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Analysis of the Operational Effect of the Joint Chemical Agent Detector Using the Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS)

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- Integrate chemical agent and defense capabilities into a combat simulation in order to derive quantitative Measures of Effectiveness
- Use to support CBD systems evaluations
 JCAD Inc. 1 as test case
 - Comparitive analysis against current capabilities



IWARS Introduction



Infantry WARrior Simulation (IWARS):

- A M&S tool for conducting Infantry Soldier Analyses, developed jointly by AMSAA and the Natick Soldier Center
- Focuses on dismounted individuals, small units, and their equipment for assessing operational effectiveness across the spectrum of missions, threats and environments
- Development heavily influenced by Army analysis needs (e.g., Land Warrior Program)

IWARS combines:

- Soldier equipment
- Soldier behaviors
- Algorithms and data

IWARS Development:

- Version 1.0 approved May 2006 for:
 - Small Arms Analysis
 - Sensor Analysis



IWARS is: - Constructive - Agent-based - Multi-sided - Focused on soldiers and small-units

- Lethality/Survivability Analysis
- Limited Battle Command Analysis
- Continually integrating best available methodology/data

IWARS Supports a Range of Individual and Small-Unit Analyses

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The Joint Chemical Agent Detector

- Lightweight and portable chemical agent detector
 - About 2 lb and 45 in.³
- Unobtrusive
- Visual and audio alarms
- Uses

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- Fixed or mobile platforms
- Survey instrument
- Incremental development (Incr. 1 shown)









RDECOM Integration of Chemical Effects into IWARS



• Modification of IWARS

- Chemical agent vapor plume modeling
- Detector alert responses
- CBD system performance integration
- Soldier CB response behaviors/tactics
- Code alteration
- Toxological level modeling

Data Collection

- External modeling plume using HPAC
- Scenario design w/ SMEs
- Verification and Validation
- Requirements data presented
- Production Runs
- Documentation
 - V&V Plan and Report
 - Event Design Plan
 - Analysis Report



IWARS Chemical Agent Hazard Integration



- Use existing IWARS spherical smoke cloud methodology
- Edge of sphere used to trigger Soldier behaviors/effects inside chemical plume
- Time and range from center of cloud used to determine concentration ring
- Concentric rings each have a different concentration level, yet uniform within
- File created describing the p(detect) for different concentration levels (based on JCAD requirements)
- Detector alerts if random draw meets p(detect) value
- Cloud parameters (expansion rate, wind speed, wind direction) are data driven



1 meter radius rings



External Vapor Hazard Concentration Modeling



- 1. Agent Cloud modeled in HPAC offline
 - No wind or terrain effects
- 2. Data collected
 - Maximum concentration
 - Distance from center to 0.004 mg/m³ (AEGL-1)
- 3. Gaussian distribution adjusted to match maximum concentration and distance to AEGL-1 level
- 4. Concentration per meter from the center of mass of the cloud exported to IWARS





HPAC output of agent cloud at 5 minutes



Concentration of agent vs distance at 5 minutes TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN. WARFIGHTER FOCUSED



Single-Sample (every 5 sec) Detection Probability



- Example data:
 - P(d)_{cum}=0.9, 30 sec
 response time at 0.1 mg/m³
 - P(d)_{cum}=0.9, 10 sec
 response time at 1.0 mg/m³
- Equation for single sample (every 5 sec) p(d) derived

 $- p(d) = 1.0 - \sqrt[s]{1.0 - p(d)_{cum}}$

• Linear function generated from given data

Sample Calculations for 0.1 mg/m³

Sample Interval = 5.0 secp(d) cumulative = 0.9Response Time = 30.0 secSamples per time (s) = 30.0 / 5.0 = 6

 $p(d) = 1.0 - \sqrt[6]{1.0 - 0.9} = 0.319$



V&V of Chemical Modifications





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- Chemical cloud
 - Creation, expansion, movement with wind, dissipation
 - Concentration band determination
- Alert device
 - Operating modes (survey, monitor) and audible range
 - Probability of detection and false alarm rate
- Soldier entity
 - Accumulation and reaction to chemical agent dosages
 - Use of protective gear to limit exposure time and level
 - Degraded mobility, acquisition, delivery accuracy in protective gear

Sensitivity runs

- Detector performance (50% decrease, 50% increase)
- False alarm rate (probabilities: 0.25, 0.50)
- Chemical agent susceptibility (50% decrease, 50% increase)
- Masked audible range (50% decrease, 100% increase)

Sample study

- 5 cases combine chemical agent use, MOPP gear, JCAD
- Results assess mission completion rate, mission time, smallarms losses, exposure level, exposure time
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- Infantry Battalion assault on OBJ SOX
 - A Company to secure OBJ BLUE
 - 1st Platoon: Secure Route A, then building west of Route A in OBJ BLUE

Scenario

- 2nd Platoon: Provide supporting fire to 1st Platoon. After 1st Platoon has secured Route A assault to secure buildings east of Route A in OBJ BLUE
- 3rd Platoon: Reserve (not shown)
- Threat
 - OPFOR has not used chemical agents in past; capability limited to isolated recovered munitions
 - OBJ SOX may contain an IED production site
 - BLUEFOR starts in MOPP level 2, assumes MOPP level 4 upon alarm or onset of symptoms; auto-masking for artillery/mortars
 - OPFOR previously emplaced an IED near Route A (mistakenly used old, unmarked 152mm chemical round)
- Environment
 - Nominal Temperature
 - Neutral Air Stability
 - Wind: 1 m/s SE



* Coordinated w/ US Army CBRN School, MANSCEN



Scenario: Production Runs



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	Case #	Short Description	Description	
rnate Cases Primary	1	Baseline without JCAD	Squad will move to the top of the hill and wait (will engage OPFOR from the top of the hill). In response to a chemical agent alert, Soldiers assume MOPP 4 and withdraw to starting point.	
	2	Baseline with JCAD	Same as case #1, except: JCAD mounted to carrier.	
	3	Assault, No JCAD	Squad will begin assault of OPFOR building after IED detonation. When chemical symptoms are recognized, Soldiers will assume MOPP 4 and continue the assault. There will be no JCAD.	
	4	Assault, JCAD on Squad Carrier	Same as case #3, except: JCAD mounted to squad carrier and operated continuously.	
Alte	5	Assault, JCAD carried by squad	Same as case #3. Squad leader will carry the JCAD during the assault.	

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- No Assault: Significant* Reduction (78%) with JCAD
- Assault: Significant* Reduction (91%) only with JCAD on Squad leader

* 95% Confidence

RDECOM Results: Average Number BLUEFOR Experiencing at Least Initial Effects



- No Assault: Average number of BLUEFOR experiencing initial effects significantly* reduced
- Assault: No significant* reduction in the number of BLUEFOR experiencing initial effects except* when the Squad Leader has the JCAD

95% Confidence

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Results: Average BLUEFOR CWA Exposure Time





- No Assault: Significant* Reduction (52%) with JCAD
- Assault: Significant* Reduction (61%) only with JCAD on Squad leader

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- Successfully demonstrated ability to integrate chemical agent effects, soldier behaviors, chemical detector capabilities into IWARS combat simulation
- Better evaluation of CBD system operational effectiveness by allowing determination of quantitative MOEs
- Additional applications to operational planning, development of tactics, techniques, and procedures





Backup Slides

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Initialism List



- AEGL Acute Exposure Guidance Level
- AMSAA US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
- BLUEFOR Blue (friendly) Force
- CBD Chemical and Biological Defense
- HPAC Hazard Predition and Assessment Capability
- IED Improvised Explosive Device
- IWARS Infantry Warrior Simulation
- JCAD Joint Chemical Agent Detector
- M&S Modeling and Simulation
- MOE(s) Measure(s) of Effectiveness
- MOPP Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
- OBJ BLUE BLUEFOR company objective
- OBJ SOX Assaulting force's target
- OPFOR Opposition (non-friendly) Force
- SME(s) Subject Matter Expert(s)
- V&V Verification and Validation