

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PARTNERS FOR SECURITY AND CAPACITY BUILDING

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USAWC PROGRAM RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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Topic Approved By
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ABSTRACT

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Sub-Saharan Africa is emerging as a region of strategic importance. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) in Africa should be considered accelerators for implementing US policy objectives aimed at helping Africans solve African problems. Resolving issues concerning good governance and substandard economic conditions will promote stability and mitigate the potential of failing or failed states that provide havens for extremist organizations. Partnering with IGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa will help assure acceptance of the US military presence on the continent and facilitate a more efficient implementation of the capacities-building policy. Across Africa, regional and sub-regional organizations play an important role in conflict resolution. Partnering with these organizations will make it possible for the US and coalitions to respond more quickly at the outset of a crisis and more effectively in post-conflict peace building. This paper examines the value of seeing IGOs as key organizations that provide structures, fluid channels of communication, and capabilities to facilitate capacity building and maintaining security in Sub-Saharan Africa and concludes that given the consonance of US and IGO objectives and complementary organization structures for implementing

objectives-oriented activities, the US should engage in robust partnerships with the IGOs for effective implementation of Phase Zero activities.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PARTNERS FOR SECURITY AND CAPACITY BUILDING

US National Security Strategy

The intent of the current National Security Strategy (NSS) is to, "seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."¹ The basic tenets of the NSS are: strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; working with others to defuse regional conflicts; igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; and expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.² A key task is ensuring fragile and failing states do not evolve into failed states³ since failed states create the conditions for tyranny, instability, and extremism.⁴

The "Way Ahead" section of the NSS recognizes Africa as a region of significant geo-strategic importance.⁵ The US goal is liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity on the African continent.⁶ Promoting US security interests depends on partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.⁷ Overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, not paternalism, with African states in the lead.⁸

The US is committed to partnering with African nations and organizations to strengthen the domestic capabilities and build the capacities required to support post-conflict transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, promote economic growth, and improve peacekeeping and disaster capabilities.⁹ This is in accord with the current US policy of "smart power."¹⁰ An area of critical focus is Sub-Saharan Africa.

US Policy Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa

Recognizing the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa in US strategic policy is not new. For almost two decades, scholars have noted the importance of a robust US policy for monitoring and shaping the conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1992, Africa scholar Dr. K. P. Magyar characterized the African continent as a “conflict environment”¹¹ where the causes of conflict are inefficient economic and political structures,¹² friction between Arab-African and Black African cultures,¹³ and influence asserted by states from outside the region.¹⁴ Dr. Magyar suggested that close monitoring and analysis of events on the African continent were imperative.¹⁵ In 1995, Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1987, observed that instability in Africa had implications for US interests and argued that the interplay between Africa's demographic, climactic, geological, and conflict trends required serious monitoring and engagement by the US.¹⁶ In 1997, Dr. Dan Henk observed that there are overlapping US national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, including regional stability, denial of sponsorship or safe havens for extremists, and promoting good governance and economic development.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, the war on terrorism brought the strategic importance of the African continent to the fore such that US interests in Africa are explicitly addressed in post 9/11 security strategies.

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (2002 NSS) recognized the instability in Africa created by poverty, armed conflict, and disease.¹⁸ The 2002 NSS identified the link between fragile states and potential safe havens for extremist organizations that threaten US security interests¹⁹ and identified three interlocking strategies for the region.²⁰ First, countries with major impact on their neighborhood

such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and will receive focused attention. Second, the US will work with its European allies and international institutions to implement constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations. Third, Africa's capable reforming states and intergovernmental organizations with a commitment to good governance and democratic political systems must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.²¹ The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States (2006 NSS) articulated policies consistent with the 2002 NSS regarding working with existing international and intergovernmental institutions to implement democratic commitments,²² prevent and resolve conflicts,²³ promote opportunities for increased trade with Sub-Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act,²⁴ combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases,²⁵ and build domestic capabilities and the regional capacities.²⁶

To promote trade and economic growth, the Bush Administration implemented the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act providing market-access for nearly all goods produced in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷ The Millennium Challenge Corporation, a mixed government-industry approach to foreign aid, was founded in 2004 that employs the Millennium Challenge Compacts program linking good policy, effective governance, and support for economic growth with qualifying countries.²⁸ To combat HIV/AIDS, the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) was established in 2003 and pledged \$15 billion in aid over five years. In 2007, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established as a regional combatant command having an area of responsibility encompassing the African continent less Egypt. AFRICOM's mission is to

build on partnerships to foster self-sufficiency by helping African nations build strong, effective democracies. AFRICOM, working with the US Embassies, will support US foreign policy on the continent.²⁹ US Africa policy during the Bush Administration employed all elements of national power (diplomacy, information, military, and economic) and was unquestionably committed to supporting political freedom and democracy, expanding economic opportunities and growth, fighting infectious diseases, resolving conflict and combating terror and violence, and increasing mutual understanding through cultural and educational exchanges.³⁰

The Obama Administration faces the continuing challenge of promoting stability and security in Africa.³¹ In April 2008, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance published its Alert Lists for 2008, ranking over 160 countries using indicators of fragility and the likelihood of experiencing violent conflict. The greatest concentration of states facing the highest risk of instability and the most serious challenges to effective and legitimate governance is found in Africa.³² The Department of State's current vision is to develop a network of well-governed states capable of protecting themselves and contributing to regional security.³³ Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton noted in February 2009 that the US needs to be a good leader and a good partner.³⁴ This vision supports working in partnership with African leaders to build Africa's institutional capacity with bilateral activities with African governments, and working multilaterally with the African Union, the United Nations, and African sub-regional organizations.³⁵ As explained by Phil Carter, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in a

briefing on 9 February 2009 regarding US policy in Africa,³⁶ the top four US strategic priorities in Africa are:

- Providing security assistance programs that are critical to securing the objective of a peaceful African continent, working with our African partners to build capacity at three levels: (1) at the level of the African Union, (2) at the sub-regional level with the Regional Economic Communities, and (3) at the level of individual states.
- Promoting democratic systems and practices.
- Promoting sustainable, market-led economic growth.
- Promoting health and social development.

To achieve our security objectives, the US must strengthen partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa, and through those partnerships, apply military and non-military power when and where needed to promote stability and to defeat adversaries when required.³⁷ In Sub-Saharan Africa, the initial focus should be on Phase Zero shaping activities and expanding partnerships with intergovernmental organizations.

Intergovernmental Organizations

An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is an organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments to protect and promote interests shared by member states.³⁸ The activities of IGOs are consistent with traditional practices that promote international cooperation and stem from diplomacy, rules of war, and international law.³⁹ While states are the members of an IGO, states do not necessarily dictate the behavior of the organization since IGOs tend to exercise power autonomously and establish their own agendas, rules, and norms.⁴⁰ States often

join an IGO not because they believe they can dominate the agenda of the IGO, but because of the leverage the organization has in developing and implementing policies which will benefit the states versus what the states can achieve with traditional diplomacy.⁴¹

Current US policy recognizes the requirement to work multilaterally through regional and sub-regional IGOs.⁴² At least one scholar-practitioner has opined that supporting sub-regional IGOs offers a greater return on investment.⁴³ This paper will examine the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the lead West African sub-regional IGO, since the US has existing partnership ties with the organization and ECOWAS has a track record in the areas of economic development and conflict resolution.

The Economic Community of West African States

The West African Sub-Region. The United Nations World Urbanization Prospects is projecting a population approaching 20 million in the West African sub-region by the year 2030.⁴⁴ (Figure 1) The expected growth of the sub-region over the next 20 years makes it an area deserving of focused attention since population growth and potential resources competition may give rise to instability. ECOWAS is the sub-regional IGO that represents the interests of West African member states.





Figure 2: Projected Urban Populations, 2030

ECOWAS was established in 1975 with the mission of bringing economic and political unity to West Africa. The ECOWAS Treaty was revised in 1993 to confer “supra-nationality” to the regional body,⁴⁵ and in June 2006, the Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government decided to transform the ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission effective January 2007 with greater supra-national powers.⁴⁶ In addition, a restructuring of the ECOWAS institutions in conjunction with the transformation to a commission structure has increased their efficiency regarding the integration and development processes to better adapt to the international environment.⁴⁷ ECOWAS is one of the Regional Economic Communities (REC) forming part of the REC structure the African Union is using to integrate the economies of African states. The members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (under suspension⁴⁸), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. (Figure 2)



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lead financial institution is the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development.⁵⁰

The ECOWAS Commission is headed by a President who serves as the chief executive officer coordinating the efforts of the activities of the seven offices of the Commission, each of which is led by a commissioner. The offices are: Administration and Finance; Agriculture, Environment & Water Resources; Human Development and Gender; Infrastructure; Macro-economic Policy; Political Affairs, Peace and Security; and Trade, Customs & Free Movement.

The Community Parliament is a representative body with 115 seats, with each member state guaranteed a minimum of five seats, and the remaining forty seats being

allocated on the basis of population.⁵¹ The Parliament makes and implements decisions for the Community in a democratic manner which promotes consensus, integration, and sub-regional identity. The Parliament also monitors the effectiveness of its decisions like any legislative body.

The Community Court of Justice is the judicial branch having the responsibilities of deciding issues concerning fulfillment of obligations by member states, settling disputes among member states, and verifying the legality of acts adopted by the Community institutions. In addition, the court construes and interprets the ECOWAS Treaty, as required. Lastly, the court has jurisdiction over fundamental human rights violations involving member states.⁵²

The mission of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) is to contribute towards the economic development of West Africa through the financing of ECOWAS and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) projects and programs relating to transportation, energy, poverty alleviation, environmental protection, and natural resources. The goal is to create the conditions which will build an economically strong, industrialized, and prosperous West Africa which is integrated both internally and within the global economic system in order to realize the benefits of globalization.⁵³

Role and Near Term Plan. In a lecture on October 2007, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, described the role of ECOWAS as being an integration facilitator in fighting poverty, promoting good governance and peace, and integrating a common West African space into the global economy.⁵⁴ Using its economic, political, and military capabilities, ECOWAS's strategy for the next ten

years is two-pronged. First, ensure stability in the sub-region by resolving intra-state and interstate conflicts employing options ranging from mediation and diplomacy to armed intervention. Second, promote economic development. These objectives are complementary in that conflict inhibits economic progress, and economic progress mitigates conflict.

Economic Activities. West African nations have high rates of poverty.⁵⁵ Of the 26 countries designated as having “low human development” in the 2008 United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI), twelve are in West Africa.⁵⁶ Poverty is a non-military threat to peace and security.⁵⁷ The overarching objective of ECOWAS is economic growth and development through integration programs that will mitigate sub-regional poverty.⁵⁸ ECOWAS continues to work for the free movement of people and goods by eliminating the existing obstacles along West African highways and at the borders of member states.⁵⁹ ECOWAS is also pressing forward with the completion of the remaining portions of international highways and the interconnection of railway networks with standard gauge.⁶⁰ The important final outcomes of the ECOWAS economic integration program include increased opportunities for trade across most sectors in the regional economy and expanded links with external trade partners.⁶¹

The principal ECOWAS program for economic development is the Market Integration Program. The program seeks to promote economic development through the free movement of persons and goods among member states.⁶² Visas and entry permits have been abolished such that ECOWAS citizens may enter without a visa and reside in any member state for up to ninety days using as documentation a valid travel certificate and an international vaccination certificate, thereby increasing efficiency by

eliminating the requirement to fill out immigration and emigration forms at border crossings.⁶³ To facilitate the movement of goods, ECOWAS member states have signed a memorandum of understanding on transit and transport related issues, affirming their collective commitment to achieving the transport objectives of the ECOWAS Programme on Trade Facilitation and the New Partnership for Africa's Development.⁶⁴ The goal is to reduce transportation costs and transit times in order to increase the competitiveness of goods produced in West Africa for distribution in regional and international markets, as well as to ensure equal treatment of all stakeholders.⁶⁵ ECOWAS has also introduced the "Brown Card" motor vehicle insurance scheme, harmonized customs documents, and is working to remove tariff barriers and non-tariff monetary barriers.⁶⁶ These measures are calculated to further integrate the markets of the member states. The second order effect, of course, is an improvement of economic conditions for all West Africans.

Socio-Political Activities. The 1993 treaty expanded the scope of the ECOWAS goals from economic development and integration to socio-political objectives calculated to reduce the obstacles to sustained economic development. The socio-political activities of ECOWAS are focused on resolving challenges such as poverty induced migration and fighting infectious diseases. ECOWAS member states have agreed to approach the migration issue from a concerted sub-regional standpoint with special attention being given to economic development in order to resolve the poverty induced emigration.⁶⁷ This policy is not inconsistent with the ECOWAS policy regarding the free movement of persons since the 90-day temporary residency standard is

designed to promote business related travel, not stimulate permanent relocation of persons.

While adult HIV prevalence continues to be much lower in West Africa than in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa,⁶⁸ ECOWAS maintains its long-standing policy of aggressively treating and preventing HIV/AIDS.⁶⁹ ECOWAS recognizes that the HIV/AIDS pandemic threatens social stability and sustainability of the regional economy.⁷⁰ ECOWAS is working in partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development on the AWARE-HIV/AIDS project to reduce HIV infection rates and improve the health of those having HIV/AIDS in West Africa.⁷¹

Military Activities. The 1993 treaty authorized ECOWAS to prevent and resolve sub-regional conflict using techniques ranging from mediation to peace enforcement military operations. ECOWAS recognizes the link between security and economic progress, and has executed critical peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions with the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d' Ivoire for the benefit of the involved states and the sub-region as a whole.⁷² ECOWAS has transformed ECOMAG into the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and is on track to field the first operational brigade for the African Stand-by Force (ASF) in 2009.⁷³ The ESF continues to participate in the US-sponsored African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, a “train the trainer” program and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program.⁷⁴

While the African Union and the ASF provide a pan-African stability operations capability, ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organization, has a greater stake in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in West Africa since the African Union is

fundamentally an umbrella organization that relies on contributions from the sub-regional organizations.⁷⁵ The African Union can augment a sub-regional force, but the ESF will be in the lead regarding conflict prevention and resolution in West Africa.

Partnering With ECOWAS

Partnering with African nations is part of the US's overall Africa policy.⁷⁶ The 2006 NSS states that the US will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal, including working with intergovernmental organizations such as ECOWAS and nongovernmental organizations.⁷⁷ The 2008 National Defense Strategy (2008 NDS) notes that the US will continue to work with allies and international organizations to achieve our objectives.⁷⁸ Joint Operation Planning Process considerations include synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) activities with other government agencies, IGOs, multinational forces, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort for accomplishing our objectives.⁷⁹ As can be seen, our primary policy and planning documents spell out the requirement for partnering not only with allies, but also with IGOs to accomplish mutual goals and objectives.

Simply declaring the desire to partner with ECOWAS and moving forward with activities in a haphazard manner will not produce the desired results. Partnering with ECOWAS requires a strategy. Professor Art Lykke's strategy model with its ends, ways, and means provides a good framework for analyzing the method for developing a productive partnership with ECOWAS.⁸⁰

Common Objectives. The vision of a strategic partnership in Africa has been described as a partnership of equals contributing to common objectives.⁸¹ While

integration of the West African states is not one of the explicit US objectives, the objectives of the US and ECOWAS are common inasmuch as the integration objective is part and parcel of the economic development and democratic governance goals that the US sees as key for the sub-region. The US's objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa, working in partnership with Africans, are: maintaining peace with security assistance; promoting democratic systems and practices; promoting sustainable, broad-based, market-led economic growth; and expanding health and social development.⁸²

ECOWAS's key objectives are promoting economic development, supporting peace and security, and supporting good governance and democratic principles.⁸³ Consequently, the economic development, peace and security, and good governance objectives (the desired ends) of the US and ECOWAS are common objectives.⁸⁴ The task is fashioning the ways and means to reach the common objectives.

Promoting Economic Development. There are several US-sponsored development programs in place that constitute the ways for realizing the economic development objective. The first program is the West African Regional Program (WARP). The US Agency for International Development (USAID), a department of the Department of State, is the lead agency for the WARP. The WARP is calculated to promote economic development, improve the health status of West Africans, and promote peace and stability as a second order effect.⁸⁵ The WARP supports the African Global and Competitiveness Initiative⁸⁶ and the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act⁸⁷ by focusing on developing trade competitiveness in global markets. USAID Global Competitiveness Hubs in Ghana and Senegal directly support manufacturing firms that process or manufacture products with strong growth potential. The Hubs play a central

role in increasing exports of new types of products to the United States under the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act. WARP activities involving the African Global and Competitiveness Initiative and Africa Growth and Opportunities Act should set the conditions for more West African countries to qualify for participation in the Millennium Challenge Account compact program. The means for continuing and expanding these programs is two-pronged. First, funding through US and international initiative donors. Second, institutional partnering of the USAID, the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and US private sector importers with ECOWAS's Trade, Customs, and Movement Commission and Macro-Economic Policy Commission.

Regarding financial sector programs, the Africa Financial Sector Initiative established in 2007 should be expanded. This initiative will mobilize more than \$1.6 billion through the support of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a US governmental agency with the mission of mobilizing and facilitating the participation of US private capital in the economic development of less developed countries and areas, and promoting non-market to market economy transitions.⁸⁸ The goal of the Africa Financial Sector Initiative is to strengthen financial markets, mobilize domestic and foreign investment, and help spur job creation and economic growth in Africa. Funding, of course, is a critical means for this initiative. The institutional participants should be OPIC, USAID, and DOC working in partnership with the ECOWAS Trade, Customs, and Movement and Macro-Economic Policy Commissions.

A new initiative should be advanced to promulgate a uniform commercial code that would provide uniform legal standards for commercial transactions. Uniform commercial laws in the areas of sales of goods, commercial paper, bank deposits and

collections, letters of credit, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and secured transactions are essential to provide the predictable transactional framework, as well as to provide remedies for aggrieved parties to transactions. The primary means for this initiative would be the Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) activity of the DOC⁸⁹ working in conjunction with the ECOWAS Trade, Customs, and Movement and Macro-Economic Policy Commissions in order to develop an agreed protocol leading to the adoption of a uniform code by the ECOWAS member states.

Supporting Peace and Security. Implementing AFRICOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs is the cornerstone way for promoting conflict prevention and response in West Africa. The approach must be holistic given the AFRICOM interagency structure, not just a set of military-to-military programs. In West Africa, the TSC programs must assist ECOWAS and the member states in building their capacities to deter and prevent conflict, and respond to conflicts if prevention fails. Crisis mediation programs and training should be implemented by the DOS to train ECOWAS leaders in techniques to resolve friction which may trigger crisis and conflict. DOD programs to train the ESF for military intervention in response to crises and conflicts are an important element, and this training should include exercises and simulations emphasizing the command and control processes for likely scenarios requiring armed intervention by the ESF and possible multinational forces operations. The TSC programs should integrate Department of Justice (DOJ) participation in order to train relevant ECOWAS departments on border control operations and law enforcement activities targeting traffickers of weapons, persons, and drugs. The means for effective

implementation of the TSC programs are AFRICOM, DOS, DOD, and DOJ partnering with the ECOWAS Peacekeeping and Security Department and the ESF.

Continuing the activities of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program are also essential ways to realize the peace and security objective.⁹⁰ The GPOI is DOS program to train, equip, transport, and sustain peacekeeping forces. The ACOTA program is also managed by the DOS with an emphasis on training peacekeepers to United Nations standards. While GPOI and ACOTA are DOS programs, AFRICOM should offer technical assistance to such programs and partner with African institutions in security sector reform.⁹¹ This means partnering with the ECOWAS Peacekeeping and Security Department and the ESF.

Providing International Military Education and Training (IMET) is also one of the ways to promote peace and security in the sub-region.⁹² IMET is a DOS program that provides education and training opportunities for foreign military and civilian leaders. Programs of instruction range from strategy development and implementation to military justice to defense resources management. IMET is calculated to enhance the professionalism of our partner armed forces and defense agencies. The means applicable to IMET are DOS and DOD working with the ECOWAS Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Commission to develop courses for West African military and civilian professionals working in the security sector. In addition, periodic conferences on relevant topics should be conducted, such as the April 2009 ECOWAS Strategic Level Seminar on Security Sector Reform in West Africa conducted in Nigeria and presented by the Nigerian National Defense College, ECOWAS, and the United States Africa

Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), with AFRICOM's civilian deputy, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, serving as one of the presenters at the program.⁹³

Supporting Good Governance. Fair elections and uninhibited access to the polls are critical for good governance and the maintenance of democratic institutions. Electoral assistance and observation programs are the essential ways to support the elections process. The principal tenets of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance are elections support and elections monitoring.⁹⁴ The means for promoting fair and impartial elections is technical assistance in planning elections and deploying observation teams to ensure proper procedures are used at the polls. The ECOWAS Electoral Assistance and Observation Unit has the mission of promoting the elections process in the member states. The DOS and DOD should work in concert with the ECOWAS elections officials providing additional technical support and best practices advice.

Rule of law and transparency in government are additional ways to realize the good governance objective. ECOWAS recognizes that corruption (i.e., any abuse of office or position for private gain) has a negative impact on equitable development, as well as a corrosive effect on trust in government which contributes to social disintegration.⁹⁵ ECOWAS is working to establish anti-corruption programs with other international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program. In terms of specific means to support the anti-corruption programs, the US should provide ECOWAS with technical expertise from the DOS and DOJ regarding oversight program implementation and methods for ensuring accountability in government.

Lastly, the US should work to establish an annex of the ACSS in West Africa. The ACSS was created in 1999 as one of DOD's five regional centers for strategic studies. The ACSS conducts a variety of academic programs for African, US, and European military and civilian officials aimed at promoting good governance, countering ideological support of terrorism, and fostering regional collaboration and cooperation in the African defense and security sectors. Presently, there is only one annex in Africa located at the US Embassy in Ethiopia.⁹⁶ Establishing an annex in West Africa would demonstrate our commitment to the sub-region. The means include funding for the annex, and then staffing the annex with faculty and administrative personnel. The DOD and the National Defense University should work with the Political Affairs Department of the ECOWAS Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Commission on this project.

Conclusions and Recommendations

While the US has coined the terms "interagency approach" and "whole-of-government" to describe the cooperative approach to employing all assets from various elements of the government to accomplish objectives, the ECOWAS institutions have a similar structure which operate on political, economic, and military lines of effort. AFRICOM with its interagency approach to staffing, planning, and execution is well-positioned to work directly with the appropriate economic, political, and military commissions and departments of ECOWAS thereby establishing real partnerships between the AFRICOM staff and counterparts at ECOWAS. This partnership approach should facilitate the building of West African capacities shaping the West African sub-region in a manner favorable to all stakeholders.⁹⁷ This is not to suggest that AFRICOM would be in the lead regarding US policy. While AFRICOM would have a key role as an

“action organization,” AFRICOM’s role is a supporting role to the DOS for the implementation of US policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁹⁸

We need to back our partnership activities with substance, not just form. This means meeting with our counterparts at ECOWAS, assessing their current capabilities and needs, and developing a realistic program to build capacities at the appropriate pace over the long term. A unilateral, directive approach will not work. Success in realizing the mutual objectives of the US and the West African states will require genuine partnership.

We must maintain a balanced approach, not only among the ways, ends, and means generally, but also with respect to the political, military, and economic elements of national power employed. Likewise, we must keep the partnership balanced such that we are engaging in cooperative engagement rather than unilateral action. We must set realistic, long-term goals taking into account the current capacities of our partners. Any lack of balance increases the risk of delay or even failure in reaching the common objectives of the US and ECOWAS.⁹⁹

Partnering with an IGO like ECOWAS is neither a substitute for bi-lateral diplomatic and commercial relations between the US and African nations, nor multilateral activities with our allies to promote democracy and maintain stability in the region. Partnering with IGOs is a complement to these traditional bilateral and multilateral activities. IGOs are representative bodies which allow broad-based communications and interaction. Obtaining the endorsement of ECOWAS regarding activities which support mutually beneficial goals and objectives will accelerate

cooperation with other IGOs. This, in turn, should accelerate the engagement process between the US and its agencies with African governments.

Suggestions for Future Research

Future research is appropriate regarding the structures, key activities and programs, objectives, and capabilities of the IGOs representing the member states of the other Regional Economic Communities in Africa. The strategy for partnering with ECOWAS will not necessarily apply to partnering with the other sub-regional IGOs. Since the Regional Economic Communities are the building blocks for an integrated African Union, research should also be done on a strategy for partnering with the African Union as the pan-African IGO.

Endnotes

¹ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006)(hereinafter sometimes 2006 NSS), p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, 8, 14, 25, 31.

³ A failing state is a state whose government is losing the ability to provide security and essential services for its people and secure its borders. A failed state is one in which the government has lost this all ability to provide security. A fragile state is a failing, failed, or recovering state. Carol Lancaster, "Failing and Failed States: Toward a Framework for U.S. Assistance," chapter 9, p. 293, in *Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States*, ed. Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav and Robert L. Ayres (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006) available from <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/7867/> and <http://www.cgdev.org/doc/shortofthegoal/chap9.pdf>; Internet; accessed 28 April 2009.

⁴ Failing and failed are a concern for the US as state collapse is usually accompanied by prolonged, civil violence often spills over into neighboring countries, and failing and failed states can provide sanctuary to criminal and terrorist organizations. *Ibid.* The 2008 National Defense Strategy recognizes that US security "is tightly bound up with the security of the broader international system," and states that US strategy must "build the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression." Robert M. Gates, *National Defense Strategy*

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2008)(hereinafter sometimes 2008 NDS), p. 6. See John E. Peters and Jennifer Moroney, "Conclusions and Recommendations," chapter 5, p. 33, in *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, (Rand Corporation, 2007) (ungoverned territories are potential terrorist sanctuaries due to lack of an effective state presence and the conduciveness of these territories to the presence of terrorist groups) available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 April 2009; Jeremy M. Weinstein, John Edward Porter and Stuart E. Eizenstat, *On the Brink, Weak States and US National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2004), p. 9 (weak and failed states challenge US strategic interests in five ways: spillover effects, illicit transnational networks, regional insecurity, global economic effects, and implications for American values and moral leadership), available from <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2879> and http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/Full_Report.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 April 2009.

⁵ 2006 NSS, 37.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ 2006 NSS, 37-38, 46. See also Peters and Moroney, "Conclusions and Recommendations," chapter 5, p. 35, in *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*.

¹⁰ Military force may sometimes be necessary to protect our people and our interests, but cooperative engagement is equally important in creating conditions for a peace and stability. This is the essence of the current "smart power" policy of the United States -- using all the tools at our disposal. The smart power approach focuses on partnership, principles, and pragmatism, and cooperating and collaborating with other nations and organizations to design and implement regional solutions to pressing problems. A key tool is partnering with international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. See United States Department of State, Fact Sheet, *American "Smart Power": Diplomacy and Development Are the Vanguard* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 4 May 2009), available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2009/122579.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2009.

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¹² *Ibid.*, 9-11.

¹³ *Ibid.* 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*,14-15.

¹⁵ Donovan C. Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, And Conflicts*, LeTort Paper (monograph) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 27 August 2008), 10, available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=821>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2009.

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²³ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

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