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MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

**ASSESSING THE PARAMETERS FOR DETERMINING MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINE CORPS
IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS**

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Executive Summary

Title: Assessing the Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security Operations

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Thesis: From among the lines of operations in the conduct of internal security operations, Civil Military Operations offer a measurable, discrete, relevant and responsive approach. Civil Military Operations is a better Measure of Effectiveness and Line of Operations in internal security operations.

Discussion: The Philippines Marine Corps has been fighting a war against internal threats who have achieved some degree of success in derailing Philippine prosperity for the past thirty-eight years. The Marine Corps has perceived internal security operations (ISO) primarily as a mere force on force employment (combat operations) against armed internal threats and, to some extent, the occasional use of non-combat means (civil-military operations) to mitigate community life disruption as a result of the combat operations. The Marine Corps ISO is guided by the government- issued National Internal Security Plan as well as the Operation Plan *Bantay Laya* that was crafted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as the security component to the NISP. Operation Plan *Bantay Laya* prescribes the use of three lines of operations to defeat the Communist Terrorist Movement (CTM), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Lines of Operations prescribed by Operation Plan *Bantay Laya* include combat operations, intelligence operations, and civil-military operations (CMO). Although the most violent and extreme of all activities employed in counterinsurgency, the Marine Corps puts premium to combat operations over other lines of operations to determine mission accomplishment in ISO. Ironically, lessons learned from the HUKBALAHAP counterinsurgency operations in the post-world war II period as well as the *Indirect Approach* to the Basilan Model in 2002 strongly infers that, from among the three lines of operations, CMO offers a better Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) and Line of Operations. Using an MOE for counterinsurgency set forth by *U.S. Field Manual Number 3-24*, CMO offers a measurable, discrete, relevant and responsive approach to ISO. On the contrary, combat operations fail to qualify under the responsive criteria by the fact that the Marine Corps has been conducting ISO against the same security threats for the past thirty-eight years. On the other hand, intelligence operations is a mere support component and does not then directly address the overarching goal of ISO of defeating all groups posing threats to national security.

Conclusion: The victories at the tactical and operational level in the conduct of sustained combat operations surely reduced the statistical strength of the enemy in terms of insurgent foot soldiers and firearms but never extinguished the insurgents' will to fight against the government as well as failed to gain the support of the Filipino people against the menace of insurgency. Military response is vital and necessary, but it is not a stand-alone solution to deter and crush insurgency. The success of the counterinsurgency against the HUKBALAHAP in the 1950s and the *Indirect Approach* to the Basilan Model in 2002 must serve as lesson that winning the hearts and minds of the people whom the insurgents derived their strength is the key to culminate internal security operations. Winning hearts and minds can only be attained through robust civil-military operations.

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Preface

Since its conception in 1950, the Philippine Marine Corps has consistently been the force of choice by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to address various security threat groups through the conduct of internal security operations (ISO). As a formidable sea-borne strike force, the Marine Corps has always relied on its brute capacity to bring shock actions to the enemy, both perceived and real. As a result, a warrior culture has evolved in the Marine Corps and has been handed from generation to generation of Marines. The warrior culture has made every Marine to thirst and hunger for tangible results in combat operations in terms of enemy body counts. Like any other warrior culture, the hunt has been the key to evaluate command performance and offers a sure path to higher and meaningful commands not only in the Marine Corps but in the hierarchy of the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The more than thirty-eight years of combat operations-focused ISO with no clear waypoints to peace on the horizon is a very clear indicator that the Marine Corps needs to reconsider its approaches to ISO. Although combat operations have been successful as a stop gap measure that quelled the spiraling violence, it has failed to solve the problems posed by the internal threat groups. Ironically, combat operations have widened the gap between the Marine Corps and the people it has sworn to defend and protect. Much is yet to be done to abate the warrior culture of the Marine Corps and shall start with the advocacy that winning the heart and minds of the people through robust civil-military operations in ISO is truly a path towards peace. This paper shall strengthen the initiatives of the Marine Corps to shift from a combat operation-focused to a more people-oriented, CMO-focused approach to ISO.

This paper was made possible through the efforts poured by Dr. Eric Y. Shibuya, Ph. D. who painstakingly reviewed and gave the much needed guidance and direction. His specialties

and interest in studies on Terrorism and Transnational Security Threats, among others, have served well this paper. Reference materials to this paper were made available by the enthusiastic and friendly staffs of the Library of the Marine Corps and by the hardworking officers of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Marine Corps Staff for Plans and Programs. Valuable reference materials were also made available by Captain Emmanuel Martinez, who despite short notice was able to send vital reference materials. This paper would not be made possible without the support of my government through the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S. government through the Marine Corps University.

I would like to thank my loving wife Christy and my caring children Patricia Mae, Gabriel, and Regina Isabel for their prayers, continued support and understanding, and for having been always the source of my strength and determination. Finally, I would thank the almighty for the wisdom that walked me not only through the requirements for my Master of Military Studies but also through the curriculum of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Assessing the Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security Operations

Introduction

Fighting a war can cost a nation more in terms of financial resources and human lives than any other undertaking in which a nation engages.¹ The Philippines has been fighting a war against internal threats who have achieved some degree of success in derailing Philippine prosperity for the past thirty-eight years. These threats have tempered the Philippine Marine Corps to withstand the worst of the conflict-stricken operational environments of the southern and western Philippines. These areas are considered as the Marine Corps' traditional areas of operations, which cater to the various internal threats that do not only confront the Marine Corps in particular but the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in general. In the southern Philippines internal threats that are identified with the Muslims thrive. These threats include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jemaah Islamyah (JI). On the other hand, the New Peoples Army (NPA) of the Communist Terrorist Movement (CTM) thrives in Palawan in the western Philippines. The Marine Corps is mandated to address all these internal threats through the conduct of internal security operations (ISO) using three lines of operations. These lines of operations are combat operations, intelligence operations, and civil-military operations (CMO). It is worthy to note that the Marine Corps perceives ISO primarily as a mere force on force employment (combat operations) against armed internal threats and, to some extent, the occasional use of non-combat means (CMO) to mitigate community life disruption as a result of the combat operations. Despite tactical gains as manifested by the decline of armed enemy strength mostly as a result of combat operations, the Marine Corps remains confronted by the same internal threats. This is a clear indicator that

combat operations as a line of operations do not measure the success of the Marine Corps in ISO. The tactical and operational gains derived by the Marine Corps in combat operations do not resonate to the AFP objectives at the strategic level. Lessons learned from the HUKBALAHAP counterinsurgency operations in the post-world war II period as well as the *Indirect Approach* to the Basilan Model in 2002 strongly infers that, from among the three lines of operations, CMO offers a measurable, discrete, relevant and responsive approach to ISO and, thus, a better Measure of Effectiveness and Line of Operations.

The Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security Operations

The Marine Corps is specifically organized for direct combat from the sea and littoral waters towards adjacent inland areas of operations. In September 1950, then Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay ordered the formation of a sea-borne strike force that could be deployed both against the HUKBALAHAP and the outlaw bands that were entrenched in formidable coastal hideouts throughout the Philippines.² The first Philippine Marine "A" Company composed of two hundred thirty enlisted personnel and six officers was formed and first engaged in ISO against the Huks in June 8, 1951 that resulted to three Huks killed in action.³ The "A" Company evolved into what is now the Philippine Marine Corps. The mission of the Philippine Marine Corps is "to provide combined arms unit for amphibious operations and such other operations to accomplish the Navy's mission."⁴

To address the various threats to national security, the Marine Corps is guided by the government- issued National Internal Security Plan, which provides the policy guidelines for coordinating, integrating, and accelerating the overall government response to all threats following a holistic strategy. The strategy has five interlocking major areas in ensuring national

security: military, political, socio-economic, informational, cultural and environmental. The NISP also adopts the operational methodology of Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (*See Figure 2 in Appendix B: Concept of ISO*) to dismantle the political and military structures of the internal threats and re-establish government control and authority in enemy-contested areas.⁵ It is within this framework that in 2001, the AFP developed the security component to the NISP, the AFP Operation Plan *Bantay Laya*⁶, to fight insurgents and rid Philippine society of internal threats. Operation Plan *Bantay Laya* translates the national government's policy goals into achievable military objectives and the military tasks necessary to achieve them. Accordingly, *Bantay Laya* is oriented towards the accomplishment of the mandate of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to crush the insurgency before the end of her term in 2010.⁷ The strategic goal of *Bantay Laya* is "to defeat all groups posing a threat to national security, enhance the security situation and peace and order condition in the country in order to establish a physically and psychologically secured environment conducive to national development."⁸

Challenges to Internal Security Operations

Since its conception in 1950, the Marine Corps has been in the forefront in the Philippine government's ISO to weed various security threat groups. These groups have evolved over time and space. The Communist Terrorist Movement that regenerated its roots in the 1960s in Luzon has since then evolved into various front organizations that are now nationwide in scope. The precursor to the separatist movement in Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), has evolved long before a peace accord was put into place in 1996. The MNLF has evolved into the MILF and ASG, both pose as a challenge to ISO notably in the southern Philippines. To

aggravate the ISO in the south, the Muslim-aligned internal threat groups forged alliances with the JI from the neighboring Indonesia mostly in terms of training.

Communist Terrorist Movement

The most potent threat to the security of the Philippines remains the CTM.⁹ The CTM is composed of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP, the direction and leadership of the movement), the New People's Army (NPA, the military force), and the National Democratic Front (NDF, which protects the armed struggle through legal and/or parliamentary struggles). The CTM is chaired by Jose Maria Sison, who is based in Utrecht, Netherlands.¹⁰ The ultimate objective of the CTM is to seize political power through armed or legal and parliamentary struggle. After taking power, the CTM plans to replace the existing structure with a communist form of government. To attain its objective, they adopt the Maoist strategic line of protracted people's war of encircling the cities from the countryside.

While the trend of CTM strength may indicate a descending slope in favor of the AFP (*See Figure 3 in Appendix C: Results of Operations against the New Peoples Army*), the CTM continues to display its resiliency in waging an armed struggle. The CTM continues to have the capability to initiate tactical offensives, extortion activities and launch terrorist operations. It also has the capability to forge linkages with other revolutionary groups, engage in propaganda activities and undertake guerilla operations. The CTM has also taken advantage of the democratic realm through the successful entry of pro-CTM individuals and Party List Groups in elective posts of the Philippine House of Representatives. Thus, the CTM is now waging a legal struggle that enables its front organizations to utilize government resources to support its armed struggle.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The MILF is a splinter group of the MNLF¹¹ and is currently the largest Muslim separatist movement with an estimated armed strength between 8,000 and 15,000.¹² The MILF's most apparent issue is to secede from the Republic of the Philippines and establish a politically independent Islamic state in southern Philippines. The MILF operates mainly in western and central Mindanao and is currently chaired by Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim who took the helm from Salamat Hashim after the latter's death in 2003.¹³ Although the MILF signed an agreement of general cessation of hostilities in July 2003, it continues to expand its military capability by building up forces and strengthening their defenses.¹⁴

The on-going peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and the MILF have been derailed due to legal issues relating to Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).¹⁵ The Supreme Court of the Philippine, upon the petition of local leaders in Mindanao, identified two substantive issues relating to the MOA-AD, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, and the other relating to its provisions.¹⁶ Many people from Mindanao (notably Christian political leaders) looked at the ancestral domain provision as a tool to enlarge Muslim controlled areas in Mindanao.¹⁷ These political leaders claimed that they were not consulted during the negotiations, particularly in crafting the Annexes that enlarges Muslim geographic scope to the MOA-AD. The Supreme Court ruled that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines peace negotiating panel violated the constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they failed to include the local governments during the negotiation leading to the MOA-AD.¹⁸ On the other hand, certain provisions of the MOA-AD can not be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws particularly the powers conceded by the MOA-AD to the

Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE, an entity introduced in the MOA-AD who shall have the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the *Bangsamoro*).¹⁹

As a result, the Philippine Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order that prevented the signing of the MOA-AD.²⁰ Until such issues are resolved, the MILF remains a threat to national security. In the meantime, the MILF will continue to take advantage of the cessation of hostilities to enhance its military capability. The MILF enjoys a vast pool of mass support within its areas of operation and can maintain a considerable amount of influence in Muslim communities, particularly in central Mindanao. It has successfully generated funding through its collection among its sympathizers. Internationally, the MILF has also maintained a strong affiliation with international Islamic organizations and benefactors that provide it with financial, logistical and technical support.²¹ Despite a seemingly formidable organization, the MILF hierarchy lacks over-all control over the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)²² since loyalty of its members usually lies with their unit or group commanders. This was clearly illustrated when rouge members of the MILF attacked innocent civilian communities in Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, and Sarangani in August 2008 to protest of the non-signing of the MOA-AD that claimed hundreds of innocent lives.²³ The Philippine government has pressured the MILF leadership to turn in the BIAF commanders (Abdullah Macapaar alias Commander Bravo, Ameril Umbra Kato, and Aleem Sulayman Pangalian) responsible for the attacks. These BIAF commanders are historically recalcitrant and have the capacity to continue their violent acts even if peace agreements are signed.²⁴ Thus, it is not unlikely that certain BIAF units may conduct operations without the sanction of the MILF hierarchy. Should the peace negotiations fail, the MILF retains the capability to conduct guerilla operations, as well as kidnapping and bombing operations.

Abu Sayyaf Group

The ASG was founded in 1990 by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani as a splinter faction of the MNLF. The ASG, whose original objective was to establish an independent theocratic Islamic state in Mindanao, veered away from its ideological orientation and degenerated into a terrorist group engaging in extortion and kidnap for ransom activities. The ASG presence and activities have been felt in 177 *barangays*,²⁵ mainly in Basilan and Sulu. Abdurajak Janjalani died in 1998 and was succeeded by his brother Kadaffy Janjalani, who was killed in October 2006 in Sulu by operating elements of the Marine Corps. The ASG is believed to be currently led by Ustadz Yasir Igasan alias Tuan Ya.²⁶

The estimated strength of the ASG as of the December 31, 2007 is placed at 383 and is equipped with 298 firearms (*See Figure 4 in Appendix D: Results of Operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group*). The ASG armed strength has been substantially degraded as a result of sustained military operations in ASG traditional enclaves in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga City. The ASG has factionalized and its remnants have splintered and are constantly on the move due to continued military pressure. Despite dwindling financial support and logistics, the ASG remains a highly-motivated but loosely organized group that can capitalize on its flexibility and mobility with the capability to engage in extortion and guerilla operations. The ASG remnants have also retained the capability to launch bombing operations in places far from its traditional areas of operation, as well as engage in kidnap-for-ransom operations to generate funds. This flexibility offset its setbacks and could generate support from international terrorist organizations.²⁷

Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah is a sophisticated network of Islamic militants aiming to depose secular governments and establish a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia. The JI operates though

independent cells making it very difficult to detect and determine its leadership, linkages and operations. The significant attacks of the JI in Indonesia that killed hundreds of innocent civilians were the bombings in Bali in 2002, the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, the Australian Embassy in 2004, and three restaurants again in Bali in 2005.²⁸ In addition, JI attacks that directly targeted Philippine interest were the bombing of the Philippine Ambassador's residence in Jakarta in 2000 and the Rizal Day bombing in Manila in December 2000 (simultaneous bombings in five different locations in Metro Manila).²⁹ The JI exploits the Philippines' porous borders and the absence of strong anti-terrorism laws to facilitate entry and exit into the country of its members. Many can speak the local dialect that enables them to interact with the local communities by assuming identities as Islamic missionaries, businesspersons, charity workers, tourists and students, among others. To date, an estimated thirty JI members are conducting training in the country.³⁰ As a result of greater anti-terrorism cooperation among Southeast Asian countries, regional manhunts have been launched against known JI operatives and the flow of funds and logistics for their operations have been disrupted. Nonetheless, the JI remains a significant threat to national security since it has the motivation and capability to launch terrorist activities with the support of local secessionist elements.³¹

Lines of Operations as Parameters in Determining Mission Accomplishment

The Operation Plan *Bantay Laya*, from where the Marine Corps draws its mandate to conduct ISO, offers concrete parameters that determine mission accomplishment. *Bantay Laya* prescribes the use of three lines of operations. The first line is Combat Operations, which are sustained ground combat operations. Combat operations destroy or neutralize insurgent tactical forces and bases and establish a secure environment in which to carry out balanced development

programs.³² The second line is Intelligence Operations, which involves the creation of a clear picture of the security threat groups that will support the combat operations. Intelligence is responsible for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy while at the same time predicts through logical analysis and assessment the enemy's future endeavors. Intelligence aids the ground commanders to come up with a doable plan that will ensure enemy defeat. The third line is Civil-Military Operations (CMO), which are operations geared towards winning the hearts and minds of the populace affected by both combat operations and intelligence operations in the whole spectrum of ISO. CMO also includes working with other stakeholders within the government as well as the civilian entities through the conduct of inter-agency coordination and integration resulting in a unity of effort.³³ It must be noted that these three lines of operations are envisioned to mutually support each other creating a synergy in order to accomplish the strategic goal. (See Figure 2).

Line of Operations as a Parameter: Combat Operations

Combat operations are the most violent and extreme of all activities employed in counterinsurgency.³⁴ From among the three lines of operations, the Marine Corps put premium to Combat Operations as a parameter to determine mission accomplishment in ISO. This can be shown by the kind of training that the Marine Corps conducts to prepare individual Marines in the fight against internal threats. In consonance with the Marine Corps philosophy to train as they fight, ten out of the seventeen specialization courses programmed to be conducted by the Marine Corps Training Center for Academic Year 2009 will hone combat skills.³⁵ On the other hand, only one specialization course each for CMO and intelligence operations will be conducted. The remaining courses will hone admin skills of the Marine Corps (See Figure 5 in Appendix E: Philippine Marine Corps Specialization Courses for AY 2009).³⁶ Priority to combat

operations as a line of operations for ISO is also manifested in the budget allocations of the Marine Corps to support ISO for CY 2009. From the Marine Corps ISO fund for CY 2009, 59% is allocated to support combat operations, 33% is allocated for intelligence operations, and a meager 8% is allocated for civil-military operations (*See Figure 6 in Appendix F: Budget Allocation of the Marine Battalions Landing Teams in the Conduct of Internal Security for CY 2009*).³⁷

Considering the Clear-Hold-Support methodology of Operation Plan *Bantay Laya*, it is logical that the Marine Corps put premium to combat operations to “Clear” areas controlled, influenced and threatened by the various security threat groups. During the early stages of the insurgency, counterinsurgents strive for the destruction of the armed component of the internal threats.³⁸ Despite the conduct of ISO for the past three decades, the Marine Corps still strives for the destruction of internal threats. In fact, *Bantay Laya* prescribed a clear target threshold for the neutralization of the security threat groups for a given timeframe. Against the CTM, the AFP’s goal for the medium term covering the period from 2007 to 2009 is to neutralize 60% of the 106 guerrilla fronts nationwide.³⁹ The priority of effort will be focused to the active and advanced/developed guerrilla fronts, regional party committees (RPC) and provincial party committees (PPC). For the long term period starting 2010, the AFP is to neutralize another 15% of the original 106 guerilla fronts and selected RPC/PPC.⁴⁰ These will be targeting the less active and basic guerrilla fronts. On the other hand, the medium term goal of the AFP covering the period from 2007 to 2009 against the ASG and the JI is to neutralize 90% of their strength and firearms. The remaining 10% of the ASG/JI will be addressed in the long term period starting 2010.⁴¹

The goals set under the Operation Plan *Bantay Laya* in terms of reduction of enemy strength within a timeframe equates to enemy body counts as a parameter that determines mission accomplishment. In an interview with top AFP leadership, the AFP reported a “short of target” against the CTM with 291 communist insurgents neutralized (meaning arrested, surrendered or death of NPA) out of the CTM’s 2007 yearend strength of 5,761.⁴² While the utilization of overwhelming military force is effective in high-intensity conflict situation, it has limited application in countering irregular threats like insurgency and terrorism. Though this method gets the job done to a certain degree and period within the whole spectrum of ISO, it narrows the effectiveness of the military to achieve a long-term solution to the problem. This is because combat operations generally only look at how to solve a military problem at a specific time.⁴³

Line of Operation as a Parameter: Intelligence Operations

The second line of operations is Intelligence Operations, which supports counterinsurgency planning and operations by providing both general and specific knowledge of the Area of Operation (AO) and the insurgent forces. Intelligence operations generally support ISO by the production of intelligence from raw information about the insurgents, weather, terrain, and populace. Even in permissive operational environments where commanders have a firm grip on enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, there is an intelligence aspect to all operations. Intelligence dictates the conduct of operations and successful operations generate additional intelligence.⁴⁴ There have been numerous Marine Corps intelligence operations that illustrate its potency in ISO. The more significant and recent of these intelligence-heavy operations that focused on high value targets was the neutralization of Abu Sabaya. The extensive intelligence operations conducted by the Marine Area Research Coordinating Center (MARCC)⁴⁵ served as a

basis for kinetic actions that intercepted Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya and his group aboard local watercraft off Barangay Panganuran, Sibuco, Zamboanga Del Norte in June 21, 2002.⁴⁶ As the spokesperson of the ASG, Abu Sabaya was able to sow fear to a wide audience through local and international media and to some extent gain support notably from the local population. At the height of the foreign kidnappings, the Marine Corps exhausted its resources in sustained combat operations in order to neutralize the ASG but this yielded negative results. However, through the employment of intelligence operations, the vulnerabilities of some of the ASG was identified and addressed accordingly through kinetic operations. Prior to the actual kinetic operations, there was exhaustive human intelligence collection on the part of the Marine Corps and signal and technical intelligence on the part of the U.S. Forces. The death of Abu Sabaya had a significant impact on the ASG as well as for the Philippine government. It ended the media exposures that the ASG used to propagate their cause at the expense of the Philippine government. With the ASG denied media exposure, ASG popularity diminished and the number of followers began to fall. In essence, intelligence operations clearly demonstrated its importance in ISO not only in terms of economy of force but more importantly on the effects on the populace. The intelligence operations illustrated its effects to the civilian populace in terms of zero collateral damage caused by ground combat operations.

Line of Operations as a Parameter: Civil-Military Operations

The third line of operations in the conduct of Marine Corps internal security operations is Civil-Military Operations. As stated earlier, CMO are operations geared towards winning the hearts and minds of the populace affected by combat operations and to some extent by intelligence operations in the whole spectrum of ISO. It is worthy to highlight the fact that common to all the internal threat groups that confront the Philippine government derive their

strength, survival and relevance from the population at large, just like most other insurgency.

The insurgents exploit the population to camouflage their weaknesses and vulnerabilities against the government. These weaknesses and vulnerabilities are manifested in terms of force equipage, training and tactics. This corroborates with David Galula who states that:

Afflicted with his congenital weakness, the insurgent would be foolish if he mustered whatever forces were available to him and attacked his opponent in a conventional fashion, taking as his objective the destruction of the enemy's forces and conquest of the territory. Logic forces him instead to carry the fight to a different ground where he has better chance to balance the physical odds against him. The population represents this new ground. If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. Thus the battle of the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war.⁴⁷

Activities concocted by internal threat groups are planned primarily to organize the population.⁴⁸ The insurgents skillfully exploit the population and shepherd them as a means to realize their goals. By exploitation, the insurgents identify causes, which normally revolve around the weaknesses of the government. Insurgents expose and exploit government weakness using all means available to them, notably through political and front organizations. It must be noted that the participation of the population in insurgency is obtained foremost by political organizations living among the population. The political organizations of internal threat groups are protected by their respective armed components, which eliminates the open enemies, intimidates the potential ones, and relies on those among the population who actively support the insurgents.⁴⁹ In the Philippines, the National Democratic Front of the communist terrorist movement and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the Mindanao secessionist groups embodies the political aspirations that mirror the cause of their existence. The weakening of these political arms put into jeopardy their organizations.

Insurgents have political objectives and are motivated by ideology and/or grievances. By identifying the objectives and motivations of insurgents, counterinsurgents can seek to address the underlying causes of the insurgency.⁵⁰ In the Philippine security environment, internal security problems are rooted in four basic societal divides: poverty, ignorance, injustice, and disease.⁵¹ These four root causes attract a large number of the Philippine population, notably in far-flung and remote areas where government services hardly or to some extent never reach, and offers a fertile ground for the insurgency to thrive. The proximity of insurgents to the affected population is a great factor that convinces and embraces them to the cause of the insurgents. Poverty, ignorance, injustice, and disease are generally social problems that normally require social solutions rather than solutions in the kinetic form.

In addition, the Marine Corps initiatives to CMO include inter-agency coordination encapsulated in the *Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslim* or SALA'AM concept.⁵² The overarching theme of the SALA'AM concept is to convey the message that the Marine Corps in collaboration with government and non-government entities is not just for war or destruction and that the soldiers and Marines are essential in establishing peace and development throughout the country.⁵³ In 2004, operating units of the Marine Corps in selected areas of central and western Mindanao in coordination with other government and non-government entities launched projects in consonance with the SALA'AM concept. Projects were small scale, high and quick impact projects such as construction or repair of madrasahs,⁵⁴ water system projects, repair of public school facilities, among others. SALA'AM operators made sure that the target population developed a sense of belongingness in every project completed by involving them in the conceptualization, implementation and the eventual completion of the project, which made every SALA'AM project high impact and lasting.⁵⁵ The more significant

result of SALA'AM is the reduction and/or eradication of insurgent activities (such as recruitment, coercion, foraging, and armed confrontation) in areas where SALA'AM were conducted and the creation of intelligence networks in the barangay level. The key to the success of SALA'AM is winning the hearts and minds of the people in the area of operation, which is central to counterinsurgency. This is best pronounced by the then MILF Chair Hashim Salamat after the fall of all MILF camps in year 2000 who stated that: "The government won over all our camps but not our hearts and minds. The worst of defeats is when the enemy (government) has won over our hearts and minds."⁵⁶

Case Studies: HUKBALAHAP Counterinsurgency and Basilan

The approaches to the HUKBALAHAP insurgency from the post World War II period through the early 1950's illustrate the downside of using body counts as a parameter to determine mission accomplishment in ISO. It must be noted that the approaches to the HUKBALAHAP insurgency in the Philippines were two fold. In 1946, when the Philippines was still recovering from the brutal effects of World War II and at the same time suffering from the birth pains of running a newly independent nation, President Manuel Roxas wanted to prove to the American government that the Philippines was ready to handle domestic security issues manifested by the Huks. Upon the orders of President Roxas, terror tactics through sustained raids by the constabulary charged into Huklandia, burning entire villages, slaughtering farm animals, and killing or imprisoning many innocent peasants in their search for the illusive insurgents.⁵⁷ President Roxas with his ill-trained constabulary and poor relation with the people failed to bring the Huks into the mainstream of society.⁵⁸ The HUKBALAHAP counterinsurgency made a turnaround when Ramon Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary of Defense. Having been a guerilla during the Japanese occupation, Magsaysay exactly knew how

to defeat the Huks. Aside from professionalizing the Armed Forces, Magsaysay stopped the terror tactics perpetrated by his predecessor. The AFP under Magsaysay underwent organizational changes with the introduction of psychological warfare activities that complemented the usual combat operations.⁵⁹ The centerpiece of Magsaysay's solution to the Huks insurgency was winning the heart and minds of the Filipino people through honest and good governance. Magsaysay overhauled the concept of counterinsurgency pegged on sustained combat operations and restored a peaceful alternative to armed revolution.⁶⁰ The HUKBALAHAP insurgency in the Philippines illustrates the vitality of considering the perception of the people towards sustained ground combat operations. The conduct of non-kinetic operations to combat insurgency in the Philippines proved to be effective in defeating threats to internal security.

Just like the HUKBALAHAP insurgency, the initiatives of the Operations Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P)⁶¹ in the ASG-infested and influenced Province of Basilan in southern Philippines in 2002 gained resounding support from the populace and led to the expulsion of significant ASG elements from Basilan. The OEF-P initiatives dubbed as an *Indirect Approach* implemented a sustainable, low U.S. forces visibility approach that was politically accepted by the Philippine government and helped changed the perception of moderate Muslim communities in Basilan of U.S. operations against the Al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and terrorist organizations.⁶² The *Indirect Approach* traces its roots from the Philippines Insurrection (1899-1902) and the HUKBALAHAP Rebellion (1946-1954), which emphasized U.S. forces working indirectly "through, by, and with" Philippine security forces and building their capacity to conduct effective operations against common enemies.⁶³ The *Indirect Approach* sharpened AFP counterinsurgency capabilities, conducted humanitarian and civic

assistance, and offered assets that enhanced AFP's capability to conduct information operations.⁶⁴ In line with the *Indirect Approach*, the OEF-P adopted the *Diamond Model* based on Gordon McCormick's strategic counterinsurgency model.⁶⁵ (See *Figure 7 in Appendix G: McCormick's Diamond Model*). The *Diamond Model* prescribes priority actions that counterinsurgents must pursue. Actions 1 through 3 of the *Diamond Model* must be done in sequence. These actions are: focus on people's needs, security; attack insurgent infrastructure; and direct AFP combat operations against the ASG.⁶⁶

In consonance with the indirect approach using notably the first and second legs of the *Diamond Model*, humanitarian assistance programs were completed that gained the support of the local populace. The *Indirect Approach* using the *Diamond Model* in Basilan was a success. After two years, the environment no longer fostered terrorist activities in Basilan Island, and Abu Sayyaf left.⁶⁷ The *Indirect Approach* in Basilan was a success that the AFP leadership began to call it the Basilan Model.⁶⁸ With the Basilan people now living in a safe environment, the AFP downsized its presence from fifteen infantry battalions to two, just enough to sustain a secured environment. The AFP won back the support of the population, who saw that the AFP was more legitimate and powerful than the terrorists. The Basilan Model enabled the AFP to achieve its strategic goal of providing a physically and psychologically secured environment conducive to economic development.⁶⁹

Lines of Operations as Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)

According to the U.S. Field Manual Number 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), a measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective,

or creation of an effect. MOEs focus on the results or consequences of actions. MOEs answer the question, Are we achieving the results that move us towards the desired end state, or are additional or alternative actions required?⁷⁰ The field manual identified and defined the criteria of four characteristics of an MOE. First, the MOE must be Measurable. By being measureable, the MOE should have quantitative or qualitative standards against which they can be measured.⁷¹ Second, the MOE must be Discrete. Being discrete requires that each MOE must measure a separate, distinct aspect of the task, purpose, or condition.⁷² Third, the MOE must be Relevant, which means that MOEs must be relevant to the measured task, outcome, and condition.⁷³ Fourth, the MOE must be Responsive. Responsiveness as a MOE require that assessment tools must detect environmental and situational changes quickly and accurately enough to facilitate developing an effective response or counter.⁷⁴ Examining the lines of operations under the Operation Plan *Bantay Laya* (Combat Operations, Intelligence Operations, and Civil-Military Operations) using the four characteristics of the MOE underscores their degree of importance in the present trends of ISO.

Combat Operations as Measure of Effectiveness

As discussed earlier, the Marine Corps puts premium on combat operations to measure effectiveness in ISO. Combat operations are relatively easy to measure quantitatively. Results of operations as an integral part of an After Operations Report or After Battle Reports (when operating units directly engaged the enemy) reflects enemy casualties, captured war materials (such as weapons, ammunitions, navigational and communication equipments), and documents. Although the lines of operations are mutually supportive, each line measures a separate, distinct aspect of the task, purpose, or condition. In the case of combat operations, it measures the kinetic side of the whole spectrum of ISO, thus, making it discrete from the two other lines of

operations. In addition, combat operations are focused on the physical terrain, to either occupy it or deny enemy use to gain tactical advantage. In terms of relevance, combat operations directly address the operational and tactical goal of defeating groups that pose as threat to national security. Despite the tangible results in ISO, combat operations fails to qualify under the responsive criteria prescribed by FM 3-24. The fact that the Marine Corps has been conducting of ISO against the same security threats for the past thirty-eight years and has been using the results of combat operations to measure effectiveness is a clear indicator that combat operations is not responsive to the current trends in ISO. Using a strategy of force for the past three decades has put the Marine Corps in a vicious cycle where in the Marine Corps gets the glory for every enemy killed as a result of combat operations but ironically gives the insurgent reason to fight against the government.⁷⁵ Close blood kinship dictates that every enemy killed create more enemies that the Marine Corps will confront in ISO.⁷⁶ Although combat operations has been among the approaches to ISO by the military and has been successful as a stop gap measure that quelled the spiraling violence, it has failed to solve the problems posed by the internal threat groups.

Intelligence Operations as Measure of Effectiveness

The Marine Corps measures intelligence operations by the number of intelligence products disseminated to initiate and support combat operations, civil-military operations, special operations directed on high value targets, and other operations relative to ISO. Without intelligence, the operating units will end up with schemes of maneuver that exhaust both human and logistic resources with limited probability of meeting the strategic goals. While combat operations are focused on kinetic actions, intelligence operations are focused on activities that will give the commanders on the ground the tools to come up with an effective plan for kinetic

actions. The constant contact of intelligence operatives to the populace creates operational awareness that makes intelligence operations responsive to counterinsurgency operations. On the other hand, using the criteria of relevance prescribed by FM 3-24, it is apparent that intelligence operations fail to qualify as a good measure of effectiveness. This does not downgrade the role of intelligence operations in ISO. In fact, counterinsurgents must appreciate the vital role of intelligence, must invest in it, and use it effectively.⁷⁷ However, intelligence operations are mere support to either combat operations or civil-military operations in ISO. As a support component, intelligence operations do not then directly address the overarching goal of ISO of defeating all groups posing threats to national security. Operations relative to ISO requires other support components other than intelligence operations, such as logistics operations. In the final analysis, it is the supported, not supporting operations that measure the effectiveness of the Marine Corps in ISO.

Civil-Military Operations as Measure of Effectiveness

The Marine Corps measures CMO in various ways. The Marine Corps measures CMO by the number of high-impact projects completed in affected *barangays* and its beneficiaries under the SALA'AM concept. CMO is quantified by the number of persons and families served in the conduct of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. CMO is also measured by the number of initiatives that changed perspectives of the population to the detriment of the insurgents through the conduct of information operations. Above all, CMO is measured by the number of affected communities and insurgents that turn their backs against the internal threats groups and joined the mainstream of Philippine society. Just like combat operations, CMO is a stand alone operation that also requires functional components such as intelligence and logistics. However, contrary to combat operations, CMO measures the non-kinetic side of the ISO and is

focused on the human terrain. The HUKBALAHAP counterinsurgency underscored the potency of CMO over other lines of operations in the conduct of ISO. The absence of CMO to win the hearts and minds of the people has proven detrimental to counterinsurgency. In other situation, Robert S McNamara enumerated this in Vietnam: "We failed then-as we have since- to recognize the limitation of modern, high technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movement. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture."⁷⁸

Focused on CMO-related actions, the Basilan Model proved effective in denying the internal threat groups their sanctuary, enhanced the legitimacy of the Philippine government (both local and national) in the eyes of the local populace, and established a condition for peace and development.⁷⁹ These are strong points that show the relevance of CMO in the current trends of ISO. Furthermore, CMO harnesses other stakeholders (interagency, non-government, international organizations) to come up with a comprehensive approach to quell internal threats and offers an alternative to the traditional kinetic-focused solution to internal security problems. Furthermore, CMO mitigates the effects combat operations and intelligence operations can have on the civilian populace. This shows the responsiveness of CMO as a measure of effectiveness for ISO. In essence, the results of CMO are valid, most appropriate and effective criteria to measure effectiveness of ISO.


Conclusion

Insurgency at the centerpiece of ISO has been plaguing the Philippines for the past thirty-eight years. The security threat groups have evolved in terms of their organization and capability in order for them to win further the support of the people while at the same time adapt to the

approaches by which the Marine Corps conducts counterinsurgency operations. For the past thirty-eight years the Marine Corps has been confronting the same threat groups using the same approach through combat operations. This focus on sustained ground combat operations over other lines of operations in ISO to address threat groups at the tactical and operational level does not resonate to the objectives at the strategic level. The victories at the tactical and operational level in the conduct of sustained combat operations surely reduced the statistical strength of the enemy in terms of insurgent foot soldiers and firearms but never extinguished the insurgents' will to fight against the government as well as failed to gain the support of the Filipino people against the menace of insurgency. Military response is vital and necessary, but it is not a stand-alone solution to deter and crush insurgency. The success of the counterinsurgency against the HUKBALAHAP in the 1950s and the Indirect Approach to the Basilan Model in 2002 must serve as lesson that winning the hearts and minds of the people whom the insurgents derived their strength is the key to culminate internal security operations. Winning hearts and minds can only be attained through robust civil-military operations.


APPENDIX A

Figure 1: Map of Philippines




Source:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/philippines_rel93.pdf
 (accessed March 5, 2009)

Source: Steven Rood, *Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society*, East-West Center Washington, 2005,
<http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei-2/ewc/ewc002/ewc002.pdf> (accessed March 5, 2009).



APPENDIX B


Figure 2: Concept of Internal Security Operations (ISO)



The Concept of ISO that shows the “Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop” operational methodology of the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) and the corresponding “Clear-Hold-Support” operational methodology of Operation Plan *Bantay Laya*. The operational objectives were also identified in relation with the operational methodologies (NISP and *Bantay Laya*) as well as the lines of operations as required by *Bantay Laya* (Intelligence Operations, Combat Operations, Civil-Military Operations). Source: The Commandant Philippine Marine Corps *Concept of Command* published in the 57th Marine Birthday Issue of CiteMar6.

APPENDIX C


Figure 3: Results of Operations against the New Peoples Army



Note: The 1,919 affected *barangays* ending as of CY 2007 accounts for 4.5% of the total *barangays* in the Philippines. Source: Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, OJ3, General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines.

APPENDIX D

Figure 4: Results of Operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group



Source: Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, OJ3, General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines.

APPENDIX E


Figure 5: Philippine Marine Corps Specialization Courses for AY 2009

Course Title	Schedule	Number of Students	Rank Requirement
1) Supply Management Course Class Nr 04	1 st Qtr	30	E2-E5
2) Personnel Admin NCO Course Class Nr 05	1 st Qtr	30	E2-E5
3) Marine Scout Sniper Course Class Nr 11	1 st Qtr	30	E2-E5
4) Marine Drill Instructor Course Class Nr 19	1 st Qtr	30	E3-E5
5) Marine Instructor Course Class Nr 05	1 st Qtr	30	E2-E5
6) Force Reconnaissance Course Class Nr 16	2 nd Qtr	60	01-03/E1-E5
7) SALA'AM Trainers Course Classes Nrs 09-10	2 nd Qtr	60	01-03/E2-E5
8) Computer Operations Course Class Nr 15	2 nd Qtr	30	E2-E5
9) Auto Mechanic & Certified Driver Course Class Nr 08	3 rd Qtr	30	E2-E5
10) Marine Operation NCO Course Class Nr 11	3 rd Qtr	30	E2-E5
11) Marine RM Specialization Course Class Nr 04	3 rd Qtr	30	E2-E4
12) Combat Intelligence Course (CIC) Class Nr 07	3 rd Qtr	30	E2-E6
13) 81MM Mortar Gunnery Course Class Nr 06	3 rd Qtr	30	E-2-E-5
14) 60MM Mortar Gunnery Course Class Nr 06	3 rd Qtr	30	E-2-E-5
15) SALA'AM Trainers Course Class Nr 11	3 rd Qtr	30	01-03/E2-E5
16) SALA'AM Trainers Course Class Nr 12	4 th Qtr	30	01-03/E2-E5
17) Marine Jump Master Course Class Nr 38	4 th Qtr	60	02-04/E3-E5
18) Marine Basic Airborne Course Class Nr 41	4 th Qtr	60	01-03/E2-E4
19) Computer Operations Course (COC) Class Nr 1	4 th Qtr	30	E2-E5

Combat Operations-related Courses
 related Courses
 Intelligence Operations-related Courses
 Courses

Civil-Military Operations-
 Admin Proficiency-related


Note: Ten (10) various courses out of the seventeen (17) specialization courses will hone combat skills for Combat Operations. On the other hand, one (1) specialization course each for CMO and Intelligence Operations will be conducted. Note SALA'AM courses will be conducted in four (4)



classes. The remaining courses will hone admin skills of the Marine Corps.
 Source: Philippine Marine Corps Training Directive Number 002-08 dated 12 December 2008.

APPENDIX F


Figure 6: Budget Allocation of the Marine Battalions Landing Teams in the Conduct of Internal Security (ISO) for CY 2009



Note: Each Marine Battalion is allocated P212,280.00 per quarter or a total of P850,320.00 per year to support Combat Operations in their respective areas of operations. The Marine Corps allocated a total of P9,353,520 for Combat Operations for the eleven (11) Marine Battalions or 59% of the total ISO funds for CY 2009. For Intelligence Operations, the Marine Corps allocated P5,277,000.00 for CY 2009 or 33% of the total ISO Funds. For Civil-Military Operations, the Marine Corps allocated P1,233,974.00 to support Civil Affairs Program, Public Affairs Program, and Psychological Operations under CMO. It must further be noted that Intelligence Funds and CMO Funds will be sub-allocated to all operating and support units of the Marine Corps. Source: Annual Plan and Budget for Philippine Marine Corps CY 2009.

APPENDIX G

Figure 7: McCormick's Diamond Model



McCormick's Diamond Model (*Indirect Approach* to the Basilan Model).
Source: Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army, *Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operations: OEF-PHILIPPINES and the Indirect Approach*, Military Review, November-December 2006 Issue.

End Notes

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- ³ Ibid. 14.
- ⁴ Philippine Marine Corps, *Doctrinal Guide to Combat and Service Support Brigade (CSSB) Operations Series 2*, DG 03A3 (Taguig City, Philippines: Combat and Service Support Brigade, August 20, 2006), 2-2.
- ⁵ General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Annex "A" to AFP ISO PLAN s-2007 "Bantay Laya": (Strategic Orientation (Quezon City, Philippines: Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, December 1, 2006), 2.
- ⁶ Bantay Laya is literally translated as Securing Freedom.
- ⁷ BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, "Philippines Commits to Attaining Peace with Insurgents by 2010," The Philippine Star, September 14, 2008, adapted from a report by Marvin Sy, "RP commits to attaining peace gains in Geneva summit." 1, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T5649330352&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T5649208183&cisb=22_T5649208182&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=24 (accessed January 29, 2009).
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- ¹⁰ International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, "Arrest of Philippine Communist Leader Won't Quell Asia's Oldest Rebel Movement", World Politics Review, November 11, 2007, adapted from an article by Fabio Scarpello, Arrest of Philippine Communist Leader Won't Quell Asia's Oldest Rebel Movement," 3, <http://web.ebscohost.com/isc/detail?vid=9&hid=112&sid=c4d08691-4780-44dc-8f80-8a383fca0995%40sessionmgr108&bdata=JnNpdGU9aXNjLWxpdmU%3d#db=tsh&AN=33526532> (accessed February 13, 2009).
- ¹¹ The Moro National Liberation Front was founded in the late 1960s by Nur Misuari, MNLF's main goal was to secede from the Philippines. The MNLF concluded its secession movement when they entered into a peace accord with the Philippine government in 1996. Most of the supporters of MILF and ASG trace their roots from the MNLF.
- ¹² Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 51.
- ¹³ International Crisis Group, "The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao," *Crisis Group Asia Report No 152* (May 14, 2008), 4, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg/0001238/0001238.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2008).
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¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ International Crisis Group, "The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao," *Policy Briefing*, Asia Briefing No. 83 (October 23, 2008), 1, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg/0007467/f_0007467_6366.pdf (accessed February 22, 2009).

²¹ International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of Revolution," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, November/December 2005, Vol. 28 Issue 6, adapted from an article by Zachary Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of Revolution," 464, <http://web.ebscohost.com/isc/pdf?vid=20&hid=112&sid=c4d08691-4780-44dc-8f80-8a383fca0995%40sessionmgr108> (accessed February 13, 2009).

²² Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) is the military arm of the MILF. The BIAF is organized into nine Base Commands with varying number of Brigades per Command. A BIAF Base Command has an armed strength ranging from 1,200 to 3,000. Found in International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of Revolution," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, November/December 2005, Vol. 28 Issue 6, adapted from an article by Zachary Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of Revolution," 464, <http://web.ebscohost.com/isc/pdf?vid=20&hid=112&sid=c4d08691-4780-44dc-8f80-8a383fca0995%40sessionmgr108> (accessed February 13, 2009).

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²⁵ *Barangay* is the smallest political unit in the Philippines.

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