

Exploiting Terrorist Vulnerabilities: A Law Enforcement Approach to Fighting Terrorist Organizations

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Exploiting Terrorist Vulnerabilities: A Law Enforcement approach to Fighting Terrorist Organizations, by Danny Day, Jr., Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 52 pages.

This paper explores some of the vulnerabilities that are present within terrorist organizations that the United States can exploit in order to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and defeat terrorist organizations. In addition, the paper will explore the ways in which terrorist organizations have been defeated in the past, so the United States can utilize these understandings in order to develop a better approach to fighting terrorist organizations.

The first section provides an overview of Arab culture, an overview of the main tenets of Islam, and an overview of Jihad history. These overviews build upon one another and demonstrate that in order to uncover vulnerabilities within an Islamic terrorist organization; one must understand the belief system upon which the organization was founded. This section also begins to recommend that the United States has a need for a different approach in order to fight terrorist organizations. One that does not rely solely on conventional military might, but one that is based on stronger cognition – comprehension, reasoning, and decision-making – for the 21st century.

The next section explores the ways by which other terrorist organizations have been defeated. In addition, vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations are examined and three cases studies will be reviewed in order to demonstrate that conventional military forces are not always the correct response to terrorist organizations. A full spectrum of national and international resources, to include law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, legislatures, humanitarian agencies, and other “soft” powers, in cooperation with limited military engagements, is a better approach to defeating terrorist organizations.

The monograph closes with three recommendations that the United States should consider to improve the effectiveness of fighting terrorist organizations. A greater emphasis on the cognitive war (war of ideas), synchronization, and greater adaptability would assist the United States in fighting both conventional forces and the atmospheres that breed terrorists and insurgencies.

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Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding. – Albert Einstein.¹

Introduction and Overview

On September 11, 2001, the citizens of the United States, as well as many throughout the world, were shocked. The shock stemmed from two reasons: First, individuals were astonished that the mighty United States, with all of its military and intelligence might, could be attacked to this degree. Second, most Americans did not understand who the enemy was or why he would want to attack the United States. American citizens did not understand that by 2001, the United States had already been at war against a terrorist organization for at least a decade.²

Since President George W. Bush proclaimed the start of a Global War on Terror (GWOT), the United States has struggled with what a War on Terror really conveys. Would this be a war in the same vein as the “Cold War,” where each side flexed its muscle, but little real war was fought? In other words, would this be a peaceful coexistence? More importantly, what would victory look like? Would victory look like it did at the end of World War II on the deck of the Missouri, or would it look completely different?³ Moreover, who exactly was the enemy? Was the enemy the religion of Islam or was it Islam’s religious underpinnings that some would use to create and breed terrorists?

The Muslim faith is as diverse as the Christian faith. Islam has many sects and subsets, as does Christianity. As Christianity has two main categories, Catholics and Protestants, Islam also has two main categories, Sunni and Shia. The subsets often divide even further based on tribe or geography. One cannot lump all of the Muslim faith into one general category. The sects

¹ <http://rescomp.stanford.edu/~cheshire/EinsteinQuotes.html>

² Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2.

of Islam can be as diverse as the differences between Roman Catholics and the snake handling Pentecostals of Kentucky and West Virginia.⁴ The point is that the United States is not waging war on Islam. It is waging a war against international terrorist organizations, the most effective of whom are championed by certain subsets of the Muslim faith. As President George W. Bush has stated, “Ours is a war not against a religion, not against the Muslim faith. But ours is a war against individuals who absolutely hate what America stands for.”⁵

To further clarify, although Islam has splintered throughout the years and deep theological crevasses exist between many factions, Islamic terrorist organizations have been able to cross-pollinate and move from one Islamic circle to another. Theological differences are set aside in furtherance of the grand strategy, a caliphate or international Islamic state without borders. Believers in Islam are divided into two overall groups: Islamists – those who are Muslims and want to practice their religion of Islam (religious), and Islamificators – those who want to establish a caliphate and will use any means necessary, especially terrorism (political). The key difference is that the Islamists want to practice religion peaceably, while the Islamificators desire to defeat the West and impose a political system.⁶

³ Philip H. Gordon, “Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2007), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86604/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won.html> (accessed November 6, 2008).

⁴ Ergun Mehmet Caner and Emir Fethi Caner, *Unveiling Islam: An Insider’s Look at Muslim Life and Beliefs* (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2002), 161 – 171.

⁵ President George W. Bush’s speech on November 20, 2002, at the Prague Castle, Prague, Czech Republic. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html> (accessed January 19, 2009).

⁶ Interview with Taj Hashmi, Ph.D., of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies on February 19, 2009. Dr. Hashmi is a devout Muslim who has studied the difference between law-abiding Muslims throughout the world and those Muslims who distort the religion. Dr. Hashmi used the term Islamificators for Muslims seeking political power and Islamists for those simply wishing to practice Islam.

The United States has a need for stronger cognition – comprehension, reasoning, and decision-making – in 21st century counterinsurgency (COIN).⁷ It has become clear that conventional military forces, with their associated large footprint, are not always needed and are sometimes counterproductive. The United States must give greater attention to the cognitive abilities, as expressed through law enforcement capabilities, it needs to combat a persistent and intelligent extremist threat. To illustrate, as quoted in David Gompert’s monograph, Colonel Jim Pasquarette says, “Counterinsurgency is a thinking man’s sport.” The United States needs to “think about thinking” before they establish a plan of action.⁸

Since the United States has been waging a war against Islamificators who base their beliefs on Islamist terrorism ideology, it is essential that those planning the war obtain a correct understanding of whom they are fighting and how terrorist organizations have been defeated in the past. Alcibiades, an Athenian general, was known for his awareness and exploitation of the customs and unique capabilities of rival powers. The Romans also understood the value of examining enemy culture and language.⁹ The United States should start at the beginning and understand who the enemy is in order to confront him. This understanding begins with a general Arab overview, a general Islamic overview, and then a radical Jihadist or Islamificators’ understanding. These overviews build upon one another and are essential to understanding the background and building blocks that have laid the foundation for terrorist organizations. These backgrounds are critical to uncovering vulnerabilities that the United States could exploit, prior to a terrorist attack or war being declared. Following this overview, an understanding of terrorist organizations’ demise is essential. This understanding is established by reviewing how terrorist

⁷ David C. Gompert, “Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN)” (Rand Corporation, 2008), ix. David Gompert explains that the United States should change its purpose and scope and focus on the mind as the central battlefield.

⁸ Ibid, 1.

⁹ M.E. Krause, “U.S. Special Operations Command,” *JFQ*, Issue 40 (1st quarter 2006): 36.

organizations have ended in the past, and by examining different case studies where tactics other than the conventional military have been successful. These tactics have revealed vulnerabilities that could be exploited.¹⁰

The United States could fight Global Contingency Operations (GCO) against terrorist organizations on an innumerable number of fronts.¹¹ However, in order for the United States to wage an effective campaign, the policymakers and planners should not focus initially or exclusively on what fronts to open. By relying on kinetic military operations to take a conventional war to terrorist organizations or Islamificators, the United States is putting the cart before the horse. Instead, the policymakers and planners should initially focus on two principle concerns: who are the terrorists and what do they believe, and how have terrorist organizations

¹⁰ A general understanding of Arabs is generally based on three sources. The first is a Behavioral Analysis Program (BAP) Report by the National Security Division (NSD) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The report was prepared by Special Agent (SA) Joe Navarro of the Tampa Division and dated September 19, 2001. SA Navarro's report was based on the book *Understanding Arabs, A Guide for Westerners* by Margaret K. Nydell. The second source is an Arab Cultural Factsheet (TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 2) produced by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, January 2006. The third source is the book *The Arab Mind* by Raphael Patai.

A general understanding of Islam is based on three sources. The first is the book *Islam: A Primer* by John Sabini. The other source is an Arab Cultural Factsheet (TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 2) produced by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, January 2006. The final source is a presentation "Islam 101" prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI and forwarded to the author on September 6, 2007.

It is important to note that all sources are obtained from readily available open sources. The point is to demonstrate the availability of information and to provide the basic, general beliefs of Islam and the Arab culture. Without this understanding, it would be impossible to fully comprehend how an Islamic terrorist has arrived within his belief system.

For a more complete understanding of Islam and the Arab culture, see some of the following: Phil Scraton, Editor, *Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent*, Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*, Paul Johnson, *A History of the Jews*, Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Andrew G. Bostom, *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate on Non-Muslims*, Alison Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe*, Zachary Karabell, *Peace Be Upon You: The Story of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Coexistence*, and Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present*.

¹¹ Daniel Byman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008). Daniel Byman has suggested the United States fight a five front war to defeat global Jihad.

been defeated in the past. Understanding these principles enable uncovering four fundamental vulnerabilities of most terrorist organizations: 1) exposure, 2) family, 3) forensic trail, and 4) communications. While not an exhaustive list, these four vulnerabilities are common throughout different terrorist organizations. Once uncovered, these vulnerabilities can be exploited to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and defeat terrorist organizations.¹²

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government as a whole, but specifically law enforcement, has shifted from investigation following a crime to being preemptive. Although it is important to bring criminals to justice, it is even more important to stop the criminal act before it occurs, especially as it relates to terrorism. The U.S. government has experienced a paradigm shift from being reactive to proactive. Law enforcement, specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), occupies a unique position in the capacity to exploit terrorists' vulnerabilities. Working within the boundaries of national and international law, the FBI can work within a whole of government approach to ensure that terrorist information is uncovered, vulnerabilities are exploited fully, and then appropriate information is forwarded to the suitable user.

This paper begins by providing a fundamental understanding of Islamic beliefs within the context of Arab culture and describes how some within Islam have perverted the religion and are now pursuing a new caliphate or Islamification. This paper also explores the four vulnerabilities that are present within terror organizations by examining how some terror organizations have ended in the past and how these vulnerabilities have been exploited to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and defeat terrorist organizations. Finally, this paper recommends potential courses of actions that the United States could address in the way ahead against the struggle against terrorist organizations.

¹² Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida" (Rand Corporation, 2008). Seth Jones and Martin Libicki have researched how terrorist

Understanding the Arab culture and Islam is an entry point for a cultural and religious inquiry. It provides a background in analyzing and anticipating behavior before and after specific events have occurred. It is a base level understanding that provides further awareness by continued exploitation. In short, reviewing the Arab culture and Islam provides a level of understanding that is a springboard to uncovering vulnerabilities that are present. Although elementary on the surface, this awareness is essential to ensure that all operatives, from the Private in Afghanistan to the Deputy Sheriff in Des Moines, are functioning from the same “sheet of music.” The continued understanding of culture and belief systems can then uncover more vulnerabilities, which continues the circle of further awareness.

Understanding Islamic Terrorism

Arab Overview

The Arab world is comprised of 22 countries. Although each of these countries has its own political system and are religiously and ethnically diverse, most share two things that help define them as Arab; Arabic is the dominant language and Islam is the dominant religion. In spite of what may appear to be vast differences, there are some basic Arab values and some basic Arab religious attitudes that cross national or social class boundaries. For instance, an individual’s dignity, honor, and reputation are of paramount importance. Along with individual dignity, loyalty to one’s family takes precedence over personal needs. Therefore, it is important to behave at all times in a manner which will create a good impression on others. This is especially true with respect to families. A family’s and kin’s honor are most important, and shame is to be

organizations from 1968 through the present have ended.

avoided at all costs. One person's indiscretion or ill-judged behavior can damage the reputation of the entire family. The reputation of any member of a group reflects on all the members.¹³

Arab families are patriarchal and hierarchal. This is to say that the fathers and the elders dominate the family and the tribe. Usually, the head of the family, clan, or tribe is the oldest male. Although the males are the authority figures, the females, specifically the mothers, have the power over the home and the children. Large families are desired primarily because they ensure that the mother and father are cared for when they are too old or feeble to care for themselves. Arab families view the Western culture as one that does not promote strong family ties. Since family loyalty is central to Arab social structure, the imitation or adoption of Western values is perceived as a threat to the traditional Arab society and culture; producing a corrupting influence on Arab society.¹⁴

Arabs have a rich cultural heritage. They have made worldwide contributions to religion, the Islamic faith, language, the Arabic language, mathematics, the decimal system, architecture, grand mosques and mausoleums, engineering, the water wheel and irrigation systems. Arabs are very proud of their heritage. They are proud of their highly developed culture and civilization where modern cities mingle with ancient ones. Although there are many differences among Arab countries, Arab citizens clearly see themselves as a distinct cultural group and members of the "Arab Nation."¹⁵

¹³ An overview of Arab culture is based on three sources. The first is a Behavioral Analysis Program (BAP) Report by the National Security Division (NSD) of the FBI by SA Joe Navarro. The second source is an Arab Cultural Factsheet (TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 2). The third source is the book *The Arab Mind* by Raphael Patai.

It is important to note that all sources are obtained from easily available open sources. The point is to demonstrate the availability of information and to provide the basic, general beliefs of Arab culture. Without this understanding, it would be impossible to fully comprehend how an Islamic terrorist has arrived within his belief system or how to exploit the vulnerabilities that are present. Also, see footnote 10.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

A critical unifying component of the “Arab Nation” is the strong belief in God. In Arab culture, most everyone believes in God. Although not all Arabs are Islamic, most acknowledge God and His power and have a religious affiliation. Arabs believe that humans cannot control all events, but that certain things depend on God. Most Arabs are not embarrassed to acknowledge their belief in God, and religious affiliation is essential in Arab society; there is normally no place for atheists or agnostics. Most Arabs also hold that there should be no separation between church and state, but rather that religion should be taught in schools and promoted by governments.¹⁶

The aforementioned characteristics of Arabs and the “Arab Nation” are an essential component to understanding the fertile ground in which some terrorist organizations spread their Islamification. These characteristics are vital in understanding the vulnerabilities within Arab culture not yet explained. The family and dignity are at cornerstone of Arab culture. The rich cultural heritage that Arabs possess in terms of their worldwide contributions is extremely important. Although many times mischaracterized as backwards or uncivilized, in fact the majority of Arabs are law-abiding citizens with families and a wide variety of occupations. Arabs have long had a strong belief in God, which has overshadowed their entire existence. These key factors of family, civilization, nation, and God when woven together with Islamic beliefs form the foundation upon which some terrorist organizations build their Islamification beliefs.¹⁷ They also provide vulnerabilities, when recognized, that can be exploited.

Islam Overview

Islam is one of the three “Big” or major religions of the world: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. It has approximately 1.2 billion followers and makes up approximately 22% of the world population. In comparison, Christianity comprises approximately 33% of the world

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

population.¹⁸ It has ties to both Christianity and to Judaism. Like Christianity, Islam has many divisions, sects, and subsets, which make it difficult to fully grasp. Building upon the Arab overview, an understanding of Islam is vital in order to appreciate the foundational religious blocks that Islamificators utilize. A basic understanding of the principles of Islam, the holy Quran, and the five pillars of Islam, is critical to revealing areas that Islamificator's ideology is vulnerable.

All three "Big" religions trace their connection back to the prophet Abraham. Islam traces its roots to Abraham through his son Ishmael, whereas Christianity and Judaism trace their roots to Abraham through his son Isaac. Muhammad was not trying to establish a new religion, but he was trying to correct and complete the message of his predecessors.¹⁹ According to Islamic belief, all revelations from God before the Quran (the Torah and the New Testament) have been either lost or tampered with and corrupted. Thus they are no longer authentic or reliable and therefore no longer authoritative.²⁰ Man has corrupted the other two revelations from God (the Torah and the New Testament) and only the Quran is the uncorrupt, unbiased, untouched, pure revelation from God to man.

Muslims believe the holy Quran is literally the word of God. It is the will of God as revealed in the Arabic language for all people. Although the Jewish Torah and the Christian Gospel also contain the will of God as revealed to those people in their time, Muslims believe that the Quran completes the revelations from God and restores all revelation to the pristine truth.²¹

¹⁸ Presentation "Islam 101" prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10. It is important to note that all sources are obtained from readily available open sources. The point is to demonstrate the availability of information and to provide the basic, general beliefs of Islam. Without this understanding, it would be impossible to fully comprehend how an Islamic terrorist has arrived within his belief system or how to exploit the vulnerabilities that are present.

¹⁹ John Sabini, *Islam: A Primer* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Editorial Associates, 1990), 6.

²⁰ R.C. Sproul and Abdul Saleeb, *The Dark Side of Islam* (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2003), 15.

²¹ Ibid, 10.

This process is considered “progressive revelation” and is crucial in understanding the core beliefs of Islam because what happens last, matters most.²² The Quran is divided into 114 chapters (sura) and the chapters are divided into verses (aya). The Quran is not in chronological order but is in descending order from the longest chapter to the shortest. Also, scholars are able to distinguish between the Meccan chapters, which were the earlier revelations and tend to be short and deal with religious themes, and the Medina chapters, which were the later revelations and tend to be longer and deal with legal, social or political situations.²³ In addition to the Quran, Islam’s traditions are also based on the Sunna and Hadith. In short, the Sunna and Hadith are the traditions, sayings, and actions of Muhammad as recalled and recorded by his contemporaries.

Similar to Christianity and Judaism, Islam is monotheistic. Islam believes strongly in the afterlife, both heaven and hell, and teaches that on the Day of Judgment, God will weigh every person’s sins and good deeds; sending whom He wills to a paradise of delights or a hell of torment.²⁴ Islam has five fundamentals of faith, or what are referred to as the five pillars of Islam. The five pillars include the Shehadah (Testimony of Faith) or the Creed, the Salat (Daily Prayer), the Zakat (Giving of Alms), the Sawm or Ramadan (Fasting), which honors the arrival of the Quran, and the Hajj (Pilgrimage), which honors Abraham.²⁵

The first pillar is the Shehadah or testimony of faith - “There is no God but Allah. Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.” This testimony is whispered into a newborn’s ear. The words are repeated throughout his life, and if possible, at his death.²⁶ Although simple, this testimony does many things. It is an affirmation of the monotheistic belief in one true god. It is

²² Stephen Coughlin is a former Intelligence Analyst with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He gave a presentation to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) on September 26, 2008.

²³ Sabini, 11.

²⁴ Ibid, 7.

²⁵ Presentation “Islam 101” prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

²⁶ Caner, 122.

the negation of false idols. It is also the statement of faith that a nonbeliever recites three times in front of a Muslim witness in order to become Muslim.²⁷

The Salat, or daily prayer, is the second pillar. It is offered five times a day: dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, dusk, and evening. Prayer is not a personal conversation between a human and God, but rather it is an external practice saturated with formal procedures and required customs. It consists of different rituals and prostrations, as acts of submission to God. In fact, “mosque,” the term designating the place of corporate Islamic worship, literally means a place of prostration.²⁸ The Friday noon prayer is the only required congregational or corporate prayer. The prayer must be recited in Arabic. The worshippers must face Mecca, and congregational prayer must be led by a learned person of the Quran.²⁹

The third pillar is almsgiving, the act of giving to the poor. Almsgiving cleanses the Muslim of greed and selfishness while exacting the equitable distribution of goods to the entire community.³⁰ Giving alms is calculated individually after all debts have been paid. Individuals are required to give from 2.5%-10% of their average annual wealth. The monies are paid to the government, such as Saudi Arabia, or a designated charitable organization, such as the Muslim World League. The resources are then distributed to poor, needy Muslims.³¹

Ramadan, the fourth pillar, is honoring the arrival of the Quran. Ramadan takes place in the 10th month of the Islamic year on lunar cycle. This is because the first revelation of the Quran appeared during the 10th month. Muslims are required to fast from dawn to dusk. Fasting

²⁷ Presentation “Islam 101” prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

²⁸ Caner, 125.

²⁹ Presentation “Islam 101” prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

³⁰ Caner, 125.

³¹ Presentation “Islam 101” prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

requires refraining from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse. In their place, one is to read the Quran introspectively, and perform an act of worship.³² Fasting is considered a method of self-purification. The only individuals exempt from the fast are the sick, the elderly, pregnant women, or travelers. If possible, they must make up the fast later in the year. Following sundown, one is allowed a small snack, then prayer, and then usually a large dinner with family. At the end of Ramadan, there is usually a large celebration.³³

The fifth and final pillar is the Hajj, or pilgrimage. The pilgrimage is the climax of the Muslim's spiritual journey. The Hajj takes place in the 12th month of the Islamic calendar year. It is an annual pilgrimage to Mecca. If physically and financially able, Muslims are required to take the pilgrimage once in their lifetime. The Hajj honors Abraham and is based on Islamic tradition where Abraham was commanded to sacrifice Ishmael, but God gave him a ram instead. In gratitude, Abraham built a place of worship, called it Kaaba, and requested that followers make an annual pilgrimage to it.³⁴ Muslims must circle the Kaaba seven times, run the two hills of Mecca, (Safa/Marwa hills) seven times, and drink from the holy well of Zamzam, in order to reenact Hagar's frantic search for water for her son Ishmael. Muhammad said that a person who performs Hajj properly would return as a newly born baby, free of all sins.³⁵

The five pillars of Islam are the cornerstone for every Muslim. They represent a continuing journey throughout the Muslim's life. All aspects of life are woven together, and God is present or acknowledged in all of life. It seems a great divide between a Muslim who peacefully and faithfully practices the five pillars of Islam (Islams), and a member of a terrorist organization who desires the worldwide establishment of an Islamic state (Islamificator). To

³² Caner, 127.

³³ Presentation "Islam 101" prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

³⁴ Caner, 128.

³⁵ Sabini, 21.

appreciate the vulnerabilities that are present, one must understand the core beliefs that motivate and inspire. With Arab culture and Islamic beliefs providing context, it is time to explore the historical roots of Jihad.

Jihad Overview

Jihad was declared by the early Muslim leaders as a sixth unofficial pillar of Islam.³⁶ In short, it was to be used as an instrument for the spread and defense of the religion or state. Muslims see the boundaries of nations in three ways. First, is the *umma* (community) or those who have accepted the message of Mohammad. They are collectively the people of the community, the whole fellowship of Islam worldwide. The *umma* (community) transcends national borders and many times supersedes nationalism.³⁷ The *umma* (community) was not limited to geography. When Mohammad and his new converts fled Mecca due to persecution, they defined themselves as an *umma* (community).³⁸ Mohammad settled in Medina and, when strong enough, returned to Mecca to defeat the rulers and establish a state, or *dawla*. This was to become the *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam), or the Islamic state. Conversely, those countries not under Islamic governance were *dar al-harb*, or the abode of war. By establishing a government for the new religion, Mohammad granted himself the right of sovereignty to manage the affairs of the state. Subsequently, this led to the buildup of instruments of governance for war and peace.³⁹

Jihad was a call to mobilize all resources in service of the higher cause. The call could only be given by the legitimate authority, and it could not be cancelled except by legitimate

³⁶ Phares, 22.

³⁷ Presentation "Islam 101" prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

³⁸ Phares, 22.

³⁹ Ibid, 22.

authority. The early Muslim leaders developed Jihad as an instrument of struggle for two conditions. The first condition was defensive in nature, intended for when the *umma* or collective Islamic body was in physical danger of being attacked. The second condition moved from defensive to offensive, and Jihad was used to promote, propagate, and conquer for Islam.⁴⁰ In practical application however, depending upon the nature of the current struggle, Jihad could be viewed as both defensive and offensive. An example of an early Jihad was when Mohammed and his followers waged war against Mecca until it surrendered.

Mohammed mobilized the community above the tribal level with a call to duty to sacrifice their resources, including their lives. This call to duty was the first comprehensive Jihad. The Mecca-Muslim war was the first geopolitical Jihad. Subsequently, all battles became holy and all encounters with the enemy were part of a Muslim's religious duty.⁴¹ It is a Muslim's moral obligation, whether through direct participation, financial contributions, charity, or prayers to oppose infidels who invade Muslim lands, or threaten Muslim existence.⁴²

Based upon the council that met at Mohammed's death, the succession of Mohammed's leadership and authority went to *khalifa*, or caliph. The caliphate decided to expand the religion by the means of the Islamic state. In other words, the Muslims wanted to expand their physical state under sound religious doctrine. As the religion expanded and moved forward, so would the state, and vice versa. This expansion into *dar al-harb* or non-Muslim lands was called *al fatah* or the opening.⁴³ *Al fatah* was the conquest of non-Muslim lands. In essence, the overall goal of the successive caliphates was the establishment of the Islamic religion worldwide.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 23.

⁴¹ Ibid, 24.

⁴² Martin E. Hanratty, "Can the United States Defeat Radical Islam?" (School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 19.

⁴³ Phares, 27.

From Mohammed and his successors in the seventh century until the last Ottoman sultan in the twentieth century, Jihad was a state business.⁴⁴ War was not a footnote on the history or expansion of Islam, but it was the main vehicle for the religious expansion.⁴⁵ Islam enjoyed unprecedented expansion for one thousand years and there was no viable concept of a defensive Jihad. It was the Muslim duty to bring peace to the world via the sword.⁴⁶ It was not until the decline of the Ottoman Empire that Islam began to embrace a defensive Jihad of survival.⁴⁷

Recent History

In 1923, Kemal Mustafa took over power in the Ottoman Empire and abolished the institution of the caliphate. This created a tremendous problem that has led to two movements that are relevant to current terrorist organizations and Islamification. First, with the caliphate dismantled, no other Muslim or Arab government has been able to reestablish it. This has ultimately left a void of religious and political legitimacy that ideological movements and charismatic leaders have tried to fill. With no caliph, it would seem simple that no one could call for Jihad. If only the caliph has ultimate control over war and the resumption of *fatah* (conquest), no one else could claim the authority to launch a worldwide Jihad. This has left questions with some Muslims as to whom the legitimate authority is. In addition, if someone were to step forward and dare declare himself as the new caliph, the caliphate could become a new super state above the sovereignties of all Arab or Muslim governments.⁴⁸

With the demise of the caliphate, two organizations took root and began to spread their schools and doctrines. These two organizations, with Arab culture and Islamic beliefs providing

⁴⁴ Ibid, 69.

⁴⁵ Caner, 78.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 78.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 77.

⁴⁸ Phares, 71.

context, have a direct impact on the Islamic terrorist organizations or Islamificators faced today. The two organizations that replaced the void left by the caliphate in the 1920s were the Wahabis and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁹ Both movements would have been submissive to the caliphate, if it had not been dismantled, but that is not to imply that the caliphate would have dismantled either organization. On the contrary, the caliphate might have championed one or the other organization's philosophies. The histories and philosophies of each organization are vital to understanding how some Muslims champion the cause of Islamification and the vulnerabilities that the United States can exploit in order to defeat terrorist organizations.

During the 1920s, the Wahabi Saudis took control of the vast deserts of Arabia and the two holy sites of Islam, Mecca and Medina. The Wahabi Saudi tribes link their existence back to Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), the founder of modern day Wahabism⁵⁰. The Saudis were a puritanical federation of tribes. The Saudi emirs, the Bedouin princes of the house of Saud, were devoted Muslims, but they were pragmatic and knew how to align ideology with reality.⁵¹ Based upon their defeat from World War I, the Bedouin princes made two historic choices during World War II. First, they decided to adhere to international law as a means of international relations. This was unprecedented because Muslims only acknowledged *Sharia* law, or law that was based on Islam. The other choice was to align themselves with the Allies, namely the United States. This established a relationship between the Saudi government and the United States that has lasted to the present.⁵²

⁴⁹ Ibid, 72.

⁵⁰ Hanratty, 10.

⁵¹ Phares, 72.

⁵² Ibid, 73.

Wahabis

Wahabism is a conservative Sunni Islam reform movement upon which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is founded and is the form of Islam found in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and parts of Somalia, Algeria and Mauritania. The doctrine is based on the uniqueness of God and denounces the moral decline and political weakness in the Arabian Peninsula.⁵³ It was founded by Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab in central Saudi Arabia in the 18th century. The followers are also referred to as *Salafi*, or followers of the Forefathers of Islam. Two of their most pronounced beliefs are that unbelievers be put to death and paradise promised to anyone who died in the struggle for purity of Islam.⁵⁴ The Wahabi Saudis or Wahabism can be labeled as Islamic fundamentalism. The Wahabi Saudis have created a strategy to continue the *fatah* (conquest). The Wahabi Saudis' approach is a top-down Jihad - meaning started at the top levels of the government and working its way down.⁵⁵

The Wahabi Saudis developed a domestic strategy and a foreign policy strategy they hoped would ultimately lead to the continued expansion of Islam. The domestic strategy was to apply the *Sharia* law and cultivate a true Islamist state, a "city on a hill" for Muslims to follow. This strategy led to the absence of any political parties, no separation of powers, few rights for women, no religious freedom, and the application of the religious code to include beheadings and chopping off hands. With the Western adherence to the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty the nation-state, this permitted the recognized legitimate leaders of Saudi Arabia to cultivate a society that was based on strict *Sharia* law.⁵⁶

⁵³ Hanratty, 10.

⁵⁴ Presentation "Afghanistan To Al Qaeda" prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

⁵⁵ Phares, 72.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 103.

The Wahabi Saudis also established a foreign policy that consisted of two avenues of influence. The first was a sustained policy of funding Islamist networks around the world within the framework of charities, mosques, hospitals, orphanages, and religious schools or madrassas.⁵⁷

According to an analysis on PBS's *Frontline*,

“A madrassa is an Islamic religious school. Many of the Taliban were educated in Saudi-financed madrassas in Pakistan that teach Wahhabism, a particularly austere and rigid form of Islam, which is rooted in Saudi Arabia. Around the world, Saudi wealth and charities contributed to an explosive growth of madrassas during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. During that war (1979-1989), a new kind of madrassa emerged in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region -- not so much concerned about scholarship as making war on infidels. The enemy then was the Soviet Union, today it's America.”⁵⁸

With Saudi Arabia financing these schools since the 1920s and the recent explosion of these schools since the 1980s, militant Jihadist groups have enjoyed an endless source of manpower to draw from. Further, according to an interview with Vali Nasr on PBS's *Frontline*,

“Those interpretations of Islam are being propagated out of schools that receive organizational and financial funding from Saudi Arabia. In fact, I would push it further: that these schools would not have existed without Saudi funding. They would not have proliferated across Pakistan and India and Afghanistan without Saudi funding. They would not have had the kind of prowess that they have without Saudi funding, and they would not have trained as many people without Saudi funding.”⁵⁹

The second foreign policy avenue of influence was the Wahabi academia assault on the United States' colleges and universities. Wahabi “petrodollars” from Saudi Arabia began as of

⁵⁷ Ibid, 103.

⁵⁸ PBS *Frontline*: “Saudi Time Bomb?” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/madrassas.html> (accessed January 20, 2009).

⁵⁹ Ibid. Vali Nasr is an associate professor of political science at the University of San Diego, specializing in the politics of Islamic extremism in South Asia. He explains how Saudi money has been funding many madrassas (religious schools) which teach its austere orthodox brand of Islam, known as Wahhabism. Nasr tells *FRONTLINE* that the result is “the increasing entrenchment of rigidity and fanaticism in the Muslim world,” which serves as the setting for Saudi-U.S. relations. This interview was conducted on Oct. 25, 2001.

the early 1980s to fund endowments, programs, grants, and other forms of educational investments.⁶⁰ With the influx of Wahabi trained and financed teachers and professors, the Wahabis became the “experts” in the field of Middle Eastern studies.⁶¹ With their expert opinions being promulgated throughout various universities, there was no militant Islamic conquest or *fatah*. *Salafis* were presented as “reformers” and Wahabis as merely “conservatives.” Jihad was painted as a spiritual inner experience, while ignoring the previous 1400 years of historical Jihad.⁶² The graduates from these courses were then picked to serve as future professors or public servants in government agencies. For more than two decades, the Wahabi apologists were in a position to provide strategic advice in foreign policy, academia, and the media.⁶³ Anyone raising a “clarion call” against the Islamic propaganda, such as Stephen Coughlin, was ostracized.⁶⁴

Fueled by the resources from the oil reserves, the Wahabi Saudis decided to continue the *fatah* (conquest) with the development of an acceptable international environment. For Jihad to be successful, it needed individuals and societies with influence in *dar el-harb* (world of war). The Wahabi logic was to rule their own country with *Sharia* law, while also influencing foreign countries by financing madrassas and ensuring that a peaceful picture of Islam was painted throughout academia circles.⁶⁵ This smooth selling of Wahabi doctrine was successful until 2001 when terrorists, primarily Saudi citizens, attacked the United States. According to Vali Nasr,

⁶⁰ Phares, 141.

⁶¹ Stephen Coughlin presentation to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) on September 26, 2008.

⁶² Phares, 141.

⁶³ Ibid, 142.

⁶⁴ Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. “A Purple Heart in war of Ideas,” *The Washington Times*, (January 8, 2008). <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/08/a-purple-heart-in-war-of-ideas/> (accessed March 12, 2009).

⁶⁵ Phares, 146.

“Saudi Arabia has been the single biggest source of funding for fanatical interpretations of Islam, and the embodiment of that interpretation in organizations and schools has created a self-perpetuating institutional basis for promoting fanaticism across the Muslim world. ... There is no other state that spends as much money at ensuring conservatism and fanaticism among Muslims.”⁶⁶

Muslim Brotherhood

The other organization that began because of the absence of the caliphate was the Muslim Brotherhood. Whereas the Wahabis were a “top-down” organization, the Brotherhood was a “bottom-up” organization, or a grass-roots movement, outside of the government.⁶⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. He formed the Brotherhood to spread the acceptance and belief in *Sharia* law. He believed that Western colonialism was the chief cause of Egypt’s ills. The Brotherhood expanded and became more radical after WWII. The Brotherhood was responsible for the assassination of Egypt’s foreign minister in 1948. This assassination led to a crackdown by the Egyptian Government. This crackdown led to an alliance with Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser promised a return to *Sharia* law in exchange for aid in overthrowing the government. After a successful coup, Nasser threw most of the Brotherhood in jail, which led to continued conflict with the Brotherhood.⁶⁸

The main philosopher/teacher for the Brotherhood was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian Islamic radical. He believed that the Western powers were bleeding Egyptian resources dry. He was firmly against capitalism and formed a social welfare network outside the government to win the hearts and minds of the population. Qutb advocated the overthrowing of

⁶⁶PBS *Frontline*: “Saudi Time Bomb?”
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/interviews/nasr.html> (accessed January 20, 2009).

⁶⁷ Phares, 73.

⁶⁸ Presentation “Afghanistan To Al Qaeda” prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

all governments because human beings need to be free of all worldly systems in order to faithfully serve God. His writings are still used by radical Islamists and Islamificators today.⁶⁹

The Brotherhood is not only anti-capitalist, but they are also anti-communist because they believe communism is atheistic. The Brotherhood believes in Pan-Islamism or the uniting of all Muslim lands under one Islamic nation – the reestablishing of the caliphate or Islamification. Although they profess a highly educated membership, the Brotherhood believes that many times only violence will produce change. They were responsible for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and were responsible for the Luxor massacre in 1996. The populace is torn between the Brotherhood's good works in the social network and the Brotherhood's brutal terrorism. Two highly noted members of the Brotherhood include Sheikh Omar Abdel al-Rahman, mastermind of the first twin tower attacks, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.⁷⁰

The Wahabis and the Brotherhood have fostered, mentored, created, and financed terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. The underlying core that binds the different Islamic terrorist groups together is the establishment of a caliphate or Islamification. It is sometimes difficult to see where one group or sect stops and the other group begins. Many times the different terrorist organizations are intertwined or even merge, but at other times, they seem to be in fierce competition.⁷¹

Al Qaeda, the Wahabis, and the Brotherhood are often classified as a *Salafist* organization. The term *Salaf* usually refers to the first three generations of Muslims.⁷² *Salafism* believes that only the prophet Mohammad and the following two generations of Muslims practiced Islam in the appropriate manner. *Salafism* has rejected any attempts to creatively

⁶⁹ Hanratty, 19.

⁷⁰ Presentation "Afghanistan To Al Qaeda" prepared by Intelligence Specialist (IS) Keith Gierlack of the FBI. Also, see footnote 10.

⁷¹ Phares, 74.

⁷² <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salaf>

interpret the Quran or any attempts to reconcile Islam with Western values.⁷³ *Salafism* desires a return to Mohammed's 7th century pure Islamic teachings. Those teachings include the expansion of Islam or the continuation of the *fatah* (conquest).

Islamic Terrorism Conclusion

Admiral Eric Olson, the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, said before the Senate Armed Service Committee that for Special Operations to accomplish their mission, their first priority was to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats to the Nation. This is accomplished by "emphasizing culturally-attuned international engagement and fostering interagency cooperation."⁷⁴ The United States' forces needed to focus more on the cognitive side and less on the kinetic side. With Arab culture and Islamic beliefs providing context, a better understanding of the breeding grounds for terrorist organizations is essential and subsequently vulnerabilities are exposed that the United States can exploit. The Irregular Warfare (IW), Joint Operating Concept (JOC) states, "IW depends not just on our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores."⁷⁵

By better understanding the enemy, vulnerabilities will be exposed. A more focused strategy can then be developed that targets these vulnerabilities. The Vietnam and the Afghanistan Wars have proven that military might does not ensure a victory. Motivations, patience, and intelligence married with Irregular Warfare (IW) can wreak havoc on a

⁷³ Byman, 14.

⁷⁴ "Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy, Commander United States Special Operations Command," before the Senate Armed Service Committee on the Posture of Special Operations Forces, March 4, 2008.

⁷⁵ Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Department of Defense (Version 1.0, 11 September 2007), 1.

conventional army. Colonel Dave Maxwell said that IW is far more intellectual.⁷⁶ General Peter J. Schoomaker referred to current joint forces commanders planning as “More often like Sun Tzu, less like Clausewitz. This means training and educating people how to think, not just what to think.”⁷⁷ To fight a better war, or to fight the “right” war, the United States needs to understand what foundational factors helped to create the terror organization and what the terror organization’s ultimate goal is. This understanding is critical to uncovering vulnerabilities that the United States can exploit, prior to a terrorist attack or war being declared. It is the opposite approach of “shoot first, and then ask questions later.” The more that is understood about the enemy, the better the strategy will be to defeat the enemy.

Understanding How Terrorist Groups End

Overview

Fighting a cognitive war against terrorist organizations with Arab culture and Islamic beliefs providing the context is the first part. Reviewing how other terrorist organizations have ended is just as critical. This is not to imply that there is one plan of action that fits all wars, battles, or insurgencies – the “cookie cutter” approach. On the contrary, this is to suggest that by examining prior successes, and in this case, with Arab culture and Islamic beliefs providing context, the United States should be able to better target Islamic terrorist organizations (Islamifactors). Or, as in the words of Clausewitz, “Historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof.”⁷⁸ By examining how terrorist groups have ended in the past, and then by exploring three case studies of how terrorist organizations were defeated by means

⁷⁶ COL David Maxwell, a U.S. Special Operations Commander briefed the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) on January 12, 2009.

⁷⁷ M.E. Krause, “U.S. Special Operations Command,” *JFQ*, Issue 40 (1st quarter 2006): 37.

⁷⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 170.

other than kinetic force, demonstrates that the United States should review how it fights terrorist organizations.

Seth Jones, in his monograph, “How Terrorist Groups End” has summarized that since 1968, terrorist groups have ended primarily by two means; the group decided to adopt nonviolent tactics and join the political process, or local law enforcement agencies arrested and/or killed key members of the group.⁷⁹ Rarely has conventional military force been the catalyst for terrorist groups ending, and further, few groups have ended by achieving success or victory. This is important because it helps planners and policymakers understand where to prioritize their limited resources. Although some argue the United States spends less of its GDP on military spending today than it did during the Cold War (4.2 percent today compared with 5.8 percent in 1988 and 9.4 percent in 1968), others would argue that, with rare exceptions, the war against terrorists cannot be fought with army tank battalions, air force wings, or naval fleets.⁸⁰ With limited resources and terrorists groups that encompass the entire world, the United States cannot afford to continue to fight terrorism by relying solely on conventional military forces.

Seth Jones analyzed 648 terrorist groups from 1968 to 2006. He concluded that terrorist groups ended vis-a-vis four major reasons. In generating his conclusions and percentages, he excluded groups that were still active (244) and groups that ended due to splintering (136). Of the remaining 268 terrorist groups, they ended because members decided to adopt nonviolent tactics and join the political process (43 percent), local law enforcement agencies arrested or killed key members of the group (40 percent), the terrorist group achieved victory (10 percent), or

⁷⁹ Jones, 9. Jones also explained that he started his data range at the year 1968 because the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database contains extensive coverage of terrorist groups beginning in the late 1960s. Jones 5.

⁸⁰ Richard K. Betts, “A Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2007), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86605/richard-k-betts/a-disciplined-defense.html> (accessed November 6, 2008).

military force was used to end the terrorist group (7 percent).⁸¹ There are also some variables or factors that can influence how long terrorist groups may last. Some of these include ideological or religious motivation, economic conditions, the size of group, and the breadth of terroristic goals.⁸²

Ideological or religious motivation, such as those with Islamic terrorist organizations, might be the most difficult to overcome. Religious motivation tends to have strong support among the local population. The population tends to internalize or “own” this motivation because it could ultimately matter whether they live or die and where they would spend eternity. Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. Since 1968, only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended. Moreover, religious terrorist groups rarely achieve their objectives. According to Seth Jones, no religious terrorist group has achieved victory, or the group’s concept of victory, since 1968.⁸³

Economic conditions might take years to overcome. Jobs and improved lifestyles do not appear overnight, however government agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been at the forefront of battling poverty and creating jobs. Instead of the U.S. military constructing roads or schools for impoverished areas, USAID has been contracting local laborers to fill these jobs. Terrorist groups tend to last longer in poor countries because the terrorist groups blame the populations’ impoverishment on either the current

⁸¹ Jones, 19.

⁸² Ibid 15.

⁸³ The following summary of variables that affect the ending of terrorist groups is taken from an e-mail interview with Seth Jones. Although the interview is similar to Mr. Jones’ monograph, Mr. Jones provided additional insight.

government or outside forces, such as the United States. When jobs are created and economic conditions improve, terrorist groups find fewer individuals willing to listen to their propaganda.⁸⁴

According to Jones, size is a significant determinant of a group's fate. Large groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members. In addition, larger groups tend to last longer than smaller groups. Larger groups would crossover into both a terrorist organization and insurgency. Larger groups would also be able to absorb the shock of key leaders being either captured or killed, whereas smaller groups might dissolve if their key leaders were captured or killed.⁸⁵

Some terrorist organizations will never join the political process or achieve victory simple due to the breadth of their demands. The terrorist groups that have ended because of politics have done so because they sought narrow policy goals.⁸⁶ The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action, and the more likely the government and terrorist organization might be able to reach a negotiated settlement.⁸⁷ Illustration 1 demonstrates that terrorist goals can range from narrow to broad. The further right on the x-axis, the broader the goal. Concurrently, the state's willingness to bargain with a terrorist organization declines as the group's goals become broader. The reason is that the government has more to lose.

⁸⁴ USAID Conflict Advisor Bob Leavitt, a fellow of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), has briefed the class throughout the course on USAID's involvement with building the infrastructure and economies of indigenous peoples throughout the world.

⁸⁵ Jones, 41.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 20.

⁸⁷ E-mail interview with Seth Jones.




Illustration 1. Breadth of Goals.⁸⁸

Terrorist Vulnerabilities

Whether terrorist organizations end quickly or are prolonged problems, the organizations are always vulnerable at some point. Vulnerability to a terrorist organization means that the organization as a whole or individual members are susceptible to exposure, persuasion and/or infiltration, evidence collection, communications, and/or direct combatable confrontation. Anticipating and disrupting terrorist attacks and exploiting these vulnerable points are extremely difficult.

Terrorist organizations are most vulnerable when they are exposed. Exposure encompasses anytime the organization is out in the open, outside of its normally closed system. So anytime a terrorist leader talks on a phone or meets with his top echelon, he has opened his normally closed system to exposure. The duration of exposure changes depending upon the circumstances. The most ardent terrorist, one that never appears in public and never uses modern technology to communicate, has limited exposure. The key for governments battling these

⁸⁸ Jones, 22.

terrorist organizations is to wait patiently for that exposure to occur, and then exploit it to the fullest extent.

MI-5, Britain's domestic intelligence service, attempts to approach suspected terrorists at key vulnerable points in their lives, such as marriage or the birth of children. Terrorists are less willing to take risks or spend many years in jail if they have family responsibilities. Terrorists that have become husbands and fathers want to provide for their families and see their children grow up. Their personal life, many times, becomes much more important than the terroristic cause. Even the most ardent terrorist who lives underground wants to see his family. For example, Israel killed Hamas leader Abd al-Rantisi when he broke his routine and visited home. British authorities also allowed older captured IRA terrorists to go home for short holiday breaks. The terrorists were able to spend time with their wives, elderly parents, and children who did not even know them. Upon their return, while the experience was still fresh in their minds, British intelligence would try to "flip" the terrorist while he was susceptible in exchange for an expedited release.⁸⁹

More than just seeing and living with family members, intelligence services and law enforcement can exploit family members in other ways. Many times a terrorist will agree to provide information if a family member needs a governmental favor. For instance, Israel regularly recruits Palestinians who seek a job in Israel, who want a visa to study in the United States, or who need to take a child to a doctor on the Israeli side of the lines. The United States also uses similar tactics when trying to recruit informants, especially if the informant is not a U.S. citizen. Intelligence or law enforcement officials can ensure that an informant stays in the United States as long as the informant is providing information and working for the government. The United States can also assist with securing visas for other family members, as long as the informant continues to work for the government. In addition, the government can undermine the

terrorist organization by simply “planting a seed of doubt.” If the terrorist refuses to work for the government, the government can ensure that other family members know that the individual met with law enforcement officials. Family members then have doubt as to whether or not the individual is working for the government, so the individual is cut off from terror planning.⁹⁰

Terrorist organizations are also vulnerable when it employs full-time professionals. Terrorists need to secure real jobs in order to provide for their families. As a result, they are only able to devote a certain amount of time working for the terrorist organization. If they work for the terrorist organization on a full-time basis, they will need to be financially supported. Once a terrorist organization begins to pay people, it is vulnerable to exposure by paper trails. Whether through false humanitarian or religious charities, financial giving and the moving of monies will inevitably leave a paper trail. Also, like any other professional, terrorists want to be compensated for their services. If they are not adequately compensated, the terrorist organization is vulnerable by the risk of a disgruntled employee, who may talk with law enforcement, or the individual may turn to another terrorist organization that will adequately compensate him. In addition, if the terrorist decides to finance himself through criminal activity, such as robberies or drug trafficking, he is vulnerable to exposure from law enforcement and intelligence services. If he is caught, the terrorist might knowingly or unknowingly expose the entire terrorist organization.⁹¹

Terrorist organizations are also vulnerable when they begin to communicate their plans. Communication, both the message and the mode of transmission, is always vulnerable. The exploitation of communications is common. The lone drug dealer on any corner in the United States knows that both local and federal law enforcement, if authorized, can intercept landline signals, cell phone signals, e-mail, beepers, and even monitor their activities through video

⁸⁹ Byman, 104-105.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 106-107.

⁹¹ Ibid, 107-108.

surveillance. The terrorist organization is also aware of these vulnerabilities and attempts to limit exposure through technology. The terrorist organization then reverts to utilizing messengers, which has its own inherent vulnerabilities. Messengers are slower and less reliable than technology, and this requires the terrorists to be patient. It may take many days or weeks for a messenger to relay the message. The messenger also runs the risk of being captured and providing information to intelligence services, which in turn, may expose the entire terrorist organization. The terrorist leader and organization is vulnerable if they continue to rely on the same trusted messenger. Similar to tracking cell phones, law enforcement and the intelligence community can track the courier and expose the entire organization.⁹²

These four vulnerabilities, exposure, family, forensic trail, and communications, are not exhaustive but are common throughout different terrorist organizations. Once uncovered, these vulnerabilities can be leveraged or further exploited to target a terrorist organization in a law enforcement approach.

Case Studies

Three case studies reveal the vulnerabilities that were exploited in order to catch the terrorist and hinder the terrorist organization's abilities. Each study demonstrates the cooperation between international law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and military forces. The studies include a look at Robert Reid, the shoe-bomber, Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, and a current look at the insurgency in the Philippines. Each will demonstrate at least one of the vulnerabilities that was exploited in order to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and/or defeat a terrorist or terrorist organization.

⁹² Ibid, 109-111.

Richard Reid – The Shoe Bomber

On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid was on American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami when he attempted to light the fuse to a bomb that was in his shoe. Since the plane was pressurized for altitude, and according to the placement of Reid's foot, the bomb would have likely blown a hole in the fuselage of the aircraft and probably caused the aircraft to crash.⁹³ Reid was subdued by a female flight attendant when she saw Reid attempting to light the fuse. The flight then diverted to Boston, Massachusetts where Reid was arrested. The international investigation began, which ultimately led to further arrests and the current condition of airport security.⁹⁴

Richard Reid was born to a black father and a white mother. His parents divorced in 1975 and Reid lived with his mother. When Reid's mother could no longer care for him, Reid was placed in foster homes until 1988. Reid began to commit petty crimes and was sent to prison for theft. While in Blundeston Prison in Britain in 1995, Reid converted to Islam. Once released, Reid attended the Brixton Mosque and then later began to attend the Finsbury Mosque, the most radical mosque in "Londonistan." From 1997 to 1998, Reid attended several terrorist camps in Afghanistan, via Pakistan. From 1998 to 2001, Reid was a frontline fighter in Afghanistan. Reid was seen in the company of senior Al Qaeda leaders, and he was known operatively by 2001. Reid was a trusted Al Qaeda scout with a Western passport and was detached on numerous aircraft reconnaissance trips. Prior to his American Airlines trip, Reid "cleaned" his passport of

⁹³ Counter Terrorism (CT) brief regarding Richard Reid given by Special Agent Roger Charnesky of the FBI of the Milwaukee Division and forwarded to author on January 9, 2008.

⁹⁴ John M. Demko, "The Ongoing War between the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure and Militant Islamists: Is the Next 9/11 Preventable?" (School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008),12.

all his reconnaissance activities by claiming that he had lost his passport and receiving a new one.⁹⁵

After Reid's capture, he became a valuable source of intelligence into the current workings of a terrorist organization. International cooperation and investigation revealed numerous e-mail accounts, phone cards, cell phones, and video. A forensic investigation of the shoe revealed a simple Improvised Explosive Device (IED), and the items were fingerprinted and catalogued. Investigations led to a raid on a safe house in Afghanistan, where weapons and explosive materials were discovered. The detonation cord found at the safe house was Pakistani made and was a match to the detonation cord found in Reid's shoe. In addition, fingerprints and hairs taken from the shoe bomb matched fingerprints and hairs found at the safe house. Also found at the safe house was a hard drive that provided a link to Al Qaeda and operative travel. Interview and interrogation of Reid revealed Reid's activities and associates, and more Al Qaeda links and leads. Scotland Yard then began an investigation and inside 23 months arrested a British citizen of Pakistani birth, Saajid Mohammed Badat, on November 27, 2003. Badat was arrested with shoe bombs similar to Reid's, and in his apartment were found the same components from the safe house Afghanistan.⁹⁶

Although Reid's attempt to bomb an aircraft could have ended tragically, the fact remains that he was captured and became a huge liability for Al Qaeda. In cooperation with military forces, international law enforcement and intelligence services were able to exploit operatives of a terrorist organization and prevent the future shoe bombings of additional aircraft. Numerous terrorist operatives were uncovered, targeted, and safe houses raided. Reid's vulnerabilities included his need to tell his story, the physical evidence that he was captured with, the forensic

⁹⁵ Counter Terrorism (CT) brief regarding Richard Reid given by Special Agent Roger Charnesky of the FBI of the Milwaukee Division and forwarded to author on January 9, 2008.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

trail regarding his travels and training, and his own admission wherein he stated that he was at war and wanted to kill infidels. Due to Reid's exposure, his forensic trail was exploited to learn new techniques that terrorists were trying to employ. Reid's communications were exploited to uncover a safe house in Afghanistan, which subsequently led to the terrorist organization's exposure from a captured hard drive. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities led to further arrests, further intelligence, prevention of future shoe bombings, and the dismantling of a cell of a terrorist organization.⁹⁷

Japan's *Aum Shinrikyo*

Although not an Islamic terrorist organization, *Aum Shinrikyo* provides a relevant case study for three reasons. First, the United States and its allies are currently fighting a terrorist organization with Islamic fundamentals. The United States might find itself fighting terrorist organizations that are based on communism or nationalism. The goal is to think about and understand the enemy and his goals before committing any resources. Second, *Aum Shinrikyo* is relevant because it demonstrates the need for the government to rethink its approach and possibly change its national laws in order to better fight a terrorist organization. Finally, *Aum Shinrikyo* demonstrates that governments do not necessarily need to fight terrorist organizations with any military resources. Intelligence and law enforcement services can be just as, and many times more, effective. Further, governments might need to focus on terrorist organization's finances in order to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and defeat them. It is nearly impossible for a terrorist organization to continue if it has no financial resources.

On March 20, 1995, five members of the terrorist group *Aum Shinrikyo* launched an attack on Tokyo's subway system. Unlike most other terrorist organizations, the terrorists who carried out the attacks were highly educated. The attackers included a graduate student studying

⁹⁷ Ibid.

physics at Tokyo University, a former cardiovascular surgeon who graduated from Keio University, a former physics student from Waseda University, and an electronics engineer. The attackers entered the trains with a loosely wrapped newspaper containing a plastic sack full of the sarin and an umbrella with a sharpened tip. At a predetermined time when the trains were arriving at the Dasumigaseki station, the terrorists put their newspapers on the floor, pierced the plastic sack with the sharpened end of the umbrella, and then walked off the trains. The sarin gas filled the subway trains and 12 people were killed.⁹⁸

Japan's *Aum Shinrikyo* (or Aum "supreme truth") was the first nonstate group to successfully launch a large-scale chemical weapon attack against civilians.⁹⁹ The group's leader, Shoko Asahara, a half-blind yoga instructor, founded the organization in the late 1980s. Asahara had grandiose dreams of controlling Japan, and then ultimately the world. The group's ideology was a mixture of Hinduism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity. Most notable, however, were Asahara's dreams and divinations of an imminent "Armageddon" in which, according to his predictions, the United States would attack Japan using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Asahara himself would allegedly emerge from the chaos as the leader. He based his predictions on the prophecies of Nostradamus, the book of Revelation, Buddhist scripture, and his personal revelations.¹⁰⁰

The development of chemical and biological weapons was due in large part to the terrorist organization's well-educated members. The terrorist organization targeted and recruited university students and experts in science and engineering with the promise of spiritual enlightenment. Membership was not strictly limited to academic circles. At the time of the 1995 attack, *Aum Shinrikyo* claimed 10,000 members in Japan and 65,000 members worldwide. The

⁹⁸ Jones, 45.

⁹⁹ Shawn Choy, "Terrorism Project - In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo," Center For Defense Information (July 23, 2002) <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aumshinrikyo.cfm> (accessed January 22, 2009).

organization had offices in the United States, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Australia, and Germany; with an estimated worth of \$1.4 billion.¹⁰¹

Following the subway attacks in 1995, the Japanese police and intelligence services conducted an exhaustive manhunt for Asahara that ultimately led to the demise of *Aum Shinrikyo* as a terrorist organization. Japan adopted a policing strategy that included the collection and analysis of intelligence, arrest of key leaders, and adoption of a range of legal measures that crippled the organization. In short, Japan defeated the terrorist organization by police and legislative efforts.¹⁰²

Based on the Japanese constitution that banned the police use of preventive surveillance techniques, *Aum Shinrikyo* was able to grow under an anemic Japanese intelligence service. Japan's intelligence service, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, was developed to monitor and target communist groups. Since *Aum Shinrikyo* claimed to be a religious organization and had not espoused communism, the Japanese government was limited as to the amount of investigation or surveillance that could be conducted. This changed following the subway attacks.¹⁰³

Japan's government passed *the Act Pertaining to Control of Organizations That Commit Indiscriminate Murder*, which allowed the Public Security Intelligence Agency to conduct surveillance on *Aum Shinrikyo*. In addition to passing the Act, the local and federal police, along with investigative and intelligence agencies, went through major changes and updates to strengthen their scientific-investigation, information-collection, and data-analysis systems. Police began to raid numerous *Aum Shinrikyo* offices, compounds, and complexes throughout Japan

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Jones, 48.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

where numerous stockpiles of poisonous and dangerous chemicals were found. Based on the evidence found during the searches from March 22, 1995 through May 16, 1995, over 200 *Aum Shinrikyo* members were arrested.¹⁰⁴ On May 16, 1995, Asahara was arrested while police were searching an *Aum Shinrikyo* facility in Kamikuishiki. Asahara and other key leaders were put on trial and many received the death penalty. During the interviews, interrogations, and investigations that followed, authorities confirmed that members of *Aum Shinrikyo* had planned and executed nine other attacks using chemical weapons, and seven attempts with biological weapons.¹⁰⁵

As information regarding *Aum Shinrikyo*'s involvement began to be made public, a series of dominos began to fall. First, individuals who lived close to *Aum Shinrikyo* facilities were concerned for their well being, so they took independent action to monitor the group's activities and notify police of anything out of the ordinary. Next, due to the groups numerous illegal and violent acts, the courts revoked *Aum Shinrikyo*'s religious status. Members could still practice their faith, however the group lost its legal protection from surveillance guaranteed to religious groups. They also lost their tax-exempt status, causing the group's donations to drop off. Simultaneously, many victims sued for compensation. In December 1996, the Tokyo district court froze all assets and appointed an adjudicator to supervise the liquidation of the group's assets.¹⁰⁶

In this situation, policing and legislation was an effective strategy in ending *Aum Shinrikyo* as a terrorist organization. *Aum Shinrikyo* became vulnerable after the Japanese laws were changed and the law enforcement agencies changed their focus and procedures. Police raids and arrests yielded evidence and information, exposing members, facilities, and procedures.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 49-52.

¹⁰⁵ Choy.

¹⁰⁶ Jones, 53-56.

These were then exploited by changing surveillance laws, denying official religious status, and freezing assets. The forensic trails that were uncovered allowed law enforcement and intelligence communities to penetrate the terrorist organization, leading to subsequent searches and the collecting of evidence, capturing or killing numerous key members, and crippling their ability to raise finances. Moreover, the government collaborated with the family members and local populations to create an inhospitable atmosphere for the organization to continue its activities. In early 2000, the cult officially ousted Asahara as its leader and apologized for the 1995 subway attack, for which it admitted the "undeniable" involvement of some of its members. The group has changed its name to Aleph and its new leader, Fumihiko Joyu, has renounced its violent methods and illegal activities.¹⁰⁷

The Philippines

The Philippines offer a successful model on how the United States is fighting small terrorist organizations. Success in this case means that the terrorist organization is losing control of both land and the hearts and minds of the population. The Philippines demonstrate how one terrorist organization joined the political process, and how another terrorist organization is being defeated by a combination of military force, law enforcement, international cooperation, intelligence services, and humanitarian assistance.

The Philippines is a group of islands with a diverse population that operates primarily by a tribal society. The southern islands are almost exclusively Muslims, known as Moros, and have been in almost constant rebellion against the Christian majority in Manila. The latest rebellion started in the 1970s and was initially led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).¹⁰⁸ The

¹⁰⁷ Choy.

¹⁰⁸ Max Boot and Richard Bennet, "Treading Softly in the Philippines: Why a low-intensity counterinsurgency strategy seems to be working there," *The Weekly Standard*, Volume 14, Issue 16

MNLF was primarily a separatist group that reached a political peace agreement in 1996. MNLF fighters were demobilized and assimilated back into society. A splinter terrorist organization from MNLF was the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which was more religious in nature. The MILF has base commands throughout the islands and some of its members have worked closely with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Indonesian terrorist group that has been linked to Al Qaeda. In addition to the Muslim population, the terrain of the Philippines, to include triple-canopy jungles, swamps and mountainous areas, is ideal breeding and hiding grounds for terrorist organizations.¹⁰⁹

In sharp contrast to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American soldiers are forbidden by the Philippine government from engaging in any direct combat operations.¹¹⁰ Their mission adjusted from direct action to Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID incorporates bounties for terrorist information (Rewards for Justice Program), training, support, and intelligence sharing for the Philippine armed forces, and a targeted civil affairs operation to pull the population away from the insurgents. According to Colonel Bill Coultrup, "The goal is to set conditions for good governance, and you do that by removing the safe havens of these terrorist groups and addressing the specific conditions that contribute to those safe havens." Some of the humanitarian assistance that has been funded or completed includes the following: a new high school and elementary school; rebuilding of 81 homes that the MILF destroyed; one-day free medical and dental clinics; 80 miles of new roads; and 34 new wells. USAID has also planned over \$130 million worth of projects over the next five years.¹¹¹

(January 5, 2009) <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/956zznwj.asp> (accessed January 23, 2009).

¹⁰⁹ COL David Maxwell, a U.S. Special Operations Commander briefed the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) on January 12, 2009. LTG David Fridowich, Director of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) briefed SAMS on January 14, 2009.

¹¹⁰ Boot.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

Along with humanitarian aid, the United States has shifted strategy. Instead of relying solely on force and traditional kinetic operations, military operations are intelligence driven and surgical. According to MG Juancho Sabban, the Commander of Task Force Comet, "... the more we destroyed, the more the number of the enemy increased."¹¹² The population will support the military when crops and buildings are not destroyed and innocent civilians are not hurt or killed. In other words, the military has to be different then the terrorist organization. In addition, the cost for operations in the Philippines is approximately \$52 million a year and requires approximately 600 U.S. soldiers.

Colonel David Maxwell explained that there are four keys to defeating terrorist organizations. The first is to deny sanctuaries so terrorist organizations can neither develop nor regroup. Next is to deny mobility so terrorist organization cannot run and hide. Third, deny resources so terrorist organizations would not have the capabilities to continue the fight. Finally, separate the population from the terrorist organization and replace the terrorist organization with humanitarian efforts.

The keys are non-linear and should be applied in parallel. The concept is to have them all happening at the same time. The mission is not to create another United States, but to create a secure environment, by both direct and indirect engagements, in which the society can build its infrastructure and grow. The United States should be the silent partner and support the current government and ensure that the local government receives the credit. The means should be "By, With, and Through" the local government. This cognitive approach to fighting terrorist organizations is through the local population and government.¹¹³ If the hearts and minds of the population are won over, the terrorist organization's vulnerabilities will multiply exponentially

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ COL David Maxwell, a U.S. Special Operations Commander briefed the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) on January 12, 2009. LTG David Fridowich, Director of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) briefed SAMS on January 14, 2009.

because the eyes of the populace will always be on them. The terrorist organization will be exposed by the diligence of the populace and family members. Law enforcement and intelligence services, working in conjunction with the military, can then follow up with forensic trails that are uncovered through raids, interrogations, information, and cooperation. The Philippines government, with assistance from the United States, is defeating numerous terrorist organizations by first winning the hearts and minds of the populace, and then exploiting the vulnerabilities that are exposed. By the host government taking the lead role, the United States can leave a much smaller footprint.

Conclusions and Recommendations

There is no single simple policy which meets this [insurgency] challenge. Experience has taught us that no one nation has the power or the wisdom to solve all the problems of the world or manage its revolutionary tides--that extending our commitments does not always increase our security--that any initiative carries with it the risk of a temporary defeat--that nuclear weapons cannot prevent subversion--that no free people can be kept free without will and energy of their own--and that no two nations or situations are exactly alike.

-President John F. Kennedy to Congress 25 May, 1961¹¹⁴

The U.S. government has shifted from being primarily reactive to proactive. Although it is important to project power and preserve evidence in order to establish guilt or innocence, lives depend on the U.S. government being proactive, especially as it relates to terrorism. U.S. government departments and agencies can no longer stovepipe their operations, nor sequester vital information and intelligence from other departments or agencies. The U.S. government needs to break the old culture of "business as usual" and employ all national and international

¹¹⁴ Special message to Congress on urgent national needs, President John F. Kennedy, delivered in person before a joint session of Congress, May 25, 1961.
<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03NationalNeeds05251961.htm>

resources, instead of relying primarily on kinetic resources. This might mean taking a law enforcement approach to defeat terrorist organizations. The point is with the paradigm shift from reactive to proactive, the U.S. government needs a further shift to allow the department or agency with the best chances of success to take the lead.

Terrorist organizations and insurgencies evolve over time and are different from one another. Although they may have some similarities, their members, goals, and operations can be vastly different. Although different, terrorist organizations do possess similar vulnerabilities that need to be exploited. The vulnerabilities that were discussed earlier, including exposure, family, forensic trail, and communications, are only some examples of items that can be exploited. As demonstrated, one or more of these vulnerabilities may be present, or different ones might be uncovered. The main point is to discover what vulnerabilities are present within a specific terrorist organization and exploit those vulnerabilities to maximum effectiveness.

Given the differences in the organizations, it is unfortunate that the United States has attempted to fight these different organizations in roughly the same fashion, namely kinetic force. Based on spending patterns and troop levels, it is clear that the emphasis in combating terrorist organizations has been on conventional forces.¹¹⁵ However, a shift has begun to occur from solely relying on conventional military forces, as evidenced by more emphasis on SOF, to the utilization of all national powers including federal law enforcement, intelligence communities, and humanitarian efforts. Even with the shift, the United States has a need for stronger cognition - comprehension, reasoning, and decision-making – in 21st century conflicts.¹¹⁶ As policymakers and planners focus on cognition, who are the terrorists and what do they believe, and how have terrorist organizations been defeated in the past, this will uncover vulnerabilities of terrorist

¹¹⁵ LTC Walter Perry and LTC John Gordon IV, "Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies," *Special Warfare* Volume 21, Issue 5 (September – October 2008), 12.

¹¹⁶ Gompert, ix.

organizations that can be exploited to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and defeat terrorist organizations.

In the current fight against Islamification, by understanding the Arab culture, the United States can exploit the vulnerability of family and tribal ties. Family members can be a leverage to convince other family members to provide information on terrorist organizations. By understanding the tenets of Islam, the United States can also exploit the vulnerability of a strong belief in God and the acknowledgement of God throughout all of life. A sincere trust in fate and a peaceful practice of one's faith can be a leverage to convince terrorists that their religion has been hijacked. Moreover, an understanding of Islam is the cornerstone of understanding where terrorists have built their philosophies and what their ultimate goals are. Terrorist organizations and Jihad are built on a certain element within Islam and on historical examples. Some actions by the United States have only exacerbated these beliefs. In order to defeat the terrorist organizations, the United States needs to leverage the underlying organizational philosophies.

It has also become clear that conventional military forces, with a large footprint, are not always needed or desired. Historical examples of how other terrorist organizations have ended in the past prove that a more comprehensive and more deeply cognitive approach is better. The United States should better understand the enemy; whom they are fighting, their beliefs, their motivations, and their goals, and then explore how similar terrorist organizations have been defeated in the past. Terrorist organizations and insurgencies can be driven by ideology, religion, race, drugs, scarce resources, outside powers, or perceived relative deprivation.¹¹⁷ The bottom line, however, is that they are all trying to gain something: political power, land, resources, or respect. This understanding helps to develop a strategy that incorporates the full complement of national and international resources. This approach does not exclude the military, but rather is conducted in concert with the military.

There is no question as to whether or not the United States plays a huge part in global security. Although the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will probably reduce the appetite for Western nations to engage in similar events without a vigorous domestic debate, the fact remains that the United States is currently involved in numerous insurgencies throughout the world.¹¹⁸ The United States cannot afford to leave these battles without a manageable stability of sustained efforts. In other words, the United States must assist the local government with defeating the terrorist organizations or insurgencies, or the U.S. will face the same threat, probably to a larger degree, in the future. Victory or success is achieved once the exploitation of vulnerabilities leads to the ideology that the terrorists espouse losing support and when potential adherents see viable alternatives to it.¹¹⁹

Although there is relative success in the Philippines and Iraq, there needs to be greater attention to cognitive capabilities due to a new class of terrorist organizations and insurgencies that combine utopian aims, intense motivation, global connectivity and mobility, extreme violence, and constant adaption.¹²⁰ Terrorist organizations have become hybrids, in that members move from one group to another, many times seamlessly. These hybrid or global-local groups are complex and many times difficult to fully understand. The United States does not lack the will or the capacity to fight these organizations or insurgencies, but may lack the understanding to effectively battle and dismantle these organizations. Many times, the United States seems to think that more bureaucracies, more money, or more military power is the answer. According to Gompert, the United States' recent response has stressed:

New bureaucratic layers, e.g., the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, that seem to have improved neither analysis

¹¹⁷ Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 125-143.

¹¹⁸ Perry, 12. Current insurgencies include Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Philippines.

¹¹⁹ Gordon.

¹²⁰ Gompert, ix.

nor decision-making; (2) increased investment in military platforms, which are of marginal utility against a diffuse and elusive insurgency; and (3) the use of force, which may validate the jihadist argument, producing more jihadists and inspiring new martyrs.¹²¹

A new military platform is not necessarily the answer to defeating a terrorist organization.

Military force should be viewed as a piece of the solution and not the answer in and of itself.

The way forward would suggest that the United States should affirm three insights that would assist in fighting terrorist organizations, or Global Contingency Operations (GCO). First, greater attention should be given to the cognitive war, that is understanding who the terrorist organization is and what are its goals, prior to any resources being committed. Second, the United States should synchronize all national and international capabilities in order to better fight the enemy. Finally, the United States should be adaptive, meaning, as new insights, vulnerabilities, or capabilities change, the United States should adapt its approach. By analyzing the history and beliefs of a terrorist organization, and by understanding how different terrorist organizations have ended in the past, vulnerabilities are exposed that can be exploited. The key to winning the campaign against any terrorist organization is grounded in the understanding of the terrorist organization. Understanding, uncovering, and exploiting vulnerabilities leads to a synchronization of all national and international capabilities. The synchronization will rely on the military, interagency organizations, the private sector, the local populace, international law enforcement, and intelligence communities to affect both near and long-term environments in which terrorist organizations will be defeated.¹²² Terrorist organizations are vulnerable on many levels and have been defeated by different means. The United States needs to continue to adapt and be innovative in fighting terrorist organizations. The United States cannot do it alone. By

¹²¹ Ibid, ix.

¹²² Dell L. Dailey and Jeffrey G. Webb, "U.S. Special Operations Command and the War On Terror," *JFQ*, Issue 40 (1st quarter 2006): 44.

incorporating the force projection of the military with the national and international intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the humanitarian agencies, the United States is fighting both conventional forces and the ideas and atmospheres that breed terrorists and insurgencies.

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