

**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**



The Unbroken Chain: A Case Study in Nth Order Effects

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: Raising the Shield and Unleashing the Storm	7
Overview of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm	7
Safwan Cease Fire	16
CHAPTER 2: Negative Impacts of Poor Planning and Communications.....	19
Were There Other Objectives?	19
Shiite and Kurdish Uprisings.....	22
Reaction to the Brutality	24
CHAPTER 3: Bin Laden’s Family and Early Life.....	29
Ties to the Kingdom	29
Early Childhood.....	31
Bin Laden’s Afghan Years	37
Opposes the U.S. in Saudi Arabia and Snubbed.....	42
CHAPTER 4: Bin Laden’s Transitory Years	47
Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan/Pakistan and Sudan	47
Back in Afghanistan and the Taliban.....	53
CHAPTER 5: The Attacks Begin	61
1998 Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.....	61
The Attacks Continue – Successful and Otherwise	64
CHAPTER 6: Forging the Chain of Events	69
CHAPTER 7: Conclusion.....	75
Appendix A: Complete Text of the 1996 Declaration of War.....	78
Appendix B: Complete Text of the 1998 Fatwa	85
Appendix C: National Security Directive 45, August 20, 1990	87
Appendix D: National Security Directive 54, January 15, 1991	92
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED.....	95
BIBLIOGRAPHY	96
VITA.....	100

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Coalition scheme of maneuver for the Desert Storm ground campaign	14
Figure 2: GEN Schwarzkopf at cease fire negotiations with Iraqi delegation.....	17
Figure 3: Depiction of the Southern and Northern No-Fly Zones	27
Figure 4: Poster found in Afghanistan in 2001	59
Figure 5: Damage to the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania	62
Figure 6: Result of USS Cole bombing	66
Figure 7: United Flight 175 before/after impact on World Trade Center on 9/11.....	68
Figure 8: Correlation of Events Leading to from Desert Storm to 9/11	70

INTRODUCTION

“No one starts a war or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. . . . Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”

- Carl Von Clausewitz, On War¹

This thesis will examine the linkage between a lack of a comprehensive plan for war termination and strategic communications in Iraq following Operation Desert Storm and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Initially, these two events appear to be independent of each other; however, once broken down into a cause and effect chain of events, there is an unmistakable tie.

General (GEN) H. Norman Schwarzkopf was given little guidance in developing the Safwan Accords which were the terms of cease fire in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm. On March 3, 1991, the delegation of Iraqi officers agreed to all cease-fire terms, but asked for the use of their helicopters under the guise of efficient transport since combat operations destroyed a large portion of their infrastructure. These helicopters were later used very effectively to put down uprisings of the Iraqi people: the Kurds in the Northern portion of Iraq and the Shiite in the South. The uprisings were spurred by earlier comments of President George H. W. Bush interpreted to mean the United States (U.S.) would provide them aid if a revolt was executed. However, when the ground

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 92.

campaign of Operation Desert Storm concluded and the Kurds and Shiites rose up against Saddam, the U.S. military, with large numbers still in theater, did not become involved.

In response to the use of Iraqi helicopters against the uprisings, the United Nations (UN) passed UN Security Council Resolution 688 on April 3, 1991, which demanded the end of Iraqi repression against both the Kurds and the Shiites. In conjunction with Resolution 688 and the Safwan Accords, the U.S., Britain and France established the Northern No-Fly Zone (NFZ) with the creation of Operation Northern Watch (ONW) and the Southern NFZ on August 26, 1992, with the inception of Operation Southern Watch (OSW). Coalition forces were stationed in Turkey for ONW and primarily out of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for OSW.

Unknown to the U.S. and the Coalition members at time, these events would lead to the long term presence of Western forces in Saudi Arabia and lead to the intensification of militant Islamic attitudes toward the U.S., especially by Osama Bin Laden.

Osama Bin Laden is the son of a wealthy Saudi construction businessman with strong ties to the Saudi royal family. He was raised as a strict Sunni Muslim and strongly adhered to the strict Wahhabi practices based on the Quran and Sharia law. After graduating from college in 1979, he traveled to Afghanistan to support the armed resistance, or mujahideen, against the Soviet invasion.

Bin Laden initially acting as a financier, logistician and recruiter for the Arab portion of the mujahideen, or Afghan Arabs. The Islamic Salvation Foundation, or Al-Qaeda², was formed in 1985 to facilitate support to their efforts in Afghanistan. Bin

² When translated means “The Base,” or “The Foundation.”

Laden and the other Arabs later developed a reputation for their courageous fighting, even if much of it was an exaggeration of actual events.

Osama Bin Laden's encounters in Afghanistan deepened his Islamic faith even further and caused him to feel his experience of jihad, or "Holy War", could be put to use elsewhere throughout the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda's primary stated mission was to battle the regimes of Muslim countries they felt were un-Islamic and the Western governments that supported them, i.e. the United States.

In 1989, when Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, an emboldened Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where he was highly vocal against the policies and corruption of the government and quickly fell out of favor with the royal family. When Saddam Hussein's Iraqi military forces attacked Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Bin Laden approached the Saudi royal family and proposed using the mujahideen to protect Saudi Arabia. He personally sought to regain some of the glory he felt in Afghanistan. However, his pride was dealt a stunning blow and was greatly embarrassed when the Saudi royal family rejected his offer and instead accepted assistance from the United States and invited the non-Muslim forces into the land of the two holiest sites in the Islamic faith, Mecca and Medina.

He became even more vocal and was expelled from Saudi Arabia and fled to Sudan in 1991 where he set up several front businesses for Al-Qaeda and numerous training camps. Bowing to U.S. diplomatic pressure, Sudan drove him out in 1996 and he went back to Afghanistan where he developed a relationship, primarily financial, with Mullah Omar and the Taliban government. Given the high degree of sanctuary in Afghanistan afforded by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda built extensive training and logistics

support infrastructure. In 1996, Bin Laden issued a declaration of war, calling for armed struggle against the Western powers occupying Muslim lands. Later in 1998, he issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, again calling for all Muslims to rid Saudi Arabia of U.S. forces that continued to enforce the Southern NFZ, as well as U.S. support to Israel.

Bin Laden also backed up the rhetoric contained in his declarations with substantive action in the form of direct terrorist attacks on U.S. forces and interests as well as supporting other factions that desired to inflict casualties on U.S. allies – all leading up to the spectacular attacks of September 11, 2001. Confirmed Al-Qaeda actions include: the 1993 attacks on U.S. personnel in Mogadishu, Somalia; the August 1998 simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole while in port at Yemen. Terrorist activity with ties to Al-Qaeda (personal associations, inspiration, training, logistics support, etc.) or suspected Al-Qaeda attacks include: the botched 1992 attack on U.S. personnel in Yemen supporting relief efforts in Somalia; the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; and the 1995 bombing of U.S. personnel at the Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh; and the 1996 bombing in Dhahran of the Khobar Towers U.S. military housing facility.

This thesis will conduct a brief summary of the execution of Operation Desert Storm and delve into an analysis of the guidance given to GEN Schwarzkopf in order to conduct negotiations at the end of offensive operations and the repercussions of those events. Additionally, there will be an examination of the strategic communications concerning the overall aims of Operation Desert Storm, with a focus on regime change in Iraq. An in depth assessment of Osama Bin Laden, to include his family background, upbringing, ideology, and militant activities and messages, will reveal how he evolved

from a freedom fighter against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to the leader of the most feared terrorist organization in the world bent on the destruction of Western society. Special attention will be given to the messages Bin Laden delivered to the world announcing his intentions and methods for attacking the United States. Finally, the various links in the chain will be forged together to demonstrate the clear correlation between the lack of a comprehensive plan for war termination and strategic communications in Iraq for Operation Desert Storm lead up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

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CHAPTER 1: Raising the Shield and Unleashing the Storm

“War is the remedy our enemies have chosen. And I say give them all they want.”

- GEN William T. Sherman³

“The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching, is simply that he should fight at the right place and at the right time.”

- Carl Von Clausewitz⁴

Overview of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Iraq had emerged from a bitter 8-year war with Iran in 1988 as a nation that was deeply in debt. Saddam Hussein was relying on revenue from Iraq’s oil industry to help rebuild his nation’s wealth. Kuwait, Iraq’s neighbor to the south and one of the primary holders of Iraq’s war debt, had refused to adopt production limitations imposed by OPEC and drove the price per barrel of oil lower, diminishing the value of Iraq’s most valuable resource. Additionally, Iraq contested the shared border between the two Persian Gulf countries and disputed access to the Rumaila oil field that lay along the border region. The seeds of conflict were sown.

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia attempted to negotiate a settlement between Iraq and Kuwait over the disputed oil fields on their mutual border on July 31, 1990, but talks broke down without a resolution⁵. Two days later, on August 2, at 0100 hours local time, the Iraqi Republican Guard was the lead element in the invasion of Kuwait consisting of three divisions (mechanized and armored) synchronized with air support, an air assault, and special forces. By 1900 hours local time that same day, Kuwait City was secured.

³ Norman H Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre. *It Doesn’t Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 498.

⁴ Clausewitz, 95.

⁵ Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 156.

Iraqi forces then turned south and took up positions on the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. By the end of the day on August 4, Iraqi tanks were in defensive positions along the border and additional supplies were brought south to potentially support additional offensive operations⁶.

The international community was quick to condemn Saddam Hussein's bold move and passed a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The first came immediately after the Iraqi invasion. UN Security Council Resolution 660, which demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and for both parties to begin negotiations, passed unanimously. Additional UN Security Council Resolutions passed shortly after the Iraqi hostilities were⁷:

- UN Security Council Resolution 662 (passed on August 9, 1990): imposed sanctions on Iraq and declared the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was null and void.

- UN Security Council Resolution 665 (passed on August 25, 1990): authorized use of naval forces to enforce sanctions.

The American response to the Iraqi invasion was swift. President Bush immediately stated, "This will not stand...this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait⁸," and on August 5, 1990 laid out the U.S. national strategic end state in National Security Directive (NSD) 45⁹ that outlined, "Four principles will guide U.S. Policy during the crisis":

⁶ United States Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, April 1992, www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008), 42-43.

⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Tracking the Storm." *Military Review* Vol. LXXI No. 9 (September 1991): 82.

⁸ John T. Fishel. *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, 1992): 12.

⁹ George H.W. Bush "National Security Directive 45: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 20, 1990, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39document2.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2008), contained in its entirety in Appendix C.

1. “the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait”
2. “the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq”
3. “a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf”
4. “the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad”

U.S. Central Command, commanded by GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, prepared a plan to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Operation Desert Shield called for the deployment of three carrier battle groups¹⁰, two Marine Expeditionary Forces, three Army divisions, 700 aircraft, and take approximately 17 weeks to have all forces in place¹¹.

Permission for U.S. forces to enter Saudi Arabia had yet to be secured. A delegation headed by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and GEN Schwarzkopf showed Saudi King Fahd intelligence photos of the Iraqi forces arrayed against the desert Kingdom. Secretary Cheney assured the King, “We will seek no permanent bases. And when you ask us to go home, we will leave¹².” The King quickly agreed and the first American forces arrived on August 7, 1990. The deployment went relatively quickly and the last necessary defensive forces arrived on December 1.

Shortly after the deployment for Operation Desert Shield began, planning was already underway for offensive operations to forcibly remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The corresponding force structure to support an escalated mission called for three more Army divisions, two carrier battle groups, a Marine division, and 300 aircraft that, in

¹⁰ There was also another carrier battle group already in the Persian Gulf at that time

¹¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard L. Trainor. *The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 4.

¹² Schwarzkopf, 354.

total, would take three months to be in place. President Bush reviewed the forces list and approved the deployment order on November 1, 1990¹³.

International support also grew for action against Iraq in the form of a robust Coalition of countries, totaling almost thirty. When President Bush addressed the Iraqi people on September 16, 1990 he stressed the fact that it was not just the Americans undertaking the defense of Kuwait, but a Coalition of many countries representing varied cultural backgrounds, to include Arabs and Muslims. He said,

“...the world met Iraq’s invasion with a chorus of condemnation: unanimous resolution in the United Nations. Twenty-seven states – rich and poor, Arab, Muslim, Asian and African – have answered the call of Saudi Arabia and free Kuwait and sent forces to the gulf region to defend against Iraq¹⁴.”

A key junction in the formation of international support against Iraq was achieved on November 29, 1990. The UN Security Council voted 12-2 for Resolution 678 which demanded “Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.” Furthermore, it authorized members, “to use all necessary force” to eject Iraqi forces.¹⁵

CENTCOM planners continued to develop the offensive campaign that would employ U.S. and Coalition forces to achieve the UN Security Council Resolutions and developed Operation Desert Storm. The campaign consisted of four distinct phases designed to achieve specific military objectives.

The stated military objectives of Operation Desert Storm were distributed to U.S. and Coalition commanders from GEN Schwarzkopf in a memorandum titled “Strategic

¹³ Gordon, 153-154.

¹⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned, 92.

¹⁵ Ibid, 79.

Directive to Combined Commander”. In the memorandum, it clearly laid out the military objectives as¹⁶,

“3. OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE. The objectives of your offensive campaign will be to destroy Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical production facilities and weapons of mass destruction; occupy southeast Iraq until combined strategic objectives are met; destroy or neutralize the Republican Guard Forces Command; destroy, neutralize, or disconnect the Iraqi national command authority; safeguard, to the extent practicable, foreign nationals being detained in Iraq and Kuwait; and degrade or disrupt Iraqi strategic air defenses.”

The memorandum went on to discuss the corresponding four phases of Operation Desert Storm designed to achieve the established military objectives as previously stated.

The four phases were¹⁷:

“Phase 1: Using strategic and tactical air assets, achieve air supremacy in the KTO (Kuwait Theater of Operations) and incapacitate Iraq’s command and control system.”

“Phase 2: Extend the air war to destroy, disrupt, and render ineffective Iraq’s warmaking ability, placing top priority on destroying weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical), the eight Republican Guard divisions, and petrochemical facilities.”

“Phase 3: Having isolated the theater, conduct an intensive bombing campaign against fielded Iraqi forces in Kuwait proper, with the aim of disrupting, demoralizing, and destroying as many of the 400,000 troops occupying Kuwait as possible.”

“Phase 4: Having attrited, disrupted, and demoralized the Iraqi Army, conduct a rapid and violent ground campaign designed to surround, isolate, and defeat completely the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait.”

International support was important to the Bush administration, but there also had to be U.S. congressional support. On January 8, 1991, President Bush submitted identical letters to both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Majority

¹⁶ Schwarzkopf, 450.

¹⁷ Lawrence Freeman and Ephraim Karsh. *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 301.

Leader requesting congress to authorize, “the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678¹⁸.” The Joint Resolution Authorizing Use of Military Force Against Iraq passed both chambers on January 12.

The last hope for a diplomatic solution came with the meeting of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland, on January 9, 1991¹⁹. The event proved useless. Aziz refused to even accept a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein and the stage had been set for the execution of offensive operations against Iraqi forces.

On January 15, the deadline set forth by the UN Security Council Resolution 678, President Bush approved NSD 54 authorizing, “military action designed to bring about Iraq’s withdraw from Kuwait²⁰.” Later that afternoon, Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Colin Powell, approved the execute order for GEN Schwarzkopf to commence Operation Desert Storm against Iraq on January 17, at 3 a.m., Riyadh, Saudi Arabia local time²¹.

Per the execute order, the opening volley of Operation Desert Storm came in the early morning hours of January 17 with a massive air attack, the likes of which had never been seen before in the history of warfare. Coalition aircraft and ships dropped and launched 2,500 tons of ordnance in the first 24 hours of the war and generated 2,000 aircraft sorties within the first 36 hours²². The attacks were so successful the timeline

¹⁸ Center for Army Lessons Learned, 92.

¹⁹ Alan Munro. *Arab Storm: Politics, Diplomacy behind the Gulf War* (London: I. B. Tauris & Company Limited, 1996), 225.

²⁰ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Directive 54: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf,” January 15, 1991, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document4.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2008). The NSD is contained in its entirety in Appendix D.

²¹ Gordon and Trainor, 206.

²² Center for Army Lessons Learned, 72.

associated with the operation's four-phase model had to be accelerated. GEN Schwarzkopf noted²³,

“After two weeks of war my instincts told me we'd bombed most of our strategic targets enough to accomplish our campaign objectives; it was now time, I thought, to shift most of the airpower onto the army we were about to face in battle.”

The air campaign lasted 38 days allowing the final elements of GEN Schwarzkopf's now famous “Hail Mary” maneuver, also known as the “Left Hook”, to take their places in the deserts of northern Saudi Arabia. Phase 4, the ground campaign, was launched on February 24, at 4 a.m. with the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps penetrating deep into Iraqi territory before turning east into the Iraqi right flank with the objective of destroying the Iraqi Republican Guard before they could escape northward into Iraq. Meanwhile, amphibious forces conducted a feint to fix Iraqi forces in place in Kuwait and conceal the main effort sweeping in from the west²⁴. The ground attack proved incredibly successful and is summarized in Figure 1.

²³ Schwarzkopf, 498.

²⁴ United States Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, 123.




Figure 1²⁵: Coalition scheme of maneuver for the Desert Storm ground campaign

After 38 days of pounding from the air and with the allied ground offensive underway, Iraqi units began to flee northward out of Kuwait as expected. U.S. airpower was able to sense the movement using the advanced ground radar of the JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System), still a prototype at the time of the war, and directed devastating attacks on the highway. The result was a scene of absolute carnage described by some U.S. aircrew as “a slaughter²⁶” and “like shooting fish in a barrel.²⁷” The event was later dubbed the Highway of Death and with the perception of “wanton killing²⁸” starting to take form in the media, U.S. leadership feared the potential for Coalition and international support to begin to erode. They began to contemplate how much longer operations should continue.

²⁵ <http://www.history.army.mil/reference/DS-t.jpg> (accessed 10 Jan 08).

²⁶ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1996), 222.

²⁷ Schwarzkopf, 542.

²⁸ Ibid.

Discussions commenced between GEN Schwarzkopf and GEN Powell, in consultation with President Bush. The three came to the conclusion that the previously stated military objectives had been met and to conclude offensive operations at 8 a.m. local Riyadh time on February 28, 1991, making the ground campaign 100 hours in duration.

The purely numeric results of the war were in stark contrast between the Iraqis and the Coalition forces. Documented losses for Coalition forces were: 390 killed in action (KIA), 776 wounded in action (WIA), 15 tanks, 25 armored personnel carriers (APC), and 42 aircraft/helicopters. The Iraqi losses were orders of magnitude greater: 40,000-100,000 KIA, 2600-3800 tanks, 1600 APCs, 2200 artillery pieces, and 110 aircraft/helicopters²⁹.

The retreating Iraqis were able to inflict a different kind of casualty on the Kuwaitis. Severe ecological and economic damage was exacted through the execution of a scorched earth policy as they headed northward, setting 750 Kuwaiti oil wells and 50 other oil-related facilities ablaze³⁰. Additionally, they released 138 million tons of oil into the waters of the Persian Gulf, killing over 30,000 sea birds. It was estimated that three percent of Kuwait's total oil reserves, or almost three billion barrels of crude oil, were wasted. Only through the heroic efforts of specialized firefighting teams was it possible for all the wells to be extinguished by November 1991³¹.

²⁹ Michael A. Knights, *Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 112.

³⁰ Ibid, 115.

³¹ Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 492-493.

Safwan Cease Fire

During the dialogue concerning when to end offensive operations, GEN Powell conveyed the requirement for GEN Schwarzkopf to lead a U.S. delegation to discuss the terms of the cease fire with the Iraqis. Schwarzkopf was completely caught off guard by the request and said, “it had never crossed my mind that I’d have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals³².” He began to draft the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the cease fire with no input from Washington on the details of the required content.

It is clear that no previous thought had been given to the cease fire terms throughout the extensive planning process for Operation Desert Storm, or if there had been a planning effort focused on this vital component, it never made it to Schwarzkopf. Therefore, he drew on his experience to draft the cease fire terms, determined to avoid several of the pitfalls he witnessed following the Vietnam War. However, he did not request a review of the TOR by any of the CENTCOM staff in an effort to garner multiple points of view and provide potential techniques the Iraqis could employ to use the TOR to their future advantage.

The demands made of the Iraqis in the Safwan Accords are as follows³³:

1. Release of all Coalition prisoners of war, information on troops listed as missing in action and the return of any Coalition remains
2. Locations of mines and booby traps
3. Set procedures to avoid inadvertent engagements between Iraqi and Coalition forces
4. Detailed a temporary cease fire line until a permanent line could be established

³² Schwarzkopf, 544.

³³ Alfred B. Prados, “Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 98-386 F, Updated March 31, 1999, www.fas.org/man/crs/98-386.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008): 1-2.

5. Banned flights of fixed-wing aircraft

Initially, flight operations of all aircraft were banned, but the Iraqi delegation specifically requested permission to use helicopters, “to carry officials in areas where the bridges are out³⁴.” GEN Schwarzkopf agreed to the request, due to the damage he knew had been inflicted on Iraqi infrastructure by Coalition bombing. The Iraqi delegation pressed for clarification and asked specifically if armed helicopters could be flown. Once again, Schwarzkopf agreed, only with the stipulation that the helicopters not fly over Coalition forces. It proved to be a decision that would have grave consequences for the Iraqi people.



Figure 2³⁵: GEN Schwarzkopf at cease fire negotiations with Iraqi delegation

³⁴ Schwarzkopf, p. 566.

³⁵ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/imint/safwan.htm> (accessed March 27, 2008).

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CHAPTER 2: Negative Impacts of Poor Planning and Communications

“If you concentrate exclusively on victory with no thought of the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one containing the germs of another war”

- B. H. Liddell Hart³⁶

“Despite the calls made during the war by Western leaders for Iraqis to rise up and dispose of Saddam Hussein, these dramatic and tragic events were the last thing any outside powers anticipated.”

- Faleh Abd al-Jabbar³⁷

Were There Other Objectives?

Joint Publication 5-0 describes National Strategic Objectives and Related Strategic Objectives as³⁸:

“For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated large scale combat), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. The achievement of these objectives should result in achievement of the national strategic end state – the broadly expressed conditions that should exist at the conclusion of a campaign or operation.”

The stated U.S. national strategic end state of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were outlined in NSD 45³⁹ on August 20, 1990. They remained consistent for NSD 54 on January 15, 1991 and were promulgated throughout the U.S. government as:

1. “the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait”
2. “the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq”

³⁶ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 366.

³⁷ Faleh Abd al-Jabbar, “Why the Uprisings Failed,” *Middle East Report* (May-June 1992): 3.

³⁸ United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, December 26, 2006, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed February 10, 2008): IV-4.

³⁹ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Directive 45: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” August 20, 1990, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39document2.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2008), contained in its entirety in Appendix C.

3. “a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf”
4. “the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad”

All the stated objectives were indisputable during the initial phases of conflict when the Bush Administration was attempting to rally domestic and international support for defensive operations against Iraq. General Maxwell Taylor described the formation of National Strategic End States and their shortfalls when he said⁴⁰,

“...it is common practice for officials to define foreign policy goals in the broad generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation, and good will – unimpeachable as ideals but of little use in determining the specific objective we are likely to pursue in the time, place and intensity of our efforts.”

Such was the case during the Persian Gulf crisis, because there was another objective that was not clearly stated, but actively broadcast in messages to the Iraqi people: to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein.

The message was sent via numerous formats on various occasions such as:

President Bush commenting on the February 15, 1991 News Conference: “I impulsively added what I called ‘another way for the bloodshed to end’: to have the Iraqi people and military put aside Saddam and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. I was anxious to see how that played. There was some risk, but perhaps the Iraqi people would respond⁴¹.”

The rhetoric to overthrow Saddam continued as a theme within the psychological operations campaign. Examples of such broadcasts are:

President Bush over a CIA-Supported Saudi Arabian radio station where he urged, “the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside⁴².”

⁴⁰ William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success.” *Parameters* (Autumn 2003), 98.

⁴¹ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 472.

⁴² Strobe Talbott. “Status Quo Ante: The United States and Its Allies,” In *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, edited by Joseph S. Nye and Roger K. Smith (New York: Madison Books, 1992), 24.

Voice of America broadcast on February 14, 1991, "...there can be no sanctuary as long as Saddam remains in power."⁴³

Voice of Free Iraq broadcast on February 24, 1991, "Rise to save the homeland from the clutches of dictatorship so that you can devote yourself to avoid the dangers of the continuation of the war and destruction. Honorable sons of the Tigris and Euphrates, at these decisive moments of your life, and while facing the danger of death at the hands of foreign forces, you have no option in order to survive and defend the homeland but put an end to the dictator and his criminal gang."⁴⁴

The Voice of Free Iraq went on to claim that Saddam would leave once he saw the populace rising up against him and said,

"[Saddam] will flee the battlefield when he becomes certain that the catastrophe has engulfed every street, every house and every family in Iraq."

Furthermore, it is not only plausible that the Iraqi populace was confused about the objectives of U.S. intervention, but also very likely that U.S. planners were confused. NSD 54, which was issued by President Bush on January 15, 1991, the UN deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, stated,

"Should Iraq resort to the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, be found supporting acts of terrorist against the U.S. or Coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait's oil fields, it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current regime in Iraq"⁴⁵.

The Kuwaiti oil fields were in fact set ablaze by the retreating Iraqi forces, but the Bush administration continued to maintain that regime change was never an objective, even when he said, "I made it clear from the very beginning that it was not an objective of the Coalition or the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein"⁴⁶.

⁴³ Tony Horwitz, "US Played an Active Role in Encouraging Revolt," <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=30&paper=1228> (accessed March 3, 2008).

⁴⁴ Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East* (London: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 646.

⁴⁵ Bush, National Security Directive 54.

⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch Report, "Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and its Aftermath," <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm> (accessed February 25, 2008).

Such discussion had a negative impact on the CENTCOM and component planners, who attempted to craft military objectives that would support the ambiguous national strategic endstate:

CENTCOM Planner: "...it was never clear from the President's rhetoric just what it was he wanted. Different audiences could deduce from his statements almost any outcome they desired."⁴⁷

CENTCOM Planner: "Lack of congruence within the U.S. Government made for confused policy and undesired (and in some cases, unanticipated) outcomes."⁴⁸

CENTAF Planner: "The strikes, in coordination with others, would not just neutralize the government, but change it by inducing a coup, or revolt, that would result in a government more amenable to Coalition demands."⁴⁹

CENTAF Planner: "Commanders could not know for certain how much value they should place and how much effort they should direct on the destruction of the Ba'ath regime and the rule (if not the person) of Saddam Hussein."⁵⁰

Shiite and Kurdish Uprisings

The messages to overthrow Saddam, intended or not, were received loud and clear by the Iraqi people and the largely conscripted Iraqi military. Further secular tension was added by the sheer contrast in demographics of the Iraq when examining the regime leadership and the military. Iraq, at the time, was 54 percent Shiite Muslim with the majority of them living in the southern portion of the country. The ruling Ba'ath Party was dominated by Sunni Muslims. This imbalance translated to the officer corps of the Iraqi military where 80 percent of all officers were Sunni, compared to only 20 percent of

⁴⁷ Fishel, 61.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 62.

⁴⁹ Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen. *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993): 44-45.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 219.

all officers being Shiite. The enlisted ranks were the polar opposite: 80 percent of the enlisted soldiers were Shiite, while only 20 percent were Sunni⁵¹.

Unrest began on March 1, 1991, in the southern city of Basra as large groups of battle weary Iraqi Army military troops were moving north following the cease fire that ended the rout inflicted by U.S. and Coalition forces just one day prior. The Iraqi troops began to lash out at loyal Republican Guard troops and other local security forces. The local population joined in on the demonstrations of dissent against Saddam. They raided police stations, weapons caches, Ba'ath Party headquarters, and political prisoner detention facilities. This scene played out again and again until all the major southern Iraq cities (Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Nasiriyya, Amara, Samawa, Kut, and Diwaniyya) were no longer under government control⁵².

The Kurds in the northern portion of Iraq had long sought autonomy from Iraq and took advantage of the post-war unrest with an uprising of their own against the Saddam regime, which began on March 4, 1991. Organized Kurdish forces, known as Pesh Merga, saw initial success, capturing the oil-rich city of Kirkuk on March 20, 1991, and at one point held most of the territory in their traditional ethnic enclave⁵³. When combined with the turmoil in the south, fourteen of the eighteen Iraqi provinces were embroiled with active anti-Saddam movements that threatened the stability of the regime.

Iraqi forces loyal to Saddam, primarily Republican Guard, were soon mobilized to counter the uprisings, starting in the South. Unlike the well-organized Kurdish forces, the rebellion in the south was chaotic, without structured leadership and quickly succumbed to the vicious government retaliation. Regime control was reestablished

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch Report.

⁵² Knights, 122.

⁵³ Steve A. Yetiv, *The Persian Gulf Crisis* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 108.

throughout southern Iraq by March 15, 1991. Saddam then turned his attention on the Kurds in the north and quelled the resistance by April 3⁵⁴.

The tactics used by Iraqi forces were ferocious. Artillery and rockets were used to destroy entire communities held by insurgents without discrimination between active resistance and non-participants (women and children). Helicopter gunships, secured by Iraqis during the Safwan cease fire talks under the guise of transportation purposes, were particularly effective against the resistance. There are accounts of helicopters strafing, spraying kerosene and burning, as well as throwing flour onto the columns of fleeing civilians to make them think it was chemical weapons and incite a riot. Ground troops later swept through cities viciously eliminating all opposition and committed countless atrocities.

The humanitarian disaster generated by Saddam's crackdown was significant. An estimated two million refugees fled the brutality and were dying at a rate of one thousand per day between April and June 1991. The Kurds fled through the rugged mountains into Turkey and northwestern Iran. In the south, the Shiites escaped through the marshlands into Iran. Both regions saw continued harassment from helicopter gunships, but also took a heavy toll from injuries, mines, unsanitary conditions, harsh weather, and starvation⁵⁵.

Reaction to the Brutality

The uprising's devastating defeat was closely monitored by the U.S. and the world. In the south, U.S. forces still occupied a large portion of Iraq and were forced to idly stand by while Saddam's forces put down the insurgency. At this point, the U.S.

⁵⁴ Knights, 121.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch Report.

policy was one of non-interference with the inner-workings of the Iraqi government. There was also a fear of outside forces, such as Iran, being involved with the uprising to capitalize on the weakness of its long-time adversary. U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, said, “We cannot police what goes on inside Iraq, and we cannot be the arbiters of who shall govern Iraq⁵⁶.”

The plight of the Shiite population largely went unnoticed by the international media who was focused on the euphoria of the crushing U.S. victory. However, enough awareness was generated by the time Saddam turned his attention to the Kurds in the north to cause an outcry for action. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991, which condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, mandated a humanitarian response and specifically cited the Kurds, but did not cite military enforcement of the provisions.

In response, the U.S. launched Operation Provide Comfort on April 16, 1991, which created safe havens and provided humanitarian supplies for Kurdish refugees⁵⁷. Additionally, it forbade both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters to operate within a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel and was actively patrolled by Coalition combat aircraft. In 1997, Operation Provide Comfort became Operation Northern Watch (ONW) and functioned until March 2003 with the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

During that same time, Saddam had begun a cat-and-mouse game with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Put in place by UN Security Council Resolution 687, UNSCOM was charged with the verification of the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and their delivery systems following

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Yetiv, 108.

Operation Desert Storm⁵⁸. Inspectors found evidence of dispersed weapons program components and an active deception campaign on the part of the Iraqi government, with the aid of U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

Additionally, an effort began in April 1992 to eliminate all residual opposition group elements, primarily the Supreme Council for Islamic Resolution in Iraq, located throughout southern Iraq. The operation included draining the ancient marshlands, a vital source of sustenance for the population, and persistent artillery barrages on suspected insurgent strongholds. However, the Iraqis began to use fixed wing aircraft in conjunction with their ground forces against the rebels in direct violation of the Safwan cease fire agreement.

In response, the U.S., along with the United Kingdom and France, established a southern no-fly zone, similar to the one in the north, but did not include a humanitarian aspect to it. Operation Southern Watch (OSW) began on August 26, 1992, headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Its purpose was to patrol the airspace south of the 32nd parallel⁵⁹ and conducted extensive surveillance operations, but did little to prevent artillery and rocket attacks against the population of southern Iraq. CENTCOM explained the purpose of OSW was, “to have better insight into what Saddam was doing south of 32 degrees north, and thereby be able to verify his compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 688⁶⁰.”

During steady-state operations, OSW consisted of approximately 160 aircraft⁶¹ operated from various locations on the Arabian Peninsula. The bulk of OSW forces were

⁵⁸ Prados, 5.

⁵⁹ The southern no-fly zone was extended to the 33rd parallel in 1996

⁶⁰ Knights, 129.

⁶¹ Compared to 48 aircraft required for steady-state ONW operations.

located within Saudi Arabia and conducted operations from inception through the beginning of OIF in March 2003.

The no-fly zones for both ONW and OSW are depicted in Figure 3 below.



Figure 3⁶²: Depiction of the Southern and Northern No-Fly Zones

⁶² <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/images/nofly-l.gif> (accessed on December 12, 2007).

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CHAPTER 3: Bin Laden's Family and Early Life

“Every grown-up Muslim hates Americans, Jews and Christians. It is part of our belief and our religion. Since I was a boy I have been at war with and harboring hatred of Americans.”

- Osama Bin Laden⁶³

Ties to the Kingdom

Mohammed bin Laden immigrated to Saudi Arabia from Yemen in 1931 where he found an economy in decline. The main source of income was from pilgrims traveling to Mecca for the Hajj⁶⁴. He was employed as a dockworker in Jedda, but took work as a bricklayer for the Arabian American Oil Company in Dhahran after oil was discovered. This discovery led to an economic boom in the 1950's and the Kingdom was rapidly transformed. A flood of foreign construction companies came to Saudi Arabia hoping to profit from the expansion. In turn, they trained local workers, who began to take some of the smaller jobs. The elder Bin Laden began to get more and more contracts, to include renovating some houses where his exacting work caught the attention of the Finance Minister, who recommended him to do some work for King Abdul Aziz. His work gained Bin Laden favor with the royal family that would continue to grow, as would Bin Laden's construction company.

Larger contracts were awarded to BinLaden Group for roads and other infrastructure projects required for the quickly growing economy of Saudi Arabia. As his reputation continued to grow, he also grew closer to the royal family. As a result, BinLaden Group was given the most prestigious of contracts, including the road from Taif to Mecca through extremely challenging terrain, as well as the twenty year project to

⁶³ Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network that Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2003), 3.

⁶⁴ Wright, 64.

renovate the Grand Mosque⁶⁵ in Mecca. The Grand Mosque is the most Holy site in all of Islam and houses the Kaaba, the large cube that is supposed to contain the Black Stone which is a meteorite placed in the corner of the cube by Abraham and Ismail⁶⁶.

The tie between the Bin Laden family and the Saudi royal family would grow stronger over the years as he built more of the Kingdom's construction projects. At one point, BinLaden Group had exclusive rights to all projects of a religious nature in Mecca, Medina, or Jerusalem⁶⁷. He further solidified his bond with the Saudi royal family when he financed the payroll of all Saudi civil servants for six months when King Faisal initially took the thrown and discovered that King Abdul al-Aziz had depleted the kingdom's treasury⁶⁸.

Mohammed Bin Laden was killed on September 3, 1967, when his company twin-engine plane crashed into mountainous terrain on approach⁶⁹. Upon his death, King Faisal said, "Your family will be my family⁷⁰" and promised to not only watch over the Bin Laden children, of which there were approximately fifty born from more than twelve wives⁷¹, but also the business valued at over \$5 billion. This close tie between the Bin Laden family and the Saudi royal family would prove to be pivotal in the future.

⁶⁵ Corbin, 4.

⁶⁶ John L. Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 23.

⁶⁷ Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*. (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 79.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Steve Coll, "Letter from Jedda, Young Osama: How He Learned Radicalism and may have seen America," *The New Yorker* (December 12, 2005), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/12/051212fa_fact (accessed November 20, 2007).

⁷⁰ Corbin, 7.

⁷¹ Coll.

Early Childhood

Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden⁷² was born on March 10, 1957⁷³, the seventeenth son of Mohammed Bin Laden from his tenth wife (although Islamic law limits the number of wives to only four at any given time), Alia, who was of Syrian descent⁷⁴. His father divorced his mother shortly after his birth and she married an executive from within the BinLaden Group.

Osama grew up in a very conservative region of Saudi Arabia in the areas around Mecca and Medina. He was raised according to the strict Sunni traditions and Wahabbi practices, based on the Qur'an and Sharia Law⁷⁵. Later, he went to one of the Kingdom's best schools, al-Thagr in Jeddah, which was primarily secular in nature (they still paused to pray). Bin Laden became close to a teacher with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood who held an Islamic study group he regularly attended⁷⁶. It is speculated this is where Bin Laden received his first indoctrination into the ideas of violent jihad. He was about fourteen years old at the time⁷⁷.

The study group began with the promise of memorizing a few verses of the Qur'an and then playing soccer. However, the group slowly began to spend less and less time playing soccer and much more time devoted to studying the Qur'an and discussing hadiths, stories about the prophet Mohammed. The stories they discussed began to turn

⁷² Central Intelligence Agency, "Usama Bin Laden: Islamic Extremist Financier," www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/ciaubl.pdf (accessed November 27, 2007): 1.

⁷³ Coll.

⁷⁴ Wright, 72.

⁷⁵ Corbin, 6.

⁷⁶ Wright, 75.

⁷⁷ Coll.

more and more violent over time with the conversation turning toward jihad and the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood⁷⁸.

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt, by Hassan Al-Banna whose stated goal was, “The doctrine of reclaiming Islam’s manifest destiny: an empire, founded in the seventh century that stretched from Spain to Indonesia⁷⁹.” The Brotherhood also believed in the overthrow of nationalist Arab leaders and the return of Islamic states. Their methodology to achieve their goals was dependent on Islamic activism by its members starting at a very early age of indoctrination and encouraged violent overthrow of secular leaders and occupiers of Islamic land by Christian crusaders⁸⁰.

Interviews of individuals who knew Bin Laden as a classmate recalled he began much more as an advocate for strict adherence to Islamic traditions and openly debated and lectured others within the school as a “schoolyard Islamic activist⁸¹.” He adhered to the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood and advocated political change within non-traditional Islamic governments, even though political activities were forbidden within Saudi Arabia at the time.

In 1974, at the age of seventeen and still in high school, Osama was married for the first time to one of his first cousins from his mother’s village in Syria. He would later decide to practice polygamy, like his father, and took a total of four wives who would eventually give him ten sons and ten daughters⁸².

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Anonymous, 84.

⁸⁰ Coll.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Anonymous, 86.

Beginning in 1976, Bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, which his father's company built⁸³. He studied economics, but would never graduate. Instead, he dropped out to work exclusively for his family's construction company. His brother, who was now head of BinLaden Group, gave Osama the project of leveling hills near the town of Mina. Bin Laden actively worked along side the Philippine and Indian laborers, strange for the Saudi elite, where he gained the skills required to effectively operate heavy machinery and manage a large work force⁸⁴, both of which would be useful in the future.

While at King Abdul Aziz University, Bin Laden became much more militant in his views on Islam and continued his association with the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a time that was characterized as an environment of "freewheeling Islamic thought"⁸⁵. Even though he was an economics major, he spent of great deal of time studying the teachings of three Islamic scholars: Taqi al-Din Ibn Tammiyah⁸⁶, Sayyid Qutb⁸⁷, and Shaykh Abdullah Azzam⁸⁸.

Taqi al-Din Ibn Tammiyah was a 13th century Islamic scholar from Damascus who held a puritanical view of the religion and opposed anything that is not formally sanctioned by the Quran⁸⁹. The most significant ideology promoted by Tammiyah was the idea of Islam practicing a form of self defense against all outside forces, or inside forces deemed to be corrupt. These views were shaped by the brutal Mongol invasion and occupation of Syria. Even though they converted to Islam, the Mongols used their

⁸³ Wright, 78.

⁸⁴ Wright, 83.

⁸⁵ Anonymous, 84.

⁸⁶ Corbin, 10.

⁸⁷ Coll.

⁸⁸ Anonymous, 85.

⁸⁹ Corbin, 10.

own set of laws and did not conform to Sharia law⁹⁰. His teachings were based on the following:

“Jihad was the responsibility of each individual when Islam was attacked by non-Muslims, when Muslim rulers were ungodly, when they ruled by manmade law and not Sharia, and when they oppressed their subjects⁹¹.”

Tammiyah’s intolerant teachings have had a cascading effect throughout the modern Muslim world. He was the inspiration for Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab who brought the Tammiyah’s school of thought to the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century at the time when the Ottoman Empire was losing control of its outer areas. Wahhab called for a return to strict Islamic law, which the Ottoman rulers did not subscribe to, making them in his eyes, worthy of death. Wahhabism is still taught in Saudi Arabia today and is the same environment in which Osama Bin Laden grew up⁹².

Sayyid Qutb is regarded as one of the most influential Islamic fundamentalist forces of the twentieth century⁹³. He was an Egyptian professor who was raised with a mixture of Islamic and secular influences; however, a watershed moment in his life was when he came to the United States in 1949 for three years to travel and study education administration. This experience deeply disturbed Qutb who came away with the understanding that the United States was a “spiritual wasteland⁹⁴” and “unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind⁹⁵.”

⁹⁰ Karen Armstrong, “Was It Inevitable? Islam Through History,” In *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New Year*, edited by James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2001), 65.

⁹¹ Anonymous, 84.

⁹² Armstrong, 66.

⁹³ Adam Robinson, *Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001), 87.

⁹⁴ Wright, 23.

⁹⁵ Corbin, 10.

As a result of his gained beliefs in the United States and Western culture as a whole, Qutb devoted his life to a radicalized Muslim way of life when he returned to Egypt where he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and became a vocal activist against the secular government of Egyptian President Nasser. He was arrested under conspiracy charges against Nasser in 1954 and was imprisoned until his execution in 1966, except for a six month parole in 1964⁹⁶. Prior to his death, Qutb was a prolific writer and published 24 books in total with his best known being “Signposts Along the Road⁹⁷”, which was smuggled out of prison piece by piece. Regarded as his manifesto, in it he advocates the use of force to overthrow non-purist Islamic governments and any non-Muslims occupying Islamic lands. He states,

“The Muslim community has long ago vanished from existence, crushed under the weight of the false laws and teachings which are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings. We need to initiate the movement of Islamic revival in some Muslim country. There should be a vanguard which sets out with the determination and then keeps walking the path.”⁹⁸

“Jihad should be waged not only defensively in protection of Muslim Lands, but offensively against the enemies of Islam⁹⁹.”

Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Mohammed, carried the torch of the fundamentalist Islamic movement after his brother’s death and would lecture often at King Abdul Aziz University. Osama Bin Laden was known to have regularly attended his lectures. According to interviews with some of Bin Laden’s closest friends at school, his views during this timeframe took a “fundamental shift¹⁰⁰” towards those of Qutb.

⁹⁶ Wright, 29-30.

⁹⁷ The title has also been translated as “Milestones.”

⁹⁸ Wright, 30.

⁹⁹ Adnan Musallam, “Sayyid Qutb’s View of Islam, Society and Militancy,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 22, No. 1 (Fall 1998): 73.

¹⁰⁰ Wright, 80.

Another pivotal influence on Osama Bin Laden's radical view of Islam is Shayk Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, who has been called, "the reviver of Jihad in the twentieth century¹⁰¹" by *Time* Magazine and "more responsible than any Arab figure in modern history for galvanizing the Muslim masses to wage an international holy war against all infidels and non-believers until the enemies of Islam were defeated," by terrorism expert Steven Emerson¹⁰².

Azzam was very devoted and well educated in the Islamic faith with a Master's degree in Sharia Law from Damascus University and a PhD in Islamic Jurisprudence from University Al-Azhar in Egypt¹⁰³. While studying for his PhD, he became friends with Sayyid Qutb who shared many of his same views. Azzam went to Palestine after his PhD to fight against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Later, he went to teach at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah where he met Bin Laden and had a decisive impact on his religious views¹⁰⁴ with, "a vision of Islam that would dominate the world through the force of arms¹⁰⁵." Azzam was known to be an inspiring speaker with rants such as, "Jihad and the rifle alone. No negotiation. No meetings. No dialogue. Jihad and the rifle alone¹⁰⁶."

Azzam and Bin Laden would meet again later in Banu, Pakistan during the initial phases of organizing Arab mujahideen in the fight against the Soviets¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰¹ Robinson, 91.

¹⁰² Anonymous, 85.

¹⁰³ Robinson, 91.

¹⁰⁴ Anonymous, 85.

¹⁰⁵ Wright, 95.

¹⁰⁶ Robinson, 91.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

Bin Laden's Afghan Years

Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of Central Asia to the Middle East. It has had a tumultuous history, replete with European interventions, tribal infighting and numerous coups. The pro-communist puppet regime in Afghanistan during the late 1970's was the Peoples Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which was hated by the tribal warlords¹⁰⁸. The warlords actively fought against the government. Their fighters were called mujahideen, which literally translated means 'someone who struggles', but also taken to mean 'holy warriors'¹⁰⁹. The Soviet Union deployed troops to Afghanistan on December 26, 1979, to help prop up the communist government¹¹⁰, but quickly met resistance from the Afghan warlords.

Bin Laden, deeply influenced from his jihadi teachings while at university, felt drawn to the cause against the secular Soviet incursion in Afghanistan. He said, "I was enraged and went there at once¹¹¹." The Saudi government had long been supporters of the mujahideen cause in Afghanistan and had, upon the Soviet invasion, searched for someone from the royal family to physically go there. No one stepped up from within the royals so the Saudi royal family leveraged their strong tie to the Bin Laden family and sent Osama¹¹².

Numerous countries made contributions to the mujahideen effort against the Soviets, to include: Great Britain, Egypt and China¹¹³. However, the bulk of aid was provided by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States.

¹⁰⁸ Robinson, 83.

¹⁰⁹ Wright, 45.

¹¹⁰ Corbin, 15.

¹¹¹ Wright, 94.

¹¹² Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 266.

¹¹³ Corbin, 15.

Aid took many forms, such as training, weaponry and other financing which would eventually total in the billions of U.S. dollars¹¹⁴. Each country acted through their respective intelligence agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the United States, Saudi intelligence headed by Prince Turki al-Faisal, and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)¹¹⁵.

Each donor had their own motives for lending assistance to the rag tag Afghan mujahideen. The United States was looking to bloody the nose of their bitter Cold War rival and "...give the USSR its own Vietnam¹¹⁶". Saudi Arabia was concerned about the Soviets making a push to put a choke hold on the Straits of Hormuz and cut off the flow of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to the rest of the world. Pakistan was interested in making sure that the conflict in Afghanistan did not spill over into its borders.

Bin Laden's initial visits to Pakistan between 1980 and 1982 were mainly short in duration and consisted of him acting as more of a courier than anything else in order to rendezvous with mujahideen representatives, but not actually go into Afghanistan. He was told by the Saudis not to venture into Afghanistan in an effort to not indict Saudi Arabia for their assistance to the mujahideen should he be captured. His trips were designed to deliver donations and then return to Saudi Arabia to gather even more funding and support from wealthy Saudis. Bin Laden said, "I used to hand over the money and head straight back, so I was not even familiar with what was going on¹¹⁷."

An elaborate network was created to recruit jihadists from around the Arab world and funnel them through Jeddah to Afghanistan. These fighters, later known as 'Afghan

¹¹⁴ Wright, 100.

¹¹⁵ Anonymous, 270.

¹¹⁶ Wright, 99.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 95.

Arabs¹¹⁸, even used Bin Laden's apartment as a halfway house. BinLaden Group offices in Cairo were utilized to process volunteers and provide them with papers supplied by Saudi intelligence¹¹⁹. Airlines also gave deep discounts to people going from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan to support the mujahideen¹²⁰.

Bin Laden would later spend more and more time in Pakistan and venture for brief trips into Afghanistan as he saw the loosely organized resistance struggle to gain focus. He was reacquainted with Abdullah Azzam from his time at university and together they formalized a support network known as Maktab al-Khadamat (MaK), or Bureau of Services¹²¹ which would later make up the basic infrastructure of Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization. MaK has also been translated to the Islamic Salvation Foundation, which is significant due to Al-Qaeda meaning 'base' or 'foundation'¹²², but the name Al-Qaeda was not used until much later. Azzam also performed a role as Bin Laden's spiritual guide at this time and used his standing as a religious leader to issue numerous fatwas¹²³ calling for Arabs everywhere to come to Afghanistan to fight against the infidel Soviets, stating it was "the duty of each Muslim individually, as well as the entire Muslim people, and that all are in sin until the invader is repelled¹²⁴."

The Bureau of Services would grow into an intricate organization comprised of military, humanitarian, logistics, and training directorates. Guesthouses were set up as stop over points before reporting to training camps in the area between Peshawar,

¹¹⁸ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2007): 55.

¹¹⁹ Wright, 95.

¹²⁰ Corbin, 16.

¹²¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 56.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Translated as "A binding religious ruling made on the basis of Islamic law by a qualified Islamic scholar or jurist" as contained in the glossary of Anonymous, 268.

¹²⁴ Wright, 103.

Pakistan and the Afghanistan border¹²⁵. Heavy engineering equipment from Bin Laden's family was brought in to build an expansive infrastructure to include roads, staging areas, tunnels, fortifications and other facilities, such as hospitals. Very quickly, an extremely effective network was established, all with the ultimate goal of preparing the newly arrived Arab recruits to integrate into Afghan fighting forces and sustain them in the overall effort against the Soviets¹²⁶.

During the time in the early to mid-1980's, Bin Laden was able to build numerous relationships with other leaders within the militant Islamic movement as they came to Afghanistan. These men who shared Bin Laden's jihadi beliefs would later play key roles as senior lieutenants and operatives within Al-Qaeda. It is estimated he made alliances with approximately thirty other organizations. These groups included: the Egyptian Gama at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Islamic Union of Kurdistan, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Al-Islah party¹²⁷, just to name a few. These connections would prove very useful for Bin Laden later and laid the basis for Al-Qaeda's future global reach as an offensive terrorist network.

These alliances and friendships would also lead Bin Laden to meet Ayman Al-Zawahiri, a doctor, who was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri would later replace Azzam as Bin Laden's second in command of Al-Qaeda when Bin Laden and Azzam had differing views on the scope of the jihad against the Soviet infidels. Bin Laden believed in a grander world view where the jihad would encompass all Islamic people, while Azzam wanted to confine it to just Arabs¹²⁸. Azzam was later killed in a

¹²⁵ Wright, 105.

¹²⁶ Anonymous, 99.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 92-93.

¹²⁸ Corbin, 22.

market bombing which was rumored to have been tied back to Zawahiri, Azzam's main rival within the organization¹²⁹.

It is unclear to what extent Bin Laden directly participated in combat in Afghanistan, but it is certain that his primary role was as a financier, facilitator, organizer, and engineer. In total, Bin Laden would help recruit, transport, train and sustain 15,000-22,000 Arab fighters¹³⁰ against the Soviets through funding of approximately \$25 million per month¹³¹ over a ten year period. The fruits of Bin Laden's efforts and the mujahideen were realized on February 15, 1989 when the last Russian crossed over the Amun Darya River into Uzbekistan¹³².

Regardless of his combat acumen, Bin Laden emerged from the Afghan conflict with the Soviets with numerous traits that made him a grave threat, both physical and mental, to the Western world. In regards to the psychological advantage, the Afghan Arabs and their leaders gained a victory against a super power and bolstered their confidence, especially following numerous defeats at the hands of Israelis in years past. They also reinforced their religious fervor, grew an "ambition for a borderless Islamic world"¹³³ and interpreted their victory as "a sign of God's favor and the righteousness of their cause"¹³⁴. In a society which encourages humility, Bin Laden himself was viewed within the Arab community as a celebrity in some circles when he returned from the Afghan war¹³⁵.

¹²⁹ Wright, 144.

¹³⁰ Robinson, 114.

¹³¹ Ibid, 100.

¹³² Corbin, 21.

¹³³ Anonymous, 107.

¹³⁴ DeLong-Bas, 267.

¹³⁵ Wright, 145.

The physical realm proved to be even more important than the mental. Bin Laden had established numerous relationships with other militant Islamic movements who were indebted to Bin Laden for his assistance during the Afghan war and saw him as an effective leader and financier. What originally started as a way to provide family members information on their sons and fathers who came to Afghanistan to answer their Islamic obligation of jihad became Bin Laden's detailed global database of young men eager for a continued jihad against the enemies of Islam. This information would prove to be vital to his recruiting efforts as he looked to expand the jihad past the victory in Afghanistan¹³⁶.

Opposes the U.S. in Saudi Arabia and Snubbed

Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1989¹³⁷ with aspirations of returning to his family's construction empire while still monitoring and funding his Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Other Arab nations such as Egypt, Algeria and Yemen lodged protests to the Saudi royal family when they discovered these Islamic forces and the source of their funding¹³⁸. The Saudi government restricted his passport and limited his travel due to concerns about his continued militant activities; fearful he may open a new front in his jihad against the communist regime in South Yemen where his father was born¹³⁹.

North and South Yemen had reached an agreement to unify under the banner, Republic of Yemen. Bin Laden was convinced that the United States had a hand in the

¹³⁶ Corbin, 21.

¹³⁷ Robinson, 121.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 126.

¹³⁹ Anonymous, 112.

deal and called upon Yemeni veterans of the Afghan mujahideen to wage a guerilla war against the newly formed republic. He helped fund the insurgency further infuriating the Saudi royal family¹⁴⁰.

On his return from Afghanistan, local publications characterized him as having returned “trailing clouds of glory¹⁴¹,” helping to fuel his celebrity persona. His status caused him to be invited to speak in numerous homes and mosques, despite not possessing any formal religious credentials. Anti-Americanism over the United States’ unbending support for Israel against the Palestinians was one of his favorite themes. His perception of U.S. influence in Yemen helped add fervor to his rhetoric. At one point Bin Laden had also turned his attention to criticizing Saddam Hussein and the secular Ba’ath Party of Iraq and characterized them as a threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This assertion angered the Saudi royal family even more. They had recently signed a non-aggression pact with Hussein, even while the Iraqi army was moving to the Kuwaiti border in the summer of 1990¹⁴².

As discussed earlier, Iraq attacked Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The Iraqi attack confirmed what Bin Laden had been preaching. Even before his prophecy came true, he had developed detailed plans of reconstituting the mujahideen in Saudi Arabia to repel an Iraqi invasion. He used his family’s connection to the Saudi royal family yet again and presented his plan to Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defense Minister. The plan consisted of Bin Laden training Saudi youth to take up arms against Iraq and use his family’s construction company’s equipment to build an earthen defensive network. Additionally, he would bring in fighters from around the Arab world and defend the Kingdom, all

¹⁴⁰ Wright, 153.

¹⁴¹ Anonymous, 112.

¹⁴² Wright, 155.

under the assumption that the United States was not invited to participate in any way¹⁴³.

Prince Sultan made no commitment at that time, but Bin Laden began to mobilize his mujahideen forces in anticipation of Sultan's approval.

It is unclear of the exact timeline, but after the Iraqi invasion had taken place, Bin Laden again approached Prince Sultan with his proposal and assured the Prince he could train and equip 100,000 mujahideen troops within three months. Bin Laden again reiterated, "You don't need the Americans. You don't need any other non-Muslim troops. We will be enough¹⁴⁴."

However, unknown to Bin Laden, the decision had already been made to allow troops from the U.S. to enter Saudi Arabia. U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and GEN Norman Schwarzkopf had already visited the Kingdom and presented intelligence photos to Crown Prince Abdullah showing the Iraqi forces arrayed against Saudi Arabia. Abdullah's biggest concern about the American's assistance was how long they would be in the Kingdom and the potential backlash it could cause from his own populace and the wider Islamic world. Once assured by Cheney and Schwarzkopf the U.S. forces would only stay as long as they were needed and were welcomed by the Saudis, Abdullah said, "Come with all you can bring. Come as fast as you can¹⁴⁵."

The official Saudi response to Bin Laden's offer of assistance by his mujahideen forces said, "The family of Mohamed Bin Laden have always been faithful subjects of our kingdom and helped us greatly in our time of need. We are sure that nothing will be

¹⁴³ Anonymous, 114.

¹⁴⁴ Wright, 157.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 156-157.

allowed to mar our good relations in the future¹⁴⁶.” He was seething with anger and responded with,

“The American government has made the greatest mistake in entering a peninsula that no religion from among the non-Muslim states has entered for fourteen centuries. Never has Islam suffered a greater disaster than this invasion¹⁴⁷.”

He also turned virulently against the Saudi royal family for their decision to allow the Americans to enter Saudi Arabia and made inflammatory statements such as,

“Any government that sells its peoples’ interests and betrays its people and takes actions that remove it from the Muslim nation will not succeed. We predict that the Riyadh leader and those with him who stood with the Jews and Christians, and forfeited Al-Haramien, the holy shines, to Jews and Christians with American identities will or other, will disintegrate. They have left the Muslim nation. We predict that like the Iran royal family, the Shah, they will disperse and disappear. After Allah gave them property on the most sacred land and gave them wealth and that is unheard of before oil, still they sinned and did not value Allah’s gift. We predict destruction and dispersal in a great devastation against the Muslim nation, especially what happens to the Muslim people of Iraq¹⁴⁸.”

The Saudi government’s reaction to Bin Laden’s provocative statements was harsh. He was harassed in the streets, followed and physically assaulted on several occasions. The Saudi National Guard even raided and searched his family farm in Jeddah. This action further incensed Bin Laden. He submitted a protest to Crown Prince Abdullah, chief of the National Guard forces, but Abdullah denied all knowledge of the incident¹⁴⁹.

As previously discussed, U.S. troops and the military forces of thirty four other nations formed a Coalition that successfully drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait.

¹⁴⁶ Corbin, 27.

¹⁴⁷ Anonymous, 114.

¹⁴⁸ Robinson, 131-132.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 132.

However, Bin Laden continued to characterize these forces as “crusaders¹⁵⁰” and a threat to Islam. He also held great contempt not only for the Saudi government for rejecting his proposal to defend the Kingdom with Muslim forces as he had done in Afghanistan, but also the United States for what he viewed as the manipulation of the Saudi royal family and imposing its will upon the Middle East and Islam.

¹⁵⁰ Wright, 160.

CHAPTER 4: Bin Laden's Transitory Years

“As for being driven from one land to another, that is the nature of war.”

- Osama Bin Laden¹⁵¹

Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan/Pakistan and Sudan

The communist Afghan government continued to remain in power following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February, 1989. By March 1992, the communist government was about to be overthrown when a war erupted between rival mujahideen forces. Prince Turki, Saudi intelligence chief, wanted to quell the discord and establish a stable government in Afghanistan following the long-term support provided by the Kingdom for the mujahideen. Bin Laden offered his assistance to go to Afghanistan and bring a settlement between his old friends and allies in Afghanistan. He also saw this as an opportunity to regain his travel documents and escape from under the thumb of the Saudi royal family.

Bin Laden was able to regain his passport and travel to Afghanistan, but continued to follow his own agenda to rationally negotiate a settlement between the two warring parties. His actions were opposite to the direction prescribed by the Saudi royal family. Prince Turki had instructed Bin Laden not to open negotiations, but to pledge Saudi support to the fundamental Sunni faction and bring a quick end to the conflict. Bin Laden failed in his negotiations and all out civil war broke out for power over the decimated Afghanistan. His defiance of Prince Turki further infuriated the Saudi royal family and drove the wedge between Bin Laden and the royals even deeper¹⁵².

¹⁵¹ Corbin, 54.

¹⁵² Wright, 160-161.

While the mujahideen were battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan, there were other Islamic fundamentalist movements taking shape in other parts of the world. One of these movements that would have an impact on Bin Laden was the overthrow of the democratically elected Sudanese government in June 1989 by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, who headed the National Islamic Front (NIF)¹⁵³ and shared many of Bin Laden's beliefs. Primarily, Turabi advocated the rise of an Islamic movement, headquartered in Sudan, which would slowly spread throughout the world. In order to achieve this aim he opened Sudan to all Muslims and took in many of the former mujahideen fighters that no other countries would accept¹⁵⁴.

Turabi offered sanctuary to Bin Laden beginning in 1990 while he was still in Saudi Arabia and later granted a major airport construction contract to BinLaden Group to sweeten the deal. In turn, Bin Laden sent representatives to purchase large plots of land and other properties in preparation for moving Al-Qaeda operations to the permissive environment of Sudan¹⁵⁵. Turabi's actions were not strictly out of benevolence toward a fellow ideologue. He needed the money he anticipated Bin Laden would bring with him to assist in building the infrastructure of Sudan which was in severe disarray. The gamble paid off and shortly after his arrival in March 1992¹⁵⁶ Bin Laden pledged to build a 300 kilometer road as a "gift to the nation"¹⁵⁷.

Bin Laden set up numerous business ventures within Sudan and brought in Al-Qaeda members and loyal former mujahideen fighters who had no other place to go as his

¹⁵³ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 39.

¹⁵⁴ Wright, 164.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 165.

¹⁵⁶ Sageman, 39.

¹⁵⁷ Wright, 165.

primary source of management. His construction company was the Al-Hirah for Construction and Development who built the 300 kilometer road between Port Sudan and Khartoum. The heavy machinery needed for construction was imported by his company Al-Qadurat. He also was a major player in the Sudanese agricultural industry with the Al-Themar al-Mubarak Agricultural Company and the Wadi al-Aqiq Company which facilitated the production and export of such commodities as corn, sunflowers, peanuts, and watermelons¹⁵⁸. Additionally, Bin Laden supported the Sudanese financial industry by investing almost \$50 million in the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum¹⁵⁹.

While this was viewed as a very pleasant time in Bin Laden's life and presented him with time to reflect, he was still consumed by the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and the perceived corruption of the governments of Muslim countries because of Western influence. It is during this time he decided the next step for Al-Qaeda was to wage an offensive war against the United States and the corrupt Muslim governments that had succumb to the influence of the West¹⁶⁰.

Bin Laden was convinced that inflicting even minimal casualties on U.S. forces would lead to their withdrawal from any conflict situation. His basis for this opinion was the suicide car bombing by Hezbollah against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon on October 23, 1983. The attack killed 220 Marines and 21 other Americans and forced the U.S. to question its Middle East policy as well as the purpose of the overall mission, which ended the following winter¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁸ Vincent Burns and Kate Dempsey Peterson. *Terrorism: A Documentary and Reference Guide* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2005), 87.

¹⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, 2.

¹⁶⁰ Robinson, 143-144.

¹⁶¹ Dennis Piskiewicz, *Terrorism's War with America: A History* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003), 51-52.

The first opportunity that presented itself to Bin Laden in his offensive against the West and the United States was against U.S. forces that deployed to the region in an effort to deliver needed humanitarian assistance to Somalia, dubbed Operation Restore Hope. Al Qaeda, at this point, was still very much a fledgling terrorist organization. In December 1992, two suicide bombers conducted attacks against hotels in Aden, Yemen used by U.S. personnel before going to Somalia. The attacks were unsuccessful in killing any American troops when the explosives detonated prematurely. Al-Qaeda still claimed victory, even when the U.S. personnel left on their scheduled departure time¹⁶².

Additionally, Al-Qaeda provided training and weapons to the warlords fighting against the American presence in Somalia. It is unconfirmed to what extent Al-Qaeda operatives assisted the warlords, but Bin Laden took credit for the downing of two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in October 1993. It further helped confirm his suspicions on the level of U.S. resolve in the face of even minimal casualties. He boasted, "...they [the U.S.] fled into the heart of darkness, frustrated after they had caused great commotion about the New World Order¹⁶³."

During this period, the Saudi royal family received numerous protests from Egypt and Yemen complaining about Bin Laden's activities to finance internal insurgencies contributing to unrest in their countries. King Fahd's response was to revoke Bin Laden's Saudi citizenship in March, 1994, and seized his travel documents for behavior that "contradicts the Kingdom's interests and risks harming its relations with fraternal countries."¹⁶⁴ Additionally, the Saudi Interior Ministry ordered the Bin Laden family, still in Saudi Arabia, to cut off Osama from any company payments and seized his

¹⁶² Burns and Peterson, 88.

¹⁶³ Wright, 189.

¹⁶⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, 3.

portion of the company, totaling approximately \$7 million. This represented his primary source of income¹⁶⁵ since his Sudanese businesses were struggling. Later, representatives from Saudi Arabia would entice Bin Laden to return to the Kingdom if he renounced jihad and proclaimed King Fahd was a good Muslim. He refused and countered with his own demands to return, which included the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

In 1995, Bin Laden added to his confrontation with the Saudi royal family by issuing a statement where he called King Fahd himself an infidel. He further berated the King by saying,

“It is unconscionable to let the country [Saudi Arabia] become an American colony for American soldiers – their filthy feet roaming everywhere – for no reason other than protecting your throne and protecting oil sources for their own use. These filthy, infidel Crusaders must not be allowed to remain in the Holy Land¹⁶⁶.”

That same year, in November, a truck with explosives detonated outside a Saudi National Guard facility used by U.S. and Saudi personnel. Saudi authorities arrested four personnel who admitted to have trained at Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Even though they did not say the act was ordered by Bin Laden, they claim to have been inspired by his ideology¹⁶⁷.

The early-middle 1990’s saw numerous other terrorist activities that were directed, supported, or inspired by Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to include¹⁶⁸:

1991-1994: Al-Qaeda operatives attacked petroleum infrastructure facilities in Yemen and assassinated government officials.

1992-1996: Al-Qaeda members lead attacks on government forces in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda.

¹⁶⁵ Wright, 194-195.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 209-210.

¹⁶⁷ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 59-60.

¹⁶⁸ Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes*, 138-140.

1992-1994: Al-Qaeda set up training camps and provided funding to Islamic fighters in Bosnia.

1992-1994: Bin-Laden funded attacks against the Jordanian government.

1993-1996: Bin Laden supported Islamic militants in Lebanon, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Tajikistan, Burma, and Libya.

1993: Bin Laden publicly praised Ramsi Yousef for the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City.

1995: French media claims Bin Laden funded a series of bombings in Paris carried out by an Algerian terrorist organization.

1995: Al-Qaeda provides logistics support to the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan.

June 1996: A truck bomb explodes outside Khobar Towers, a residential complex for U.S. military personnel deployed to support Operation Southern Watch, which killed nineteen and wounded 372 personnel. Al-Qaeda ties are suspected, but remain unknown. The attack was most likely carried out by Saudi Hezbollah¹⁶⁹.

Sudan and Turabi received negative international attention after these terrorist activities and an attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he visited Addis Ababa. The attack was carried out by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad headed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the close associate of Bin Laden. In response, the United Nations adopted economic sanctions against Sudan and concern began to grow within intelligence circles about the increased influence of Bin Laden and his associates operating freely from Sudan. The U.S. Ambassador to Sudan discussed ways Sudan could improve its standing within the international community, to include the expulsion of Bin Laden and providing the U.S. with the names of all his associates in Sudan. The Sudanese at one point even offered to turn over Bin Laden to U.S. law enforcement officials, but they did not have enough solid evidence to prosecute him within the U.S. justice system.

¹⁶⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 60.

Sensing his sanctuary in Sudan had come to an end; Bin Laden liquidated his business ventures in Sudan and departed for Jalalabad, Afghanistan in May, 1996¹⁷⁰.

Back in Afghanistan and the Taliban

Since the time Bin Laden had left Saudi Arabia to go to Afghanistan and failed to carry out the instructions of Prince Turki, Afghanistan had been embroiled in a bitter civil war between the remaining warlords following the fall of the communist government in Kabul. Out of the ashes of what remained, Mullah Mohammed Omar, a little known puritanical cleric and teacher at the time claimed to have had a vision of The Prophet that instructed him to bring peace to Afghanistan¹⁷¹. He rallied students from throughout the Oruzgan province and quickly gained support from the local populace, who was looking for order in any form and referred to him as the “Commander of the Faithful¹⁷²”. Omar’s followers, known as the Taliban¹⁷³, quickly grew and took the southern Afghan city of Khandahar in November 1994, and later Kabul, the capital city in September 1996¹⁷⁴.

The Taliban imposed a strict code of conduct that banned all items that were unclean and could lead to moral corruption such as: satellite dishes, movies, music, alcohol, computers, and televisions. They also restricted women from going to school and working. Given the continual chaos over the last several decades in Afghanistan, the order was welcomed. Internal order was also welcomed by other governments in the

¹⁷⁰ Wright, 220-223.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 227.

¹⁷² Sageman, 45.

¹⁷³ Translated as “Students of Islam.”

¹⁷⁴ Robinson, 180-181.

region including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan¹⁷⁵ who provided the Taliban with weapons, training and vehicles.

Mullah Omar and the Taliban initially knew very little about Bin Laden, except that he had invested large amounts of money in Sudanese infrastructure and was exiled from Sudan. They assumed he was still wealthy and hoped he would do the same for Afghanistan. When the Taliban discovered Bin Laden was coming to Afghanistan they consulted the Saudi government on what they should do with him and were simply told to “hold on to him and keep him quiet¹⁷⁶.”

Bin Laden very quickly defied his hosts and issued his first fatwa in August, 1996, even though he had no formal clerical qualifications or authority to issue such a decree. The fatwa¹⁷⁷ was an open declaration of war against the United States and begins with a discussion of martyrdom:

“...a martyr privileges are guaranteed by Allah; forgiveness with the first gush of his blood, he will be shown his seat in paradise, he will be decorated with the jewels of belief (Imaan), married off to the beautiful ones, protected from the test in the grave, assured security in the day of judgment, crowned with the crown of dignity, a ruby of which is better than this whole world (Duniah) and its' entire content, wedded to seventy two of the pure Houries (beautiful ones of Paradise) and his intercession on the behalf of seventy of his relatives will be accepted.”

He goes on to specifically talk about rewards for those who martyr themselves, later to become a favored tactic used by Al-Qaeda¹⁷⁸ while fighting the United States:

“Those youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double than their rewards in fighting some one else not from the people of the book [Muslims]. They have no intention except to enter paradise by killing

¹⁷⁵ Wright, 230-231.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 226.

¹⁷⁷ Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” 1996, <http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm> (accessed January 5, 2008). The 1996 Declaration of War is contained in its entirety in Appendix A.

¹⁷⁸ The name Al-Qaeda was still not used at this point.

you. An infidel, and enemy of God like you, cannot be in the same hell with his righteous executioner.”

Later, Bin Laden indicts King Fahd for allowing U.S. troops to enter and stay in Saudi Arabia:

“...he permitted in the holy country the most filthy sort of humans. I have made an oath by Allah, the Great, to fight who ever rejected the faith.”

He then discusses how fighting against the U.S. is an obligation, reminiscent of the teachings of his previous mentor, Azzam, and again berates the Saudi royal family for allowing the U.S. into the Kingdom:

“Terrorizing you [the U.S.], while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all humans and other creatures. Your example and our example is like a snake which entered into a house of a man and got killed by him. The coward is the one who lets you walk, while carrying arms, freely on his land and provides you with peace and security.”

He calls his fellow Muslims to fight against the United States, but also takes an opportunity to also express disdain for the Israelis as well:

“My Muslim Brothers of the World: Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia] are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy -your enemy and their enemy- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with your own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam”

He closes the fatwa with a prayer, asking for assistance from God in the struggle against the United States:

“Our Lord, the people of the cross [the U.S.] had come with their horses [soldiers] and occupied the land of the two Holy places. Our Lord, shatter their gathering, divide them among themselves, shaken the earth under their feet and give us control over them; Our Lord, we take refuge in you from their deeds and take you as a shield between us and them Our Lord, show us a black day in them! Our Lord, show us the wonderment of your ability in them! Our Lord, You are the Revealer of the book, Director of

the clouds, You defeated the allies (Ahzab); defeat them and make us victorious over them.”

The fatwa caused immediate international media interest in Bin Laden and infuriated his Taliban hosts who feared Saudi reprisals in the form of suspension of financial assistance, but were still hopeful Bin Laden would bankroll infrastructure improvements as he had done in Sudan. Even after reassurances that he would heed the wishes of the Taliban, Bin Laden granted interviews for newspapers and the most notable to that date, a recorded interview with Peter Arnett from the Cable News Network (CNN) in March 1997¹⁷⁹.

In the CNN interview, Arnett asked specific questions concerning topics derived from the 1996 fatwa declaring war against the United States. Of note, Bin Laden openly criticized the Saudi royalty, even going as far to proclaim takfir against the King, or say that he was not a true Muslim and could be killed. Furthermore, he reiterated his call for war against the U.S. and Israel. He went even further this time when pressed about what he would do if the Americans did leave the Arabia peninsula and said the United States would have to “withdraw from any kind of intervention against Muslims¹⁸⁰.”

Once again, Mullah Omar was enraged. He brought Bin Laden to Khandahar under the auspices of security, but really to keep him under better control. Omar pledged his protection of Bin Laden and he moved into a meek compound with his family and several associates.

Zawahiri had been in Chechnya to establish a base for his own Egyptian Islamic movement following expulsion from Sudan, but was captured, jailed, and later released by the Russians who never ascertained his real identity. Given few options at that point,

¹⁷⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 65.

¹⁸⁰ Wright, 247.

he rejoined Bin Laden in Afghanistan and the two were contracted by the Pakistani ISI to revive their training camps and generate fighters for the conflict in Kashmir for the government of Pakistan. This was an important development since Bin Laden actually had very little accessible resources at that time¹⁸¹.

Early in 1998, Bin Laden and Zawahiri reached a decision to formally combine the forces of all the various disparate Islamic militant organizations that had come to Afghanistan under one cause and focus their efforts against a common enemy, the United States. Bin Laden therefore issued another fatwa through his propaganda arm in London that was much more focused than his previous declaration of war against the United State, which had a much more rambling quality about it.

The first half of the 1998 fatwa was broken into three distinct grievances. The first two focus on the United States presence on the Arabian Peninsula and continued operations against Iraq. The last point deals with the U.S.-Israeli alliance and their perceived aim, which is a concerted campaign to subjugate Muslims countries to their will. In detail, the three grievances are as follows¹⁸²:

“First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless.”

¹⁸¹ Wright, 250.

¹⁸² World Islamic Front, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” February 23, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm> (accessed January 5, 2008). The 1998 fatwa is contained in its entirety in Appendix B.

“Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million...despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.”

“Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.”

Once the grievances are listed against the U.S., Bin Laden weaves a very persuasive argument: because the U.S. has declared war on Islam through its past and continuing actions, it is the duty of all Muslims, based on past precedent and Islamic law, to wage jihad.

“All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries.”

“Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.”

Finally, he closes with the methodology to be used by all Muslims to wage jihad against the U.S. and Israel. Additional verses from the Qur'an are added to the decree to supply further justification. A distinct difference between the fatwas issued in 1996 and 1998 is that in the 1996 fatwa Bin Laden focuses almost exclusively on the U.S. military forces deployed to the Middle East and attacking only military targets overseas. Conversely, The 1998 fatwa greatly expands their focus to both civilian and military targets wherever they are found:

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies (civilians and military) is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God."

“We (with God's help) call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”




Figure 4¹⁸³: Poster found in Afghanistan in 2001

¹⁸³ Burns and Peterson, 78. Text on the poster translates to: “God is great – Soldier of Islam – Osama Bin Laden.”

As with the declaration of war against the U.S. Bin Laden issued in 1996, there was immediate media attention on Bin Laden and his organization after the 1998 fatwa was released. Numerous interviews by regional newspapers and American television crews were granted, which further incensed Mullah Omar. Bin Laden's financial health had improved and was an important partner for Omar. Since Omar was not able to keep his guest quiet as the Saudi royal family had instructed, the Saudi demanded Bin Laden be handed over and taken back to the Kingdom. The Taliban leader refused at the time, but agreed to set up a committee to discuss the details for what they had expected to be Bin Laden's eventual repatriation to Saudi Arabia¹⁸⁴.

¹⁸⁴ Corbin, 69.

CHAPTER 5: The Attacks Begin

“Al Qida seeks to drive the United States out of the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere in the Muslim world. It also seeks to overthrow moderate governments and establish theocracies similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”

- Richard Clarke¹⁸⁵

“Osama Bin Laden and his global network of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and serious threat...He is capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning.”

- George Tenet¹⁸⁶

1998 Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

Up to this point, Al-Qaeda had only attempted relatively small, not very successful attacks on the U.S. and acted primarily as a financial and logistics support organization for other terrorist organization to carry out operations¹⁸⁷. New life was breathed into the Bin Laden terrorist conglomerate following the issuance of the 1998 fatwa to inspire Muslims around the world and the unification of the numerous smaller terror organizations under one banner. Unified under the moniker “World Islamic Front¹⁸⁸,” the sum of the various groups was greater than its individual parts and quickly

¹⁸⁵ Richard Clarke, “Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects,” <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20attachment.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2007). Richard Clarke was the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism, 1998-2001.

¹⁸⁶ Comments made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World" (Feb. 7, 2001), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/pub_statements_terrorism.html, Accessed on March 2, 2008. George Tenet was the Director of the CIA from Dec 1996 – Jun 2004.

¹⁸⁷ Primarily a financier and supporter of other terrorist organizations; only direct attack had been the unsuccessful bombing against the two hotels in Aden, Yemen against U.S. troops deploying to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope.

¹⁸⁸ Sageman, 47.

struck its first blow, closely following its declared target set and methodology stated in the fatwa.

On the seventh anniversary of the initial deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield, August 7, 1998¹⁸⁹, near-simultaneous truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. When the debris settled, the death toll for the attacks was 291 Africans killed and approximately 5,100 wounded; 12 Americans killed and 7 wounded¹⁹⁰. The two bombers that survived the attack were quickly taken to the U.S. where they revealed the training they had received in Afghanistan and divulged their affiliation with Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden.



Figure 5¹⁹¹: Damage to the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania

¹⁸⁹ Corbin, 72.

¹⁹⁰ Anonymous, 200.

¹⁹¹ <http://www.fbi.gov/kids/6th12th/adventure/tanzania/tanzania.htm> (accessed March 3, 2008).

Bin Laden was quick to claim responsibility for the attacks which served to increase his popularity in the militant Muslim world. He said the bombings, "...gave the United States a taste of the atrocities that Muslims had experienced¹⁹²."

The U.S. response to the bombings of the embassies was swift. On August 20, 1998, sixty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs, or Cruise Missiles) were launched from U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Sea with their primary target of camps in Afghanistan. Intelligence sources had indicated there was a meeting scheduled with several senior Al-Qaeda officials in attendance, to include Bin Laden¹⁹³.

Nearly simultaneous to the missile attack in Afghanistan was the U.S. attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan using twenty additional TLAMs from U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea. The plant was suspected to be producing chemical weapons for Al-Qaeda¹⁹⁴.

The actual results of the U.S. retaliatory strikes were far less than what was hoped to be achieved. U.S. officials claimed that 20-30 Al-Qaeda operatives were killed, but later reports from Taliban and Al-Qaeda representatives countered the U.S. claim and said there were only six Al-Qaeda and 22 Afghans killed in the attack. Regardless of the total numbers killed, the senior leadership, Bin Laden and Zawahiri had survived¹⁹⁵.

Tests at the suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan revealed the initial assumptions of VX nerve agent precursors were incorrect. It truly had been only a

¹⁹² Wright, 272.

¹⁹³ Piskiewicz, 114-115.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 115.

¹⁹⁵ Wright, 285.

pharmaceutical manufacturing facility and produced a large portion of the medicines used within Sudan¹⁹⁶.

More important than the physical destruction caused by the U.S., and the U.S. failing to kill their intended targets, the retaliatory strikes further raised Bin Laden up as a central figure in the militant Islamic realm. He had showed yet again, similar to how he confronted the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, how he could confront a superpower and be victorious. Furthermore, the U.S. attacks solidified what had been an uneasy relationship between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, who saw the U.S. strikes as much against Afghanistan as they were Bin Laden. This relationship proved vital when the Saudis again asked for the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden and when the U.S. approached the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden following the Al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001.

The Attacks Continue – Successful and Otherwise

The opening volley from the new and inspired Al-Qaeda against the U.S. embassies in Africa had announced Bin Laden could not only “talk tough” but also follow through with his claims. Al-Qaeda attempted to follow up on their initial accomplishment, but did not have the same degree of success.

The millennium celebrations scheduled throughout the United States and all over the world presented a prime opportunity for terrorist activity to take center stage in the media and serve their propagandist desires. Such was the aim of Ahmed Ressam who had been trained in Afghanistan by Al-Qaeda, but was not a full-fledged Al-Qaeda directed operative. He was attempting to enter the U.S. from Canada on December 14, 1999, with bomb-making materials in the trunk of his car when he was apprehended by a

¹⁹⁶ Piskiewicz, 115.

U.S. border agent who noticed he was agitated and nervous. Once in custody, his plans were uncovered to set off explosives at the Los Angeles International Airport. Ressay also had other associates in the United States that were apprehended and charged in the plot. This event also led U.S. law enforcement to become even more concerned about the spread of Islamic terrorism and the potential for the existence of numerous other “sleeper cells” that were waiting to be activated to carry out additional attacks¹⁹⁷.

Another plot that failed to achieve its desired effects was attempted in Aden, Yemen on January 3, 2000. Al-Qaeda operatives were planning on using a small boat packed with explosives to sink U.S. Navy ships refueling in the Yemeni harbor. However, when the boat was left unattended for a period of time, local peasants tried to steal the boat’s powerful motor and dropped it into the water, rendering it useless. USS The Sullivans, a U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer, was the intended target of the attack but had to be aborted¹⁹⁸.

Also during this millennium celebration timeframe was an attempted attack on Christian pilgrims in Jordan, scheduled for December 31, 1999. Thirteen Al-Qaeda agents were bringing explosives into Jordan since 1998 with the aim of blowing up hotels in Amman, specifically targeting Christians visiting holy sites along the Jordan River. A co-conspirator of the thirteen was arrested in Pakistan and Pakistani officials tipped off the Jordanians, who arrested the other operatives¹⁹⁹.

Al-Qaeda’s fortune changed in October 12, 2000, when another attempt was made to attack a ship refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. Initially, Al-Qaeda lieutenants proposed attacking a commercial ship, such as an oil tanker. However, Bin Laden vetoed

¹⁹⁷ Wright, 297-298.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 299.

¹⁹⁹ Anonymous, 216.

the idea and insisted a U.S. warship be the next target. The same concept of operations was used to attack the USS Cole, another guided missile destroyer: a small boat packed with a shaped explosive charge raced across the harbor while it was moored for refueling and once pulled along side it would detonate. The attack proved successful, killing seventeen U.S. personnel and wounding forty²⁰⁰.



Figure 6²⁰¹: Result of USS Cole bombing

Bin Laden was waiting for a U.S. response, similar to the repercussions of his attacks on the U.S. embassies in Africa, but no missiles or soldiers ever came. President Clinton was deeply embroiled in peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Any attack in the Muslim world could potentially derail the talks that were already in danger of falling apart²⁰².

²⁰⁰ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 190.

²⁰¹ www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/images/si/cole.jpg (accessed March 2, 2008).

²⁰² Wright, 331.

The Clinton Administration did explore a host of military options to retaliate for the attack against the USS Cole. TLAM strikes were considered again, but planners also went so far as to explore military options against the Taliban for harboring Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden that included U.S. military personnel on the ground in Afghanistan. However, the Clinton Administration was looking for conclusive evidence that it was an Al-Qaeda operation before strikes were launched. The best the CIA could give the White House were “preliminary” findings, but were not conclusive enough to launch strikes, or deploy U.S. troops²⁰³. By the time conclusive evidence had been gathered in February 2001, the Bush Administration was in office and the decision was made not to go ahead with military action²⁰⁴.

Overall, the USS Cole attack had both positive and negative aspects to it for Al-Qaeda. On the positive side, Al-Qaeda experienced a huge recruiting surge as well as an influx of much needed financing. Bin Laden was also somewhat disappointed that there was not a massive U.S. response into Afghanistan with deployed soldiers into what had been deemed, “The Graveyard of Empires” where his mujahideen forces could systematically inflict damage on the U.S. and humiliate them much the way he had defeated the Soviet Union²⁰⁵. A much more spectacular plot would have to be executed against the U.S. in order to get his desired result.

The U.S. and the rest of the world would not have to wait long for the spectacular event Osama Bin Laden had been planning. Eleven months after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, nineteen Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial passenger aircraft on September 11, 2001. The jetliners were used as human-guided missiles to

²⁰³ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 194-196.

²⁰⁴ Corbin, 97.

²⁰⁵ Wright, 331.

strike both towers of World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon killing approximately 3000 people. One of the aircraft did not reach its target and crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania²⁰⁶.



Figure 7²⁰⁷ : United Flight 175 before/after impact on World Trade Center on 9/11

Bin Laden got a U.S. response, but perhaps not on the scale he was expecting...the Global War on Terror had begun.

²⁰⁶ Robinson, 277-279.

²⁰⁷ <http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/Front/overview2.html> (accessed March 05, 2008).

CHAPTER 6: Forging the Chain of Events

“Even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”

- Carl Von Clausewitz²⁰⁸

“My brother and I against my cousin. My cousin and I against the stranger.”

- Arab Proverb²⁰⁹

Thus far, a great deal of background material has been presented and can be thought of as links in a chain. In order to construct a whole chain, you have to interconnect the links together, even though they may be seemingly incongruent pieces of data. The chain actually begins long before Osama Bin Laden was born and weaves its way through the White House, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen before the unbroken chain of events ended with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as summarized in Figure 8.

Bin Laden was raised in a traditional Wahabbi Muslim family and stayed in Saudi Arabia for his education. While there, he was exposed to an extremist Islamic ideology at a relatively early age and was greatly influenced by the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood and other jihadist scholars.

Even though he was originally from Yemen, Osama’s father gained favor with the Saudi Royal family due to construction empire he built from the ground up and was responsible for a great deal of the modern infrastructure in the desert kingdom following the discovery of oil. This connection to the House of Saud was very important. It gave

²⁰⁸ Clausewitz, 89.

²⁰⁹ Munro, 130.

Saudi intelligence an avenue, through Osama, to funnel support to the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. Also, it allowed Bin Laden ready access to prominent royal family members when he wanted to make a proposal to use Muslim forces in order to eject Iraq from Kuwait. However, his proximity to the royal family also made the rejection of the idea and the use of “infidel” U.S. forces even more of a slap in the face that hurt him very deeply and irreconcilably turned him against the Saudi royals and the United States.




Figure 8: Correlation of Events Leading from Desert Storm to 9/11

Bin Laden's experience in Afghanistan proved very valuable to his future organizational endeavors. During this time he built a vast network of like-minded, loyal individuals that would later provide the core group that would become Al-Qaeda. Additionally, he learned vital leadership skills and built his standing within the worldwide jihadi movement to a "celebrity" status.

The Western and the Middle Eastern cultures collided on a scale not seen since the crusades of the 13th century when Coalition troops poured into the region following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Their purpose was initially to defend Saudi Arabia, but quickly turned toward forcibly ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Coalition's military success was unprecedented in the history of modern warfare. In spite of this, as previously discussed, there were conflicting objectives that caused military planners to not fully understand their ultimate goals, or the national strategic endstate, for which they needed to plan against.

Additionally, the terms of the Safwan cease fire agreement were not properly planned. GEN Schwarzkopf drafted the cease fire terms himself, without the aid of his planning staff. Conversely, his planning staff did not prepare the terms of the cease fire as part of their comprehensive planning effort and were too narrowly focused on offensive operations. During the meeting, GEN Schwarzkopf quickly made concessions for armed helicopters to the Iraqis without the consultations of his staff. The result of allowing helicopters in Iraq following Coalition offensive operations proved fatal for thousands of Kurds and Shiite insurgents against the Iraqi regime – and was specifically granted for use by the United States.

There were conflicting objectives communicated to the population of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein directly from President Bush and contained in numerous messages as part of an extensive psychological operations campaign during Operation Desert Storm. When the population actually did rise up against Saddam Hussein, the U.S. did not provide aid to the Kurdish and Shiite insurgents as they had assumed, but were never specifically promised. The scope of the UN mandated action was only for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the reinstatement of the legitimate government of Kuwait, not for the change of the regime in Baghdad.

A consequence of the uprisings and resulting humanitarian crises, U.S. and Coalition forces maintained no-fly zones in both the north and south of Iraq. While not specifically mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 688, Operations Northern and Southern Watch protected the population of Iraq and allowed the UN weapons inspectors following Operation Desert Storm to monitor Saddam's "cheat and retreat" tactics. Mountains of valuable intelligence on Iraq were gathered during the decade, and longer, ONW and OSW were conducted and proved useful to future operations against the rogue regime.

However, in the case of Operation Southern Watch, U.S. and Coalition forces were based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which is also the home to the two holiest places in the Islamic faith. The Saudi Arabian King is the sworn keeper of these treasures and many in the Muslim world viewed the presence of non-Muslim forces, such as troops from the U.S. and Coalition countries, as an insult to all Muslims.

This view is shared by Osama Bin Laden who cited the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in his 1996 open declaration of war on the United States²¹⁰, and the 1998 fatwa²¹¹. Both of these statements called on Muslims, and demanded it as their duty to wage jihad, to drive the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia. The 1998 fatwa expanded the scope of the jihad to both civilians and military targets anywhere in the world.

The U.S. government acknowledged that the presence of non-Muslim forces was a source of aggravation to Bin Laden when Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, said in an interview with *Vanity Fair* following Operation Iraqi Freedom²¹²:

“...by complete mutual agreement between the U.S. and the Saudi government we can now remove almost all of our forces from Saudi Arabia. Their presence there over the last 12 years has been a source of enormous difficulty for a friendly government. It's been a huge recruiting device for al Qaeda. In fact if you look at bin Laden, one of his principle grievances was the presence of so-called crusader forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina.”

The U.S. further incensed Bin Laden when pressure was brought on Sudan to expel him. He had invested large sums of money in the poor African country and shared a similar ideology to the Sudanese leaders. Nevertheless, he had also financed other terrorist operations that caught the attention of the UN and U.S. which resulted in sanctions brought against Sudan. In an effort to gain favor, the Sudanese leaders complied with the demands of the international community, driving Bin Laden back to Afghanistan.

Bin Laden was convinced that the U.S. would leave Saudi Arabia as soon as he was able to inflict the appropriate level of casualties because of his perception of the U.S.

²¹⁰ Contained in Appendix A

²¹¹ Contained in Appendix B

²¹² Paul Wolfowitz, Interviewed by Sam Tennenhaus, *Vanity Fair* (May 09, 2003), <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594> (accessed November 24, 2007).

being “casualty averse”. His evidence for this was the bombings against U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. While his ideology inspired numerous attacks, the first opportunity the forces under his direct control took to attack U.S. forces was against troops preparing to deploy to Somalia and provide humanitarian assistance. While this direct attack was a failure, he had also aided Somali warlords to “bloody the U.S.’s nose.” Just as he thought, American troops were withdrawn.

Bin Laden was able to conduct successful attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the hope he could inflict enough damage to drive out the U.S. forces. Alternatively, he thought he could draw the U.S. into a prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, where he fled after Sudan, and defeat the empirical infidel forces similar to the way he defeated the Soviets. He got neither – the U.S. response to the embassies was very “sterile” in the form of TLAM strikes to both Sudan and Afghanistan.

He needed a bigger target, perhaps a military target. The USS Cole docked in Aden, Yemen was the type of military target he sought – and he found it. Once again, Bin Laden did not get the U.S. response he desired. This time, there were no missile strikes, no troops deployed, and the U.S. presence remained in the Muslim holy land. He had miscalculated the timing of the attack: by the time conclusive evidence was collected, there was a transition in the U.S. administration and the decision was made that the opportune time for retaliation had passed.

What would it take to drive “the infidels” out of his beloved Saudi Arabia and provoke such a response so that he could humiliate the United States for the whole Islamic world to see?

The chain was completed on September 11, 2001.

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

“War involves a train of unforeseen and unsupported circumstances that no human wisdom could calculate the end.”

- Thomas Paine²¹³

“Bin Laden has publicly outlined his military plans and intentions with precision. Despite the warfare that has now reached U.S. soil, most Americans still have paid little heed to his words.”

- Anonymous²¹⁴

As outlined in this thesis, a chain of events that began long ago was finally completed on September 11, 2001, with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Were there opportunities to break the chain? Absolutely; as previously discussed, many of the links in the chain were forged during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and could have been fabricated differently.

Is it certain that minor modifications to the chain would have broken the sequence of events? Absolutely not; there are too many interacting variables to be able to point to any one, or several events, and determine with certainty the end result would have been different.

Almost two decades later, have we mitigated the effects of poor decisions made during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the opening five years following September 11, 2001? Probably not. As Steve Yetiv prophetically said in his book *The Persian Gulf Crisis* printed in 1997²¹⁵,

“...the full impact of the Persian Gulf War has not yet been felt. Like any major event, its effects will continue to spiral through history, producing additional consequences and perhaps significant developments. This is

²¹³ Flavin, 111.

²¹⁴ Anonymous, 4.

²¹⁵ Yetiv, 135.

inevitable; it is the nature of politics, of time, of history. And we can only wait for time to tell us the rest of the take that has unfolded in the sands of Arabia.”

However, we cannot just look through the lens of a post-Desert Storm political landscape. We have to look at the grievances Osama Bin Laden had against the United States and its Coalition partners. Some experts say that part is easy:

“There has been much talk and analysis directed at determining what motivates terrorists. Finding the answer is simple – listen to what the terrorists have to say²¹⁶.”

Once those grievances have been identified, and validated through such documents as the 1996 Declaration of War Against the United States and the 1998 fatwa by Osama Bin Laden, it is the duty of military and political professionals to trace the root causes back through time in an effort to find what actions along the way could have produced the conditions for instability and perhaps sowed the seeds of future conflict.

History is replete with examples of similar conditions from the past echoing through time, just waiting for the current generation to take the lessons our ancestors learned the hard way and apply it to an impending crisis. While history does not repeat itself in detail, there are often enough similarities where those in the present can apply the lessons learned from the past.

The thread from Desert Storm and the Safwan Cease Fire to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is no different. Numerous parallels can be drawn to the conclusion of World War I leading into World War II. Noted World War historian Stephen Ambrose said,

“The seeds of World War II in Europe were planted in the harsh Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I...Unfortunately the Treaty of Versailles made a lot of Germans angry. One man in particular, Adolf

²¹⁶ Piskiewicz, 127.

Hitler, leader of the National Socialist Party, used this nationwide resentment to bring himself to power. He promised to make Germany strong again...²¹⁷”

When applying Ambrose’s assessment of World War II to this case study, the parallels quickly become apparent:

- Much like the Treaty of Versailles, the Safwan Accords, in conjunction with incoherent U.S. objectives in Iraq, set the conditions for a long-term U.S. presence on the Saudi Arabian Peninsula to support Operation Southern Watch.

- The long term presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia angered many Islamic militants, to include Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden rose to power vowing to strengthen, or purify, Islam by driving the infidels away from the land of the two holy places, similar to Adolf Hitler’s rise to power and declaration to strengthen Germany.

Why is it important to analyze the infinite number of ripples across the pond of history and scrutinize how they interact? It is imperative so when military professionals see U.S. Presidents pronounce, “I pledge to you: there will not be any murky ending²¹⁸,” like President George H.W. Bush declared in November 1990 when discussing Operation Desert Storm, planners can set the conditions for enduring peace and long-term stability that will not ultimately lead to a global conflict destined to span generations.

²¹⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Good Fight: How World War II Was Won* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 6.

²¹⁸ Atkinson, 497.

Appendix A: Complete Text of the 1996 Declaration of War

Osama Bin Laden "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" 1996

Our youths believe in paradise after death. They believe that taking part in fighting will not bring their day nearer; and staying behind will not postpone their day either. Exalted be to Allah who said: {And a soul will not die but with the permission of Allah, the term is fixed} (Aal Imraan; 3:145). Our youths believe in the saying of the messenger of Allah (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him): "O boy, I teach a few words; guard (guard the cause of, keep the commandments of) Allah, then He guards you, guard (the cause of) Allah, then He will be with you; if you ask (for your need) ask Allah, if you seek assistance, seek Allah's; and know definitely that if the Whole World gathered to (bestow) profit on you they will not profit you except with what was determined for you by Allah, and if they gathered to harm you they will not harm you except with what has been determined for you by Allah; Pen lifted, papers dried, it is fixed nothing in these truths can be changed" Saheeh Al-Jame' As-Sagheer. Our youths took note of the meaning of the poetic verse:

"if death is a predetermined must, then it is a shame to die cowardly."

and the other poet saying:

"Who do not die by the sword will die for other reasons; many causes are there but one death".

These youths believe in what has been told by Allah and His messenger (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) about the greatness of the reward for the Mujahideen and Martyrs; Allah, the most exalted said: {and -so far- those who are slain in the way of Allah, He will by no means allow their deeds to perish. He will guide them and improve their condition and cause them to enter the garden -paradise- which He has made known to them}. (Muhammad; 47:4-6). Allah the Exalted also said: {and do not speak of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead; nay -they are- alive, but you do not perceive} (Bagarah; 2:154). His messenger (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) said: "for those who strive in His cause Allah prepared hundred degrees (levels) in paradise; in-between two degrees as the in-between heaven and earth". Saheeh Al-Jame' As-Sagheer. He (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) also said: "the best of the martyrs are those who do NOT turn their faces away from the battle till they are killed. They are in the high level of Jannah (paradise). Their Lord laughs to them (in pleasure) and when your Lord laughs to a slave of His, He will not hold him to an account". Narrated by Ahmad with correct and trustworthy reference. And : "a martyr will not feel the pain of death except like how you feel when you are pinched". Saheeh Al-Jame' As-Sagheer. He also said : "a martyr privileges are guaranteed by Allah; forgiveness with the first gush of his blood, he will be shown his seat in paradise, he will be decorated with the jewels of belief (Imaan), married off to the beautiful ones, protected from the test in the grave, assured security in the day of

judgment, crowned with the crown of dignity, a ruby of which is better than this whole world (Duniah) and its' entire content, wedded to seventy two of the pure Houries (beautiful ones of Paradise) and his intercession on the behalf of seventy of his relatives will be accepted". Narrated by Ahmad and At-Tirmithi (with the correct and trustworthy reference).

Those youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double than their rewards in fighting some one else not from the people of the book. They have no intention except to enter paradise by killing you. An infidel, and enemy of God like you, cannot be in the same hell with his righteous executioner.

Our youths chanting and reciting the word of Allah, the most exalted: {fight them; Allah will punish them by your hands and bring them to disgrace, and assist you against them and heal the heart of a believing people} (At-Taubah; 9:14) and the words of the prophet (ALLAH'S BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM): "I swear by Him, who has my soul in His hand, that no man get killed fighting them today, patiently attacking and not retreating ,surely Allah will let him into paradise". And his (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) saying to them: "get up to a paradise as wide as heaven and earth".

The youths also reciting the All Mighty words of: {so when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks.....} (Muhammad; 47:19).

Those youths will not ask you (William Perry) for explanations, they will tell you singing there is nothing between us need to be explained, there is only killing and neck smiting.

And they will say to you what their grand father, Haroon Ar-Rasheed, Ameer-ul-Mu'meneen, replied to your grandfather, Nagfoor, the Byzantine emperor, when he threatened the Muslims: "from Haroon Ar-Rasheed, Ameer-ul-Mu'meneen, to Nagfoor, the dog of the Romans; the answer is what you will see not what you hear". Haroon El-Rasheed led the armies of Islam to the battle and handed Nagfoor a devastating defeat.

The youths you called cowards are competing among themselves for fighting and killing you reciting what one of them said:

The crusader army became dust when we detonated al-Khobar With courageous youth of Islam fearing no danger If (they are) threatened: The tyrants will kill you, they reply my death is a victory I did not betrayed that king, he did betray our Qiblah and he permitted in the holy country the most filthy sort of humans. I have made an oath by Allah, the Great, to fight who ever rejected the faith.

For more than a decade, they carried arms on their shoulders in Afghanistan and they have made vows to Allah that as long as they are alive, they will continue to carry arms against you until you are -Allah willing- expelled, defeated and humiliated. They will carry on as long as they live saying:

O William, tomorrow you will know which young man is confronting your misguided brethren! A youth fighting in smile, returning with the spear colored red.

May Allah keep me close to knights, humans in peace, demons in war. Lions in jungle but their teeth are spears and Indian swords. The horses witness that I push them hard forwarded in the fire of battle. The dust of the battle bears witnesses for me, so also the fighting itself, the pens and the books!

So to abuse the grandsons of the companions, may Allah be pleased with them, by calling them cowards and challenging them by refusing to leave the land of the two Holy Places shows the insanity and the imbalance you are suffering from. It's appropriate 'remedy, however, is in the hands of the youths of Islam, as the poet said:

I am willing to sacrifice self and wealth for knights who never disappointed me Knights who are never fed up or deterred by death, even if the mill of war turns In the heat of battle they do not care, and cure the insanity of the enemy by their 'insane' courage.

Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all humans and other creatures. Your example and our example is like a snake which entered into a house of a man and got killed by him. The coward is the one who lets you walk, while carrying arms, freely on his land and provides you with peace and security.

Those youths are different from your soldiers. Your problem will be how to convince your troops to fight, while our problem will be how to restrain our youths to wait for their turn in fighting and in operations. These youths are worthy of commendation and praise. They stood up tall to defend the religion; at the time when the government misled the prominent scholars and tricked them into issuing Fatwas (that have no basis neither in the book of Allah, nor in the Sunnah of His prophet (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him)) of opening the land of the two Holy Places for the Christians armies and handing the Al-Aqsa Mosque to the Zionists. Twisting the meanings of the holy text will not change this fact at all. They deserve the praise of the poet:

I rejected all the critics, who chose the wrong way I rejected those who enjoy fireplaces in clubs discussing eternally. I rejected those, who in spite of being lost, think they are at the goal, I respect those who carried on not asking or bothering about the difficulties, never letting up from their goals, despite all hardships of the road, whose blood is the oil for the flame guiding in the darkness of confusion. I feel still the pain of (the loss) Al-Quds in my internal organs. That loss is like a burning fire in my intestines I did not betray my covenant with God, when even states did betray it!

As their grandfather Assim Bin Thabit said rejecting a surrender offer of the pagans:

"What for an excuse I had to surrender, while I am still able, having arrows and my bow having a tough string?! Death is truth and ultimate destiny, and life will end any way. If I do not fight you, then my mother must be insane!"

The youths hold you responsible for all of the killings and evictions of the Muslims and the violation of the sanctities, carried out by your Zionist brothers in Lebanon; you openly supplied them with arms and finance. More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanction) imposed on Iraq and its nation. The children of Iraq are our children. You, the USA, together with the Saudi regime are responsible for the shedding of the blood of these innocent children. Due to all of that, what ever treaty you have with our country is now null and void. The treaty of Hudaibiyyah was cancelled by the messenger of Allah (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) once Quraysh had assisted Bani Bakr against Khusa'ah, the allies of the prophet (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him). The prophet (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) fought Quraysh and concurred Makka. He (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) considered the treaty with Bani Qainuqa' void because one of their Jews publicly hurt one Muslim woman, one single woman, at the market. Let alone then, the killing you caused to hundred of thousands Muslims and occupying their sanctities. It is now clear that those who claim that the blood of the American soldiers (the enemy occupying the land of the Muslims) should be protected are merely repeating what is imposed on them by the regime; fearing the aggression and interested in saving themselves. It is a duty now on every tribe in the Arab Peninsula to fight, Jihad, in the cause of Allah and to cleanse the land from those occupiers. Allah knows that their blood is permitted (to be spilled) and their wealth is a booty; their wealth is a booty to those who kill them. The most Exalted said in the verse of As-Sayef, The Sword: {so when the sacred months have passed away, then slay the idolaters where ever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush} (At-Tauba; 9:5). Our youths knew that the humiliation suffered by the Muslims as a result of the occupation of their sanctities can not be kicked and removed except by explosions and Jihad. As the poet said:

The walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets. The freeman does not surrender leadership to infidels and sinners without shedding blood no degradation and branding can be removed from the forehead.

I remind the youths of the Islamic world, who fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina with their wealth, pens, tongues and themselves that the battle had not finished yet. I remind them about the talk between Jibreel (Gabriel) and the messenger of Allah (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on both of them) after the battle of Ahzab when the messenger of Allah (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) returned to Medina and before putting his sword aside; when Jibreel (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) descend saying: "are you putting your sword aside? by Allah the angels haven't dropped their arms yet; march with your companions to Bani Quraydah, I am (going) ahead of you to throw fears in their hearts and to shake their fortresses on them." Jibreel marched with the angels (Allah's Blessings and Salutations

may be on them all), followed by the messenger of Allah (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) marching with the immigrants, Muhajeroon, and supporters, Ansar. (narrated by Al-Bukhary).

These youths know that: if one is not to be killed one will die (anyway) and the most honourable death is to be killed in the way of Allah. They are even more determined after the martyrdom of the four heroes who bombed the Americans in Riyadh. Those youths who raised high the head of the Ummah and humiliated the Americans-the occupier- by their operation in Riyadh. They remember the poetry of Ja'far, the second commander in the battle of Mu'tah, in which three thousand Muslims faced over a hundred thousand Romans:

How good is the Paradise and its nearness, good with cool drink, But the Romans are promised punishment (in Hell), if I meet them I will fight them.

And the poetry of Abdullah Bin Rawaha, the third commander in the battle of Mu'tah, after the martyrdom of Ja'far, when he felt some hesitation:

O my soul if you do not get killed, you are going to die, anyway. This is death pool in front of you! You are getting what you have wished for (martyrdom) before, and you follow the example of the two previous commanders you are rightly guided!

As for our daughters, wives, sisters and mothers, they should take prime example from the prophet (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) pious female companions, may Allah be pleased with them; they should adopt the life style (Seerah) of the female companions of courage, sacrifice and generosity in the cause of the supremacy of Allah's religion. They should remember the courage and the personality of Fatima, daughter of Khatab, when she accepted Islam and stood up in front of her brother, Omar Ibn Al-Khatab and challenged him (before he became a Muslim) saying: "O Omar , what will you do if the truth is not in your religion?!"

And to remember the stand of Asma', daughter of Abu Bakr, on the day of Hijra, when she attended the Messenger and his companion in the cave and split her belt in two pieces for them. And to remember the stand of Naseeba Bent Ka'b striving to defend the messenger of Allah (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) on the day of Uhud, in which she suffered twelve injuries, one of which was so deep leaving a deep lifelong scar! They should remember the generosity of the early woman of Islam who raised finance for the Muslims army by selling their jewelry. Our women had set a tremendous example of generosity in the cause of Allah; they motivated and encouraged their sons, brothers and husbands to fight- in the cause of Allah- in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya and in other countries. We ask Allah to accept from them these deeds, and may He help their fathers, brothers, husbands and sons. May Allah strengthen the belief - Imaan - of our women in the way of generosity and sacrifice for the supremacy of the word of Allah. Our women weep not, except over men who fight in the cause of Allah; our women instigate their brothers to fight in the cause of Allah.

Our women bemoan only fighters in the cause of Allah, as said:

Do not moan on any one except a lion in the woods, courageous in the burning wars Let me die dignified in wars, honorable death is better than my current life

Our women encourage to Jihad saying:

Prepare yourself like a struggler; the matter is bigger than words! Are you going to leave us else for the wolves of Kufr eating our wings?! The wolves of Kufr are mobilizing all evil persons from every where! Where are the freemen defending free women by the arms?! Death is better than life in humiliation! Some scandals and shames will never be otherwise eradicated.

My Muslim Brothers of the World:

Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy -your enemy and their enemy- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with your own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam. Exalted be to Allah said in His book: {and if they ask your support, because they are oppressed in their faith, then support them!} (Anfaal; 8:72)

O you horses (soldiers) of Allah ride and march on. This is the time of hardship so be tough. And know that your gathering and co-operation in order to liberate the sanctities of Islam is the right step toward unifying the word of the Ummah under the banner of "No God but Allah").

From our place we raise our palms humbly to Allah asking Him to bestow on us His guide in every aspects of this issue. Our Lord, we ask you to secure the release of the truthful scholars, Ulama, of Islam and pious youths of the Ummah from their imprisonment. O Allah, strengthen them and help their families.

Our Lord, the people of the cross had come with their horses (soldiers) and occupied the land of the two Holy places. And the Zionist Jews fiddling as they wish with the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the route of the ascendance of the messenger of Allah (ALLAH'S BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM). Our Lord, shatter their gathering, divide them among themselves, shaken the earth under their feet and give us control over them; Our Lord, we take refuge in you from their deeds and take you as a shield between us and them Our Lord, show us a black day in them! Our Lord, show us the wonderment of your ability in them! Our Lord, You are the Revealer of the book, Director of the clouds, You defeated the allies (Ahzab); defeat them and make us victorious over them. Our Lord, You are the one who help us and You are the one who assist us, with Your Power we move and by Your Power we fight. On You we rely and You are our cause. Our Lord, those youths got together to make Your religion victorious and raise Your banner. Our Lord, send them Your help and strengthen their hearts. Our Lord, make the youths of Islam steadfast and descend patience on them and guide their

shots! Our Lord, unify the Muslims and bestow love among their hearts! Our Lord, pour down upon us patience, and make our steps firm and assist us against the unbelieving people! Our Lord, do not lay on us a burden as Thou didst lay on those before us; Our Lord, do not impose upon us that which we have no strength to bear; and pardon us and grant us protection and have mercy on us, Thou art our patron, so help us against the unbelieving people. Our Lord, guide this Ummah, and make the right conditions (by which) the people of your obedience will be in dignity and the people of disobedience in humiliation, and by which the good deeds are enjoined and the bad deeds are forebode. Our Lord, bless Muhammad, Your slave and messenger, his family and descendants, and companions and salute him with a (becoming) salutation. And our last supplication is: All praise is due to Allah.

Appendix B: Complete Text of the 1998 Fatwa

Praise be to God, who revealed the Book, controls the clouds, defeats factionalism, and says in His Book: "But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)"; and peace be upon our Prophet, Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah, who said: I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one but God is worshipped, God who put my livelihood under the shadow of my spear and who inflicts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey my orders.

The Arabian Peninsula has never -- since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas -- been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter.

No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them, in order to remind everyone:

First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.

If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless.

Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.

So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors. Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.

All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al- Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: "As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life." On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God."

This is in addition to the words of Almighty God: "And why should ye not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)? -- women and children, whose cry is: 'Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!'"

We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.

Almighty God said: "O ye who believe, give your response to God and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life. And know that God cometh between a man and his heart, and that it is He to whom ye shall all be gathered."

Almighty God also says: "O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of God, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things."

Almighty God also says: "So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith."

Appendix C: National Security Directive 45, August 20, 1990

Internet Source (accessed January 5, 2008):

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document2.pdf>

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion
of Kuwait (C)

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to the national security. These interests include access to oil and the security and stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also will support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense. The United States will encourage the effective expressions of support and the participation of our allies and other friendly states to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. (S)

Declassified/Released on 11-22-96
Under provisions of E.O. 12065
U.S. National Security Council
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On Thursday, August 2, 1990 the government of Iraq, without provocation or warning, invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait, thereby placing these vital U.S. interests at risk. Four principles will guide U.S. policy during this crisis: (S)

- the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (S)
- the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq; (S)
- a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; and, (S)
- the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. (S)

To meet these principles and to bring the crisis to an immediate, peaceful, and just end, I hereby direct that the following diplomatic, economic, energy and military measures be undertaken. (S)

Diplomatic

The United States will continue to support the precepts of UNSC resolution 660 and 662 condemning Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait and calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Secretary of State should continue to work bilaterally with our allies and friends, and in concert with the international community through the United Nations and other fora, to find a peaceful solution to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait's legitimate government. (S)

Economic

Consistent with my authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, the United Nations Participation Act, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, the Executive Orders signed on August 2 and August 9, 1990 freezing Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in this country and prohibiting transactions with Iraq and Kuwait remain in force. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, should continue to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of these Orders. Furthermore, the United States will continue to support UNSC Resolution 661 imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We will emphasize individual and collective compliance with these

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sanctions, but are prepared, if necessary, to enforce them in the exercise of our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. (S)

Energy

The United States now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and, as a result of the current crisis, could face a major threat to its economy. Much of the world is even more dependent on imported oil and more vulnerable to Iraqi threats. To minimize any impact that oil flow reductions from Iraq and Kuwait will have on the world's economies, it will be our policy to ask oil-producing nations to do what they can to increase production to offset these losses. I also direct the Secretaries of State and Energy to explore with the member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) a coordinated drawdown of strategic petroleum reserves, and implementation of complementary measures. I will continue to ask the American public to exercise restraint in their own consumption of oil products. The Secretary of Energy should work with various sectors of the U.S. economy to encourage energy conservation and fuel switching to non-oil sources, where appropriate and economic. Finally, I will continue to appeal to oil companies to show restraint in their pricing of crude oil and products. The Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, should work with oil companies in this regard. (S)

Military

To protect U.S. interests in the Gulf and in response to requests from the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Kuwait, I have ordered U.S. military forces deployed to the region for two purposes: to deter and, if necessary, defend Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the Gulf region from further Iraqi aggression; and to enforce the mandatory Chapter 7 sanctions under Article 51 of the UN Charter and UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to preserve their national integrity and to deter further Iraqi aggression. Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi Arabia and other regional states to defend themselves. (S)

I also approve U.S. participation, in conjunction with the forces of other friendly governments, in two separate multinational forces that would provide for the defense of Saudi Arabia and enforce the UN mandated sanctions. These two groups will be called the Multinational Force for Saudi Arabia (MNFSA) and the Multinational Force to enforce sanctions (MNFES) against Iraq and Kuwait. The United States should coordinate closely with the Saudis, the Kuwaitis and others on the composition and organization of these forces. (S)

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- The MNFSA: The MNFSA is to deter aggression by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and other friendly Arab states in the Gulf, to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Saudi Arabia and other members of the GCC, and to conduct exercises and training to enhance the proficiency of Saudi forces in the defense of the Kingdom. (S)

Adequate legal basis exists under the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions for the implementation of multinational efforts. I do not believe it is necessary now for the United States to seek additional UN endorsement for the MNFSA. If I subsequently determined that further UN endorsement is required, we should ensure that any UN-led effort is acceptable to U.S. military commanders and an adequate command structure is established and operating beforehand. (S)

In concert with the other UNSC Permanent members, I authorize U.S. participation in discussions of the UN Military Staff Committee on the MNF operation for Saudi Arabia. If such talks are initiated, they should be of lower priority than talks concerning the MNFES. (S)

Soviet participation in the MNFSA is warranted only if the Saudis request it. If so, we should work with the Saudis to insure that the Soviet mission is acceptable to us and that Soviet forces are deployed at a distance from U.S. operations in these countries. Soviet assistance in providing lift support to others providing forces inside Saudi Arabia should be encouraged. (S)

- The MNFES: The MNF to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait is designed to bring about the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Participating countries would seek to prevent the export of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait, regardless of port of embarkation or transshipment point, and prevent the shipment to Iraq or Kuwait, regardless of declared port of destination or transshipment point, of any commodities or supplies whose provision to Iraq or Kuwait is contrary to UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661. These efforts should complement individual and collective compliance measures already in force. (S)

In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions 660 and 661, I hereby direct that all imports and exports, except medicines and food for humanitarian purposes (i.e., natural disasters) bound to and from Iraq and Kuwait be intercepted immediately. I direct the

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Secretary of Defense to immediately organize and coordinate a multinational force as requested by the Government of Kuwait. U.S. forces, in coordination with other cooperating national forces, should take necessary action to intercept vessels on a case-by-case basis until sufficient U.S. and other forces are available for more comprehensive enforcement. I also approve the submission to Congress of a separate letter informing it of the character and basis for our intercept operations in keeping with my commitment to congressional consultations on matters of national importance. The GCC states and potential contributors to the MNFES should be notified of the implementation of the intercept operation. I also agree to Soviet participation in the MNFES. (S)

Since the UN Charter provides the legal basis for the conduct of this operation, I do not believe it is necessary now to obtain additional UN endorsement for the MNFES. Subject to the consent of the UNSC Permanent members, I agree to allow U.S. participation in discussions of the MNFES operation for enforcing sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait by the UN Military Staff Committee. (S)



Appendix D: National Security Directive 54, January 15, 1991

Internet Source (accessed January 5, 2008):

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document4.pdf>

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 54

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf (U)

1. Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. Consistent with NSD 26 of October 2, 1989, and NSD 45 of August 20, 1990, and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States remains committed to defending its vital interests in the region, if necessary through the use of military force, against any power with interests inimical to our own. Iraq, by virtue of its unprovoked invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and its subsequent brutal occupation, is clearly a power with interests inimical to our own. Economic sanctions mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 661 have had a measurable impact upon Iraq's economy but have not accomplished the intended objective of ending Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. There is no persuasive evidence that they will do so in a timely manner. Moreover, prolonging the current situation would be detrimental to the United States in that it would increase the costs of eventual military action, threaten the political cohesion of the coalition of countries arrayed against Iraq, allow for continued brutalization of the Kuwaiti people and destruction of their country, and cause added damage to the U.S. and world economies. This directive sets forth guidelines for the defense of vital U.S. interests in the face of unacceptable Iraqi aggression and its consequences. (S)

2. Pursuant to my responsibilities and authority under the Constitution as President and Commander in Chief, and under the laws and treaties of the United States, and pursuant to H. J. Res. 77 (1991), and in accordance with the rights and obligations of the United States under international law, including UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667,

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Under Executive Order 12958
By: [illegible]
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669, 670, 674, 677, and 678, and consistent with the inherent right of collective self-defense affirmed in Article 51 of the of the United Nations Charter, I hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. These actions are to be conducted against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait by U.S. air, sea and land conventional military forces, in coordination with the forces of our coalition partners, at a date and time I shall determine and communicate through National Command Authority channels. This authorization is for the following purposes:

- a. to effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- b. to restore Kuwait's legitimate government;
- c. to protect the lives of American citizens abroad; and
- d. to promote the security and the stability of the Persian Gulf. (TS)

3. To achieve the above purposes, U.S. and coalition forces should seek to:

- a. defend Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states against attack;
- b. preclude Iraqi launch of ballistic missiles against neighboring states and friendly forces;
- c. destroy Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities;
- d. destroy Iraq's command, control, and communications capabilities;
- e. eliminate the Republican Guards as an effective fighting force; and
- f. conduct operations designed to drive Iraq's forces from Kuwait, break the will of Iraqi forces, discourage Iraqi use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, encourage defection of Iraqi forces, and weaken Iraqi popular support for the current government. (TS)

4. While acting to achieve the purposes in paragraph 2 above and carry out the missions in paragraph 3 above, every reasonable effort should be taken to:

- a. minimize U.S. and coalition casualties and

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b. reduce collateral damage incident to military attacks, taking special precautions to minimize civilian casualties and damage to non-military economic infrastructure, energy-related facilities, and religious sites. (TS)

5. The United States shall seek the maximum participation of its coalition partners in all aspects of operations conducted in either Kuwait or Iraq. (S)

6. The United States will encourage Iraq's neighbors Syria and Turkey to increase their forces along their borders with Iraq so as to draw off Iraqi forces from, and resources devoted to, the Kuwait theatre of operations. (S)

7. The United States will discourage the government of Israel from participating in any military action. In particular, we will seek to discourage any preemptive actions by Israel. Should Israel be threatened with imminent attack or be attacked by Iraq, the United States will respond with force against Iraq and will discourage Israeli participation in hostilities. (TS)

8. The United States will discourage any participation in hostilities by Jordan. Similarly, the United States will discourage any Jordanian facilitation of, or support for, Iraqi military efforts. The United States will also discourage violation of Jordanian territory or airspace. (TS)

9. The United States recognizes the territorial integrity of Iraq and will not support efforts to change current boundaries. (S)

10. Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorist acts against U.S. or coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait's oil fields, it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq. I also want to preserve the option of authorizing additional punitive actions against Iraq. (TS)

11. All appropriate U.S. government departments and agencies are to prepare and present to me for decision those measures necessary for stabilizing to the extent possible energy supplies and prices during hostilities. (C)

12. Military operations will come to an end only when I have determined that the objectives set forth in paragraph 2 above have been met. (S)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
CNN	Cable News Network
GEN	General
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
KIA	Killed In Action
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
KTO	Kuwait Theater of Operations
NFZ	No-Fly Zone
NIF	National Islamic Front
NSD	National Security Directive
OBL	Osama Bin Laden
ONW	Operation Northern Watch
OSW	Operation Southern Watch
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission
U.S.	United States
USS	United States Ship
WIA	Wounded In Action

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