling of political and military roles will eventually create a system in which military and civilian leaders' separate responsibilities will cease to exist in warfare. "Every diplomatic move will also be a military one," he argues, "as the artificial separation between the civilian and military command structures that has been a feature of contemporary democracies continues to dissolve." Kaplan advocates a return to the unified leaderships of the ancient worlds and calls it the "basic truth of all political systems."[48] With such unified roles, leaders will not struggle with the fine line between soldier and statesman.

Under a fusionist theory, military men and women must open their military minds to incorporate political, social, and economic thinking with their military thinking. They must become military statesmen and assume nonmilitary responsibilities.[49] U.S. military strategic leaders will be required to integrate political with military strategies for increasingly higher stakes: economic strength, homeland security, open markets.

Unifying the roles of soldier and statesman is the key to successful strategic courses of action. Until this key is cut, great strategic leaders like GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf will continue to prefer retiring with great victory over suffering "a thousand defeats at the hands of Congress."[50] It is no longer useful to argue that "one whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious."[51] To succeed as both soldier and statesman, it is more useful to ask, "how can a general and a ruler who are capable be victorious?" ***MR***

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Battle Command, Decisionmaking, and the Battlefield Panopticon

Major Scott F. Murray, U.S. Air Force

I am I plus my circumstances.
—Spanish philosopher Jose' Ortega y Gasset

MANY ARGUE and most agree that the U.S. military is currently in the midst of the most significant revolution in military affairs (RMA) in its history. This technology RMA, like the infantry, Napoleonic, and nuclear RMAs before it, has captured the attention of military theorists around the globe. As the world's foremost military, economic, and technological power, the United States is the chief navigator through these uncharted RMA waters. As such, it is the cradle for many significant changes in doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel management, and warrior skills derived from the ongoing technological RMA and informed by recent military experiences like Operation Enduring Freedom.

By definition, RMAs are dramatic, with far-reaching results. They induce cultural and doctrinal changes within military organizations and directly impact the ways in which the Army deters, fights, and resolves conflicts. During a speech in January 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described what he saw as fundamental RMA components: "new ways of thinking," "an ability to adapt," and a "culture of creativity and intelligent risk taking."[1] In short, RMAs change the traditional "rules of the game."[2] The new game being played right now in Afghanistan and worldwide is best described as "networkcentric warfare" (NCW), a phrase then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson first used publicly in 1997.[3]

Whether intentionally or not, Rumsfeld continues to raise, in his public remarks, the issue of battle command within an NCW environment. He is fond of calling the battle at Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, where U.S. Special Forces, on horseback, rode into battle with laptop computers as well as with weapons, "the first cavalry attack of the 21st century." He describes the German blitzkrieg through France in 1940 as "transformational."[4] Most recently, he asked the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee to consider this: "Imagine for a moment that you could go back in time and give a knight in King Arthur's court an M-16. If he takes the weapon, gets back on his horse, and uses the stock to knock his opponent's head, it's not transformational. Transformation occurs when he gets behind a tree and starts shooting."[5]

In 1996, beginning with the publication of *Joint Vision (JV) 2010* and continuing through the release of *JV 2020* in June 2000, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized and validated NCW as the way in which U.S. military forces should conduct all operations now and in the foreseeable future. *JV 2020* states: "The continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations. [Furthermore, the pace of the present RMA places a high premium on] the ability of our joint military organizations to foster innovation in our people."[6]

The drive for a seamless NCW environment is a journey the U.S. military must navigate successfully if it is to maintain its superiority. However, its intended destination will become that much more illusive if it fails to examine the possible unintended consequences of each journey. This article will examine the most important component of combat leadership—battle command—in light of the ongoing technology RMA, Department of Defense transformation, and the NCW environment. Specifically, it will identify one potential unintended consequence that the NCW environment has on battle command, the central tenet of battlefield success.

Bentham's Panopticon

In the late 18th century, utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham proposed a radical reformatory, or penitentiary, design to the British government.

Known as the panopticon, it was based on a complex star design with corridors radiating out from a central observatory or tower. The design of the original U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was based, in large part, on Bentham's design theory.[7] Bentham's Panopticon design enabled jailers to observe inmates constantly, 24 hours a day, with every aspect of their behavior controlled completely. In the panopticon, individuals act differently because they are being observed. It was, for Bentham, "a mill for grinding rogues honest."[8]

Information technology allows the creation of all sorts of panopticons. Modern theorists have used panopticonism to challenge workplace monitoring and privacy policies in many large corporations. The NCW creates a panopticon that gives the commander an unhindered, all-encompassing view of the contemporary operating environment. During U.S. Army National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center rotations or U.S. Air Force Red Flag deployments, commanders who were observed and evaluated by observer-controllers acted and led differently than they would have if they were not being evaluated. It is clear that an individual acts and leads differently when being observed.

It is possible that emerging NCW technologies could have the same impact throughout the U.S. military, particularly when cultivating battle command skills. Using NCW technologies, senior commanders become de facto observers, allowing them not only to monitor the battle but also to second-guess a subordinate commander's decisions. Within an NCW environment, two important questions arise. First, how does this virtual panopticon affect a commander's ability to exercise battle command in the traditional sense? Second, what lessons about battle command might junior leaders learn in such an environment?[9]

There is no question that rapidly emerging technologies in the U.S. military influence a commander's leadership abilities. That is not necessarily negative. RMAs are based on these types of radical changes. The fear is that when a military organization finds itself operating in an ongoing RMA transformation, key cultural questions with long-term, possibly catastrophic, consequences might be easily overlooked. Neglecting such questions could limit the benefits that should accompany the RMA. Military theorists feel that the NCW RMA is especially vulnerable to this type of neglect. The first line of defense against such misguided abuse is moral decisionmaking.

NCW Defined

Today's NCW information age demands equally dramatic changes in military organization and doctrine, particularly in how the military views battle command. These changes could largely impact individuals who operate within this new NCW environment. If the U.S. military does not adapt, its leaders might find themselves at a disadvantage when waging modern war. Success in waging war now and in the future will depend on commanders' abilities to exercise battle command and lead subordinates while operating within an NCW environment. What, then, are the essential characteristics of such an environment?

During National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center rotations or U.S. Air Force Red Flag deployments, commanders who were observed and evaluated by observer-controllers acted and led differently than they would have if they were not being evaluated. It is clear that an individual acts and leads differently when being observed.

NCW takes place in a wireless, digital environment. Information transfer and processing rates have increased so dramatically over the past decade that extremely high bandwidth on demand is practically a reality. This capability allows unlimited amounts of information to be exchanged in real time between any two or more points on the globe.[10] A former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the NCW environment for military operations as a "system of systems" creating a "knowledge umbrella."[11] Within this system of systems, sensors, shooters, and decisionmakers connect seamlessly and, in effect, function as a single fighting entity.

NCW emphasizes viewing leaders and their soldiers as independent actors united by task and purpose rather than viewing them as part of a continuously adapting system united by technology and deriving its power from "the strong networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force."[12] An NCW concept of operations seeks to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, a high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. Speed of command is the process by which a superior information position is turned into a decisive advantage, and self-synchronization is the ability of a force to "organize and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up."[13] The single center of gravity for U.S. military operations, then, becomes the digital network linking all knowledgeable players worldwide from the battlefield to any reachback location.

NCW Command and Control

The immediate effects of an NCW environment on military organizations are readily apparent to military thinkers. First among these is the potential for an unprecedented level of command and control (C2). Like the telegraph, transistor radio, and long-range satellite communications before it, NCW provides an enhanced ability to communicate up and down the chain of command. However, unlike older technologies, NCW includes unparalleled amounts of data, imagery, video, color graphics, digital maps with overlays, and voice communications with unlimited bandwidth. The prospect for enhanced, unchallenged combat power derived from improved C2 in an NCW environment appears to be extremely bright.

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NCW information superiority is anticipated to be the key enabler of future joint C2 and, ultimately, victory. The competitive advantage that results from enhanced C2 enables a condition called decision superiority. Decision superiority is the ability to make better decisions faster and to implement them more quickly than any opponent can react. It allows U.S. forces to shape the situation, react to changes, and accomplish the mission. NCW C2 is the prerequisite for decision superiority.[14] Agility is the Army operations tenet that is founded on gaining and maintaining decision superiority.[15]

However, the question left unanswered is at what C2 level are agility and decision superiority best exercised? The dangerous inclination of subordinate commanders in an NCW environment may be to defer decisionmaking to higher-level decision-makers at the expense of battle command at the lower levels because, in an NCW environment, subordinate commanders can defer. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* makes a critical point that directly addresses battle command in an NCW environment. A force whose commanders make good decisions at the lowest level will operate faster than a force that centrally makes its decisions. This type of NCW C2 environment assures an agile force that can exploit all opportunities for success on the battlefield.[16]

Recall Rumsfeld's German blitzkrieg analogy. During World War II, the concept of Auftragstaktik was central to Germany's warfighting philosophy. Drill manuals at the time stipulated that commanders should give their subordinates general directions on what to do while allowing them total freedom to determine how to do it. This approach developed thinking leaders who improvised, adapted, and overcame to exercise sound tactical judgments.[17] It is clear that FM 3-0 codifies this approach in U.S. Army doctrine. Decentralized decisionmaking through a system of mission-type orders detailing task and purpose is the foundation of two other Army operations tenets—initiative and agility. Through these tenets, commanders give their subordinates the "greatest possible freedom to act" and place the decisionmaking authority at the lowest practical level. Agile commanders exercise battle command by making timely decisions.[18]

Despite current doctrine and the practicality of Auftragstaktik, many believe the art of command and its associated decisionmaking authority have migrated upward throughout the 20th century as communications capabilities have expanded, leading to a greater C2 potential.[19] The NCW environment adds to this state of affairs. Despite attempts to migrate command upward, the tactical-level commander essentially has been immune to these forces because of technical limitations of bandwidth capabilities. Therefore, battle command has remained at the tactical level. However, when creating a concept of operations within an NCW environment, these bandwidth limitations are easily overcome. This questions the conventional wisdom of the past that ensured immunity from "centralized command and execution" for tactical-level leaders.

Here lies the critical fork in the road where the path chosen will greatly impact successful U.S. military operations in future NCW environments. NCW promises "decentralized empowerment." Decentralized empowerment frees organizations from centralized authority altogether, thus allowing them to exercise initiative and agility and to apply unlimited firepower.[20] Is this a likely outcome? Perhaps so. Continued emphasis on battle command skills at the tactical level holds the answer to which path the U.S. military will choose. Decision dominance and decen-tralized empowerment represent one path. Just as likely an outcome is a "very rapid movement toward even greater command centralization on the battlefield, accompanied by an unprecedented reduction in both individual and command authority."[21] Battle

command flourishes under the previous environment or is extinguished under the latter.

The challenge of the current RMA is not technological but cultural. Elting Morison, in his classic study on innovation in the U.S. military, concludes that the primary impediment to exploiting new technologies in the military is the cultural impact of organizational change. Such a state questions the deeply rooted mores of military society. Auf-tragstaktik and centralized command, decentralized execution represent two such historical military norms. The NCW environment represents the technological challenges ahead. NCW demands a level of organizational change that is in the U.S. military's best interest. However, as one theorist explains, "It would be wise to institutionalize processes that allow the commensurate cultural change to proceed at a rate that keeps pace with advancing technology."[22] To be ultimately successful, the U.S. military must examine how it cultivates battle command skills in junior leaders today who will someday become senior leaders upon whom future successful military operations will depend.

Battle Command as a Moral Choice

According to FM 3-0, leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power. Leadership focuses all the other elements of combat power and is the primary catalyst that creates conditions for military success. Competent and audacious leaders make the difference between success and failure.[23] Leadership has been and will continue to be the cornerstone of all military operations.

Battle command is combat leadership, the "exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy."[24] It is the basis of U.S. military success, and it is the essential element of combat action that successful military operations depend on. There can be no changes to U.S. military doctrine, training, organization, materiel management, or warrior skills without examining the effects these changes might have on commanders as they exercise battle command.

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, defines leadership as "influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."[25] This is a straightforward textbook definition. As previously stated, battle command implies exercising leadership during combat; namely, exercising command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy.

There are many different descriptions for the inner workings and processes that create battle command and develop battle command skills. Military theorist John Boyd postulated his now famous OODA Loop—observation, orientation, decision, and action—to describe combat decisionmaking. Some senior Army generals describe battle command as a process of seeing, deciding, and acting. Retired General Frederick M. Franks simply states, "Battle command means action."[26] U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper recently credited Operation Enduring Freedom successes to the rapid execution of the "kill loop."[27]

What emerges from these theories is that battle command begins with one's ability to see, visualize, observe, or find, depending on the theory to which one subscribes. FM 3-0 describes this process as "visualize, describe, direct, and assess." The first building block of leadership is how one sees, and one's character influences how one sees.



101st Airborne Division soldiers operating near the Afghani-Pakistani border.

Continued emphasis on battle command skills at the tactical level holds the answer to which path the U.S. military will choose. Decision dominance and decentralized empowerment represent one path. Just as likely an outcome is a "very rapid movement toward even greater command centralization on the battlefield, accompanied by an unprecedented reduction in both individual and command authority." Battle command flourishes under the previous environment or is extinguished under the latter.

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle addressed the question, "Why do I choose to do x?" His answer is "I do x because of sense perception, desire, and intellectual intuition."[28] Sense perception, of which sight or seeing is one, is not guided by reason. According to Aristotle, as examined by Nancy Sherman in *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*, character affects the enduring traits, attitudes, sensibilities, and beliefs that affect how one sees, acts, and lives. Desire and intellectual intuition are rational, and their relationship is key to exercising battle command in an NCW environment. Practical wisdom and character are also rational.

Stephen L. Carter describes good character as the "courage of our convictions" or the "willingness to act."[29] More specifically, a person of sound character exhibits a high degree of moral reflectiveness. According to Carter, possessing good character means living with and embracing an ongoing struggle. A person must discern what is right and wrong, act on what he discerns, and say openly that he will act according to his understanding of right and wrong.[30] Carter, Aristotle, Sherman, and others feel the moral struggle itself is at least as important as the resultant decision or act. The ability to discern and deliberate is essential in exercising battle command. If strong, innovative, and agile battle command begins with the act of seeing, then practical wisdom and character are the primary building blocks for battle command in a military environment.

Leaders who exercise good moral character can discern the particulars of a given situation and deliberate them before making a moral decision. Both actions combined form the act of seeing for a leader. The presence of good or bad character in individuals explains not only why they act or do not act a certain way but also why they can or cannot be relied on to act in a particular way in the future. Character gives leaders a "special sort of accountability and pattern to action."[31]

Independent thought, self-esteem, and confidence are the prerequisites a combat leader needs to be able to see in the theoretical sense. Leaders must be able to think for themselves; that is, they must exhibit a notion of autonomy characterized by independent thought. Self-esteem and confidence are required to produce independent thought.[32] Realizing that a decision is required, then, is the first step of battle command. One's moral character and practical wisdom are the foundations for these abilities. What is it that allows one individual to characterize another as possessing or not possessing good moral character? Most important, why is character the foundation of battle command?

Practical wisdom and character have always been considered rational abilities. The ability to reason properly informed one's character. Recently, however, a study has revealed that when one faces intense moral judgments, the brain's neurological processes place additional emphasis on the individual's emotional state. This study directly applies here because battle command involves moral choices. While not disputing the important role reason plays in making moral judgments, this scientific study argues that "moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment."[33] Apparently, good moral character has both rational and emotional components. Accordingly, as leaders consider their circumstances before they act, they engage both rational and emotional mechanisms before making decisions.

One's character determines his ability to lead. Scottish philosopher David Hume grounded his theories of knowledge and character in examining the passions that move someone to act and his personal and historical experiences. Passion and experience both influence and burden one's ability to exercise battle command. In an NCW environment of rapidly advancing technologies, exercising battle command could become more difficult because of the potential military panopticon.

Battle Command in the 21st Century

Recently, a senior Army general told of a great technological success story from Operation Enduring Freedom. When U.S. Special Forces operators in Afghanistan engaged their blue force tracker, the general could closely monitor their location from his command post in Washington, D.C. This may not be a good practice because it tempts senior commanders to make combat decisions for subordinate leaders. Junior leaders learn battle command through experience, not by waiting for senior commanders to tell them what to do in real time based on a common operating picture. Likewise, senior commanders might dictate mission orders in real time simply because, in an NCW environment, they can. The military panopticon is but one possible unintended consequence of the technology RMA.

There is an explosion of military literature warning of the dangers of micromanagement, information saturation, and command compression, most of which are well-founded and close to the mark. At the same time, most lack a sense of urgency when the development of battle command is being threatened. Because leaders make moral choices, they must learn battle command skills through experience and by exercising their practical wisdom. No level of NCW can enhance or replace these critical learning opportunities for junior leaders.

Retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege

has written extensively on battle command in an NCW environment, specifically about experience gained from training and the moral component of command. According to Wass de Czege, experience enables leaders to produce creative solutions under difficult circumstances. Commanders at all levels must make difficult judgments and transmit moral force in an NCW environment that will not lack information.[34]

Rumsfeld's transformation initiatives reinforce that the U.S. military has embraced the current NCW RMA. However, the services should proceed cautiously because of NCW's potential to adversely affect battle command. NCW could encourage a military panopticon; it could complicate rather than enhance decisionmaking and C2. NCW could also limit combat leaders' autonomy and discourage their independent thought that has proven crucial to military success in the past.

NCW's potential adverse effects are rooted in examining combat leaders' practical wisdom and character because battle command depends on their moral choices. Sound character, reinforced by practical wisdom, is a prerequisite in being able to exercise battle command because seeing, deciding, and acting begin there. The U.S. military, as it organizes, trains, and equips its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, must cultivate and promote conditions that encourage individuals to make good moral choices to ensure successful battle command in the future.

Retired Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., first addressed these kinds of issues 15 years ago. Among current discussions of structural and doctrinal changes in the U.S. military, he wrote, "there are few references to the challenges to leadership and leadership development that will attend [the ongoing] RMA . . . fascination with technology, finances, and geopolitics continue to relegate human issues to the back bench."[35] Battle command is one human issue that cannot be relegated to the back bench as the U.S. military marches forward to develop into an NCW force.

This article began with Gasset's timeless observation, "I am I plus my circumstances."[36] Where will we be if tomorrow's senior leaders—today's junior leaders—do not bring battle command experience with them as they progress? Although a difficult question to answer now, the future will reveal the answer because leadership has and always will revolve around the human dimension. ***MR***

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Team Development in Objective Force Logistics

Major Jeffrey W. Drushal, U.S. Army

THERE CAN BE NO revolution in military affairs without a revolution in military logistics."[1] This statement by then Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer set the stage for sweeping changes in Army logistics. These changes incorporate information technology (IT) enablers, changes in force structure, and changes in support relationships in combat service support (CSS). The desired end state is focused logistics, which is fusing logistics information and transportation technologies to achieve the level of agility and flexibility necessary to support combat forces throughout military operations.[2] The changes required to achieve focused logistics—leveraging IT, changing force structure, and changing support relationships—are incorporated into the logistics paradigm of the Army's Objective Force.

Research indicates that leaders and force developers have not addressed how the Objective Force CSS model will affect some aspects of leadership, specifically, the team development process. Teams at every level execute CSS operations that support fighting units. Identifying the adverse impacts of the Objective Force CSS model on team development may help the Army eliminate problems before implementing Objective Force logistics systems.

The Objective Force CSS structure will negatively impact team development. The negative impacts of Objective Force CSS structure, support concepts, and IT on team development could be negated by leveraging the potential of technology inherent in IT enablers to develop teams. Leaders and combat developers should incorporate technology to enhance leadership.

This article evaluates the effects Objective Force logistics concepts have on team development and explains the stages of team development and the Objective Force CSS model. It then analyzes the impact of Objective Force CSS concepts, structure, and IT on team development. It will also present ideas on how technology may be used to enhance the team development process. These ideas do not suggest literal implementation; they are forward-thinking ideas intended to generate Army leaders' and combat developers' thought and analysis.

[Stage one] is commonly referred to as "forming." Politeness among members, concern about the mission's ambiguity, and team members and leaders feeling out other team members occurs at this stage. Critical tasks for new leaders in this phase include communicating effectively, learning standards, and providing stability for the team.

Three Team Development Stages

In a military setting, the team development process can be initiated through new personnel or new leaders arriving, changes in task organization, or changes in team dynamics. Based on these events, units at every level will at some time negotiate the stages of team development. Teams do not achieve their optimum level of output or performance until the final stage of team development; the preceding stages are social overhead and are a required cost for reaching the optimum level of performance.[3] Although the military chain-of-command structure alleviates much of the social overhead associated with the team development process, it is still important to understand the process and to recognize its progression as units work through mission problems. Negotiating these development stages quickly will allow organizations to perform at an optimal level quickly.

In U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, the Army model for team development has three stages—formation, enrichment, and sustainment.[4] Howard Tuckman developed a civilian model of team development that roughly equates to the Army model, but Tuckman's model

includes four stages of team development. The formation stage of the Army model equates to the formation and conflict stages of Tuckman's model. There is no conflict in the Army model, possibly because a strong military chain of command may alleviate conflict. The enrichment stage is equivalent to Tuckman's cohesion stage. Sustainment is the equivalent of the functional role relatedness stage in Tuckman's model. This article addresses both models because the Army model describes leaders' and subordinates' activities during team development; it does not discuss the characteristics of the stages. The Tuckman model discusses team members' activities and clearly describes the characteristics of each stage.

Stage one—formation—occurs when the team or mission unit is assembled and authority, responsibility, and resources for the mission are received. This stage is commonly referred to as "forming." Politeness among members, concern about the mission's ambiguity, and team members and leaders feeling out other team members occurs at this stage.[5] Critical tasks for new leaders in this phase include communicating effectively, learning standards, and providing stability for the team. Critical tasks for subordinates include gaining acceptance into the team and getting to know other team members.[6] Conflict may also occur during the formation stage. Conflict is not addressed in the Army model, but it is present in Army teams. Weak leaders, strong peer leaders, or the presence of cliques may produce conflict during the team development process.

In Tuckman's model, the intragroup conflict stage is referred to as "storming." Lack of unity is its primary characteristic.[7] Resistance to authority or to team members may be overt, covert, or passive-aggressive. Typical behavior may include power struggles, questioning the mission's validity, undermining the military chain of command, and criticizing the leader and his plan. This is normal behavior as team members express their individuality and their desire to impact the team. As leaders and soldiers come to understand the mission, internalize the commander's intent, and set priorities, they develop their own perceptions of the terms of the mission, which are often contrary to other team members' plans.

Stage two—enrichment—occurs when the team works together cohesively. In Tuckman's model, the group cohesion stage is referred to as "norming." During enrichment, team members accept other members and the authority or legitimacy of the leader and the mission. The team develops a common perception of its performance standards, how performance is assessed, and who assesses it. Teams are most effective when the group as a whole assesses performance rather than when the leader assesses performance. Stage two leads to establishing roles and responsibilities. Team members normally gravitate toward their areas of expertise. As team members become more comfortable, they establish interpersonal relationships with other team members and the team leader.[8] Critical leader tasks include establishing authority, communicating unit goals, and building unit pride. Critical follower tasks are developing trust and accepting unit idiosyncrasies.[9]

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Stage three—sustainment—occurs when the group becomes productive. The Tuckman model refers to the sustainment stage as "performing." All team members know their roles, performance standards, other team members' idiosyncrasies, how performance will be assessed, and who will assess it. Members' roles enhance the group's activities. The energy expended on the other stages focuses on productivity; hence, the unit achieves maximum output.[10] Critical leader tasks are keeping team members engaged in their tasks and maintaining team dynamics. Subordinates will assist other team members, develop shared value systems, and maintain the rest of the team's trust and confidence.[11]

Combat Units

The Objective Force is designed around units of employment (UE) and units of action (UA). UEs are command and control structures that synchronize and coordinate battle operating systems to allow UAs to perform their missions. A UE is analogous to a division in today's Army. A UA is analogous to a maneuver brigade in today's Army; brigades are the units of choice for tactical missions immediately on entering a theater and in fluid situations. UAs are employed to achieve their assigned objectives throughout military operations. The success of these units on

the battlefield is predicated on assuming that these units will be able to "see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively"; these organizations have robust command, control, commu-niations, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure this happens.[12] Battalions within the UA are combined arms battalions that coordinate small fighting units' actions into collective actions or dispersed separate actions.[13]

CSS Forces

The UA's design and organization greatly reduce the need for logistics support. UAs are specifically designed and equipped to perform 72 hours of high operational tempo combat without logistics support, except for force health protection. Ultrareliable equipment, commonality among equipment components, and energy efficiency will enhance the UA's ability to operate without logistics support. UA and UE commanders will design battle rhythm to provide logistics to tactical units during sustainment pauses. UE commanders will rotate UAs to mission staging sites (MSSs) where Objective Force CSS units, called maneuver support commands (MASCOMs), will link up with a UA to provide critical CSS. The MASCOM may be required to project CSS forces up to 1,000 kilometers into the battlespace to establish the MSS. Force health protection is the only CSS function that is organic to the UA.

Sustainment pauses may appear in the form of mission staging operations and pulse operations. Mission staging operations are deliberate, intensive logistics pauses that take place while a UA prepares for shaping or decisive operations. Pulse operations are preplanned pauses in the battle rhythm that allow combat forces to replenish routinely. Pulse operations include movement from the decisive operations zone to mission staging operations and redeployment to the decisive operations zone.

Support Concept Changes

The Objective Force logistics model eliminates the task and procedures paradigm of today's Army in favor of a skill-based and knowledge-based Army. To accomplish this, Objective Forces will rely heavily on CSS IT enablers. These enablers will greatly increase the amount of CSS information available to CSS and maneuver unit commanders, but they will also reduce the amount of human interaction between supporter and supported, and among mutually supporting CSS units.

The IT enablers required for the Objective Force CSS model will leverage technology to allow strategic and national logistics providers to reach into the battlespace to assist CSS to the UA. Even today we see the integration of strategic and national-level providers reaching into theaters of operations with the U.S. Army Materiel Command forward concept and the Defense Logistics Agency's Logistics Assistance Office Program. These national-level capabilities will be critical in a theater of operations in the Objective Force CSS model.

The Objective Force logistics model eliminates the habitual support relationship between supported and supporting units, and among mutually supporting logistics units. Objective Force logisticians will task organize their MASCOMs to provide class I, II, III(P), III(B), IV, V, VII, and IX supply support; food service; water support; and programmed and unprogrammed maintenance support. MASCOMs are modular and tailored to the type of support required at the MSS. Depending on task organization, situation, or mission, the composition of the MASCOM providing support at the MSS may change to meet the MSS support requirement.

Analysis

The Objective Force CSS structure will negatively impact team development. Modularity and eliminating habitual support relationships cause teams to negotiate the team development stages every time there is a change in task organization, mission, or logistics requirement in the MASCOM. Eliminating habitual support relationships will mean the mandate for Army units to train as combined arms teams no longer applies to CSS units.

The Objective Force support concept changes will impact team development negatively. Changing from a task- and procedures-based CSS force to a knowledge-based force while eliminating habitual support will hinder the team development process. When leaders put soldiers together who have not worked together before, there must be a common frame of reference; units now use tasks and procedures to ensure continuity. Skills and knowledge are excellent tools when units operate together for a long time as they do in a habitual support relationship. Eliminating common tasks and procedures will extend the duration of the team development formation stage.

IT enablers of any type that reduce or eliminate human interaction hinder team development. Software applications with their readily available information have removed the human element from CSS operations. Leaders are beginning to rely on computer information for logistics status instead of talking to unit commanders. This effect will increase as the Army relies on information systems instead of people, impacting team development by reducing human interaction among CSS elements. There are no "bubble charts" for

uncertainty, conflict, morale, teamwork, cohesiveness, or productivity. These are the essential human qualities teams experience during the development process; electrons will not experience these qualities.

Recommendations and Concepts to Explore

There is potential for a leadership module in Objective Force IT enablers. Perhaps a change in task organization initiated or forecasted by IT systems could automatically download the moving unit's current tactical standing operating procedures, current supply status, current operations, and projected operation orders for the gaining unit. Automatically transmitting this information through a tactical-level command and control system for CSS would alleviate some social overhead incurred during stages one and two of team development. Civilian entrepreneurs are developing software and web-based technology designed specifically to enhance team development that has military application.[14] The Army is also currently researching how information and media can physiologically affect the human brain.[15] There is potential for developing software that can automatically provide enough information to leaders to completely eliminate the task orientation stage of team development.

Applying biofeedback, Bluetooth technology, and proximity technology could enhance the chain of command's ability to monitor team development. Biofeedback is results gathered from monitoring physiological and neurological changes in individuals by attaching monitoring equipment to their bodies. Bluetooth technology is short-range, radio-based technology that can connect many electronic devices, including personal computers, organizers, and applications of cellular or satellite-based technology.[16] Proximity technology tracks individual movements through cellular or satellite-based technology.[17]

Using miniaturized biofeedback could help team leaders identify stress levels, aggression levels, and job satisfaction levels by monitoring physiological and neurological reactions to mission changes.[18] In conjunction with biofeedback, proximity detection could be used to determine stress levels when the team is together and when certain individuals are together. These applications, along with Bluetooth technology and proximity technology, could give CSS leaders consistent input on team members' mental and physiological states. Proximity technology could be used to determine how long teams have worked together. Perhaps leaders and combat developers should explore these technological advances to determine if they could enhance leaders' ability to monitor team development in CSS units.

The negative impacts of Objective Force CSS structure, support concepts, and IT on team development could be negated by leveraging the potential of technology inherent in IT enablers to develop teams. Now is the time to incorporate the capabilities presented in this article into Objective Force systems, at least conceptually. Leaders and combat developers should incorporate technology to enhance leadership. Reserving space to implement these concepts in Objective Force CSS structure, concepts, and IT will allow integration of emerging technology when said technology has reached its pinnacle or when it becomes cost effective. Applying this technology could result in a tactical advantage for our forces and a leadership advantage as well. ***MR***

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

Quality Over Quantity and Hedges

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired

Currently, the United States fields an army of unprecedented quality; however, the time might come when the nation will need a force predicated on quantity, as it did during World War II. Brown argues that during mobilization when the Army transitions from a quality force to a quantity force, the nation must rely on hedges—highly credible military alternatives to either quality or quantity—that compensate for acknowledged but accepted shortfalls in military capability.

A PERENNIAL defense question is "how much is enough?" What percentage of precious national resources should the U.S. Government devote to defense? This is a particularly vexing question when an exceptionally broad array of defense-policy choices are available and when there are many compelling national competitors for resources.

The quandary increases as attractive emerging capabilities offer hope in upgrading aging U.S. land, sea, and air power. Adding to the dilemma is that the new options claim to be the font of genuine Transformation. So, how much of which—and when—will ensure the desirable future? Which are "must" acquisitions, and which can be deferred until a more certain need emerges? And, what should we buy?

Equally important, in which defense areas do we defer capabilities? What should we *not* buy? Where should we accept shortfalls, confident that we can develop the requisite national-defense capability—the necessary hedge—required to win (to get well) faster than can our competitors?[1]

Defense shortfalls are dangerous. Neglecting defense preparation can quickly become a slippery slope leading to military impotence. We simply cannot permit shortfalls to endanger present capabilities.

Immediately available military capabilities deter those tempted to damage important U.S. interests. Deciding where to make cuts so as not to impair important existing capabilities (and if the cuts turn out to be in the wrong areas, taking measures to correct the situation) are important issues of national-defense policy.

America's Army is a unique product composed of soldiers honed from a democracy that reflects the values of the nation, the states, the Federal republic, and the continent.[2] What does this mean for U.S. land power when balancing the weight of "how much is enough?" Should the time that elapses until a peer competitor arises be a time of land-power quality or of quantity?

By land-power quantity, I mean land power sufficient to win rapidly against any combination of opponents rapidly with available forces (forces-

in-being) when the National Command Authority (NCA) directs. On the other hand, land-power quality includes having fewer forces but greater capabilities that are on the absolute front edge of contemporary technologies.

If the answer is a smaller, qualitatively superior force, then how do we correct known deficiencies to restore military supremacy if that answer proves wrong? What are the necessary hedges?

Quality and quantity are highly subjective terms often subject to misinterpretation and distortion. One person's quality becomes another's gold plating. To a critic, a focus on quantity could be interpreted as the military's reliance on ill-prepared, ineffective forces used as cannon fodder.

The World War II Army best represents national focus on quantity. Protected by sea power, we built an enormous military capability with which to defeat the Axis Powers. Drafted soldiers were representative of all strata of U.S. society.

As manifested in equipment, such as tanks and aircraft, quantity generated its own quality in tactical excellence. Today, quantity can include active standing forces across all battlefield operating systems (BOS) that are immediately available to fight and win simultaneously in multiple theaters and can maintain that capability irrespective of threat buildups.

On the other hand, quality can be considered as being the following:

- The "best," not just the "satisfactory" of important components of military capability.
- "World class," when comparing military capabilities internationally.
- The exceptional performance of tasks or missions, which means consistently performing in the top 30 percent of a distribution of task and mission performance of individual, team, and collective tasks in typical Army missions executed across a broad spectrum of conflict and drawing on state-of-the-art technologies, and also performing in the top 30 percent of the distribution (half performed in the top 10 percent) of all individual, team, and collective tasks.[3]

Today, U.S. land power has become accustomed to quality, and quality has been the hallmark of most Army activities for the past several decades. Quality has been manifested in a variety of actions, such as in the following:

Recruiting quality soldiers, who continue to maintain quality practices that are essential to their retention, while generating significant resource advantages; for example, significantly reducing support-force requirements such as the institutional-training base.

Building an expanded quality force during the Cold War to produce an agile David against the Warsaw Pact Goliath.

Refining warfighting doctrine, equipment, and organization as reflected in Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and in extended peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities; and the continued experimentation involved in assimilating the advantages of the digital revolution, as during Louisiana Maneuvers, Force XXI, Strike Force, and most currently, Objective Force Transformation.

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Implementing change by focusing on six imperatives: doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS).

Another example of quality in which the Army plays a larger role is Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which was created to combine joint conventional capabilities with highly responsive, joint unconventional and counterterrorism capabilities. Clearly SOCOM is a model of successful quality-force generation drawing effectively on capabilities across national institutions and is an important precedent in joint-force development.

In fact, quality has been the well-lauded keynote of America's Army since its post-Vietnam rebuilding, arguably paced by quality accessions. TRADOC and SOCOM are particularly important quality precedents for Transformation—one in executing service responsibilities, the other in joint warfighting.

Quantity v. Quality?

The rational national leader wants both quantity and quality—affordably. But with constrained resources, conscious choices are necessary. Alternatives are "fewer but clearly better" or "more but less capable," assuming roughly comparable resource cost for each alternative.

Resource requirements are seldom equal. The policy and program challenge is to avoid "fewer

Losing in war is not an acceptable alternative. Quality can be traded off for quantity only above a minimum defensive capability to preserve national values and resources. This minimum would include such capabilities as nuclear deterrence.

Achieving a realistic capability is complex and involves striving for "more and better," while avoiding "less and worse," than any capability a likely opponent or coalition of opponents can achieve. The search is for a "sweet spot" of quality sufficient to accomplish assigned missions while maintaining agility and flexibility with which to respond to surprise.

[SOCOM] was created to combine joint conventional capabilities with highly responsive, joint unconventional and counterterrorism capabilities. Clearly SOCOM is a model of successful quality-force generation drawing effectively on capabilities across national institutions and is an important precedent in joint-force development.

"Fewer but excellent" continues to be preferable to "more but average" for the America's Army. Neither quality nor quantity is attained with any specific size or capability. Nor does the distinction necessarily relate to any specific threat. Rather, it is an issue of capabilities—a "present" orientation for quantity, a "future" orientation for quality.

Past accomplishments that focus on quality predict future success in pursuing quality in the current international environment, particularly given the substantial broadening of the potential spectrum of conflict. That spectrum includes weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Homeland Defense against asymmetrical threats such as cyberwar and terrorism as well as conventional threats. Quality can better respond to change—expected or unexpected.

Hedges

Perhaps more important than either quality or quantity, however, is practical policy and program recognition of the requirement to develop hedges. Hedges are highly credible military capability alternatives to either quality or quantity. They compensate for either quality-based or quantity-based programs should future projections prove wrong. A hedge is the quick fix to a recognized and accepted shortfall in defense capability.

The focus of national defense policies and programs needs to be on quality. But, simultaneously, much more attention needs to be paid to creating and maintaining hedges. In sum, shortfalls are implicit in any quality defense strategy. Policies and programs to fix shortfalls are as important to the nation's defense as are the clear, evident strengths of quality focus. Therefore, the Army should base hedges on its strengths. Effective hedges should include the following:

- Be potentially decisive if implemented and clearly make a difference at strategic, operational, or tactical levels.
- Be assimilated by the military; the air assault division was clearly a quality success although it required adaptation during the Vietnam war similar to development of U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) amphibious capability and U.S. Navy (USN) carrier aviation before and during World War II. To be a genuine hedge, military capability must be perceived as having been assimilated into doctrine and the force structure so that it will be employed properly when fielded.
- Be credible to a potential enemy.

Policymaker George Kennan once described the United States as a dragon that suddenly awakes and destroys all in its path. Suffering surprise attack, such as at Pearl Harbor or the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, is unacceptable as a trigger to stimulate building a quantity military capability. Less extreme alarms must be taken seriously. Past U.S. military responses also serve as hedges, such as being the sole user of nuclear weapons against an enemy during war and as evidenced by actions in Korea and Iraq. There is a strain of national unpredictability that should support the credibility of hedge policies.

Nevertheless, the lesson seems clear. Hedge strategies rely on national acceptance of triggers that mandate a hedge's execution. Some might see hedges as an artful return to the disastrous 10-year policies of the British during the Interwar Period.[4] The comparison is unpersuasive. Defense issues are consistent presidential campaign issues.

Prolonged debate continues concerning a vital national security issue—national missile defense. While there is international unease about a potential Fortress America, the clarity of consistent national support for a highly credible national missile shield is remarkable and crosses Demo-

US Army

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cratic and Republican administrations. The issues center on "how," not "if." Credible defense is a continual subject of national debate.

The importance of collective security can be seen in the Balkans, where U.S. and NATO policies have prevailed, but only after an admittedly unconscionably slow start. That NATO forces will eventually be present in most of former Yugoslavia for the foreseeable future seems likely, but that, also, is a public reminder that freedom is not free.

U.S. Armed Forces are continually in the public view and in harm's way across the globe. A dysfunctional, zero-casualties mandate, caused by uncertain national support for minor contingencies, is a genuine problem that influences commitment.

There is broad public recognition of a growing Chinese threat, perhaps partially racially based but nonetheless effective as a generator of continuing public concern about defense readiness. Nuclear espionage and intelligence and electronic warfare collector interceptions also stimulate public perceptions of danger.

Of more significance is the fact that the U.S. defense budget remains enormous. In 1999, U.S. defense expenditures were greater than those in NATO Europe, Russia, China, Iraq, and North Korea combined.[5] This does not mean that resources are distributed as effectively or as efficiently as they might be, but that the continuing defense focus is exceptional.

The United States might not be best at allocating defense resources, but it is not sleeping. Hedges with appropriate triggers are not only desirable and feasible as Transformation evolves, but they are essential for covering the inevitable shortfalls in a quality force.

The design of hedges will be strongly influenced by the nature of the baseline quality force itself, which is quite likely to draw on the considerable strengths of U.S. land power. Each of

the three components of America's Army shares in providing the quality force and derivative hedges:

- The Active Component, supported by Reserve Components (RC), dominates operations conducted outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) and maintains the reservoir of long lead-time expansion capabilities (actual and latent) that constitute nationally agreed-on credible land-power hedges.

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- The ARNG is the "guts" of quantity-based land power and, supported by AC and USAR, conducts Homeland Defense.
- The USAR conducts (individually or as units) highly specialized, "exotic" national capabilities such as cyberdefense, biological defense, and community management and civil affairs that cannot be sustained by AC nor ARNG.

These general characteristics of a quality-based America's Army generate specific, abiding requirements for each of the six DTLOMS imperatives. The requirements reinforce the need to maintain a quality standing force. Equally important, they become the practical policy and program foundation for developing and sustaining requisite credible hedges.

To support likely hedges, a quality force needs to consider the following six imperatives:

1. Doctrine. Doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) should be appropriate to the preponderance of highly qualified, motivated leaders. The Army needs to design highly flexible, eclectic tactical doctrine with which to dominate opponents across the broadening spectrum of conflict. Doctrine must accommodate joint and combined forces at all levels of conflict.

2. Training/learning. Training evolving into learning (training and education) should encompass individual, team, and collective learning to standard in an institutional, self-developmental, or unit setting. A practical leader-development instrument, training at CTC should be increased, and leader-training units need to be developed to provide quasi-combat experiences to leaders not assigned to Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units in order to maintain a reservoir of highly competent combat leaders.

3. Leaders. The single most important asset in a quality force is having quality leaders at all grade levels and all soldiers E4 and above should be addressed as leaders.[6] The Army must prepare adaptive, self-aware leaders who can assume responsibilities three to five echelons higher post-mobilization or when there is a national decision to implement an appropriate hedge.[7] In all areas, the Army must cultivate and institutionalize leader and teams of leaders abilities so leaders can assimilate changes more rapidly than can leaders of national peer rivals (singly or in coalition).[8]

4. Organization. The Army needs ad hoc, hybrid organizations, that can be readily modified to add situational-dependent BFAs or joint or combined forces that might be needed to dominate local military requirements.

5. Materiel. Modern materiel needs to have planned objective-force capabilities with variable survivability, lethality, and mobility backed by modernized legacy forces.

6. Soldiers. The Army needs to encourage enhanced professional development so as to train and retain leaders. Programs such as service with industry, tours supporting state and local government, and extended sabbaticals should be considered. Lateral mid-service entry should be encouraged to attract highly competent individuals into the USAR.[9]

However capable the quality force, there will be shortages. If the six imperatives have been supported in the quality force, rapid expansion to build the agreed hedges should be feasible.

Specific hedge design depends on the nature of shortfalls between the quality force and the desired dominating quantity force. Hedges could be present across all BFAs or targeted to specific high-risk areas. Designing hedges to support the most challenging circumstance, which is world-war scale mobilization, might be prudent.

Transitioning from exceptional quality to significant quantity would cause great change to Amer-ica's Army. The all-volunteer force would disappear. More nationally representative soldiers arriving with the draft Army would profoundly affect policy. For example, there would be a much higher percentage of Category IIIB

and Category IV soldiers; the economy would transition to a mobilization production base; and the Army would activate a standby mobilization training base.[10]

Under circumstances such as these, when a full mobilization hedge is implemented, policies and programs appropriate for each of the six imperatives during hedge execution might include the following:

Doctrine TTP—focusing on mid- to high-intensity conflict.

Training—conducting individual, team, and collective training in the unit; maintaining task, condition, standard, and quality-force learning structures; increasing hands-on training to accelerate leader development; distributing quality control of training that the institutional base provides, focused on leader preparation.

Leader—preparing for an actual post-mobilization position drawing on previous AC leader development (preparing combat (C), combat service (CS), and combat service support (CSS) leaders prepared to serve three to five echelons higher).

Organization—balancing C, CS, and CSS within brigade combat teams (BCT).[11]

Materiel—executing a previously agreed on, multiyear rule (overmatch then peer competitor) and supporting new economy in whatever forms it takes (mass production).

Soldier—increasing accessions as structure increases to overmatch the peer competitor and assuming World War II draftee mental and physical characteristics.[12]

Developing and maintaining these DTLOMS hedges would be truly challenging and would portray the most difficult case; that is, expansion to a level of national mobilization comparable to World War II. Presumably there would have been accompanying national military policy decisions to follow 5- or 10-year rules for buildups (or much shorter periods for some forms of conflict such as cyberwar). Shortfalls in the quality force would have been determined, and a prudent national security community would have done essential planning for hedge execution.

Little if any planning in likely hedge areas seems underway. Design of the Objective Force for Transformation focuses on creating a quality force. Quality not quantity prevails, correctly. But, I hope the quality force will reflect the strengths of America's Army. That seems to be generally the case. However, competing national-resource demands will generate inevitable shortages, which will become areas of defense risk.

If this world-war example seems extreme, select another—such as the early Cold-War strategy of preparing for two and one-half wars, which well exceeds current war planning. From that, estimate likely shortfalls, then think hedges.

That is the central issue. Little if any planning in likely hedge areas seems underway. Design of the Objective Force for Transformation focuses on creating a quality force. Quality not quantity prevails, correctly. But, I hope the quality force will reflect the strengths of America's Army. That seems to be generally the case. However, competing national-resource demands will generate

NOTES

1. Hedges are the policies/programs required to restore a known deficiency in ready-military capability.
2. Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, *The U.S. Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age* (McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1993), 53-54.
3. Common usage is go or no go with respect to performing tasks to standard. Establishing and measuring high levels of performance, drawing on various forms of simulation linked to proven CTC learning practices (observer and controller (OC), opposing force (OPFOR), information systems (IS), after action review (AAR)).
4. *See* Donald Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan, *While America Sleeps* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 2000).
5. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ed., Table 38: International Comparisons of Defense Expenditure and Military Manpower, 1985, 1998, 1999, *The Military Balance 2000/2001* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 297.
6. The extraordinary strategic value of quality soldiers was evident in the success of Partnership for Peace (PfP). Even better, citizen-soldiers reinforced and, in time, led the effort as various states teamed with PfP nations, such as the U.S. State of Georgia teaming with the Caucasian Republic of Georgia.
7. Being trained to assume command three to five echelons higher was a German practice in the Reichswehr in the 1920s.
8. Excellent learning innovation is being applied in this area in the interim brigade's nested leader preparation.
9. Highly flexible personnel-management policies, which would enable early vesting of retirement and lateral entry, are clearly needed.
10. Category IIIB and Category IV are rankings determined by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test. Category IIIB equals slightly below-average intelligence; Category IV equals below-average intelligence. For more information, *see* <http://dticaw.dtic.mil/ prhome/chapter_2.html>.
11. The terms "5-year or 10-year rule" designate the time period prior to likely employment when national leaders need to make a decision to expand from quality to quantity in land-power capability.
12. Balancing C, CS, and CSS BCTs should follow the general designs Douglas MacGregor advocates in *Breaking the Phalanx* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

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Training Today's Captains: Why the Gauntlet?

Recently a change has occurred in officer education methodology relating to educating nonbranch-qualified captains within U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) schools. Emphasis is shifting from mission planning (the visualize and describe aspect of battle command) to actual mission execution (the direct aspect of battle command).

Although this change appears to be in the Army's best interest, shifting focus from one aspect to the other shifts the schools' focus from teaching how to think to what to think. Teaching future company commanders how to think provides them a framework with which to solve a variety of tactical problems, given many different organization types. This approach is, therefore, better suited to shaping leaders who can perform across the full spectrum of future tactical scenarios.

The move toward a mission-execution focus comes in the form of an exercise title, The Gauntlet. Proponents of The Gauntlet (a live, multiechelon, shared-training event) seek to conduct a 10-step training model within the TRADOC environment that advocates a task similar to one found in U.S. Army Training and Evaluation Program 7-10, Maintenance and Training Plan, that might read like this:

ACTION: Execute an Assault (UO) [Undelivered Orders].

CONDITIONS: Given a suitable built-up area, a mechanized company team, observers/controllers, a dedicated opposing force, a battalion task force operations order (OPORD) with supporting overlays, necessary classes of supply, and 12 hours within which to plan and execute the mission.

STANDARDS: The company kills, captures, or forces the withdrawal of all enemy in its assigned area. The company conducts the assault by the time specified in the order. The company maintains enough fighting force to repel an enemy counterattack and to conduct follow-on operations. The company complies with rules of engagement (ROE). Collateral damage is minimized.

The collective task implies that the commander and the unit can conduct all supporting tasks, including platoon, squad/section, team/crew, and individual tasks. If a unit cannot conduct supporting individual and collective tasks, however, what value would the results be from the execution of the company-level collective task? Following the 10-step training model ensures that all echelons of a unit are adequately prepared to execute the training event. Assembling ad-hoc units of officer basic, basic noncommissioned officer (NCO), and career course students fails to provide captains with the ability to accomplish the learning objective.

The Gauntlet's multiechelon, shared-training nature can have positive results. However, the results are better attained in the visualize and describe portions of the course where NCOs and junior officers provide feedback on their ability to effectively communicate their visualization of the terrain and the enemy and the expected course of action.

One of the steps required to execute a collective task is to issue a company OPORD. As part of leader training, this objective needs to be executed to the synthesis level on Bloom's hierarchy of cognitive levels.[1] Doing so would ensure that the unit received sufficient guidance to execute the task and that leaders were properly trained in the visualize and describe aspect before directing the execution of the collective task.

If the need to reach a high level of cognitive proficiency on issuing a company order is identified before training begins, will there be time to complete the remaining steps in the 10-step training model? The Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC) currently takes 18 weeks to train students on an array of situations (light, mechanized, and airborne and air assault organizations; jungle, desert, woodland, and urban environments) in which the students might find themselves. Focusing on the leader-training portion of the 10-step training model allows a focus of effort. The officers' true mentors (battalion commanders, battalion S3s, brigade commanders) can then complete the training without worrying about their captains' ability to execute leader tasks. Directing has a place within a captain's career course, just not a center place.

So, is "less talk-more action" the right thing for captains? Those who support the visualize and describe aspect believe the answer is no. Why is the commander's ability to visualize and describe terrain so important? Because, if a commander cannot determine which terrain best supports establishing a foothold in an urban area, for example, he cannot array his forces to accomplish the unit's purpose. Captains could direct their companies all day, and they might *guess* the best place to enter the objective, but at what cost to the unit?

Guiding a student to realize the concepts of battle command is difficult, even more so if he or she learns the direct aspect before learning the visualize and describe aspect. Consider also the problem of preparing a captain to lead a light

or airborne company or a company from an interim brigade combat team. What about planning jungle, desert, or woodland offensive and defensive operations?

If the Army were to take 18 weeks allotted for the career course to train a company-size unit on all the required supporting tasks of a single Gauntlet exercise, it would produce officers who could only lead one type of unit in one type of environment in a limited capacity.

How many captains could possibly fill the role of company commander during the 18-week Gauntlet exercise? Certainly not all 120 participants. That is why Army training relies on virtual and constructive simulation. The Army has not completely disregarded the direct aspect of battle command, but leveraging constructive and virtual tactical decision games saves time and exposes students to a wider spectrum of possible situations. Thus, gaining units receive a well-rounded captain who has been exposed to and can adapt to many different situations.

The ICCC fully supports the integration of other courses at Fort Benning, Georgia, within its curriculum, which has been the norm for many years. The curriculum includes several constructive and virtual exercises. During the Infantry Officer Basic Course capstone-training event, the tactics department sends three to five captains from each class to participate in live exercises. But, if the hope is to produce full spectrum adaptive leaders capable of performing all aspects of battle command, given the limitations currently experienced, then a mul-tiechelon, shared-training, live exercise such as The Gauntlet is not the answer. TRADOC should consider maintaining a program of instruction similar to that of the ICCC. Today's Army is no place for a leader who has a limited set of credentials. ***MR***

NOTES

1. An explanation of Bloom's Hierarchy can be found online at <www2.rgu.ac.uk/sub/eds/pgcert/specifying/speci6.htm>. Go to <www2.pstcc.cc.tn.us/~babum garner/bloom.htm> to see a chart that synthesizes Bloom's Hierarchy.

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The Balancing Act: The Saga of Major Smith

Colonel Jack D. Kem, U.S. Army, Retired

Major Smith was a real physical training (PT) animal. He never made less than a max on his PT test, and he could run with the new lieutenants all day long. As the new executive officer (XO), he looked like an officer at the top of his form.

Having recently graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Smith knew the profession of arms and was truly an expert in his branch. Promoted below the zone to major, he was expected to keep moving up, being promoted below the zone to lieutenant colonel then to battalion command. Of course, he humbly told others he just hoped to make it to 20, but secretly he wanted to command a tactical battalion. His day was coming, and all he had to do was just keep pressing.

The troops and other officers, especially his battalion commander, loved him. They knew he arrived at work before 0500 every morning, and he was frequently the last to leave. In fact, he was famous for kicking people out of their offices after 1800 saying, "Just because I'm inefficient doesn't give you an excuse to stay around here all day."

During CGSC, Smith finished his master's degree and found he really enjoyed the intellectual challenge of working on the degree while attending the Command and General Staff Officers Course. Of course, the word is that a master's degree is not necessary to get promoted, but every little bit helps. It would be a waste to have the extra time in school and not invest it in the future, and some day, he would like to get a doctorate. Dr. Smith! That had a good ring to it!

Going to school changed Smith's reading habits. For years he had been too busy to do serious reading, so at school he made a commitment to himself to stay on top of his professional reading. At a minimum, he read at least a book a month, and he was developing a reading list to give to his staff officers to help them establish the same habit.

Smith. Everyone wanted to be just like him. He was in great shape, well read, and hard working. He was on the road to success. His next Officer Evaluation Report could lock him in for battalion command and even greater things.

Then, Smith's world changed. One Friday night he wanted to get done with work a bit early so he could get home before the kids went to bed. They were growing up so fast! As he started out the door, some of the other officers asked him to go over to the club for a quick officer's call. He knew it was a sincere offer, so he went for a little while, just to sit and talk with some of the officers for an hour or so.

When he got home, his wife met him at the door. Something was wrong—terribly wrong. It was not that late. In fact, he was home earlier than most nights of the week. It was just past the kids' bedtime. They were probably still awake, but his wife had that serious look.

"Are the kids O.K.? Is something wrong, honey?"

"Yes, they're O.K., but there *is* something wrong. Tomorrow the kids and I are leaving. I'm going home to my folks. You're a great guy, and I love you, but you've pushed the kids and me aside. We're not your priority. In fact, I don't think we're even second or third on your list of priorities. So, I've decided it's best we spend some time apart. It will give me time to think things over, and give

you time to focus on your job and your career—and your priorities."

Smith was stunned. This was a bolt out of the blue! He did not know what to do, so he went back to the office. He had a report he needed to work on, and he thought it best to keep busy.

In the office, Smith realized he did not have anyone to really talk to. He had many acquaintances but no real friends. He had always been told it was lonely at the top. The higher in rank you got the fewer true friends you had to really confide in. Most of his close friends were friends from years ago that he had lost touch with. He wanted to call someone, but could not come up with someone he really trusted. He could not call his boss. He got along well with his battalion commander but not on a personal level. The other XOs in the division were great guys, but they were his competition.

He chuckled ruefully. Under the same circumstances, he would have advised other officers to call the chaplain. Now he was the chaplain's rater! Not exactly the kind of relationship that allows you to pour your heart out to the padre. He and his wife had attended a church on a regular basis when he was a lieutenant, but those days were long over. In fact, it had been years since he had really even prayed. Sunday mornings had become a great time to relax and play golf. Now he wished he had a pastor or priest he could call on.

He was a bit surprised that he was taking it all in stride. He felt no emotion. Shouldn't he want to cry? It did strike him that if things did not work out that being a single battalion commander could be a problem. Most brigade commanders liked to have married guys in command to take care of the family-readiness issues. If his wife pushed it, he could also lose half his retirement. After a while, he shook his head in disbelief: "Why am I thinking these things?" A bit ashamed, he returned to his work and stayed through the night. When he finally went home the next morning, the house was empty.

Pieces of the Pie

This story is all too familiar to me. I have seen it happen dozens of times, including, unfortunately to me. What happened? How can you avoid this?

Smith thought he had things in order. He worked hard on his professional and intellectual life, and he kept himself in great shape. Yet, these are only two components of a balanced life. He had allowed these two areas to squeeze out the other parts of his life—the emotional realm of relationships and the spiritual dimension.

My primary image of a balanced life is that of a pie cut into four big pieces. The first piece is the physical part of life and includes health, wellness, and being in physical shape. The second piece is the professional and intellectual part of life. The third piece is the area for relationships—emotional ties to others. The fourth piece is the spiritual dimension. To be balanced, truly balanced, we must keep all the pieces roughly the same size, which requires cultivation and hard work. If one piece of the pie grows in importance, it could shrink or squeeze out some of the others.

The physical dimension. Army officers generally do well in the physical dimension. If you have ever been to a high school reunion, you can remember how shocked you were at how fat and old everyone appeared, even after only a few years. Of course most civilians do not get up and run every day or take PT tests. My definition of the physical dimension, which goes beyond PT, includes such areas as getting enough sleep and eating the right diet. I can go for several months with only three hours of sleep a night, but that does not make doing so good for me. I will have to pay the price later for those extended periods when I pushed the limits. You might be able to keep going for a while on a lunch of a candy bar and a soda, but that is certainly not healthy. The key to maintaining balance in the physical dimension is to have discipline—discipline to get enough sleep on a regular basis, to work out at least three times a week, and to eat right.

The professional and intellectual dimension. A disciplined life-long commitment to reading and studying from a broad spectrum, spending time to reflect on the application of ideas and concepts is essential to achieving balance in the professional and intellectual dimension. I have always been amazed when I learn that an officer has not read a book for years. How can a college graduate not have *some* level of intellectual curiosity? Accordingly, how can officers not demonstrate interest in the profession of arms by staying abreast of changes in doctrine and by reading professional journals? Continued education is a life-long requirement for professionals. The American public expects military professionals to stay on top of their profession. The lives of their sons and daughters depend on us.

Relationships—the emotional dimension. We cannot go it alone, and we should not want to. Cultivating the emotional dimension is hard work and requires a solid commitment of time and effort. Do you remember Harry Chapin's song, *The Cat's in the Cradle*?[1]

"When you coming home, dad?"

"I don't know when, But we'll get together then.

You know we'll have a good time then."

When you retire, will the words to this song haunt you? We all need relationships with our spouses, kids, parents, and friends. We need people to share with, confide in, and love. Why is this so hard? Are we really that busy or self-centered?

A friend of mine has a date with his wife every Friday night. That is their time to go out to eat and be together. They have "dated" for years, and after 30 years of marriage, they still like to be together. You might not be able to spend the same quantity of time with your family and friends as you must spend on the job, but you can make up for that with quality time spent in a disciplined, regular manner. Kissing the kids good night after they are already in bed, night after night, is not the kind of memory you want them to have after they leave home.

The spiritual dimension. It seems to be acceptable to talk about leadership and Army values, but it does not seem to be acceptable to talk about the basis for those values. Where do values come from? Do we wake up one day and have values? Were they implanted when we joined the service? I suspect not. I am not just referring to organized religion or religiosity (demonstrated behaviors such as attending church) when I speak about the spiritual dimension. Rather, I am speaking of an understanding that there is more to life than the here and now (spirituality-internalized beliefs). Albert Einstein once reflected: "Everyone who is seriously involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the Universe—a spirit vastly superior to that of man, and one in the face of which we with our modest power must feel humble."[2]

Looking beyond the immediate issues of today and reconciling matters of faith, whether that faith is Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, or no faith at all, is essential for having a balanced life. Running from spiritual matters, or worse yet, ignoring the spiritual dimension, leaves the foundational question of your purpose in life unanswered.

The Four-Legged Stool

Imagine a stool with four legs. Each leg represents one component of a balanced life: the physical dimension, the professional and intellectual dimension, relationships/the emotional dimension, and the spiritual dimension. There are times, unfortunately, when things happen that are beyond your control. One leg of the stool could be unexpectedly kicked out from under you. You might not have great balance, but you will not topple if the other three legs of the stool are firm.

In 1998 I had the wonderful opportunity to have my chest split open so doctors could ensure that cancer, initially discovered in 1995, had not spread. This was the third time I had to undergo this operation, so I knew exactly how I was going to feel physically for the next several months. The physical leg of my life would again be kicked out rather abruptly.

Fortunately, the other three legs supporting my life were in great shape. My wife and I were close, and she provided great love and support during the preparation, surgery, and recovery. Other friends, including my pastor, were supportive, and I could share with them my fears and doubts, as well as my confidence all would go well. Others at work were behind me, and I had the full support of my command. I was well versed in the medical procedures and understood what was going on, and I had confidence in the surgeons. I was at peace spiritually. I had a strong faith to carry me through this difficult time. Of course there were times when it was a struggle, but I could lean back on the other three legs supporting my life through this difficult time.

Smith was already on shaky ground. Physically he was in decent shape, and he was in good shape professionally and intellectually. Spiritually, however, he was bankrupt. He had pushed that part of his life away long ago. But, he did not realize he was emotionally bankrupt until his wife walked out. He did not have emotional ties or relationships with anyone; he was destined to fail.

At some point in our lives, all of us will have a leg kicked out from under us; it might be a personal tragedy, a health concern, a promotion pass over, or a spiritual trial. The task is to stay balanced and to cultivate all components of our lives.

Values—A Perspective of Priorities

The Army has a wonderful list of values that conveniently spell out the acronym LDRSHIP: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Although I agree all soldiers should possess these traits, I prefer to think of these as virtues rather than values. None of these virtues is more important than the others; we expect all soldiers to embody all of these traits as part of their character. To me, the term values indicates a prioritization. Values pertain to relative worth or importance. What things do you value over others? When you have to make a tough choice, what are your values? What guides those choices? Have you ever really thought this through?

My values, those parts of my life I value the most, include the following:

- God. My faith in God is what I value most and is at the top of my list. I consider my faith in God to be the most enduring relationship in my life—an eternal relationship. When anything else in this world tries to get between my faith in God and me, my relationship with God will win. It is the most important thing to me in my life and is a conscious decision.
- Family. The relationship with my family is a life-long relationship. I value my family relationships in the following order: spouse, children, parents, and my extended family. Long after I have left my job, my family will remain, and I will still value these relationships.
- Country. I love this great country, and I am truly proud to be an American. My citizenship is a lifelong relationship, but it does not have the same enduring quality as my relationship with my family.
- Job. My current job is not of as much value to me as was my job when I was on active duty with the Army. Still, the example of active duty helps illustrate this point. At most, you might be in a unit for three years; you might hold a specific duty position for a year or two at best. Choices between doing what is best for your unit or best for the country as a whole should be easy. If you place a higher value on your country, you have made the decision.

You might not fully agree with my listing of values, or you might have a similar list. The problem is in how to invest your time. Do you invest time and energies based on values, or do you have everything upside down?

Smith might well have agreed with my values, but his actions

showed he valued his own success over everything else. His job was just a ticket-punch to get to the next job, and he was investing great time and effort to make sure he got what he wanted. Was this best for the Army, the country, or was it just self-serving? While everyone wanted to be "just like him," was his legacy one to be proud of? Smith had the best intentions to see his kids before they went to bed that Friday night. His priorities, the things he valued most, showed otherwise.

If you are trying to get your priorities right, values will complement your life most of the time. There will, however, be times when values and priorities compete with each other. Deployments will no doubt compete with time for your family, but deployments do not make the family less important or valued. Letters, e-mail, phone calls, and other ways to stay in touch help keep priorities straight. There might be times when you have to go to work on a Sunday morning, but this should not affect your faith in God. Competing values might require a compromise of time but not priorities.

A problem exists when compromise becomes habit and reflects your true values. Self-assessments should include what you value most. How you spend your time reflects your values. If you say you value your family above your job, your actions should indicate that value. Ask your spouse how you are doing.

If you value your country above your current job, when you become an XO, will you spend all the unit funds at the end of the year to make sure you get the same funding next year? Or, will you be a proper steward of funds and spend only what is necessary? Will it really make a difference what other XOs do?

There will be times when values conflict, and you will have to make choices. You might be told to spend year-end money foolishly just to keep the same funding level for the next year. Such an ultimatum will force you to choose between values, and they might not be complementary. You might go home one day to an ultimatum of "the Army or me." If you already live up to your values, hopefully you will not be presented with such choices. You will have already made a stand, and your actions will be reflective of your values.

You might already be living a balanced life, but a regular self-

MR Almanac

Coming Into its Own: The Contribution of Intelligence at the Battle of Alam Halfa

Captain Kevin D. Smith, U.S. Air Force

What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

—Sun Tzu[1]

The Battle of Alam Halfa, 30 August–3 September 1942, was the first undisputed victory of British forces over Rommel's Afrika Korps.[2] According to historian George Forty, the Battle of Alam Halfa "was undoubtedly the major turning point in the war in the Western Desert."[3]

Alam Halfa was a defensive battle fought with tanks, aircraft, men, and intelligence. Many intelligence operations, which played critical roles in the British victory, took place hundreds of miles away from the actual battle and had been ongoing for months before the battle.

At Alam Halfa, intelligence operations deserve the credit for the British victory. In a report following the battle, British 8th Army Chief of Intelligence Sir Edgar Williams said that "intelligence came into its own" and was the basis of the victory.[4] How did the British apply intelligence at the Battle of Alam Halfa? Before we answer that question, we must understand what occurred at the battle.

Battlefield Events

The Battle of Alam Halfa was the first battle in North Africa of which British Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery was in command.[5] The battle began on 30 August at 2300 when German Major General Erwin Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps to attack British defenses. The British were waiting for Rommel's forces and met his assault.

Rommel's attack began to fail the first night when his forces were unable to clear a minefield that lay directly in front of his main assault force. By the morning of 31 August 1942, Rommel had failed to achieve a single objective.[6] Rommel continued his assault and turned the Afrika Korps north earlier than originally planned (see map). This move proved to be fatal when tanks, armored cars, half-tracks, and other vehicles found themselves floundering in soft sand.

The Royal Air Force had complete air superiority over the battlefield and continually attacked the Afrika Korps as German and Italian troops attempted to free their vehicles. Vehicles that were not stuck in the sand were slowed because of a lack of petrol that did not arrive as planned. Rommel's forces were trapped between the Alam Halfa ridge and the Quattara Depression, and aircraft attacked his vehicle on six different occasions within a 2-hour period on 3 September.[7]

Having no other option, Rommel ordered his force to retreat the

next day. After the casualties were counted, the Afrika Korps had lost 3,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing in action. In addition, 50 tanks and 50 antitank guns were destroyed. Conversely, the British lost just over 1,700 men, close to 70 tanks, and 20 antitank guns.[8]

Ultra's Impact

Ultra was the code name of the British effort to break Germany's ultra-secret and nearly unbreakable Enigma code as well as being the name of the intelligence derived from the code. Enigma was composed of several other codes used by the German Army, Air Force, and Navy.[9] The German High Command thought the code was unbreakable, and the quality and quantity of intelligence gathered through Ultra was remarkable. According to Ralph Bennett in *Intelligence Investigations: How Ultra Changed History*, "Enigma was believed unbreakable, [so] the Germans felt no necessity to seed their messages with disinformation."[10]

Breaking the German code was only half the battle. The information gained had to be distributed to the forces who could exploit it in a timely manner. In Bennett's book, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy,* Williams elegantly states, "The best half-truth in time [is better] than the whole truth too late."[11] Being able to quickly disseminate Ultra intelligence, specifically Army Ultra intelligence, improved before the Battle of Alam Halfa and proved to make the difference. During and before the Battle of Alam Halfa, Ultra's contribution greatly affected the battle's outcome.

At Alam Halfa, Rommel failed to surprise the British forces who knew almost to the day when he was going to attack. On 17 August, Ultra re-ported that two days earlier Rommel had informed German dictator Adolf Hitler of his plan to begin an offensive by the end of the month if he had enough fuel and ammunition.[12]

On 24 August, Ultra reported that a German offensive was expected on the night of 30-31 August.[13] Ultra validated Montgomery's estimate of how Rommel was going to attack as well as the fact that



German forces had not detected the camouflaged and concealed British forces. While this type of intelligence was of great use, probably the most significant use of Ultra was in attacking Rom-mel's supply lines.

The Afrika Korps almost completely depended on ships for all necessary supplies. Reinforcements of troops, tanks, antitank guns, petrol, and ammunition came by ship from Europe. Ultra provided almost daily intercepts of Italian and German ship convoys bound for North Africa.[14] Armed with this information, the Allies attacked the convoys and cut Rommel off from his much-needed supplies. Ultra intercepts provided information on convoy departure dates and routes and listed specifics as to what each ship would be carrying and to where the supplies were bound. Official Italian naval history calls this period of the war "the hecatomb of the tankers."[15]

In the first three weeks of August, German units under Rommel's command alone consumed twice as many supplies as arrived in theater.[16] To continue his campaign, Rommel required an additional 1,500 trucks, more than 200 tanks, and 16,000 troops. None of this vital equipment and personnel arrived.[17] Forty states that Rommel was "seriously short of everything," before the Battle of Alam Halfa.[18] The problems with Rom-mel's supplies can be directly attributed to Ultra intercepts. Ultra revealed that the disruption to Rommel's fuel supply was having an effect on his ability to begin his offensive.

On 26 August, Ultra confirmed that Rommel had ordered emergency transport of fuel and ammunition, and that these supplies would not arrive until 28 August.[19] For the Battle of Alam Halfa, Rommel had been promised a resupply of petrol, and 2,400 tons of petrol were scheduled to arrive on 28 August. However, thanks in part to Ultra in-tercepts, the Allies sank the three tankers carrying the majority of this much-needed fuel.[20] Only

100 tons of fuel arrived to support Rommel's attack at Alam Halfa.

During August 1942, 41 percent of the total fuel bound for North Africa wound up at the bottom of the Mediterranean.[21] This was the highest percentage of petrol destroyed during a 1-month period for the entire North Africa Campaign, and it occurred precisely when Rommel needed it most.

What is important to recognize about the losses of these ships is that not only was the cargo each ship was carrying lost, each ship's ability to transport cargo in the future was also lost. The total effect of each ship sunk was compounded, therefore, and was actually greater than the tonnage of supplies it carried at the time it sank.

Before his attack, Rommel had stated in a request for more petrol that at the current consumption rate his forces would run out of fuel on 26 August.[22] Lack of fuel caused Rommel to halt his attack on 1 September while waiting to refuel his tanks. By providing the intelligence information that allowed the successful attack on these convoys, Ultra made one of its greatest contributions of the entire war and directly contributed to the British victory at Alam Halfa.

Deception Operations

In *The Art of War,* Sun Tzu says, "All warfare is based upon deception."[23] Deception consists of "measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests."[24] A key element in any deception plan is that it must be based on truth. Only enough false or misleading information should be included to cause the intended effect.

Getting the correct mix of truth and fiction into a deception operation can be challenging. Too much false information can cause the enemy to ignore the deception, either because the deception is seen for what it is or because the information is contradicted by too many other sources of information. Yet, if the deception plan contains too little false information, the enemy might believe the deception but it might fail to have any effect on the enemy's plans.

One of the deception plans that contributed to British success at the Battle of Alam Halfa was the British impersonation of two German spies in Cairo. This deception operation actually exploited a German intelligence-collection operation. Operation Kondor began when two German spies, John Eppler and Peter Monkaster, established an intelligence-collection operation in Cairo.

A Major Smith, from British General Headquarters had become romantically involved with a belly dancer, Hekmeth Fahmy, who was a spy working against the British. Fahmy met with Eppler and began to pass information, which she had received from Smith, to Eppler.[25] Eppler and Monkaster then passed the information, via wireless communications, to a German listening post in Athens. Eppler and Monkaster were captured alive, and with the help of a Jewish agent, the code they used to transmit their messages was broken. The British then impersonated Eppler and Monkaster and transmitted false information to Fahmy.

Because transmissions continued on a regular basis and still provided useful information, Rommel continued to trust Operation Kondor. This enabled the British to use Kondor for deception before the Battle of Alam Halfa. They sent the following message: "Condor [*sic*] calling. Have confirmed message from reliablest source Eighth Army plan to make final stand in battle for Egypt at Alam Halfa. They are still awaiting reinforcements and are not yet ready for more than make-shift defence."[26]

A few days later, the British sent a second message regarding the British order of battle. After receiving this message, Rommel requested the spies in Cairo be awarded the Iron Cross.[27] This observation is important because it shows that Rommel truly believed Kondor was providing reliable information.

Of the deception operations at the Battle of Alam Halfa, probably the most controversial was the creation of a false "going map."[28] What is controversial is whether the map actually affected Rommel's decisions. But before these differing opinions can be discussed, a look at the facts of the deception is in order.

Before the Battle of Alam Halfa, the British produced going maps classifying the terrain in the area according to how suitable it was for vehicle movement. The maps had been created previously by the British for other areas of the desert, and it was known that the Germans had captured some of the maps.

British Major General Francis de Guingand, Montgomery's chief of staff, proposed creating a false going map and allowing it to fall into German hands. Guingand and his staff selected an area south of the Alam Halfa ridge that was soft sand and marked on the map that the area was firm sand. The location of the falsely marked area dovetailed nicely with Montgomery's defensive plan of trapping Rommel's forces as they attacked at Alam Halfa. That the area selected be near the minefields and Rommel's expected route was important. If a different location had been chosen, Rommel's forces might never have gotten near the falsified area, and the deception would have had no effect.

The false going map was delivered to the Germans by another deception plan. The map was placed into a haversack, which in turn was put into a British jeep. The driver for the jeep was Smith, who had been under arrest for his involvement with Fahmy. The jeep, with Smith and the false going map in it, were driven into a German minefield and blown up. German troops later found the jeep and its contents. Accounts are unclear whether Smith was aware or not that he was on a suicide mission or whether he knew of the false going map deception. Either way, he and the false map were delivered to the Germans without arousing suspicion.

That Montgomery had correctly guessed Rommel's plan of attack was critical. Montgomery was able to properly fit together British forces, minefields, and deception plans. Only a few days before the battle,

Ultra confirmed that Montgomery's estimate of Rommel's intentions was correct. Montgomery could anticipate Rommel's every move.

Rommel could move his forces in one of four directions after the minefields were discovered. He had the following options:

1. Continue forward through the minefield regardless of the losses his forces might incur.

2. Move south farther from his objective and toward the impassible Qattara Depression.

3. Move north early but still toward his objective but into impassible soft sand.

4. Order a full retreat during the first day of battle.

Of these, Rommel would not have chosen options 2 and 3 because they would have placed his forces in an area where they would be unable to maneuver. Option 1 was also a poor option but one Rommel might make if he chose to continue his offensive. Option 4 would have allowed Rom-mel to leave the battlefield with his remaining forces to cut his losses. The British believed Rommel would most likely choose either option 1 or 4.

The British deception plan using the false going map changed Rom-mel's options. Instead of turning north into soft sand, he would have the option of turning north onto what he thought was firm sand. When the Battle of Alam Halfa occurred, Rom-mel chose the false option and ordered his forces north into the soft sand.

One of two conclusions can be made about Rommel's knowledge of the terrain. Either he knew nothing about the terrain to his north and hoped it would be passable, or he trusted the false going map and thought the ground was firm.

The controversy that surrounds this deception operation concerns whether the false going map actually affected Rommel's decision. There are three opinions as to the effectiveness of the deception operation. In his book *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, Michael I. Handel outlines the following three opinions:

1. The false going map deception was completely successful.

2. The false going map deception might have had some effect but only because other tactical and strategic operations succeeded.

3. The false going map deception had no effect.[29]

Handel's thoroughness in covering the controversy is not mirrored by an ability to settle it. Handel says little as to the effectiveness of the false map other than that "what is important . . . is that the 'going map ruse' was only one of many other evidently more successful deception plans that preceded the Battle of Alam Halfa."[30]

In *The Desert Generals*, Correlli Barnett writes that Rommel's move north was "forced on him, not by a planted false going map, but by the delays in the minefields and by shortage of petrol."[31] While Barnett is correct, he misses the point of the deception operation. The false going map was never going to force Rom-mel to make a decision that no other evidence supported. A deception operation must be based on fact, and it cannot be too contrary to what the enemy is already predisposed to do.

One final, but key, factor affected the success of British deception plans. Earlier in the desert campaigns, Rommel had quite successfully used wireless intelligence to determine British plans. The commander of Rommel's wireless intelligence was Captain Alfred Seebohm, who had become quite good at determining the British order of battle, dispositions, and intentions. It is fitting that after the British learned of See-bohm's listening post, British wireless intelligence, the Y service, located it.[32] On 10 July, an attack was planned on Seebohm's position on a small group of mounds called the "Hills of Jesus." The attack was successful, and most of the intelligence equipment was captured intact. Seebohm himself was mortally wounded and later died in Cairo.

The British learned much about how Rommel had been able to outfox them in previous battles from the equipment found at the Hills of Jesus. They identified areas of poor British wireless security and made changes.

Probably the biggest blow to Rommel's intelligence-collection ability was Seebohm's loss. Rommel replaced the equipment and again began wireless intelligence-collection, but according to Anthony Cave Brown in *Bodyguard of Lies,* without Seebohm's keen ear for the abnormal, Rommel was "vulnerable to wireless deception."[33] Whether or not Seebohm would have detected British deception plans is debatable. What is not debatable is that intelligence played a large and critical role at the Battle of Alam Halfa.

Making a Difference

Intelligence operations significantly contributed to the British victory at Alam Halfa. No single intelligence operation made the victory possible. Rather, a synthesis of many different intelligence operations came together and demonstrated how valuable intelligence is. From the Ultra intercepts that helped sink Rommel's supply convoys to the deception plans that pushed Rommel into making bad decisions, effective intelligence made victory possible. Without supplies, Rommel had to limit the scope of his attack and alter his plan. This shortage allowed British deception plans to work to the fullest and trap Rommel's armored columns in soft sand where they could be destroyed. While no ground was gained or lost and losses on both sides were roughly equal, Rommel encountered at Alam Halfa his first decisive loss in the desert. Alam Halfa marked the last major offensive for the German army in North Africa and the beginning of the eventual withdrawal by German and Italian forces. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 76. Three different spellings for Alam Halfa (Alam el Halfa and Alam El Halfa) appear in published works on the battle. I have chosen to use Alam Halfa because it is used by *Brasseys Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography* (London: Brasseys, Inc., December 2000). Also, most period maps omit the "el," which means "of" in Arabic.

2. Ralph Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), 142.

3. George Forty, *The Armies of Rommel* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997), 150.

4. Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy* 154.

5. Correlli Barnett, *The Desert Generals* (London: William Kimber and Co., Inc., 1960), 241.

6. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited, 1975), 114.

7. Cave Brown, 114.

8. Forty, 190.

9. U.S. Army Air Force, *ULTRA and the History of the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force,* Paul L. Kesaris, ed.

The Combined Action Program: Vietnam

Captain Keith F. Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps

"Of all our innovations in Vietnam none was as successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful for the future as the Combined Action Program [CAP]," wrote U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Lieutenant General (LTG) Lewis Walt in his memoirs.[1] British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson said CAP was "the best idea I have seen in Vietnam."[2]

The program, undertaken by the USMC during the Vietnam war, was an innovative and unique approach to pacification. In theory, the program was simple; a Marine rifle squad would join forces with a South Vietnamese militia platoon to provide security for local villages. CAP's modus operandi made it unique. While assigned to combined units, Marines would actually live in a militia unit's village.

CAP was a response to the conditions in Vietnam. As the senior command in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the Marines were responsible for securing more than 10,000 square miles of land that included the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. More than 2-1/2 million people lived in the I Corps area. Using the militia for local security made sense; there were not enough Marines to go around.

The Marines and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, disagreed on war strategies. U.S. Army leaders wanted to search and destroy the communists in the rural and less-populated areas of South Vietnam; the Marines wanted to clear and hold the populated areas. CAP was a manifestation of the strategy the Marines felt best suited the conditions in Vietnam.

With U.S. Marines living and fighting side-by-side with the Vietnamese people, CAP seemed to rep-resent an effective, long-term, around-the-clock commitment to combating the Vietnamese communists at the grassroots level. CAP worked well in some locations; elsewhere, its results were transitory at best—with villagers becoming overreliant on the Marines for security.

CAP's Origins

CAP came naturally for the Marine Corps because counterguerrilla warfare was already part of the USMC heritage. From 1915 to 1934, the Corps had a wealth of experience in foreign interventions fighting guerrillas in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. For example, the Marines organized and trained the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Nacional Dominicana in Haiti and Santo Domingo from 1915 to 1934. In Nicaragua (1926-1933), the Marines organized, trained, and commanded the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. These organizations were nonpartisan, native constabularies the Marines commanded until host-nation forces could competently assume command.[3]

Senior USMC generals in Vietnam had studied as lieutenants such interventions—called "small wars." But more than that, As Commanding General (CG), Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, LTG Victor H. Krulak was responsible for training and readiness of all the Marines in Vietnam. As CG, III Marine Amphibious Force, Walt directed the operations of all the Marines in I Corps.

Krulak and Walt began their careers during the 1930s and 1940s under the tutelage of such Caribbean Campaign veterans as LTG Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, Sr., and Major General (MG) Merritt "Red Mike" Edson. In Vietnam, Krulak and Walt applied the lessons they had learned about guerrilla fighting.[4]

When the Marines arrived in South Vietnam in 1965, they occupied and defended three enclaves in the I Corps area: Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. CAP grew out of an experiment that Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William W. Taylor's 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, conducted near Phu Bai.[5]

Taylor's infantry battalion defended 10 square miles and a critical airfield at Phu Bai. He knew his three rifle companies were not enough to defend that amount of territory. The local population lived in six villages, each nominally defended by a militia platoon. Taylor and his officers brainstormed ideas of how to improve the battalion's defensive posture. They looked to a previously unused resource—the militia platoons.

Taylor's executive officer, Major Cullen C. Zimmerman drafted a plan to incorporate the militia platoons into the battalion's defense. He proposed integrating the militia platoons into the battalion's rifle squads to form a combined unit.

Taylor liked Zimmerman's plan and forwarded it to Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler, the regimental commander. Wheeler also liked the plan and pushed it all the way up the chain of command to Walt and Krulak. Both generals liked the idea, and Walt sold the idea to South Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Chuan. Chuan, who was responsible for the Vietnamese military forces in Phu Bai, agreed to give Walt operational control over the militia platoons operating in Taylor's sector.

Taylor integrated four rifle squads from his battalion with the six local militia platoons in early August 1965. First Lieutenant Paul R. Ek commanded the combined unit, known as a Joint Action Company. Ek, who had already served as an adviser to a U.S. Army Special Forces unit in Vietnam and spoke the language, was well versed in coun-terguerrilla warfare. The Marines in Ek's combined company were volunteers from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and each had been carefully screened by Zimmerman.[6]

The Phu Bai experiment yielded promising results. The Marines instilled an aggressive, offensive spirit in their counterparts and gave the militia something it had never had before—leadership. The Marines also learned from the Vietnamese, gaining knowledge of local terrain and learning Vietnamese customs and courtesies. Winning fights

against local enemy guerrillas, Ek's combined unit upset the status quo by driving the communists out of the villages.

Walt seized on the success of Ek's unique company in Phu Bai and approached Vietnamese General Nguyen Chanh Thi, his counterpart, with a proposal to expand the program to include Da Nang and Chu Lai. Walt did not need to put the hard sell on Thi; he was already impressed by the Phu Bai experiment.

CAP Expansion

Because of Walt and Thi's enthusiasm, CAP stopped being an experiment and started becoming an integral part of the Marine Corps' war in the I Corps area. The platoon became the program's basic tactical unit. A 35-man Vietnamese militia platoon, and a 13-Marine rifle squad, with one attached U.S. Navy hospital corpsman, formed the combined-action platoon. This unit lived in and operated out of the local village of the militia platoon.[7]

U.S. and Vietnamese chains of command remained separate. The Marines were only supposed to serve as advisers to their counterparts, and they did—in garrison. In the bush, on patrol, the senior Marine present became the de facto commander of the combined unit.

From the original 6 platoons at the end of 1965, the number of combined units grew to 38 platoons by July 1966. By January 1967, 57 combined platoons operated throughout the I Corps area—31 platoons in the Da Nang enclave and 13 each in the Phu Bai and Chu Lai enclaves. The number of combined platoons peaked at 114 in 1970, and the units had spread throughout the five provinces in the I Corps area.[8]

Increasing the number of combined platoons caused problems for Walt. For one, he needed more Marines. He was robbing Peter to pay Paul by taking men from his two infantry divisions and assigning them to combined units. Headquarters was not sending Walt more men to make up the difference. A limit on troop strength in Vietnam had already been set so as to meet commitments elsewhere.[9]

To get into CAP, Marines needed to be volunteers, have already served 2 months in country yet still have at least 6 months left on their tours, have a recommendation from their commanding officers, and once selected, had to attend a 2-week school, which offered instruction in Vietnamese language and culture and small-unit tactics.[10]

Marine infantry commanders were hesitant to release their best noncommissioned officers for duty with combined units; they knew they would not receive replacements. And because infantry commanders did not always give up their best men for CAP, the quality of combined platoons ranged from outstanding to abysmal, based on the amount of the Marines' experience, proficiency, and maturity.[11]

Walt acted on these problems. In February 1967, he appointed LTC William R. Corson as his Director for Combined Action.[12] Corson was the right man for the job. He had fought with the Marines in the Pacific and Korea and had completed a tour in Vietnam as a tank battalion commander. Corson spoke four Chinese dialects, held a doctor's degree in economics, and had experience in unconventional warfare in Vietnam. He had also served with the Central Intelligence Agency in Southeast Asia from 1958 to 1959, organizing guerrilla operations against the Viet Minh.[13]

Corson believed CAP required its own chain of command and objected to the existing command arrangement that gave local infantry commanders control of the combined units in their areas of responsibility. He did not believe the average infantry battalion commander in Vietnam knew what it took to succeed in the business of pacification. According to writer Robert A. Klyman, Corson "was there to kill enemy. . . . His mission was two up, one back, hot chow. Battalion commanders were not in Vietnam to win the hearts and minds of the people. . . . They were playing the game of . . . search and destroy. They didn't understand the nature of the war they were involved in."[14]

Corson wanted mobility in each of his platoons. "The [combined-action platoon] will [not] function as the garrison of a so-called 'French Fort,'" he wrote.[15] The platoon must "conduct an active, aggressive defense [of its assigned village] to prevent [communist] incursions and attacks directed at the hamlet residents and officials."[16]

In July 1967, Corson drafted a set of standing operating procedures charging each of his platoons with six different missions:

1. Destroy the communist infrastructure within the platoon's area of responsibility.
2. Protect public security; help maintain law and order.
3. Organize local intelligence nets.
4. Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the communists.
5. Motivate and instill pride, patriotism, and aggressiveness in the militia.
6. Conduct training for all members of the combined-action platoon in general military subjects, leadership, and language, and increase the proficiency of the militia platoon so it could function effectively without the Marines.[17]

CAP Problems

The relationship between the Marines and the Vietnamese militia was the key to CAP's success. Theoretically, each combined platoon derived its strength from fusing the two primary elements—the militia soldier and the U.S. Marine—into a single operational entity. Because the political climate did not allow Americans to command Vietnamese forces, the Marines had no formal authority over the militia.[18] Walt and Corson hoped decentralized control and close coordination and cooperation could resolve any problems caused by this tenuous command relationship.

There were serious problems with the Vietnamese militia. They were woefully incapable of defending the villages by themselves. One official account reads: "In general, the equipment and training of the [militia] platoons and their unimaginative use in static defensive positions made them a slender reed in the fight against the Viet Cong."[19] At US$19 a month, the militia soldier earned less than half that of his regular Vietnamese Army counterpart.[20] Corruption and graft were accepted practices, and

village chiefs controlled the militia and padded the muster rolls of their platoons to extort the salaries of "ghost" soldiers.[21]

The Marines also had problems. The combined platoons modus operandi—living and fighting alongside the Vietnamese population—required the Marines to adapt to a culture radically different from their own. Most of the Marines were junior enlisted men in their late teens or early twenties. Expecting men of these ages to quickly adapt to such foreign surroundings while also serving in a combat zone was a tall order.[22]

The majority of the Marines who served with combined units from 1965 to 1967 came directly from the infantry. This was not the case, though, as the war continued. From 1968 to 1970, many Marines joined combined platoons from rear-echelon support units and lacked basic infantry skills. In 1969, a senior CAP commander in Quang Tri province wrote of these shortcomings: "Sound tactics are not God-given; they are not inherited or acquired automatically. Not one young corporal or sergeant in a hundred has adequate competence in this field. Their understanding of the proper use of terrain, the control of the point element, all-around security, fire and maneuver, fire superiority, fire control and discipline (to say nothing of the psychological and morale forces involved) leave much to be desired. In six months, I have yet to see any [combined-unit] leader working to improve his own knowledge or understanding of tactics.[23]

Vietnam Strategies

Notwithstanding its problems in execution, CAP seemed a viable strategy for providing local security in South Vietnam. Some analysts speculate there would have been a much different outcome to the war had the United States applied the Marines' strategy on a larger scale.[24] One of the main reasons why the program never expanded beyond the borders of the I Corps area was because General William C. Westmoreland, the senior U.S. Army commander in Vietnam, subscribed to a different strategy.

Westmoreland believed the regular North Vietnamese Army and main-force communist battalions posed the greatest threat to the government of South Vietnam, *not* the guerrillas operating in the south. He pursued a strategy through which he could exploit the U.S. advantage in mobility and firepower to engage the most threatening communist units. After the United States won the "big unit" war against conventional enemy formations, the South Vietnamese Army could focus on the "other war" against the entrenched communist political infrastructure. This formed the philosophical underpinning for the search and destroy attrition strategy.[25]

Krulak believed pacification and protection of the South Vietnamese population—a clear-and-hold approach—was more appropriate than the search-and-destroy attrition strategy. "If the people were for you," he wrote, "you would triumph in the end. If they were against you, the war would bleed you dry, and you would be defeated."[26]

Westmoreland believed population security was a Vietnamese task. However, he did write in his memoirs that CAP was one of the more "ingenious innovations developed in South Vietnam."[27] Westmoreland also offered this explanation: "Although I disseminated information on the [combined action] platoons and their success to other commands, which were free to adopt the idea as local conditions might dictate, I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet; that would have been fragmenting resources and exposing them to defeat in detail."[28]

A Viable Approach

By 1970, "a total of 93 [combined platoons] had been moved to new locations from villages and hamlets deemed able to protect themselves. Of these former CAP hamlets, the official Marine Corps history of the Vietnam war claims that "none ever returned to Viet Cong control."[29] These figures are spurious at best, as are most other attempts to quantify the war in Vietnam.

Edward Palm, an English professor and former CAP Marine, is not as sanguine as the official Marine Corps history: "I would like to believe, with some, that combined action was the best thing we did [in Vietnam]. . . . In my experience, combined action was merely one more untenable article of faith. The truth, I suspect, is that where it seemed to work, combined action wasn't really needed, and where it was, combined action could never work.

"The objective was certainly sound. There was a demonstrable need for an effective grassroots program targeted toward the [communist] infrastructure, for the most part left intact by large-scale search and destroy operations. But combined action came too little, too late. The [communist] infrastructure was too deeply entrenched, literally as well as figuratively, in some places. They had had more than 20 years to win hearts and minds before we blundered onto the scene. We were naïve to think 13 Marines and a Navy corpsman could make much difference in such a setting. The cultural gulf was just unbridgeable out in the countryside."[30]

Even at its zenith of 2,220 men, CAP represented only 2.8 percent of the 79,000 Marines in Vietnam. Yet during its 5-year lifespan, combined units secured more than 800 hamlets in the I Corps area, protecting more than 500,000 Vietnamese civilians.[31]

CAP was not the magic ingredient that would have won the war in Vietnam, but it was a viable approach to counterguerrilla warfare, worthy of further study. What better way was there for learning about the enemy in such a war than fighting with the militia and living with the local populace? No wonder CAP Marines became some of the best sources of intelligence in the Vietnam war as well as some of the best small-unit leaders. They had to be, operating as they did, in order to survive. Air strikes, free-fire zones, and massive demonstrations of firepower were commonplace throughout South Vietnam, but such were rare occurrences near villages with combined-action platoons.

The Battle for Hue City and the siege at Khe Sanh dominate the literature about the Marines in Vietnam. CAP, however, was the Corps' greatest innovation during

the war. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Lewis W. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on the War in Vietnam* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), 105.
2. Quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1986), 174.
3. On the Marines in Nicaragua, *see* Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). On the Marines in Hispaniola, *see* Hans Schmidt, *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 74-95. *See also* Graham A. Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos: Marines and Counterinsurgency in Hispaniola, 1915-1924," in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium,* William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, eds. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 293-308. For a comparison of CAP with the constabularies the Marines organized in Latin America, *see* Lawrence A. Yates, "A Feather in their CAP? The Marines' Combined Action Program in Vietnam," in ibid., 320-1.
4. Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 190-1; Walt, 29; Jon T. Hoffman, *Once a Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Marine Raiders* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 98, 122-3. Puller and Edson, who served with distinction as officers in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, also served successively as small-wars instructors during the 1930s. Walt and Krulak were their students and, as captains, served with Edson and Puller in the Pacific during World War II.
5. Ibid., 38-40.
6. Robert A. Klyman, "The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken" (Honors thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1986), 4-5; Michael Duane Weltsch, "The Future Role of the Combined Action Program" (Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1991), 57-65.
7. III MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] Force Order 3121.4A, sub [subject]: SOP [Standing Operation Procedures] for the Combined Action Program, dtd [dated] 17 July 1967 (hereafter, CAP SOP), in CAF [Combined Action Force] History and SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs [Documents], Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, DC; Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1966: An Expanding War* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1982), 239-43; Gary L. Tefler, Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967: Fighting the North Vietnamese* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1984), 186-95; William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 181-3.
8. Shulimson, 239; Tefler, et al., 187; Weltsch, 65.
9. Corson, 178.
10. CAP SOP; Corson, 183-4; Edward F. Palm, "Tiger Papa Three: A Memoir of the Combined Action Program," *Marine Corps Gazette* (January 1988), 35; CAP School syllabus, 21 August-1 September 1967, and CAP School diploma, dated 25 February 1969, *in* Michael E. Peterson, "The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam" (M.A. thesis, The University of Oregon, Eugene, 1988), 285-91. Peterson is a CAP veteran. Praeger Publishers published this thesis in 1989.
11. Ltr [Letter], CG [Commanding General], III MAF to CG FMFPac [Fleet Marine Force Pacific], sub: Combined Action Group Headquarters, Organization, Equipment, Functions and Concept of Operations, dtd 4 May 1967, MCHC; Ltr, CO [Commanding Officer], CAF to CG, XXIV Corps, sub: CORDS [Civil Operations for Rural Development Support] Survey of CAP Villages, dtd 24 March 1970, MCHC (hereafter, Ltr, CO, CAF). *See also* Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 195; Shulimson, 240; Klyman, 13. Klyman quotes Colonel G.E. Jerue, a former regimental commander in the 3d Marine Division: "Although the requirement states that they [CAP Marines] should be volunteers, it doesn't demand volunteers. We more or less had to go by the rule of thumb that if the man doesn't object, he is a volunteer for it."
12. Corson, 179-80.
13. Peterson (Praeger), 39-41.
14. Klyman, 22.
15. CAP SOP.
16. Ibid.
17. Ltr, CO, 4th CAG [Combined Action Group] to 4th CAG CACO [Combined Action Company] Commanders, sub: Tactical Operations, Policies and Guidance, dtd 14 January 1969, MCHC (hereafter, Ltr, CO, 4th CAG); Corson, 174-98; CAP SOP.
18. CAP SOP; Corson, 183-4; Palm, 35; CAP School syllabus and CAP School diploma *in* Peterson, 285-91.
19. Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 34-35.
20. Russel H. Stolfi, *U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March 1966* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3 Division, HQMC, 1968), 39.
21. Krulak, 187-189; David H. Wagner, "A Handful of Marines," *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 1968), 45; Hunt, 91.
22. Hunt, 39.
23. *See* Ltr, CO, CAF.
24. Ltr, CO 4th CAG.
25. Krepinevich, 172-7. Krepinevich argues in favor of expanding combined action throughout Vietnam. Unfortunately, his approach does not take full account of the recruiting problem that would accompany such an expansion. Spector highlights a few of the problems: "The ideal CAP Marine was a cool and efficient infantry fighter, not only expert in the skills of combat but able to impart these skills to an untrained, uneducated farmer who spoke little or no English. At the same time, he was a patient, subtle, and resourceful community organizer, able to overcome cultural barriers and prejudice to win the hearts and minds of the villagers. Such men, if they existed at all, were in short supply" (195).
26. George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2d ed.* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 150; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America,* rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 580; Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), 352-4; William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Dell, 1980), 215-6.
27. Krulak, 194; *see also* Neil Sheehan, *A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 629-33.
28. Westmoreland, 216.
29. Ibid.
30. Graham A. Cosmas and Terrence P. Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1986), 149. For a description of a successful combined platoon, see Francis J. West, *The Village* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). West tells the story of the Binh Nghia combined platoon, which operated from May 1966 to October 1967 near Chu Lai.

MR Book Reviews

CHINA AND THE VIETNAM WARS, 1950-1975, Qiang Zhai, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000, 320 pages, $49.95/$19.95.

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975; is one of many about Chinese involvement in the Indochina Wars. Qiang Zhai is one of the first to use recently opened Chinese archives; the many memoirs, diaries, and documentary collections published in China over the last decade; and secondary works based on archival sources. He concentrates exclusively on the policies and personalities of those involved in China's Vietnam policy. This is not a definitive study. Many American, Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese archives are still closed, but it does begin to shed light on reasons for Chinese behavior during the period.

Chinese support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is an important part of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) diplomatic history and the Cold War in Asia. Ho Chi Minh called the Chinese "comrades plus brothers" during the height of their influence.

In the first 25 years of its existence, the PRC aided the DRV against France and the United States. With varying degrees of success, the DRV used Chinese models in the 1950s and 1960s to fight the French and rebuild the north after the First Indochina War. However, between 1968 and 1972, China adjusted its diplomatic strategy, and the Sino-Vietnamese alliance slowly fell apart. By 1975, the alliance was in disarray, and China faced the prospect of an alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

Zhai traces the course of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and shows how events in Laos and Cambodia influenced Chinese policy toward Vietnam. He eschews impersonal social scientific models to explain change. Instead, he highlights the individual's role in making history, framing his discussion by identifying four interwoven motives that influenced Chinese policy: geopolitical realities; a sense of obligation and mission to aid a fraternal Communist party and promote Asian anti-imperialist revolutionary movements; personality; and using foreign affairs to promote a domestic political agenda.

Zhai emphasizes Mao Zedong's role as a charismatic revolutionary visionary who set the general framework of China's foreign policy. Mao made the crucial decisions to aid Ho Chi Minh, confront U.S. pressure, accept or reject Soviet ini-

tiatives, and change Chinese policy toward the United States. His close associates implemented these decisions. While they all made mistakes, they shared victories, and their actions left a deep imprint on Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Throughout the entire period, there was an underlying tension in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Just as the DRV needed Chinese aid against the French and the Americans, the PRC needed Vietnamese support to break out of the ring of U.S. alliances. As Sino-Soviet tensions increased, Hanoi tried to stay neutral, but Beijing insisted on the DRV's endorsement of its policies and viewed it as a tool of Chinese foreign policy. Other alliance tensions came from competing visions of the two countries' role in Indochina. These originated in historical memory and in the more practical concerns for national prestige and destiny.

Mao believed his way of revolutionary theory and practice had universal significance. In this, he resembled Chinese emperors and their belief in the superiority of Chinese experience and institutions. Zhai shows Mao's perplexity and frustration when the Vietnamese refused to follow his instructions in the Sino-Soviet dispute or in their relations with the United States.

Ho Chi Minh and his associates were also students of history. They aimed to free Vietnam from foreign domination—Western or Chinese. They belonged to a tradition that prized independence from China and aspired to realize a Vietnamese political destiny to dominate Indochina. Thus, when the war concluded in 1975, the United States was not the only loser. Only the North Vietnamese won, for instead of a secure southern border, China faced insecurity as Vietnam moved closer to the Soviet Union.

Zhai's study shows that realpolitik is not the only language of international politics. He demonstrates that Mao and his revolutionary comrades were also motivated by ideas. China's leaders thought of self-preservation and national aggrandizement, as exemplified in their policies in Laos and Cambodia, but they were also motivated by a concept of justice. While they responded to changes in international politics, they also had beliefs and convictions and were driven by a vision of China's future, which ultimately determined foreign policy. The Vietnamese saw Mao's insistence on the centrality of the Chinese model and experience as arrogant, bigoted, and prejudiced.

Lewis Bernstein, ***Senior Historian, SMDC, Huntsville, Alabama***

VINEGAR JOE'S WAR: Stilwell's Campaigns for Burma, Nathan N. Prefer, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 312 pages, $29.95.

Vinegar Joe's War: Stilwell's Campaigns for Burma, is slightly mistitled. The focus is not so much on General Joseph W. Stilwell as much as on U.S. involvement in the Burma Campaign with the glamorously nicknamed Merrill Marauders.

Nathan N. Prefer takes the reader from a call for volunteers to when the unit disbanded. The murky command relationship in the Burma theater of operations is critical in understanding why Stilwell used the unit for so many daring missions. Yet, Prefer glosses over the command relationship and never quite goes into the depth required to gain a full understanding of the complexities involved.

Burma was a British theater of operations, and the Japanese were threatening the weak British forces in India, which were protecting the only remaining supply route for Mainland China. This led to Chinese involvement in clearing northern Burma to allow the opening of the Ledo road and to shorten fighter coverage for transports flying the Hump.

Stilwell was never truly in charge of the Chinese Army assigned under his control, and he never could rely on the force to accomplish its assigned orders or missions. This led to his requesting and finally obtaining the 5307th Composite Unit, better known as Merrill's Marauders.

The Marauders were patterned after the British Chindits, a long-range penetration force organized and trained by the unorthodox General Orde Wingate. The Chindits operated behind enemy lines and conducted small-scale actions to disrupt lines of communications. The Chindits trained the Marauders to conduct similar missions as a penetration group operating behind enemy lines.

The unit required nothing but air resupply throughout the campaign. Overcoming the obstacles of the complex terrain required detailed training and preparation. The techniques developed for causality evac-uation and medical treatment are informative, and the insight gained about the consequences of an improper diet is worth study. Also, the lack of training in fieldcraft seems almost criminal in its oversight. Simple things like boiling water and personnel hygiene were critical in keeping down nonbattle casualties. This book naturally leads to the question, "How would I train a force to operate and be successful in this type of warfare?"

Prefer's book is insightful and thought-provoking. As the U.S. Army tackles new concepts of strategic deployability and smaller, more widespread operations in noncontiguous operations in areas with little to no infrastructure, it is essential to learn from such historical examples.

LTC Billy J. Hadfield, ***U.S. Army, Beavercreek, Ohio***

COMBAT OPERATIONS: Stemming the Tide, John M. Carland, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 2000, 410 pages, $43.00.

Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide is the second in a series of four volumes about the history of U.S. Army combat operations in Vietnam. The book covers the first 18 months of combat and completes the operational history from May 1965 to October 1967.

Combat Operations is not an analysis of operations during that period; it is a description of events—a chronicle—that only occasionally approaches an analytical account. Even so, Carland clearly presents the tension within the Army and civilian officials in Washington between strategies of "main force combat and pacification."

Competing strategies, with the incompetence and corruption of South

Vietnamese officials and President Lyndon Johnson's unwillingness to provide the resources requested by General William Westmoreland, left Army commanders with an operational concept that vacillated from preventing the collapse of South Vietnam, fighting to defeat the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, to winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Twenty-seven maps contribute significantly to the book, which is replete with footnotes from original sources found in the National Archives and the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The thousands of captured documents in the Archives are particularly relevant and provide invaluable insight into the thinking of North Vietnamese commanders.

Beginning in 1993, Carland conducted many interviews with operational- and tactical-level commanders in Vietnam. In hindsight, several of these commanders candidly recognized that, rather than pursuing an enemy based on excellent intelligence, they were actually thrashing around blindly.

Richard L. Kiper, *Ph.D.,*
Leavenworth, Kansas

BELORUSSIA 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study, David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, trans. and eds., Frank Cass, London. Distributed by International Specialized Books, Portland, OR, 2001, 337 pages, $39.50.

Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study moves on several planes for the professional soldier and military historian. The Belo-russia operation, a multifront offensive from 23 June to 29 August 1944, initiated a strategic offensive by the Red Army to tie down German units on the Eastern Front while allies established a Western Front after the Normandy invasion.

The operation exhibited Red Army operational-level capabilities after three years of surviving and driving back the German invasion. The staff study, source material from a Soviet perspective, covers preparation, penetration of German defense, offense in depth, encirclement, liquidation of the Minsk encirclement, and pursuit.

On another plane, Soviet Lieutenant-General E.A. Shilovsky, supervisor and editor of the study, illustrates a fascinating part of the Red Army general staff's ability to change army operations through the Directorate of the Exploitation of War Experience. Shilovsky, groomed as a military thinker, produced a 1939 study on World War I breakthrough operations. At mid-war, he observed Western and Bryansk fronts during the Red Army Kursk counteroffensive and published an excellent guide to the preparation, attack, and exploitation phases of a breakthrough operation. These lessons were applied in the Belorussia operation. In 1944, Shilovsky wrote and published *Front Breakthrough* (out of print) in which he explains the analytic structure for operational-level offensive breakthroughs.

Belorussia 1944 represents an example of how the Red Army tapped its institutions and war college for historical study and incorporation of analytical conclusions to create a complex adaptive process, which offers thought for future forces. In a rudimentary fashion, the Red Army established feedback processes for adapting and changing its fighting force in the face of catastrophic defeat.

In future warfare, with blurred lines among tactical, operational, and strategic levels, fighting staffs will require different forces, operational concepts, and execution. Similar exploitation of war experience in military history, which will not only heuristically anchor understanding of the many levels of war but guide applications of information technology, new sciences, and military thought for future complex adaptive forces capable of operational change during the course of an operation, will further blur boundaries.

Leaders cannot fight a war without maps, and they cannot study an operation without good maps. The editors include a compilation of detailed operational maps that significantly contribute to this book. *Belorussia 1944* is gist for a professional soldier's mill; it would be a valuable addition to any private military history library.

COL Richard N. Armstrong, *USA,*
Retired, Copperas Cove, Texas

AIR ASSAULT FROM THE SEA, Patrick Allen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, 136 pages, $39.95.

In today's low-intensity conflict environment, the ability to project power from the sea has taken on new dimensions. This had led to the birth of new technologies designed to rapidly place forces on a beach and defeat an enemy through the doctrines of combined arms and vertical envelopment. These tactical doctrines, with more than a dozen different types of maneuvers from the sea, comprise today's amphibious operations.

The list of capabilities an amphibious platform provides ranges from evacuating citizens from a hostile shore, known as noncombatant evacuation operations, to the tactical recovery of an air pilot, to all points in between. Warships, landing craft, helicopters, and weapons systems have been specifically designed to land over 900 marines that comprise the battalion landing team.

Patrick Allen's marvelous book brims with photographs that portray U.S. amphibious capabilities as well as those of allies. The United Kingdom is second only to the United States in amphibious capability. The Royal Navy commissioned the H.M.S. *Ocean* in 1998, which is a 21,500-ton variant of the Iwo Jima-Class landing platform, helicopter (LPH). By 2004, *Ocean* will be joined by two smaller landing platform, dock (LPD)-class ships—the H.M.S. *Albion* and the *Bulwark*—to make up what is called an amphibious ready force, the English equivalent of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious ready group. Featured for the United States is the USS *Bataan* (LHD-5), which is one of the newer 40,500-ton, large-deck, amphibious warships commissioned in 1997.

Seventy percent of the world's population lives on or within 300 miles of a coast. The littorals, as this is called, have become an important part of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps considerations. Other nations are also investing scarce defense resources on amphibious capabilities. The Royal Dutch Navy's 12,800-ton HNLMS *Rotterdam* LPD can carry 600

marines and accommodate up to 800 marines for a short period of time. Entering service in 1998, the *Rotterdam* is part of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force, a defense concept that might soon include Spain. The Italians have embarked their famed San Marco Battalion on-board one of two LPDs—the ITS *San Marco* or the *San Giorgio*. The French have added the FS *Foudre,* which is an LPD that displaces 11,900 tons and is part of the armada that was assembled during the Persian Gulf war.

This excellent volume is easy to read and bursting with dramatic photos. Those interested in joint operations and the absolute importance of combining land, sea, and air capabilities will enjoy this book.

LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, ***USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland***

JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR, Philip Towle, Margaret Kosuge, and Yoichi Kibata, eds., Hambledon, NY, 2000, 195 pages, $29.95.

Japanese Prisoners of War contains 11 essays that explore the various aspects of prisoners of war (POW) operations in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II. Primarily about Japanese and British prisoners of war, the essays tangentially discuss Australian and U.S. prisoners of war.

Each essayist has his own perspective, which gives the book an eclectic voice and allows the reader to interpret the World War II POW phenomenon in many ways. For example, one essay talks of prisoners of war in relation to international law; another considers the influence of Japanese culture on Japanese POW war operations and policies.

One idea that emerges is the importance of culture in understanding the POW experience. International law at the time was more or less predicated on a European set of values vis-à-vis the League of Nations.

This book's relevance pertains to international law and the laws of war. This is an easy-to-read, well-paced book, and it contains little jargon. The essays are not so lengthy or focused that they alienate an average reader. However, it helps to have knowledge of the subject before beginning.

CPL David J. Schepp, ***USA, Fort Benning, Georgia***

TAKING HAITI: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, Mary A. Renda, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 440 pages, $49.95.

The early-20th-century occupation of Haiti by the U.S. Marine Corps, once the subject of exotic folklore, has largely been forgotten. Mary A. Renda revisits this part of history, primarily through a content analysis of memoirs, cartoons, literature, art, and other pop culture from the era.

Renda argues that the occupation was the start of an imperialist trend in U.S. foreign policy, marked by paternalism, racism, and sexism. The Haitian encounter ultimately failed at its goal of "cultural conscription" and profoundly changed the United States and Haiti. Rather than laying the seeds for U.S.-style democracy, the United States helped "lay the groundwork for two Duvalier dictatorships and a series of post-Duvalier military regimes." Meanwhile, the depiction of Haitians as dark savages and white Americans as fatherly liberators led to heightened racial awareness and a renaissance in African-American literature.

The book is a postmodern, feminist polemic that will likely not appeal to most *Military Review* readers. While not directly concerned with modern military affairs, it nonetheless has implications for peacekeeping missions that have dominated the scene for the past decade. The book also raises the question of how much an outside intervener can truly change a cultural landscape. From Renda's perspective, one might also ask whether the Western inclination to solve the domestic problems of so-called failed states is not in reality simply a new paternalism.

James H. Joyner, Jr., ***Ph.D., Troy State University, Alabama***

ENDURING WHAT CANNOT BE ENDURED, Doreothy Dore Dowlen, McFarland & Co., Jefferson City, NC, 2001, 193 pages, $29.95.

The title of Doreothy Dore Dowlen's book, *Enduring What Cannot Be Endured,* is a trifle melodramatic, but she can be forgiven the hyperbole. She was 16 when the Japanese invaded her home in the Philippines. Over the next four years she became a lieutenant in the U.S. Army, a nurse for the guerrillas, a prisoner, an escapee, an orphan, a wife, a widow, and a mother.

While still living with her family, Dowlen's various assignments gave her the mobility and access to interact with headquarters, black marketers, and soldiers. She witnessed the guerrillas' internal politics and participated in a gunfight. Yet, despite the dramatics, the book is still very much a highschool girl's history of her family during the war.

Kevin L. Jamison, ***Attorney at Law, Gladstone, Missouri***

DEALING WITH THE DEVIL: East Germany, Détente & Ostpolitik, 1969-1973, M.E. Sarotte, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 295 pages, $55.00.

International treaties are often in the news, such as recent headlines about the antiballistic missile and Kyoto treaties. But how are they really created? For answers, read *Dealing with the Devil,* which is a detailed look at East and West German relations and treaty negotiations from 1969 to 1973. M.E. Sarotte deftly shows how the events that occurred during that narrow span of time affected and were affected by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. England, France, NATO, Poland, and the Warsaw Pact also had roles, and the Vietnam war produced broad repercussions.

Sarotte's view of Soviet control is one of the book's many strong points. The Soviet Union controlled and slowed East Germany's improved relations with the West so the Soviets could improve their own relations with the West. Sarotte's work in East German archives enabled him to report on the documents and directions the Soviets provided to East German communist leaders. He also provides detailed notes and a comprehensive bibliography. The East German and Soviet records

provide a unique insight into the history of the time and the Soviet perspective.

Comparing the Soviet perspective and control of the East Germans with the relationships between West Germany and the United States is interesting. Sarotte shows how German relations influenced the actions of Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon in improving relations with the Soviet Union and China at the same time.

This informative book will appeal to historians, service members, and students of political science and the Cold War. A key step in improved relations between East and West Germany was the fall of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain. Those who vividly remember the wall coming down will enjoy reading about how it all began.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, *USAF,*
Yokota Air Base, Japan

THE BATTLE OF AP BAC, VIET-NAM: They Did Everything But Learn from It, David M. Toczek, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2001, 185 pages, $62.00.

In 1964, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson said, "I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. What I have been trying to do with the situation that I found, was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their own fighting with our advice and with our equipment."

The United States never intended to commit ground forces to fight in a place called Vietnam. America's preferred role was to train and help the fledgling Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) defeat a Maoist insurgency waged by the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) within South Vietnam and to deter an invasion from the North. That effort failed, necessitating the commitment of U.S. ground forces in strength and leading ultimately to America's least popular war.

In *The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam,* David Toczek explains many of the reasons for early U.S. failures in Vietnam. While Toczek clearly has learned a number of lessons from the battle that he chronicles, he contends that the "they" of his subtitle—the senior leadership of the U.S. Army during the early years of the Vietnam war—did not. Toczek's discussion of why lessons were ignored is of great relevance today as the Army struggles to define its role in supporting failed and failing governments amid the wreckage of the post-Cold War world.

The Battle of Ap Bac took place on 2 January 1963. The 7th ARVN Division attacked to destroy a PLAF force that was protecting a radio station in the Mekong Delta. For the first time in the Second Indochina War, PLAF forces stood their ground, inflicting substantial casualties on the much larger and better-armed ARVN forces and downing five helicopters.

The importance of the fight does not rest in its immediate result, impressive though that was for PLAF guerrilla army forces, but rests in the adversaries' reactions to it. The PLAF conducted what is now described as an after-action review, finding much to admire but also much that it later improved. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army ignored the facts of what Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, an ARVN adviser on the scene, correctly described as "a miserable damn performance" by the ARVN. Rather than revisiting the foundations of its strategy, based on the assumption that the Government of South Vietnam shared U.S. interest in winning the war, the United States continued to bet ever higher stakes on a losing hand.

The Battle of Ap Bac was made famous at the time by the young journalists who reported it and later for the prominent role it played in Neil Sheehan's Pulitzer Prize-winning *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988). Toczek's work, a more dispassionate and scholarly analysis than Sheehan's book, deserves to be mentioned in the company of books like H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: HarperCollins *Publishers*, 1997) and Andrew F. Krepinevich's book, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

A new generation of Army officers is evaluating the lessons of America's most divisive foreign war, and both the Army and the nation will benefit. Toczek's book deserves a wide audience.

MAJ John A. Nagl, *USA,*
Fort Riley, Kansas

THE GREATEST GENERATION SPEAKS: Father's Day: Now and Forever, Tom Brokaw, New Video, NY, 2001, 50 minutes, VHS, $14.95.

Television journalist Tom Brokaw begins the documentary *The Greatest Generation Speaks: Father's Day: Now and Forever* by asking, "What is the greatest generation leaving behind? What do they want us to remember?" The real question should be, "What do we have a responsibility to remember about the Greatest Generation?" That is what the video provides. From Baby Boomers to Generations X and Y, today's society has a responsibility to those who went before. The documentary gives us three things to remember: values, work ethic, and joy for life.

The first vignette provides insight into the emotions of a daughter whose father died during the war. She enlists the help of a researcher and learns that her dad was a hero. In fact, she is able to meet one of her father's comrades who claims that her father saved his life. The knowledge of the way her father lived gives the daughter a strength and pride she had not felt before. Because her father was honorable, courageous, selfless, and honest, she feels she can be that way too and can handle anything life puts in her path. She is not bitter that her father died. Not being bitter is a theme throughout the documentary.

The second vignette provides an example of the sacrifices made by the families of soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines. The survivors' acceptance of those sacrifices gives them an understanding of the preciousness of life. They, also, are not bitter. Rather, they choose to live each day fully and appreciatively.

The final vignette shows the value of work to the Greatest Generation. Good things come from work, and nothing is—nor should be—handed to us. Success is earned one day at a time. This was true for the returning soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines as well as for the

civilians who stayed at home. Ultimately, the Greatest Generation, which was raised during the Great Depression and fought and won World War II, leave a lot for us to remember. Patriotism, selfless service, and honesty are priceless. They provided for the wonderful standard of living Americans now enjoy. They built it through hard work and pride in a job well done. They made the ultimate sacrifice.

MAJ John W. Amberg, II, *USA,*
Fort Riley, Kansas

JEROME BONAPARTE: The War Years, 1800-1815, Glenn J. Lamar, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2000, 176 pages, $62.95.

In *Jerome Bonaparte: The War Years, 1800-1815,* Glenn J. Lamar discusses the role French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's youngest brother Jerome played during the Napoleonic Wars. Jerome has generally been castigated by historians as being militarily inept and irresponsible as ruler of the puppet kingdom of Westphalia.

Lamar provides a balanced examination of Jerome that neither overtly condemns him or completely exonerates him. Instead, the reader is presented with a balanced portrait of a young man in positions of responsibility that clearly exceeded his capabilities.

Military historians will find the book useful for its discussion of the little-known campaigns in Silesia in 1806-1807 and in Westphalia during the 1809 campaign. The book is well researched and uses primary sources, but because of its narrow focus, I cannot recommend it for the general reader.

CDR John T. Kuehn, *USN,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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66 STORIES OF BATTLE COMMAND, James W. Lussier and Adela Frame, eds., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001, price unknown.

Any reader fascinated by the process of how battle commanders gain tactical savvy will relish *66 Stories of Battle Command*, but the importance of this lucid, readable book goes beyond that obvious focus. Editors James W. Lussier and Adela Frame present a model of how military stories, communicated with informal candor, can offer a broad, deep analysis of multiple issues pertaining to U.S. Army Transformation.

Stories of tactical decisions are nothing new. Think of Homer's epic poem *The Iliad* as an example. That such an early record of battle-command thinking survives underscores the theme of the storytellers of this collection: battle command is as much art as science.

Twenty battle commanders share 66 stories drawn from their training experiences at the National Training Center (NTC). The tone throughout is conversational, off-the-cuff. No braggadocio surfaces. In fact, several commanders find the battle-command training experience at NTC—succinctly summarized by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Orley Jones—as "quite humbling."

Among the critical issues arising during NTC training, and a point that makes this collection relevant beyond its scope, concerns the limitations of technology and how to overcome such limitations. Colonel (COL) Rick Lynch comments, "People . . . are fixated on this idea that things happen quicker on tomorrow's battlefield given all this digital capability, and that is exactly wrong. [I]t is going to happen at the pace you want because you are in charge."

Underscoring a battle commander's need to remember the human factor in technological settings, LTC Stephen Mitchell describes how his battle plan went awry when his joint surveillance and target attack radar system failed because of a corrupt computer file. "[S]uddenly we were very analog," he notes, and one ponders just how disastrous such a digital failure would have been outside of a training environment.

Make no mistake; there are no Luddite battle commanders here, no pining for "the good old days" before force digitalization. What emerges is the need to constantly shuffle between digital and embodied, concrete battlefields. From an engineer's perspective, LTC John Peabody quite eloquently states, "You are a man of dirt, you have to be *in* the dirt to be a man of dirt."

If digital battlefield data constantly needs human sensory supplementation and in-depth interpretation, battle-command tactics need to be drawn from artistic and intuitive hunches as well as from scientific, rational analysis. Many of these stories underscore the

remarks of COL George Bowers: "Sometimes there is not an empirical why or justification or scientific rationale for making the decision; it's just a gut-level feeling."

The Army Research Institute's research into the role that tacit knowledge plays among Army leaders should be examined in light of commander involvement in more than linear, "by the book," tactical thinking. The implications for Army training go far beyond the realm of battle commanders. How can a new cadre of "Army of One" warriors train to bring artful intuition and adaptive thinking and enhanced situational awareness to future conflicts?

These stories can be read as test beds for spawning new ideas that might be incorporated into future training. This point brings me to this collection's single shortcoming. NTC training brings together Reserve and Active Component soldiers. Collecting stories that highlight whether differences in tactical learning styles between force components surfaced during training might have proved valuable. How might National Guard battle commanders transfer their civilian-based tacit knowledge, and how does their knowledge transfer, mesh, or interfere with active-commander tactical knowledge?

This caveat aside, this book is a lively, insightful, applicable collection of Army tactical thinking. The editors have accomplished what some find unthinkable—an official Army training publication so entertaining it could hold the steadfast attention of civilian readers.

Norman Weinstein, *Ph.D., Boise, Idaho*

VICTORY IN EUROPE 1945: From World War to Cold War, Arnold A. Offner and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2000, 308 pages, $39.95.

In the early 1990s, World War II commemoration activities re-ignited a broad, general interest in that war, and the rapid departure of veterans from the scene reinforced that interest. As a benefit, the increasing availability of archival material is helping scholars who want to revisit the issues that most of us thought had been put to rest.

Victory in Europe 1945: From World War to Cold War, a collection of essays, addresses war termination, which is a topic of contemporary application in light of efforts of succeeding U.S. Government administrations to articulate the exit strategy that must accompany any rational decision to become militarily involved in some type of international operation. How and why did the war in Europe end as it did? What is its significance to an evolving world?

The book is for readers who are generally familiar with the politico-military and strategic perspectives of the war in Europe. The varied essays include such topics as the decision to halt Allied Forces at the Elbe River, 50 miles from Berlin, a decision that allowed Soviet forces to capture the town. Other topics, not as renowned, are significant to the Cold War.

COL James D. Blundell, *USA, Retired, Arlington, Virginia*

CARNAGE AND CULTURE: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, Victor Davis Hanson, Double-day, NY, 2001, 320 pages, $29.95.

Carnage and culture are words that usually bring to mind completely different and almost opposing scenarios. But, in *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power,* military historian Victor Davis Hanson makes a convincing argument that it is precisely the culture of the West (Europe and the United States) that allows its "way of war" to be such a resounding success in world history.

Citing nine battles, ranging from Salamis in 480 BC to Tet in 1968, Davis illustrates how concepts and traditions of freedom, decisive battle, civic militarism, landed infantry, adoption and improvement of technology, capitalism, discipline, individualism, and even dissent and self-criticism have made Western armies into incredible killing machines. These are militaries that have shown an uncanny ability to overcome numeric superiority, brilliant leadership and bravery of their enemies, and even arrogance and bad generalship of their own side.

At a time of culture clash between East and West, this book is particularly relevant. I highly recommend it.

Don Middleton, *Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

WORLD WAR II IN COLONIAL AFRICA: The Death Knell of Colonialism, Richard E. Osborne, Riebel-Roque Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, 2001, 414 pages, $22.95.

World War II did indeed encompass the entire globe. In Africa, only the Spanish and Portuguese colonies were not in a state of declared war,but directly or indirectly, all of Africa was involved.

World War II in Colonial Africa, by Richard E. Osborne, focuses on the military events that occurred on land, sea, and air in and around the continent, including the various colonies' efforts to support the war effort. Osborne also relates the important political events that shaped the short- and long-term prosecution of the war and the development of nationalism within the various colonies.

During 1942 and 1943, in the European Theater, the main action focused on the fight for North Africa against German General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the U.S. invasion of North Africa and Italy. Africans made important contributions to the success of these ventures. They constructed new air and sea routes that supplied lend-lease equipment and built facilities that became a legacy of ports, roads, railroads, airfields, and industry that colonial governments would not have created under other circumstances.

By 1944 Africa was secure and many staging areas had moved to the continent. In general, the economies of the colonies were doing well. Many jobs in cities were filled with people who, but for the war, would have been living in rural villages. The growth of cities weakened tribal ties, which were replaced with political organizations with nationalistic aims. Greater educational opportunities were also available. France, England, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, as well as the U.N., are heirs of this African legacy.

MAJ William T. Bohne, *USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA, 1950-1953,

Robert F. Futrell, Air Force History and Museum Program, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2000, 823 pages, $58.00.

CRIMSON SKY: The Air Battle for Korea, John R. Bruning, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, VA, 1999, 232 pages, $18.95.

The year 2000 marked the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean war. Two books, one published in 2000, the other in 1999, detail different aspects of U.S. Air Force (USAF) actions during the Korean war. *The United States Air Force in the Korean War, 1950-1953,* by Robert F. Futrell, covers USAF involvement from strategic policy to cockpit action. *Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea,* by John R. Bruning, focuses primarily on pilots' personal accounts and experiences throughout the war.

Futrell, in his comprehensive account of USAF involvement in the Korean war, states that one of his principal reasons for writing the book was to codify lessons learned and relearned for future planners. The extensively annotated book addresses all aspects of air operations from the highest levels to the lowest, from the opening days of the war through the cease-fire; is an excellent baseline source for research; and provides links to documents, books, and interviews for further research.

Bruning's book is a more personal, intimate look at Korean war air operations. He opens with the account of the first pilots sent from Japan to Korea in June 1950. Subsequent chapters relate stories from across the spectrum—fighters and bombers, victories and defeats—generally following the war chronologically.

Bruning's brief chapters are a type of snapshot in time of a particular unit engaged in the air war. He devotes several chapters to particular characters whose stories are noteworthy for one or another reason. The chapter on Ensign Jesse Brown, the U.S. Navy's first black aviator, is a study in how bonds formed during combat superceded boundaries society imposed. Another chapter tells of George Davis, a pilot whose skill and audacity led to 14 confirmed kills. His daring ultimately led to his own death in aerial combat.

These two books are completely different in scope and purpose. I recommend the first for historical research or background. The second is more appropriate for recreational or informational reading.

CPT Fred Wintrich, *USA,*
Fort Polk, Louisiana

COMMON DESTINY: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, MacGregor Knox, Cambridge University Press, NY, 2000, 320 pages, $27.95.

In *Common Destiny,* MacGregor Knox demonstrates in a most effective way that simply involving the populaces of a country does not necessarily bring about peace. Italy and Germany mobilized their popu-