

State Defense Force Monograph Series



Winter 2005, Homeland Security

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FOREWORD


We live in a frightening time, experiencing world-wide terror on a daily basis. Every day we see terrorist groups killing and destroying to demonstrate that what we believe, what we stand for, is of no value. The United States is the epicenter of their hatred. In order to protect our beliefs, our way of life, our families, we must secure our homeland, protect our citizenry and infrastructure.

The Congress has authorized a U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. Department of Defense has augmented this effort by providing the homeland defense contingent of homeland security. This is a mandate for a massive U.S. antiterrorist effort and the antithesis of this is a counter-world-wide effort by the terrorists and political entities that support terrorist activities. Herein lies the mandate for an integrated homeland security effort.

Limited federal military and civil support are currently being augmented from such state and municipal agencies and organizations as the State Police, state health agencies, municipal police, hospitals and local physicians, and those remaining National Guard units not selected for military duty elsewhere. This homeland security force is not sufficiently adequate to provide security for our borders, critical infrastructures, critical material logistics depots, buildings, etc., and it will further create other delivery of services problems when those programs are stripped to staff the homeland security mission(s): the reduced State Police and local police presence, the lack of medical staff at the hospitals, the need for the National Guard to perform vital federal military missions.

One way to augment the National Guard is through a State Defense Force (SDF) consisting of volunteers with a variety of expertise to fill those gaps that will be experienced by the National Guard as it attempts to support its state's homeland security effort. These volunteers, unlike those volunteers who support civilian agencies, are under the protocol of military guidance and customs; they are less likely to walk away from assigned missions and are more likely to integrate well with the National Guard units that are given those missions.

This issue of the SDFMS is centered about the use of the SDF Brigades and Units in support of homeland security. The first two articles are oriented toward the use of the SDF as a force multiplier in support of the Active and Reserve Forces in their homeland defense roles. Although the first three articles all trace the historical role of the SDF, the third article makes the case that, as the state militia system transformed into the National Guard at the turn of the 20th Century, it may now be the turn for the SDF to morph into an active force support role for homeland security. The last article assumes this to be the case and provides a guide from which a SDF Brigade or Unit can select its own path to achieve that end.



Martin Hershkowitz
Colonel (MDDF-Ret)
Editor

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**STATE DEFENSE FORCES:
“FORCES FOR” NORTHCOM AND HOMELAND SECURITY? ¹**

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur N. Tulák, USA,
Lieutenant Commander R. W. Kraft, USN,
and
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INTRODUCTION

As U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) assumes responsibility within the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD) missions, it does so with few assigned forces. While the “Forces For” apportionment to NORTHCOM are still being finalized, they will in any case be meager in comparison to the scope of the task and the assigned area of responsibility (AOR). The paucity of forces available to NORTHCOM will require more economical approaches to force building for contingency operations in support of HLS missions. While the National Guard (NG) is ideally positioned and suited to HLS, it may not always be available in adequate numbers if called to active federal duty in support of military operations overseas. In addition to the forces the state NG may provide, State Defense Forces (SDF), military forces created, funded, and controlled solely by a state, and already integrated into the emergency management operations of over 20 states, are a potential force-provider for HLS operations.²

NORTHCOM finds itself in a position similar to that of the other regional combatant commands in that it must interact with the numerous sovereign nations in its AOR and develop appropriate Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). The NORTHCOM AOR encompasses Mexico, Canada, Caribbean nations, and the European possessions in the Caribbean. NORTHCOM also has responsibility for the territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the 49 U.S. states on the North American continent, which are much like the sovereign nations, in that each state or territorial government controls the military forces and other resources in its state.³ Just as it must develop a TSCP for the sovereign nations in its AOR, so must NORTHCOM develop security cooperation plans for HLS contingency operations with each of the U.S. states and territories in its AOR.

¹ Prepared, submitted and approved as a Joint Forces Staff College research paper on 7 March 2003.

² State Defense Force is a generic term – the actual title is the prerogative of the state. See National Guard Regulation 10-4, *State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau, and State National Guard Interaction*, Washington D.C., 21 September 1987, p. 2. SDFs have also been described as “Home Guards” and “Home Defense Forces” and, depending on the state, are officially known as National Guard Reserves, State Military Reserves, State Guards, State Military Forces and Militia. The term Home Guard was used in reference to the organized State Defense Forces of several states during World War I, many of which had the term in their official names. See Barry M. Stentiford, *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century*, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2002, p. xi. The term was also used to describe the organized auxiliary “Local Defence Volunteers” established in May 1940 employed for the defense of Great Britain during World War II. Today, the term is used only for purposes of comparison of present-day SDFs to their earlier American manifestations and foreign counterparts. See George J. Stein, “State Defense Forces: The Missing Link in National Security,” *Military Review*, September 1984, Vol. LXIV, No. 9, pp. 3 & 4

³ The White House, *Unified Command Plan*, [UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET APPENDIX DETACHED], 30 April 2002, with Change 1, 30 July 2002, p. 7.

Friendly forces available to NORTHCOM to conduct its HLS mission largely belong to the governors, the military components of which are under the control of The Adjutant General (TAG).⁴ In 28 states, TAGs are also the directors of the state's Emergency Management Agency or Directorate with control over all emergency management components, both civilian and military.⁵ Within the military departments of 23 states and the territory of Puerto Rico are the SDFs, which like the state or territorial NGs, are under the command of the governor through TAG. Thus SDFs comprise the third tier of military forces (the first two are federal forces, both the active and reserves, and the dual-status NG forces, which may be under either federal or state control).

SDFs, controlled and funded by the state or territory, comprise volunteers who are paid only when called to state active duty by the governor. Nearly half of the governors have standing SDFs, while all the remaining states have the authority to raise such forces (see Appendix 1 for a list of SDFs). It is therefore important for the NORTHCOM staff to understand SDF capabilities and limitations, and appropriate roles and missions for these forces as they work through TAGs to develop contingency plans in advance of the next terrorist attack or disaster. According to the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart, and Warren Rudman, such an attack is most likely to occur when the United States is involved in a conflict overseas, in which the NG of a state may be employed, making the potential contributions of the SDF all the more significant.⁶

SDFs include both land and naval forces and comprise state-controlled military forces that may not be called to federal service. Five states — Alaska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin — have, as part of their SDF, a State Naval Militia, similarly administered by their State Military Department.⁷ SDFs vary in size, composition, assigned missions, and capabilities, but all share a responsibility to provide the state capabilities to respond to disasters, both natural and man-made, including terrorist attacks or subversive acts.⁸ SDFs can enhance HLS effectiveness and should therefore be integrated into NORTHCOM's planning and preparation for HLS operations.

⁴ In Rhode Island and the District of Columbia, the position is known as the "Commanding General," but has the same functions.

⁵ Michael Doubler, "Guarding The Homeland: The Army National Guard and Homeland Security," A Role of American Military Power Monograph, Association of the United States Army, Arlington, VA, December 2002, p. 31. See also Major Bruce M., General Lawlor, U.S. Army, "Military Support of Civil Authorities – A New Focus for a New Millennium," p. 6. Viewable at <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Lawlor.htm>

⁶ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman Cochairmen, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, Washington, D.C., January 31, 2001, p. 25, hereafter cited as the Hart-Rudman Report.

⁷ Naval Mobile Construction Battalion TWENTY-SEVEN (NMCB 27) "NMCB 27 Hosts Naval Reserve Center Conference at Naval Air Station Brunswick" homepage viewable at http://www.seabee.navy.mil/nmcb27/news_01-03_hosts_naval_reserve_cent.htm The article affirms the Naval Militia of five of these states. See W.D. McGlasson, COL (Ret.), "Naval Militia," in *National Guard Magazine*, November 1984, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 11, pp. 12-14 and 39 for a history and descriptions of these forces.

⁸ SDFs vary in size, the smallest being Michigan's, which is currently under reorganization and has a nucleus cadre of 15, while New York and Puerto Rico have very large SDFs, the latter having over 1,500 members. See Roger Brown, William Fedorochko, and J. Schank, RAND Research Report MR-557-OSD, "Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard," study sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and available at <http://www.rand.org>

Key Definitions

Homeland Security: “The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.”

Homeland Defense: “The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.”⁹

State Defense Force: “The State Defense Force is a form of militia and is authorized to the states by federal statute (Title 32 U.S. § 109). State Defense Forces are not entities of the federal government. They are organized, equipped, trained, employed and funded according to state laws and are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the governor. Should the National Guard be mobilized for war, specialized operations such as humanitarian or peacekeeping missions or called into federal service during national emergencies, the State Defense Force will assume the National Guard's mission for the state's security.”¹⁰ SDFs, along with the state NG, comprise the State Militia, but unlike the NG, cannot be federalized, and remain under state control.

HLS may be generally classified into preventive measures to deter attacks against the nation, and consequence and crisis management to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist or subversive attack. SDFs can play a large role in enhancing the ability of the state through planning, coordination, and rehearsals during normalcy in order to bring effective organizations (and their capabilities) to bear in times of crisis.

RELIANCE ON THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR INITIAL RESPONSE

The national HLS strategy assigns to the states and localities the “primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack.”¹¹ In the wake of the September 11 attacks, General William F. Kernan, then Commander of Joint Forces Command, outlined the role of the military in HLS and proposed an order of response to domestic emergencies “that starts with the first-responders, then the National Guard, and finally the Reserves and active components.”¹² Unfortunately, the first-responder civilian “forces” under gubernatorial control are largely nonstandard from state to state, employ varying procedures, are organized according to the preferences of the local and state governments, and in most cases cannot communicate effectively intrastate, let alone interstate.¹³ “[W]ith few exceptions, first-responder commanders do not have access to secure radios, telephones,

⁹ HLS and HLD as defined in a Memo from GEN Richard B. Myers, SUBJECT: “Terms of Reference for Establishing NORTHCOM,” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not dated.

¹⁰ National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet National Guard and Militias, viewable at http://www.ngb.army.mil/downloads/fact_sheets/doc/militias_word.doc

¹¹ The White House, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington, DC, USGPO, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002, p. viii.

¹² See John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Changing of the Guard: Evolutionary Alternatives for America’s National Guard,” *Journal of Homeland Security*, May 2002, viewable at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Brinkerhoff_guard.html Brinkerhoff, p. 5, cites General William F. Kernan, address to the Fletcher Conference, “The Military’s Role in Homeland Security,” 15 November 2001, DefenseLink, JFCOM Website.

¹³ “First responders” are primarily local organizations, such as law enforcement, emergency medical personnel, fire departments, and emergency crews from the transportation and communications industries. See MG (Ret) Don Edwards and COL (Ret) Richard Dunn, “The National Guard’s Enhanced Role in Homeland Security,” *Homeland Security Journal*, March 2001, viewable at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Edwards_Dunn.htm

or video conferencing capabilities that can support communications with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials or National Guard leaders.”¹⁴

The differences of local and state first-responders’ organizational structures, procedures, communications architectures, and interoperability levels across the nation will impose organizational limitations on NORTHCOM planners as they develop contingency plans for military support. Such differences will require the identification of technological and procedural bridges and capabilities within each state and territory that will enable command, control, and communications (C3), and permit some degree of standardization to NORTHCOM plans of contingency support. The scale of planning required from NORTHCOM is significant considering that before the terrorist strikes on September 11, only four states had contingency plans in place to respond to such an attack.¹⁵ SDFs and the State National Guard comprise the state military forces available to the governor in this order of response to follow the municipal and county first responders to the scene of an attack or disaster. SDFs represent a significant potential at the state level for providy territory, as well as Washington, D.C., to form and maintain state military forces, specifies ting trained personnel or forces who can easily integrate with active and reserve component military forces in time of crisis as they share a common culture, rank structure, organization, and regulatory procedures.¹⁶ Since SDFs are not required to train for a combat role to support the Army or Navy, they can focus exclusively on HLS tasks in support of their state or territorial governor – an option not available to the Air and Army National Guards, which simply must train for their combat roles in the event they are called into service for the nation. The law (Title 32, U.S.C. § 109 (c)) authorizing the states and anhat such forces “...may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces,”¹⁷ and as such remain under state control.

With the significant reduction in forces in the active components undertaken by the Clinton Administration, the nation is now heavily reliant on the Reserve Component forces (RC)¹⁸ to conduct operations abroad in fulfillment of its foreign policy. The NG is unique among these RC forces in that it may be considered a dual-apportioned force, that is a force included in more than one combatant command, as these units have both state and federal missions. NG units are included in the war plans of every combatant command. Furthermore, NG units have been activated and deployed intact, up to the division level, to conduct peacekeeping operations as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia¹⁹ and the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.

If the nation were to have to execute even one major theater war, the RC would be called up in substantial numbers just to fulfill the force requirements for that theater and to ensure preparedness to deal with a possible second front, leaving the state governors with fewer options to deal with the consequence management aspects of natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and to provide for the required response to increased levels of readiness required by a change in the National Alert System. Recognizing this challenge, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism

¹⁴ Hart-Rudman Report, op. cit. p. 14.

¹⁵ Bossert, Lt. Col. Phil, USAF, “Improving the Effectiveness of First Responders in Homeland Security,” a Research Report, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, November 2002.

¹⁶ All SDFs are under the purview of the National Guard Bureau, which is the designated executive agent within the DOD for providing administrative, procedural, and organizational guidance to the SDFs through the states’ TAGs.

¹⁷ Excerpts from the U.S. Code are viewable at the website of the Virginia State Defense Force at <http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+44-1>

¹⁸ Essentially the Army and Air National Guard and Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves.

¹⁹ Most recently, the 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania sent 3,100 troops on September 16, 2002, and is currently providing the bulk of U.S. forces for this operation. See Michael Doubler, op. cit., p. 26.

Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Mr. James Gilmore, recommended to the Secretary of Defense that NORTHCOM develop “plans across the full spectrum of potential activities to provide military support to civil authorities, *including circumstances when other national assets are fully engaged or otherwise unable to respond*, or when the mission requires additional or different military support.”²⁰

This change in the paradigm of how the nation has viewed its internal security situation militarily has resulted in a dramatic change of focus for DOD, which is studying intently the question of how to provide support to civil authorities to enhance their HLS posture and capabilities while fighting the Global War on Terror abroad in several theaters of operations. This paradigmatic shift has also resulted in a change of mission for the SDFs, which are now focusing more than ever on how to support the state to protect its citizens from threats to the homeland such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the dual-apportioned character of the NG, many see the SDFs as the ultimate guarantor to the states and territories to handle state-specific missions in the event that the NG is federalized.²¹

ROLE OF THE MILITIA IN HOMELAND SECURITY

“The National Guard and Reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror and the disorder our enemies may try to create.”²²

Recognition of the increased role of the militia (i.e., the NG and SDFs) in HLS was clear in the reports of two advisory panels of experts convened to review preparations for HLS, namely, the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel, both of which recommended that the NG take on HLS as its primary mission and be reorganized, trained, and equipped for such missions. The Gilmore Panel recommended further that certain NG units be designated, trained, and equipped for HLS “as their exclusive missions.”²³ The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) both oppose this stance. The NGAUS argued that while NG units could perform HLS roles, their primary purpose was to remain inter-operable with the Army in order to be employed in regional contingencies, and that their training and organization should reflect that fact.²⁴ SDFs, on the other hand, have no combat mission and may focus exclusively on HLS.

Both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel argued that HLS requires specialized training and recommended to the Secretary of Defense to require units to undergo such training. Both panels noted that while the NG will comprise the bulk of forces provided to NORTHCOM in the event of a crisis, those forces “will most likely be trained for warfighting not necessarily for homeland defense or civil support missions.”²⁵ SDFs, on the other hand, encourage specialization in emergency management training for units and leaders. SDF personnel certify in emergency management and planning through

²⁰ Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mr. James Gilmore, Chairman, 15 December 2002, (emphasis in original), hereafter cited as the Gilmore Panel Report, viewable at <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4txt.pdf>

²¹ See, for example, John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Changing of the Guard: Evolutionary Alternatives for America’s National Guard,” op. cit. See also an open letter to Governor Thomas Ridge from BG (MD) Hall Worthington, President of the State Guard Association of the United States, dated 14 November 2001, viewable at <http://www.sgaus.org/volunteers2.htm>

²² George W. Bush, 14 February 2001, speech, Remarks by the President to National Guard Personnel Yeager Field, Charleston, WV, viewable at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010214-2.html>

²³ Hart-Rudman Panel, op. cit., p. 24, Gilmore Panel, op. cit., p. xi.

²⁴ Doubler, op. cit., pp. 18-19, cites NGB *Annual Review*, 2000, 31; U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Task Force Civil Support, “JTF-CS Fact Sheet,” n.d. 1; and *National Guard*, February 2001, p. 10.

²⁵ Gilmore Panel, op. cit., p. 95.

courses offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the Emergency Management Institute.²⁶ The SDFs place great importance on this specialized skill set, and certification in emergency management training is often a prerequisite for duty in the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and for promotion. The State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) offers a Military Emergency Management Specialist badge to SDF personnel who have completed this training, providing a national standard of competence.²⁷ Having such highly specialized and qualified personnel to serve in the state EOC provides a vital procedural bridge between the military force, local first-responders, and state and federal agencies responding to the crisis as they can operate effectively in both worlds.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF STATE DEFENSE FORCES

In the event of a crisis or terrorist attack, the state and localities will respond with their military and civilian assets available in accordance with their emergency management plans. When circumstances pose military requirements that exceed the capabilities of the state militia (i.e., the state NG and SDF), the governor may appeal for federal assistance. The introduction of federal military forces does not require the federalization of the NG, unless the task is HLD, in which case, these state military forces would be integrated into the military chain of command under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to defend against aggression. SDFs “may not be controlled or commanded by Federal authorities, and missions are identified only by appropriate State officials, [i.e.] the State Adjutant General...[who] is not considered a federal authority.”²⁸ The lead federal agencies for crisis management and consequence management are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and FEMA, respectively.²⁹ NORTHCOM will probably support these lead federal civilian agencies through Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ HLS), or its subordinate joint task force-civil support (JTF-CS).³⁰

If the emergency prompting the employment of state military forces is declared a disaster at the federal level, then state National Guard soldiers may transition from a state active duty status to a Title 32 status, which is federally funded, nonfederal duty status to perform state duty. SDFs would remain in state active duty status in any case. Only in the case of a declaration of martial law or in the execution of HLD operations against an aggressor would SDFs be under the direct control of the federal military.³¹

²⁶ For a list of courses, see the FEMA Emergency Management Institute website at <http://www.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/crslist.asp>

²⁷ See the SGAUS Education Committee Military Emergency Management Specialist program at <http://www.sgaus.org/MEMSAppli.htm>

²⁸ National Guard Regulation 10-4, *State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau, and State National Guard Interaction*, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1987, p. 3.

²⁹ LTC Lawrence L. Randle, (USAR), “Integrating Versus Merging of the Guard and Reserve: Should the United States Continue to Maintain Duplicate Federal and State Military Forces?” A Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAWC June 2002, p. 14.

³⁰ FEMA provides civilian oversight of military operations during consequence management operations. See CDR Ted Smits, USN, Lt. Col. Terri Wilcox, USAF, and Maj. A.J. Heino, USMC, “Limiting the Military’s Involvement in Homeland Defense,” a student research paper submitted to the Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School, Class 01-2, 8 June 2001, p. 4.

³¹ Ronald R. Armstrong and Alexander Philip Gisoldi, “State Defense Forces: Past, Present, and Future,” master’s thesis, California State University, Sacramento, CA, 1989, p. 21. See also Tulenko, Thomas, Bradley Chase, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Grace P. Hayes, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, *U.S. Home Defense Forces Study*, prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dunn Loring, VA, March 1981, p. 3.




Figure 1. Tiers of Military Forces and Source of

As noted, TAG is frequently the senior official in the state responsible for emergency management and will run the state EOC during a crisis or natural disaster, or during the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In those states where TAG is not the director of the state emergency management agency or directorate, he is often the governor’s primary adviser for military emergency response.³² Since TAGs and the state military headquarters (State Area Command, or STARC) do not mobilize for war, they should be viewed as available for the HLS mission.³³ At the state level, TAGs are responsible for consequence management preparations as part of the state’s emergency response plan, and are responsible for “supporting community readiness exercises designed to test local planning and preparation.”³⁴

During a crisis in which state military forces are employed, TAGs will command and control state military forces, and conduct operations through the STARC headquarters. Below the STARC are the unit armories and subordinate brigade headquarters distributed throughout the state or territory through which TAG extends his command and control to assigned NG and SDF units. This ready-made C3 structure in the STARC and supporting facilities available to TAG, as well as the unique federal-state status of the NG, and state status of the SDF, uniquely qualifies it to serve as NORTHCOM’s primary force provider of military support to local first-responders and civilian authorities.³⁵

State military forces under the control of TAG may assist neighboring states in responding to natural disasters and HLS mission where bilateral agreements exist.³⁶ This is made possible through the national standardization of tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as organizational culture, rank structure, and staff/unit organization, all of which greatly facilitate effective integration with federal military units,

³² COL Michael P. Fleming, Florida Army National Guard, “National Security Roles for the National Guard,” *Homeland Security Journal*, August 2001, p. 11, viewable at <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Fleming.htm>

³³ John R. Brinkerhoff, “Restore the Militia for Homeland Security,” *Homeland Security Journal*, November 2001, p. 8, viewable at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Brinkerhoff_Nov01.htm

³⁴ COL Michael Fleming, op. cit., p. 6.

³⁵ Jack Spencer and Larry M. Wortzel, “The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security,” April 2002, Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1532, p. 6.

³⁶ Stentiford, p. 56, provides examples of SDFs operating outside their state boundaries and even in Canada during World War I. Tulenko, Thomas, Bradley Chase, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Grace P. Hayes, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, *U.S. Home Defense Forces Study*, prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dunn Loring, VA, March 1981, p. B-2, discusses SDFs operating outside state borders either in “hot pursuit,” or at the direction of the governor and at the request of the neighboring state.

as well as those in other states.³⁷ The procedures, culture, and training of NG soldiers and units, to which the SDFs adhere, are common across the nation, and provide a framework for standardized models of command and control (C2) and planning for NORTHCOM for contingency planning at the state level.³⁸ Both the newly created Department of Homeland Security and NORTHCOM can work through TAGs to coordinate state contingency planning for HLS missions employing state military forces.

Procedures for federal command and control of state military forces have evolved through such civil support operations as the Olympic games in 1996 and 2002. In supporting the 1996 Olympic games, the U.S. Army (then designated as the DOD executive agent) used the First U.S. Army as the controlling headquarters under which it formed a Response Task Force (RTF) headquarters. The RTF headquarters, which directed all military support operations, was “designed specifically to work federal, state, and local civilian officials supporting the event.”³⁹ In that operation, the Army worked with parallel chains of command for federal and state military forces.⁴⁰

For the 2002 Olympic games in Salt Lake City, DOD formed the Combined Joint Task Force-Olympics (CJTF-O). To facilitate tactical direction of state military forces, a series of memorandums of agreements were completed between various state TAGs, CTF-O, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), which gave the CJTF-O commander “tasking authority” over the Title 32 forces in his area of operations.⁴¹ The memorandums of agreement (MOAs) developed with TAGs of 11 states for CJTF-O offer a solid model for HLS contingency planning, for NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS for using state military forces on state status were under the tactical direction of a Title 10 JTF commander.⁴² Using this model would mean that NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS would not “command” the state’s National Guard forces called to active duty by the governor, nor its SDFs, even though it would work in a combined organization, but would achieve unity of effort through tasking authority through TAG.

ROLE OF STATE DEFENSE FORCES IN HOMELAND SECURITY

SDFs participate in the planning and preparation for natural disasters and terrorist attacks and participate in joint and interagency exercises to prepare for such contingencies. Tasks supporting HLS are the *raison d’etre* for SDFs and drive the development of their mission-essential tasks. Through their TAG, governors set SDF missions, and provide necessary resources to enable them to accomplish those missions.

The primary contributions SDFs offer to NORTHCOM lie in the areas providing personnel specialized in emergency management to support planning, preparing, and coordinating for contingencies, and to

³⁷ Col. Randall J. Larsen, USAF (Ret.), and Ruth A. David, Ph.D., “Homeland Defense: Assumptions First, Strategy Second,” *Strategic Review*, Fall 2000, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, pp. 4-10, also viewable at <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/article1.htm>

³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Organization and Functions: State Defense Forces National Guard Bureau and State National Guard Interaction*, National Guard Regulation 10-4, governs all SDFs.

³⁹ MG Bruce M. Lawlor, “Military Support of Civil Authorities – A New Focus for a New Millennium,” *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Alan D. Preisser, “Understanding Authorities in National Special Security Events,” *Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin*, Vol. V, Issue 1, September 2002, Suffolk, VA, p. 2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Charlene Eastman, “Joint Task Force – Olympics 2002,” *Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin*, Vol. V, Issue 1, September 2002, Suffolk, VA, p. 6. See also, CAPT D. Fox, USN, Lt. Col. R. Hodgkins, USAF, and Lt. Col. W. Peterson, USAF, “Challenges for NORTHCOM: Will CINCNORTH have the tools required?” a paper submitted to the Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Class 02-2S, 31 May 2002.

man the C3 facilities set up in response to crises. SDF personnel staff duty stations in the state EOCs and state joint operations centers (JOCs) and are capable of providing C3 facilities and headquarters in the field. Most SDFs provide staffing at fixed C3 facilities, but some have the ability to staff mobile command posts.

Probably the ultimate example of the potential contributions in the arena of mobile C3 capabilities SDFs can offer is found in the South Carolina State Guard, which operates the South Carolina Emergency Communications Vehicle (ECV). The ECV is a state-of-the-art system, which provides the technological bridges and systems to link together the various C3 systems used by the local first-responder forces, state and federal emergency management agencies, and the military command post. The ECV provides short-term emergency telephone and/or radio dispatch capability in a forward disaster area (see Appendix 2).

EXAMPLES OF STATE DEFENSE FORCES IN HOMELAND SECURITY

SDFs have a long history of service to their states, including recent examples relevant to current threat conditions (Appendix 1 lists the tasks typically assigned to SDFs and their Naval Militia in support of HLS).⁴³ Over the last two decades, SDFs have been called to state active duty in support of several disaster/terrorist attack responses, including the following: 1980 – Winter Olympics at Lake Placid (New York Naval Militia); 1989 – Exxon Valdez oil spill recovery operation (Alaska Naval Militia); 1996 – TWA 800 crash into New York Harbor (New York Guard and Naval Militia); 1993 – tornados in Tennessee (Tennessee Defense Force); 1996 – winter storms (New York Guard, Virginia State Defense Force, Oregon State Defense Force, and Maryland Defense Force); 2001 – World Trade Center terrorist attack (New York Guard, Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia).⁴⁴

The example of the New Jersey Naval Militia actions in response to the World Trade Center attacks superbly demonstrates how several SDFs are already integrated into the consequence management aspects of HLS. In response to the attacks, the New Jersey Naval Militia’s Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Chaplain Corps were both mobilized at Staten Island, New York, to assist survivors and rescue workers in support of Task Force Respect and a unit of Naval Guardsman was also mobilized to assist the FBI and National Guard with evidence collection at Staten Island.⁴⁵ Naval Militia were also activated to participate in Operation NOBLE EAGLE, where the Naval Guardsman provided 24-hour staffing for the New Jersey National Guard’s Joint Operations Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey; provided boat crews to support the rescue and recovery efforts in New York City with ferry services across the Hudson River; provided the waterborne security that allowed for the opening of the George Washington Bridge; augmented the U.S. Navy’s waterborne security forces at U.S. Naval Weapons Station Earle with boats crewed by Naval Militia sailors, who performed picket boat duty to patrol the U.S. Navy’s security zone to protect U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard ships while loading munitions; relieved State Marine Police crews; and provided waterborne security for New Jersey’s nuclear power plants.⁴⁶

⁴³ See Stentiford, op. cit., SDFs served their states during WWI, WWII, the Korean War and the Cold War. During WWII, 47 states had SDFs of substantial size and capabilities, including air, naval, and land components.

⁴⁴ For a more detailed description of SDFs in several of these operations, see State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS), “Our Best Kept Secrets,” *SGAUS Journal*, viewable at <http://sgaus.org/bkept.htm>

⁴⁵ LT (JG) Steve Mannion, New Jersey (Naval) State Guard, “Reviving the United States Naval Militia,” unpublished, provided by the author, January 2003, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Mannion, op. cit.

AN AERIAL COMPONENT?

As stated, the State Defense Forces include both land and naval components. Obviously, to conduct HLS operations, the governor may also call to state duty the Air National Guard with its wide range of transport, reconnaissance, and fighter capabilities. However, like their land component counterparts, units of the various State Air National Guards are earmarked for combat operations and are included in war plans for the regional unified commands and so may not be available to the state when needed. The only SDFs with air components are those of Alaska, New York, and Texas,⁴⁷ but there are other aerial forces NORTHCOM can call on for HLS operations in the event that the Air NG forces are not available in time of crisis, and the SDF lacks its own aviation component. NORTHCOM can also draw on the resources of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and in some cases, the aviation elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary.

While not an organ of any state, the Civil Air Patrol, the Congressionally designated civilian auxiliary to the U.S. Air Force, is already integrated into state emergency management operations in each of the 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The CAP “through its emergency services program, maintains the capability to meet requests of the Air Force and assist federal, state, and local agencies...[with]...aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and a force of trained volunteers for response to natural and man-made disasters or national emergencies.”⁴⁸ Among the missions listed in the document for CAP in support of HLS is the task to “man designated positions at state and local communications and emergency operations centers.”⁴⁹ This means that NORTHCOM will encounter CAP personnel at the various state EOCs during crisis response operations. Accordingly, CAP and its capabilities should be considered as the aviation component of the friendly forces available to NORTHCOM as it works with states to develop contingency plans for HLS contingencies. Capabilities offered by the Civil Air Patrol for HLS are included in Appendix 3, along with examples of support provided in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks.

CONCLUSION

As this exploratory investigation has demonstrated, SDFs are often already integrated at the state level in the emergency management and consequence management plans of the states and territories that maintain such forces. Given the dual-apportioned character of the NG to fulfill both its federal mission to support the Armed Services in fulfilling the National Military Strategy, and its state missions of civil support and disaster assistance, SDFs represent a value-added component for HLS and HLD contingency planning and operations. SDFs can provide a pool of specially trained personnel to assist in HLS planning and command and control. SDFs and their Naval Militias provide key technological and procedural bridges to link NORTHCOM to local first-responders, state and federal agencies during operations. As NORTHCOM continues to develop its friendly operating picture, establish contacts and working arrangements with the State Area Commands and TAGs, it will find itself working with SDF personnel. Since NORTHCOM will be looking to the states and territories for first-response and for initial forces, it is vital that its planning staff consider SDFs and plan for their integration into contingency planning for regional and state response for HLS. NORTHCOM must ensure that future

⁴⁷ E-mail correspondence with CAPT Gene Romanick, NJSG (Naval), February 27, 2003, and LT (JG) Steve Mannion, NJSG (Naval), February 26, 2003.

⁴⁸ HQ, CAP-USAF XO and HQ CAP DO, *Civil Air Patrol Support for the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security*, p. 2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

contingency planning efforts for HLS operations fully incorporate the valuable capabilities resident in SDFs.

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APPENDIX 1:

STATE DEFENSE FORCES AND HLS TASKS: LISTING OF STATE DEFENSE FORCES:

1. Alabama State Defense Force (ALSDF). <http://www.alsdf.org>
2. Alaska State Defense Force (ASDF). <http://www.ak-prepared.com/asdf>
3. California State Military Reserve (CASMR). <http://www.militarymuseum.org/CASMR.html>
4. Connecticut State Militia. <http://ctarng-web.ct.ngb.army.mil/militia/militia.asp>
5. Florida State Defense Force. <http://www.floridaguard.bravepages.com/>
6. Georgia State Defense Force. (GSDF) <http://www.dod.state.ga.us/SDF/>
7. Indiana Guard Reserve (IGR). <http://go.to/igr>
8. Louisiana State Guard (LSG)
9. Maryland Defense Force (MDF). <http://www.mddefenseforce.org/>
10. Massachusetts Military Reserve (MAMR).
11. Michigan Emergency Volunteers (MIEV).
12. M i s s i s s i p p i S t a t e G u a r d .
http://groups.msn.com/MississippiStateGuard/_homepage.msnw?pgmarket=en-us
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18. Oklahoma Reserve Force (OKRF).
19. Oregon State Defense Force (ORSDF). <http://www.mil.state.or.us/SDF/index.html>
20. Pennsylvania State Military Reserve (PASMR). <http://www.navpoint.com/~pasmr/>
21. Puerto Rico State Guard.
22. South Carolina State Guard (SCSG). <http://www.scsrg.org/>
23. Tennessee State Guard (TSG). <http://home.att.net/~dcannon.tenn/TNSG.html>
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26. Washington State Guard. http://www.washingtonguard.com/State_Guard/

HOMELAND SECURITY/HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSIONS GENERALLY ASSIGNED TO THE SDFS:

1. Augment State Emergency Operations Centers under the State Emergency Management Agency.
2. Assume control of NG facilities and state properties in the event of a mobilization of the National Guard of the state.
3. Assist in the mobilization of the National Guard for state or Federal duty.
4. Under the control of the governor, cooperate with Federal military authorities and forces engaged in active military operations or charged with internal security missions within the state.⁵⁰
5. Support the NG in providing family assistance to military dependents in the state in the event of mobilization.
6. Assist local and state law enforcement agencies in the preservation of law and order

⁵⁰ This particular mission is found in National Guard Regulation 10-4, *State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau, and State National Guard Interaction*, Washington, DC, 21 September 1987, p.3.

7. Prepare to conduct the following tasks during natural disasters or civil disorders: Civil Disturbance control; search and rescue; evacuation of casualties; traffic control; VIP escort and security.
8. Assist in the coordination of the highway movement of all Army convoys and other federalized ARNG units within the state and operate traffic control points as required.
9. Augment shortages in ARNG units when activated to provide administrative, operations, and logistics personnel during states of emergency
10. Operate Disaster Field Offices, Disaster Recovery Centers, and Disaster Application Centers; provide Preliminary Disaster Assessment and Damage Verifications; administer the provision of Individual and Family Grant programs associated with disaster relief.
11. Support events designated as requiring national-level security (as determined by the President) such as the 1996 Olympics, the Super Bowl, etc.
12. Support youth programs such as the California Cadet Corps, a state-run junior high school cadet program much like the Army, Air Force, and Navy JROTC programs at the high school level.

NAVAL MILITIA TASKS:

1. Support USCG in the execution of naval and port interdiction of WMD and support of Homeland Security.
2. Support Marine Police and other law enforcement agencies
3. State emergencies resulting from natural or man-made disasters/events.
4. Provide the governor and EOC a naval off-shore command center.⁵¹
5. Evidence recovery (e.g., TWA Flight 800 that crashed into New York's harbor, and recovery of evidence from the WTC attack).
6. Rescue and recovery.
7. Ferry and transportation services.
8. Waterborne security for critical infrastructure protection (e.g., nuclear power plants and bridges) as well as Navy logistics and ammunition facilities.
9. Maintain U.S. Naval history at the battleships, submarines, and other floating public museums of naval history.
10. Provide waterborne security for bridges, harbors, nuclear power plants, etc. against terrorist attack or sabotage.
11. Provide waterborne transportation for governmental agencies.
12. Provide waterborne security at military sites adjacent to waterfronts.
13. Support the USCG in law enforcement duties.
14. Support youth programs, such as Naval JROTC.

⁵¹ McGlasson, W.D. COL (Ret.), "Naval Militia," in *National Guard Magazine*, November 1984, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 11, p. 39, California, for example, performs this mission and capability with its ship *Golden Bear*.

APPENDIX 2:**SOUTH CAROLINA STATE GUARD****MOBILE EMERGENCY CONTROL VEHICLE (ECV):**

SCSG Emergency Control Vehicle (ECV) C3

The ECV provides the technological bridges and systems to link together the various C3 systems used by the local first-responder forces, state and federal emergency management agencies, and the military command post. The ECV provides short-term emergency telephone and/or radio dispatch capability in a forward disaster area. In addition, the ECV can provide still images over satellite to the State Command Center and full-motion video from aircraft to the ECV. South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division and the State Budget and Control Board own the vehicle, which is operated by the South Carolina State Guard.

- C3 capabilities of the SCSG ECV
- 2 - HF Radios
- 3 - VHF/Low Band Radios
- 3 - VHF/High Band Radios
- 3 - 800 MHz Radios
- Aircraft Radio
- 2 – Fold-down Antenna Racks
- 5 - Radio Operator Positions with Consoles
- 2 - Satellite Phones
- 2 - Cellular Phones
- 2 - Laptop Computers
- 10 - On-site Pagers
- 2 - Generators
- Electronic Mail
- FAX Machine

- Printer
- Telephone System
- Direct Duo DSS and PC Satellite Dish

APPENDIX 3:

CIVIL AIR PATROL (CAP) CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE:

CAP HLS/HLD CAPABILITIES: ⁵²

- CAP can provide airborne communications relay platforms so law enforcement personnel on the ground or in low-flying aircraft can communicate with the task force leader or mission base.
- CAP can upload pictures taken during airborne reconnaissance on a limited access Web site for law enforcement agencies.
- CAP can deploy airborne and ground search and rescue teams to assist in disaster response and recovery efforts.
- CAP has a limited radiological monitoring capability. CAP airborne and ground platforms could be equipped with sensor equipment to support the initiative to detect chemical and biological materials and attacks.

EXAMPLES OF CAP SUPPORTING HLS OPERATIONS.

- “At the request of the Governor of New York, on September 12th CAP provided the first direct perspective of the World Trade Center disaster site. The photographs the aircrew provided were of immediate value to rescue and security personnel at Ground Zero...
- 564 hours were flown in support of 9/11.
- 450 CAP members manned their designated positions at the FEMA Region Operations Centers and State Emergency Operations Centers.
- NY Wing CAP stepped up existing New York City watershed reservoir reconnaissance...
- CAP personnel from the Northeast Region provided communications and coordination support to the FEMA Region 1 Regional Operations Center.”

⁵² HQ, CAP-USAF XO and HQ CAP DO, *Civil Air Patrol Support for the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security*, p. 8.

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STATE DEFENSE FORCES, AN UNTAPPED HOMELAND DEFENSE ASSET¹

Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus

INTRODUCTION

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington DC, a comprehensive federal government review of homeland security and homeland defense has led to a massive effort to coordinate assets at the local, state, and federal level, with an emphasis on contingency planning and information sharing. In addition, several new organizations were formed to address homeland security and homeland defense issues including the Department of Homeland Security and DoDs Northern Command (NORTHCOM), at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Also, civilian volunteer programs such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency sponsored Citizen Corps and the White House sponsored USA Freedom Corps were formed.² In the U. S. National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush makes it clear, "Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cutoff terrorist financing."³ Additionally, in a recent interview Democratic Presidential hopeful, retired General Wesley Clarke announced his proposal to create the "Civilian Reserve." His plan consists of a "Civilian Reserve," and will comprise a cross section of everyday Americans using their skills in efforts to address community based problems ranging from repairing local schools structures to less tangible goals such as "securing the homeland."⁴

Yet, little has been written about expanding the use of current volunteer organizations, specifically State Defense Forces (SDF), who continue to play an important but unheralded role in defending the homeland. These local volunteer organizations have historically been referred to as State Militia, Home Guards, State Guards, or State Guard Reserves and represent a heretofore untapped asset and potential additional force for Homeland Security/Defense in the Global War on Terrorism. Since before World War I, State Guards and Naval Militias have been called upon to fill the void left by the federalized forces, particularly the National Guard, and have ably carried out their assigned duties. Also, as currently demonstrated, state recognized SDFs and Naval Militia units carry on the tradition of their predecessors in approximately half the states and territories of the United States, with little fan fare mostly on a limited budget, and without standardized policies and procedures.

HISTORICAL ROOTS

Colonial America

Similar to the U.S. Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve, State Guards/ State Defense Forces trace their roots to the colonial militia. The militia tradition in early America obligated all able-bodied men to bear arms when called upon by the government fulfilling two requirements:

¹ Prepared, submitted and approved as a Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College research paper on 7 March 2003.

² For more details see web page, Citizen Corps, <http://www.citizencorps.gov/about.shtm>.

³ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Executive Summary.

⁴ Wesley Clark and patriot games interview, by Robert Yoon, CNN, Tuesday, October 14, 2003 Posted: 9:14 AM EDT (1314 GMT).

- o Providing local defense and security service (resisting enemy attacks, suppressing insurrections and enforcing laws),
- o Providing manpower for expeditions during wartime.⁵

Subsequent to the American Revolution, the Founding Fathers attempted to institutionalize their distrust for a large standing active force by depending on local militia units as the first line of defense. This idea was abandoned due to defense requirements for an expanding nation, command and control, and reliability challenges associated with militia troops.⁶ As an alternative, in 1789 Congress granted special permission to maintain a small military force autonomous of state control with the understanding the militia would be used as augmentation for emergencies.

This system was viewed as adequate as militia or volunteer units served on numerous occasions throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, participating in domestic and overseas actions ranging from defending their homes from Indian attacks, (Indian Campaign 1867-98), to traditional operations (War of 1812, Mexican War 1846-48, Civil War 1861-65, Spanish American War 1898) to Military Operations Other than War (Philippine Campaign, 1899-1903; China Campaign 1900; Cuban Pacification 1903; and the Puerto Rico Occupation 1899-1903) to name a few.

However, the increased federal demands on local militia or volunteer units beginning with the Spanish American War in 1898, caused concern among decision makers with respect to personal readiness and equipment interoperability when supporting the active forces. This prompted a review of the effectiveness of the Militia Act of 1792, the first attempt to regulate local militias. It stated that “all able bodied males citizens between the ages of 18-42 to arm themselves and attend regular muster.” While well meaning, the Militia Act of 1792 was never widely enforced and unit effectiveness varied.⁷

In response to these problems, Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio sponsored legislation, later named the Dick Act of 1903, which differentiated between the organized militia and the unorganized militia by granting Federal recognition to the land forces of the organized militia and designating them as the “National Guard.” Federal recognition was crucial since it provided federal funding for monthly drill periods and a five-day summer encampment to units that had previously been only state sponsored. In addition, National Guard units were directed to emulate the active force in structure and training. The Act also stipulated that the duration of Federal service would not exceed nine months and overseas assignments were forbidden. In 1908, this legislation was amended, effectively lifting sanctions on length and location of federal service.⁸

Arguably, the National Defense Act of 1916 proved the most influential as the National Guard was officially designated the Nation’s second line of defense giving it dual status as both a state and Federal force under Title 10 United States Code. Consequently, National Guard soldiers were required to swear two oaths of allegiance, one to their state the other to the federal government. In addition, National Guard units were permitted to retain their unit designations while in federal service, thereby preserving

⁵ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 5.

⁶ COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 3.

⁷ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 7.

⁸ I Ibid, p. 14 bid, p. 13.

lineage and honors.⁹ More importantly, there was concern, that if large numbers of National Guard units were federalized, states would be without the necessary means for self protection, since most state police forces remained relatively small and were unable to cope with large scale state emergencies.

Mexican Border Campaign and World War I

Federal service for the new National Guard was soon tested as large numbers of units were mobilized for the Mexican Border Campaign in 1916. An American Expeditionary force augmented by National Guardsmen, was sent to the southern border with Mexico to apprehend Pancho Villa, who had recently raided U.S. border settlements. Although Villa was never captured, the expedition proved valuable as National Guard units received extensive training and experience that would later prove valuable in World War I.

As the Mexican Border Campaign stabilized, National Guard units were returned to state control in 1917 only to be re-activated in preparation for World War I. With their National Guard units federalized numerous states found themselves ill prepared to provide a similar force to accomplish traditional state missions such as law enforcement assistance, and providing flood and disaster assistance to local authorities. Consequently, state governors inundated the War Department with requests for federal troops. These requests went largely unmet because the War Department could spare few federalized forces for traditional state missions, and governors were advised to organize replacement units.

Prior to World War I, federal laws prohibited states from maintaining armed forces other than the National Guard. However, the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 provided cursory authority to do so as the last sentence of Section 61 stated, “that nothing contained in this act shall prevent the organization and maintenance of state police or Constabulary.” Governors used this clause as permission to begin preparations for organizing replacement National Guard units. The stipulation being, replacement forces were designed **only** for state service and would not be eligible for overseas duty as a unit, although individual members could be federalized.¹⁰

The Federal government made several additional attempts to assist State Guard programs by passing the Home Guard Act of 1917 and the subsequent War Department Circular #3 of March 1918.¹¹ This 1917 amendment to the Dick Act provided for Federal aid to State Guards when practicable, and the circular stated State Guard units organized and recognized by federal authorities after August 5th 1917 would be furnished arms, equipment, and uniforms by the federal government.¹² In reality, the organization and maintenance of State Guard units defaulted to the governor, principally due to inadequate supplies in all categories of war stocks.

Composition of World War I State Guard units routinely consisted of retired or prior service personnel, many former National Guardsmen, or those who for one reason or another were ineligible for federal service. Training varied as several states pressed Civil War and Spanish American War veterans into service as training cadre. Additionally, the reliability and efficiency of State Guard units varied,

⁹ Ibid, p. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 23.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Home Defense Forces Study”, by Historical Research and Evaluation Organization, Washington DC, 27 April 1981, p. 10.

¹² Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 33

depending on location, local and state government support. Several of the more effective units were established in the Northeastern states including Massachusetts and Connecticut. These states created effective and centralized state military forces that provided invaluable assistance during the “Spanish Influenza” outbreak in 1918 supplying much needed manpower, transportation, and medical assets for this emergency.¹³ Texas also extensively used State Guard units to fill the void. Due to the recent raids by Pancho Villa, an additional five cavalry and three infantry regiments were organized for strictly state service, guarding the border with Mexico.

Fortunately, other than labor strikes and associated local contingencies, no incidents required large scale domestic military intervention and the presence of State Guard units provided a calming effect to the local populace. Approximately 27 states created State Guard units representing an additional 79,000 soldiers for strictly state duty.¹⁴ After the war, as the nation turned its attention to prosperity and internal affairs, State Guard units were mostly disbanded, but would again be called upon to serve in World War II.

World War II

As World War II began in September 1939, the United States was caught in the throes of preparations for mobilizing a long neglected military. National Guard units were again called into federal service in late 1940, with the first peacetime draft in American history. Originally recalled for one year, this length of service was later extended to eighteen months. Recognizing the impending dilemma, and with advice from General George C. Marshall, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the State Guard Act of October 21st of 1940.¹⁵ More comprehensive than the previous Home Guard Act of 1917, the 1940 Act clarified the constitutionality of organizing State Guard forces as replacements for the federalized National Guard and permitted access to Federal supplies and equipment, when available. As part of the organizational process, State Guard command and control policies and procedures were established as the Militia Bureau (later National Guard Bureau), became the strategic command and control headquarters, while each state Adjutant General exercised operational and tactical control of State Guard units.¹⁶ However, while the State Guard Act of 1940 effectively relieved the War Department from supervision of many State Guard functions and responsibilities, Guard possession and use of Federal small arms and related equipment placed State Guards under scrutiny of the U.S. Army.¹⁷ As such, State Guard units were subject to periodic inspections to ensure proper care and maintenance of Federal facilities and equipment. At first, these inspections caused consternation between state forces and their Federal inspectors. As the war progressed, these tensions subsided and the two sides grew increasingly interactive and cooperative, as the nine Service Area Commands within the United States incorporated State Guards into their defense plans, and furnished training programs specifically designed for these replacement National Guard units.

State Guard forces were autonomous of Federal control, but the Hawaiian Territorial Guard was an exception. Due to their strategic location, and credible status they were placed under operational control

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Home Defense Forces Study”, by Historical Research and Evaluation Organization, Washington DC, 27 April 1981, p. 22.

¹⁴ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 51

¹⁵ COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 7.

¹⁶ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 92.

¹⁷ Ibid.

of the Commander, Army Forces of the Pacific from the beginning of the war through May 1942. They demonstrated their ability to perform as part of the overall defense plan.¹⁸

Missions outlined for World War II State Guard forces mirrored those of the National Guard and included performing the peacetime duties such as response to natural and manmade disasters. They performed full time guard duty in coastal regions and other vital areas, trained for combat to ensure interoperability with federal troops in the event of an invasion and performed internal security functions. All of these duties were reflected on their Mission Essential Task List (METL).¹⁹

Drill periods also followed the National Guard model, e.g. training one night a week at the local armory, and conducting a five-day annual training period, usually during the summer months, using standard Army training manuals as their doctrinal base.²⁰ Since State Guards were volunteer organizations, weekly drill periods were conducted in a non-pay status. However, soldiers normally received full pay and allowances for the annual training period or any state active duty service. Training courses were sometimes in a pay status, when funding was available.

Personnel readiness standards were also established as modified physical examinations were given to all enlisted members to account for the variation in age, which ranged from 21-50. No maximum age limit was established for the officers however, in order to optimize the prior service manpower pool available at the time. Some men much younger than the above stated range, were accepted into service with State Guard units.²¹ However, the constant turnover of personnel due to Federal service became an important readiness issue for State Guard units. Many units experienced 100% turnover in a year's time. While detrimental in one sense, training received in State Guard units was valuable preparation for personnel later serving as active component NCOs during the war. Frequently, recruits receiving training in State Guard organizations prior to entering federal service attained promotion more quickly than those with no prior training.²²

Equipment for State Guard units, particularly small arms, was in short supply during the war. Available arms included M1903 Springfield bolt action rifles, military issue shot guns, Reising and Thompson sub-machine guns, and turn of the century derivatives of the Colt machine gun. Officers were responsible for obtaining their own side arms and ammunition. As the war progressed and federal stocks were more plentiful, uniforms, equipment and weapons were upgraded.²³ Research indicates the weapons arsenal for State Guard units primarily consisted of small arms, but in some cases, such as Pennsylvania they had M-3 half-tracks later in the war. Employment of State Guard forces during the war varied from state to state. Understandably, they were extensively used in strategic areas such as the West Coast of the United States, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. While governors were permitted wide latitude on force structure, most modeled their units after the National Guard with Infantry forces being the dominant.

During the critical period several weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, approximately 13,000 State Guard troops were called to service and prepared to defend the homeland. As the emergency subsided in late

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 148.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, "U.S. Home Defense Forces Study", by Historical Research and Evaluation Organization, Washington DC, 27 April 1981, p. 43.

²⁰ "The State Defense Force Manual," The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA, October 1940.

²¹ Mr. William Perry, correspondent, Hazelton Standard Speaker newspaper, Hazelton, PA, interview by author 8 May 2003.

²² Barry M. Stentiford "The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 172.

²³ The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, March 1942, p. 5; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.

January 1942, units were returned to their normal status of drilling one night a week and one-week annual training. However, again, due to their strategic location, states such as California kept a portion of their State Guard on state active duty for the balance of the war.²⁴

Although never called for combat actions, these volunteer units proved valuable in providing homeland defense for the nation. State Guard units provided comprehensive security assets and assistance during times of civil unrest and labor disputes. In addition, their success as an additional armed force freed personnel needed in other areas of the war effort while also providing a sense of security for the population. Approximately 35 states, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone created State Guard forces for service during World War II. Several State Guards, including Pennsylvania remained active into 1948, as an interim force while National Guard units returned from World War II service, were reconstituted and returned to state control.²⁵

The Korean War and the Cold War

As National Guard units returned to state service after World War II, interest in State Guards effectively vanished. This situation changed following the surprise move in June 1950, when Communist North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded pro U.S. South Korea. Renewed interest in State Guard programs was experienced throughout the nation. While the U.S. response to North Korean aggression was immediate, it was of a lesser magnitude than that of World War II. Nonetheless, President Harry S. Truman authorized a Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up as National Guard units were sent to Korea, while others were replacements for active component units sent into the theater of operations. In total, eight National Guard Infantry Divisions, three Regimental Combat Teams, and 714 company size units were called to federal service for the Korean War.²⁶

For the fourth time in the first half of the 20th century, the departure of large numbers of National Guard units left states without substantial means to execute traditional National Guard missions. During the Korean War, several states re-activated their State Guards to replace the departed National Guard. For example, Pennsylvania activated at least one Regiment for service in the western portion of the state. Missions for the Korean War era State Guards was not substantially different from World War II, with the exception of defending against gas attacks.²⁷

In the post-Korean War era all but a handful of states disbanded their State Guard units. During much of the 1950s and 1960s enthusiasm for the State Guard declined until 1972 when Defense Secretary Melvin Laird began the Total Defense Policy, that called for increased reliance on Reserve Component organizations to assist the nation in its ability to wage war. However, substantial interest in State Guard programs was again not noticeable until after the collapse of U.S. – Soviet détente in the late 1970s.²⁸

By the spring of 1985, interest in State Guard units (now known as State Defense Forces or SDFs) had risen to the point of the State Defense Force Association of the United States being formed. This group

²⁴ COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 8

²⁵ The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, November 1948, p. 5; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.

²⁶ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 194.

²⁷ The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, June 1950, p. 25; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.

²⁸ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 214.

(changing their name to the State Guard Association of the United States, or SGAUS in 1993) “was organized to promote the role of state authorized and organized defense forces, state guards, or state military reserves, and to foster and encourage cooperation between the various state defense forces, the Department of Defense, the National Guard, the active armed forces and their reserves, other government agencies, and the general public.” SGAUS acts as an advisory council for the collective of all the State Defense Force units and provides guidance on missions and related State Guard issues.²⁹

21ST CENTURY ISSUES

Military/Military Support to Civilian Authorities Capabilities

Present SDF missions and related training generally mirror their World War I and World War II counterparts as National Guard replacement units. Potential missions include meeting domestic emergencies within the state, assist civil authorities in the preservation of order, guard and protect critical industrial installations and facilities, prevent or suppress subversive activities, and cooperate with federal military authorities. Also, since National Guard units are being mobilized in increasing numbers, SDFs are charged with assuming control of state armories and Federal property and when directed, assist in the mobilization process.³⁰

Today’s SDFs continue their traditions of World War I and World War II by providing value-added assets in the areas of manpower and specialized expertise. These assets include infrastructure site security, emergency operations center operations, search and rescue capabilities, medical, religious, legal, Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects and air assets. Several SDF units are modeled after a Military Police organization or have substantial Military Police assets within their force structure due to the current emphasis on site security. For example, the Alaskan SDF, primarily a Military Police organization, provides security for the Alaskan pipeline and harbor’s of Anchorage and Whittier, using four patrol craft armed with crew served weapons.³¹ Their training focus reflects this emphasis as core courses of formal instruction are in law enforcement. With an instructor cadre of either current or former state troopers, graduates of the Alaskan SDF Military Police academy have the same certifications and arrest powers as Alaskan state troopers, thereby increasing the law enforcement strength of Alaska by several hundred. Due to strategic importance, vast expanse and sparse population, utilizing Alaska’s SDF in a Military Police role compliments well the security assets of the region, to include the active and reserve Federal forces.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, several states utilized their SDFs for security. Alaska’s SDF was on duty for five months protecting critical infrastructure sites. In addition, the New York Guard (NYG) Army Division’s Military Police Brigade was used for perimeter security at Camp Smith, NY and critical infrastructure sites within the city.³² However, Army SDFs are not the only volunteer organizations that provide security assets. For example, the “blue suit” or Air Force SDFs are the second dimension of volunteer organizations providing security assets. Air Force SDFs routinely augment security forces,

²⁹ See State Guard Association of the United States, <http://sgaus.org> for details.

³⁰ Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau Regulation NGR 10-4, Washington, DC, 21 September 1987, page 3.

³¹ BG Thomas Westall, Commander, Alaska State Defense Force, Anchorage, AK interview by author, 4 August 2003.

³² After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, New York Guard, 10 January 2002, pps. 1-3.

particularly in the states of New York and Texas, providing security for Air National Guard installations (see Table 2).³³

Naval Militias are the third dimension, providing water borne patrol assets for security missions, particularly critical in coastal areas on the Great Lakes or in states containing sizeable rivers. For example, the New York Naval Militia was extensively used in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, providing routine security for the nuclear power plant at Indian Point, NY and providing transportation assets to and from the crash site. Ohio also routinely utilizes their naval militia for patrolling Lake Erie in the vicinity of Camp Perry, site of the national rifle matches, and complimenting the U. S. Coast Guard in the region.

The authority for volunteer Naval Militias is provided by either Title 10 OR Title 32 United States Code. Of the four active Naval Militias (Alaska, New York, New Jersey and Ohio), Alaska and New York are organized under Title 10 USC. This legislation stipulates that 95% of personnel must be drilling reservists of the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard Reserve, hence, they are a federally recognized force.³⁴ Conversely, Ohio is strictly a state recognized Title 32 organization, while New Jersey is a combination with one battalion of drilling reservists and two battalions of non-reservist volunteers. The distinction between Title 10 and Title 32 authority is important since Federal recognition equates to Federal funding. Conversely, a Title 32 organization is strictly a state force and therefore ineligible for Federal funding. As a consequence, state funding does not always satisfy unit requirements, particularly in the areas of material and supplies and overall readiness. Title 10 also affects mission support, if called to state active duty by the Naval Militia and by their reserve unit, members are required to serve with their Federal reserve unit, effectively rendering the volunteer Title 10 Naval Militia non-available for duty. Table 1 provides a comprehensive view of current funding levels for SDFs.

Table 1. State Defense Forces - Army

State	Active Strength	Budget	Type Unit by branch & function	Prior Service	Age Range
Alabama	600	30K	Support HQs	75%	22-69
Alaska	274	26.5K – 1 Mil	M.P.	75%	20-72
California	500	225K	Support HQs	80+%	18-62
Connecticut	275	0	Infantry/Cavalry	40%	20-60
Georgia	500	0	Infantry	40%	18-64
Indiana	315	40K	Support HQs	70%	21-75
Louisiana	108	0	Admin HQs	96%	50-65
Maryland	194	0	Support HQs	75%	17-70
Massachusetts	60	0	Admin Det.	60-75%	18-65*
Michigan	130	0	Support HQs	80%	20-70+
Mississippi	185	0	Infantry	85%	18-78

³³ Col Robert Cheeseman, Commander 4th Air Wing, Texas Air Force State defense Force, San Antonio, TX, interview by author, 10 August 2003.

³⁴ See United States Code, <http://uscode.house.gov/download.htm> for details.

State	Active Strength	Budget	Type Unit by branch & function	Prior Service	Age Range
New Mexico	200	7K	M.P.	75%	18-65
New York	1,200	75K	Support HQs	75%	18-65*
Ohio	650	14K	M.P	50+%	17-67
Oklahoma	28	0	Support HQs	75%	21-75+
Oregon	184	0	Infantry	50%	18-65*
Puerto Rico	1,630	300K	Support Det.	30%	16-65
South Carolina	1,500	100K	Infantry	45-50%	17-75
Tennessee	990	53K	Light Infantry	80%	18-70
Texas	1,518	103K	Infantry	60%	17-79
Vermont	326	0	Infantry	90%	17-70
Virginia	774	0	Light Infantry	70%	18-70*
Washington	95	0	Infantry	90%	18-64

*Note: Approximate age.

Support for county and state Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) is another important mission SDFs frequently support. With many retired or former National Guard personnel in the force, SDF assets represent an experienced force knowledgeable in state and National Guard emergency operations processes and procedures. The Louisiana SDF for example, provides a team of soldiers and desk officers for each parish (county) EOC, consisting of subject matter experts in operations and logistics. They are part of the integrated civil, military team manning these centers.³⁵

As an integral part of the Georgia Department of Defense, the Georgia SDF is a major contributor in providing EOC assets. They have a robust training program evidenced by their recent participation in a Weapons of Mass Destruction command post exercise, reacting to a “dirty bomb” scenario, detonated in the port of Charleston, SC. In addition to providing trained desk officers for the National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Center at Dobbins AFB, Atlanta, GA, they operated their own headquarters tactical operations center. Training, appearance, and mission execution was not substantially different from any battalion Tactical Operations Center, and all staff sections were exercised. In addition to refining tactical standing operating procedures, exercising command and control of subordinate units, issuing operations orders and FRAGOs and coordinating communications protocols with a variety of state agencies.

In addition to traditional missions, support to civil authority, such as search and rescue, are an important part of several SDFs METL. Search and rescue assets vary from state to state, and can include personnel with medical training such as emergency medical technicians, and enhanced search capabilities including horses and fixed wing aircraft. For example, with former Special Forces and Ranger members, the Tennessee SDF has a robust search and rescue organization somewhat modeled after a Special Forces “A” team. The team contains licensed paramedics, civilian structural engineers, communications specialists, and a canine section that are both airborne and scuba qualified, adding to their capability for insertion into austere locations. While they extensively use current Special Forces and Ranger doctrine

³⁵ COL Louis May, Commander, Louisiana State Defense Force, New Orleans, LA interview by author, 7 June 2003.

for military task training, such as map reading, their certification for search and rescue tasks are accomplished by utilizing the National Association of Search and Rescue standards.³⁶

Although SDFs are predominately land based, several states including Tennessee, have privately owned fixed wing aircraft detachments, sometimes augmenting the local Civil Air Patrol in search and rescue operations. Virginia extensively uses their aircraft by supplying aircraft as drones for WMD scenarios, providing realistic training for air defense units of the Virginia National Guard. They are also active in assisting the Virginia Fish and Game Commission by flying reconnaissance missions over the Shenandoah Valley searching for poachers as bear poaching is on the rise in the region and the vast land expanse requires additional air assets. The Connecticut SDF, while predominately a ceremonial organization, used their cavalry detachment for cross-country search and rescue missions augmenting the ground search operation on at least one occasion. These examples are a sampling of the capabilities available in SDFs units.

To help face the growing threat of possible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorist attacks, several SDFs provide relevant professional services. For example, the Georgia SDF has robust Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CDRNE) capabilities. With the Center for Disease Control and several well know hospitals located in Atlanta, the Georgia SDF has acquired the skills of a number of chemists, medical doctors and various other professional skills relating to WMD to fashion an organization to advise, assist and train with specialized National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction, Civil Support Teams.³⁷

Other SDF professional service capabilities for external missions include legal, medical, and religious support assets. With the current high operations tempo, SDF professionals in the medical, legal and religious fields are highly desirable and used extensively. For example, the NYG supplied legal and religious support in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, in addition to manning the medical clinic on Camp Smith, NY to include a full compliment of licensed Chiropractors. In total, the NYG 244th Medical Detachment treated 844 patients, mostly at the crash site.³⁸ Other states specifically Georgia and Virginia routinely provide legal support to their National Guard units during mobilization for federal missions. Table 2 provides a list of the missions SDFs regularly support.

Table 2. State Defense Forces – Army – Missions/Capabilities

State	Security	Search & Rescue	Air Assets	EOC	Medical Support	Legal Support	Religious Support	Ceremonial Support	ESGR	Armory Support	Mob Spt.	Weapons Use/Fam.
Alabama	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Alaska	X		X									X
California	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Connecticut		X		X	X	X		X				X
Georgia	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Indiana	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Louisiana	X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Maryland				X	X	X	X			X		
Massachusetts				X		X		X		X		X

³⁶ LTC Lynn Carr, Brigade S-3, 4th Brigade Tennessee State Guard, Atlanta, GA, interview by Author, 11 July 2003.

³⁷ Information Paper, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams Overview and Update, Ms. Kathi Heaton, National Guard Bureau, September 24th, 2002.

³⁸ After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, 244th Clinic, New York Guard, 9 January 2003.

State	Security	Search & Rescue	Air Assets	EOC	Medical Support	Legal Support	Religious Support	Ceremonial Support	ESGR	Armory Support	Mob Spt.	Weapons Use/Fam.
Michigan	X			X			X			X		
Mississippi	X	X		X				X		X	X	
New Mexico	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
New York	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ohio	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Oklahoma	X	X	X		X			X	X			
Oregon	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Puerto Rico	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
S. Carolina	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Tennessee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Texas	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vermont	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Virginia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Washington	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		

Notes: EOC – Emergency Operations Center; ESGR – Employee Support to the Guard and Reserve; Mob. Spt. – Mobilization Support

ALTERNATIVE TO AC/RC SERVICE

Expanding the use of SDFs provides an opportunity for increasing numbers of citizens to serve in a military organization in a less demanding environment than the Federal active or reserve military. For example, of those who enter the active military, 14% leave during the first six months and more than 30% leave before their first term is complete. The main reasons for the high attrition rate include inadequate medical and pre-entry drug screening and recruits fail to perform adequately because they are in poor physical condition for basic training or lack motivation.³⁹

Routinely, State Guard units of World War II took advantage of National Guard discharges from active service due to stringent physical standards associated with overseas deployments. Approximately 3,400 National Guardsmen were discharged prior to deployment providing trained resources for State Guard service. While disqualified from Federal service, these trained soldiers were fully capable of enduring the less strenuous regimen of service in State Guard units.⁴⁰ As well, the State Guard programs of World War II provided for the patriotic spirit of the day permitting non-prior service personnel, who were not eligible for federal service to participate.

Professionals in the legal and medical fields who desire continued service are finding SDF organizations particularly attractive. As doctors and lawyers often have their own practice or are part of a small consortium, the prospect of an extended deployment as part of a Federal reserve unit represents a significant loss of income if not bankruptcy. Participation in SDFs represents a viable alternative, as units are designed strictly for state and not Federal service, thereby not subject to deployments.⁴¹

FOSTERING PATRIOTISM THROUGH SERVICE

In recent articles a number of authors echo the argument of Samuel Huntington on the growing concern that the military is not representative of U.S. society. Journalist Thomas Ricks has warned of a “sense of separation between this military and this society.” For a variety of reasons, such as a shrinking

³⁹ “Military Attrition; DoD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel,” GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan 6, 1997, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 94.

⁴¹ Dr. David W. Fairbanks, Virginia State Defense Force, Interview by author 20 October, 2003.

military, and fewer installations, the current military can be compared with our pre-World War II military, where duty in remote locations of the South and West insulated the military from the rest of society. In a 1994 article Huntington states “In the recent decades the basic outlook of the military has not changed, but the “baby boom” generation are more antagonistic to and questioning of the fundamental assumptions of the military approach than any previous generation.” Former Navy Secretary John Lehman comments, “without the draft, the military is increasingly being populated with career professionals, an important link to society has been lost.”⁴²

Misperceptions of SDFs also abound, as past critics have complained that “ultra right wing survivalists” are their main source of these volunteer organizations. A law suite filed by the Chrisitc Institute in 1995, a Washington based interfaith legal foundation, charged the State Defense Forces are drawn from “weekend survivalists Training Centers or ultra right war game schools.”⁴³ These examples represent but a few of the misperceptions of military overall and SDFs in particular. Expanding their use would be a viable solution to erasing that perception as a broader base of society would have the opportunity to participate, performing valuable community service while experiencing the regimen of a military organization.

Volunteer Spirit / Community Service

Between September 2001 and September 2002, approximately 59 million Americans or 27.6 per cent of the non-institutional public performed volunteer service. For a variety of reasons, the 35-54 year old category was the most likely to volunteer, with one in three donating their time.⁴⁴ Additionally, a January 2003 poll conducted by the Center for Information in Civic Learning and Engagement, of Americans ages 15-25 believe that volunteering in local community activities to address local problems is the most important kind of activity in which a person can be engaged.⁴⁵

By these numbers, conventional wisdom suggests the American public is taking an active role in shaping their environment. Partly due to the 9/11 attacks, but more so due to the younger generation whose parents were the protestors of the 1960s, are believed to be more action oriented than previous generations.⁴⁶ Expanding the use of SDFs would be a viable option for younger Americans to fulfill the need as both volunteers and the ability to make a contribution in changing the environment.

Multidimensional Assets and Life Skills

Given the median age of these volunteer organizations is between 45-60, these soldiers, airmen, and sailors represent a seasoned force, many with combat experience. Research suggests that SDFs in 20 of 22 states, have a 50% or higher prior service percentage in both the NCO and officer ranks, many being former National Guardsmen with extensive knowledge of civil military operations. SDF units are replete with experienced personnel, particularly in leadership positions, representing a wealth of

⁴² “The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken” by Erik J. Dahl, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis MD, Dec 1999, Vol. 125, Iss. 12 p. 34.

⁴³ See State Defense Forces – authorized militia, <http://www.sonic.net/sentinel/gvcon3.html> for details

⁴⁴ “Volunteerism in the United States,” by Stephanie Boraas, Monthly Labor Review, August 2003, p. 3.

⁴⁵ “A generation to be Proud of” by Peter D. Hart and Mario Brossard, The Brookings Review, Fall 2002; 20, 4; Research Library, p. 36.

⁴⁶ “The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken” by Erik J. Dahl, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis MD, Dec 1999, Vol. 125, Iss. 12 p. 34.

knowledge allowing them to make a positive contribution. This is not a new phenomenon as both World War I and World War II State Guards heavily utilized prior service personnel.

A prime example of the World War II officer manpower pool was Brigadier General Robert Vail, Brigade commander of the Pennsylvania State Guard. A career National Guardsman, BG Vail was a veteran of the Spanish American War, Philippine Campaign, the Mexican Border Campaign, and World War I and continued to serve until his retirement in 1939. With the mobilization of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard in 1940, he was returned to state active duty as both the State Guard commander and acting Adjutant General.⁴⁷ BG Vail and many others with extensive prior service, applied their vast experiences for state service, providing outstanding leadership to the State Guard.

SDF service provides an opportunity for present day veterans to again serve their country. With 24 million veterans distributed throughout the U.S. 50 states and four territories, the availability of an experienced manpower pool for possible service is encouraging.⁴⁸

During preparations for activating the Pennsylvania State Guard for service during the Korean War, Pennsylvania Governor James H. Duff stipulated that regimental and other command staff positions for the Pennsylvania Stat Guard would be manned by prior service personnel, particularly those with combat or overseas experience.⁴⁹ These examples are representative of the civilian leaderships desire to call upon the prior service population, as a start point for placing proven leaders in charge of these replacement National Guard units.

Another example of a prior service leader is BG Barry Hartman, the Commander of the NYG Army Division. Hartman, has extensive credentials as a West Point graduate, Vietnam Veteran and former advisor to the New York National Guard's 42nd Infantry Division. The NYG Army Division Sergeant Major is also experienced, being a Vietnam Veteran (173rd Airborne Brigade) and former member of the Army Reserve. BG Joel Seymour, Commander of the Georgia SDF is also quite experienced being a retired Georgia National Guardsman with expertise in command, control and operations from the platoon thru the headquarters, Georgia Army National Guard level.

The education and experience of these and many other SDF soldiers is difficult to replace and their expanded use provides a venue not only for prior service personnel but a force with a high degree of education. For example, of the approximately 210 officers in the Georgia SDF, 46% have either a masters or doctoral degree demonstrating a rather substantial education level contained in these volunteer organizations.⁵⁰ Since these numbers are representative of SDF soldiers nation wide, life experiences coupled with prior military experience provides states a well educated and proven force to be utilized where needed.

COST EFFECTIVENESS

⁴⁷ The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, November 1952, p. 28; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.

⁴⁸ Sources of Perceptions Military Service, by Jerry Lehnus, defense Manpower Data Center & Mike Wilson, Westat, Inc, data as of 1999, Table 3, p. 6

⁴⁹ Ibid, June 1950 p. 7.

⁵⁰ The Georgia Department of Defense, 2002 Year In Review, Georgia State Defense Force, p. 6.

Given that all land SDFs are strictly state organizations, their operating budgets are most often minimal when compared to Federal forces such as the National Guard. Similar to their World War I, World War II and Korean War counterparts, today's volunteer SDFs and Naval Militia's receive no pay or allowances for training and drill attendance. In addition, unless called to state active duty, mission support is also done strictly in a non-pay status. Each time SDFs are used for a function in a non-pay status, states save money, sometimes representing substantial savings for the professional services rendered. Table 3 provides a comprehensive list of the reported funding levels of each active SDF.

Table 3. State Defense Forces - Army

State	Active Strength	Budget	Type Unit	Prior Service	Age Range
Alabama	600	30K	Support HQs	75%	22-69
Alaska	274	26.5K – 1 Mil	M.P.	75%	20-72
California	500	225K	Support HQs	80+%	18-62
Connecticut	275	0	Infantry/Cavalry	40%	20-60
Georgia	500	0	Infantry	40%	18-64
Indiana	315	40K	Support HQs	70%	21-75
Louisiana	108	0	Admin HQs	96%	50-65
Maryland	194	0	Support HQs	75%	17-70
Massachusetts	60	0	Admin Det.	60-75%	18-65*
Michigan	130	0	Support HQs	80%	20-70+
Mississippi	185	0	Infantry	85%	18-78
New Mexico	200	7K	M.P.	75%	18-65
New York	1,200	75K	Support HQs	75%	18-65*
Ohio	650	14K	M.P.	50+%	17-67
Oklahoma	28	0	Support HQs	75%	21-75+
Oregon	184	0	Infantry	50%	18-65*
Puerto Rico	1,630	300K	Support Det.	30%	16-65
South Carolina	1,500	100K	Infantry	45-50%	17-75
Tennessee	990	53K	Light Infantry	80%	18-70
Texas	1,518	103K	Infantry	60%	17-79
Vermont	326	0	Infantry	90%	17-70
Virginia	774	0	Light Infantry	70%	18-70*
Washington	95	0	Infantry	90%	18-64

For example, during 2002 the Georgia SDF contributed more than 1,797 days of operational service saving the state an estimated 1.5 million dollars. In 2001, their service saved Georgia in excess of \$754,000.00.⁵¹ During the 9/11 crisis the 244th Medical Detachment of the NYG provided medical services saving the state of New York approximately \$400,000.00.⁵² These examples provide insight into the financial advantage of not only using SDFs, but makes a sound argument for expanding their current force levels. In addition, since SDFs possess little equipment overhead costs are relatively small.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 3.

⁵² After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, 244th Clinic, New York Guard, 9 January 2003.

Since SDFs are all-volunteer organizations, salaries are paid to its members only in the event of activation for state active duty. Table 4 outlines the categories of legal authority to activate National Guard soldiers, the third choice relating to SDFs.⁵³

**Table 4 Legal authority to mobilize the National Guard:
The three distinct legal authorities available to mobilize the National Guard**

Title 10 – Armed Forces, U.S. Code, Sections 12301 – 12304 is federal active duty under the command and control of the President.

Title 32 – National Guard, U.S. Code, Section 102 is federally funded active duty “in the service of the United States,” but where command and control remains with the governors and adjutants general..

State active duty (SAD) allows the governor to use National Guardsmen or State Defense Forces with state funds for state specific events.

CHALLENGES TO BE RESOLVED

Expanding the use of SDFs, while attractive, requires resolution to several strategic and operational issues with the lack Federal recognition as the most prominent. Understandably, as state entities, SDFs were designed for state and not federal service, but their lack of federal recognition has several second and third level effects. First, current laws prohibit SDFs from purchasing excess Federal equipment of all types such as uniforms, and other individual equipment. Without at least cursory Federal recognition overall readiness and unit morale is affected. This issue is not new, as similar problems were experienced for both World War I and World War II. However, both President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt were able to lend assistance by passing the Home Guard Act in 1917 and the State Guard Act in 1940 respectively. Essentially, both pieces of legislation granted at least cursory recognition to state forces and permitted their use of Federal equipment and weapons when available. Also, since the US is not involved in a conflict of the magnitude of a world war, research suggests enough excess equipment exists to fulfill the operational needs of these volunteer organizations.

As a collective, SDFs lack an active command and control headquarters to provide strategic direction on types, Table of Distribution and Allowances, readiness reporting, missions, training and personnel policies. Standardization and cohesion in policies and procedures are essential to ensure interoperability with their federal counterparts and other state agencies and is crucial for mission success. Similar to World War II, National Guard Bureau is currently the DoD executive agent and the channel between the state and federal government in all matters pertaining to SDFs. As such, National Guard Regulation (NGR) 10-4 provides guidelines on such matters as potential missions and wear and appearance of the uniform, but lacks authoritative language to ensure compliance.⁵⁴

⁵³ LTC Tammy Miracle, The Army National Guard’s Role in Securing U. S. Borders, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 2003, p. 9

⁵⁴Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau Regulation NGR 10-4 21 Washington DC, September 1987.

Command and control was also an issue during World War II, particularly in light of the possibility of State Guards and active forces operating in the same area. However, by adopting a common sense approach and choosing cooperation over turf battles, both state and Federal force headquarters found a workable solution.⁵⁵ An alternative for the current issue of an oversight organization is the State Guard Association of the United States or SGAUS. Since most recognized SDFs belong to SGAUS and their charter is to promote the roles of and foster cooperation between SDFs, the Department of Defense, the National Guard, the active armed forces and their reserves they would be the logical choice for that responsibility.

Given, that a “one size fits all” mentality is not realistic, research suggests unit types and missions have changed, but not substantially. For example, most World War II State Guard units were modeled after either a light infantry or M.P. organization in form and function. Today, several SDF organizations mirror that traditional structure, yet there is a substantial derivation as a growing number of administrative and support headquarters within the force. This lack of standardization also reflects the lack of concern at the strategic level as to where these volunteer organizations fit into the overall defense plan.

The current world environment reflects similarities to World War II, as some have compared the 9/11 attacks to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. However, differences include the possibility of the entire National Guard being called to Federal service is minimal, yet mobilizing a preponderance of forces from an individual state or region is possible. In addition, there is increased concern over possible threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons of Mass Effects(WMD/WME), and Information Technology threats. As demonstrated by the 2002 anthrax attacks against U.S. domestic targets, the ease of proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical agents causes constant concern by local, state and Federal government officials questioning whether sufficient manpower exists to defend against an attack of one or more of these agents.

Information Technology is another potential asymmetric threat by terrorist groups and is becoming increasingly difficult to locate and eradicate. The importance of information technology cannot be overstated, as our dependence on computers and “the information highway”, and the ease of subversives “hacking” into government systems causes great concern. Again, questions regarding sufficient numbers of trained personnel to meet this threat are being voiced at every level.

Readiness reporting also requires resolution as research suggests there is not formal process to report SDF unit readiness posture such as a DA 2715 Unit Status Report. While commanders periodically brief their Adjutant General on readiness, the process is without formal structure and the readiness of units is unknown at echelons above the state headquarters, particularly at National Guard Bureau.

Taking the lead from Army Field Manual #1 (FM1), “The Army”, doctrine is crucial to training. The lack of codified missions impacts on the doctrine and associated training for SDFs as a collective. It is important for SDFs to have a clearly established universal task list, approved METL, and associated doctrine to develop challenging and meaningful individual and collective training programs.

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Home Defense Forces Study”, by Historical Research and Evaluation Organization, Washington DC, 27 April 1981, p. 52.

To date all 23 SDF organizations offer military training courses to their soldiers and officers, such as Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course, Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course for the enlisted ranks or Basic and Career Courses for officers. These courses were designed by the units themselves using current doctrine such as Soldiers Manuals, STPs, MTPs and TTPs, adapted to the needs of the organization. However, unlike their active Army and Reserve counterparts, the course program of instruction varies from state to state.

For example, the Tennessee SDFs BNOC and Basic Officer courses are approved through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, VA.⁵⁶ The NYG Army Division courses are also well organized, designed by former non-resident USAR course instructors.⁵⁷ While these initiatives are commendable, there is no set standard to ensure the collective curriculum is as well organized and all soldiers are receiving basic and uniform instruction.

Further, SDFs are prohibited from participating in non-resident training such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Research indicates the school prohibits SDF participation due to their lack of Federal recognition. This argument however, lacks credibility since officers of foreign armies are permitted entrance into the course of instruction.⁵⁸ In efforts to educate their officers, states such as California and Georgia have enrolled them in the U.S. Marine Corps Command and General College, who despite their non-federal status permits enrollment of SDF officers.

A venue which SDFs utilize to train their officers and soldiers on military support to civil authorities is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website. In fact, many states including Georgia, California and New York require FEMA courses as a pre-requisite for advancement. Again however, no standards exist to ensure a base level of education in military support to civilian authorities. Table five provides a comprehensive list of military courses offered by SDFs.

Table 5. State Defense Forces – Army - Schools

State	Basic Training	PLDC	BNCOC	ANCOC	Sergeant Major	Officer Basic/Co Grd	Officer Advanced	CGSC	OCS	Warrant Officer
Alabama	X									
Alaska	X		X							
California	X	X	X	X		X	X			X
Connecticut										
Georgia	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Indiana	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Louisiana	X									
Maryland	X									
Massachusetts	X									
Michigan	X									
Mississippi	X									
New Mexico	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	
New York	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X
Ohio	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Oklahoma	X									
Oregon										
Puerto Rico	X	X	X	X		X	X			
South Carolina	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

⁵⁶ LTC Lynn Carr, Brigade S-3, 4th Brigade Tennessee State Guard, Atlanta, GA, interview by Author, 11 July 2003.

⁵⁷ BG Barry Hartman, Commander, NYG Army Division, Camp Smith, NY, interview by author 16 May 2003.

⁵⁸ Mr. Michael Turner, Chief, Non-Resident CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, interview by author, 29 June 2003.

State	Basic Training	PLDC	BNCOC	ANCOC	Sergeant Major	Officer Basic/Co Grd	Officer Advanced	CGSC	OCS	Warrant Officer
Tennessee	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		
Texas	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Vermont	X		X							
Virginia	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Washington										

SDF personnel issues such as recruiting, medical and physical readiness standards, rank structure and security clearance procedures also require clarification and resolution. Most units have screening procedures in place to ensure quality recruits, such as criminal background checks however, standards vary and are directly linked to funding shortfalls. Due to cost, most units use any means available to check service records (Department of Defense Form 214) for prior service personnel and background checks with the local police departments for non-prior service personnel.

Medical and physical standards for SDFs also vary greatly within the force, with height and weight standards as a prime example. Some commanders such as the BG Lawrence Morrell, Commander of the New Mexico SDF states, "if they do not present a soldierly appearance in uniform, we discharge em." BG Barry Hartman, Commander NYG Army Division, uses a modified AR 600-9, by adding 20 pounds to each height category, while other SDF commanders enforce no height and weight standards. This area is of particular importance not only linked to duty performance but health issues and potential law suites to these volunteer organizations. Without directive guidance and compliance measures in place this area remains highly decentralized and potentially a major problem area .

Liability for its soldiers is another operational concern as current laws prohibit SDF soldiers from operating Federal equipment, such as vehicles, weapons or construction equipment. Professionals in the medical or legal fields are also prohibited from practicing their trade unless on state active duty orders. When supporting week end or annual training, medical doctors are permitted only rudimentary medical advice or referring patients to civilian or active duty medical facilities. This lack of standardization represents a potential loss of valuable professional services particularly in the medical field.

CONCLUSION

While it is understood these units possess challenges that require resolution, available evidence suggests their expanded use makes sense for several reasons. First, with the OPTEMPO currently experienced by our forces, particularly the National Guard in its growing Homeland Defense role, it is likely trained Federal forces may be at a premium and augmentation forces will be required for future contingencies. The possibility of National Guard units being inaccessible to state governors is a growing concern. Therefore, by actively supporting the SDF concept, governors have an alternative to provide a trained force at least in cadre strength providing uninterrupted service to their citizens.

Currently, SDF units successfully operate in 22 states and Puerto Rico, with another handful maintaining a volunteer Naval Militia. The cost associated with maintaining these volunteer forces is much less than an active or reserve federal force while providing trained personnel for state missions.

Additionally, with the increased volunteer spirit in the United States particularly after 9/11 events, SDFs provide a viable alternative to active or reserve federal service. SDFs, including Title 32 Naval Militia units, provide an opportunity for continued community service for both prior and non-prior service

personnel, in a less strenuous setting, while maintaining the discipline and values of a military organization.

Lastly, as research has demonstrated, historically SDF organization and use has been an afterthought. From the Mexican Border expedition through the Korean War, State Guard/SDF use has been a last minute, knee jerk reaction to unexpected circumstances, much like the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of 9/11. With today's increase in asymmetrical methods of warfare particularly global terrorism, it is imperative to explore the use of all the existing force structure to meet our national security requirements, particularly homeland defense. Expanding the use of volunteer organizations such as SDFs represents a step in that direction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the current restrictions placed on these volunteer organizations, it is recommended the current laws be changed to grant Federal recognition at least to facilitate SDF access to excess government equipment. Since these units are strictly volunteers, participating mostly in a non-pay status, denying access to basic necessities such as uniforms and accoutrements makes little sense and effects unit morale and readiness.

Lack of Federal recognition also impacts on the SDFs ability to tap into existing non-resident military courses, particularly the Non-Resident U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The idea of officers and soldiers being denied access to training courses and instead utilize sister service non-resident training e.g. The Marine Corps Institute courses seems a bit extreme. In light of foreign army students having access to such courses, it is recommended current policies and procedures be changed to permit recognized and approved SDFs participation.

Funding has always been an issue with these volunteer organizations. Since they are state supported their funding stream is at the behest of the governor. Research suggests most SDFs operate on a minimal budget, often unable to supply soldiers with the basic necessities. In efforts to augment funding levels, it is recommended partial Federal funding be initiated through National Guard Bureau and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Civilian organizations of similar ilk, e.g. the Citizen Corps and the USA Freedom Corps have access to Federal funding, SDFs should enjoy the same privilege.

With the increase in National Guard OPTEMPO, it is recommended that non-participating states and territories consider activating an SDF organization. The recommended size of proposed units should be at least Regiment, following either the light infantry or military police model, with the associated organic combat service support organizations such as Nuclear, Biological and Chemical organization, plus medical, and legal sections in their Table of Distribution and Allowances. For those shore line states or who have borders with or contain large bodies of water, activating a Naval Militia in either Title 32 or Title 10 status is advisable to augment their current security assets. As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, recovery operations are extensive and manpower intensive and can be multi-dimensional in the ability to utilize land, air and sea assets. Trained volunteer organizations can and do provide manpower and professional services that permit federal forces to concentrate their efforts in other critical areas.

There are several recommended solutions to the command and control issue of SDFs, since it is currently a highly decentralized process. As the DoD agent for SDF issues, it is recommended that National

Guard Bureau be more proactive in providing guidance in standardizing roles and missions, training and doctrine and personnel matters in conjunction with the Department of the Army and each Adjutant General. While SDFs exist at the behest of each governor, and he/she will dictate policy on force employment, standardized missions and related training, doctrine and personnel matters would add much legitimacy to these organizations. It is further recommended that an office of at least three fulltime staff members be activated at National Guard Bureau to dispense with such matters. It is important that SDF programs be given proper attention, and guidance in establishing and quantifying standards on a number of issues, which cannot be accomplished by staff officers as an additional duty.

As an alternative it is also recommended further study be conducted to place SDFs, as a collective, under the operational control of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in much the same manner as the U.S. Coast Guard. Since a primary focus of SDFs is homeland security, their inclusion under the umbrella of DHS would be a valuable assistor particularly concerning funding issues. It is also understood for this recommendation to be a reality, a high level of cooperation between state and federal officials and possible new legislation would be required.

Also, further study should examine SGAUS as the organization to provide standards for SDFs. Since SGAUS exists for the sole purpose of advising and informing on SDF matters and their board of directors consists of SDF members from programs nation wide they would be a logical choice.

Finally, research suggests the question of liability for volunteer SDFs is of growing concern particularly at the National Guard headquarters of participating states. It is therefore recommended Federal legislation be implemented to encourage state legislatures to change their policies to clarify liability issues associated with state service while not on State Active duty orders. Clarification is required at both the state and federal levels since professional service protection such as malpractice insurance for medical doctors is the responsibility of state legislatures.

THE STATE GUARD EXPERIENCE AND HOMELAND DEFENSE ¹

Colonel Andre N. Coulombe (USAR)

The attacks on the World Trade Center Towers on 11 September 2001 brought Homeland Security to public attention in a most dramatic way. While such an assault on recognized national symbols was a shock, it did serve us to refocus on an old strategic concern. The mission for homeland defense is not new, yet in each age must be rethought within the context of our overall National Security Strategy, Ends, and Ways and Means.

One of the highest “Ends” of any NSS must be the preservation life and property but also the survival of our national institutions. It is these institutions which support our freedoms that must be guarded and protected, even as we work towards other strategic objectives. Under our Federal System, we have also given the States not the Federal Government, the main responsibility for domestic security and the plenary police power necessary to meet that responsibility.¹

THE PROBLEM

The Founding Fathers, who met at Philadelphia in 1787, were interested in on creating a compact between thirteen Confederated states. The earlier Articles Of Confederation had failed to provide the security and efficiencies required for growth and even continued existence. The use of balance of governmental powers and decentralization was designed to ensure neither a dictatorship of an elite nor the chaos of the masses.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

On one hand the nation had to have a central or Federal government with sufficient authority to fulfill the common good. On the other hand it could not have so much authority as to overshadow the authorities of subordinate centers of power. The solution was a division of powers. This separation at the Federal level was horizontal and created an Executive, a legislative and judicial branch. In addition all powers were reserved to the States not specifically delegated to the Federal Government. The States themselves mirrored the horizontal separation of powers at their governmental levels and vertically with county and city/town governments.

Constitutionalists recognized that a major End State of these new relationships was a “Common Defense”. How this was to be accomplished was an early matter of controversy. The generation grew up in the shadow of Oliver Cromwell, the military dictator of England 1649-1657. One school of thought called for a large militia as a primary defense force with a very small full time component or none at all. Others called for something of a full time regular force.

In the end the Constitution allowed for the Legislative branch to raise an army, but did not specifically call for one. A United States Army was organized around two companies remaining from the old Continental Army, followed by a US Navy and Marine Corps ten years later. This Federal military was charged with homeland defense, the States with the domestic and local security mission of the overall defense; however, in fits and starts, federal forces grew by necessity. The Navy grew to protect

¹ Prepared, submitted and approved as a United States Army War College research paper on 9 May 2003.

American maritime commerce. The Army grew because of offensive operations against the Indian Nations to our West.

Meanwhile, each state of the new Union had its own militia organized into various types. Some States had Mounted Rangers and Rangers, which were a type of fulltime military police. In addition, in the settled areas, volunteer militia units often copied the latest uniforms from Europe. These units were often expensive in membership dues and carried a very strong political/social nature. The common militia could be organized into units or not and, in general, comprised all white males between 16 and 60, depending on the State.

The Militia Act of 1792 was to comprise the basic law and governance for the military structure to support our National Military Strategy for the first 125 years.² The Act did not provide for any Federal Reserve, rather it codified the relationship of the State to the overall national defense. In effect, the President, in his role as Commander In Chief, could direct forces into war. He could neither support nor reinforce without Congress and the States. Although the Act allowed the President to call the militia of the states into Federal service it did not provide the authority to do so. Militia forces remained under state control unless authorized to volunteer for Federal service. The States were to be the source of military manpower, but with no requirement to provide it.

In practice, states could respond or not. If they responded, they could either raise entire new units or authorize State Militia units to “volunteer” for Federal service. The State however could determine what elements of their militia they could retain within their boundaries for local defense and domestic security.

Homeland defense, therefore, comprised an exterior function which was a federal responsibility. There was also an interior one of domestic security and local defense which fell to the State. These functions however were not coordinated. The system was not designed to be efficient; it was designed to be a decentralized responsibility to defend our national territory from outside forces. It was not envisioned that such a system would be used to sustain wars conducted beyond our borders. Within the second generation an attempt would be made to support a second war with Britain using this system.

WHAT IS HOMELAND DEFENSE?

A basic “End” of any National Security Strategy is the protection of the life and property of our citizens. The military element of national power is designed to prevent the accomplishment by force of arms of the strategic objectives of our enemies. These strategic objectives may involve direct and indirect attacks to disrupt, destroy and demoralize the Homeland of America and our people. This can involve wide scale destruction of life and property or limited attacks designed to accomplish political or psychological objectives. Wider US Strategic objectives depend on a secure home base and uninterrupted supply to the operational elements of national power.

In homeland defense, political, economic and informational elements play key roles in an integrated approach to achieve our national objectives while denying those of our enemies. Homeland defense are the active measures taken to repel or defeat enemy attacks. Military Support To Civil Authorities, which herein will also include domestic security, are more passive support measures. Operations, such as the

² Joseph R. Barnes, “Amend the Stafford Act to Fund Emergency State Use of the National Guard,” ANSER Journal of Homeland Security, February 2002 Issue, 2.

attack on the World Trade Center, are an integrated attack making use of enemy political, economic and informational elements as well as military. Homeland defense includes those measures designed to defeat attacks on the National Territory prior to actual impact, and those focused on preventing disruption of that National Territory on a local or domestic basis.

In the current political climate the focus has been on terrorism and the use of the military element to combat this. This view may be narrow and unbalanced as planning criteria for the use of the military elements.³ The initiative can be lost in homeland defense planning by a narrow focus on the military element alone or the excessive use of elements of national power. In the overall protection of our national base a number of other threats exist, both natural and man-made. Defense planners, in coordination with other branches of government and in coordination of the other elements of national power, must consider floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, strikes, riots and a host of internal threats.

THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Although the basic concept of Homeland Defense has remained unchanged, its conduct has changed over the years. The key issues have been the developing role of national objectives beyond our borders and the evolving concept of Federalism.

Prior To World War I

The Militia Act of 1792 was the essential governing document until the National Defense Act of 1916. The War of 1812 became the first major test of the Federal-State relationship within Military Policy. The State Militia was designed for defensive service within the United States. Offensive limitations of the system were demonstrated when US Forces invaded Canada and the New York Militia refused to cross the border.

The development of State Volunteer Regiments beginning in 1806 was grounded on quasi Constitutional grounds.⁴ These units were either based on existing volunteer militia or brand new units created against Presidential levies for troops. It was this application of the Militia Act that was used for the Mexican War and later the Civil War. The vast majority of Civil War units were raised this way; however, the State still had final authority over its manpower. This allowed local authorities to meet state requirements first. Domestic security was provided at the expense of the overall defense effort.

Before the 20th Century the US Navy had no reserve per se. In the early days of Confederation each state had a maritime cutter service or patrol. In the 19th Century many coastal states maintained a Naval Militia. This Militia was patterned after the Navy and became a kind of reserve along with commercial maritime workers; California even had a Marine Corps battalion.

With the Spanish American War and the Philippine Insurrection the old system showed its unsuitability. Supply and transportation broke down. Other scandals of that period paved the way for reforms and the fruition of years of National Guard lobbying. Since the 1870s, the National Guard, through its association (NGA), had extensively advocated to become the primary reserve for the active Army. Based on the Civil War experience, National Guard enthusiasts argued that their service, if benefited by

³ Ian Roxborough, The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 7.

⁴ Stentiford, 7.

federal support and standardization, offered a means to a trained, organized reserve for the army. In other words a National Guard based in the states, but with a primary Federal reserve role, offered an updated version of the federal concept.

Regular army followers of Brigadier General Montgomery Upton argued that the National Guard would never be a suitable reserve for the army because of the lack of Federal standards and political intrigue. What was needed was an expansible regular army on the European model. This concept was too advanced for the time and only a small Enlisted and an Officer Reserve Corps existed by 1908.

Meanwhile, the Dick Bill of 1903 began the arguous process of replacing the Militia Act. Under the Bill, the Federal Government could set standards, provide funding and proscribe organization. States still appointed Officers and set personnel policies. The National Guard was still a state organization but the process to convert the Guard to a Federal reserve had begun.⁵

The World War I Era

In March 1916, President Wilson called up the National Guard to protect the Southwest borders. This was in response to a Terrorist attack on Columbus, New Mexico led by Poncho Villa. At that time, National Guard units still had state titles and their uniforms bore state insignia. These forces did not cross into Mexico in support of the punitive expedition because the laws of that time precluded it. Change was coming, however, with the Defense Act of 1916.

In the Defense Act of 1916, the militia was divided into an organized militia called the National Guard and an unorganized militia. States were limited to keeping one or both types of Militia. For the first time, the National Guard was identified as the primary reserve of the army. This reserve was to be called before any state or the traditional volunteers were. This was an enormous change not recognized at the time. In effect, the National Guard had achieved its objective, but in so doing placed itself in line for federal control.

National Guard forces were stood down in early 1917 from Mexican Border operations, only to be recalled in July and August. The second recall, however, was for overseas service in World War I. The Defense Act of 1916 allowed the President to call individuals in the National Guard of the several states into federal service as a part of the National Guard of the United States.

The Act mandated that the National Guard was the primary reserve of the army and, for the first time, members swore allegiance to the President as well as the Governor. The National Guard units could not be called up for foreign service, but Guard individuals, all or a portion, could. When this was done, however, all state affiliations were severed. This was a triumph of the NGA position of the previous decades.

An example was the 69th New York Infantry Regiment. This fine old unit, called the "Fighting Irish," had just returned from the Mexican border in February 1917. In July, all personnel were examined and evaluated for federal service at their armory in New York. Members who qualified were called into federal service and assigned to a new unit, the 165th US Infantry Regiment. Personnel unfit due to physical, age or family situation were left assigned to the 69th. In this same way, the 7th New York Infantry became the 107th US Infantry and so on.

⁵ Ibid., 13.

This system allowed the Army to use the bulk of the National Guard exactly as Guard enthusiasts had advocated in the previous forty years; however, in an unanticipated consequence it left the States without a body of troops. We see this mirrored today in calls for the National Guard to assume the bulk of the homeland defense missions. If this is done would that not weaken the federal reserve? ⁶

The solution in 1917 was found as states began to activate units to replace the departing National Guard. Built around the remains of the old State Regiments, these units were called State Guards, Home Guards and later a Federal unit called the US Guard. The US Guard was comprised of 25,000 men who were deemed unfit for overseas service with the American Expeditionary Force.

World War I occurred during a period of stable Nation States. The threat to the homeland was primarily at the Southwest border and internally with sabotage and subversion. In addition, the traditional Guard missions of humanitarian assistance and aid to the civil authority continued. In 1918 an ammunition ship in the harbor at Halifax Nova Scotia exploded, spreading death and fires all along the waterfront. One of the first military units to respond was a medical unit from the Massachusetts State Guard on loan. Canadian forces were either deployed or too distant. The threat of strikes and industrial unrest continued from the pre-war period. These challenges were met by state forces. A very good example of this was the Massachusetts State Guard deployments during the Boston Police Strike of 1919.

Home Guard units of 1917-18 were comprised of the over and underage and men unfit for active service. They played a key role, however, in internal security operations within the homeland base area. World War I ended before the full implications of the reserve role for the National Guard had been digested. Although the National Guard had succeeded in becoming the primary Federal Reserve, in its success it left the states without any trained military body. This void was filled by State forces on an ad hoc basis. When the troops returned from the war, the State and Home Guards were deactivated and the troops sent home. The National Guard resumed its State mission, but now with Federal unit numbers, support and approval. Another step had been taken in the transformation of the Guard from State forces to a Federal reserve for the Army.

World War II

The return of the National Guard to state service after the First World War and the nature of our wartime participation did little to address the problems of homeland defense and wartime domestic security. The Second World War, however, with its greater threats to the US Homeland nearly brought the problem to a head.

In the summer of 1940, President Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited national emergency. In October of that year he began calling National Guard units into Federal service. The experience of Virginia is interesting.⁷ In anticipation of probable war, the Governor established a State Defense Council, chaired by a retired National Guard Colonel. The Council began to develop plans and coordinate between state agencies for wartime defense. A major concern was to replace the National Guard in both state missions and as a possible auxiliary to Federal forces in the event of invasion, raids or sabotage. The Virginia Protective Force was activated in late 1940. With the departure of the last National Guard units by April 1941 the now renamed Virginia State Guard had grown to over 6,000 men.

⁶ John R. Brinkerhoff, "Restore the Militia for Homeland Security," *ANSER Journal of Homeland Security*, November 2001 Issue, 12.

⁷ Marvin W. Schlegal, *Virginia on Guard* (Richmond, VA.: Virginia State Library, 1949), 137-141.

By February 1942, with American military defeats overseas in mind, local Virginia civilians began to organize themselves into private militia units to defend the local communities. To establish some semblance of order and coordinate these forces towards the overall security plan, the Virginia Reserve Militia was established. Unlike the State Guard, which deployed throughout the state, the Virginia Reserve Militia was limited to the County. These county based organizations were organized under the supervision of the Conservation Supervisor in each county.

California had one of the largest forces during the war.⁸ For several weeks after Pearl Harbor, over 20,000 men were on state active duty. For the rest of the war California maintained a virtual state army of over 6,000 full time State Guardsmen. These forces supplemented the Federal forces in the state, freeing them from internal security roles as well as assisting them with population controls. In addition the California State Guard was involved in strikes, natural disasters and civil disturbance operations.

Both Puerto Rico and Alaska had robust organizations. The famous Eskimo Scouts originated during this period. The largest State or Territorial Guard was that of Hawaii. The record of this organization is perhaps most instructive for current applications to homeland defense. Plans for a Hawaiian Territorial Guard were in place by the time of Pearl Harbor. The Hawaiian Territorial Guard (HTG) was actually called out by the Governor even as the attack was in progress. At that point it was largely a paper force being called out. The force grew with volunteers from American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars posts, and individual veterans. Within a week the Governor had incorporated the high school Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps into the HTG. The Guard established security on key installations, bridges and key road junctions. General Short estimated that the HTG, in the several weeks after the attack, freed up about eight rifle companies for other duties. These duties included defense from external invasion.⁹

As fear of invasion rose in the Islands the State authorized a number of different units often based on ethnic origin. Such units as the Hawaii Rifles, the Oahu Defense volunteers and the Lanai Volunteers brought organized militia strength in the Territory to over 50,000. This was an important contribution to both domestic security and the potential defense of the Islands, had that been required.

The growth and development of State Guards during World War II was ad hoc. Other than some limited State guidance, the program, with the exception of Hawaii, was not well integrated into the overall Homeland Defense Plan. State Guards grew on the initiative of local authorities who appreciated the void that departure of the National Guard created and a groundswell of patriotic feeling among the populace. Between 1940 and 1947 these units grew from a rag-tag, in many cases un-uniformed, militia into a well organized approximation of the pre-war National Guard.

Federal officials did consider Homeland Defense, but from a centralized perspective. To this end, the War Department tasked 48 Military Police Battalions to provide internal security for the entire Continental United States area. Obviously, had the US homeland been systemically targeted, this force would have been insufficient. As the war continued and the majority of Federal forces deployed overseas, these Military Police Battalions followed. Ultimately, the State Guards allowed this to happen as they assumed the domestic security mission of homeland defense.

⁸ Stentiford, 171.

⁹ Ibid., 148.

State Guards for the most part were the only trained force to support local Police in Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance. On a number of occasions State Guard units were activated to control racial riots in a number of cities, including Beaumont Texas, Lynchburg Virginia and the largest was in 1943 in Detroit, Michigan. In that operation, over 2,000 State Guardsmen deployed along side an equal number of Federal troops for over a week of race riots. Detroit was the hub of the automotive industry and other key war industries. One interesting use of the Virginia State Guard occurred during a threatened power strike which would have brought the state to a halt, including war industries, shipping and key communications, as well as jeopardize public health and order. The Governor drafted the power workers under the old militia statutes into the State Guard and sent 1,000 additional Guardsmen to enforce their now military duties of power supply to the state.

The National Guard's departure did not end natural disasters such as flooding, hurricanes and tornado's. As has been mentioned, Humanitarian Assistance was a centerpiece of State Guard operations during the war. State Guard units fought forest fires and in Oregon and Utah searched and found parts of Japanese balloons. Man made disasters in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor continued. State Guardsmen performed Internal Security operations, participating both in securing evading prisoners of war to searches for intelligence agents landed by U-boat.

One area which was never resolved was mission priority. The active component's major focus till the end of the war was the fight against Germany and Japan. The State Guards were welcome on one hand, but the idea of providing any Federal support seemed to detract from the primary mission of winning the war. Although the State Guard suffered from a very high turnover due to conscription, this greatly benefitted the Federal forces.

According to reports 130,000 men serving on active duty in mid-1943. Thousands more had begun service with Sgs ¹⁰. A great portion of these personnel tended to become early Noncommissioned Officers or Officer Candidates. The entire period was one of slow acceptance and gradual Federal support in the forms of uniforms (with State insignia), weapons, ammunition, communication equipment and vehicles. Early on, the Army issued caliber .308 Enfield Rifles to serve along side State purchased and personally owned weapons. Later, these were withdrawn in favor of shotguns and submachine guns. By the end of the war over 180,000 men and woman were serving in State Guard with numbers of them in both Federal and State training schools.

The states also supported State Guards with some equipment, weapons and uniforms. Many Governors took great pride in their forces and appreciated the important roles they played. The National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association supported State Guards for two major reasons: the maneuver elements of the National Guard were now part of the active Army and the command and control of State Guards represented a valid mission for the Adjutants General; and the desire of the Adjutants General Association to control the debate after the war and ensure the outcome of the postwar struggle over the National Guard's role.

The Cold War and After

Nearly all State Guard and State Guard Reserve forces were disbanded by 1947. As the National Guard returned, State Guard units stood down. Some states, such as California, maintained lists, but, in general, the concept was mothballed. There were periodic revivals. During the Korean War a number

¹⁰ Ibid., 173.

of states lost portions of their National Guard to activations. Another revival occurred during the Reagan Administration. Beginning in 1980, with the “Total Force” concept states began to realize they might lose their National Guards very quickly in the event of a war in Europe with the Soviet Union.

In 1981, the Department of Defense commissioned a study by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, which examined the World War experience of 44 states that activated State Guards. It was clear from the study that such forces were critical to pick up the State missions of the departing National Guard. These State missions and domestic security had strategic implications from the homeland defense and security aspect. In 1983, the National Defense Act was amended to permit all States to maintain State Defense Forces. The drive to expand the concept peaked by 1989 with over 24 States having such organization.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 the drive faltered and atrophied. With the threat diminished, such forces were seen as a drain on the “peace dividend.” The Department of Defense saw no reason to expend funds in a time of lowering budgets and drawdown. The states no longer felt they might lose their National Guards. In addition, there were a number of media “exposes” and a few incidents of overzealous State Guard units creating an impression of rogue units. In the 1990s, even the term “militia” came into disrepute after the Oklahoma City bombing and arrests of various Aryan Nation and skinhead types. The National Guard was no longer enthused about an organization who might present an institutional threat. Without the state mission, the old question of why the active Army needs two reserves might arise.

In spite of setbacks, the State Guard movement is not dead. A number of states, with South Carolina and New York in the lead, are involved at the local level of homeland defense. New York has activated an Air Wing and a Civil Affairs Group. South Carolina has activated a Brigade for “Homeland Defense.”¹¹

CONCLUSIONS

In the recent past, both the US and other great powers have faced the issue of how best to meet the challenge of domestic security in support of homeland defense. The State Guards are uniquely American in their concept. These forces originate from an earlier concept of social organization which flourished before the growth of the nation state and mass armies. Unlike the British Home Guard or the German Volkstrum, these forces reflect a military policy based on a decentralized separation of powers. As long as our Constitution is in force this will be an issue. How we provide defense for the homeland and at what institutional price was answered in the last century by installing a dual nature to the National Guard. Now we face a similar problem in the allocation of missions relating to local and internal security in the face of the war on terrorism.

The War on Terrorism has rightfully focused our attentions on terrorism and Consequence Management of terrorist acts. While critical, this focus must not be allowed to cloud our vision for the potential of other threats and of threats to our ability to fight terrorism. We must ensure that defense of the homeland addresses other contingencies from other Theaters to the potential disruption of the home base from natural or manmade disasters. National Guard forces continue to be called up for the War on Terrorism.

¹¹ Colin Robinson, “America’s Forgotten Army: The State Guards,” Center For Defense Information (26 July 2002): 19.

The Utah National Guard is currently 88% on active duty and that state has no State Guard.¹² The experience of the two World Wars, while largely forgotten today, is very clear what this means.

The historic record shows us the adaptability of our Constitutional government in the face of great change. Half of the states currently maintain some form of State Guard. These forces range from administrative cadre to some fairly robust organizations. Without federal funding and limited state interest these forces number around 10,000. Homeland defense requires forces oriented towards local security, trained and organized, but coordinated within a national strategy. In two World Wars this challenge was met with local volunteer forces on an extremely cost effective basis. State Guards have represented a smart investment because they make use of local military retirees, veteran organizations and other volunteers who know their area.

The current War on Terrorism is based on a Continental United States (OCONUS) offensive effort concurrent with a defense in depth of the Homeland. The Federal Government has recognized the need for a high level of volunteerism. The initiative for local homeland defense came from local and State government in the World Wars, consistent with the concept of Federalism. Today the Federal Government is attempting to “Top Load” this concept. One program with great promise is the Department of Homeland Security Grant Program. These grants totaled \$3.9 billion in 2002 and were provided to qualified organizations that provide support to homeland security. States that have implemented Defense Forces are eligible.¹³ Another good concept is the AmeriCorps which has just made a \$1 million grant to the South Carolina Department of Military Affairs. State Guards provide the local basis to homeland defense consistent with our laws and Institutions. Preservation of these institutions along with life and property of our citizens is the highest “End State” of our National Security Policy.

The challenge, therefore, is and has been historically to conduct defense of the homeland within the constraints imposed by the very institutions we seek to preserve. In addition, the initiatives must be fiscally supportable. Should the Federal Government take responsibility for Homeland Security? If conducted at the federal level the expense will be both fiscal and Constitutional. There is no guarantee that domestic security, as a part of the overall homeland defense effort, will be improved proportionate with the cost. Rather, the historic record of the State Guards in the last century document a model for the current War on Terrorism that is both legally and fiscally supportable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

State Guards need clarification and recognition of their mission. The Department of Defense does not need to nor should it take charge of state forces, but must clarify how these organizations support the overall defense effort. In the late 19th century the National Guard and its Association struggled for recognition as the primary Federal Reserve. Today, the State Guard and its Association need recognition as the primary State Reserve. While this is primarily a political question, it will have profound impact at the strategic level. Without a primary State Reserve the actual utility of the National Guard is a question mark. Today, the National Guard has been effectively integrated into the Department of Defense planning process. We will no longer have months to build a State Guard. Without a State Guard, Federal forces might be diverted from a defensive combat contingency to conduct both domestic security and the former State missions of the Guard.

¹² Ibid., 22.

¹³ Brinkerhoff, 12.

Resourcing will be critical. States should fund State missions. In some ways the Civil Air Patrol is a model. The Air Force invests very little in its auxiliary. The funding it does provide primes the pump, the volunteers do the rest. Today, State Active Duty for National Guard personnel is state funded. That was the practice during the World Wars as well. The Department of Defense can support the growth of State Guards by opening such agencies as the Defense Reutilization and Management Office to supply surplus equipment, such as uniforms, equipment, communications gear and vehicles at a no cost basis. In addition, the Department of Defense can allow State Soldiers to attend select schools on a State Active Duty basis and the establishment of specialized training courses within the Army Correspondence Course Program and local US Army Reserve training units.

States must write Tables of Organization and Equipment for State Guard units. This has already begun and is essential for the use of the Defense Reutilization and Management Office. These units should be Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical, logistics and Light Infantry. As was the practice in the World Wars, limited issue of weapons and ammunition from War Reserve Stocks should be made. The Civilian Marksmanship Program does this for gun clubs. Until recently the Civilian Marksmanship Program was giving away M-1 Rifles to such clubs. Selective Service should create a specialized classification for State Guardsmen. This would enhance recruiting, in particular, of those with dependency or health issues and also minimize turnover in State Guard units in the event of a draft. This turnover was a major problem for the states in the World Wars.

As during the World Wars, the State Adjutants General coordinated State Guard efforts through the National Guard Bureau. This Command and Control extended to NORTHCOM will ensure "Unity of Effort."

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A GUIDE FOR ESTABLISHING A STATE DEFENSE FORCE WITH A HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION

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BACKGROUND

The State Defense Force (SDF), or State Guard or State Militia as it has been traditionally known, was typically thought to be the State's National Guard "Reserve." Its missions were typically to protect armories when National Guard (NG) units were on annual active service or when the units were activated in support of a Federal mission; to "Troop the Colors" at public events and parades when the National Guard was not able to perform that activity; to conduct military burials and other Honor Guard duties when the National Guard was not able to perform that activity as well; to provide special military-style support activities as requested by local jurisdictions [with the Adjutant General's (TAG's) specific approval]; and, in some very rare cases, based on that TAG's beliefs about the viability and credibility of his SDF, to conduct "crowd control" and other military police functions on a case by case basis.

Today, however, the world has changed significantly and the National Guard has many more missions than was anticipated when it was first organized. The NG is now regularly activated for "peace-keeping" missions, for homeland security missions and in anticipation of a military response in foreign countries. Even when it performs a homeland defense mission within homeland security the NG performs in a "WarFighter" or military police role.

The National Guardsman is typically well trained to perform as a "WarFighter" or in direct support of the WarFighter mission. The NG Military Police can function in the police role; however, they lack specific training in that other category known as "security," that is, the protection of critical infrastructures, vital material and individuals, or identification and mitigation of the "insider threat ¹." Many NG troops are knowledgeable about various aspects of "information technology" (IT); however, most are not computer specialists who can develop, collect and maintain massive integrated databases, develop and maintain in-depth information query systems that use that data for control or intelligence purposes, or maintain the hardware systems that must service such activities. NG Engineers are knowledgeable about maintaining, repairing or destroying such vital infrastructure elements as bridges, tunnels, roads and buildings; however, their experiences are in support of military actions and rarely in support of natural catastrophes. Finally, the NG has units that are trained in the art and science of "Civil Government"; however, few are trained in the legal and legislative functions that underlie the success of reestablishing and/or stabilizing a civil government following a natural disaster or a terrorist attack.

¹ The "Insider Threat" is a threat to the organization or mission by a psychologically impaired, drug addicted, alcohol abusive, financially unstable, and/or spouse or child abusive employee who may inadvertently or by coercion by a political or criminal entity provide classified and/or sensitive information, access or material vital to the organization or mission (see M. Hershkowitz, "The 'Insider Threat' and How to Minimize It," Homeland Protection Professional, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2005, pp. 10-12; M. Hershkowitz, "Ensuring Good Judgement," in S. J. Davies and R. R. Minion (eds.), **Security Supervisor Training Manual**, Butterworth-Heinemann, Division of Reed Publishing (USA, Inc.), Stoneheim, MA, 1995, pp. 42-47; and M. Hershkowitz and L. Gebrowsky, "The Personnel Security Assurance Program: An Overview, with Emphasis on Training and Training Impact," proceedings volume of the 13th Annual TRADE Conference: Changing Expectations and Performance, 1989, pp. 47-52)..

From recent experiences we see that such rebuilding of the civilian sense of trust and of the future are both tenuous and difficult to achieve.

The purpose of this Guide ² is to provide a structure for organizing a volunteer military SDF unit that State TAGs can activate in support of their NG's natural disaster, homeland security and/or community assistance functions. A well-designed SDF would fully integrate with the NG by supplying talent through TAG to the Governor and the citizenry of the State on a voluntary basis that the NG either lacks, is weak in providing or is unable to provide due to a commitment to a Federal mission.

A MANDATE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

The President has spoken, the Congress has spoken, the electorate has spoken, the United Nations has spoken, the Congress has spoken again by enacting legislation to establish a U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. Department of Defense has augmented this effort by establishing the Northern Command to provide the Homeland Defense contingent of Homeland Security. This is a mandate for a massive antiterrorist effort throughout the world. The antithesis of this is a counter-world-wide effort by the terrorists and political entities that support terrorist activities. Herein lies the mandate for homeland security efforts throughout the world.

The United States, as the leader in the worldwide effort to halt and hopefully to destroy terrorist action groups and governments that actively support terrorists, is clearly marked for massive retaliation by this enemy. In anticipation of this attack on our homeland, the Congress has provided the President and the Governors with legislative guidance and funding to establish Homeland Security organizations in every State of the Nation and our National Territories.

Within six months of the Congressional guidance, Homeland Security directorates or offices have been established with reasonably stated missions. Limited Federal military and other support are already being made available through expanded Department of Defense Rapid Assessment and Immediate Decontamination (RAID) units, the U.S. Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the Department of Health and Human Services at Atlanta, Georgia and an expanded selection of the National Guard. Other "players" will come from such State and municipal agencies and organizations as the State Police, State health agencies, municipal police, hospitals and local physicians (all basically "First Responders"), and some of the remaining NG units. The National Guard Bureau's Office of Homeland Security has indicated its belief that the terrorist threat dictates the growing role of the NG in homeland security in the coming decades.

On the surface, this force would seem to be adequate to provide security for our borders, critical infrastructures, critical material logistics depots, buildings, etc. Analyzing below the surface, however, raises the question of impact on other functions when they are stripped to staff the Homeland Security mission(s): the reduced State Police presence, the reduced local police presence, the lack of medical staff at the hospitals, the reduced availability of local physicians, the reduced capabilities of the NG to perform vital Federal military missions, the empty offices in other State agencies with other vital State

² A "guide" by its very nature is meant to present all possibilities and alternatives, presenting the reader with a roadmap, including pathways, options and concerns for consideration. The reader should not expect that this "Guide" will be a proposal, which is specific to actual activities and approved missions to be implemented; thus, much more succinct in nature. Rather, the reader is presented with several levels of SDF configuration, including optional missions that may be authorized by TAG to assist the NG in support of requesting or sponsoring State or municipal agencies and approved by them.

functions. In addition to the above, there remain questions concerning the needed intelligence effort to determine targets needing primary protection, the massive IT effort needed to support that intelligence effort, the training function that must be established to help grow the Homeland Security directorate or office and prepare its members to function at the highest levels of proficiency, and the ability to mount a Personnel Security Assurance Program (sometimes referred to as a Human Reliability Program or a Personnel Reliability Program) to eliminate or at least minimize the potential “insider threat” (that is, the threat presented by employees under the influence of chemical substances or excess use of alcohol, psychiatric or psychological impairment, financial instability, with criminal backgrounds, or child and spouse abusers). It becomes clear that the new Homeland Security directorates or offices will be functioning at less than adequate levels.

As final insight into the State’s homeland security need for all the support it can receive from an integrated Federal resource, consider past Federal massive reorganization experiences. The new U.S. Department of Homeland Security, composed of 22 distinct agencies (many having overlapping responsibilities) with 170,000 employees will take many years to become the cohesive operation needed by the States seeking policy guidance, operational funding support and priorities from a central source. The Department of Defense was created in 1947, yet the full planned for power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not realized until 1986; the U.S. Department of Energy was created in 1977, yet it still remains a patchwork of national security and numerous other energy related organizations led by a variety of military and civilian appointees, and competing for budget priorities and political control.

Therein lies the need for a support operation that can back up the State’s Homeland Security staff with appropriate expertise and in such a manner as to permit the Homeland Security staff to rapidly grow into their positions with an appropriate level of expertise. An additional benefit from this would be to free up more State and municipal police, medical personnel and the NG to return to their principal vital functions.

DESIGN FOR A VOLUNTEER STATE DEFENSE FORCE TO FULFILL THE HOMELAND SECURITY SUPPORT FUNCTION

The design phase covers both the recognition of the various mission options and roles that a volunteer SDF can undertake through TAG to provide authorized support to the State in general and its homeland security effort in particular, and the organizational elements that will meet those needs. Throughout this design phase it is vital to incorporate safeguards to ensure that SDF volunteers are trained to properly conduct missions assigned to them and to have those missions monitored by knowledgeable professionals to guarantee that the volunteers do not exceed the mission guidelines.

Roles for the State Defense Force³

From previous discussions, it follows that there should be three specific roles:

- The traditional role, although not exciting or demanding, is one that has received acceptance in all of the existing SDF organizations. This is the authorized administrative back up of the NG through protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence; the

³ For a view of the totality of the several SDF configurations and optional missions that TAG may authorize, see the table at the end of this Guide. Keep firmly in mind that, for a SDF to be successful, the missions must be authorized by TAG in support of the NG and as approved by the requesting or sponsoring agency.

“Trooping of Colors” at State approved functions; Honor Guard details at military burials or other special functions; and assistance at community activities, as approved by TAG.

- The non-traditional and quite limited role of authorized assistance, as approved by TAG, to the State Emergency Management Agency, State Police and municipal authorities in anticipation of and/or following a natural disaster, such as hurricanes, tornadoes or floods. Typically, one or more of these agencies, including elements of the NG, will refuse any SDF assistance; however, in the rare case when the offer is sought after or accepted, and this will occur on occasion, a SDF must be prepared to offer a certain level of needed assistance. The support may take the form of providing perimeter protection; logistics involving the storage and/or distribution of food, bedding and/or shelter; transportation guidance to safe roadways and emergency housing; and, in that very special case, the use and manning of personally owned heavy equipment and 4-wheel drive vehicles.
- The very non-traditional and likewise very limited role of authorized assistance to the Homeland Security directorate, as approved by TAG, in preparation for anticipating and combating terrorist threats within the State. This is one role that the idea of depending on a volunteer organization to provide continuing and competent support will cause the potentially receiving organization(s) to be extraordinarily cautious and negative. It therefore falls upon the SDF Command to identify specific areas within which the other agencies will lack sufficient expertise and to ensure that its SDF units can indeed provide that expertise on a regular basis. Herein lies the most interesting challenge for a SDF Command. The immediate choice falls to provision of security as it exceeds the military and local police effort, that is, the establishment of appropriately, professionally monitored perimeter protection, leadership protection, personnel security assurance, policy guidance on the extent to which such security differs from police security and the training that will ensure a continued expertise. The next immediate choice is that of providing appropriately, professionally monitored in-depth, integrated IT approaches that will address intelligence, data search, cross-referencing and analysis of information, computer and system programming, and data entry. Here is where most homeland security efforts will falter and bog down awaiting results; here is where an appropriately organized and monitored SDF can make a definitive contribution. Still another area of support is the ability to assist Homeland Security attorneys in determining legal need and assessing the needed legislative redirection to accommodate that legal need. One example is to provide easily understood both legal and operational guidelines on the difference between “retain” and “restrain.” The latter alludes to the “sworn officer’s” authorization to use various levels of physical force to prevent entry to a location that is restricted to special access, while the former alludes to preventing access to such areas without “laying on of hands.”
- A fourth SDF activity not addressed above, but which would enhance each of those roles, is the establishment of a medical group or MEDGRU of physicians, nurses and other health providing individuals (including administrators and technicians) who, for one reason or another, have not been identified or are not currently functioning as First Responders. At a minimum, this group can provide aid and comfort at parades and other celebratory events by treating heat exhaustion, minor automobile injuries, skinned knees and elbows, splinter removal, etc. In support of disaster mitigation, the MEDGRU can provide secondary medical attention as the First Responders and triage teams deal with the “incoming” injured and shock victims. However, in the case of homeland security activities involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD, i.e., biological, chemical or nuclear weapons) the support is not for the injured, for which it is

unlikely that the MEDGRU team members would have specific experience or training to provide direct medical assistance, but for the WMD Response Team members who will be suffering from heat exhaustion, dehydration, physical exhaustion, emotional shock and a variety of related minor physical injuries.

On initial examination, each of the roles above appears to be significantly different from the others as to require very different expertise and experience to conduct their mission(s). Upon closer examination, each also requires a very similar expertise and experience in command leadership, planning, administration and training. As might be expected, these two disparate and opposing staffing requirements can lead to territorial friction between the roles or mission groupings. This potential problem must be addressed early in the developmental process by the SDF leadership cadre, channeling the potential territorial friction into productive competition in order to achieve high levels of mission performance. In order to achieve this, the SDF Commander must exercise extreme care in selecting and appointing the leadership and training elements for each role or mission grouping, concentrating on recognized knowledgeable professionals.

Initial Cadre Elements for Establishing a Volunteer State Defense Force

The final organizing of an approved and active volunteer, uniformed SDF is a later-stage activity. Initially, it is vital to begin the thinking and then planning functions of how to organize the effort of identifying and selecting the most suitable support efforts for the Homeland Security directorate to best accomplish its assigned mission(s). To accomplish this, it becomes apparent that an “inner-cadre” of senior officers and enlisted personnel is required as the kernel for creating the structure that will eventually form the SDF cadre upon which a SDF can be called into service. This inner-cadre must be prepared to undertake an extensive and agonizing burden at their own expense to accomplish this most vital activity in the development of the SDF.

As the first step, the SDF Command Coordinator should select five (5) senior persons as his “Deputies” for thinking and planning purposes. Note that these individuals are not to be considered as Deputy Commanding Generals or Brigade Commanders or Battalion Commanders, but rather as the senior cadre for thinking and planning purposes. These individuals should be given assignments as follows:

- One “Deputy” should be responsible for planning for a force to be the kernel for conducting the traditional military support functions, including Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities, armory protection, parades, community events, communications, and support for the NG museum and library. This should involve an inventory of all armories and other Army and Air NG locations; planned State and community events; communications equipment and repeaters; the names and telephone numbers of the Mayors, County Executives and Commission Chairmen, and their Directors of Public Safety; location of Federal and State surplus supply warehouses; and local businesses that supply military style clothing, equipment and surplus materials. It should also include an inventory of all potential SDF volunteers and their willingness to serve. Likewise, in support of this effort, the Deputy should identify and recruit a small number of suitable individuals to assist in identifying and cataloging the inventories and potential SDF personnel.
- One “Deputy” should be responsible for planning for a force to be the kernel for conducting the natural disaster mitigation support function. This should include an inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings throughout the State that could be damaged by

hurricanes, tornadoes or floods. Furthermore, it should also include an inventory of all construction and material warehouse organizations in the State, and an indication as to the extent that the owners and employees would be willing to volunteer their materials and labor for disaster mitigation. In support of this effort, the Deputy should identify and recruit a small number of suitable individuals to assist in cataloging targets, materials and potential SDF personnel; although age should not be a determining factor, the MEDGRU should determine whether each volunteer for these activities is capable of performing under such demanding conditions.

- The homeland security support effort is somewhat different as its missions are most encompassing and complex. Accordingly, this mission grouping will require two (2) “Deputies,” one totally responsible for thinking through and planning the IT function in support of the Homeland Security directorate and the other Deputy totally responsible for thinking through and planning the security function in support of the Homeland Security directorate. Both will have responsibility for the massive training efforts involved in their area of responsibility. The IT Deputy function will identify and inventory all State offices and all industries within the State that utilize a major IT effort in support of their activity; for instance, payroll, personnel, health and human services, and military and police assignments to mention just a very few. It will also identify and inventory all IT hardware centers and suppliers within the State. The IT Deputy will also work with the Homeland Security directorate to identify and inventory all areas of IT activity and potential support needs being considered by that directorate. The Security Deputy function will identify all Federal, State, municipal and business groups that provide various security efforts throughout the State. It will also identify and inventory all likely targets of terrorist activity that might compromise the State’s vital infrastructures and operations, for instance, bridges, tunnels, rivers, power stations, highways, water reservoirs, docking and warehousing facilities, airports, train and bus stations, hospitals and military installations to mention just a very few. Both Deputy functions will identify and inventory all training facilities in support of their own functions. They should also include an inventory of all potential SDF volunteers, their expertise, availability and willingness to serve under difficult operational conditions. Likewise, in support of these efforts, the Deputies should identify and recruit a small number of suitable individuals to assist in identifying and cataloging the inventories and potential SDF personnel.
- Finally, the remaining, fifth Deputy will function more like a Chief of Staff, although not with those specific responsibilities. In addition to functioning as a coordinator of and a confidant for the activities of the other four Deputies, this function will have certain esoteric responsibilities, as follows:
 - Initiate a public relations effort.
 - Identify legislators willing to modify or enact legislation in support of a SDF.
 - Identify businessmen willing to provide personal and other support for a SDF.
 - Identify secondary and higher education leaders willing to support a SDF.
 - Identify retired military and public safety leadership willing to support a SDF.
 - Nominate staff to be appointed to the Citizen Corps Councils.
 - Identify a physician to develop and lead the SDF MEDGRU.
 - Obtain a list of all privately owned boats suitable to support coastal watch.
 - Obtain a list of all privately owned aircraft suitable to support coastal air watch.
 - Establish a SDF State Chapter under the State Guard Association of the U.S.

In addition –

- Establish a SDF State Guard Benefit Foundation under the SDF State Chapter of the State Guard Association of the U.S. as a nonprofit 501 (c) (3) to accept gifts of funds, equipment, materials and other support for the SDF.
- Establish a volunteer SDF Cadet Corps.
- Establish an Advisory Council of identified businessmen, educators and retired military and public safety leadership who would be willing to provide insight, guidance and advice beneficial to a SDF, but do not wish to serve in the SDF because of monthly drill, annual muster and periodic exercise requirements.

As with the other four Deputies, a number of suitable individuals, each with one or more of the special expertise suggested above, should be identified and recruited to assist in carrying out these activities.

The last three activities, above, are quite important to the growth potential of a SDF. The State Guard Benefit Foundation is a legitimate charity vehicle for individuals, businesses and other nonprofit organizations to provide funds, equipment (such as, communications gear, vehicles, copy machines, computers, satellite telephone equipment and services, desks, file cabinets, chairs, uniforms, field equipment, cameras), materials (such as, paper, envelopes, stamps, medical supplies, tents, foodstuffs, fuel) and other support (such as, assistance in public relations, legislative lobbying, audio-visual training materials, staff specialists in IT, security, and other desirable areas for purposes of training) for a SDF.

The SDF Cadet Corps is a very special recruiting device.⁴ In order to establish one it is necessary for the State Legislature to require that community service be a requirement for high school graduation, as was done in Maryland. The Cadet Corps provides many of these students the opportunity to obtain their community service credits through the SDF, which is considerably different from traditional opportunities for community service. The requirements are straight forward; however, because of the politics involved, they become quite time consuming. The stages are as follows: (1) Establish a legislative requirement for community service for high school graduation; (2) Obtain TAG's approval to establish a SDF Cadet Corps to provide community service credit, which must include provisions for medical coverage, worker compensation insurance and other traditional coverage for members of a SDF (this may require a modification to existing legislation); (3) Issuance of a SDF Directive establishing the Corps as a unit of the SDF; (4) Formal acceptance by the school systems of the SDF as a provider of community service opportunities and credit; (5) Issuance of a Directive providing operational guidance for the Corps Commandant and staff; (6) Training materials and classes for the Cadets; and (7) A procedure for periodic reporting of credit for each Cadet to the appropriate school system. The Cadet Corps also offers an unexpected benefit upon graduation, which are potential recruits for the SDF, the NG or the active military.

An alternative to the precise configuration of the suggested SDF Cadet Corps, above, is to sponsor Explorer Scout units, with desired specialties, assigned to selected SDF units. In this manner, some of

⁴ Colonel M. Hershkowitz, (MDDF-Ret), "Recruitment and Community Service: A Two-Edged Sword," The SGAUS Journal: Articles and Book Reviews, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2000, pp.21(1-12).

the political/administrative complexities of the suggested Cadet Corps may be eliminated; however, some of the propriety control may be lost as well. Other military style youth volunteer organizations provide similar positive and negative aspects.

The Advisory Council provides an excellent opportunity to obtain valuable input without the “cost” of very high military rank appointment against an existing Table of Organization and Equipment or the need for these persons to attend regular meetings. These individuals are in the position to offer advice based on extensive personal experience and to influence other groups, such as legislators, political appointees, State and municipal public safety leaders, health service providers, news media, local educators and the Homeland Security Director, to support and utilize the SDF whenever the need becomes apparent.

Identifying the availability of privately owned suitable boats and aircraft provide the potential for a SDF water and air armada to augment U.S. Coast Guard, State Police and Civil Air Patrol efforts in support of homeland security coastal watch, and search and rescue.

In all information and data searches mentioned above, obtaining 100% of the items is desirable; however, obtaining 90-95% is often more cost-efficient. The remaining 5-10% can be obtained piecemeal over time while attempting to maintain the viability of the existing information and data through updates.

The Training Imperative

All organizations, military or civilian, require continuing technical and leadership (management) training to permit and encourage its staff to meet and exceed performance goals. Military organizations require additional training in military order, custom and courtesy. Because a SDF is a volunteer organization that meets infrequently, the requirement for the military, technical and leadership training is even greater for the lessons to have their desired effect. Thus, SDF training must, by its nature, be more intensive and requires a greater sense of unit cooperation and team building.

Having addressed the need for extensive and intensive training the unanswered question is how to obtain and expense the cost of such training. It is clear that little or no funds are currently available within TAG’s current budget, nor is there an expectation that such funds will be made available within the foreseeable future. The impetus then rests with a SDF cadre to resolve this issue.

The SDF’s initial leadership cadre will be under tremendous pressure to identify and recruit individuals, each with recognized expertise in both the military training requirements and at least one identified mission related technical area to form and prepare the next level of leaders. To further complicate this identification and recruitment effort, the initial and “second round” leaders must be experienced in adult training, preferably of volunteers, and in group and team facilitation. Thus formulated, a SDF can provide its own training capability with little or no reliance on constrained NG or other State resources.

There is some minimal level of training support that the State can provide to its SDF from its current inventory without impacting any constrained resources. The NG and other mission related agencies can provide available textbooks, training materials and other related documents. Furthermore, the NG should be expected to provide available training facilities and audio-visual equipment and materials whenever they are not in use by NG personnel (as a volunteer organization, a SDF can schedule its needs for those periods when they are not in use by the NG). However, in the final analysis, SDF staff must

develop and provide its own trainers and training materials as volunteers training volunteers at their own expense of time and materials.

A Word on Recruitment and Recruits

The traditional SDF recruitment pools are recently retired active military, reserve and NG officers and enlisted personnel. Members from this group will join a SDF because of the sense of a comradeship among volunteers, because of the comfort level obtained from being among uniformed persons once again, or because of having served the military well and received much in return they wish to “repay” that emotional “debt” through continued community service with a SDF. Another traditional pool is those individuals who were unable to serve or to complete a full service commitment due to a medical disability that would not affect service in a SDF, thus, permitting them to perform community service while wearing a military uniform. Another, lesser pool is one composed of the family, friends and colleagues of current members of a SDF who speak highly of pleasure derived from serving their State, community and fellow citizens in this manner.

Unfortunately, the preponderance of recruits from these pools is principally in the older age groupings and so their ability to serve long periods of time in a SDF is greatly reduced. What is needed is a great effort to recruit from younger age groupings, permitting sufficient time to train these individuals and an expected longer service period from them thereafter. Thus, the idea of establishing a SDF Cadet Corps and of involving secondary and higher education leadership in a SDF should help to meet that requirement.

There are two simultaneous tracks that must be pursued in order to accomplish this. One is to provide missions that have either or both homeland security and community service components, and a training component that exceeds the traditional formation, marching, guard-mounting and military deportment components. Although these components are needed, first aid and beyond, communications, IT, land-based navigation, etc., are far more exciting and have some application in the academic classroom. Other activities, such as preparing directives, media releases, action reports, training manuals and other documents; assistance in intelligence gathering activities and preparing periodic exercises; assistance to in-school activities; and assistance in providing support to homebound individuals, through such activities as “meals-on-wheels” and assistance in taxi service between home and medical providers, are all excellent experiences for the younger recruit.

The other simultaneous track requires identifying and recruiting senior, experienced persons in each of the required disciplines who are willing to undertake the extensive responsibilities of training volunteers, at their own expense, over extended time periods and of monitoring these volunteers in the conduct of a mission. It is, therefore, incumbent upon these senior individuals to be committed to the military concept of “volunteer.”

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This “Guide” has suggested a dynamic and proactive SDF to provide the NG with needed assistance in a variety of State emergency and local community situations as a gap in such support is established by the increasing role of the NG in homeland defense and security. However, can a SDF actually obtain such a level of operational expertise and acceptance?

There are three conditions that a SDF must satisfy in order to be considered the SDF alluded to herein. The first is a proposed SDF leadership that truly sees itself in this role. The leadership must accept the fact that this SDF is not just simply a place for “old soldiers” to gather for an evening’s coffee drinking and “war-story” telling entertainment or a uniformed NG “reserve” that functions only on mundane tasks deemed acceptable by both the NG and State political leadership or a group that can be depended upon by local and municipal groups to march in holiday parades. These tasks are acceptable to a growing, viable SDF membership; however, only when the SDF is involved in the vital activities described herein.

The second condition is acceptance by the political, legislative and State bureaucratic leadership of a SDF as an important “cog” in their functioning machinery. That is, a willingness to recognize the potential of a SDF, the designation of specific areas and activities within which tasks can be assigned to a SDF, an expectation that a SDF will deliver a service or product that will integrate with their needs and an understanding that the SDF is there to augment their mission and functions, not to infringe upon them. And, recognition by the functioning members of the State and Federal organizations involved of the potential for acceptable performance by SDF personnel assigned in support of their efforts.

The third condition involves the use of volunteers to conduct critical missions. A civilian volunteer or group of volunteers can say “no” to an assignment or to just simply say “enough” and walk away during the conduct of a mission. Civilian volunteer service agencies continuously suffer from this condition, often having to rely on the same very small kernel of their volunteer force to “always be there.” Elements of the Citizens Corps, such as the Association of Chiefs of Police and the Volunteers In Police Service have expressed concern over this. In contrast to this, a SDF is fully staffed by volunteers who are much less likely to display the “no” or “enough” syndrome. The aspect of serving as a volunteer within a military hierarchy provides the military structure of following orders within a command and control environment. Within the guidelines of a “military” volunteer subject to the rules of military law and justice, SDF personnel typically accept assignments and, once having done so, rarely walk away from one. Therefore, this places a great deal of pressure on the recruiting function to seek out and accept membership from individuals who will not refuse a mission, who will not walk out in the midst of a mission, and who will have the commitment and the stamina to perform as needed. This, in turn, places a special requirement on the MEDGRU to examine and medically qualify SDF members for specific types of missions.

A final and critical caveat! Regardless of the existence in State Law, Rules and Regulations of a provision for the establishment of a SDF, one cannot exist or function without the approval of TAG and concurrence of the Governor, nor can a SDF perform a mission without TAG’s authorization. It is, therefore, necessary that the concept of a SDF be based on that organization being utilized to backfill the NG on any NG mission in support of State needs, where a gap in such support is ascertained by either the NG or the State agency requiring the assistance.

The decision as to whether a SDF can be formed to meet these conditions lies fully with the Governor, TAG and the Commanding General of the SDF. Should a positive decision be made to establish a SDF, a corollary decision to provide a small operating budget for the SDF, administrated by TAG, but independent of the NG budget, would be desirable.

Two final concerns! One has to do with civil libertarians who may feel threatened by the use of SDF military-style volunteers involved in activities normally conducted by authorized State and municipal appointees, employees and contractors. The second has to do with the fear of elected and appointed officials over the potential threat to constitutional and property rights, and the potential infringement into

government agency territories. Both groups have to accept that in the face of potential terrorist acts they must overcome the worst of these silly territorial constructs and be willing to make the additional sacrifices necessary to mitigate the danger.^{5,6}

⁵ The authors are indebted to Colonel William L. Witham, Jr., (DNG-Ret), Brigadier General Donn Devine (DNG-Ret) and Mr. David V. Skocik for their reviews of and insightful comments on this Guide leading to improvements in concept and concerns. Colonel Witham is a sitting Judge of the Delaware Superior Court, has served as Deputy STARC Commander, as an Armor officer in the USAR, as DNG Quartermaster and as President of various Court Martial Boards; Brigadier General Devine is an attorney, has served in a variety of major staff positions, including Inspector General, Public Information Office Commander and DNG Historian, commanded an Artillery unit, published a history of the DNG, and has recently retired as Director of Planning for the City of Wilmington, Delaware; Mr. Skocik is a consultant in public relations for business, education and nonprofit organizations, has served in several military organizations, including the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Army NG and the U.S. Naval Reserve, and until recently as Director of College Relations and Assistant Professor of Communication at Wesley College. All three are assisting the Delaware National Guard Command Coordinator for establishing a Delaware State Defense Force.

⁶ The contents of this “Guide” are proprietary and subject to copyright by the authors. The concepts contained herein are intended solely for use by State and Federal National Guard entities, State and Federal agencies involved in or in support of Homeland Security, and authorized State Defense Forces. Either author must be contacted to obtain permission to further disseminate, distribute, copy or otherwise take action in relation to the contents of this Guide. Any such action without the permission of one of the authors is prohibited.

**OPTIONAL MISSIONS THAT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY
THE STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL
FOR DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS OF A STATE DEFENSE FORCE**

Traditional Missions	Addition of Non-Traditional Missions Following a Natural Disaster	Addition of Non-Traditional Missions in Support of Homeland Security	Independent Developmental Tasks
• Protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence • “Trooping of Colors” at State approved parades and other functions • Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities • Support for the NG museum and library • Assistance at approved community activities	• Protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence • “Trooping of Colors” at State approved parades and other functions • Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities • Support for the NG museum and library • Assistance at approved community activities • Perimeter protection • Logistics involving the storage and/or distribution of food, bedding and/or shelter • Transportation guidance to safe roadways and emergency housing • Use of personally owned heavy equipment and 4-wheel drive vehicles • Inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings that could be damaged	• Protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence • “Trooping of Colors” at State approved parades and other functions • Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities • Support for the NG museum and library • Assistance at approved community activities • Perimeter protection • Logistics involving the storage and/or distribution of food, bedding and/or shelter • Transportation guidance to safe roadways and emergency housing • Use of personally owned heavy equipment and 4-wheel drive vehicles • Inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings that could be damaged	• Public relations effort • Identify legislators willing to modify or enact legislation in support of a SDF • Identify businessmen willing to provide personal and other support for a SDF • Identify secondary and higher education leaders willing to support a SDF • Identify retired military and public safety leadership willing to support a SDF • Nominate staff to be appointed to the Citizen Corps Councils • Identify a physician to develop and lead the SDF MEDGRU • Obtain a list of all privately owned boats suitable to support coastal watch • Obtain a list of all privately owned aircraft suitable to support coastal air watch • Establish a SDF State Chapter under the State Guard Association of the US

- Inventory of all construction and material warehouse organizations
- Extent that owners and employees would be willing to volunteer their materials and labor for disaster mitigation
- Inventory of all construction and material warehouse organizations
- Extent that owners and employees would be willing to volunteer their materials and labor for disaster mitigation
- Leadership protection
- Personnel security assurance
- Policy guidance on the extent to which SDF security differs from police security
- Training that ensures a continued expertise
- In-depth, integrated IT approach addressing intelligence, data search, cross-referencing and analysis of information, computer and system programming, and data entry
- Assist Homeland Security attorneys in determining legal need and assessing the needed legislative redirection
- Identify and inventory all State offices and all industries that utilize a major IT effort
- Identify and inventory all IT hardware centers and suppliers within the State
- Identify all Federal, State, municipal and business groups that provide security efforts throughout the State
- Establish a SDF State Guard Benefit Foundation under the SDF State Chapter of the State Guard Association of the U.S. as a nonprofit 501 (c) (3)
- Establish a volunteer SDF Cadet Corps
- Establish an Advisory Council of identified businessmen, educators and retired military and public safety leadership

MEDGRU: Limited to medical examinations of SDF members, and aid and comfort at parades and other celebratory events by treating heat exhaustion, minor automobile injuries, skinned knees and elbows, and splinter removal.

MEDGRU: Expanded to provide medical services for injured persons, as needed, at a natural disaster site (secondary medical attention as First Responders and triage teams deal with the “incoming” injured and shock victims).

- Identify and inventory all likely targets of terrorist activity that might compromise the State’s vital infrastructure and operations

MEDGRU: Expanded to provide medical services for military and First Responder personnel at a terrorist attack site for heat exhaustion, dehydration, physical exhaustion, emotional shock and a variety of related minor physical injuries.


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