

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

LEVERAGING GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIPS TO
INCREASE GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

There is an urgent need for a unified global effort to increase security in the maritime domain. Global Maritime Partnerships (GMPs) must be leveraged to internationalize the Global Fleet Stations (GFSs) concept to increase global security in the maritime domain. The methodology of research for this paper was a literary search and analysis of current national and international maritime security strategies and regulations, looking for commonality in the perceived maritime threat, along with ways to address the maritime threat with a unified front. A critical part of the research was the evaluation of dialogue groups, coalitions and regional security initiatives currently in place that could be leveraged to generate a broader and more effective global response to increasing maritime security. Using an ends, ways, means model this paper lays out a path to increased security in the maritime domain, which starts using current dialogue and coalitions in place to build trust and enduring GMPs. The paper will identify shortfalls or seams with those current efforts and then illustrate how key groups like the embassy country teams must be leveraged to facilitate a holistic government approach to meet the host nation needs to improve global security in the maritime domain. This paper illustrates that the GFS concept has significant potential to increase security in the maritime domain, especially if it is supported by the international community, to include other countries taking a lead role to establish their own GFSs.

Abbreviations

AIS	<i>Automatic Identification System</i>
AFRICOM	<i>African Command</i>
AOR	<i>Area of Responsibility</i>
APEC	<i>Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation</i>
ARF	<i>ASEAN Regional Forum</i>
ASEAN	<i>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</i>
AU	<i>African Union</i>
BPC	<i>Building Partnership Capacity</i>
CIA	<i>Central Intelligence Agency</i>
CIIC	<i>Coalition Intelligence Interagency Cell</i>
CBP	<i>Customs and Border Protection</i>
CNA	<i>Center for Naval Analysis</i>
CSI	<i>Container Security Initiative</i>
CTF 150	<i>Combined Task Force 150</i>
COCOM	<i>Combatant Commander</i>
DEA	<i>Drug Enforcement Agency</i>
DIA	<i>Defense Intelligence Agency</i>
DOD	<i>Department of Defense</i>
DOS	<i>Department of State</i>
EC	<i>European Commission</i>
EMSA	<i>European Maritime Safety Agency</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
EUCOM	<i>European Command</i>
FAA	<i>Federal Aviation Administration</i>
FATF	<i>Financial Action Task Force</i>
FBI	<i>Federal Bureau of Investigation</i>
FDI	<i>Foreign Direct Investment</i>
FMF	<i>Foreign Military Financing</i>
FMS	<i>Foreign Military Sales</i>
G8	<i>Group of Eight Industrialized Nations</i>
G20	<i>Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors</i>
GEF	<i>Guidance for the Employment of the Force</i>
GFS	<i>Global Fleet Station</i>
GMP	<i>Global Maritime Partnership</i>
HCA	<i>Humanitarian Civil Assistance</i>
HOA	<i>Horn of Africa</i>
HSPD	<i>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</i>
HSV	<i>High Speed Vessel</i>
ICCC	<i>International Crisis Command and Control Course</i>
ICE	<i>Immigration and Customs Enforcement</i>
IMB	<i>International Maritime Bureau</i>
IMO	<i>International Maritime Organization</i>
INL	<i>Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</i>

ILAMS	<i>International Leadership and Management Seminar</i>
IMET	<i>International Military Education and Training</i>
IMOC	<i>International Maritime Officer Course</i>
ISPS	<i>International Ship and Port Facility Security</i>
ISS	<i>International Seapower Symposium</i>
ITD	<i>International Training Division</i>
JIATF South	<i>Joint Interagency Task Force South</i>
OAE	<i>Operation Active Endeavor</i>
LLOC	<i>Land Line of Communication</i>
MLL	<i>Maersk Line, Limited</i>
MSO	<i>Maritime Security Operations</i>
MSPCC	<i>Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee</i>
MT	<i>Metric Ton</i>
MTSA	<i>Maritime Transportation Security Act</i>
NATO	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</i>
NDAA	<i>National Defense Authorization Act</i>
NGA	<i>National Geodetic Agency</i>
NGO	<i>Non-government Organizations</i>
NORTHCOM	<i>Northern Command</i>
NSA	<i>National Security Agency</i>
NSPD	<i>National Security Presidential Directive</i>
PSI	<i>Proliferation Security Initiative</i>
RDCTFP	<i>Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program</i>
RMSI	<i>Regional Maritime Security Initiative</i>
ROK	<i>Republic of Korea</i>
SC	<i>Strategic Communications</i>
SLOC	<i>Sea Line of Communication</i>
SOG	<i>Strait of Gibraltar</i>
SOH	<i>Strait of Hormuz</i>
SOLAS	<i>Safety of Life at Sea</i>
SOM	<i>Straight of Malacca</i>
SOUTHCOM	<i>Southern Command</i>
TCP	<i>Theater Campaign Plan</i>
TSC	<i>Theater Security Cooperation</i>
USAID	<i>United States Agency for International Development</i>
USG	<i>United States Government</i>
V-RMTC	<i>Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center</i>
VTS	<i>Vessel Traffic System</i>
WMD	<i>Weapon of Mass Destruction</i>
WTO	<i>World Trade Organization</i>

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Introduction

In this century, countries benefit from healthy, prosperous, confident partners. Weak and troubled nations export their ills – problems like economic instability and illegal immigration and crime and terrorism. America and others ... understand that healthy and prosperous nations export and import goods and services that help to stabilize regions and add security to every nation.¹

President George W. Bush
November 20, 2004

Export and import of goods and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that they depend upon are a fundamental need for every country in the world, first and foremost for survival and second, for economic growth to maintain pace with the rest of the world's expansion. Whether it is a large country with rapid growth like China, who depends as much on the massive amount of imports to feed their voracious appetite for resources as they do on the ability to get their goods out to the rest of the world as exports or a small developing country in Africa, that exports its sought after natural resources such as crude oil, natural gas or another natural resource to pay for the imports that it requires to sustain its people. In any case, they each depend on the maritime domain and secure SLOCs to protect the movement of trade and goods to and from their countries.

Thesis statement

The thesis of this paper is: Global Maritime Partnerships (GMPs) must be leveraged to internationalize the Global Fleet Stations (GFSs) concept to increase global security in the maritime domain.

¹ U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. *The National Security Strategy for Maritime Security*. Open-file report. (Washington, DC: September 2005), 1.

Methodology

The research and methodology for this paper was a literary review and analysis of current national and international maritime security strategies. The analysis looked for a commonality in perceived maritime threats and more importantly whether there was a shared interest and collaborative method to deter the threat. Whereas, the idea of increasing security in the maritime domain (the ends) is not a new concept, some of the things that are new, include technological advances and increased global interdependency (ways to counter the threat), along with the agility and elusiveness of the maritime threat to utilize the vastness of the maritime domain to their advantage. Individual country resource limitations (means) have created gaps in global security coverage for the maritime threat to exploit. The focus of this paper is the identification of ways for the global maritime community to synergize their efforts in order to level the playing field against the maritime threat, thus creating a safer and more secure global maritime domain.

The interdependency of today's global economy makes a secure maritime domain a vital strategic interest for the United States as well as every other country in the world. Whether they are an established and fully developed industrial nation or a developing country, each depends on the SLOCs to support either the outflow of goods as exports or the inflow of goods to support their people and livelihood.

From a security standpoint, it is no longer feasible, against a technologically advanced threat in today's interdependent global community, for one country to go it alone. Even a country as powerful as the United States, who prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks had been buffered from a catastrophic attack by the oceans surrounding it,

realized that it was no longer free from attack by terrorists operating thousands of miles away. Considering the elusiveness and increasing lethality of today's asymmetric threat of terrorism, piracy and transnational crime, no nation can afford to unilaterally fund a cold war style buildup to protect its global assets in the global maritime domain. The direct and indirect costs and global economic effects of the detonation of a nuclear weapon in one of the world's Megaports would be significant when compared to those of the 9/11 attacks. There are also other higher order and indirect effects to consider for increased costs for things such as security, insurance, rerouting of shipping, and loss of tourism dollars due to the "fear factor" of another attack, all of which would have an impact on the global economy.

For hundreds of years countries have used their navies and maritime forces to protect their maritime borders, and when they have found commonality in protecting their national interests against a similar enemy or threat, they have joined together to form lasting coalitions or partnerships. Historically, countries have come together to complete short term exercises or missions and worked side-by-side enforcing embargoes and conducting boarding operations in support of United Nations (UN) sanctions. Countries have also conducted at-sea and ashore training to strengthen ties and build partner capacity. The world needs to build on this collaboration and increase the capacity building effort to take another step forward to increase security in the global maritime domain.

The 9/11 attacks served as a rallying point for the global community to come together to fight terrorism. In the maritime domain OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE) brought North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries together in

October 2001 to deter terrorism and protect the Mediterranean SLOCs and Combined Task Force 150 did the same for the Red Sea, Horn of Africa and Arabian Sea. These initiatives each continue to grow and increase maritime security, strengthen partnerships, and build capacity in their respective regions. In Europe, the Madrid train bombings and London bus bombings had similar rallying effects in 2004 and 2005, leading to the passing of several regulations to address security in and around European port facilities.

In addition to these operational coalitions, there are also initiatives that use dialogue and discussion to share ideas, develop trust and build partnerships. An example of this is the International Seapower Symposium (ISS), which is a bi-annual event led by the U. S. Navy and held at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The Seventeenth ISS brought together 72 countries, including chief's of naval operations, commandant's of coast guards and other maritime leaders to discuss maritime security on a global basis, which has led to some very enduring maritime partnerships.² ISS discussions included current and future maritime security initiatives, security cooperation and partnership building exercises to build capability and capacity and other related maritime security initiatives.³

It is somewhat puzzling why these operational coalitions and partnerships haven't led to a more rapid building of security capacity throughout the world, when the livelihood of the global economy is at stake. Is it money, competing national interests, national pride, geographical and personnel seams, cultural differences, lack of trust, or a combination of all of the above?

² John B. Hattendorf. *Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings (19-23 September 2005)*, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, 4.

One could argue that it is a combination of all of the above, and more importantly a lack of a long-term vision into the future. More specifically, an unwillingness to map out a protracted solution to the problem, along with the difficult task of winning the will of the people to fund the implementation of the extensive security initiatives on a global basis. These factors are amplified by the fact that the threat is not immediately imminent for the majority of the world at any one time. It seems that as a society we would rather choose to ignore the indicators and wait for a significant event, such as the 9/11 attack, Madrid train bombing, or some other catastrophic attack to rally the national and/or global community to take action. Unfortunately, history has shown that it takes an attack on a country's sovereign territory or a significant loss of life for a country's people that are working in the country that is attacked to generate a stronger and more enduring response. An example of the latter was the 9/11 attacks, which resulted in the death of people from all over the world.

Seams are another important factor. Specifically, due to the sheer size of the maritime domain there will always be seams that are too numerous for one or even several countries to cover. Whether using global piracy attack statistics from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the world's Megaports or a list of Barnett's Gap countries from his book *Blueprint for Action*, it is readily apparent where the major security seams are and where the initial effort should be focused. For example, Barnett's recommendation to reduce the size of the non-generating gap would prove beneficial to the effort of improving global maritime security.

While this paper will mainly address the effort to unify the maritime force, one can see that there also needs to be a concerted effort to unify efforts across other seams.

As compared to unifying the effort of the maritime security forces that operate in a common environment, the one that will be more challenging is the bridge between the sea and land security forces. The author of this paper feels that the reason terrorists have not conducted more attacks in the maritime domain is due to their unfamiliarity in that arena and the increased complexity of operating there. The maritime threat will evolve and unless the global community addresses this seam, the maritime threat will continue to exploit it.

Looking at history and the costs of war that the world has endured, in a long run a better and less expensive way to create increased security and stability would be to influence the world through the use of enduring partnerships to build security capacity.

In many cases, a small coherent investment in developing local capabilities within regional cooperative organizations would allow them to handle these problems... or at least, handle them with minimal support from us. More importantly, this could be done with regional “boots on the ground” – and with support from us and the international community. In many cases, the local will is there, but the means and skills are lacking. Building and supporting these capabilities is an investment in stability and prevention.⁴

General Zinni,
The Battle for Peace

In closing, there are many good initiatives to increase stability in the world; including those laid out in Thomas P. M. Barnett’s *The Pentagon’s New Map*, General Zinni’s *The Battle for Peace*, and even the U. S. maritime military forces “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, but individually they do not provide the complete answer to increasing security in the maritime domain. In order to achieve lasting global maritime security that significantly increases the global coverage area; each country must bring a holistic national government approach, which can be synergized into a global

⁴ Tony Zinni and Tony Klotz. *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2006), 149.

effort. Interdependency amongst the international community's participants must be realized to build enduring maritime partnerships that can be leveraged to build capacity to increase maritime security on a global basis.

The recent number of catastrophic attacks in the land domain outnumbers those in the maritime domain, but that can change quickly if the maritime threat adapts before the maritime security forces do. The reason for more attacks coming in the land domain can be debated, but the potential for much more significant and numerous attacks in the maritime domain are there. Additionally, the effects on the global interdependent economy of a maritime attack in one of the world's Megaports have the potential to be much more devastating than those in the land domain. The road ahead is long, but the world must find commonality in goals, prepare itself and take action. The essential part of the effort to increase maritime security is that it be shared by "all", vice "the few" being the police and "bank rollers" for global maritime security. Global Fleet Stations that are manned by a holistic government and international team, which leverage the host nation expertise and relationships of the embassy country team provide a way to achieve this.

Chapter 1 - The threat to the maritime domain

On September 10, 2001, the thought of a catastrophic terrorist attack on United States soil was not at the forefront of the minds of many people throughout the world. The coordinated terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11, involving four commercial airplanes, resulted in the death of more than 2981 people.⁵ The destruction of physical assets was estimated in the national accounts to amount to \$14 billion for private business, \$1.5 billion for State and local government enterprises and \$0.7 billion for Federal government.⁶ Rescue, cleanup and related costs have been estimated to amount to at least \$11 billion.⁷ Evidently, no one or at least no one with the capability and authority to prevent it thought that a terrorist attack of this magnitude was possible! This damage was a result of a conventional attack. What if a nuclear weapon was used? In a study that looked at the effects of a terrorist detonated nuclear explosion in the Port of Los Angeles, the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy estimated that the early costs could exceed \$1 trillion dollars.⁸

While the 9/11 attack was not in the maritime domain, it demonstrated the global reach of terrorism, the resolve of those supporting it and the reverberating effects that it would send around the world. More importantly it demonstrated to the United States, a world superpower, and the rest of the world that there was a general lack of awareness that an attack of that magnitude was feasible. It also illustrated our lack of readiness to

⁵ Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States*. (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-2.

⁶ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Economic Consequences of Terrorism," Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Economic Outlook Nr 71 (June 2002), 119.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander. *Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, 2006), xvi.

prevent it from happening and our inability to immediately recover from it. Even the designers and supporters of the 9/11 attack were amazed with the results. It is important to note that terrorism attacks have occurred long before September 11, 2001. The significance of that attack was that it rallied the majority of the international community and provided the resolve to fight terrorism together.

... it took the tragic events of September 11th 2001 for the maritime community to agree the need for international maritime security requirements. Following intensive discussions, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in December 2002 adopted new international maritime security requirements in the SOLAS Convention 1974, new Chapter XI-2, and a new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.⁹

It was at a very high cost, but the 9/11 attacks had a tremendous rallying effect for increasing global security and the countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Following several other terrorist attacks in the maritime domain, including an attempted suicide attack on oil laden tankers and the main Iraqi oil terminal in the North Arabian Gulf in April 2004, a response specific to the maritime domain was established. In December 2004, President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13), which established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC), to address security in the maritime domain.¹⁰ Its definition of the maritime domain follows. Note that it reaches beyond the water, to include the ports and the personnel that work in them.

⁹ European Maritime Safety Agency. "Maritime Security," European Maritime Safety Agency <http://www.emsa.europa.eu/end185d007d001d003.html> (accessed January 10, 2008).

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security* (November 2005), by Condoleezza Rice, Open-file report, U.S. State Department (Washington DC, White House, 2005), iii.

All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.¹¹

The MSPCC's first main focus was to oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security. Its eight supporting implementation plans are described below.

- **National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness** lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible.
- **Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan** uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain.
- **Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan** aims for coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly and decisively.
- **International Outreach and Coordination Strategy** provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security.
- **Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan** recommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption.
- **Maritime Transportation System Security Plan** responds to the President's call for recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory framework regarding the maritime domain.
- **Maritime Commerce Security Plan** establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain.
- **Domestic Outreach Plan** engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13.¹²

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

Although the primary focus of these eight supporting plans is maritime security within the United States, due to the globalization of today's interdependent economy the majority have global ties or measures that need to be implemented in the ports of the international partners of the U. S. to be fully effective. One recurring theme in each of them is a requirement for coordination between military personnel, local authorities, government agencies, port security personnel, and other foreign governments to improve security in the maritime domain. Additionally, the concepts or maritime security initiatives that they illustrate are not unique to the United States and could very easily be used by other countries, or potential partners, to complement their own national programs. They could also be used as templates to improve their own national maritime security. The key to success is finding a commonality in goals and initiatives to improve maritime security, developing trust and enduring Global Maritime Partnerships (GMPs) that will lead to a unity of effort which can be leveraged to implement security initiatives on a regional basis. Those regional efforts could then be joined to provide expanded coverage on a global basis. Since everyone will not have the same level of security capacity, the maritime partnerships could be leveraged to find commonality and then used to build security capacity; through dialogue, training and support of initiatives like the Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept.

History of the maritime threat

For thousands of years man has depended on the sea for transportation of people and goods for trade. The value of the sea in the political system of the world is as a means

of communication between States and parts of States.¹³ Julian Corbett emphasized the importance of the sea for communications and the interdependence they create between states.

In today's economy, the oceans have increased importance, allowing all countries to participate in the global marketplace. More than 80 percent of the world's trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link. About half the world's trade by value, and 90 percent of the general cargo, is transported in containers. Shipping is the heart of the global economy, but it is vulnerable to attack in two key areas. Spread across Asia, North America, and Europe are 30 Megaports/cities that constitute the world's primary, interdependent trading web. Through a handful of international straits and canals pass 75 percent of the world's maritime trade and half its daily oil consumption. International Commerce is at risk in the major trading hubs as well as at a handful of strategic chokepoints.¹⁴

Due to globalization and the interdependency of the world's economies the importance of keeping the world's SLOCs open is even more important today than it was in Corbett's time, over 100 years ago.

There are currently many threats to maritime security, but looking back in history, piracy is one that has been around for a long time, going back to the Sea Peoples, who threatened the Aegean in the 13th century BC.¹⁵ To counter this threat, countries created navies to protect their commerce and when advantageous, banded together with verbal agreements or treaties to form partnerships to protect their ships and cargo. These agreements were often bi-lateral and focused on the regional vice global level.

Today, the threats of trafficking people and drugs, and terrorism also threaten maritime security and unfortunately where you have one you will have some or all of the others. It is true that in the past couple of decades some terrorist organizations have

¹³ Julian S. Corbett. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. (New York: AMS Press, 1972), 336.

¹⁴ U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. *The National Security Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005)*, Open-file report, U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. (Washington, D.C., 2005), 1-2.

¹⁵ David Cordingly and Angus Konstam. *The History of Pirates* (London: Mercury Books, 2006), 20.

collaborated and converged with groups of organized criminals such as drug traffickers, usually for financial reasons.¹⁶ The overall result is a compounding negative impact on global maritime security.

An American view of the maritime threat

Protecting the maritime domain is of vital interest to the United States and its interdependent global economy. The *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*, which lays the foundation for those things that affect the maritime domain, classifies the threats into the following four groups:

- ***Nation-State Threats.*** The prospect of major regional conflicts erupting, escalating, and drawing in major powers should not be discounted. Nonetheless, for the near-term, states represent a more significant challenge to global security. Some states of concern provide safe havens for criminals and terrorists, who use these countries as bases of operations to export illicit activities into the maritime domain and into other areas of the globe. The probability of a rogue government using a WMD is expected to increase during the next decade. An even greater danger is that a state of concern will provide critical advanced conventional weaponry, WMD components, delivery systems and related materials, technologies and weapons expertise to another rogue state or a terrorist organization that is willing to conduct WMD attacks. This is of the greatest concern since the maritime domain is the likely venue by which WMD will be brought into the United States.
- ***Terrorist Threats.*** The vastness of the maritime domain provides great opportunities for exploitation by terrorists. The use of smaller commercial and recreational vessels closer to our shores and areas of interest to transport WMD/E is of significant concern. Additionally, terrorists can use large merchant ships to move powerful conventional explosives or WMD/E for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore facility. Terrorist groups have demonstrated a capacity to use shipping as a means of conveyance for positioning their agents, logistics support, and revenue generation. Terrorists have shown that they have the capability to use explosives-laden suicide boats as weapons. This capability could easily be used with merchant ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platforms.
- ***Transnational Criminal and Piracy Threats.*** Modern-day pirates and other criminals are well organized and well equipped, often possessing advanced

¹⁶ Martin N Murphy. *Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The threat to international security.* (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2007), 8.

communications, weapons, and high-speed craft to conduct smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband, as well as piracy.

- ***Environmental and Social Threats.*** Catastrophic destruction of marine resources, conflict between nation-states over maritime resources, and mass migration flows have the potential to harm the maritime domain or destabilize regions of the world. The accompanying economic impacts are often significant.¹⁷

Whereas these do not specifically mention protection of the SLOCs and instead focus on WMDs and terrorist attacks, it is implied, with 90% of cargo moving in the maritime domain, that the SLOCs are a strategic center of gravity for today's interdependent global economy and therefore a decisive point for the maritime threat. Research into maritime and security strategies for other regional groups or coalitions revealed a commonality in the interpretation of the maritime threat.

In recent years, the maritime industry has been broadly evaluating security at its facilities and voluntarily taking actions to improve security as deemed appropriate based on shipping trade area, geographic location, potential risk to workers and the surrounding communities, and potential risk attacks. Terrorism ties and political agendas are the latest trend in motivation for stealing cargo and ships, suggesting that "modern pirates" are increasing the violence and the severity of the attacks.¹⁸

Other regional views on the maritime threat

Though not conveyed in the same level of detail or exact terminology, the European Union (EU) shares a similar view of the maritime threat and unfortunately needed a rallying point of its own to take definitive action. Following the Madrid train bombing, which took place on its own soil on March 11, 2004, the EU took additional steps to prevent terrorist attacks in the maritime domain. Specifically, the European

¹⁷ U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. *National Strategy for Maritime Security: National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (October 2005)*, Open-file report, U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security (Washington D.C., 2005), 5.

¹⁸ European Maritime Safety Agency. "Maritime Security," European Maritime Safety Agency <http://www.emsa.europa.eu/end185d007d001d003.html> (accessed January 10, 2008).

Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) was assigned the responsibility of maritime security within the EU. To enhance ship and port facility security the European Parliament and Council of the European Union adopted the Regulation (EC) No 725/2004. EMSA made the following statement to address the threat of terrorism:

- (1) Security incidents resulting from terrorism are among the greatest threats to the ideals of democracy, freedom and peace, which are the very essence of the European Union.
- (2) People, infrastructure and equipment in ports should be protected against security incidents and their devastating effects. Such protection would benefit transport users, the economy and society as a whole.
- (3) On 31 March 2004 the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 (4) on enhancing ship and port facility security. The maritime security measures imposed by that Regulation constitute only part of the measures necessary to achieve an adequate level of security throughout maritime-linked transport chains. That Regulation is limited in scope to security measures on board vessels and the immediate ship/port interface.¹⁹

The EU then followed up this regulation in October 2005 with the Directive 2005/65/EC, which requires that Member States extend security measures from the ship-port interface (the port facility) to the whole port area.²⁰ Coincidentally, this directive followed the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005.

As the 9/11 attacks were a rallying point for the United States to take action to protect itself from terrorism, the Madrid and London terrorist attacks served the same purpose for Europe.

¹⁹ Council of the European Union. European Maritime Safety Agency. "REGULATION (EC) No 725/2004 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security," http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=32004R0725&mod=guichett&lg=en, Official Journal of the European Union (accessed November 30, 2007).

²⁰ Council of the European Union. European Maritime Safety Agency. "DIRECTIVE 2005/65/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security," http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_310/l_31020051125en00280039.pdf, Official Journal of the European Union (accessed November 30, 2007).

Looking back in history, there are many other instances in which it took a catastrophic attack on a country's own soil to rally the "national will of the people" to take the necessary action to support the legislation and funding required to raise the level of security required to protect itself from further attacks. One that had a significant rallying effect was the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), which is made up of 52 countries, considers terrorism and trafficking as the main threats to their regional stability. Unfortunately, they also have the very real threat of piracy in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca.

Terrorism constitutes a grave threat to stability, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. It has links with transnational organized crime, such as money laundering, arms smuggling, people smuggling, and the production of and trafficking in illicit drugs. It is also associated with the illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other deadly materials. Because terrorism has multiple dimensions, manifestations and causes and respects no national boundaries, it is a complex phenomenon that requires a comprehensive approach and unprecedented international cooperation. More than ever, it is important to ensure the secure flow of goods and people, to create and reinforce sound border infrastructures, and to coordinate information sharing and enforcement.²¹

ASEAN Regional Forum website

The ARF member countries realize the common threat and understand that working together is a more efficient and effective solution. In response to piracy in the Straits of Malacca, ARF members Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand formed a partnership to coordinate their efforts. Individually they did not have the resources to take on this significant effort, but realizing a common goal they partnered together to

²¹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Cooperative Counter-terrorist Action on Border Security." ASEAN Regional Forum. <http://www.aseansec.org/14836.htm>. (accessed November 30, 2007).

share the effort. This demonstrated the value of partnering to address a transnational threat that resulted in a more stable maritime environment for the region.

While the wording may change, depending on the country, coalition, or union, the common theme in each listed example is the protection of commerce and the people involved, which in turn correlates in the maritime domain to safe SLOCs and port facilities.

Additional non-traditional (non-kinetic) maritime threats

Whereas the direct effects of maritime terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime are relatively easy to see, there are also some very significant indirect effects that they bring to the port or region where they occurred as well as to today's interdependent global economy. Should a terrorist attack occur on a ship in the Gulf of Guinea, like the one that happened off of the coast of Yemen on the French-registered oil tanker Lindburg, the resulting increase in insurance costs for ships going in and out of the region would result in added costs to their owners. These costs would then be passed on to the global economy and consumer. Depending on the event and the risk of future attacks, insurance companies may even decide not to insure ships going into a particular region, which in the case of the Gulf of Guinea or Arabian Gulf would disrupt the global supply of oil and result in significant increases in the price of oil for the global economy.

While the damage to the environment is another example of a direct effect from this type of attack, there are also secondary effects to consider. A developing country may be heavily dependent on the fishing industry in the region to feed its people and to support its economy. The loss of this source of income may be significant enough to

prevent the growth of the developing country enough to bring instability and corruption to the country's government.

Consequently, it is the generalised problem of disorder at sea that encourages maritime criminality and gives insurgents and terrorists the opportunity to pursue their activities largely unmolested by law enforcement. This problem will be exacerbated by the increasing pressure on coastal waters from what can be termed 'migration to the sea', as increasing numbers seek to exploit the sea's resources.²²

One must also consider the effects of criminal activity like poaching. A developing country may have significant untapped fish resources off their coast, but not have the security capacity to patrol its own coastal waters to protect them. Whether poachers are working individually or as part of an organized group with ties to transnational crime, the effects of the lost revenue will have an impact on a developing nation's ability to gain national wealth. This lack of security capacity and stability may also result in a loss of foreign direct investment (FDI), which the country needs and is depending on for economic growth. The strategic impact, using Thomas P.M. Barnett's *Pentagon's New Map* model, is that those developing countries will remain "disconnected" from the world economy.

Real freedom exists within defined rule sets that reduce life's uncertainties to the point where individuals can efficiently run their own lives, avoiding the tyrannies of extreme poverty, endemic violence, and talent-stifling political repression ... as entire populations are liberated from the debilitating inefficiencies that kept them largely disconnected from the integrating whole, not only does their freedom increase but ours does as well. For each time we expand globalization's Functioning Core, we expand for all those living within it the freedom of choice, movement, and expression.²³

²² Murphy, 10.

²³ Thomas P.M. Barnett. *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, May 2005), 124.

Stowaways are another case of a non-traditional threat to the maritime domain. Whether intended as an instrument of terrorism or just someone trying to get a better life in another country, that stowaway has an impact on the global economy through an increase in operating costs for companies who ship goods by sea. This in turn affects the everyday consumer through cost of goods increases. Breaking this example down in greater detail, it may be as simple as a stowaway who paid off someone, with or without ties to other transnational crime, to get onboard a ship that is coming to the United States to gain a better life. Or maybe he is a member of a terrorist organization that has bought his way onto a commercial ship to gain access into the United States, with or without resources (money, false passports or visas, WMDs) to support their organization or a terrorist attack. While there are some shipping companies with ties to terrorists, they are not the most likely way for terrorists to come into the United States. Whether a terrorist or simple stowaway, the economic impacts are passed along to the everyday consumer via increased operating costs for the commercial shipping companies. A specific example of this is the real world effects facing Maersk Line, Limited (MLL), which spends an estimated \$40,000-\$50,000 for each trip that its ships make to African ports, where they currently have the biggest problem with stowaways.²⁴ This added cost only covers increased security on the ship to prevent stowaways from getting onboard. If a stowaway does get onboard MLL is responsible for “additional costs”, which include lodging, food and 24-hour guard services until the stowaway is deported, along with any transportation costs to get that person back to their home country. The “additional costs” for a stowaway that succeeds in making it to the United States run \$100,000 or more if

²⁴ Steve Carmel, interview by Jason Haen, December 4, 2007, interview 1, Maersk Line, Limited, Norfolk, VA.

the ship is held up by U.S. Coast Guard security procedures.²⁵ Each day that the ship is delayed by the U.S. Coast Guard will drive up the cost by roughly \$50,000 daily to cover operating costs.²⁶ These figures also do not include legal fees. The bottom line is that all of these costs cut into their profit margins and are therefore passed along by way of increased prices for goods purchased by the everyday consumer. Chances are that most consumers do not realize that these increased costs are there and even if they do they probably do not know what the increases are attributed to.

Conditions and enablers of the maritime threat

Even with a complex global port monitoring system that is funded, operational and manned with trained operators, along the same lines as a global ship and container tracking system that is not achievable in the near term, there are enough enablers in the port environment to facilitate stowaways, terrorism or transnational crime. A few of the geographic enablers are the sheer size of port facilities, the vast size of the maritime domain and the significant number of ports connecting the SLOCs. These enablers all work against the goal of a secure maritime environment. Other enablers are the personnel that work in the maritime and land domain, which presents the problem of different agencies having authority for different geographic domains, creating a land-sea interface seam.

Another enabler that is more likely in the world's ports, especially in the developing countries, is corruption. Increasing the capacity of the port security personnel and port operators will help make the world's ports more secure, but will not have a

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

lasting effect until those same people and their supporting local and state/federal government personnel are free from the influences of corruption and other enablers that are mentioned in figure 1.

There are a number of conditions that enable both piracy and maritime terrorism to flourish; in their absence, both would probably be unsustainable. Where circumstances favoring the two differ, the difference can be one of a nuance (see figure 1). These conditions interact with one another, and although one or some will predominate at a given time or in a given time or in a given place, all are usually present in some degree whenever piracy or maritime terrorism is found. Political context is the over-arching common factor. While this might be clear in relation to insurgency and terrorism, especially given the fact that weak states are less capable than others of resisting insurgent or terrorist infiltration, it may perhaps be less evident in the case of piracy.²⁷

Piracy	Maritime Terrorism
Legal and jurisdictional weakness	Legal and jurisdictional weakness
Favourable geography	Geographical necessity
Conflict and disorder	
Under-funded law enforcement	Inadequate security
	Secure base areas
Cultural acceptability	Maritime tradition
	Charismatic and effective leadership
Permissive political environment	State support

Figure 1: Conditions that enable piracy and maritime terrorism.²⁸

The core competencies and capacity of terrorists is not in the maritime domain, but they are working to develop those core competencies. Going after the threat directly and unilaterally is probably not the best long term solution, as a permissive political

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Murphy, 9.

environment will allow for the threat to continue regenerating. Therefore, countries must seize the opportunity to build and leverage enduring maritime partnerships to collaborate their efforts to build security capacity in the areas that the threat finds hospitable. With this increased capacity, “weak countries” will be able to create an unsuitable environment for the threat, so that it is unable to continue to base and proliferate global instability from their countries.

In addition to looking at the port facilities, the maritime security forces must look inward to the land lines of communication (LLOCs) that feed into the ports, vice just at the ship or ship/port interface. Terrorists and criminals will look to exploit the security seams in order find the easiest path of resistance.

Closing

From a pragmatic viewpoint, the global maritime security forces will never be able to prevent all incidents of piracy, maritime terrorism and transnational crime. The maritime domain is just too large for one or even several global economic superpowers to address maritime security on a global basis. Even if all of the world’s maritime security forces from the Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations or Group of Twenty (G20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governor countries joined together to provide forces to patrol the world’s ports and SLOCs, they would not be able to protect everything. Some advantages that these larger economic groups do have are resources, global reach and an interest in keeping the global SLOCs and ports safe. What they do not currently have is a global network of contributing partners. They work together for economic issues and may discuss maritime security, but their response is not holistic to the degree

that is needed to stay ahead of the maritime threat. With an adversary that is smart, agile, creative, capable, well-resourced and able to strike with increasing lethality, a WMD attack on one of the world's busiest ports is not out of the question. The economic shock of such an attack would not only affect that country, but would have a significant impact throughout the world.

Therefore make an assumption that pirates will continue to focus their efforts on chokepoints that are lacking in adequate security; in places like the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Malacca. Also, make an assumption that terrorists will attempt attacks in the maritime domain in the future and that it is just a matter of time before one is successfully carried out on one of the world's Megaports. If those assumptions hold true, the question is does the U. S. or the global community wait for terrorists to attack on the of the world's Megaports using a nuclear weapon or another attack in a way that does not currently seem possible, or does the global community look to build maritime partnerships, which can then be leveraged to increase partner capacity, and increase awareness in the maritime domain? Each maritime threat is a little different and each country, coalition or union will prioritize and deal with them in slightly different ways. Building maritime partnerships to increase interoperability, transparency and the building of capacity, especially in the developing or "Gap countries" as referred to by Barnett, will serve to increase maritime security on a global basis.

Chapter 2 – A review of maritime security initiatives and coalitions

Protecting national interests, and in the case of this paper, protecting the SLOCs to enable the flow of goods around the world has served as a national rallying point for many countries against the maritime threat. Whether the way has been in the form of coalitions, as short term solutions or as lasting partnerships, as a more enduring way to protect their maritime livelihood and lifeline to their growing economies, the common end remains the same.

The research for this paper revealed that there are currently many maritime security initiatives in effect throughout the world. Whether they are dialogue, operational coalitions, systems to improve maritime domain awareness, ship and container tracking systems or capacity building initiatives, this chapter will illustrate that they are all improving security in the global maritime domain to varying extents. There are some very large groups that address maritime security, like the ASEAN Regional Forum, which predominantly addresses ways to improve maritime security through dialogue between the 52 member countries, and the International Seapower Symposium (ISS), a US maritime military forces-led event held every other year in Newport, RI. Of note the most recent ISS brought together top maritime military representatives from over 72 countries to share maritime security initiatives and discuss ways to improve security in the maritime domain by working together. There are also operational coalitions like the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), which has been very successful at reducing the flow of drugs in the Western Hemisphere, through the use of a holistic government and coalition manned force approach. In the area of capacity building, there is relatively new initiative which focuses on developing Global Maritime Partnerships

(GMP) to work together to engage the maritime threat. One of its key tools is the Global Fleet Station (GFS). These GFSs will provide capacity building training, as tailored by the host nation, through persistent presence by a sea-based platform and are manned with an interagency and international force. Many of the other initiatives that were analyzed are American-led and focused primarily on United States ports. What is lacking is a unified global effort, which involves all of the world economic powers sharing the load to increase security in the maritime domain.

JIATF South – A model interagency operational coalition

Equally important as the successful effort to counter illicit trafficking operations, JIATF South has generated enduring partnerships, which has led to improved security and law enforcement capacity for the participating countries. While its name has changed, it has been an effective coalition since 1989, covering the Caribbean, Western Pacific and Southern Atlantic area of operations. The current version of its mission is as follows:

Joint Interagency Task Force South conducts counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.²⁹

The effort of JIATF South has had a significant impact on drug flow in the Western Hemisphere as illustrated by the testimony before Congress by Admiral James G Stavridis, the Commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM):

²⁹ Joint Interagency Task Force-South. "J-5 Mission Statement." <http://www.jiatf.southcom.mil/> (accessed September 7, 2007).

The positive effects of everyone pulling together are clearly illustrated by the great successes JIATF South has achieved over the last six years of ever increasing record disruptions. The last three years alone resulted in cocaine disruptions of 219 metric tons (MTs) in 2004, 252 MTs in 2005, and 260 MTs in 2006. These numbers represent nearly a threefold increase in disruptions since 2000, and all of this is a result of continually improving our working relationships with involved U.S. Government entities and with our partner nations. However, today's more robust intelligence picture of illicit drug movements also points to room for continued improvement. Intelligence suggests that some cocaine movements in JIATF-South's operating area go undetected each year because of a lack of an appropriate detection resource to respond to intelligence queuing, a real missed opportunity because nearly 90 percent of illicit drug movements that are successfully detected by JIATF-South assets are eventually interdicted.³⁰

In addition to the quantitative material successes, JIATF South is considered a model interagency template that has served to build interagency operations and security capacity amongst all of the participants. It is a joint coalition interagency operation that involves all of the United States military services, eight United States Government (USG) agencies and departments, including Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Security Agency (NSA) and National Geodetic Agency (NGA), and eleven European, North, South and Central American countries.³¹ Although JIATF South is primarily an operational command, the partnerships and cooperation have led to increased security and law enforcement capacity in each of the participating countries. This in turn, has led to increased security and stability in the entire Western Hemisphere.

³⁰ James G. Stavridis. The Posture Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy Commander, United States SOUTHERN Command before the 110th Congress (March 21-22, 2007), 29.

³¹ Joint Interagency Task Force-South website.

Enduring Friendship

An initiative that leverages partnerships to build security capacity in countries located in the JIATF South operating area is called Enduring Friendship.

It is a voluntary program aimed at synchronizing multinational operational maritime forces of the Americas to assist with security against transnational and asymmetrical maritime threats, such as drug and weapon trafficking, terrorism, uncontrolled migration, fish poaching and other threats to maritime life, hazards to navigation, and humanitarian emergencies. Two major changes that Enduring Friendship seeks to enact are a reduced pressure on U.S. assets in the Caribbean Basin and expanding the maritime capabilities of our partner nations to make them more self- and mutually-reliant.³²

The effort is a SOUTHCOM-spearheaded multi-year program that aims to lay the groundwork for a regional security network of maritime patrollers by providing seven nations with improved communications systems and high-speed interceptor boats that far outperform anything in their current arsenals.³³

So far, the command has delivered four boats to the Dominican Republic, two to Jamaica and now four to Panama. According to Army Maj. Gerald Boston who manages the program, USSOUTHCOM expects additional deliveries to five nations in 2008: the Bahamas, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Belize. All of those nations, except Jamaica, are slated to get four boats each. Jamaica has already received two boats and will get two more. In all, more than seven South and Central American countries are scheduled to receive new interceptor boats.³⁴

The program is funded with Section 1206 funds, which were authorized by Congress under the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act to build security capacity. In 2009 and beyond, Boston said no boats are scheduled to be delivered, but the

³² *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, 7.

³³ Michael Wimbish. "Command delivers high-tech patrol boats to Dominican Republic." (July 16, 2007) <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=550> (accessed 21 March, 2008).

³⁴ Michael Wimbish. "SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Command provides patrol boats to Panama to counter maritime threats, drug traffickers." (January 29, 2008) <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=958> (accessed 21 March, 2008).

command will work with the Enduring Friendship nations to “provide sustainment training and command and control enhancements.”³⁵

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF)

In recognition of security interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.³⁶ This forum is not an operational coalition like JIATF South, but has a larger coverage area and a broader mission. Specifically, the ARF agenda aims to evolve countries in three broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and collaboration of approaches to conflict.³⁷ The present participants in the ARF include: Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea (ROK), Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Viet Nam.³⁸

In a region with little history of security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum is the principal forum for security dialogue in Asia. The ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues which underpin the region's security architecture. The ARF is premised on the idea - drawn from the ASEAN experience - that a process of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in political relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region.³⁹

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Cooperative counter-terrorist action on border security." ASEAN Regional Forum. <http://www.aseansec.org/147.htm> (accessed December 2, 2007).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. "ARF Workshop on Managing the Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack." <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf> (accessed October 26, 2007).

An ARF workshop held in Darwin, Australia in June 2003 demonstrated the value of dialogue between partners and the ability to bring participants together to discuss how to respond to a major terrorist attack in a coordinated fashion. An excerpt of the results is below:

The workshop was the first time that ARF countries had met to discuss their capabilities to respond to a chemical, biological or radiological threat. It brought together experts from emergency response, civil defence, health, law enforcement and security agencies, as well as foreign and defence ministry officials. Over three days of lively discussion and networking, participants identified areas in which ARF countries could cooperate more closely at a practical level, such as search and rescue, medical treatment of mass casualties, forensic investigation, and the challenges posed by CBR weapons.⁴⁰

An initiative that started in 1989 to facilitate economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region that also deals with security in the maritime domain is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which currently includes 21 countries in the Pacific Rim.⁴¹

The U.S. government works in APEC, comprising 21 economies on the Pacific Rim, to facilitate trade and investment and enhance security against terrorist threats. Member economies have agreed to: implement a container security regime; implement the common standards for electronic customs reporting developed by the World Customs Organization; promote private-sector adoption of supply chain security; and assure integrity of officials involved in border operations. The U.S. government also works with APEC in assisting its member economies to implement the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, through training, technical assistance, and capacity-building programs.⁴²

⁴⁰ Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)." <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/background.html> (accessed October 26, 2007).

⁴¹ Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. "About APEC." http://www.apec.org/content/apec/about_apec.html (accessed October 26, 2007).

⁴² *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, Appendix B, 6.

While one could argue that these previously listed initiatives received increased attention and level of effort following the 9/11 attacks, they were all in place prior to September 11, 2001.

Post 9/11 maritime security initiatives and coalitions

Unfortunately loss of life and national treasure lead to action. The 9/11 attacks served as a rallying point for a large part of the global community against terrorism. Noticeably absent in the world's initial response were large countries like China and Russia, who had at the time and still do have a significant role in the global economy. Perhaps their lack of participation was due to having their own national or sovereign issues to deal with, or maybe it did not rally their people and governments because the attack did not happen on their own soil. Regardless of the reason, there was a global tidal wave of response to terrorism. Some of the major responses that focused on the maritime domain follow:

1. Operation Active Endeavor

After the 9/11 attacks, NATO formalized its response to the threat of terrorism on October 26, 2001 with Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), which serves to protect the SLOCs in the Mediterranean and Strait of Gibraltar from terrorism, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Along with the NATO countries, the Partner countries of Russia and Ukraine have just recently participated and there are negotiations with several Mediterranean Dialogue and other Partner countries to participate in the future.

In March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to include providing escorts through the Strait of Gibraltar to merchant ships from Allied states that requested them. This extension of the mission was designed to help prevent terrorist attacks such as those off Yemen on the USS Cole in October 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg two years later. This was a precautionary measure taken on the basis of intelligence indicating that ships passing through this extremely narrow passage were potential terrorist targets. Some 3,000 commercial shipments pass through the Straits every day. In May 2004 the escorts were suspended as a result of a declining number of requests. They may, however, be reactivated at any time.⁴³

The effect of OAE on maritime security has been positive, with over 81,000 ships being hailed and 102 boarded as of July 13, 2006, along with the escorting of 488 non-combatant vessels through the Strait of Gibraltar.⁴⁴ In addition to the increased security, there has also been valuable capacity building for the OAE participants, as well as several successful search and rescue operations.

The increased NATO presence in the Mediterranean has also enhanced the Alliance's security cooperation programme with seven countries in the wider Mediterranean region – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue, was set up in 1995 to contribute to regional security and stability and to achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners. Mediterranean Dialogue countries are equally concerned by the threat of terrorism and have already been cooperating with NATO in Active Endeavour by providing intelligence about suspicious shipping operating in their waters. Enhanced coordination and cooperation mechanisms are currently being developed. Russia and Ukraine have also offered to support the operation.⁴⁵

Even though OAE has increased information sharing and built maritime security capacity in the participating navies, it does not have a direct interaction with the port

⁴³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Active Endeavor Briefing: Combating terrorism at sea." (July 2006). http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm. (accessed November 30, 2007), 3

⁴⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Operation Active Endeavor." http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/practice.html. (accessed November 30, 2007).

facilities and does not build capacity with the port security personnel, therefore leaving a seam that can be exploited by the maritime threat.

2. Combined Task Force 150

Shortly after OAE started, UN resolution 1373 established Combined Task Force (CTF 150) to monitor shipping and deter and disrupt international terrorist organizations from using the SLOCs in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean to transport their personnel and equipment.

The Commander of the task force rotates between a pool of the participating countries, and there are typically 14-15 ships that take part at any one time. Ships from Canada, France, Germany, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, Italy, New Zealand and Portugal currently participate or have in the past.⁴⁶

The ships patrol the waters supporting maritime security operations, also referred to as Maritime Security Operations (MSO), while working with regional partners to increase their capacity in those same areas.

Maritime Security Operations (MSO) set the conditions for security and economic stability. MSO are designed to protect critical energy infrastructure and complement counterterrorism and security efforts of regional nations. MSO deny terrorist use of the maritime environment as a venue for the attack or for illegal transport of personnel, weapons and illicit cargo.⁴⁷

One of the challenges CTF 150 faces is the sharing intelligence to manage a common operational picture. To overcome this hurdle it established a Coalition Intelligence Interagency Cell (CIIC) to facilitate the sharing of intelligence to better accomplish its mission. The sharing of intelligence or lack thereof has and always will be

⁴⁶ FIFTHFLEET Public Affairs Officer. "History of Combined Task Force 150 Command," 2007.

⁴⁷ Naval War College. *Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium Report on Proceedings*. Naval War College, (June 2006), 86.

a sensitive area, but in this case the CIIC worked to increase effectiveness and at the same time build partner capacity. Another challenge that CTF 150 successfully overcame was operating under a complex set of rules of engagement, for which each participating country brings its own set of national rules of engagement or “national caveats”, which regulate what actions they can take on their own and what actions require permission from higher authority. Without a standardized solution for this, due to the constant rotation of ships and their associated “national caveats”, CTF 150 worked through by developing a matrix of the capabilities and limitations that each participating country has to operate with. Over time the participants gain an understanding of their partners “national caveat” limitations and organize the tasks for each country’s ships accordingly.

While CTF 150 originated with the primary mission of enforcing maritime security it has developed into a venue to build partnership capacity, while serving to increase stability and security in a region known around the world for lawlessness and piracy.

3. Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is one of the largest security initiatives in the world. It is a global initiative, started in May 2003 by President Bush, aimed at stopping shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), their delivery systems and related materials worldwide. As of November 13, 2007 there were 86 countries that have expressed their support for the PSI, and the number continues to grow.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ U. S. Department of State. “Proliferation Security Initiatives Participants.” U. S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm> (accessed March 31, 2008).

Countries are becoming involved in PSI in varying ways. Some, for example, have attended interdiction training exercises or informational meetings to help build the basis for effective cooperation. Participation in the PSI will continue to expand based on countries' responses to the initiative, in accordance with the steps that states can take to establish the basis for their participation in the PSI, as listed below:

- Formally commit to and publicly endorse the PSI and the Statement of Interdiction Principles and indicate willingness to take all steps available to support PSI efforts.
- Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land. Indicate willingness to strengthen authorities, where appropriate.
- Identify specific national "assets" that might contribute to PSI efforts (e.g., information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).
- Provide points of contact for PSI assistance requests and other operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response efforts.
- Be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations as opportunities arise.
- Be willing to conclude relevant agreements (e.g., boarding arrangements) or otherwise to establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts.⁴⁹

4. Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center

While still a coalition of sorts, Italy has led the development of a regional data system, called the Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center (V-RMTC), which covers the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding areas. Started in October 2006 with 17 countries, the V-RMTC system is now fully automated using an internet accessed graphic database and it continues to expand.⁵⁰ The V-RMTC is an online database that lists the movement of vessels of more than 300 tons, is updated and accessed by member navies, and

⁴⁹ U. S. Department of State. "What is the Proliferation Security Initiative?" U. S. Department of State. <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/> (accessed November 15, 2007).

⁵⁰ Tom Kington. "Online database tracks ships." *Navy Times* (March 12, 2007): 17.

registers 300 inputs daily.⁵¹ The system shares unclassified data on commercial shipping with participating navies to increase maritime situational awareness. In 2005, the Italian navy improvised a one-off version of the system when it contributed to the monitoring of naval traffic off the coast of Lebanon after the end of the Israeli naval blockade, following the war between Hezbollah and Israel.⁵² By focusing on one of the world's busiest chokepoints, along with the areas of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, V-RMTC is able to maximize its effort by watching a large number of ships passing through a very small area. The region has economic significance with twenty percent of the world's crude oil moving through that area, including traffic that sails up through the Suez Canal to reach Europe and Atlantic ports.⁵³

Although this initiative does not have a primary mission of building partnership capacity it goes a long way to increasing partner interoperability, by bringing all of its participants into the same data system. The value of this system is being recognized more and more each day as other countries see the benefit to increasing their awareness in their maritime domain. A seam with V-RMTC, which also applies to automated Identification System (AIS), is that commercial shipping companies may not want to participate as they will have to provide proprietary locating information of their ships to competitors.

5. Regional Maritime Security Initiative

The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), jointly coordinated by Pacific Command and the U.S. Department of State, was a capacity-building program that was started in 2004 and focused on enhancing cooperative security and maritime law

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

enforcement capabilities in the East Asia and Pacific region, with an initial focus on the Malacca Straits.⁵⁴ The initiative was designed to increase maritime situational awareness through enhanced information gathering and sharing, not only among maritime agencies within a State, but also between States.⁵⁵

An outgrowth of the RMSI and the partnerships developed at the ARF was the development of a regional coalition to counter piracy in the Malacca Straits, which is one of the most dangerous parts of the world and also a vital global SLOC chokepoint.

Joint efforts by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have kept piracy under control in the Malacca Straits, said Cyrus Mody, a senior analyst with IMB. Those states had poured a considerable amount of additional resources into fighting piracy since last year, including increased patrolling and law enforcement on the water.⁵⁶

6. United States Government (USG) maritime security initiatives

There are a number of United States Government (USG) Maritime Security Initiatives developed to cover the commercial shipping industry, including the Megaports Initiative, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), the International Port Security Program, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Smart Box Initiative, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and the 96-Hour Advance Notice of Arrival. There are also programs to build capacity, such as the U.S. Coast Guard International Training Programs. These initiatives are all part of the Department of State's *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security* and have made strides to improve maritime security. They are described briefly below:

⁵⁴ *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, Appendix B 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Associated Press. "Pirate Attacks Increase Worldwide." CNN.com (October 17, 2007). <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/10/17/pirate.attacks.ap/index.html> (accessed October 26, 2007).

a. Megaports Initiative

Under this program, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration installs radiation detection equipment in the world's largest and busiest ports to help detect, deter, and interdict illicitly trafficked nuclear and other radioactive materials through the global maritime system before they reach U.S. shores. This program also provides training to host government officials in the operation and maintenance of the equipment. The program provides technical resources to complement the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The Megaports Initiative has installed monitoring systems in the Netherlands and Greece, and is installing equipment in the Bahamas, Belgium, Singapore, Spain, and Sri Lanka.⁵⁷

b. Maritime Transportation Security Act

Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the U.S. Coast Guard verifies the compliance of foreign ports and flag states vessels with the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code, which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in December 2002 and came into force on July 1, 2004. The ISPS Code is a comprehensive, mandatory security regime, comprised of both mandatory and recommendatory components, for international shipping and port operations. It requires vessels and port facilities to conduct security assessments develop security plans and hire security officers. It seeks to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to ensure that security measures are implemented in proportion to the potential risk to security, which may vary from time to time.⁵⁸

c. International Port Security Program

Under this program, the U.S. Coast Guard and host nations work jointly to evaluate the countries' overall compliance with the ISPS Code. The U.S. Coast Guard uses the information gained from these visits to improve the United States' own security practices and to determine if additional security precautions will be required for vessels arriving in the United States from other countries.⁵⁹

d. Container Security Initiative

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is an initiative that was developed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11. The primary purpose of CSI is to protect the global trading system and the trade lanes between CSI ports and the United States. Under the CSI

⁵⁷ *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, Appendix B 2.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Appendix B 4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Appendix B 5.

program, a team of officers is deployed to work with host nation counterparts to target all containers that pose a potential threat. Announced in January 2002, CSI was first implemented in the ports shipping the greatest volume of containers to the United States. CBP has entered into bilateral discussions with all the foreign governments where these top ports are located and is now expanding to additional ports in strategic locations. The four core elements of CSI:

- (1) using intelligence and automated information to identify and target containers that pose a risk for terrorism;
- (2) pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arrive at U.S. ports;
- (3) using detection technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk; and,
- (4) using smarter, tamper-evident containers.⁶⁰

e. Smart Box Initiative

The Smart Box technology involves an imbedded, electronic container security device that helps U.S. authorities to determine whether a container has been opened or tampered with at any point along its journey.⁶¹

f. Automatic Identification System

An AIS is navigation equipment installed on ships that automatically sends the ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status, and other safety-related information to other ships and shore-based agencies, allowing for ship tracking and monitoring by Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) located in various U.S. ports. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter V requires carriage of AIS on all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships irrespective of size.⁶²

g. 96-Hour Advance Notice of Arrival

In order to determine which vessels require additional attention, including at-sea boarding or escort during transits of U.S. waters, the U.S. Coast Guard requires that all ships provide detailed information on the crew, passenger, cargo, and voyage history 96 hours before arriving in a U.S. port. In addition to analyzing this information, the U.S. Coast Guard reviews previous security problems with

⁶⁰ Ibid., Appendix B 1-2.

⁶¹ Ibid., Appendix B 8.

⁶² Ibid., Appendix B 13.

the vessel or illegal activity on the part of the crew, as well as the security environment in previous ports of call.⁶³

h. U.S. Coast Guard International Training Programs

The Coast Guard International Training Division (ITD) from Training Center Yorktown deploys teams worldwide and each fiscal year trains over 2000 international students in over 65 countries on Coast Guard missions, including maritime security related topics. Training is coordinated with the host nation and with the respective U.S. Embassy. Primary sources of funding include programs such as Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), or Security Assistance Programs of International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (RDCTFP), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The Coast Guard ITD also includes the International Maritime Officer School, which provides maritime law enforcement and maritime security training to international students. In addition, there are three courses designed especially for international officers: the International Maritime Officer Course (IMOC), the International Crisis Command and Control Course (ICCC), and the International Leadership and Management Seminar (ILAMS).⁶⁴

Implementation hurdles for maritime security initiatives

Each of these security initiatives has strengths and offers a starting point or path to increased security in the maritime domain, but their success is dependent on resources to implement and operate them. For example, if the United States or group of countries, like the G8 or G20, had enough money to implement each of these on a global basis, the risk of operating in the maritime domain would be significantly reduced. This more stable and secure maritime domain would enable the global economy to continue to grow and provide for increased prosperity for all of those involved. But this is not reasonable, especially in the near term, due to funding constraints. Even if each country in the G8 or G20 had enough money to implement these initiatives in their countries, due to the sheer size of the maritime domain, there would still be significant gaps in the maritime domain

⁶³ Ibid., Appendix B 9.

⁶⁴ Ibid., Appendix B 5-6.

for the threat to exploit. Of greater significance is that the maritime threat, whether piracy, terrorism, or transnational crime, would most likely avoid the places that are most prepared and instead look to exploit the path of least resistance or those developing countries that do not have the resources to secure themselves. These developing countries, which Barnett refers to as the Gap countries in his book *The Pentagon's New Map*, provide the maritime threat an insecure place to base their operations, target shipping, or serve as an unchecked entry point into the maritime domain SLOCs. Without a comprehensive system, like the FAA has to track airplanes as they move around the world, it would not be that difficult for terrorists to smuggle themselves aboard a commercial ship with a “dirty bomb” or conventional explosives that is bound for one of the world’s Megaports or another large port.

With this in mind, one must also consider that the security initiatives are only as good as the people enforcing them. The impact of limited resources and capacity to implement these security measures to improve security has already been stated, but one must also consider that limited resources and capacity to verify compliance with those measures has a potentially greater impact in that there could be a false sense of security from believing that some or all of the security measures listed above have been effectively put in place. Although facilities may report they are complying with the ISPS Code, there is no mechanism currently in place to verify compliance, and U. S. Coast Guard activities abroad are limited by and dependent on conditions set by host nations, including the locations the U. S. Coast Guard can visit.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ GAO, *Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers*, GAO-08-14 (Washington, DC: December 10, 2007), 8.

The fact that these are U.S. initiatives also has the potential to detract from their effectiveness. Even if the U. S. is going to fund their implementation and oversight, which may be enough incentive for the host nation to agree to their implementation in their ports, there will be hesitation in some countries as these initiatives are seen as “U. S. hegemony” that are being done in response to “U. S. interests” instead of their own host nation interests. Overcoming this perception is a difficult task that would be partially mitigated if the implementation of these initiatives was undertaken and maybe even partially funded by a global group such as the G8 or G20. The use of effective strategic communications to show that the implementation of these security initiatives is in the interest of the host nation would also help mitigate “U. S. hegemonic” perceptions. The use of strategic communications will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

Another problem with many of the U. S. initiatives, on top of the significant cost to implement them, is that they are focused on improving security in U. S. ports and the world’s Megaports. Implementation of the previously listed security initiatives will improve global maritime security in the short term, by focusing on their predefined areas, but terrorists, pirates and transnational criminals are agile and smart and will not focus on the most secure ports. Instead they will look to the smaller ports and less traveled SLOCs, because they will be easier to exploit. Once they have a foothold they will work to take advantage of the land-sea interface, which is a current seam in global security.

Finally, with the exception of U.S. Coast Guard’s International Training Programs, the majority of these are not capacity building initiatives. Therefore, they will increase maritime security for U. S. ports and eventually the world’s Megaports, provided that the U.S. Coast Guard and/or those individual countries have the resources, time and

will to enforce compliance. Therefore, the importance of increasing the membership to spread the level of effort to the maximum number of participants cannot be overemphasized. Increasing the level of security in the maritime domain is in the best interest of every country in the world. Putting it bluntly, the U. S., or any other global economic superpower, does not have the resources to be the world's police force. The effort to improve security in the global maritime domain must be a collaborative one, in which the costs and effort are shared. More importantly, if this shared effort can incorporate the national interests of the group of countries implementing them, as well as the host nation's interests that are on the receiving end, the perception of "U. S. hegemony" will be mitigated. In short, the sooner the "Made in America" label can be replaced with "Made by coalition X" the better off the maritime domain and interdependent global economy will be.

Impact of implementation on the commercial shipping industry

A significant barrier to global implementation of any security initiative is the cost. Take for example the Smart Box Initiative. The largest shipping companies are better positioned to take a longer term approach to maritime security and as a result can afford to pay the large upfront costs associated with the implementation of the technologically oriented security initiatives. On the other hand, smaller companies do not have as much capital and therefore have a harder time covering the up front costs of security measures and initiatives without cutting into their profit margins. Because of this they are more apt to take on the added risk of not implementing security measures and initiatives, especially those that are not required, which may result in them being more susceptible to attack by

the maritime threat or be targeted by terrorists to transport weapons, materials or personnel. One solution that would level the playing field would be for the participating countries of a global organization such as the G8, G20 or World Trade Organization (WTO) to subsidize the cost of these various initiatives and measures. This would enable more people to implement these security initiatives and broaden global coverage, which would ultimately achieve the desired objective of achieving increased global maritime security.

While the ports in developing countries may not have to have the shipping throughput to be classified as a Megaport and therefore have the associated increased or tighter security measure requirements, a terrorist attack in one of their ports would still have worldwide implications on today's interdependent global economy, which in turn would impact the everyday consumer. Examples of this are the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg. Each of these attacks led to a significant increase in insurance costs for ships operating in the area surrounding Yemen, making it cost prohibitive to travel in the vicinity or enter Yemen for a period of time. Consider the effect of a terrorist attack in the Strait of Hormuz or Gulf of Guinea. World oil prices would spike immediately as a direct result of the attack and they would remain elevated until the maritime insurance companies felt that the risk of further attacks had subsided and oil flow out of those locations resumed. In all likelihood the impact on the everyday consumer would be a lasting effect as the higher or prohibitive insurance costs would not fall until the risk of additional terrorist attacks was mitigated.

Once the terrorists have successfully carried out an attack, the only way to mitigate the risk is to bring in maritime military forces to stabilize the area and if

necessary, escort commercial ships in and out of port. This would be a long term process and would be significantly more costly to the global economy than the costs to the implement the security measures and conduct the associated capacity building training up front. To a lesser extent, but for the same reasons piracy also has an impact on shipping costs, and therefore the consumer. As the number of attacks increases, insurance and security costs go up for the commercial shipping companies, which leads to increased cost of goods passed on to the consumer.

One way to address these costs from a global perspective would be to have the world's largest economies, based on a measure such as their gross domestic product, cover the cost of added security measures. The coordination and funding could be shared by the participating countries of an international organization such as the G8, G20, or WTO, who each have a vested interest in a secure and stable maritime domain. This collaboration would support a common goal and may also lead to better enforcement of current International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations, serving to make the maritime environment less hospitable for terrorism, piracy and other transnational crime.

One final area to address is the negative impact that security measures have on the flow of goods for shipping companies, which cut into profit margins. As listed in Chapter 1, the significant daily operating costs that face commercial shipping companies can quickly add up and cut into profit margins, as the new security initiatives increase the time it takes to verify compliance and screen ships and their containers.

International Seapower Symposium

One successful initiative by the U. S. Navy that has unified the international maritime effort to improve global maritime security is the International Seapower Symposium (ISS). It is a bi-annual meeting of maritime military leaders to discuss ways to improve maritime security. The ISS is held at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. The most recent ISS was held in October 2007 and was attended by maritime leaders from over 72 countries, including the heads of their navies, coast guards, and other civilian maritime leaders. In addition to the development of enduring partnerships, it provided an opportunity to share best practices of maritime security initiatives between the global participants. U. S. maritime military forces presented a common strategy to maritime security called “A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower”, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. In this forum, participants are able to take away initiatives like the new U. S. seapower strategy in whole or in parts to implement on a national or regional level with their governments, military and the commercial industry.

A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower

In order to unify the effort of the United States maritime forces, the U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps and U. S. Coast Guard recently co-signed a Maritime Strategic Concept centering on the following six strategic imperatives:

- Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power.
- Deter major power war.
- Win our Nation’s wars.
- Contribute to homeland defense in depth.
- Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners.

- Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.⁶⁶

This overall strategy can serve as a template for a unity of effort to synergize a national response to a single event such as a terrorist attack or a series of events such as piracy or trafficking that will have global impacts on the world economy. The key part of this focuses on maintaining a maritime force with sound core competencies to defend the national homeland, but the last two measures have a greater potential to leverage maritime partnerships to improve global maritime security. While the importance of a unified maritime national response will serve as an example for what nations around the world must do to economize their forces there is also an underlying strategic theme that is more important. This theme is the importance of building enduring maritime partnerships that can be used to increase security capacity. More importantly these partnerships could be leveraged to generate a global response, instead of only an American response, that would lead to a more stable global maritime domain.

Global Maritime Partnerships and Global Fleet Stations

Introduced by the U. S. Navy, GMP is a global initiative that incorporates a whole of government approach, along with willing international partners to develop trust and cooperation among the participants and then leverage them to increase security in the maritime domain. The broader concept of GMP seeks opportunities to assist partner nations in using the sea for lawful purposes and legitimate commerce, while limiting its

⁶⁶ U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Navy, and U. S. Marine Corps. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (October 2007).

use by those who threaten national, regional or global security.⁶⁷ GMP unites both public and private sector maritime entities in a partnership resulting in a collaborative international approach to maritime security.⁶⁸ A key tool of the GMP concept is the Global Fleet Station (GFS), which provides a way to leverage those partnerships to build capacity between the partners.

Each GFS will provide *tailored* and *adaptive* capability packages. Composition of a GFS package depends on Combatant Commander theater security cooperation (TSC) and building partnership capacity (BPC) requirements, the operating environment, and needs of the partner nations. Each GFS will be a unique combination of participants and mission sets depending on the desired effects and the host nations. As such, each GFS might carry detachments of Seabees, salvage divers, civil affairs units, explosive ordnance disposal teams, security forces, expeditionary medical, dental, engineering, mobile training teams, and logistics teams. In addition, each GFS could integrate partners from other services, other nations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to enable a variety of diverse training and support missions. Coalition capabilities may be ideally suited to augment GFS mission packages to fill gaps in available U.S. forces and deliver timely needed effects within a region.⁶⁹

An important advantage of the GFS is that it focuses on developing partnerships and building partnership capacity, vice post conflict operations and reconstruction. While these operations cost much less, as compared to the reconstruction effort like Iraq and Afghanistan, they also work to build trust and confidence of the local people up front, versus trying to repair it following conflict.

GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime security through cooperative efforts. From its sea base, each GFS could conduct humanitarian outreach, military/maritime training ashore and afloat, maritime civil affairs activities, counter piracy and counter terrorist training, shaping and stability operations, and information sharing. These activities all contribute to the development of maritime capabilities and increased capacities to ensure safe, well-governed global maritime commons. GFS achieves its goals of building partner capability

⁶⁷ U. S. Navy. "Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) _ Thousand Ship Navy (TSN) Concept Paper (July 2007)."

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ U. S. Navy. "Global Fleet Stations (GFS) Concept Paper (July 2007)."

and capacity through persistent goodwill presence while imposing a minimal footprint ashore.⁷⁰

The afloat footprint doesn't build resentment of the local population, since it is not viewed as an occupying force and also provides the advantage of not having to establish a land base and its associated force protection. The afloat GFS does provide a different force protection challenge, in that the minimum number of ships, along with the maneuverability constraints of the larger command and control ships, may leave them vulnerable to terrorist attack.

A critical component to shaping and stability operations inherent in GFS is a *cultural awareness* that can only be gained through persistent interaction with partner nation navies, native maritime security forces, and populations. Each interaction should employ tailored activities selected with the goals of strengthening partnerships, building partner capabilities, and establishing favorable security conditions. Sufficient cultural and language expertise organic to the GFS is critical to providing effective interaction with local populations throughout the region.⁷¹

The process of developing cultural awareness takes a long time and therefore for the GFS to be successful it must leverage the experience and relationship that the embassy country team has with the host nation. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

The first Global Fleet Station (GFS) deployment took place in the SOUTHCOM AOR in 2007 using the High Speed Vessel 2 (HSV2) Swift. The Swift GFS conducted 12 visits to seven countries over a period of five months.⁷²

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Holly Boyton. "NAVSO Completes Busy Deployment Season" (October 16, 2007). <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/10/mil-071016-nns06.htm> (accessed 15 January 2008).

The Swift GFS, made up of training teams from the U. S. Navy, U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Marine Corps, and support staff from the Department of State, traveled to Belize, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama to provide instruction and training to partner nation forces in a variety of subjects. Training in seamanship, small-boat handling, navigation, non-commissioned officer leadership, and security assessments gave partner nation navy, coast guard and port operation personnel valuable skills for increasing maritime security in the region.⁷³

The concept of the GFS is that each will include at least one vessel capable of serving as the main logistics and command and control center, and may include smaller vessels and helicopters for ship-to-shore transfers and other operations. Also, non-traditional vessels, such as hospital ships for humanitarian assistance (HA) missions may be employed as part of a GFS in order to enhance the building of strong partnerships.⁷⁴

The USNS Comfort completed a deployment during the same timeframe as the GFS deployment to the same area. Over a period of only four months in the summer of 2007, the USNS Comfort traveled to 12 countries with its specially tailored joint, interagency, international and private sector crew and brought modern medical care to almost 100,000 men, women, and children through nearly 400,000 patient encounters.⁷⁵ The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted an analysis of the engagement operations for the USNS Comfort deployment and found that there was a very positive effect on the local population. They used post-deployment on-site interviews, structured media and content analysis, surveys of patients, targeted populations and national public to determine the effects of the deployment. Specific feedback on the impact of Comfort's visit to Colombia was as follows:

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Global Fleet Stations (GFS) Concept Paper (July 2007).

⁷⁵ James G. Stavridis. *The Posture Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy Commander, United States Southern Command before the 110th Congress (March 2008)*, 21.

- In Colombia, Comfort set up clinics for the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations in the area
- Populations act as informants for Colombian Navy on location of terrorist groups
- After Comfort's visit, the amount of information that the Colombian navy received from these populations more than doubled because the indigenous populations were willing to work more closely with the government.⁷⁶

Based on the success of the Comfort deployment, the U. S. Navy plans to conduct another humanitarian civil assistance (HCA) deployment in the SOUTHCOM AOR in 2008. Leveraging lessons learned from previous theater security cooperation events and a SOUTHCOM GFS pilot deployment, a European Command (EUCOM) GFS deployment to the Gulf of Guinea just completed. The deployment is called the African Partner Station and involves interagency and coalition partner participation. It is aimed at building capacity to provide regional stability in an unstable area of the world that holds a significant amount of pertinent natural resources to support the global economy. As of 2004, Africa as a whole produced nearly nine million barrels of oil per day, with approximately 4.7 million barrels per day coming from West Africa. African oil production accounted for approximately 11 percent of the world's oil supply.⁷⁷

Closing

Each of the initiatives has strengths in the area of improving maritime security, but they do not provide a complete solution. The operational coalitions like JIATF South and CTF 150 cover relatively small areas of the maritime domain and are mission focused. They also have a gap in that they do not really address capacity building,

⁷⁶ Alison Vernon. "Analysis of Engagement Operations: Preliminary Findings for USNS Comfort." (November 6, 2007). CNA Brief. 12.

⁷⁷ Gulf of Guinea Guard. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/guinea-guard.htm> (accessed 9 January 2008).

especially in the port facilities. Groups like the ARF and ISS have a larger audience and can lead to enduring partnerships, but they are predominantly focused on dialogue and increasing transparency. They are therefore dependent on other initiatives to put their words and ideas into action. The many technological initiatives have great potential, but are heavily dependent on funding and have a “single point of failure” in the operators of the systems. Even a simple and relatively inexpensive system like AIS only works if it is turned on and its use is regulated and enforced. The GFS has the greatest potential in that it focuses on individual countries and building capacity that they can tailor to address their needs. If there is an overarching weakness or seam for the GFS, it would be the resources of ships, money and personnel that they need to sustain them. The partnerships established in the other venues such as the ISS and ARF must be leveraged to garner international support to resource them. The key to long-term success in improving maritime security is the building of enduring partnerships which can be leveraged to build capacity in the global maritime domain. The partnerships must then be leveraged to help everyone in the world understand the impact of not participating and funding, to whatever extent they can afford, the effort to increase maritime security.

Chapter 3 – The solution to increased security in the maritime domain

"The threat of international terrorism to international peace and security requires concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world. It is important that the underlying causes of this phenomenon be addressed to resolve the scourge of international terrorism."⁷⁸

Statement by the ARF Chairman dated October 4, 2001

With 80 percent of trade moving through the maritime domain, an area that covers over three quarters of the Earth, there are a significant number of ships and cargo containers that move around the world on a daily basis. This movement over such a large area creates an opportunity for any maritime threat to negatively impact global maritime security and the world's interdependent economy. As previously illustrated the maritime threat is able to attack in a variety of ways, via piracy or a terrorist attack that directly affects the economy and the environment or via the transportation of instruments of terrorism (people, equipment, money, etc), that indirectly affects the economy. It may also be non-kinetic in nature in the form of stowaways, who may or may not be terrorists or personnel tied to transnational crime. The commonality with all of these is that there is a direct or indirect impact on the global economy, which in turn impacts the cost of goods that can be traced or linked back to the everyday consumer.

The economic consequences of a major attack could include a temporary price spike reflecting fears of further attacks, and supply disruptions associated with delays of shipments if major transit routes, key facilities, or key ports are closed. The loss of one cargo of an energy commodity might not have a significant, sustained price impact. However, if an attack results in port closures for multiple days or weeks, price responses and higher costs could mean losses in economic

⁷⁸ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Cooperative Counter-terrorist Action on Border Security." ASEAN Regional Forum. <http://www.aseansec.org/14836.htm>. (accessed November 30, 2007).

welfare to consumers, businesses, and government amounting to billions of dollars.⁷⁹

The issue with sustaining the effort to counter the threat is garnering the public or “national will” and to do this the public must see a link between the maritime threat and their lives. This link is not usually readily apparent, unless they are a victim of the threat. This is especially true to the average consumer, who does not correlate the increase in price of the goods they purchase to the maritime threats listed in Chapter 1. Communicating these effects to the everyday consumer so that they support the effort and resources needed to increase the level of security in the maritime domain is a difficult task. The next catastrophic attack will rally the national support, but that will be too late and will come with a significant cost of life and national treasure.

The examples of initiatives and coalitions that are currently in place to improve global maritime security, along with the positive effects that they are producing, illustrate what can and needs to be done, but the world is a long way from attaining a global maritime domain that is not vulnerable to the current maritime threats.

With this in mind, what is the best and most efficient method to increase global maritime security? Is it a high-tech global security network that tracks every ship and shipping container as they transit around the world (currently only a very small percentage of containers coming into the U. S. are checked), a series of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements to cover regional hot spots that are more vulnerable to the threat, a series of theater security cooperation events to build capacity on a global level, a goodwill campaign to win the “hearts and minds” of the people living in the areas that are

⁷⁹ GAO, *Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers*, GAO-08-141 (Washington, DC: December 10, 2007), 8.

most hospitable to the possible threat so that they will evict the perpetrators of the threat or a combination of all of them?

On paper, an airtight global security network, in which you could track every ship and shipping container as they move around the world would appear to be the best answer, but the author of this paper speculates that the cost of this network would be in the billions or probably trillions of dollars, which the world, especially developing countries, do not have the resources to fund. Most countries barely have the resources to cover their own domestic needs. Even if the larger and more prosperous countries in the world (ie – member countries of the G8 or G20) funded all of the security initiatives for their countries and the world's Megaports, there would still be major gaps. The time and resources needed to build a basic level of security capacity to effectively implement and enforce these initiatives must also be considered.

Building Partnership Capacity - A template to disrupt financing of terrorism

A successful example of building capacity with international partners was recently completed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs in an effort to crack down on illegal international financing of terrorists and their organizations follows:

Many countries do not have the technical ability and skills to take the actions required of them. The U.S. government has engaged in important capacity-building initiatives with other governments to clamp down on terrorist financing activity. The State Department has obligated more than \$11.5 million for counterterrorist finance assistance since 2002. We have prioritized countries needing assistance and shaped programs based on this prioritization. The FATF, G8, United Nations Committee on Counterterrorism (CTC), International Monetary Fund, and World Bank are also pursuing and coordinating with us on efforts in this area. In this context, I want to stress that our embassies around the

world have been essential in helping to develop and implement all elements of this global strategy. This input is invaluable as we craft objectives and we implement efforts to build our coalition and take effective actions.⁸⁰

Maritime Security: A common maritime strategy

As illustrated by many of the initiatives in the previous chapter, the United States is looking to address the threat to the maritime domain with a global unified front.

Specifically, the United States National Strategy for Maritime Security establishes the following strategic goals:

- *A coordinated policy* for United States government maritime security activities with foreign governments, international and regional organizations, and the private sector.
- *Enhanced outreach* to foreign governments, international and regional organizations, private sector partners, and the public abroad to solicit support for improved global maritime security.⁸¹

The fundamental solution to increased security in the maritime domain, as laid out in this paper, is the building of trust and enduring partnerships, which can then be leveraged to increase security capacity in the maritime domain.

Since more than 80 percent of global trade travels by water, all sea going nations and even land-locked nations have a dependency on maritime trade. They all have a common goal of increasing maritime security. While most of the world has been fortunate to not experience a maritime terrorist attack, this makes it harder to generate the support to form strong unifying partnerships. Terrorism, piracy and other transnational crime are those viable threats that can serve to unify global partnerships, but history has shown that unless there is an attack on a country's own soil to rally the public will, the support will not last.

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Internationalizing the Fight," Department of State, by Anthony E. Wayne, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/wayne.htm> (accessed November 30, 2007).

⁸¹ *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, 4.

Since there will hopefully never be such a cataclysmic event that would bring the world together or rally them, we must depend on the countries having the most to lose taking the lead to build the enduring partnerships, followed by funding and supporting the training to build the security capacity around the world raise the level of security in the maritime domain.

Global Maritime Partnerships and Global Fleet Stations

The growing support and attendance for non-kinetic events, like the ISS, that use dialogue to build trust and form partnerships, demonstrate that the world's maritime services are increasingly willing to synergize their efforts to improve maritime security. Implementation of the GMP and GFS pieces of the U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps and U. S. Coast Guard's "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" provide an effective and efficient way to increase global maritime security. Specifically, the capacity building potential through persistent presence provided by the GFS to the Combatant Commander (COCOM) is significant; especially if the embassy country teams are fully leveraged to identify and then coordinate a "whole of government" response to meet the host nation's needs. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century seapower also provides a sound example for the world to copy in whole or parts for their own countries and regions.

Global Fleet Station composition - addressing the needs of the host nation

Understanding that each country may have unique requirements for the GFS team, there would need to be some general guidelines and restrictions established on what

mission sets or capacity building packages would be available to request, such as related to general security, law enforcement and associated supporting tasks, and basic maritime mechanical and electrical system maintenance, to name a few. More complex training could be made available on a limited basis, if requested, in order to maintain the “will” of the host nation’s people behind the GFS. For example, a country may desire assistance in building capability to protect their fishing resources, in addition to traditional security training, while another may need assistance in securing their oil terminals and platforms or better port security training to increase their capacity to track incoming and outgoing vessels and their associated cargo. The critical part is that the embassy country team is able to work with the host nation and then work with the COCOM personnel to arrange for the GFS team to provide the requested capacity building training and then work with DoD or other USG departments or agencies if additional funding is needed.

The SOUTHCOM Enduring Friendship program is a very successful example of DOD funding capacity building to improve regional maritime security. Enduring Friendship has used a relatively small amount of money to deliver a significant amount of security capacity, in the form of training and equipment to seven Central and South American countries. The estimated overall cost of the program is \$47 million through Fiscal Year 2008, which is a counterterrorism use of funds that Congress authorized under Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.⁸² The embassy country team is also in a position to arrange for additional funds to build capacity through programs like FMF, FMS and IMET to address host nation requests. The ambassador or chief of mission should have increased authority and resources of USAID and other non-

⁸² Michael Wimbish. “SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Command provides patrol boats to Panama to counter maritime threats, drug traffickers.” (January 29, 2008)
<http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=958> (accessed 21 March, 2008).

government organizations (NGOs) so that they are able to allocate money for training and other specific requirements that are requested by the host nation.

Keeping the GFS notionally configured and focused on these core skill sets will help keep the will and support of the nation's people that are sponsoring the GFS. This will also counter the perception that they are supporting a GFS with unlimited resources for a country on the other side of the world, when they have their own domestic issues that require funding. Having an effective strategic communication program to communicate the purpose and benefits of the GFS is critical from the perspective of the country(s) sponsoring the GFS, as well as, from the perspective of the host nation benefiting from the services of the GFS.

The embassy country team has the critical role of maintaining balance between the host nation needs and fiscal responsibility for the sponsor nation. For the GFS process to be successful, it is critical that each country that the GFS visits, via their respective embassy country team, has the ability to tailor the requirements and make-up of the GFS to meet their specific needs.

Leveraging the embassy country team

The reach into the whole of USG and host nation access that the embassy country team brings is invaluable. An excerpt from the DOD BPC instruction:

Security cooperation activities are aimed at preventing future crises and, should preventative efforts fail, ensuring that the Department and its partners are sufficiently trained, equipped and positioned to respond when necessary. The Department must also ensure that we are reinforcing, and not duplicating, efforts with international partners in our capacity building initiatives.⁸³

⁸³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *QDR Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity (May 22, 2006)*, Open-file report, Office for the Secretary of Defense (Washington D.C., 2006), 15.

Although this focuses on relations between the Department of Defense (DOD) and international partners, the importance of not duplicating efforts also applies to our own USG efforts. Theater security cooperation and building partnership capacity cover a broad spectrum and have many ways to effect success. Therefore, there is the potential to counteract efforts within our own government because we are not able to coordinate between agencies and departments. To prevent this from happening the broad knowledge base and country expertise in our respective embassy country teams must be leveraged to eliminate the duplication or counter efforts by our own personnel. These country teams must also be leveraged to facilitate inter-embassy coordination to arrange multinational response to capacity building requests by the host nation.

The significance of the embassy country team is again illustrated, as they understand the local culture and work with the local people on a daily basis. The ties they have with the host nation, as well as with the NGOs who work with the host nation on an even closer basis are critical to the success of the GFS. The relationship between the COCOM and embassy country team is of critical importance to make sure that efforts are synchronized and that the host nation's desires are met, communicated effectively and understood. The dual DOD/DOS deputy make-up of AFRICOM, which is organized to facilitate closer interagency coordination, should prove more effective than a traditional COCOM, especially in the GFS effort.

Although the primary composition of the GFS will be DOD personnel, there will be other specific capacity building requirements. The embassy country team and COCOM must work together to leverage their expertise and access to find the best way to answer the host nation's needs. Options for manning may be outside DOD with the U. S.

Coast Guard, another governmental agency or department, or an NGO if they have the best capacity and availability.

In addition to the importance of putting together a holistic USG team for the GFS, the value of international participation is significant. Not only does it enable a sharing of effort for global maritime security, but it also brings the respective cultural experience and access that our international partners have. The underlying partnerships that are developed and strengthened through the execution of the non-kinetic capacity building from the GFS will also have enduring effects.

Implementation of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force

The implementation of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) by the COCOMs and the synergizing of the theater security cooperation and contingency planning in the theater campaign plan will also benefit maritime security on a global level by unifying efforts and reducing lost efficiency by overlapping efforts.

With the implementation of the GEF, the COCOM will be better able to address its theaters security cooperation requirements holistically through its campaign plan. The COCOM will also be able to economize its effort and put together GFS deployments to address the capacity building requirements of a number of countries through persistent presence versus an undesired “ashore footprint”. As the COCOMs better integrate their interagency personnel like SOUTHCOM has done and AFRICOM is implementing, they will be in a better position to fulfill the host nation requirements, provided that the COCOM and embassy country teams can work together to efficiently resource their respective country’s needs. Each embassy will still be solely focused on meeting the

needs of their respective countries, but shifting to the GEF will enable the COCOMs to plan from a regional perspective and thus prioritize their TSC requirements to best build capacity in the countries in their region.

Although it was not a GFS deployment, host nation feedback on the perception of planning to the CNA analysis of the USNS Comfort deployment indicated that communication and coordination after the initial planning was not adequate.

CNA Preliminary Findings for the USNS Comfort deployment November 6, 2007:

- In the medium- to long-term, host nation officials perceived that they were left to plan by themselves.
- Communication appeared to be largely absent after the initial planning until about 10 days before the ship arrived.
 - This put host nation officials in very uncomfortable positions.⁸⁴

The long process of organizing the coordination and execution of the GFS deployment may require additional staffing of the embassy country team so that the host nation does not feel left out of the process. Any negative feelings by the host nation would adversely impact the development of trust and enduring partnerships in support of the COCOM's theater campaign plan.

Internationalizing the Global Fleet Station concept

There are currently thousands of bilateral or multilateral agreements and regional security initiatives active throughout the world. The success of the GMP concept will depend on the ability to leverage those agreements into the regional partnerships and coalitions already in effect to increase global coverage. It makes sense to use the partnerships developed in existing coalitions such as JIATF South, CTF 150, OAE and in

⁸⁴ Vernon, 7.

the Strait of Malacca to support the GFS manning since they already are working to counter the maritime threat and improve the level of maritime security in global places of instability. The eventual linking of GFS efforts with these regional coalitions would raise the level of maritime security and increase global maritime domain awareness, making it more difficult for terrorists, pirates and transnational criminals to use the global maritime domain's ocean highways to transport their people and raw materials.

Internationalizing the GFS concept would spread out the responsibility and resourcing to make it more manageable for the interagency and coalition supporters. Instinctively, every country, to some extent, will be hegemonic in their views of what aspects of maritime security need to be addressed and the approach or prioritization of tasks to get there. They will therefore, place their own national self-interests first with respect what objectives and tasks are addressed first. The key to the collaboration of effort is finding commonality in goals and having the flexibility to work towards the common goal (end) of increased security in the maritime domain.

Illustrating the benefits of improved security capacity to the other embassies in the host nation is critical to facilitate an internationally manned GFS, which would be able to provide a balanced and effective response to the host nation requirements. It is also very important that the GFS is viewed as a response to the host nations desires, versus the desires of the U. S. The GFS must be seen by the other embassies in the host nation as addressing their interests also. The best case scenario would be for another country to use the GFS concept to lead a GFS of their own, that would be composed of a multinational team, which could also include the U. S. in a supporting role if that was desired by the lead country or host nation.

The format or template that is used or who leads it is not the issue. More importantly it needs to be a holistic international approach that involves as many countries as possible, and is designed around whatever each supporting country is able to provide. Due to the non-kinetic mission set of the GFS and its purpose of building partnerships and building capacity, the international community will be generally more supportive than it would for a war.

Global Fleet Station enablers

Coordinating efforts by integrating the GFS deployments with humanitarian missions, like the USNS Comfort deployment to Latin America and the Caribbean in the summer of 2007, would go a long way towards winning the “hearts and minds” of potential partners against the threats to global maritime domain.

More than just a medical mission, USNS Comfort provided dental care to about 25,000 patients, conducted medical training for almost 30,000 host nation students and medical providers, and sponsored over 20 construction and restoration projects at local schools and health care facilities. USNS Comfort also extended veterinarian services throughout its journey, treating and vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of many families.⁸⁵

The humanitarian effort will continue in 2008 with two separate deployments scheduled using two large deck amphibious ships. The ships will visit nine nations where embarked teams of joint military, interagency and non-governmental groups specializing in health care and engineering will provide a range of medical services, infrastructure

⁸⁵ Stavridis, *Posture Statement (March 2008)*, 22.

improvements and humanitarian aid to citizens in need.⁸⁶ The teams will also provide training with their host nation counterparts, which will build capacity and lead to less dependence on outside agencies and personnel to support their development.

Whether in support of GFS or humanitarian missions there is an opportunity for the private sector to help provide resources for these capacity building initiatives. With the extent of globalization in today's economy there is a significant amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) spent in the world's developing countries. This is done by countries like U. S. and China, to build infrastructure to protect their national interests abroad and facilitate the efficient flow of natural resources out of the host nation to supply their own growing economies. There is also an interest by the private sector to protect their corporate interests that are based in developing countries. Non-government agencies already work with the private sector to supply resources for humanitarian assistance in developing countries around the world. Why can this not be leveraged to fund security and other capacity building initiatives? Once again the embassy country team would be the perfect venue to facilitate this effort, which could serve to raise host nation security capacity, provide for increased regional stability and therefore reduce the level of security that the private sector would need to provide for their overseas-based businesses.

One final benefit of the GFS is that the participants would be able to maintain a persistent look into the host nation's level of stability and security, government organization, government operation and the status of their key infrastructure.

⁸⁶ U.S. SOUTHCOM. "Preview of 2008 partner nation engagements"
<http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=1002> (accessed 19 March 2008).

Additional considerations - Strategic Communications

Whereas the potential of the GFS to provide invaluable capacity building is high and there are many ways to implement it, the possibility of negative perceptions, including those of “U. S. hegemony” are also there. Therefore the strategic communications (SC) plan to cover the implementation and execution of the GFS is vital to its success. With respect to ways the GFS could fail, the majority would be a result of unintentional effects. For example, if the GFS is perceived to be tailored to U. S. needs versus the host nation’s needs, the effort would probably not have enduring effects. The short term effects of receiving free training, equipment or a combination of both would most likely be positive, but the potential for leaving a lasting impression that the GFS was done to support only American interests could be fatally damaging. An example of this would be the perception that the GFS was only done to protect the oil interests for the U. S. There is also the potential for exploitation by terrorists or other obstructionists if the SC are not carefully done. Any negative outcome of the GFS in a host nation could be spun to introduce derogatory representation of the GFS and the country(s) supporting it. This could include a response to intentional provocation by supporters of the various maritime threats. Finally, the negative effects of giving the host nation the perception that the planning process does not include its inputs throughout the process or that it is not providing everything the host nation has requested has the potential of leaving a negative impression with the host nation. This would adversely affect the concept of building trust and enduring maritime partnerships. An example of this was the case of the mid- to long-term planning for the USNS Comfort deployment that was mentioned in Chapter 2.

The importance of SC must not be underestimated. Garnering the “national will” of the people from the GFS sponsor country that is answering the call to respond to a maritime threat is the first SC task. Sustaining that “national will” to provide enduring support and resources to maintain a higher level of readiness against a maritime threat is the next SC task. A terrorist event with the rallying effect of the 9/11 attacks makes the SC process much easier when compared to trying to convince people that they need to fund an effort like a GFS that operates thousands of miles away from their borders. The fact that the maritime threat is not associated with one country, like the Soviet Union in the Cold War, also makes SC more difficult.

Without being able to draw a direct line to increased cost of goods that they purchase or an attack on their own soil to rally them, the majority of people won't see the tie in to their economic interests. The value of SC to show the positive effects of supporting the GMP/GFS and how those positively impact the individual consumer is critical. Specifically, showing how the GFS affects security in the maritime domain and how the threats to the maritime domain (terrorism attacks and attempted attacks, piracy, transnational crime) can be tied directly to individual consumers is probably the most important part of the SC effort.

Another important aspect of SC is portraying the importance of GMPs/GFSs to the international community. There are two main reasons why this is important. First, the international community must see the benefits for participation by their country so that they can rally their own public will. Second, the SC must convey to the international community and its people that the increased maritime security generated by the capacity building provided by the GFS is benefiting their countries to encourage increased support.

If the host nation feels that the GFS is just there to protect the hegemonic interests of the U. S. or the other countries supporting it, the international support will wither.

Finally, the speed of information flow and access provided to today's media, via live satellite coverage and the internet, make the SC associated with the GFS even more challenging. SC must be carefully thought out and interwoven into the GFS implementation. The positive influence and success of the GFS must be shared with the global community, via a wide variety of media venues and thru a diverse cross section and global representation of the international media community.

Media is a powerful tool that has not just increased the importance of SC for "good guys". The perpetrators of the various maritime threats have been successful in using the media as tool to recruit, as well as discredit those interested in establishing a more stable and secure global environment. While embarked media would portray the success of the GFS to the country(s) supporting it, there must also be coverage by the host nation. The reporting source is very important. While word of mouth is a powerful voice and source, the coverage of local host nation media is needed to ensure that the GFS success is carried out to the host nation and global community. The local governments will benefit from the success and empowerment of their people and will have the opportunity to gain political capital for providing their people the opportunity to improve their stature as well as their country.

Host nation reporting will also counter the proponents of the threat who will say that the US media coverage is not truthful. For example, media coverage or a news paper article by US personnel may be the most factual representation of a humanitarian or capacity building event, but the "western world" bias or "made in the USA" stigma will

always be attached. This, in turn will be exploited by those opposed to western ideological diplomacy to discredit the GFS effort. Therefore, the value of host nation media and media with ties to the opposition, like Al Jazeera, will have a more enduring effect at countering the maritime threat's effort to discredit the benefits of the GFS and the stability and security GFS brings to the maritime domain.

Limiting factors and seams

1. Resources

The single greatest limiting factor to improving maritime security is money; whether it is to buy equipment or to fund the training to build capacity. As the use and compliance with relatively inexpensive systems like the AIS increases, global maritime security should improve, but there will still be gaps associated with those countries and ships that do not use it. While there are advantages to keeping a system simple, in that the number of participants will increase, there is also the disadvantage in that the system is probably more susceptible to manipulation or exploitation by the enemy. A strong coalition provides a way to counter this in that its strength is the "power of many", presenting a unified front against a common enemy or threat. This brings the "resources of many" (people, equipment, unique tool sets, special capabilities, etc) to the table, so that individual countries don't have to "go it alone". Coalitions also facilitate the bringing together of differing levels of capacity and resources, which results in an overall building of capacity leading to a unit that is stronger than its individual components. More importantly, the coalition leads to the development of a strong trust and interdependence amongst the participants.

To address capacity building resources from a USG perspective it is imperative that Congress pass legislation to make permanent special measures like Sections 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized sharing of resources between DOD and DOS to support the building of security capacity and civilian security capacity. This will enable USG departments to transfer funds between them better accommodate building partnership capacity.

2. Intelligence sharing

There will always be a hesitation for coalition participants to share intelligence, especially with neighboring countries, for fear of giving up a military or economic competitive advantage or simply not trusting each other. Every country has intelligence to bring to the GFS, which is usually of the highest granularity for things occurring within their own territorial borders. The coalitions or partnerships that are the most effective are the ones that have the greatest transparency with intelligence and thus create a common operational picture to improve situational awareness for the coalition. This common operational picture will lead to increased global maritime security for the region. To overcome the issue of sharing, the trust and enduring partnerships must be leveraged to increase transparency and sharing in the interest of a common goal of improving global maritime security. Implementation of liaison officers was successfully used to form a common operational picture in CTF 150.

Due to the fact that local maritime, port security and land-based police and law enforcement authorities generally operate in the unclassified domain, the effort to counter the maritime threat regionally and globally will not be fully effective until there is an

increased level of intelligence sharing. To overcome this hurdle there must be serious consideration to reducing the classification of intelligence to allow for data exchange over the sea/land seam. Reducing the level of classification will also increase effectiveness of the participating countries in maritime coalitions and GFSs set up throughout the world. Countries will still have protected information, but they can share data so that the coalition or GFS has a higher overall level of situational awareness. This increased transparency will pay dividends in the long run and serve to build trust, strengthen partnerships and ownership in the GFS process.

3. Global Maritime Partnership/Global Fleet Station concept seams

The benefits to the implementation of the GFS concept are significant, but there are some basic issues that have been overlooked. For example, the vulnerability to attack or breakdown of the GFS command and control platform, due to operating in remote areas and in close proximity to land must be addressed. A platform like the HSV has the speed and maneuverability that will help it avert damage from attack, but its vulnerability may be the very technology that makes her so highly capable. U. S. Navy ships have an onboard supply of parts, although the amount of parts is decreasing due to “just in time” parts support concept. As a result parts must be shipped to them, which could take as few as 24-48 hours or weeks if the parts are not readily available or must be manufactured. Another consideration for the HSV is that it may need special part requirements that must be manufactured or shipped from great distances, due to the uniqueness of the platform. The remoteness of many of the potential sites for GFSs is beyond the reach of one or two day delivery by Navy assets, therefore working against getting parts there in an

expeditious manner. This is an area that the commercial shipping industry may be able to provide assistance, as they have a broader reaching supply network.

Any downtime for equipment, whether it is propulsion or force protection related would leave the GFS ship(s) vulnerable to attack. A way to mitigate the risk of this would be to deploy a Navy combatant ship like a destroyer or frigate with the large Navy command and control platform. This would serve to provide redundancy and added force protection security for the GFS, especially in light of the crew size of ships being reduced as a result of technological upgrades. The GFS ships may need to be augmented with additional personnel for the deployment to cover the additional navigation, engineering restricted maneuvering and force protection manning requirements that are a result of the significant amount of time spent in close proximity to the coasts.

The fact that GFSs will operate in remote parts of the world, in close proximity to land and in small numbers, leave them susceptible to terrorist attacks. Whereas, the HSV has speed and maneuverability, the larger and less maneuverable Navy ships will not have the same capabilities. Based on changes to force protection procedures, increased training and equipment upgrades that have been made since the USS Cole terrorist attack, the U. S. Navy may still have an advantage over today's maritime threats, but that could change quickly, due to the availability and ease of use of new technology.

The strength of the U. S. Navy is the core capabilities that enable its ships to operate in remote areas, navigate in proximity to the littorals safely, and provide force protection for them. These core competencies are gained not by operating independently, but operating together as strike groups, where they can use other ships in the group to practice layered defense, build capacity and test each other's effectiveness. While there is

some benefit to using the same ships over and over for GFS platforms because of the regional expertise they will gain, there is also a risk of keeping them out of the strike group work-up cycle. In order to prevent a loss of core competencies, whether the large deck amphibious ship serving as the command and control platform or the surface combatant providing training and added force protection, the GFS ships should be rotated back to their traditional strike group work-up cycles every other GFS deployment. Note, that this does not apply to the HSV platform, which should be used as often as possible due to the significant capability they bring and based on the fact that they are not currently integrated into strike group operations.

The USS Cole attack took the world by surprise and was carried out by a single small boat. Unless the world takes action today to develop enduring GMPs that can be leveraged to build security capacity to defend against the maritime threat it may once again be surprised with an attack that was previously deemed not possible.

4. DOD-DOS interface/relationship

One major seam that is improving, but still has a way to go is the general interagency relationship. This relationship is often better between maritime agencies and departments, due to dialogue events such as the bi-annual International Seapower Symposium and the collaborative effort to develop the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” to approach the maritime threats. The success of the GFS is tied to the embassy country team and therefore the relationship between DOD and DOS is tied to improving global maritime security. This is because the COCOM falls under DOD and the embassy country teams fall under the DOS, even though the Ambassador

technically reports directly to the President. The remaining interagency relationships must be developed via the embassy country team, which incorporate numerous other agencies like USAID, as well as other NGOs that can provide assistance. The embassy country team is the “looking glass” into the host nation’s requirements and has access to a wealth of host nation cultural knowledge, along with influence to how USAID resources allocated to NGOs will be utilized in the host nation.

JIATF South provides a model template for effective interagency integration and as a COCOM, SOUTHCOM will only get better at addressing issues from a holistic government approach once their interagency reorganization that is currently underway is complete. Continued coordination with NORTHCOM to work the seam between Mexico and Latin and South America will serve to improve the effective handling of issues such as maritime security and the Global War on Terror in the Western Hemisphere. Borrowing from the successful template of SOUTHCOM, other COCOMs such as AFRICOM will employ its interwoven DOD and DOS command organization, with an Ambassador level civilian official as a deputy to the Commander, to present a holistic government effort to solve problems. This holistic government approach should prove very effective in a few years, once it reaches full manning and begins to establish enduring relationships with the African embassies. The African Union (AU) and regional economic communities will also provide further insight into specific maritime security requirements and help regionalize Africa’s efforts to improve the security in the maritime domain.

5. Addressing country borders and the land-sea interface

Critical to such an approach and to effective international cooperation are the control of states over their borders and the denial of cross-border movement to terrorists and that of their goods, funds and material. It is imperative therefore that borders should not be thought of only in terms of land frontiers between nations. Airports and seaports are also border crossing points so that air transport and maritime transport need to figure in the overall concept of border security.⁸⁷

ASEAN Regional Forum, 2001

While the world's navies have operated together for centuries, one seam that must be addressed is the integration of the other services, government agencies, shore-based police agencies and port authorities. This is new territory for most countries and bridging this seam will be a valuable tool to shut down the highway that the criminals and terrorists are using. To be successful it must be a holistic government approach and not just a military response. Bringing other departments and agencies into the GFS effort will help counter the "get out to the mall" syndrome and keep the maritime threat in the forefront of everyone's mind, instead of only those in the military and government with the responsibility for addressing maritime security in the global domain.

The world's navies have and will continue to address the borders in the maritime domain with venues like the ISS, but the land-sea interface remains a valid seam. Once again the embassy country team is in the best position to address this interface due to their relationship with the host nation, their understanding of the local culture and level of security capacity and their direct ties to the host nation. With the embassy's understanding of regional culture and country relationships they are once again in a position to facilitate regional security initiatives and agreements. Crafting security

⁸⁷ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Cooperative counter-terrorist action on border security." ASEAN Regional Forum. <http://www.aseansec.org/14836.htm>. (accessed November 30, 2007).

coverage across country borders and the land-sea interface will depend on the implementation of the new GEF, which directs the integration of phase zero theater security operations and contingency planning under the COCOM's Theater Campaign Plan (TCP).

6. Host nation corruption

Building the capacity of the equipment and personnel that run security for the port facility and associated sea interface may not increase overall security in the maritime domain if a country's government and/or port facility leadership are corrupt or do not have a strong legal system to enforce the maritime regulations and security initiatives in effect.

Indirectly, corruption is an enabler for the maritime threat that impacts the global economy, as illustrated by the stowaway example in Chapter 2, which quantified the impact on Maersk Line, Limited operations of additional security and transportation costs to return stowaways to their own countries. To address corruption, the embassy country team is in the best position to observe the host nation's government and security forces in operation to determine if there is embedded corruption or if they just need added capacity. Either way, the embassy country team may require additional personnel assigned to the embassy to work with the host nation to help identify the source of the corruption and bring in personnel to build capacity to eliminate it. Reducing corruption is not a small task, but it must be addressed, especially in the developing countries of the world that do not have strong governments and legal systems in place. Without addressing corruption up front, the security capacity building process will be short

circuited and therefore not have an enduring effect on the maritime security in that country or region.

7. Lack of participation by key players in the global economy

Noticeable absent from the majority of this paper is action by global superpowers like Russia and China to build partnerships and coalitions to increase security in the maritime domain. They are starting to participate, via OAE and exercises to prepare for terrorist attacks in the Asia-Pacific region, but they need to be involved to a much greater extent. One method to pressure them into greater involvement would be to put the G8 or G20 in a leading role in increasing global maritime security, since they have a vested interest in safety and security in the maritime domain. In an effort to “influence” maritime security improvements as an alternative to conflict or war, the G8 or G20 would be a suitable organization to undertake this. They would also be in position to bring in the private sector to fund these security measure improvements, with the realization that the improved stability and security may provide an opportunity for the private sector to increased access in many new places around the world.

Closing

In light of the recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the significant loss of life and national treasure that are a result of war and the subsequent rebuilding process, the concept of building trust and enduring partnerships that can be leveraged to build capacity with GFSs and other theater security cooperation events is far more appealing to the global community. The United States learned the hard way that essentially “going it alone” without global support is a long and drawn out process, which in the end is a very

burdensome and costly way of making the world a more secure place. If instability or conflict in a country or region results in war, the costs are going to put an economic strain on all those involved, including those dependent on resources or goods from that country or region. Even if there is a group of countries to bear the burden, war is still very costly.

A terrorist attack on a country's soil rallies that nation's people to take action. A terrorist attack of the magnitude of the 9/11 attack rallies the world community to bring their forces to bear against the perpetrators of the attack. The issue is that this national or global community response has a finite time before the support or will of the people runs out. Even the appetite for building partnership capacity will not last, especially when there are domestic issues such as inflation, recession and domestic crime to deal with.

The task of increasing global maritime security is one that must be undertaken by the global community. It is a long-term task that that does not require equal monetary and personnel support by everyone, but it does require participation and the common vision of increased security in the maritime domain by all.

Recommendations

The research for this paper resulted in four main recommendations that will lead to improved maritime security in the global maritime domain.

1. A continued dialogue and operation among maritime security forces in the international community is needed to build trust and enduring Global Maritime Partnerships.

Existing dialogue efforts like the International Seapower Symposium and operational coalitions such as JIATF South, which provide a synergized holistic government and international effort to address a common problem, must be used to build trust and bring people together to address common goals. As countries find that they have common goals and objectives to increase maritime security in the maritime domain they will realize that by working together they can provide a greater impact on increasing security on a larger level than they could individually. Countries must synergize their efforts internally as the United States maritime military forces did with the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Once those internal efforts have been completed, the enduring GMPs must once again be leveraged to bring together countries to form regional partnerships to implement maritime security capacity building initiatives such as the GFS. For the greatest effectiveness the GFS must have available all governmental departments, agencies, coalition personnel that are integrated with the embassy country team, which will play a critical role ensuring that the GFS meets the host nation’s security requirements. Finally, in an effort to expand the area of security coverage

provided by the various security initiatives, participants of existing coalitions and partnerships must always look for ways to increase membership and join together with other partnerships to increase the umbrella of security in the maritime domain.

2. The embassy country teams must be leveraged to a greater extent and their relationship with the DOD must be strengthened.

The local cultural expertise, relationship and day-to-day dialogue that the embassy country team has with the local nation, provide a “looking glass” into the host nation, as well as other agency and NGO efforts ongoing in the country. DOD must strengthen its ties with the DOS and embassy country team to facilitate a more holistic approach to increasing security in the maritime domain. The successful theater security cooperation efforts in SOUTHCOM, along with the interagency reorganization that is in progress should be used as a model template for other COCOMs to follow. The intended organization of AFRICOM should also provide for a sound interagency foundation to provide a holistic USG and international approach to increasing security in the maritime domain. The implementation of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) will also present a more unified theater approach to common issues such as increasing maritime security in the global maritime domain.

3. Available resources must be increased so that embassy country teams have the opportunity and access to resources to increase maritime security in their countries and regions.

Special authorizations like Section 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act must be made permanent to allow for more efficient sharing of congressionally authorized funding between agencies to better resource efforts to increase maritime security in the maritime domain. As compared to the cost of war and its subsequent reconstruction a small amount of money will go a long way in a capacity building effort, as demonstrated by the SOUTHCOM Enduring Friendship program. These types of programs have the potential to provide very broad reaching effects on today's interdependent global economy, especially if the private sector is brought in to support them. The private sector has significant resources and much to gain by a more secure maritime domain. Therefore, DOD, DOS and other agencies must reach out to the private sector to collaborate efforts to address areas such as maritime security, facility security and other areas that will create a more stable and secure operating environment.

4. Security initiatives such as the GFS must be internationalized to increase global coverage.

While capacity building efforts like the U. S. led interagency and coalition supported GFS and humanitarian deployments provide significant potential to improve maritime security, medical and dental and general capacity, there are limits to the effectiveness if they remain "U.S. only" efforts. Therefore, these initiatives must be internationalized to the point where other countries take the lead, with the U. S. providing assistance in a supporting role. Participation by organizations such as the EU and ARF also provide the opportunity for significantly wider global coverage. Spreading the effort

and resourcing to a number of countries also reduces the financial and personnel burden to each individual country. Specifically, internationalizing efforts to organizations like the G8 or G20 would spread out the responsibility to resource and validate compliance with initiatives like those listed in the USG port security initiatives section of Chapter 2.

Ends, Ways, Means Analysis

Summarizing the global maritime environment with an ends, ways, means method of thinking or model provides a more concise view of the current global maritime security situation. Due to the sheer size of the maritime domain, the operational environment is broad and there are a number of factors that influence it. Globalization and interdependency of world's economy tie some of those factors together.

With the desired objective or end state of increasing global maritime security, the illustration below summarizes the maritime domain from an ends, ways, means model. It also includes risk, defined as gaps and seams, which were discussed in the earlier part of this chapter.




Figure 2: Global Maritime Security from an ends, ways, means approach illustrated using the Bartlett model.⁸⁸

The means to achieve this “ends” are each of the maritime military forces throughout the world, and the money and equipment needed to support their operations.

⁸⁸ Richmond M. Lloyd. *Strategy and Force Planning*. (Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2004), 19.

There are many ways currently in play throughout the world to increase security in the maritime domain. Specifically, there are and have always been forums, symposiums and organizations that come together for a common purpose. Some successful examples of these are the ARF, which is focused on the Asia-Pacific region and the ISS that brings together maritime participants from all over the world to discuss ways to improve security in the maritime domain. As outgrowths to those venues and also independent from them, there are a number of operational coalitions that are well established such as JIATF South and some relatively new ones that were a result of the 9/11 attacks, such as OAE and CTF 150.

As the global community looks to establish GFSs it must ensure that their national maritime military forces maintain their core competencies and that they remain properly equipped and prepared to defend them, so that these vital instruments of national power can provide a holistic government approach to countering the maritime threat.

Piracy, transnational crime and especially terrorist attacks are rally points that are costly in terms of loss of life and financial reconstruction. Unless the world wants to wait for the next rallying event, the international community must take a more aggressive push toward unifying its efforts to target places that are hospitable towards terrorism, piracy and transnational crime to prevent future attacks. The best option is to spend a relatively small amount of money now and invest the time to build enduring GMPs, which are built on trust and the pursuit of the common goal of reducing the maritime threat. Creating an interdependent relationship amongst the global community will deliver a safe and secure maritime domain that facilitates global economic growth for everyone. A key tool to build security capacity is internationally organized and operated Global Fleet Stations.

Chapter 4 – Recommendations for future research

The “national will of the people” is the strategic center of gravity for a vast majority of the countries around the world and therefore the people must see an impact to their lives for them to want to fund a core maritime security capability to protect their country’s ports and coasts. The “national will of the people” is also needed to support GMPs and their collaborative efforts like the GFS to increase global maritime security beyond their ports and territorial waters.

Even with enduring partnerships in the maritime community, the “national will of the people” is needed for governments to authorize funding, resources and personnel to support maritime capacity building initiatives like the GFS. Without the support of the people, the support for the partnerships and their associated security initiatives will not last.

Therefore, one area for further study is a detailed analysis of the costs the maritime threat adds to consumer goods; consisting of insurance costs, security costs, costs to prevent stowaways, and most importantly the impact and increased cost of goods from a terrorist attack on a maritime port. Once those costs have been determined, the next step is coming up with a SC plan that presents those costs in a fashion that the everyday person can understand them and sees how they impact their daily lives, in order to win over their sustained support for capacity building initiatives. The SC plan must illustrate those costs in a way that the everyday person can see the impact to their lives.

The people must see the increased costs that they would pay to drive their car each day or go to the grocery store, if a terrorist attack occurred in one of their country’s ports or one on the other side of the world. This SC plan must make the people think

about those increased costs when they are shopping at the mall or watching the ballgame. They must realize that there is a valid maritime threat that will be viable for the foreseeable future and they must feel a need to take action before there is another catastrophic rallying event.

The SC plan must motivate the global community to spend the money to first pay to provide their country with the core capability in maritime security to protect their own coasts and second be willing to look at what they can do beyond their territorial waters. The Core and Gap countries must see the long-term benefits to building trust with each other and enduring partnerships that can be leveraged to build capacity through collaborative efforts like GFSs. The Core countries must understand and be willing to bear more of the burden to increase the security capacity in their ports, and they must also be willing to support the building of capacity in the Gap countries. Gap countries must be willing to put forth the effort and take the steps to improve security in their maritime domain, whether focusing on building capacity, reducing corruption in their governments or abiding by more stringent rules.

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