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**INNERE FUEHRUNG –
A SUPERIOR CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP**

by

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**“INNERE FUEHRUNG”–
A SUPERIOR CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP**

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ABSTRACT

This study describes the inner design of military forces in a German democracy—*Innere Fuehrung*—in the face of new challenges. “Transformation” and its various manifestations, including EBAO and NCW/NCO are contrasted with *Innere Fuehrung*. Differences of contemporary NATO, U.S., and German concepts are discussed and possible connection points for *Innere Fuehrung* are highlighted.

Some of the approaches examined are dominated by the extensive use of technology. The analysis is focused on a possible contradiction between technology and *Innere Fuehrung* as an enabler of successful interagency cooperation.

The study concludes that *Innere Fuehrung* is a guiding principle based on the application of the German constitution, the Basic Law, to the reality of soldierly service. In contrast to Transformation or RMA, *Innere Fuehrung* emphasizes the human being as a citizen rather than technology as tools of war. *Innere Fuehrung* constitutes the heart of the Bundeswehr’s institutional culture and remains applicable in the present. Citizens in uniform at home in the pluralism of state and society are best able to adapt to the security and defense challenges of the present—in contrast to an exclusive military caste or an outsourced mercenary horde.

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In loving memory of my grandfather
Herbert Sornik
(1912–2002)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

Innere Fuehrung defies translation into English, but it has become a trade mark of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, since the debut in 1953 of the term and the formal articulation of the ideas of an ethically motivated citizen-soldier for which it stands.¹ Why should one care about such a term or concept, when its very definition offers only problems, or worse leads to difficult conversations instead of simple, catchy answers? Furthermore why should a member of an allied military force, with its own successful democratic traditions and integration of the soldier in society care, about this barely pronounceable German principle? Since 2002, much invective has circulated among NATO allies about chocolate nations and their marzipan armies, in which the contrast between the storied soldierly chops of the Nazi-era Wehrmacht and the bearded, vacation-minded Bundeswehr redounds to the detriment of the Federal Republic of Germany (though typically without much regard to the nature of the society that each army served or of the role of the soldiers in those very different Germanies). This study is intended to address this misconception in a manner that sheds more light than dark on both the German experience of Innere Fuehrung and its applicability among allied forces.

One might begin with a definition of what Innere Fuehrung is *not*, by way of introducing this complex topic. Innere Fuehrung means that the soldier in democracy—the citizen in uniform—must *not* serve or defend any regime, ruler, or ideology with

¹ Although the *White Paper 2006 of the Federal Government of Germany* (hereinafter White Paper 2006) refers to Innere Fuehrung as “leadership development and civic education,” to the term, in fact, resists easy translation into English. In fact, this term describes a whole construct of ideas that, together, mean nothing less than the incorporation of the values of the German Basic Law, the Grundgesetz, into every German soldier’s daily judgment and action. White Paper 2006; <http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/sicherheitspolitik/grundlagen/weissbuch2006> (accessed November 26, 2007).¹⁰

unconditional obedience against the best of one's knowledge.² Born out of the need to reconcile pluralism and liberal democracy with soldierly honor and service (especially as these issues showed themselves in the era 1890–1945) the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr put forward Innere Fuehrung as a counterpoint to the political abuse by—and of—soldiers in National Socialism.³ Additionally Innere Fuehrung was seen as a means to reformulate military professionalism in a democracy, a feat that heretofore had never worked in Germany. This concept, sometimes described as a leadership philosophy, became a major success story despite a rocky start in the 1950s and 1960s. Innere Fuehrung made generations of Bundeswehr soldiers proud and dedicated servants of the Federal Republic of Germany. Throughout the cold war, Innere Fuehrung offered a common identity and a sense of service to a just cause. Furthermore, it equipped the Bundeswehr soldier to resist anti-democratic ideologies.

1. Purpose

More than five decades after the founding of the Bundeswehr in 1955, the security environment and the image of war have changed dramatically. Bipolarity is long gone, and transnational terrorists have emerged as a major threat. The present study treats the evolution, character, and prospects of Innere Fuehrung in the radically altered security and defense context of the twenty-first century. The main research question asks: Is the concept of Innere Fuehrung still relevant in contemporary conditions as faced by the

² This negative definition does not differ greatly from what we usually would consider as common sense, formed by existing laws and ethical criteria. Neither does such a collection of ethical criteria differ a lot from the incorporation of such concepts into the military forces of most of the Western or “modern” states. The idea is normal only in a settled participatory democracy, however. In the German case, one see the difference in the formulation of the oath of allegiance to the Federal Republic of Germany—with the attendant vow to serve the German nation loyally and bravely to defend its rights and freedom—that career soldiers in the Bundeswehr swore in the first years of the German post-war democracy (in contrast to the idea of absolute obedience that obtained during the Third Reich). In the event, conscripts participated in a ceremonial obligation, even less automatic obedience for the citizen draftees. Donald Abenheim, *Bundeswehr und Tradition: Die Suche nach dem gueltigen Erbe des deutschen Soldaten*. Muenchen: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1989. 116.

³ See, e.g., Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640–1945*. London et al.: Oxford University Press, 1964; Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1998; David K. Yelton, *Hitler's Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945*. Lawrence (Kan.): University of Kansas Press, 2002.

German Bundeswehr?⁴ An additional subset of questions, related to this major topic, concerns the possible application of Innere Fuehrung in present and future Bundeswehr operations, especially in a multilateral environment. Such a multilateral environment increasingly becomes a multi-value environment, which in turn affects the values of all sides.⁵ The shape of such operations therefore also should be of great concern.

Other questions deal with the construct of Innere Fuehrung itself. Here the focus will be directed to the quality of personnel needed and the appropriate selection of personnel able to cope with the new challenges while maintaining the primacy of the principles of Innere Fuehrung.⁶

2. Importance

This thesis advances an understanding of how the concept of Innere Fuehrung has worked, as well as the challenges for this concept in contemporary military operations. Particular attention is given to the so-called Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). Without describing or defining this approach in detail at this early stage of this study, it can be noted that EBAO addresses the strategic level in order to combine the available capabilities of all agencies and organizations—military and civil—acting simultaneously rather than sequentially in a specific engagement space. A more refined attempt to define EBAO and its derivations is provided in Chapter III.

⁴ Various armies in Europe have adopted key features of Innere Fuehrung. A broader, comparative study—which among others things would have to parse the features selected and the degree to which these features were incorporated amid a thorough analysis of the respective societies—exceeds the scope of the present work. The necessary data may not exist or be accessible. Furthermore this study assumes that while certain principles of Innere Fuehrung are transferable, Innere Fuehrung itself is hard to copy because it has developed for more than five decades and still is developing each day.

⁵ The role of mutual cultural awareness, so-called “intercultural competency,” is important and is partly discussed in Chapter III. This thesis focuses mainly on Innere Fuehrung as the “home” culture that shapes the reality and the political context of the Bundeswehr. Other partners or agencies must contend with just this reality.

⁶ The German news magazine *Spiegel* published on its online version on November 20, 2006, the summary of the contemporary discussion. Despite a sexy title, purportedly an unattributed quote, the whole article draws a rather dubious outline. Konstantin von Hammerstein, Hans Hoyng, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, and Alexander Szandar, “The Germans Have to Learn How to Kill,” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,449479,00.html> accessed April 16 2008.

The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr deemed it necessary to provide the soldiers of the young Federal Republic of Germany with a value-based concept, including the famous idea of the “citizen in uniform” as a guideline. In important ways, this enlightened and empowered citizen soldier is particularly well equipped to operate effectively and ethically within the multilateral, even internally competitive, realm of EBAO and other such approaches to interoperability.

B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

Whether Innere Fuehrung can be seen as a fundamental philosophy or a concept of ethics based on the democratic values embodied in the German constitution is partly answered by the closer examination of the institutions of command, obedience, and morale in the German experience. Each soldier is obligated perpetually to reassess his decisions, behavior, and actions based on the constitutional and legal aspects of his mission. He or she does so to avoid the abuses of human rights that have been repugnant features of the past and the present. The main aim here is to prevent German soldiers from once more becoming tools of oppression.

More recent scandals of other nations, where regular soldiers knowingly did inhuman things to other humans, suggests that this topic is still of great interest.⁷ The recent Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo detention camp scandals, as well as the willingness of many U.S. political and military leaders to accept this obvious moral and legal injustice, suggest that the epoch of military Transformation and a changing security environment requires a renewed validation of military discipline and morale on the basis

⁷ A subjective or even biased description of such mechanisms conducted in order to defend a democracy can be found in Moazzam Begg’s book, *Enemy Combatant*, where Begg describes his imprisonment at Guantanamo. One must realize that in such an environment, the traces of cause and effect easily can get lost for both sides, activating a further downward spiral. Moazzam Begg, *Enemy Combatant: My Imprisonment at Guantanamo, Bagram, and Kandahar*. New York: The New Press, 2006.

of democratic values.⁸ Soldierly and professional values—be they Western or universal—cannot be defended by their neglect or willful destruction in the name of the needs of security.⁹

Innere Fuehrung seeks to prevent the depersonalization that is the prelude to atrocity in military service. At the same time, one must say that Innere Fuehrung has hardly been foolproof and specific controversies in the history of the Bundeswehr underscore this fact. Various (and variously hair-raising) scandals of the soldier and constitutional norms periodically appeared in the five decades of the existence of the Bundeswehr. Almost every decade saw such an event.¹⁰ Nagold in 1963, Coesfeld in 2004, or the “skull affair” in Afghanistan in 2006 are only the most prominent names of these scandals. The content of these scandals and their effects on the Bundeswehr and its inner structure must be mentioned and examined. While the scandals are entirely inexcusable, this study shows that they all were endeavors of some misguided individuals and not some large-scale antidemocratic and inhuman operations sanctioned from the senior levels of command. These events were neither organized nor authorized nor encouraged by any higher authority. Individual failure in leadership usually was the main cause. Another commonality can be seen in the fact that none of these events could be covered behind the barrack’s gate. Public interest as well as the principle of Innere Fuehrung prevented—if there were such tendencies at all—such attempts of misunderstood camaraderie.

Mention of these scandals underscores the basic idea that Innere Fuehrung is not a product that can be applied off the shelf; rather Innere Fuehrung is a process that relies on

⁸ For the purpose of this thesis, “Transformation” is written with a capital letter. Transformation in this sense includes adaptations to new technologies and operational requirements and shall be characteristic for the worldwide movement noticeable in western military organizations since the late 1990s.

⁹ The central field manual ZDv 10/1 as of January 2008 states in No. 604: “*Wer Menschenwuerde verteidigt muss Menschen wuerdig behandeln.*” (Whoever defends human dignity must treat humans with dignity). A more thorough discussion of this subject is provided in Chapter II. A solid foundation for the discussion of this point can be found at: Werner Freistetter, “Conscience and Authority—Virtues and Pitfalls of Military Obedience.” http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/08_cma_05_frei.pdf accessed May 05 2008. 29.

¹⁰ An incomplete list for the last two decades can be found at <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,444655,00.html> accessed April 23 2008.

education and training as well as a reality of military service. To be sure, this high ethical standard derived from the process *Innere Fuehrung* demands a thorough military education as well as a competent and permanent training program and a careful selection of personnel so as to avoid those figures likely to abuse their soldiers and others. It is also very important to differentiate between the seeming limitations of *Innere Fuehrung* and its real limitations. *Innere Fuehrung* most certainly is not a perfect remedy, but similarly, even the most scrupulous practice of *Innere Fuehrung* cannot ensure that individuals will not engage in unethical behavior while in uniform.

Innere Fuehrung though is very likely to limit the work of such misguided persons and bring it to public attention by the means provided. These means are the legal possibilities anchored, among other things, in three codes pertaining to soldiers in Germany: the *Wehrbeschwerdeordnung*, the *Wehrdisziplinarordnung*, and the *Soldatengesetz*.¹¹ It is the relentless promotion of this network of guaranteed and protected rights and duties that marks the successful backbone of *Innere Fuehrung*.

Furthermore each soldier must understand and evaluate his or her orders within the frame of military discipline.¹² Being a “citizen in uniform” acts as a prophylactic remedy to atrocity and antidemocratic deeds. The idea of a citizen in uniform should not be misunderstood as a “soldier being a citizen.” The latter constitutes what *Innere Fuehrung* tries to preclude: soldiers as a functional caste, a state within the state. The emphasis therefore remains on the citizen and hence the rights provided by the German

¹¹ The dictionary offers for *Wehrbeschwerdeordnung* the term “military grievance code”; for *Wehrdisziplinarordnung*, one could use “military disciplinary code,” while *Soldatengesetz* might be translated as “military code” or “soldier’s law.” In Appendix 2 of the current central field manual ZDv 10/1, five pages are dedicated to the rights and duties of all soldiers of the Bundeswehr and the relationship of the Basic Rights of the German Basic Law to the above-mentioned codes. Appendix 2 not only lists the curtailed rights of soldiers but briefly explains why they are curtailed. Additionally it emphasizes the duties of Bundeswehr soldiers, but it also clearly states the limitations of these duties. A special focus is directed towards the limitations of obedience and the resulting duties for superiors. (Central field manual ZDv 10/1, App. 2/2, 4.) For example, the note that active soldiers retain the right to vote actually expresses the intention that soldiers actively should take part in politics in order to perform their duties as a informed soldiers of a democratic and pluralistic society in the true sense of *Innere Fuehrung*. Rolf Clement and Paul E. Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr : 1955 bis 2005*. Hamburg et al.: Mittler, 2005. 89.

¹² For the purpose of this study in reference to the Bundeswehr, the noun “soldier” includes all soldiers, i.e. male and female. This task can be directly derived from various numbers in the ZDv 10/1.

Basic Law are curtailed only to a minimum.¹³ The German Parliament made sure that each soldier is encouraged to take part in the active life of a citizen. In turn, his political duties enable the soldier to detect wrongdoing without the fear of oppression. Ideally in the result is a system of military checks and balances which creates an environment of mutual trust and respect. Further, Innere Fuehrung provides ample chances so that it is most likely that no soldier is hung out to dry with the assessment of his mission.¹⁴ On the other side, such a system based on the values of a mature and responsible citizen leads to officers who—while giving orders—will act as a corrective factor, if they detect any conflict with their conscience.

1. Context

The concept of Innere Fuehrung was introduced more than five decades ago at the time of a West Germany contribution to Atlantic defense and in the wake of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism. On the one hand it was supposed to insure to the Belgians and the French of the completely different nature of the new German military forces; on the other hand, it also truly tried to provide answers about how future German soldiers could be an organic part of the society of the Federal Republic of Germany with a working democratic control over armed forces. Innere Fuehrung in its first years served the democratic legitimacy, based on a consensus throughout society, in order to justify the armed forces in the face of stiff internal and international opposition to the remilitarizing of Germany. At its inception, the West Germans were at pains to make clear to the NATO allies that Innere Fuehrung was not intended for export, since the Americans, British and French have followed a different path of democratic integration of their forces.

¹³ The English translation of the German Basic Law is derived from the following English version: http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf accessed May 01 2008.

¹⁴ This assumption is backed by the author's own experiences of almost two decades of serving in the Bundeswehr. Different perspectives gained from being a conscripted soldier and a professional soldier, various ranks and levels of responsibility, and different branches within the German Air Force add further statistic "n" to this view. Despite some frictions one generally can experience while interacting with other human beings and different personalities the vast majority of own experiences prove that statement. Nevertheless, as Freistetter argues, it is clear that "the final answer to questions of this kind will always have to be given by every individual human being alone, listening to the voice of his or her personal conscience." Freistetter, *Conscience and Authority*. 35.

Another aim of this thesis is to determine whether the Bundeswehr still follows its own guiding principles, or if in the face of Transformation, Innere Fuehrung has become a mere mask of public relations or even worse an obstacle. This thesis will illuminate the close relationship of Innere Fuehrung and the Bundeswehr as a conscript force in the aspect that conscripts play a vital democratic role in the life of the armed forces.

Today such concepts or conceptual frameworks as “asymmetric warfare,”¹⁵ “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), “Network Centric Warfare” (NCW), “Transformation,” or EBAO now seem to dictate the military future:

Such an effects based approach should be developed further and might include enhancing situational awareness, timely operational planning and decision making, improving links between commanders, sensors and weapons, and deploying and employing joint expeditionary forces coherently and to greatest effect.¹⁶

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, the NATO heads of state and government expressed in their “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” that is, the alliance’s need for an “effects-based approach,” commonly referred to as EBAO. Another term on the same level for this kind of approach is the so-called Comprehensive Approach (CA), which was endorsed by the NATO heads of state and government in the Riga Summit Declaration.¹⁷ These terms are part of a key concept for NATO for the transformation of the allied forces in order to operate successfully in the new strategic environment. A closer examination is provided in Chapter III.

Often mentioned in combination with EBAO is Network Centric Warfare (NCW) in its different varieties. Although NCW addresses by definition mainly another level of analysis, it is relevant to this thesis because it is connected to transformation and

¹⁵ In a close connotation with the observed asymmetric warfare the concept of “Counter Insurgency” (COIN) is often promulgated as the appropriate answer. This study recognizes the existence of this discussion. However, COIN can be viewed rather as a tool than an approach like EBAO or a method like NCW and hence is not the same level.

¹⁶ Comprehensive Political Guidance; Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006 at the Riga Summit: Part 2, par.17.

¹⁷ NATO website: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> accessed March 2008.

therefore constitutes another characteristic feature of the Western military operations in the twenty-first century. The U.S. interpretation of the Revolution in Military Affairs, as well as Transformation, places too great an emphasis on the hegemony of technology in the eyes of some observers.¹⁸ The proponents of transformation in the U.S. forces poorly appreciate the factor of ideology since September 11, and, as such, an analysis of Innere Fuehrung casts light on the impact on present conflict of what is called the inner structure of armed forces.¹⁹ This question has relevance for not only Germans, but also for others.

The soldier's ability to meet the high demands at every level of modern operations is crucial to the success of a tactical mission as well as to the success of a whole operation. Never before in history could media have covered a single action in the ways that are possible today. More than ever one soldier can have remarkable effects on the outcome of a whole operation.²⁰ This raises the question whether the operational concepts are right as well as whether the personnel have been properly selected, educated, trained and prepared for their mission.

Trusting in the soldier's competence and reliability becomes more and more important. Education in its widest sense in this case becomes more crucial than the focus on technology. Although it is a prudent approach in order to protect one's one soldiers

¹⁸ Critique on an overall level on that topic for example can be found at: Abenheim, Donald. *Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment*. Berlin: Miles, 2007. 224. EBO related critique can be found at: Milan N. Vego, "Effects-Based Operations: A critique." In: *Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ)*, issue 42, 2nd quarter 2006, S. 51-57. <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/>.

¹⁹ Paul Yingling, "General Failure: America's Military leadership is in Crisis," *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2007), 17-23.

²⁰ The examples and the connected effects of the intended or unintended use of modern low cost recording devices provided by almost any mediocre mobile phone and the instant propagation via platforms offered by the World Wide Web are ample and can be devastating to any cause. Whether the shown clips are real or not does not matter since people want to believe what they see. Even if such images prove to be definitely wrong and staged, the harm is done since any answer would likely be perceived as counter-propaganda at first hand. For the role of propaganda and its appeals see: Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day*. 3rd ed. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Such mechanisms become more and more important while interacting with other cultures and their views. A simple prohibition of such devices in the field is not sufficient enough. The necessary capacity to understand the wrongfulness of such an act committed out of various motives ranging from a foolish and impudent prank, pompousness or simple maliciousness must be reached via education. By no means there should be a connection in a sense that Innere Fuehrung would cure this since even in its ideal form Innere Fuehrung can only constitute a sound basis and not the one fits all solution.

and enhance their efficiency to equip them with the best technology available and beyond, it will forever remain an illusion to control any battlefield totally with zero losses and minor collateral damage. This self-evident truth must shape the mind of the responsible decision makers, as well as of those soldiers in charge in order to prevent them from becoming submissive henchmen of wrong political decisions.

Admittedly, this goal requires not only the personality and ability to judge such decisions, but also the appropriate framework where such criticism can be exercised without fearing harm.²¹ Innere Fuehrung is intended to constitute such a framework and is supposed to enable the respective officers in charge to develop the needed political expertise.

Additionally in the aftermath of present military operations there seems to be a trend to favor outsourcing of security and support tasks to “private companies,” which, in this author’s view, constitute modern mercenaries. Despite their assumed and yet not proven (cost) effectiveness, these defense contractors and modern mercenaries might well

²¹ A recent case study showing the complexity of such an endeavor can be found at Martin L. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A case study in Professional Ethics.” *Parameters*, Spring 2008. www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08spring/contents3.htm accessed May 3, 2008. Triggered by the famous inflammatory Paul Yingling article about the “General Failure,” Wade Markel writes in the same publication about the limits of American generalship in the “arena of national strategy” and its strategic advices in the early Cold War crises. From comparing the situation in Korea 1951 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, he concludes that then the generals out of a lack of political experience would have given dangerous advice and that until today it is therefore highly advisable for American generals to take care of their business, i.e., guaranteeing the mere functioning of military forces. It is exactly this complete separation from the mind of a citizen who is required to act as a citizen from the mind of the military specialist that is so frightening. Admittedly, Markel concludes that due to the political inexperience in combination with the focus on their military expertise of these generals simply would not have been able to give any other advice as they did. Still such a focus on the functionality of a specialized caste and the resulting conclusions are more than questionable and are a terrifying signal in the face of the reasons why a concept like Innere Fuehrung was introduced and still is a highly valued asset. Wade Markel, “The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS’s Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises.” *Parameters*, Spring 2008. www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08spring/contents3.htm accessed May 3, 2008.

cause more harm than good.²² They clearly operate outside the well-tried channels of military discipline or justice. Additionally, from a German point of view, they are not bound to the high moral standards that the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* requires and hence such contractors offer no real alternative to regular forces.²³

2. Literature

In general, the thesis design allows a grouping of the available literature into two major topic blocks, namely *Innere Fuehrung* and Transformation. The latter is divided into EBAO and NCW/NCO. Furthermore, many sources are available in both German and English, which adds to the abundance of useful literature. Additionally, the complexity of this topic calls for an interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, history, political science, and sociology offer ample literature.

a. *Innere Fuehrung*

The principle of *Innere Fuehrung* cannot be discussed without a thorough historical analysis. Such reflection on history, however, in this thesis shall lead to understanding and the definition of important distinctions of key terms. Looking back into history, analyzing cases, and trying to understand with the advantage of hindsight why things turned out in a certain fashion is in general a prudent approach. Studying

²² Interesting figures about the cost of wars for example in Iraq and Afghanistan only for the United States can be derived from the *CQ Researcher*, vol.18, no. 16, 361–384. www.cqresearcher.com accessed May 4, 2008. Because the human costs are immeasurable on all sides, the focus for this argument is solely directed without any cynics to the estimated U.S.-Dollar amounts spent. Additionally there is no evaluation taken, whether the money is spent in vain or not. The estimated total costs on these wars range from \$2 trillion to \$3 trillion. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A case study in Professional Ethics.” 364. The probably most infamous “private security company,” Blackwater, alone is assumed to have been awarded \$1 billion, by the U.S. government for their engagement in Iraq since 2001. “U.S.-Verteidigungsminister kritisiert Blackwater” (“U.S. Secretary of Defense criticizes Blackwater”) as of October 19, 2007. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/979/138695/> accessed May 8, 2008.

²³ Other indicators for such an argument can be found in the above cited criticism of Secretary Gates. After slowly realizing how much money these “private companies” actually cost, the main advantage of such mercenaries remains the almost non existing legal accountability compared with the legal restrictions regular soldiers face on purpose. Additionally they are not accounted statistically as the officially announced more than 4000 dead U.S. troops. The discussion about the use of mercenaries and its possible implications on the success of a mission is continued in Chapter III. Data derived from *CQ Researcher*, 363. The arguments shown are derived from Peter Lindner, “Der Krieg ist ueberall.” (“War is everywhere”) <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/artikel/73/139780> accessed May 8, 2008.

history to identify “best practices” and trying to condense events into digestible “lessons learned” is an evil of modern times. Therefore, this approach is not selected in this thesis. Here history is examined to draw a picture of the then applicable *Zeitgeist* and to assess where and why things have gone terribly wrong or right.

Further, the record of the German past since 1945 offers an important point of contrast to the years that preceded the Third Reich and is also of merit for those who reflect on the themes of democratic consolidation and security building. Although most of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr served in the Wehrmacht, it clearly must be stated that the Wehrmacht is neither the legal nor the mental forerunner of the Bundeswehr.²⁴ Yet these first officers enabled the Bundeswehr to overcome the record of the soldier in National Socialism by creating *Innere Fuehrung* based on their own experiences.²⁵

A remarkable insight into German society rather stumbling into the Third Reich than going into it in a planned fashion can be found at Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.²⁶ He furthermore develops a line of alternatives Germany seemed to have had in these crucial days of late 1932 and early 1933, for example a military dictatorship that would have prevented the outcome of the Third Reich. Even if one easily can follow Turner’s work, one might object to such hypothetic alternatives as counter factualism. Nevertheless, Turner manages to show how former soldiers from all ranks were not able to perform the roles and proper duties of a politician. A role these soldiers were offered based upon the unjustly high prestige the interwar soldiers gained in the face of the failure of the Weimar Republic. This very attempt of German democracy they helped to burry for own personal purposes while using the infamous “stab in the back” myth. In doing so, Turner provides us with deep insights of the German society’s demeanor and composition of the 1930s.

²⁴ ZDv 10/1, Vorbemerkung, no. 5.

²⁵ Hans Speier, “German Rearmament and the Old Military Elite.” *World Politics* 6, no. 2 (Jan., 1954): 147–168.

²⁶ Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. *Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power: January 1933*. Yale: Basic Books, 1996.

An extension of this insight into the German military of the early 1930s as of the Wehrmacht in general until its end is provided by Geoffrey P. Megargee.²⁷ History is made by humans, their personalities and their decisions based upon their knowledge rather than inevitable circumstances. Megargee contributes a great deal to this view of decision makers shaping the world. His critical examination of the German General Staff—changed from a World War I military force devoted to the Kaiser into a World War II military force devoted to the Fuehrer—calls into question the professionalism of these officers. He explains some of the catastrophic military misjudgments by casting light on the inadequacies stemming from the obvious weakness of character of some main players in the small circle of generals surrounding Hitler. Additionally he points out that interservice rivalry—partly resulting from the Versailles Peace Treaty limitation of numbers of the old Reichswehr and partly credited to the emerging technological developments—helped to create tensions that left little time for political contemplation.²⁸ Megargee further argues that a dramatic quantity problem with the supply of officers and hence the connected lowering of entrance standards by 1934–35 helped to turn the Wehrmacht into a compliant tool of the National Socialist state.²⁹ Ranks had to be filled and ranks were filled. This in turn opened the doors for a number of mediocre and actually incompetent officers up to the ranks of a general. The proper display of the right party membership book helped to cover rotten characters. With his book, Megargee can contribute to a great extent to the main argument in the historical part of this study that rejects inevitability. He furthermore helps to demystify the Third Reich and its military force. Additionally his findings help to underline the importance Innere Fuehrung dedicates to the “inner order” or to be more precise the inner composition of military

²⁷ Geoffrey P. Megargee, *Inside Hitler's High Command*. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

²⁸ One of the purposes of research of this study is to show that exactly this inability or worse the unwillingness of soldiers to reflect on the political implications of a task inevitably leads to catastrophic results. This effect is amplified when the influence of an ideology or party covers the remnants of common sense and leads to a fatalistic attitude.

²⁹ Ibid., 31.

forces.³⁰ Yet to blame only inadequacies credited to individual biographies would neither do justice to Megargee's book nor to the complexity of his topic. It furthermore would neglect the almost diabolical ability of Hitler to manipulate people and his cunningness in choosing weak and compliant servants.³¹

In order to draw an even clearer picture of this pivotal period additional historians and their works selected. Most of them—Omer Bartov, Peter Hoffmann, Jay Lockenour, and Gerhard Weinberg—are objective scholars.³² If biased tendencies can be observed, then this is credited to the methodology (eyewitness reports) chosen by such authors as Mark Mazower and David Kitterman. However, such testimonies add an intense and rather personal character and are very valuable.³³

Although a soldier is supposed to obey orders, a perverted form of blind obedience led to the catastrophe of the Third Reich. Bartov and others argue that this issue was not only a problem soldiers had, but a problem that burdened society as a whole.³⁴ This thesis cannot excuse the criminal deeds of German soldiers, time nor does it attempt to soften cruelties. However, sociological experiments have shown that militarism, authoritarianism, neuroticism and antisocial behaviour are closely related and are easy to breed, since at least the first two foster a stable society.³⁵

³⁰ *Innere Ordnung* in relation to military forces is yet another term that seems too difficult to translate. The German original describes partly the inner structure, the inner order and the cohesion of military forces in relation to the existing law code and the fulfillment of the task. The ZDv 10/1, No. 401 formulates the design of the *Innere Ordnung* as one of its four main goals.

³¹ A legendary example of this ability is the episode how Hitler chooses Wilhelm Keitel ("Lakeitel" i.e. lackey) as commander of chief of the Wehrmacht. Megargee, *Inside Hitler's High Command*, 41.

³² Omer Bartov, "The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of Warfare," *The Journal of Modern History* 64, no. Supplement: Resistance Against the Third Reich (Dec., 1992): 32–45. Peter Hoffmann, "Colonel Claus Von Stauffenberg in the German Resistance to Hitler: Between East and West," *The Historical Journal* 31, no. 3 (Sep., 1988): 629–650. Jay Lockenour, "The Rift in our Ranks: The German Officer Corps, the Twentieth of July, and the Path to Democracy," *German Studies Review* 21, no. 3 (Oct., 1998): 469–506. Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II," *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 2 (Apr., 1998): 371–380.

³³ Mazower, "Military Violence and National Socialist Values." Kitterman, "Those Who Said "no!"

³⁴ Omer Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich," *The Journal of Modern History* 63, no. 1 (Mar., 1991): 44–60.

³⁵ Ray, John J. "Militarism, Authoritarianism, Neuroticism, and Antisocial Behavior," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16, no. 3 (Sep., 1972): 319–340.

Most of the accounts reviewed contribute in an elaborated way to the historical mosaic. This thesis, though, connects the various pieces in order to determine why men did things that they knew were wrong and why they kept doing it. The sole reference to the pressure of coercion would be too myopic and a logic shortfall. The roles of society and individuals in consideration of the then applicable *Zeitgeist* are distilled from these historical accounts in order to show the path that Innere Fuehrung had to take to avoid the same mistakes.³⁶

The contemporary literature on Innere Fuehrung in German is compendious. The description of Innere Fuehrung is derived from official documents such as the 2008 edition central field manual ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung that replaced the edition of 1993 as this study was being written.³⁷ Relative minor changes in the overall content, a few gender related formulations and the acknowledgement of the new challenges resulting from the changed security environment constitute the main characteristics of the new central field manual.³⁸ Yet the new ZDv 10/1 is more appealing than its predecessors since its contemporary style seems to be more accessible. The accessibility via electronic means underlines this observation. Given the fact that most of the German literature was written before the release of this central field manual and hence relates to its predecessors a closer examination of this new document is necessary.

Being a German and being educated in the very sense of Innere Fuehrung, the author might be suspected of being myopic or biased toward this topic. Therefore, the recent work of Uwe Hartmann (a luminary of the youngest generation of Innere Fuehrer and a graduate of NPS) is used critically to underline current developments in the field of

³⁶ “Zeitgeist” means more than the “spirit of the times.” It takes also into consideration the then inherent cultural background of the people. In other words in this German phrase the spirit is connected with the time and hence time acts as explanatory function why the spirit was like the way one can see its outcomes today.

³⁷ Its predecessor was released in February 1993 and can be seen as a reaction to the German reunification and the absorption of the NVA (National People’s Army) of the ceased German Democratic Republic into the Bundeswehr.

³⁸ For the degree of change one can cite the article of the German Minister of Defence, Dr. Franz Josef Jung. “Innere Führung: noch nie war sie so wertvoll wie heute” retrieved from http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/ministerium/der_minister?yw_contentURL=/C1256F1200608B1B/W27AWGBB605INFODE/content.jsp accessed May 8, 2008.

Innere Fuehrung.³⁹ His book illuminates the successes *and* deficits of Innere Fuehrung. Additionally one can find the current challenges to Innere Fuehrung listed in the end of this particular book.⁴⁰ His credibility stems from his academic background as well as from his perspective as an active officer who has served in the field and the highest echelons of the Bundeswehr.

Leading German authorities like Reiner Pommerin (a professor, reserve officer and spokesman of the civilian Innere Fuehrung council that advises the Defense Ministry) or Uwe Hartmann label this construct a “guiding philosophy.”⁴¹ The central field manual, ZDv 10/1, also describes Innere Fuehrung as a contributor to such a “guiding philosophy.”⁴² Hartmann also points out that it is rather unlikely to find a short and concise definition for this term since Innere Fuehrung in its core is about conviction and attitude.⁴³ Yet Innere Fuehrung is not a partisan instrument or part of a partisan conviction.⁴⁴ Such difficulties in finding a handy and easy to carry definition draws the outline of chapter II where instead of offering such definitions of Innere Fuehrung the rather long way is taken through describing it via its origins leading to its contemporary appearance.

In order to commemorate the 100th birthday on May 8, 2007, of Wolf Count Baudissin, one of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr as well as the “spiritual” father of Innere Fuehrung the German Command and Staff Academy, the Fuehrungsakademie in Hamburg held a symposium about the future of Innere Fuehrung.⁴⁵ In the book edited by Elmar Wiesendahl various authors illuminate the

³⁹ Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie fuer die Bundeswehr*. Berlin: Mies, 2007.

⁴⁰ Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie fuer die Bundeswehr*. Berlin: Mies, 2007, 264–266.

⁴¹ Rainer Pommerin, “Exportartikel Innere Fuehrung.” In: *if Zeitschrift fuer Innere Fuehrung*, Nr. 2-3/2007.18–21. Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 7.

⁴² Central field manual ZDv 10/1. Vorbemerkung Nr. 3.

⁴³ Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 207.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁴⁵ The mentioning of Baudissin as the father of Innere Fuehrung often neglects that other men like Kielmansegg or deMaizeire had more than their fare share in preparing and implementing this concept. Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*. 53–55

inception of Innere Fuehrung, its present and future challenges. Wiesendahl and his co-authors help to understand how Baudissin was trying to get as much as possible of his philosophy into the Bundeswehr as well, as they point out that recently especially the history of Innere Fuehrung was in the focus of research.⁴⁶ Additionally current challenges towards the concept are described.

In the year of the fiftieth birthday of the Bundeswehr in 2005 Rolf Clement and Paul Elmar Joeris created an extensive compendium with accurate timelines and various documents.⁴⁷ Above the mere listing of milestones, they describe the gradual evolution from an army with the main scope of defending the German territory during the Cold war towards an expeditionary force. Additionally they manage to reflect the trends in the German society towards the creation of the armed forces and its evolution. Amongst others, this description is used as a timeline in order to define the state of Innere Fuehrung today. The role of Innere Fuehrung gets a prominent part in their book while the reaction of the Bundeswehr towards the new challenges is also described in a way that proves to be useful for the Transformation part of this study.

As for the Innere Fuehrung part, it is obvious that the English-language sources are neither very numerous nor very new. For example, Catherine Kelleher's book chapter dates from 1982. Nevertheless, it still provides a concise and detailed overview concerning the period from the 1950s to the 1980s.⁴⁸

Similarly, Donald Abenheim's 1988 *Reforging the Iron Cross* is an introduction in English on this subject that looks at the 1950s through the 1970s.⁴⁹ In addition to the archival sources present at the time, Abenheim was able to interview the relevant persons for the introduction of Innere Fuehrung, including Count Baudissin and

⁴⁶ Elmar Wiesendahl (ed). *Innere Fuehrung fuer das 21. Jahrhundert—Die Bundeswehr und das Erbe Baudissins*. Paderborn et. al.: Schoeningh 2007.17–19.

⁴⁷ Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr : 1955 bis 2005*.

⁴⁸ Catherine Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," in: *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, edited by Murray, Douglas J. and Viotti, Paul R., Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982: 268–298.

⁴⁹ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*. Princeton: 1988. Wherever appropriate this study relies on the 1989 published and edited German version of this book: Abenheim, Donald. *Bundeswehr und Tradition*.

Count Kielmansegg. The latter, with whom that author was on cordial, professional terms, even writes the epilogue. Abenheim followed the work of others who had conducted extensive interviews with the founders of the Bundeswehr, adding the dimension of the personal and professional to the archival sources. Although the volume concentrates on the role of a valid heritage for the Bundeswehr and hence the role of tradition for the Bundeswehr rather than mainly Innere Fuehrung, the very well researched and detailed book provides this study with the necessary depth.⁵⁰ Therefore, the thoughts elaborated in Abenheim's book are used to support basic discussions.

Abenheim's latest work, *Soldier and Politics Transformed*, offers a critical résumé of Innere Fuehrung in the face of Transformation in a comparative German American perspective.⁵¹ Challenges resulting from Transformation in the years since the early 1990s are depicted and compared with today's Innere Fuehrung. In order to compare these challenges, Abenheim explains Transformation as well as he shows the often neglected perspective of the shortfalls of the Revolution in Military Affairs partly based on Clausewitzian thinking. His reflections are contrasted later on with the other sources for Transformation.

Because Innere Fuehrung deals with such fundamental questions as power, obedience, values, education, knowledge, and conscience, the social sciences of sociology respectively psychology also contribute definitions necessary for an understanding. These definitions can also be used to understand a few key factors in Transformation as well as in the latest RMA with its emphasis on information superiority. These definitions mostly are derived from the theory called "social constructivism." This particular theory emphasizes the importance of culture and its context. It creates an understanding of the phenomena within a society. The observations of these phenomena

⁵⁰ In order to understand the difficulties of the Bundeswehr in the beginning to find traditions or to find a sound relationship to German soldiers and their soldierly values, the role of Innere Fuehrung is undoubtedly necessary in order to understand the justified fear of contact with the German past. Since Innere Fuehrung marks the successful attempt of "liberal and civilian powers to control military forces" the critical relationship between the searches for an acceptable tradition of elements of the past and Innere Fuehrung a tradition on its own is crucial. Ibid. (German Version) 214.

⁵¹ Donald Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment*. Berlin: Miles, 2007.

“construct” the knowledge on which an individual’s understanding of his environment is based.⁵² Although not a new theory, this study utilizes a more recent version. Admittedly, this theory is often criticized as an elitist and too self-sufficient theory; it nevertheless allows an openness to other concepts that enables us to incorporate other approaches to a certain degree, as Kenneth R. Gergen puts it.⁵³

This approach is chosen because at various stages of this study it is useful to explain the seemingly changing role of power, coercion and group pressure in the Third Reich towards shaping the individual reality of soldiers and their decision making process. Gergen’s work is useful for this study in this particular subject since he contrasts the role of structural power with the role of post-structural power as theorized by Michel Foucault.⁵⁴ In this contrast, structural power is a remnant of the past as expressed in the relationship between rulers and ruled. Those in power were clearly to identify as “kings, dictators, and warlords.”⁵⁵ They had the means of power in the form of “material control, for example armies, weapons, property, or money.”⁵⁶ Over time, the means changed into the shape of institutional control. This “institutional control rests on sets of beliefs—shared ideas, values, and sentiments often called *ideology*.”⁵⁷ Consequently Gergen introduces the term “hegemony” in connection with “ideology” as coined by other theorists since hegemony is “a capacity to gain and sustain control through the unification

⁵² David S. Wilson, “Evolutionary Social Constructivism,” http://evolution.binghamton.edu/dswilson/resources/publications_resources/DSW05.pdf accessed November 23, 2007.

⁵³ The biggest problem of social constructivism, however, is that despite its scientific beauty one could get the impression that people do not behave accordingly. They do behave exactly the way constructivism explains it because they react to their constructed reality with the same constructed means from this constructed reality. They could not have possibly acted any differently. These seeming shortfalls remind us that constructivism is a theory that explains (constructed) reality but not a recipe that helps to construct reality for all. Other factors what one would call irrationality have to be taken into account. Kenneth R. Gergen, *An Invitation to Social Construction*. Los Angeles et al.: SAGE Publications, 1999. 206.

⁵⁴ Gergen, *An Invitation*, 206.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 204.

⁵⁷ Gergen in this case refers to the way structural power was seen at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Gergen, *An Invitation*, 17.

of multiple institutions (for example, government, education, military).⁵⁸ In fact, power seen in this way is a question about being free or being controlled.⁵⁹ Over time based upon knowledge gained through experiences as accumulated in history, such a relationship that used to have benefits for rulers (power) and ruled (protection) turned into a rather negative connotation.⁶⁰

For the later part, this approach can be used to explain, how the concept of *Innere Führung* gradually became the reality for the Bundeswehr trying to make use of a mixture of structural and post-structural power. Gergen quotes Foucault when he sees the starting point for shifting away from hierarchical structures in the advent of the Enlightenment.⁶¹ As a consequence of the changing forms of structural power he furthermore refers to Laclau and Mouffe when he concludes that “*the traditional idea of hegemony, as the unified and interdependent efforts of multiple institutions to form a monolithic whole, is no longer applicable in Western democratic societies.*”⁶² Power appears in such democracies as a “multiplicity of *nodal points*.”⁶³ It is exactly this multitude of such nodal points that makes it difficult to identify the respective importance of these single points in the overall network a society constitutes.⁶⁴ In addition to this problem the sources that fuel such nodal points vary and are not fixed.⁶⁵ Allowing the postmodern view of power as a developed addition to the structural approach fosters the understanding of the two main topic blocks of this study. The understanding of power, be

⁵⁸ Gergen, *An Invitation*, 17.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Reduced to economic means, this duality becomes the classical Marxist taxation of “Haves” and “Have nots.”

⁶⁰ Ibid., 205–206.

⁶¹ Ibid., 206.

⁶² Ibid., 208.

⁶³ Ibid. This point is valid for this study in both parts. It shows the challenges *Innere Führung* as well as EBAO have to face. The idea of “nodal points” as coexisting and varying centers of power constituting a net of power becomes again useful in order to explain the systemic approach as assumed in EBAO. As one can see later on EBAO tries to influence certain nodes in order to change the net rather than bluntly destroying the net.

⁶⁴ A possible criticism to EBAO focuses on the complexity of such networks in other and hence rather unfamiliar societies. In turn this means also that one has to accept that other societies have a more structural i.e. rather traditional approach to power.

⁶⁵ Gergen, *An Invitation*, 207–209.

it the own or the one of a possible opponent is crucial in order to pursue one's own goals. Additionally this approach is helpful in order to show the problem of the (non-) universality of knowledge and values as factors of a constructed reality of groups.⁶⁶

Because the role of values, norms and ethics are relevant for the construct of Innere Fuehrung as well as for the new challenges to the security environment, a closer look at the concept of relativism has to be taken. Relativism in this study shall be the position that is characterized by the denial of absolute or universal standards. Andrew Heywood differs between moral and cognitive relativism.⁶⁷ For him “*moral* relativism rejects the notion that there are, or can be, authoritative ethical principles, usually because the individual is a morally autonomous being.”⁶⁸ Additionally he states that “*cognitive* (...) relativism holds that different modes of knowing are equally valid and thus dismisses the universalist pretensions of science.”⁶⁹ He further points out that the concept of relativism has been criticized “for weakening the moral cement of society” and that this concept is basically the opposite of fundamentalism.⁷⁰ As for the chosen theory of social construction Gergen argues that “there is no *position of relativism*, that is, a transcendent standpoint from which we can rule on the relative merits of various contenders without espousing any values.”⁷¹ In this view, Innere Fuehrung is not a concept prone to relativism either. It does recognize the pluralism of German society but at the same time the legal and to a certain extent ethical framework as built upon the German Basic Law is the foundation of German society and hence of the Bundeswehr.⁷²

⁶⁶ Gergen, *An Invitation*, Gergen refers to it as “cultural imperialism.”

⁶⁷ Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, 2nd ed. Houndmills et al.: Palgrave Macmillan: 2002.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 412.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid. For the purpose of this study, his definition of fundamentalism is adopted in the short version, whereas “*fundamentalism is a style of thought, in which certain principles are recognized as essential truths that have unchallengeable and overriding authority regardless of their content.*” Ibid., 63. Innere Fuehrung in this case is a kind of fundamentalism since the own conscience of a responsible soldier acts as the last resort, the overriding authority.

⁷¹ Gergen, *An Invitation*, 231.

⁷² ZDv 10/1. Chapter 3.

As the German Ministry of Defense White Paper of 2006 translates *Innere Fuehrung* as “leadership development and civic education,” it is evident that education plays an important role in this concept. This fact becomes even more interesting since the Bundeswehr does not have a common agreed definition of education itself. Education in this case is a sociological phenomenon on the aggregated level and a psychological phenomenon on the individual level. It is little comfort that neither sociology nor psychology offer a common agreed definition of education either.⁷³ This might be a shortfall since education is a controversial topic in the Bundeswehr.⁷⁴ Education in this connotation differs from training, plainly, as it must.

Especially in connection with military forces, education often is viewed as propaganda that is supposed to act as a motivator. Because *Innere Fuehrung* is based on education or, for some might be the ultimate use of education, this study relies on the following simple understanding to differ between education and propaganda: “propaganda *tells* people *what* to think whereas education *teaches* people *how* to think.”⁷⁵

Because in general the question of obedience is a central element in any hierarchically organized institution as military forces are a few definitions are needed. As the experiences of the past had shown, blind obedience contributed a great deal to catastrophe. Therefore, the question of obedience, or to be more precise the tolerable degree of obedience, was (and still is) considered a central element for the future German military forces where *Innere Fuehrung* should form the code of behaviour respectively the code of conduct. For the purpose of the study, the definitions of Stanley Milgram given

⁷³ Due the limitation in space, this study does not try to solve the problem of definition of education for adults. Although Gergen’s attempt to counter constructivism with Foucault’s post-modernism in order to fuse core elements is interesting. Gergen, *An invitation*, 40–41. For the role and importance of military pedagogy see Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 94.

⁷⁴ The discussion one can find also in a whole chapter at Hartmann. He also deals with the possible paradoxes as the rejection of education while appreciating at the same time the concept of *Innere Fuehrung*. Ibid., 85–104.

⁷⁵ The goal of education for *Innere Fuehrung* is the responsible soldier. Ibid., 95. The quote is cited from Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 14.

for obedience shall act as foundation for the later discussion.⁷⁶ For Milgram “obedience is as basic an element in the structure of social life.”⁷⁷ Furthermore, he concludes that “some system of authority is a requirement of all communal living” and obedience is “the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose.”⁷⁸ In addition to that he recognizes that obedience “is the dispositional cement that binds man to systems of authority.”⁷⁹ A contrast or maybe an obstacle for the realization of the principles of Innere Fuehrung is his view of obedience based on his experiments in a reference to the Holocaust and the then German society since he further points out “*that for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behaviour tendency, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy and moral conduct.*”⁸⁰ The question when exactly “moral judgments of the individual must override authority” he cannot answer either.⁸¹ Further research had shown that people are less willing to inflict pain and harm to other people as long as they consider them human. Even if the setup of his experiment seems questionable from today’s point of view and given the rather small likeliness that the results would be the very same, it is the aftermath of his experiment that is even more remarkable.⁸² As soon as some of the participants realized that they had traded their existing moral standards for the sake of an authority representing the success

⁷⁶ As the famous Milgram experiment in the early 1960s named after the Yale university psychologist Stanley Milgram showed, people in general are prone to authorities and are willing to obey if they believe that obedience is necessary in order to pursue a goal they can identify themselves with. Despite often conveyed criticism this experiment is remarkable since it was conducted with people closely related to the time, i.e. people who were educated in an authoritarian style typical for the first half of the twentieth century. In this case it does not matter whether the study participants were selected and paid for their participation since they are “contemporary” participants in the meaning of contemporary witnesses. The description of the experiment can be found at <http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~wwu/psychology/compliance.shtml> accessed May 12, 2008.

⁷⁷ Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1983 (paperback edition).1.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 2.

⁸² The effect of learning helps to construct a new reality, i.e. knowledge about this experiment would hinder possible participants from doing it again. However, it is still likely that persons not knowing the implications of this experiment would act as did those participants of the first time. A summary of further criticism can be found at Werner Stangel, <http://paedpsych.jk.uni-linz.ac.at:4711/LEHRTEXTE/Milgram.html> accessed May 12, 2008.

of the experiment they immediately knew that they should not have done so, i.e. the knowledge of “good” or “bad” obviously was suppressed by authority and the decision to obey: Obedience had become the new moral instance.⁸³ Milgram tried to prove that obedience does not necessarily depend on a certain predisposition towards sadism or evil nor does it need a lot of coercion.⁸⁴

Another classic in the research of obedience is the book of Herbert Kelman and Lee Hamilton.⁸⁵ Here it becomes clear that the relationship of obedience and authority is a relationship of give and take. The submission of free will under an authority often enough happens under the premises that there is an exchange in the shape of a reward for obedience. Kelman and Hamilton however, elaborate the question where and when disobedience is justified. They see the roots based upon religion: “Normative support for disobedience in the modern West is thus rooted in Judeo-Christian tradition.”⁸⁶ Remarkably, they start out with an example where God, the ultimate authority, wanted Abraham to sacrifice his dear son, the ultimate form of obedience.⁸⁷ Despite a last minute waiver, a sign Abraham might have expected, he prepares to obey. The interpretation of this scene of Genesis might vary. What is interesting for this study is the fact of total submission to an authority based upon trust in this authority. In other words if an authority is able to create such a trust relationship obedience seems able to pass over own existing moral standards formerly given by this very authority.⁸⁸

As seen from the theories and the experiment there is an area of tension between obedience and authority. Innere Fuehrung tries to deal with this area of tension by referring to the legally guaranteed limits of the duty of obedience.⁸⁹

⁸³ Milgram, *Obedience*, 6.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁸⁵ Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, *Crimes of Obedience*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 58.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 59.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ ZDv 10/1. No. 309.

Social constructivism is also the source where the description of the function of values is taken from for use in this study. Values are the source for legitimation, whereas “legitimation is the process of “explaining” and justifying.”⁹⁰ Furthermore, “legitimation produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes.”⁹¹ Values in this case are not the only source for legitimation, since it “has a cognitive as well as a normative element.”⁹² Berger and Luckmann further argue that this process of legitimation “always implies “knowledge” as well.”⁹³ Finally, they conclude that “there must first be “knowledge” of the roles that define both “right” and “wrong” actions within the structure.”⁹⁴ In this study it becomes clear that such is the role of Innere Fuehrung; it incorporates values and it provides knowledge or encourages individuals to make use of their knowledge.

b. Transformation (EBAO, NCW)

Transformation is often seen in connection with its technological manifestations. Such a combination surely is a result on the primary focus on technology fostered by technocrats and an eager defense industry that is willing to sell technology and hence also perpetuates the glossy image of a zero loss war. This image in turn suits those who are convinced that war is applicable in limited doses and inevitably limits the role of a soldier to that of a combat machine or part of combat machinery.⁹⁵ Despite its close relation with the Revolution of Military Affairs and its fixation on capabilities, Transformation itself must be seen in a different, deeper context, “in its true strategic dimension.”⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Anchor Books, 1966. Reprint 1989. 92–94.

⁹¹ Ibid., 92.

⁹² Ibid., 93.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 93.

⁹⁵ Abenheim, *Soldier*, 171.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 225.

Whoever criticizes a simply reduction on technological aspects is right as long as the human dimension for example of EBAO is neglected.⁹⁷ For the purpose of this study, however, the implications of Transformation on the human beings and the related impacts on the respective institutional cultures are in the focus. A closer definition and the related contrasting of these terms as well as their interaction with such business cultures are conducted in chapter III. For the time being, the idea of EBAO regardless a deeper development or future shape shall be close to that of the 2006 paper from Smith:

The strength—and challenge—of an effects-based approach to operations is that it squarely addresses this complexity by concentrating on the most complex aspects of this world: man, his institutions, and his actions. Indeed, the entire effects-based approach can be characterized by four things: a focus on the human dimension of competition and conflict; the consideration of a full spectrum of actions whether in peace, crisis, or hostilities; a multi-faceted “whole of nation” concept of power; and the recognition of the complex interconnected nature of the actors and actions involved.⁹⁸

The Transformation literature includes official sources from NATO, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT), U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and the German Ministry of Defense (MoD). The concepts and documents retrieved from the websites of these organizations are considered primary sources as to official policy. Transformation, however, is seen differently on the two sides of the Atlantic. The United States takes a more technology-oriented approach, while Germany favors a conceptual approach, including an overarching security concept.

⁹⁷ Edward A. Smith published in 2002 his often as “EBO-bible” regarded book which surely had a certain appeal to those who seek the solution primarily in technological answers. Edward A. Smith, “Effects Based Operation (EBO)—Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War,” CCRP Publication Series, Washington 2002. Given the wide reception based on the then surely fashionable topic a gradual development of thoughts had taken place. Four years later a sequel was published where the title already implied a development. Edward A. Smith, “Complexity, Networking, & Effects-Based Approaches to Operations, CCRP Publication Series, Washington 2006.

⁹⁸ Edward A. Smith, “Whither EBO? Prospects for a Network Enabled Synergy.” Command and Control Research Symposium. 2006. http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/217.pdf accessed May 10, 2008.

Literature responding to these sources often conveys criticism and is often enough on the verge of a policy paper. Although Transformation is widely seen as an answer to the new security environment, the term itself has become pejorative for many soldiers.⁹⁹ Thomas Hammes book acts as a typical example for this trend. He addresses this in his critical analysis of the process of Transformation that most NATO military forces are pressed into today.¹⁰⁰ His conclusions though are mainly focused on a rather pragmatic lessons learned approach from the Iraq experience. However, he manages to characterize a few core elements of EBAO such as “Networking,” “information availability” or the information exchange with civilian experts.¹⁰¹ Given his reception he unfortunately does not connect these positive aspects seamlessly with Transformation or EBAO.

Instead of fighting transformation, as most forces with traditional orientations are doing, it should be considered that “Transformation is not just about technology and things,” as the late Admiral Cebrowski put it; it is “rather, more about culture, behaviour and the creation and exploitation of promising concepts to provide new sources of military power.”¹⁰² Such of course might be a euphemism for the desperate attempt to overcome budgetary restrictions and trying to find answers on the question how modern military forces can face altered security challenges.¹⁰³

Using the rather tactical level of the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) of NATO as a start point Rainer Meyer zum Felde begins his examination of the question

⁹⁹ The idea of an answer to the new security environment is derived from the German MOD (ed.): White Paper 2006.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 275.

¹⁰² Cebrowski quoted in Smith, *Complexity*, Preface.

¹⁰³ Altered security challenges are also the motivation for an UK based definition for transformation (“realisation of how we have to change the way we operate (transform)”). Furthermore an Effects Based Approach is seen as follows: “*These campaigns will also include Other Government Departments (OGDs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), amongst others, as key stakeholders in a campaign, all of whom will have key roles in delivering a successful outcome. While this is not new it is the acknowledgement of the capabilities that these players bring to the campaign, which has resulted in the generation of an Effects Based Approach ... which addresses cross government planning synergies, and an Effects Based Operational Concept ... , addressing the Military requirement to deliver their role in future campaigns.*” www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/106.pdf accessed May 10, 2008.

where NATO Transformation might lead to. He concludes that at the level of CIMIC within the process of Transformation in future operations only a coherent civil and military interagency might provide the necessary effects.¹⁰⁴ Although this is not the main focus of this study it gives once more the outlook of the complexity “simultaneousness” of future engagement spaces as well as it shows that civil military interagency is one of the cornerstones of the new concepts.

EBAO and NCW presently are widely discussed.¹⁰⁵ For the depiction of the original Effects-Based Operations (EBO) principle and its relation to NCW, this study relies on the 2002 published book of Edward A. Smith.¹⁰⁶ Milan Vego, for example, argues that EBO as the military core of EBAO tries to replace the art of war by an excessive use of technology.¹⁰⁷

At least four different “schools” of thought can be observed: the American (EBO), the British (CA),¹⁰⁸ the German, and the NATO ideas (EBAO). The latter two are similar in their multilateral approach with an emphasis on interagency cooperation, while the first focuses on the use of national instruments of power in one strong executive

¹⁰⁴ Rainer Meyer zum Felde, “From NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) towards Coherency of Civil and Military Interaction in Future Complex Engagements: A case Study in the Context of NATO’s Transformation.” in: Heiko Borchert, (ed.). *Zu neuen Ufern: Politische Führungskunst in einer vernetzten Welt*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag 2006: 55–75.

¹⁰⁵ When referring to EBO or NCW; their origins or manifestations can be traced back to the very early 1990s where they were partially visible in the Gulf War. John Warden with his Five Rings Model, David A. Deptula with his further refinement or even the earlier John Boyd and his famous pilot oriented “OODA-loop” (observe, orient, decide, act) clearly mark this development as a genuine U.S. one. A detailed illustration can be found at John Andreas Olsen, *John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power*. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007.

¹⁰⁶ A short version of the meanwhile developed and adapted thoughts are offered at Smith, Edward A., http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/217.pdf accessed May 10, 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Milan N. Vego, *Effects-Based Operations: A critique*.

¹⁰⁸ CA with a strong element of the Maneuverist Approach. Furthermore the differences are expressed as follows: “There is a view that Effects-Based Operations are wholly in the kinetic domain and associated with warfighting. The UK view is that the effects based approach should be based upon all three levers of power and should look to the long term in order that a co-ordinated plan can be made across the Diplomatic, Economic and Military domains to achieve an end state where stability is viewed as a high level of Governance, Rule of Law, Economic and Social Well Being, and Security in a region in instability.” Such were the thoughts as expressed by Julian Starkey of the UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/106.pdf accessed May 10 2008.

hand and the second adds own thinkers and interpretations to the first one.¹⁰⁹ However, it can be observed that the differences are slowly vanishing.

Transformation, RMA, NCW and EBAO are not the same. They are related, though. Transformation is seen as the process to adept forces to the new, asymmetrical challenges of the security environment. RMA gave the technical impetus and the current RMA is the military expression of the information age. NCW is the modus operandi of some military forces of the twenty-first century, while EBAO might constitute the future link between strategy, planning, tactics and other domains of national as well as international power.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

1. Methodology

This thesis examines whether Innere Fuehrung remains valid as a guiding ideal of the Bundeswehr despite changes in technology and the emergence of new operational requirements. The latter include interagency cooperation with different organizations. Innere Fuehrung puts an emphasis on the soldier as a citizen and human being responsible for fulfilling his moral and legal obligations within his duties as a soldier. Therefore, this thesis discusses the historical background and current definitions of Innere Fuehrung. Political, historical, and social as well as cultural aspects must be also considered in order to understand the concept fully. Transformation-related aspects like EBAO and NCW are described and applied to past and ongoing operations. Connections with related concepts and ideas, including *Auftragstaktik*, and RMA are also examined. Due to the evolving quality and the dynamic character of these concepts, the assessment reflects trends and is not definitive.

¹⁰⁹ Such an embrace of an overarching concept instead the mere reliance of small high quality forces seems at first hand rather surprising since British military thinking was and still is amongst others greatly influenced by the numerous writings of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Heart (1895–1970). J.P. Harris, *Men, Ideas and Tanks: British military thought and Armoured Forces (1903–1939)*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996. The same accounts for other English speaking military thinkers. Abenheim, *Soldier*, 125.

2. Sources

The division of the literature into two major topic blocks shows how abundant the sources are. The thesis focuses on scholarly sources. However, various policy papers, doctrines, and basic documents of official origin are considered primary source literature. The majority of the literature consists of articles from peer-reviewed journals. Books on Innere Fuehrung are mostly written in German, while books concerning Transformation are rarely found due to the rapid speed of development and changes in this field. The internet sites of NATO Headquarters, USJFCOM and the German MoD contain a great deal of information.

Data for Innere Fuehrung are derived from the annual report of the parliamentary commissioner of the armed forces.¹¹⁰ This is a valuable source, in order to determine trends in the climate and “state-of-the-art” of Innere Fuehrung in the Bundeswehr. These reports help to assess to a certain degree the effectiveness of Innere Fuehrung although they mainly act as an indicator for things gone wrong. In other words, these reports gain also their value for this study from the things not explicitly mentioned.

In order to draw a closer picture or a at least picture based on data rather than deduction one wishes to find more data for example from ongoing or past operations or internal conducted surveys or social scientific studies. Such data are rare though or if they do exist, they are hardly accessible. The reasons are subject to speculation. For example it often can be observed that the publication of the result of such studies is delayed in case the result might reveal possibly uncomfortable insights in times of elections. If the publication is not delayed sometimes these studies are classified due to the military respective political nature. Such protective mechanisms might help to keep military secrets secret but they do hamper research that might lead to improvements. Admittedly, sadly enough available data from ongoing operations are simply not collected for the lack of money. This study is based on description and deduction. The need for the collection

¹¹⁰ Jahresbericht des Wehrbeauftragten. <http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/008/1600850.pdf> (accessed November 23, 2007). Archived versions (2001–2006) can be found at <http://www.bundestag.de/wehrbeauftragter/index.html>.

of data is recognized and might help to underline or reject the hypotheses presented. Therefore to collection and evaluation of data is subject to further research.

Because this thesis is classified “open,” the military documents examined are accessible via internet or from other sources are “open” documents. The German central field manual ZDv 10/1 is unclassified and therefore constitutes a very valuable source for this paper. Most of the scholars having researched the topic of Innere Fuehrung had to rely on its predecessors. Despite the rather moderate changes this study utilizes to contemporary version of the central field manual to a maximum possible extent as “existing reality” rather than referring to other scholars.

Speaking of an “open” classification, the new central field manual is even available to the public as a colorful brochure: “ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung: Selbstverstaendnis und Fuehrungskultur der Bundeswehr.”¹¹¹ Distributing a military field manual in such a manner is the ultimate proof that Innere Fuehrung is an open invitation towards the German society to understand its military force and to remind this society to take part in shaping its forces through an open discussion.

¹¹¹ In addition to the plain military edition entitled “ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung” this brochure has the subtitle: “self image and culture of leadership.” This document is downloadable at http://www.50-jahre-bundeswehr.de/portal/PA_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/C1256EF4002AED30/W27C8L7X331INFODE/ZDv+10+1+Internet_72dpi.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb accessed May 16, 2008.

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II. INNERE FUEHRUNG

*Innere Führung gewährleistet, dass die Soldatinnen und Soldaten der Bundeswehr Teil der Gesellschaft sind und verpflichtet die Streitkräfte zur Wahrung von Recht und soldatischer Ordnung. Sie prägt die Führungskultur der Bundeswehr.*¹¹²

Despite the above citation and its attempt at pithiness, the term *Innere Führung* still defies a correct translation into English as well as a short definition. The White Paper 2006 translates *Innere Führung* as “leadership development and civic education” while later on refers to it as “guiding principle” and “concept.”¹¹³

Others label this principle a “guiding philosophy” while the respective central field manual ZDv 10/1 describes *Innere Führung* as a contributor to such a “guiding philosophy.”¹¹⁴ It surely would be possible to define *Innere Führung* as the concept that allows the German citizen at arms to be a uniformed and convinced defender of the values and norms embodied in the German Basic Law and hence creating motivation as well as integration in society.¹¹⁵ Yet as Figure 1 illustrates, a few important factors contributing to this concept must not be omitted.¹¹⁶

This discussion is important because it can offer answers, if the main hypothesis that *Innere Führung* is a universal concept should make any sense. This chapter therefore is more than a question of simple labels. For this reason Chapter II contains material dealing with historic origins, the relationship of history and tradition in relation to the Bundeswehr and *Innere Führung*, and gives a short insight in the intellectual and cultural origins of this concept. Still, this chapter is not the place where one can find

¹¹² “*Innere Führung* guarantees that all soldiers [female and male] of the Bundeswehr are part of the society and obliges the armed forces to safeguard the rights and the soldierly order. It [*Innere Führung*] coins the guiding philosophy of the Bundeswehr.” ZDv 10/1. Vorbemerkung. 3.

¹¹³ White Paper 2006, 78–80.

¹¹⁴ Pommerin, *Exportartikel*. 18–21; Hartmann, *Innere Führung*.7; Central Field Manual ZDv 10/1. Vorbemerkung Nr. 3.

¹¹⁵ Chapter 4, ZDv 10/1.

¹¹⁶ The terms of this figure are translated from different chapters of the ZDv 10/1. “Basis and Principles” (Chapter 3) and “Domains” (Chapter 6).

handy definitions or a “lessons learned” approach despite the fact that the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr had a rich field to draw possible lessons from.




Figure 1. Innere Fuehrung—Basis, Principles and Domains

For the purpose of this study one basic assumption must be made. When referring to the principle of Innere Fuehrung and the German Basic Law, it is referred to their ideal i.e. ideal condition in the abstract. Nevertheless, deviations from the norm and resistance or conflict with such principles are addressed wherever possible.

To be sure, the reality of Innere Fuehrung comprises its aspirations in the ideal and the reality of same in military life. Such has been the case from the moment the founders of the Bundeswehr crafted these principles in the 1950s and today. There is no comparison of the mechanisms other democracies have made to integrate their military forces into society nor is there a comparison of the institutions of command, leadership, obedience and morale in NATO armies. Such an inquiry would triple the size of this study.

A. HISTORIC ORIGINS—A QUESTION OF TRADITION OR MAYBE MORE?

Die Bundeswehr ist die erste deutsche Armee, die in einen bestehenden freiheitlichen demokratischen Rechtsstaat hinein geschaffen wurde. Der demokratische Neuanfang nach 1945, der zur Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 führte, musste zwingend auch zu einem Neuanfang in den Streitkräften führen.¹¹⁷

This section deals with the historic origins of the concept of *Innere Fuehrung*, its core elements and paves the way to the role of this concept today. *Innere Fuehrung* has become a trademark of the German armed forces since its inception in 1953 as well as a tradition itself in the life of the Bundeswehr.

In order to understand the topic in its full range and its implications until today such a search however, is necessary. The same way it is necessary to discuss the role of what is called military tradition and its relationship with German and European history. What with the disaster associated with military power in Germany from the perspective of 1950, the prospects of a new foundation of the military profession in West Germany were pretty meager. The danger of a restoration of a military caste as an anti-democratic force, as well as bogus revival of military honor at the expense of pluralism was a real threat in the early 1950s. The founders of *Innere Fuehrung* had to fight such tendencies right from the beginning by extracting soldierly virtue from its abuse in National Socialism and in the era 1890–1933.¹¹⁸ At the same time, the Germans had to assure all their neighbors and future allies that *Grossdeutschland* had vanished.

The exact historical origins of all the features of *Innere Fuehrung* defy easy generalization, because, in fact, its components have various origins and dates of birth reaching back to the 19th century. At the same time, the cult of tradition that had been an anti-democratic feature of the army and society has also origins in the mid-nineteenth

¹¹⁷ “The Bundeswehr is the first German Army that was created into an existing liberal democratic state founded on the rule of law. The democratic fresh start after 1945 that led to foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 to led to a obligatory fresh start of military forces.” ZDv 10/1, no. 203.

¹¹⁸ Amazingly enough it took the German MoD almost three decades to create a satisfactory document to give binding and durable guidelines on soldierly tradition. The result was the *Traditionserlass* from 1982. This discussion is continued in the next paragraphs.

century. The debate about the efficacy of soldierly tradition inevitably was linked to the debate about the putting of Innere Fuehrung into practice.

The key words “Weimar,” “Korea,” “Himmerod” and “Amt Blank” circumscribe the origins of Innere Fuehrung in the narrow sense of the years 1950–1955. The mere listing of so many valid topics gives a glimpse of the multitude of approaches where one could find the historic origins for Innere Fuehrung. Yet they would only describe a timeline leading to the introduction of this concept. Such a timeline could not describe the conflicted search for an identity, motivation and the necessary dissociation with the past century.

1. West German contribution to Atlantic Defense, 1948–1955

The ZDv 10/1 contains a history of Innere Fuehrung in a brief chapter.¹¹⁹ Yet this very condensed version can function as an introduction. For the purpose of this study, a few additions have to be made to the above cited chapter in order to understand the time at the creation of Innere Fuehrung. The first part of this paragraph describes the international outline of the decade prior the foundation of the Bundeswehr while the second paragraph follows the line as drawn in the field manual.

The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 caused diffuse ideas from 1948–1949 about a possible armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to go into crisis of implementation in the summer and fall of that year. By dint of the demilitarization requirements of the era 1944–1948, the new FRG in 1949 had no means to defend itself, such as it was, because the responsibility for this task rested with the western occupying powers. The desultory reflection on this problem that had been manifest in certain unofficial memoranda in the period 1948–1949, however, became most acute when the NATO allies realized that the war in Korea might well duplicate itself in a divided Germany. In particular, the U.S. Defense Department (but not the U.S. State Department) wished to arm the FRG, a desire that conflicted with the statecraft of the French and with West German public opinion. This desire for soldiers also echoed in the hearts of certain

¹¹⁹ ZDv 10/1. Chapter 2.

men around Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sensed with vehemence the vulnerability of the new FRG to the East German and Soviet assault.

Even though the United States and its allies faced war in Korea, Western Europe remained the strategic focus of U.S. policy. After World War II America did not withdraw all military forces from Europe. From 1947 America added its treasure to the reconstruction of Western Europe. Nevertheless, it needed a strong Western Europe to counter the Soviet threat, since the events of 1947/48. Almost two years after the end of WW II President Harry Truman expressed his doctrine, that the U.S. should actively aid all free governments in order to contain the Soviet threat in a weakened Europe.¹²⁰

This goal could only be achieved successfully together with a Europe where the West Germans were strong enough to contribute according to their potential. Two years from the end of WW II, the American image of the aggressive Germans, one should not fraternize with according to the “non-fraternization directive,” Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067, had dramatically changed at least in the ranks of the armed forces.¹²¹ American soldiers played a significant role in this change. The wartime enemy was dead, crippled or wounded but had left his hungry children and women in need of protection. A protection, gentleman—as most of the GIs were—could not refuse to give, especially to women.¹²²

Aside these personal encounters after years of coercion the “easy” American way of live appealed to West Germans, who quickly realized, that the American occupiers had much in common with the Germans or at least shared great interest for West Germans.¹²³ The Federal Republic of Germany had to be integrated into the western community of democratic nations.¹²⁴ There had to be a twofold strategy taking care of economic needs

¹²⁰ “Truman Doctrine” of 1947. <http://www.trumanlibrary.org> accessed May 9, 2008.

¹²¹ Petra Goedde, “GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949.” New Haven, Conn; London: Yale University Press, 2003. 204–205.

¹²² “*Cultural feminization became a powerful catalyst in America’s postwar rapprochement with Germany. The preponderance of women and children and the pervasiveness of hunger in early postwar Germany fostered American GIs a shift from one traditionally male gender role conqueror—to another—protector and provider.*” Ibid., 202.

¹²³ Ibid., 161.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 199.

and security incentives. Economic recovery should be established with the “European Recovery Program” better known as the Marshall Plan.¹²⁵

The introduction of the Deutsche Mark in 1948 along with the currency reform led to the Berlin crisis, which was overcome in a truly heroic effort by the famous “Berliner Luftbrücke” and the well-known “Rosinenbomber.” West Germans and Americans were welded further together by this event. The Marshall Plan helped to stabilize West Germany and the other Western European economies and made American consumerism and pluralism part of the new Germany.¹²⁶

The other pillar European freedom should be built on was the security and defense integration. The Vandenberg-Resolution of 1948 finally enabled the U.S. to set the stage for the collective defense alliance.¹²⁷ To keep “France in, the Russians out and the Germans down” the U.S. underlined their firm involvement in European affairs by signing the Washington Treaty in 1949.¹²⁸ A presence of U.S. troops and European forces (NATO) as stationed defense forces versus an occupation army should be an institutionalized transatlantic link of a community of values and act as a bulwark against

¹²⁵ “Cultural feminization became a powerful catalyst in America’s postwar rapprochement with Germany. The preponderance of women and children and the pervasiveness of hunger in early postwar Germany fostered American GIs a shift from one traditionally male gender role conqueror—to another—protector and provider.” Ibid., 199.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 195–197.

¹²⁷ The Vandenberg Resolution: <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/3.htm> accessed May 10 2008.

¹²⁸ Though no documentary proof substantiates the convention, this quote is commonly attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general (1952–1957). It is cited from Michael Lind, *The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press (USA), 2006.134.

The signing of the treaty and the consequences are cited from John L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 282.

communism.¹²⁹ This goal however was especially in the eyes of the Americans only possible with a substantial West German contribution.¹³⁰

The first half of this section outlined the international conditions leading to the wish for the armament of West Germany. The next section describes the political situation in West Germany in the decade after the war and it examines how the West German society dealt with the unwanted burden of soldiers.

The term “total defeat” is an often used description for the situation in Germany after World War II. In ruins lay not only the urban centers, but the imponderables of a strong Prussian/German tradition of the soldier in the state. Germans had defined themselves and their xenophobic attitude as *Kulturnation*.¹³¹ Moreover, Germans had defined themselves via their military success ranging back to Franco-Prussian War from 1870–1871. This war saw the proclamation of the German states to a union, the German

¹²⁹ The description of the period is derived from Ryan C. Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and the Military Action after the Cold War*. Columbia, London: University of Missouri Press, 2006. 8–20.

¹³⁰ “The Korean incident not only changed the previously relaxed atmosphere of the NATO organization but also forced the German issue into a focus that many of the allies preferred to remain blurred. The change was inevitable. If the United States were to assume leadership in creating a viable military force in Europe with American troops and an American commander, it was only natural to expect United States pressure for utilizing German resources to the fullest.” Lawrence S. Kaplan, “NATO and Adenauer's Germany: Uneasy Partnership.” *International Organization* 15, no. 4 (Autumn 1961): 618–629.

¹³¹ *Kulturnation*: The nation defines itself via common language, cultural heritage and common achievements for example in the field of science or military victories. *Kulturnation* and its counterpart, *Verfassungsnation* (nation based on the rather abstract construct of a constitution), are part of the concept of nationalism. From the view of political science it describes a concept with various shades. Without evaluation, it can be defined per se as a concept, where the term nation is the “central principle of organization” for a state. Nation in this case equals a construction, which is shaped “by a collection of cultural, political and psychological factors.” Cultural factors are such as “common language, religion, history and traditions.” Cultural heterogeneity can be incorporated into such a construction. A psychological factor can be patriotism, defined as loyal affection towards this particular nation. Nationalism in general is closely related with the search for identity. During this identification process all groups try to find a few criteria that separate them from others, criteria that make them genuine. Most of the time, this process is therefore an excluding process at the expense of the “other.” This is the point where the concept is prone to get involved with evaluation and the following characteristic: “(...) the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labeled ‘god’ or ‘bad’.” The definitions are taken from Heywood, Andrew. *Politics*. 2nd ed., London: Palgrave Foundations, 2002. 106 and 115. The closing citation can be found at Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*. New York: Vintage Books: 2005.10. A more historic approach towards this subject can be found at Schulze, Hagen. *States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present*. Malden, Mass. and Oxford (UK): Blackwell, 1998.

Empire. As a result, the German Empire was founded on the military victory resulting from the Prussian-German superiority and the humiliation of the Danish, Austrian and French opponents.¹³²

The rise of the stab-in-the-back” myth in 1918 provided the rationale for the lost war and the founding idea of National Socialism. However, no such state of affairs existed, after World War II.¹³³ This time soldiers could scarcely blame civilians for the real defeat.¹³⁴ This war had left the battlefields, had resulted in millions of deaths and turned cities and hence the foundations of existence of a modern society into ruins and dust. Above that, the unconditional surrender not only shattered but literally wrecked former reference points of German identity. This time the Germans were not only militarily defeated beyond any doubt; they were even disarmed and sent for re-education.¹³⁵

With this war and the mass murder of the Holocaust, the Germans had wiped out their reputation as a civilized *Kulturnation* within twelve years. Not only the defeat was complete and total, there were few remnants of a regime or government left to blame for since the Nazi state had ceased to exist in contrast to the situation of 1918.¹³⁶ In other words the first group to receive blame were soldiers, even if many professions had been pillars of Nazism and many had tossed away their brown and grey uniforms to disappear for a few years. The appearance of a Zero Hour may have been less reality than perception, but the discontinuity with 1918 was real and profound. This fact fostered the collective suppression of memories and allowed directing any energy and capacity left into a fresh start. In other words, the West Germans rolled up their tattered sleeves for the task of reconstruction, consumer spending and the enjoyment of jazz music. Coming into

¹³² Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery*. New York: Picador, 2004. 6.

¹³³ Ibid., 11–13.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹³⁵ The fear of the “Morgenthau Plan” was still alive. For the Morgenthau plan and its chance for realization check: Harper, *American Visions*, 105–107.

¹³⁶ Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat*, 10.

grips with the past was not a priority until many years later. The caesura of the *Stunde Null* made possible a new beginning in West Germany.¹³⁷

International factors also played an important role. They led to an attitude change toward the West Germans. The “struggle for power and position” in the cold war helped to overcome resentments.¹³⁸ Before the end of the war and right after the war, the Allies were driven by the “Four Ds” policy on the Germans: Demilitarize, Denazify, Decartelize, and Democratize.¹³⁹

Besides such an attitude change caused by external factors, diverging views about the question of which design would suit West Germany finally led to a change of policy towards Germany. The occupying forces of Germany (the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union) soon started to disagree over the way the German state should be organized. In 1946/47 each of the allies favored an organizational principle similar to the principle their respective state was organized.¹⁴⁰ In autumn 1947 at the London Conference, the difference over the diverging views of German statehood became irreconcilable. In 1947, the published communiqué of the Six Power conference of that same year made way for further alienation between the Allies.¹⁴¹ It gave this

¹³⁷ “Stunde Null: Zero Hour.” Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer, Richard Stoess (ed). *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland*. Schriftenreihe Band 338. Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung. 1997. 63.

¹³⁸ David Clay Large, “Reckoning without the Past: The HIAG of the Waffen-SS and the Politics of Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic, 1950–1961.” *The Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 1 (Mar., 1987): 79–113. 79.

¹³⁹ “In the years immediately following World War II the allied powers committed themselves to the so-called four-D’s policy towards their vanquished enemy: they would demilitarize, denazify, decartelize, and democratize the former Reich. The success of this unprecedented experiment in social-political engineering depended in large part on the resoluteness and competence of the allied administrators, as well as on the willingness or ability of the Germans to undertake an ambitious experiment of their own: namely, an exercise in self-understanding and self-purgation—a “reckoning with the past” (*Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung*).” Ibid., 79.

¹⁴⁰ For the United States this meant a federal organisation, for the United Kingdom a decentralized unitary state and for the Soviet Union a centralized unitary state. Only France as a highly centralized state pursued the opposite policy towards Germany. France was interested in a highly decentralized state. Heinz Laufer and Ursula Muench, *Das foederative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung. 1997. 56–57.

¹⁴¹ In these two sentences a process of more than two years and various documents is depicted. A more detailed version can be found at the above cited book that contains links to the sources. Ibid. 57.

inability to agree on the design of Germany finally to the creation of the “Trizone” and consequently to the foundation of the two Germanys.¹⁴²

With the help of rather foresighted than revengeful allies Western Germany started to take the path towards unquestionable West-Integration.¹⁴³ It is the era that in Germany inevitably is connected with the name of Konrad Adenauer.¹⁴⁴ This remarkable politician soon realized that West-integration would offer those benefits of security and sovereignty that later could lead to reunification. In other words he risked the unity of Germany for the price of security and limited sovereignty.¹⁴⁵

At the turn of the decade, the American attempts on the “issue of German rearmament” were openly pursued.¹⁴⁶ Besides the strategic necessity to arm the FRG that would be a European battlefield in a hot war, the U.S. and UK saw the shifting of the defense burden to the FRG as a logical outcome of the Marshall Plan.¹⁴⁷ In order to make use of West German economic power the French Premier Rene Pleven introduced in October 1950 the idea of a European army with German units well subordinated to operational and strategic control.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² Bizone: American and British sector; Trizone: Bizone plus French Sector.

While the American and the British Zone in late 1946 became the “Bizone” only a month before the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany the French agreed under restrictions to the “Trizone.” Nevertheless the French Zone participated in the monetary reform in June 1948. Elke Kimmel, in http://www.bpb.de/themen/TUT5WQ.0.0.Franz%F6sische_Zone.html accessed May 11, 2008. French reluctance contrasted with the other Western Allies. Without judging or referring to economic interests it must be noted, that France more or less was overrun three times by its neighbour East to the Rhine within seventy years. This in turn left a lasting impression and shaped the French perception of Germany. The later on described plans for the European Defence Community and the French-American discrepancies over this construct are further proof. Harper, *American Visions*, 301–303.

¹⁴³ Remarkable insights in the relationship between intention, perception and (actual) outcome of some important decision makers on behalf of the U.S. of the period at hand can be found at Harper, *American Visions*, 332–333.

¹⁴⁴ Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967). First Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–1963. The role of Adenauer and his inner German counterpart, the Social Democratic Leader, Kurt Schumacher can be found at Bernard Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization: A History of Europe in our Time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 442.

¹⁴⁵ Peter Maerz, *Dokumente zu Deutschland: 1944–1994*. Muenchen: Bayerische Landeszentrale fuer Politische Bildungsarbeit, 1996. 21.

¹⁴⁶ Kelleher, *The Defense Policy*, 269.

¹⁴⁷ Kaplan, *NATO and Adenauer's Germany*, 619.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 620.

When, in the second half of 1950, it became more and more obvious that the armament of the FRG would become a reality, Adenauer and his administration began first preparations.¹⁴⁹ For these preparations the chancellor employed former high ranking officers of the Wehrmacht around Count Schwerin, men who were politically acceptable because of their ties to the anti Hitler Putsch of July 20, 1944.¹⁵⁰ Due to the illegal nature of such work, a small group of less than twenty people met in early October 1950 in a clandestine atmosphere in the isolated monastery of Himmerod in the Eifel.¹⁵¹ After much discussion, this group managed to produce a document that became the Magna Carta of the Bundeswehr the so called “Himmeroder Denkschrift.”¹⁵² It was the first major planning proposal for a West German contribution to Atlantic defense.

In the middle of October 1950, Adenauer appointed his Christian-democratic party colleague and member of the German Parliament Theodor Blank as the Commissioner of the German Chancellor for issues of increasing of Allied troops.¹⁵³ His eponymous office, the “Amt Blank,” later the nucleus of the German Ministry of Defense, was founded with a distinctly civilian character. Blank in turn relied also on

¹⁴⁹ Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, 36.

¹⁵⁰ Abenheim points out three former general staff officers as main protagonists of the “Zentrale fuer Heimatdienst”: Count Kielmansegg, Bussche, and Oster. Ibid., 36. While he later mentions other important names of this group such as Heusinger and Dr. Speidel. Ibid., 41.

Despite the close examination of these men, it is exactly this proximity to high-ranking officers of the former Wehrmacht that fanned and for some still fans criticism on the overall construct of Innere Fuehrung. Ibid., 41.

The following citation is derived of one of the pages of the Navy Department Library and exactly describes the problem: *“It reflects the central internal dilemma of the young Federal Republic: If all of those who were involved in the Nazi regime, and for that matter, in the conduct of the war, were to be excluded from post-war engagement in their respective areas of expertise, no functional governmental system could have been provided. As a matter of fact, Germany had to rely on those who were not accounted for as war criminals per se because of the huge gap in the succeeding generation (millions of young Germans fell in Word War II) and the lack of experts who already gained leadership experience prior to 1933 (Konrad Adenauer, *1876, was one of the few exceptions).”*

<http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usnavyandbundesmarine.htm> accessed May 12, 2008.

¹⁵¹ Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, 37.

¹⁵² The “Himmerod Consultation Paper.” The full text of the secret paper was officially released almost two and a half decades later in the mid 1970s. Ibid., 37.

The text as well as scanned copies of the “Himmeroder Denkschrift” can be found at the German Bundesarchiv: http://www.bundesarchiv.de/aktuelles/aus_dem_archiv/galerie/00147/index.html accessed May 12, 2008.

¹⁵³ “Beauftragter des Bundeskanzlers für die mit der Vermehrung der alliierten Truppen zusammenhängenden Fragen.”

former generals of the Wehrmacht close to the British and the Americans as advisors, while Adenauer as Chancellor demonstratively continued to select reputable men for this office.¹⁵⁴ In November 1950 the German Parliament agreed on the plan on the European Defense Community (EDC) introduced by Pleven and in May 1952 signed the foundation agreement for the EDC. Though the idea of a European army had been French, by August 1954 strategic conditions had changed and the anti-American attitude of the opposition in the 4th Republic as well as the growing reliance on nuclear weapons led the French to ditch the idea, whereupon the U.S. and UK simply moved for the accession of the FRG into NATO directly.¹⁵⁵ The Paris Treaties as of October 1954 lead to this NATO accession of the FRG in May 1955.¹⁵⁶ On the bicentennial birthday of Scharnhorst, the Prussian reformer, the first soldiers of the newly founded German military force got their appointment.¹⁵⁷

The armed forces of the FRG arose from the growing antagonism between the Allies that became the cold war. The year 1949 saw the foundation of two German states in the Federal Republic of Germany and in October the German Democratic Republic. The Korea crisis in 1950 made the allies willing to arm the FRG. However, from the start in 1950, the possibility of a new army made many Germans angry. The price for the first steps into sovereignty of West Germany was its armament and the unintended and undesired division of Germany.¹⁵⁸ Neither the prospect of a supranational army as outlined in the European Defense Community (EDC) nor the integration of national forces into NATO helped to change the mind of those opposing West and East German soldiers only a decade after the unconditional surrender.

¹⁵⁴ The former generals were Dr. Speidel and Heusinger. Carefully selecting personnel Adenauer demonstrated on the one hand German sincerity as well as sensitivity. Such was needed to clearly demonstrate abroad as well as in the face of a stiff inner German opposition the “good” German motives concerning the topic of rearmament. Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, 53.

¹⁵⁵ A concise description of the French motives can be found at Yost, David. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New roles in International Security*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 2001. 30

¹⁵⁶ Germany then also became member of the Brussels Pact of 1948, the predecessor of the West European Union (WEU).

¹⁵⁷ November 12, 1955.

¹⁵⁸ In the late 1940s and early 1950s, nobody could have predicted that such a division could have been overcome four decades later in a remarkable peaceful way.

The “total defeat” resulted not only in the destruction of vast parts of Germany and its culture and economy, but also rendered illegitimate the antidemocratic mindset that obviously had been dominant throughout the preceding century. The union of east Elbian latifundia and Rhinish steel cartels had been broken; the mass murderers of the brown horde were either dead or in hiding, and hence, the political culture of West Germany had been radically altered.¹⁵⁹ The young Federal Republic saw its future embedded in supranational structures. Militarism as defining factor for German nationalism fostered the rise of Hitler, the establishment of the Third Reich and finally led to the total defeat of Germany. Therefore any form of an army or military force then seemed unacceptable for the majority of the Germans.¹⁶⁰ Such a perception was fostered in the early years after the war mostly by the Allies. National Socialism and the exaggerated—almost sacrosanct—position of soldiers in the German society equaled the German essence that had to be extirpated.¹⁶¹ The complete rejection of the past made for problems for the new German soldier since in reality such radical breaks with the continuity of institutions are never as straightforward as they might seem in the moment.¹⁶² Nevertheless, immediately after the war, the Germans wanted neither soldiers nor weapons and only sought a square meal and shelter or knowledge of the whereabouts of a missing father, son or brother.¹⁶³ Such were the conditions the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr had to face.

¹⁵⁹ Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, 60.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

For the role of the soldier in the Third Reich in general see: Omer Bartov, “Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich.” *The Journal of Modern History* 63, no. 1 (Mar. 1991): 44–60.

¹⁶² An interesting view of a contemporary witness for that topic can be found at Speier, *German Rearmament*, 147–152.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 148.

2. The Tradition of the German Soldier—a Constant Struggle?

*Germans are by nature subservient to authority, militaristic, and aggressive, and that there is very little that any one can do about this except deprive them of the means of making themselves dangerous to their neighbours.*¹⁶⁴

One should distinguish clearly between the terms history and tradition. Often those who invoke the past and speak of history actually intend to use tradition as a justification, explanation or a corner stone of their social and political ideas. While history is the sum of events that has happened in the past, tradition is the more or less conscious choice of suitable events or habits to undergird a social and political role. Soldiers in particular often take a page from the Catholic Church and use the word tradition as a basis of their collective identity.¹⁶⁵ In this connection, the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr could not simply revive the cult of tradition in the Prussian-German army as it had existed in the period 1880–1945 as the foundation of the professional ethos of the new West German army.

After the total defeat in 1945 the vast majority of the Germans saw no need for a discussion of what constitutes soldierly tradition.¹⁶⁶ Once a new army became a reality, the fathers of the future inner structure of the new Bundeswehr had to choose very carefully from the past as to legitimate aspects of training and education as practiced in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht.¹⁶⁷ The question became pressing and remained so.

¹⁶⁴ This quote is taken out of context. Craig embedded this sentence in a denial of such generalizations. In his book he rejects clearly such attempts. Craig, *The Politics*, xiii.

¹⁶⁵ As already mentioned in the introduction, for a proper legitimation in the sociological view values and knowledge are needed. Berger and Luckmann further argue that “‘knowledge’ comes to him [the member of the clan] through a tradition that ‘explains’ what clans are in general and what his clan is in particular. Such ‘explanations’ (...) are as much legitimating instruments as ethical elements of the tradition.” Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*.93.

¹⁶⁶ Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, 255.

¹⁶⁷ Innere Führung and the technological leaping as indicated by any RMA in this case were no opposing views. The Reichswehr as well as the Wehrmacht were armies that partly still exercised the mindless discipline needed for armies advancing in line tactics in the nineteenth century. Such a needless discipline hence became a perversion in order to suppress soldiers in order to show them their position in such an organisation; they became a synonym for senseless military drill. Abolishing such features the founding fathers however started a movement that already had taken place in the Wehrmacht. Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, 52.

While the allies immediately after the war studied the methods of the Wehrmacht, the reality of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism made a revival of the latter a taboo.¹⁶⁸ While the fighting power and inner cohesion of small fighting units as the epitome of camaraderie had been noteworthy (with little attention paid to the draconian military justice) one could not separate this so called tradition from the ideological blindness of soldiers to the worst in national socialism.¹⁶⁹ If the new soldiers had to be different from the generations having served in the Wehrmacht, the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr had no other choice than to reject the cult of tradition as it had existed heretofore. Discontinuity was the only choice.¹⁷⁰

This problem was later addressed in formal statements about military reform and soldierly tradition. As the still-valid “traditions decree” (*Traditionserlass*) of 1982 clearly states, “tradition is a fundamental base of human culture.”¹⁷¹ In the next sentence however, it also explicitly states that such a view “assumes as a prerequisite an understanding for historical, political and societal causal relationships.”¹⁷² This decree also defined tradition as “the handing down of values and norms.”¹⁷³ Furthermore tradition results from a “process of a value oriented examination or analysis of the past.”¹⁷⁴ It is this linking with values and norms that excludes any connection with the Wehrmacht or any other undemocratic German military force. Since the Bundeswehr sees itself as the army of a German democracy, those exemplars of an undemocratic or antidemocratic past have no place.

¹⁶⁸ An interesting testimony of that time can be found at Edward A. Shils, and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948). 280–315.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 51–52.

¹⁷⁰ Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*. 254–255.

¹⁷¹ *Traditionserlass*: Decree containing definitions what counts for acceptable tradition for the Bundeswehr. The struggle in the variety of all its details can be found in: Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*. Traditionserlass of 1982 as Annex 3 to the ZDv 10/1. no. 1, sentence 3.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, no. 1, sentence 4.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, no. 1, sentence 1.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 1, sentence 2.

The question of what counts as valid tradition for the Bundeswehr has been the subject of struggle since the 1950s. The new central field manual ZDv 10/1 offers a prominent place in its preliminary remarks a clear statement.¹⁷⁵ On the one hand it clearly refers to the German Basic Law as the appropriate and obligatory foundation of any evaluation of contemporary events. The exclusive character of the second sentence, however, leaves a stronger impression. There is more though than the rejection of the Wehrmacht and another army not serving the German people rather than a party, its ruling class and socialism per se despite its name.¹⁷⁶

The search for an appropriate tradition led to a crystallization of three main lines as acceptable tradition for the Bundeswehr: the Prussian reformers and their ideas, the men of July 20, 1944, and the Bundeswehr itself. The first one is commonly related with the idea of the citizen in uniform as the born defender of his or her country.¹⁷⁷ The Prussian reformers began the emancipation of the subject into citizen with rights as well as duties. The inability of the then Prussian Army to truly reform itself based upon the ideas expressed by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen is not part of the accepted line of tradition.¹⁷⁸

The “memory beacon” of July 20, 1944, truly is a celebrated line of tradition.¹⁷⁹ For Innere Fuehrung, this event formed a test of conscience, where the abuse of

¹⁷⁵ “The German Basic Law and the critical dealing with the past oblige the Bundeswehr to evaluate political events and its connections within the present and to develop a sound understanding of tradition. The former German Wehrmacht as a tool of the national socialistic worldviews can not serve as a traditional foundation of the Bundeswehr. This extends to former National People’s Army [NVA, the army of the former socialist German Democratic Republic GDR] as the army of the party and the classes of the SED-regime [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; the ruling party of the GDR].” ZDv 10/1. Vorbemerkung Nr.5.

¹⁷⁶ The oath to the GDR flag from 1962 onward, where GDR soldiers pledged allegiance to the ideology of socialism, can be found at Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 78.

¹⁷⁷ The idea in this fashion is commonly attributed to Scharnhorst and used to underline the necessity of a conscript force. Scharnhorst surely took his inspiration from the French Revolution and its aftermath. Foerster, Roland G. (ed.). *Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militaerische Wirkung*. Schriftenreihe des militaergeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes. Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1994. vii.

¹⁷⁸ Craig, *The Politics*, xiv–xv.

¹⁷⁹ The term “memory beacon” is taken from an article of Douglas Pfeiffer in the *Journal of Military History*. It is true that especially in the very early days of the German rearmament such memory beacon initially helped to separate between “good” and “bad” in reference to the Wehrmacht and hence was utilized.

obedience made these officers risk the lives of their families and their own to restore Germany's place among civilized nations. Innere Fuehrung does not call for the assassination of the head of state, but it does encourage the role of conscience as measure for own actions and it protects those doing so from arbitrariness.¹⁸⁰ Admittedly the plan to assassinate the leading figure is extreme but it was the realization of the incorrectness and the decision to take actions that are very important features of this date. In this case any criticism in the shape of "why took it so long" or "these soldiers did break their oath" does not matter at all. With the advantage of hindsight it is always easier to judge events of the past. Nonetheless, the choice of German officers to kill the head of state in the extremity of wartime embodies a remarkable event that highlights the limits of soldierly conscience and command and obedience. How this historical event can form a soldierly tradition itself has been a source of controversy, but the men and women of July 20, 1944, naturally serve as a source of tradition in a way that the celebrated Knight's Cross Holders and darlings of the Nazi regime could and should not. Therefore this date and its connotation is more than a fashionable and constructed reality.¹⁸¹

The elements that constitute the tradition of the Bundeswehr help to understand the focus of the Bundeswehr on alliance defense. The *Traditionserlass* points out the importance of three elements for the formation of its own tradition: the first conscript military force in a democratic German nation, designed exclusively for defense, and integrated in an alliance of nation states devoted to the right of personal freedom and the rule of law. Such is the foundation of tradition of the Bundeswehr that contributes to its self image.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ ZDv 10/1. Annex 2/2. No. 4c.

¹⁸¹ It is the same way true that the event of July 20, 1944, was not the only sign of resistance as it is true that the Wehrmacht was not a completely innocent organisation composed of soldiers unwilling to follow their orders. There were other manifestations, too that also led to harsh consequences up to the execution of those soldiers resisting on another level. For the role of the Wehrmacht Omer Bartov offers interesting insights as well as the more recent work of Juergen Foerster. Omer Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich." *The Journal of Modern History* 63, no. 1 (Mar. 1991): 44–60. Foerster, Juergen. *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Eine strukturgeschichtliche Analyse*. Beitrage zur Militaergeschichte. Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 2007.

Kitterman finds a number of examples where soldiers of the Wehrmacht refused to take part in executions for a variety of reasons and were not executed. His findings are interesting, but his statistical evidence however, might be criticised for a small and selective "n." Kitterman, *Those who said 'No!'* 252–253.

¹⁸² *Traditionserlass*, no. 9.

The search for tradition for the Bundeswehr has been a struggle because of the Wehrmacht. In a nation with a strong sense of historical pride, such an effort has naturally been conflicted. The problem of the functional separation of possible qualities from the ill-fated motives however, has required long reflection and debate.¹⁸³ Such a struggle is an inevitable consequence of defeat and the need to re-formulate the basis of military service in a new political context as well as an altered social setting.

B. DESCRIPTION


1. Attempts at Definitions

Most of the scholars of Innere Fuehrung took their definitions or description from the 1972 and 1993 editions of the central field manual 10/1. This section explains and models gradually the constituent parts in order to foster an understanding of the overall construct as depicted in figure 1. The description of the main parts is supported by further figures. The gradual proceeding by description shall compensate the lack of definitions this paragraph only partially can offer.

As Figure 2 shows, Innere Fuehrung identifies four goals and recognizes one central element:

¹⁸³ Knab, Jakob. "Zeitlose soldatische Tugenden." ZEIT ONLINE 46/2005. 92. <http://www.zeit.de/2005/46/A-Bundeswehr> accessed May 11, 2008.

4 Goals and the Central Element of "Innere Fuehrung"



(ZDv 10/1; No. 401)

Figure 2. Four Goals and the Central Element of Innere Fuehrung

Based on one central element, Innere Fuehrung seeks to create legitimacy and guarantee the democratic integration of armed forces. Furthermore the design of the inner order or the institutional culture shall contribute to the proper motivation of the Bundeswehr.¹⁸⁴

Innere Fuehrung has a central element that acts as guiding motive, the citizen in uniform that is something distinct in the German experience than the dynastic soldierly caste, the national socialist soldier in race war or the soldier of the socialist unity part of the Soviet block.

If one looks at the basic ideal of the concept of Innere Fuehrung, the citizen in uniform easily can be identified already partially in the ideas of Kant, more definitely in the French Revolution and its elevation of the citizen. Further, the roots lie in the Prussian reforms as a response to the defeat Prussia suffered from Napoleon in 1806.

¹⁸⁴ ZDv 10/1. No 401.

Even the ancient Greeks in Athens or to a lesser degree in Sparta at the height of the Persian wars in the fifth century BCE offer prototypes as well. With their reliance on self financed heavily armed hoplites (rich citizens) or lesser armed peltasts (not so well endowed citizens) they understood the importance and value of soldiers fighting for their own cause which however more often had very worldly motives, i.e. money and economic influence or control.¹⁸⁵

Innere Fuehrung however differs from all the previous roots because of the central fact: Service in order to *defend* the values incorporated in the German Basic Law, the “*freiheitlich demokratische Grundordnung*”(FdGo).¹⁸⁶ It is this rather abstract and fundamental principle a soldier must defend. At the same time this hallmark of the “*wehrhafte*” democracy includes the forfeiture of basic rights in case any possible opponent deliberately tries to attack this system of values.¹⁸⁷ This in turn leads to the right of resistance for all Germans in case they do not see any other possibility to protect this liberal democratic basic order.¹⁸⁸ Among other things, this article 20 paragraph 4 of the German Basic Law creates the delicate balance between obedience and resistance.

The ZDv 10/1 identifies three main domains for military leaders or superiors in general to lead, to educate, and to train: leadership, (military) law, and political education.

¹⁸⁵ John Warry, *Warfare in the Classical World*. Norman (Okla.): University of Oklahoma Press, 1995.25.

¹⁸⁶ A close literal translation for the “*freiheitlich demokratische Grundordnung*” leads to Liberal Democratic Basic Order. This abstract principle as mentioned in art. 18 and 21 (2) of the German Basic Law and is defined in the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheid (BVerfGE 2, 1–12). It explicitly rules out any terror regime or despotic rule and emphasizes the self determination of the German people based on the rule of the majority as long as this majority respects the freedom and equality as guaranteed by the German Basic Law. Ernst Benda, in: <http://www.bpb.de/wissen/07403964499523816036687609136772.html> accessed May 4, 2008.

¹⁸⁷ The term to be translated is *wehrhafte Demokratie* or *streitbare Demokratie* where *wehrhaft* or *streitbar* can be translated as “combative” or “valiant.”

¹⁸⁸ The text of the German Basic Law is derived from the following source: <http://www.bundestag.de/parlament/funktion/gesetze/grundgesetz/gg> accessed May 4, 2008.





Figure 3. The Three Main Domains

The preferred means to achieve the goals as described before are *Auftragstaktik* (mission command, directive control) and the mature and responsible personality of the respective military leader.¹⁸⁹ The maturity in turn is expressed by the incorporation of *Innere Fuehrung*. *Politische Bildung* (political education) is not propaganda because political education truly is supposed to encourage the ability of the soldiers of the Bundeswehr “how to think.” Therefore political education teaches or offers tools rather than solutions in a sense of “what to think.” The motivation behind such an education is to create and foster an understanding of the mission as well as of the purpose and the

¹⁸⁹ *Auftragstaktik* can be described as a process where a superior outlines the mission in a way that the subordinate has a high degree of freedom in the choice of means in order to fulfil the mission. In other words, the result is all that matters. This in turn requires well trained and educated superiors as well as subordinates and mutual trust. Despite the fact that *Auftragstaktik* and its German origin are widely known to an English-speaking audience, it is often neglected, that the term itself almost constitutes an oxymoron or at least the connection of a task (*Auftrag*) with tactics (*Taktik*) is too narrow. *Auftragstaktik* is rather a method than plain tactics. An interesting discussion of this topic with appropriate definitions can be found at: <http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer> accessed May 28, 2008. Although almost a decade ago Keithly and Ferris published an article with still interesting insights about *Auftragstaktik* and the discussion about this “command philosophy” in the twenty-first-century U.S. military force. David M. Keithly and Stephen P Ferris, “*Auftragstaktik*, or Directive Control in Joint and Combined Operations.” *Parameters*, Autumn 1999. www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/philosophy/source_materials/auftragstaktik-keithly_and_ferris.doc accessed May 27, 2008.

necessity behind the mission. For example, in order to keep the above described balance amongst others permanent training and education for example in the shape of political education is required.¹⁹⁰



Soldiers: Duty to inform themselves politically in order to be "citizen in uniform"

No. 625 and 627 Central Field Manual ZDv 10/1 as of January 2008

Figure 4. Political Education: Motivation and Goals

Political Education is not a one-way street because all soldiers are obliged to inform themselves politically.¹⁹¹ The informed citizen in uniform cannot be separated from his or her background. Furthermore all soldiers are supposed to bring their political knowledge into daily service instead of leaving it outside the barrack's gate. Political education therefore does not start from zero. It encourages the active formation of political objectives and explains political causal relationships. The four goals and the central element of Innere Fuehrung as outlined before are supported by the proper dealing with different views. In the process of political education historical knowledge shall support the consciousness of the values as embedded in the German Basic Law (figure 4).

¹⁹⁰ Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, "Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr."

¹⁹¹ Ibid., no. 627.

These values are further anchored and their worthy of protection is acknowledged. By knowing own values and accepting plurality the intercultural competency and thus the respect for other cultures is strengthened.¹⁹²

Despite the aim to strengthen the own ability to judge political life and therefore foster discussion, the limits are clear though. The norms and values embedded in the German Basic Law remain the admittedly very liberal foundation.¹⁹³ The ZDv 10/1 states the role of political education as the task of superiors or military leaders.¹⁹⁴ Usually the lowest level of an officer responsible for this task is the company commander level. Innere Fuehrung realizes the norms and values embedded in the German Basic Law.¹⁹⁵ As a result a maximum amount of military effectiveness is achieved while at the same time it guarantees the maximum amount of liberties and rights.¹⁹⁶




Figure 5. Ethical Foundations of Innere Fuehrung

¹⁹² Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, "Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr." no. 620.

¹⁹³ Ibid., no. 626.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., no. 602.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., no. 301.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., no. 302.

The principles of Innere Fuehrung are founded on ethical, legal, political, and social foundations. Additionally these principles correlate with military requirements.¹⁹⁷ The ethical foundations are seen in connection with the German Basic Law. The central field manual explicitly states that this document has been the most liberal constitution German ever had.¹⁹⁸ Its system of values is based on the century long development of politics, philosophy and ethics in Europe. A special emphasis is put on the historical experiences. Hence this system of values is supposed to be a guarantee for the terms as depicted in Figure 5. Directly after the ethical foundations, the central field manual 10/1 refers to the duty of the state to honor and protect human dignity. Since it is a duty of the state as a logical consequence it is a duty of the Bundeswehr. The high value of human dignity and its protection form the ethical foundation and limit of daily service.¹⁹⁹

The legal or judicial foundations are composed of International Law, the German Basic Law, and such further laws as the military laws. This combination builds the legal framework, outlines the position of the Bundeswehr in the state and the position of its soldiers as well as it is the legally binding measure for their actions.²⁰⁰ Since the soldiers are citizens in uniform, their constitutional rights are curtailed to a minimum of military necessity. Finally each soldier is guaranteed an extra protection by the limitations of command of superiors. The duty to obey and its limitations are also regulated. Furthermore it is explicitly stated that no soldier is supposed to suffer any disadvantages or other arbitrariness while exercising his or her guaranteed rights.²⁰¹

The description of the political foundations starts with the “primacy of policy”:²⁰² The legitimate and legal will of German politics as expressed for examples in the decision of the German Parliament or other organs as stated by the German Basic Law have priority. This civil control commonly is regarded the strongest part of the civil-

¹⁹⁷ Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 303.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., no. 304.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., no. 305.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., no. 306.

²⁰¹ Ibid., no. 309.

²⁰² Ibid., no. 310.

military relationship. It means that the armed forces and planning of operations are subjects to civil control, i.e. the German Parliament.²⁰³ Further political foundations are expressed by the interests of German security policy as written down for example in the German Whitepaper 2006.²⁰⁴ Possible connection points to Chapter III can be derived from the statement that the mission of the Bundeswehr is integrated in the overall concept for security provision of Germany.²⁰⁵

The social foundations are the liberal and pluralistic society of the Federal Republic of Germany. Such a multi-faceted society is defined by a variety of convictions, individual plans for life, a variety of religious, ideologies, philosophies, views and interests. These differences are subject to change and partially competing with each other.²⁰⁶ The soldiers of the Bundeswehr are members of this society and hence the diverging—and from time to time conflicting—interests as described above are part of the Bundeswehr throughout the different generations, cultures and origins of its members.²⁰⁷ Innere Fuehrung enables the soldiers of the Bundeswehr peacefully to coexist with all their differences. Since German soldiers for example have the right to vote and the right to be elected and hence are requested to take an active part in political life, further guidance on how to behave in election times is not necessary.²⁰⁸ An open dialogue based on mutual trust creates the necessary camaraderie.²⁰⁹ Conscription is considered as an expression for the responsibility the German citizens have for their state and society.²¹⁰ The principles of Innere Fuehrung are shown in Figure 6:

²⁰³ Ortwin Buchbender, et al. (ed.). *Wörterbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik mit Stichworten zur Bundeswehr*. 4th revised ed. Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Mittler 2000. 290.

²⁰⁴ White Paper 2006. 10.

²⁰⁵ The statement can be found in the ZDv 10/1, no. 311, while the White Paper 2006 refers to the task and the civil-military cooperation on page 72.

²⁰⁶ ZDv 10/1. No. 312.

²⁰⁷ The ZDv 10/1 recognizes partially the possibility of changing societies. The limits of the incorporation of such changes however, are the “freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung” and the improper limitation of the military mission. Ibid., no. 314.

²⁰⁸ A strong contrast to this view one can find at Thom Shanker, “Military Chief Warns Troops About Politics” <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/us/politics/26military.html> accessed May 26, 2008.

²⁰⁹ ZDv 10/1, no. 313.

²¹⁰ Ibid., no. 315.

Principles of "Innere Fuehrung" (ZDv 10/1;No. 316)

Foundations and Criteria




Figure 6. Principles of Innere Fuehrung

These principles are based on the before described foundations and are expressed in the criteria as outlined.²¹¹

The role of military leaders is crucial to the concept of Innere Fuehrung and its reception. Superiors are supposed to act as a role model. Their influence on the spirit of their soldiers and their daily work is immense. Superiors educate by being a role model and they train their personnel with passion. They have to be credible at all times.²¹² In order to lead, train and educate their soldiers superiors have three main domains: leadership/ management of personnel, political education, and law respectively the military code of conduct. By making use of theses main domains, superiors coin their soldiers imminently and leave a lasting impression.²¹³

Leadership or management of personnel is an attempt to translate "Menschenfuehrung." The following paragraph describes this main domain. The German

²¹¹ Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, "Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr." no. 315.

²¹² Ibid., no. 601.

²¹³ Ibid., no. 602.

Basic Law demands the unrestricted respect of human dignity, human rights including the principles of equality, justice, responsibility and tolerance. Hence these principles form the foundation for superiors to guide their soldiers. Leadership or management of personnel in this case are a core competence of all superiors in the Bundeswehr. The mastering of this core competence in turn is the foundation of appreciation and success as a superior. A positive attitude towards human beings is a *conditio sine qua non* for this main domain.²¹⁴

The next mentioned foundation in this domain is trust. It is the most important foundation for camaraderie and hence an indicator for successful leadership. Especially in situations of stress trust and camaraderie are linking elements through all ranks. Trust in turn demands good judgment of character and social empathy. Superiors therefore must get to know their soldiers. Additionally this requires an openness and willingness to get into touch with entrusted human beings.²¹⁵ In dependence of the size of the unit allotted superiors are supposed to get to know all soldiers personally despite the time consuming procedure.²¹⁶

In order to create trust in their personalities superiors share the burden, deprivations and dangers together with their soldiers. The true quality of leadership shines through especially in such stressful situations where responsibility and the ability to lead have to be proven. Superiors must show a great deal of self-control and predictability. Innere Fuehrung in the daily routine becomes evident through a respectful dealing with each other.²¹⁷

Soldiers Bundeswehr must deal with the possibility of getting killed in action or getting severely wounded.²¹⁸ Therefore superiors have to deal in an appropriate way with topics concerning the possibility of getting wounded or being killed. Questions related

²¹⁴ Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, "Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr." no. 604.

²¹⁵ Ibid., no. 605. Additionally no. 607: "Whoever wants to lead people must be philanthropic."

²¹⁶ Ibid., no. 608.

²¹⁷ Ibid., no. 606.

²¹⁸ The discussion about soldiers and "sui generis" view can be found at Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 139-140.

with the fear of being killed, having to kill, or questions of guilt and failure must not be oppressed or ridiculed.²¹⁹

2. Theory versus Reality?

Despite the mainly positive reflections on the concept of Innere Fuehrung up to this point, this study is not intended to be a simple advertisement for the merits and glory of Innere Fuehrung. Neither is it an attempt to convince the reader of the flawlessness of such a concept. Critics might point out that the legal foundation of Innere Fuehrung exists only in the shape of the respective central field manual. In other words, there exists no other explicit legal anchoring of Innere Fuehrung as one would expect for example in the German Basic Law.²²⁰ Furthermore these critics might relate to difficulties and the partly strong rejection of Innere Fuehrung in its early years and the related scandals. Over the years of the existence of the Bundeswehr there were a number of scandals where the promise of Innere Fuehrung collided with the reality of the Bundeswehr in daily life and even worse this promise was broken to individual soldiers.

Daily frictions of reality however remind us that up to this point it was a description of the concept as outlined in its central field manual. The annual report of the parliamentary commissioner of the armed forces constitutes a valuable source for the lesser publicly known frictions and sometimes willful committed injustices resulting from unacceptable hardships in the daily routine.²²¹ This report however, is more than a mere listing of sensations as some tend to read the given examples. Some of the prominently described events most commonly provoke a “how could they.” The ability to see these bad examples in this very sense partially is credited to the existence of Innere Fuehrung.

²¹⁹ ZDv 10/1, no. 105 and 609.

²²⁰ For this discussion close insights can be gained from Froehling, *Innere Fuehrung*, 45–46.

²²¹ The creation of this parliamentary commissioner is based on the Scandinavian example. The history of the circumstances leading to this creation can be found at Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*, Chapter 2. According Art 45 of the German Basic Law the German Parliament elects the parliamentary commissioner (*Wehrbeauftragte*) as an organ to protect the basic rights of the soldiers in the Bundeswehr. This is guaranteed by the right for any soldier to contact this parliamentary commissioner without being obliged to stick to the line of command. The parliamentary commissioner publishes an annual report concerning amongst others matters of Innere Fuehrung.

As already mentioned in the introduction almost every decade saw a scandal connected with leadership and morale as well as the liberal ethos of the West German or German soldier. In 1963 in Nagold, an obvious misconception of training methods (i.e. an emulation of French or U.S. paratroopers' methods) led to the death of one soldier.²²² This scandal and the connected methods connected the name of this town indelibly with the image of an extreme form of martinet.²²³

In the 1990s, the first decade with the gradual move towards an expeditionary force in combination with new technological possibilities seemed to have created a suitable environment for a number of topically related scandals.²²⁴ It is this mixture of reasons that constitute the background for example for the “Hammelburger Gewaltvideo” dated from 1997.²²⁵ Seven misguided soldiers who were part of a unit responsible for the training of other troops going to Bosnia played during their lunch break scenes containing the more or less clear depiction of mindless violent scenes and taped them. Since nobody was really harmed and nobody ordered these individuals to exercise such scenes one could consider this in an act of benevolence as an immature and more than tasteless prank. Given the media coverage however, it turned into a nasty trick for some. What was really bad is the fact that it should not have happened since the depicted scenes are definitely the opposite the way *Innere Fuehrung* and hence society expect its soldiers to act—not even in a staged video.²²⁶

²²² Abenheim, *Bundeswehr*. 144.

²²³ The German expression *Schleifer* finds its slangy expression in the grinder, who is a drill sergeant tyrant. The literal translation “grinder” is related to the process of grinding down subordinates e.g. in basic training. Such actions were forbidden then (as they are still now). *Innere Fuehrung* or, to be more precise, the obvious absence of it led to its first crisis.

²²⁴ A comparison and a rather complete listing including a commentary can be found at Matthias Geis, “Nach dem Video-Skandal: Ist die Bundeswehr ihrer neuen Aufgabe gewachsen, bei der Friedenssicherung auf dem Balkan zu helfen?” *Zeit online*. 29. 1997. <http://www.zeit.de/1997/29/video.txt.19970711.xml> accessed April 28, 2008. An additional overview offers: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,444655,00.html> accessed April 23, 2008.

²²⁵ Hammelburg is a village in the far Northwest corner of Bavaria and home of the German Infantry School where the vast majority of training for the operations abroad is conducted.

²²⁶ The consequence are usually the same: the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* is accused of having failed, the MoD has to figure out under the immense media pressure what actually has happened and while doing so the rules for training are under supervision. Usually it turns out that the initially given explanation of the MoD of the “singular cases” or “singular culprit” can be proofed and the public interest fades. The underlying societal consequences, however, are not of a great interest anymore.

A major scandal happened in 2004 in Coesfeld where again some instructors could not differ between their ill view of training including applied torture, the values as outlined in Innere Fuehrung and the resulting limitations for training.²²⁷ This time however, the number of culprits was as well larger as the scale, and it involved superiors.²²⁸ It was more than a tastelessness action discrediting the Bundeswehr. This time it involved breaking criminal laws. In a completely unacceptable way the responsible training staff had according to their views attempted to offer their recruits a more realistic training experience including a hostage situation with torture.²²⁹ At least one of the four (!) exercises was approved by the company commander. Even if not being involved personally he consequently was sentenced from the civilian court to a fine of 7500 Euro.²³⁰ Other results of this verdict were five times probation from ten month up to twenty two month and four acquittals.²³¹

In spring 2003 a few German soldiers in Afghanistan posed in a more than disgusting way with human skulls they discovered at lime field where parts of human skeletons were easy accessible.²³² When these photos gradually first surfaced in a high-circulation German tabloid in 2006 the details were not known and the first impression was that the Bundeswehr repeatedly had desecrated graves. The public outcry and the

²²⁷ The chronology of the scandal until March 2006 can be found at: http://www.wdr.de/themen/panorama/8/soldaten_misshandelt/inhalt.jhtml accessed May 11, 2008.

The more recent chronology can be derived from http://www.wdr.de/themen/panorama/8/soldaten_misshandelt/uebersicht.jhtml?rubrikenstyle=panorama accessed May 11, 2008. Additional information is derived from: Bittner, Jochen and von Randow, Gero. "Sadisten in Uniform." ZEIT ONLINE 50/2004. <http://www.zeit.de/2004/50/Coesfeld> accessed May, 11 2008. Despite a polemical inclination, this article especially deals with quality of the NCOs involved in the scandal.

²²⁸ The investigations of the public prosecutor's office include up to twenty seven suspects. The highest accused rank was the company commander, a captain followed by two master staff sergeants (Hauptfeldwebel). The verdicts of the trial are as of March 12, 2008.

²²⁹ Such might be acceptable in the views of some for Special Forces under close observation of existing rules and being accompanied with the necessary psychologists since other armies involved in special operations are doing alike. For conscripts this is unacceptable. Hence, according to the critics, a conscript army is useless in modern days.

²³⁰ http://www.wdr.de/themen/panorama/8/soldaten_misshandelt accessed May 11, 2008.

²³¹ A probation longer than one year equals an absolute discharge. Whether the verdict was again appealed is presently unknown to the author.

²³² "Schnelle Aufklärung." ZEIT ONLINE 25.10.2006. <http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/43/Reaktionen> accessed May 11, 2008.

inherent calls for harsh consequences were a logical consequence. The fact that it was a lime field rather than a graveyard may be of a small consolation but it was revealed after the investigations of the public prosecutor's office. Even if finally no laws were broken and again singular culprits were identified, the damage was enormous. The majority of the involved soldiers faced court-martial for having endangered the security of the German forces in Afghanistan.²³³ What was even more disappointing was the fact that those critics claiming that the Bundeswehr was mentally not ready for such operations in Afghanistan seemed to be right. Innere Fuehrung again was in the line of fire.

It is not the intention here to redefine or turn negative events into positive looking aspects. Innere Fuehrung did not prevent these scandals. Yet it is calming and reassuring once such scandals were discovered they were taken care of in a thorough civilian prosecution as well as it always had additional dire military consequences and disciplinary actions ranging from a promotion stop to degradation or in the worst case for the person a discharge in addition to the civil law consequences.²³⁴

Because Innere Fuehrung is a process that has started more than five decades ago it is obvious that these ideas must continually be applied to military service in difficult conditions. In the same way, the scandals have been a reality. The public outcry furthermore showed that despite a certain lust for sensations the public cared and still cares for its military forces. Simply put it can be stated that Innere Fuehrung works both ways. The German military forces today are an organic part of the German democratic state and society. They are not a distant functional caste living in a dynastic world of privilege.

Whether the public openness with the scandals on behalf of the Bundeswehr are a result of incorporated Innere Fuehrung or simply the fear of being accused of suppressing rights cannot be proved. It does not matter in this case since the mere possibility of being

²³³ "German Soldiers Face Court-Martial Over Afghan Skull Scandal." <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2273976,00.html> accessed May 11, 2008.

²³⁴ It is disturbing though, that except in the Nagold case the time between the occurrence of the event and its coincidental discovery ran one to three years. The investigations, however, were conducted with no delay.

accused and being prosecuted is a definite sign that one aim of Innere Fuehrung—the civil-military relationship under a civilian control—works.

In the face of the repeated demonstration of Innere Fuehrung at work, the question whether the concept is a cold theory that collides with messy reality can be answered in the negative. The concept is good and accepted, however it is not a sure-fire success all the time. Military life can nonetheless lead to a neglect of this ideal in the hands of those who are not wholly committed to the task. Innere Fuehrung is based upon the values incorporated in the German Basic Law. This fact, however, does not imply that the Bundeswehr and its concept can correct immediately the failures of education of young citizens endured before joining the armed forces. In this case the Bundeswehr cannot be the school of the nation as the other German armies before.²³⁵ The role for the Bundeswehr is to serve the FRG loyally and to reconcile the citizen with military service in a manner that produces both military effectiveness within the frame of constitutional checks and balances.

Innere Fuehrung must be the total reality of service in the Bundeswehr. The danger that some kind of militarist or tyrannical figure can somehow pervert the ideal and its application is always present, but one cannot also overstate this danger as a rhetorical extreme. To be sure, the armies of the other democracies often embrace methods at odds with Innere Fuehrung so a certain danger to the German principle lurks in a multinational environment.²³⁶ In order to avoid relativism Innere Fuehrung relies on a strong foundation. Daily contact with reality challenges this concept in a way that it becomes more and more the desired reality.

²³⁵ “In the late nineteenth century, imperial Germany charged the army with promoting a conservative political agenda and forestalling Social Democracy. The German mass army, like many of its counterparts in the age of nationalism, was designed to serve as “a great national school in which the officer would be an educator in the grand style, a shaper of the people’s mind.” Krebs, Ronald R. “A school for the nation?: How Military Service does not build Nations, and how it might.” *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), 85–124.92.

²³⁶ Froehling, *Innere Fuehrung*, 123-124.

3. Philosophy or Concept of Ethics?

Again the implied question is more than a simple labelling issue. Philosophy or ethics are mighty words and the attempt to define them or use them in correlation to Innere Fuehrung might lead to distractions, wrong promises or disappointed expectations. Even worse the continued use of such terms might create an elitist and hence excluding impression. Philosophy, ethics, and morality are often used in combination with Innere Fuehrung. Additionally mentioning of values and norms as well as the permanent referring to such are dominant characteristics of the central field manual. Furthermore, the field of tension between conscience and obedience demands a closer look at this question. As described in the previous chapter Innere Fuehrung was needed as an answer on the question why people who were considered civilized committed uncivilized acts like war crimes.

*“The Germans are very harsh, but their harshness does not stem from hatred. It is cold and mechanical, the result of applying a given formula which aims at fulfilling a goal they believe in.”*²³⁷ Such were the words a Greek novelist in 1943 wrote about the Wehrmacht soldiers in Greece.²³⁸ The formula these Germans were running on did not necessarily need fanaticism but the belief of racial superiority enabled some of them to commit massacres against civilians.²³⁹ For the purpose of this study the following observation of Mazower is very interesting: *“Considerations of justice, morality and military honour mingled with widely accepted notions of racial inferiority and social deviance in their attitude towards reprisals.”*²⁴⁰

Innere Fuehrung is by far too complex to constitute any simple formula. In other words, racism or ideology are not simply substituted by the often cited norms and values embedded in the German Basic Law. Although Innere Fuehrung definitely substitutes them and tries to prevent a “cold and mechanical” acting of soldiers, it is far more. Innere

²³⁷ Mazower, *Military Violence*, 158.

²³⁸ Ibid., 158.

²³⁹ Mazower refers to the massacre of Kommeno in north-western Greece on August 16, 1943.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 158.

Fuehrung enables soldiers to recognize a situation as described above and equips them to deal with it properly since it denies racialism and clearly defines the role “military honour” plays in the overall concept. Conflicting duties are made distinguishable from seemingly conflicting duties. The problem of conflicting norms in the sense of conflicting laws might seem complicated at first look, but it becomes clearer when one considers that the possible lack of legal knowledge can be partially substituted by morality. In other words, even in daily life not everybody has a master’s degree in law and yet everybody usually tries to act in a way that excludes conflict with laws. By referring to its inherent values Innere Fuehrung sets the boundaries where soldiers can and should get answers on the above cited “considerations of justice, morality and military honour.” What is it, though?

Philosophy as a science does not offer a common agreed definition. A linguistic analysis reveals that philosophy can be “a search for a general understanding of values and reality by chiefly speculative rather than observational means.” Innere Fuehrung does not search for an understanding of values, neither is it speculative. The values are defined and not subject to discussion. If one wishes to continue a linguistic analysis one could find that philosophy can be “a theory underlying or regarding a sphere of activity or thought.” Innere Fuehrung is more than a theory; however, it shows an underlying character. The last entry of the dictionary comes close to the character and intention of Innere Fuehrung by stating, that philosophy constitutes “the most basic beliefs, concepts, and attitudes of an individual or group.”²⁴¹ Innere Fuehrung, however, is only the vehicle that carries the values and the description to incorporate them.

According to the current central field manual ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung is a process that materializes the values and norms of the German Basic Law. It refers to ethical, judicial, political, and societal foundations.²⁴² All soldiers must be able at all time to live and act with personal responsibility as well as being prepared to take over

²⁴¹ The linguistic analysis is based upon the entry “philosophy” in: *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*. 11th ed. Merriam-Webster: Springfield, May 2003. 930.

²⁴² ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung, Chapter 3.

responsibility from others for others. In order to do so, they must sharpen their conscience and develop moral judgment ability.²⁴³

Ethics is “the discipline dealing what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation.” Furthermore it is a “system of moral values” and it contains “the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group.”²⁴⁴ Such a definition at first sight seems perfectly to match Innere Fuehrung. This becomes even more plausible given the catalogue of soldierly values based upon the sense of Innere Fuehrung. There exists an idea of how the Bundeswehr soldier should be:

Catalogue of Soldierly Values In the Sense of “Innere Fuehrung”




Figure 7. Catalogue of Soldierly Values

Such a definition neglects though the existence of a multitude of exogenous factors—like religion or philosophy—that on the one hand contributed to the (moral)

²⁴³ Clement and Joeris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr*, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 508.

²⁴⁴ Merriam-Webster’s *Collegiate Dictionary*. 429.

values while on the other hand such factors still shape the decision making process. Although the last decision instance for any individual is his or her conscience, it is clear that conscience is not only influenced by values but also to a certain degree by the knowledge of laws.

The danger of philosophy is the exclusive character, while ethic or a concept of ethics might be too specific. *Innere Fuehrung* in this case is a good compromise since it combines partly philosophy and ethics. The last entry in the dictionary plainly offers “guiding philosophy” for the term ethic.

Following Hartmann one could argue that *Innere Fuehrung* is not the guiding philosophy *of* the Bundeswehr but rather a guiding philosophy *for* the Bundeswehr.²⁴⁵ For the purpose of this study *Innere Fuehrung* is the unique institutional culture of the Bundeswehr for the Bundeswehr. Giving its openness and its deep anchoring in German society it constitutes a business culture that easily enables interaction with other agencies.

²⁴⁵ Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung*, 8-9.

III. TRANSFORMATION

Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that is the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.

— Carl von Clausewitz²⁴⁶

Transformation has become in the ears of many military personnel a buzzword with a mostly pejorative character.²⁴⁷ One of the main reasons for this reaction from soldiers is the notion that “transformation” inevitably seems to be connected with negative change. Without defining the term’s specific content, the linguistic analysis already implies that during transformation the status quo changes. In other words, as the next lines show, transformation is all about change.²⁴⁸

However, what makes transformation a suspicious endeavor in the eyes of those “living” transformation at the “receiving end” is that they experience it as a remote top-down approach threatening their own career paths. Moreover, they have an unerring sense that traditional organizational branches will be swept away by technological advances and that future forces will be simply tailored according to dubious economic and political needs.²⁴⁹

Others fear that, with the transformation agenda propelled by powerful lobbyists, in the end only infantry forces will remain. These infantry forces may be expeditionary forces mainly skilled with counterinsurgency tactics.²⁵⁰ Current military operations,

²⁴⁶ *On War*, Book I, I,3.

²⁴⁷ Hammes, *The Sling*.

²⁴⁸ For the process of change, USJFCOM offers a good entry.
<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html> accessed March 15, 2008.

²⁴⁹ Carl Conetta, “Cul de Sac: 9/11 and the Paradox of American Power.” Research Monograph No. 13. Project on Defense Alternatives. Commonwealth Institute: Cambridge, Ma. 2008. 11.

²⁵⁰ Steven Mertz and Frank Hoffman, “Restructuring America’s Ground Forces: Better, Not Bigger.” The Stanley Foundation. Policy Analysis Brief. September 2007. www.stanleyfoundation.org accessed February 14, 2008.

notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, in combination with the revival of books of the classic counterinsurgency era (e.g., works by David Galula) seem to underline such a trend.²⁵¹

Because of the discussion whether there are new images of war has direct connections to the term Transformation, this chapter starts with an outlook of this contemporary discussion. Then in an attempt to grasp the phenomenon Transformation and its implications this chapter uses a threefold strategy. The term “Transformation” is approached from a short analysis of the contemporary U.S. discussion, the NATO discussion and—if it can be called thus—the German approach.

Another main part of this chapter is dedicated to the status quo of the overarching approach presently called EBO, EBAO or CA. Doing so a short look is taken at the concept of NCW and its relation and a possible interdependency to this overarching approach.

A. NEW WARS—ASYMMETRIC THREATS?

It is undoubtedly true that presently in a world subject to globalization one can detect a changed security environment compared to the days of the cold-war period.²⁵² As this chapter shows, such a changed security environment is often mentioned as driving factor for Transformation. Furthermore it is often concluded that war has become a new image.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Galula David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Praeger Security: Westport, Ct, London, 1964, 2006.

²⁵² Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 7.

When the author of this paper joined the Bundeswehr in October 1989 in order to fulfill his citizenship duties as a conscript the service time was a quarter ago prolonged for three months to a length of eighteen month. Almost exactly one month later in the evening of November 9th 1989 the wall in Berlin came down. The German Democratic Republic turned to be a chapter in history and together with the end of this large field study of “real existing socialism” the end of the cold war was near. As a kind of peace dividend the service time for German conscripts was reduced to twelve month in 1990.

²⁵³ Some like Mary Kaldor propose that even wars are new. Kaldor argues, that interstate wars have been replaced a mixture of criminal violence with global as well as local actors who are of private or public nature. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. 2nd ed. London: Polity, 2007.

Others like Herfried Muenkler argue that classical interstate wars are too expensive and their preparation is too obvious. Therefore—though they still exist—they constitute a discontinued model. However, Muenkler does admit that his observations might only be valid for the first half for the twenty-first century. Herfried Muenkler, “Neues vom Chamaeleon Krieg.” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ)* 16-17/2007. April 16, 2007. 3–9.

In the early 1990s, many scientists as well as politicians seemed completely be surprised by the sudden crumbling of bipolarity.²⁵⁴ However it was more than a decade later when the still continuing classic inter-state war image finally was shattered.²⁵⁵ Although the classic and hence to a certain extent symmetric image of war in the form of war between states seems to fade away in the face of that ill-fated September morning in 2001 and its aftermath, a few constants remain.²⁵⁶ The moment the first human beings started systematically to impose their will upon others by the use of deadly force, the nature of war and its results have not changed much. Therefore it would be more correct to speak of new challenges to the security environment. These challenges stem from the observation that wars or the purposeful use of violence have become commercialized and privatized.²⁵⁷

Such observations of a new security environment are real to a great extent; nevertheless sometimes the conclusions drawn out of these observations are endangered of leading to haphazard decisions in the long run. These decisions involve the interdependent complex of equipment, training and education of regular soldiers as expression of a states' monopoly over violence or the exercise of power. Quick efficiency oriented decisions might be the short time answers to current problems but they will not guarantee a successful future since they might not correlate with strategy or even worse the still existing international organizational principle. According to this principle states constitute the international actors and these states exercise violence over their own territory.²⁵⁸ Whoever questions this principle questions the role of armed forces in politics, its civil-military relationship and the connected democratic control and

²⁵⁴ As an example for the then spreading ideas in the field of international relations two widely received thinkers shall be mentioned. There is on the one hand Samuel P. Huntington with his rather apocalyptic "clash of civilizations" while Francis Fukuyama predicted "the end of history." Surprisingly both ended their titles at least in the beginning of their publication with a question mark.

²⁵⁵ Dieter Ruloff, and Livia Schubiger, *Kriegerische Konflikte: eine Uebersicht. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ) 16-17/2007*. April 16, 2007

²⁵⁶ Muenkler, *Neues vom Chamaeleon Krieg*, 5.

²⁵⁷ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, Preface.vi–x.

²⁵⁸ Although one can see the vanishing role of the state as the main actor, for the purpose of this paper it is assumed that the Weberian definition of the state still applies. For Max Weber a state is an organization that maintains a monopoly of violence over a (own) territory. Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation." *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*. Muenchen, 1921. 396–450.

advocates chaos. Leaving the path of such principles or rules awards those who cowardishly attack others with carpet cutters. Privatizing the monopoly of force into the hands of mercenaries is the wrong answer on privatized and commercialized violence.²⁵⁹

It is undoubted that these criminal low cost “warriors” constitute a threat to any form of national security and that they contribute to the impression of a new security environment. Thus the answer cannot be of the same kind since it would lead to anarchy where the survival of the fittest (i.e., not necessarily the strongest) will lead to a further downward spiral.²⁶⁰ No sole military Transformation ever will find appropriate solutions to the advantage of attack a military relatively under equipped or generally every opponent has.²⁶¹ In other words, the main danger of Transformation lies in the wrong application of its technical possibilities. This danger gets bigger, once long term strategic necessities and factors are neglected.

It is true that the most likely threat for the United States for example presently does not result from regular forces of another state.²⁶² Denying the new challenges of the security environment one could call even counter factualism. Nevertheless, given the current oil prices, along with a rising nationalism, Russia might – sooner or later – again constitute the well-known old security environment with an able and capable Russia.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Christian Schaller, “Private Sicherheits- und Militaerfirmen in bewaffneten Konflikten.” http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=724 accessed March 8, 2008.

²⁶⁰ John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter. “A World of Liberty Under Law.” In: Richard K. Betts, (ed.) *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*. 3rd ed. New York et al.: Pearson Longman, 2008.625-630.627.

²⁶¹ Richard K. Betts, “The Soft underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 1 (Spring 2002). Reprinted in Betts, Richard K. (ed.) *Conflict*. 559–575. 563.

²⁶² Conetta, *Cul de Sac*, 9.

²⁶³ Hannes Adomeit, “Russische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik.” *IFDT—Information fuer die Truppe* Nr.2, II. Quartal 2006. 34–37.

B. TRANSFORMATION—THREE DEFINITIONS

The major advances in civilization are processes that all but wreck the societies in which they occur.

— Alfred North Whitehead²⁶⁴

Due to the evolving quality and the dynamic character of Transformation, the assessment of the three main directions of this term reflects trends and is not definitive. Because Transformation can be described as dynamic, static definitions are not of great use. Therefore the following paragraphs blend the various definition attempts for Transformation in order to show communalities.

In the view of a European, one aspect is striking: Transformation is seen differently on the two sides of the Atlantic.²⁶⁵ The United States takes a more technology-oriented approach, while Germany favors a conceptual approach, including an emphasis on an overarching security concept.²⁶⁶

Without judging transformation and its results, there is a common denominator that calls for open-mindedness and encourages the spirit of exploring new ideas and approaches.²⁶⁷

1. The United States

Transformation can be traced back to the so called last Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA).²⁶⁸ Without referring to the present situation in Iraq, a few basic principles from the last and still lasting revolution in military affairs can be drawn from

²⁶⁴ As cited in Gergen, Kenneth R. *An Invitation*, 1.

²⁶⁵ Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed*, 61.

²⁶⁶ White Paper 2006, 29.

²⁶⁷ http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/rma/Primer3_e.asp accessed March 3, 2008.

²⁶⁸ If the emergence of a new technology and its military use has a fundamental impact on the conduct of war, one can label this a “revolution in military affairs.” Such fundamental changes periodically appeared in history. Some examples are the use of railroads, the telegraph, or the nuclear bomb. Most commonly they led to a superiority which usually resulted in victory. A good definition of RMA in general can be found at the internet pages of the Canadian Forces. http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/rma/primer_e.asp accessed March 3, 2008.

the Iraq theatre. The technological cornerstones are the advance of information technology, high mobility of forces and precision guided ammunition.²⁶⁹

Given the information from USFCOM's website the United States define Transformation as follows:

Transformation is the process of changing form, nature or function. Within the United States military, transformation requires changing the form, or structure of our military forces; the nature of our military culture and doctrine supporting those forces; and streamlining our warfighting functions to more effectively meet the complexities of the new threats challenging our nation in the new millennium.²⁷⁰

Furthermore six transformation goals are listed which range from the commonly known goals like protection of the homeland and power projection via the explicit mentioning of the protection of information networks and making use of such technology up to the access and use of space.²⁷¹

Additionally in order to create the twenty-first-century forces the method of Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) is the main tool.²⁷² Interestingly a reference to effects-based planning is given.²⁷³ The emphasis on technology is visible.²⁷⁴

2. NATO

Facing the tragic moments of September 11, 2001, and their consequences was not the first time the question arose, whether a cold war security alliance seemed to be an

²⁶⁹ Benjamin Schreer, "Die Transformation der U.S.-Streitkräfte im Lichte des Irakkriegs." http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=680 accessed March 8, 2008. 25.

²⁷⁰ <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html> accessed March 8, 2008.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² "Concept Development and Experimentation." Within this method a concept is subject to experimentation and supposed to be further developed. It is not an exercise since an appropriate experimentation design shall eliminate unfeasible ideas rather than to train mistakes. <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html> accessed March 8, 2008.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Schreer, *Die Transformation*, 6.

appropriate answer for current security challenges.²⁷⁵ Through the various summits since 2001 the Alliance has recognized this and still puts a premium on its core competence, the collective defense role, while at the same time tries to cope with this various new challenges resulting from asymmetric warfare.²⁷⁶ Transformation shall deliver the appropriate answers.

It is no coincidence that USJFCOM and NATO ACT are in very close proximity. The latter is supposed to convey the ideas of the first into NATO. Differences in some fields are marginal. ACT for example sees Transformation as “a sustained and dynamic process that develops and integrates new concepts, processes, technologies, and organizational designs.”²⁷⁷

Furthermore in the 2005 document “Understanding NATO Military Transformation” published via the ACT website NATO offers the following summary of Transformation:

NATO’s military transformation efforts strive for improved interoperability where fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces, capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battle-space, ensure the Alliance’s relevance—now and in the future. Military transformation is as much about mindset as it is about technology. It is about understanding the need to embed a culture of innovation and managed risk into our thinking.²⁷⁸

The emphasis of the mindset in a perceived opposition to technology differs from the U.S.-version. One might argue that—like the rest of the above definition—this is

²⁷⁵ www.iht.com/articles/2004/06/26/edbonnart_ed3 accessed February 28, 2008. One of the first and still current scholarly works on this topic about the core competence of the Alliance can be found at: Yost, *NATO Transformed*.

²⁷⁶ The summits were Prague 2002, Istanbul 2004, and Riga 2006.

²⁷⁷ Although surely more in depth documents exist, the “ACT Trifold” as of November 2007 is not classified and gives an understandable overview of the concept of the Alliance’s Transformation. <http://www.act.nato.int/media/5-Multimedia/Doclibrary/trifoldfall07.pdf> accessed February 28, 2008.

A deeper analysis on another level can be found at: Meyer zum Felde, *From NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)*. 55–75.

²⁷⁸ <http://www.act.nato.int/media/5-Multimedia/Doclibrary/unmtbooketenglishversion.pdf> accessed March 8, 2008. i.

credited to the chronically unwillingness or inability of the majority of NATO members other than the United States to spend more money on their defense budgets.²⁷⁹

Furthermore the Alliance recognizes three Transformation goals and seven Transformation objective areas (TOA). The three Transformation goals are decision superiority, coherent effects, and joint deployment and sustainment. These goals are supported by the seven TOAs (Information Superiority, NATO Network-Enabled Capability, Effective Engagement, Joint-Manoeuvre, Enhanced Civil-Military Cooperation, Expeditionary Operations and Integrated Logistics).²⁸⁰

3. Germany

Transformation in the White Paper 2006 is a continuation of the Bundeswehr Concept of 2004 which again is related to the Defense Policy Guidelines published in 2003.²⁸¹ From the early documents one main argument can be derived; for Germany Transformation means that the Bundeswehr has to focus on its core (i.e., military) competencies. This economic driven impetus mainly stems from budgetary restrictions which to a certain extent are still a result from the reunification.²⁸²

Here most probably lies the biggest difference from the thoughts of the other agencies. Budgetary restrictions however have their limitations, too. The observed trend

²⁷⁹ Such is expressed in the second half in this summary: “*It requires investment in time and resources, with a return sometimes difficult to measure and not always guaranteed. However, with a clear vision, common aim and quality people, our successes will far outweigh the disappointments and the investments of Member Nations will indeed show solid returns over time.*” Ibid.

This argument about budget issues also can be found at: Geir Lundestad, “Towards Transatlantic Drift?” in: Andrews, David M. (ed.). *The Transatlantic Alliance under Stress: U.S.-European Relations after Iraq*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2005. 9–29. 22.

²⁸⁰ ACT Trifold.

²⁸¹ At <http://www.bmvg.de/portal> accessed March 1, 2008, one can find the following: “The Bundeswehr Concept as derived from the Defence Policy Guidelines represents the conceptual and structural framework for future stationing of Bundeswehr units in Germany. The key elements of the Bundeswehr Concept are: Focusing on the most probable operations; dispensing with capabilities and structures which solely serve national defence in the traditional sense; strengthening the joint approach including a joint command and control organisation; allocating to the force categories of response forces, stabilisation forces and support forces which allows for differentiated training and equipment; firmly integrating conscripts into the structures of all military organisational areas; and cost-efficiency in procurement and in-service use.

²⁸² Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics*, 72.

in the aftermath of contemporary military operations, to favor outsourcing of security-providing and support tasks to private companies constitutes such a deviation. These private companies and mercenaries are not bound to the high moral standards that the German concept of Innere Fuehrung upholds. Neither do they identify themselves sometimes with the mission in a way that is necessary to legitimize such operations over all.²⁸³ Therefore, this can be seen as a limitation to the German approach to Transformation.

The described further motivation for Transformation in the Bundeswehr however does not differ in great detail from those agencies as described before.²⁸⁴ Defining the term Transformation is performed over three pages and relates to various NATO concepts and summits.²⁸⁵ A short look at the index of the White Paper 2006 reveals that at roughly one hundred seventy pages the term “transformation” is used thirty seven times in its different variations. The term “training” shows thirty four entries, while Innere Fuehrung gets eight hits. “Operations” (82), “European Union” (48), and “NATO” (44) are the top three listings. Without further analysis this marks a clear trend that this White Paper once more emphasizes the multinational outline of Germany’s interests as well as “transformation” has become reality.

C. AN OVERARCHING APPROACH

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, the NATO heads of state and government expressed in their “Comprehensive Political Guidance” the Alliance’s need for an “effects-based approach,” commonly referred to as EBAO.²⁸⁶ Yet, this topic must be seen in relation to terms and developments connected to it. The Effects-Based Approach to Operations addresses the strategic level in order to combine all available capabilities of

²⁸³ Schaller, *Private Sicherheits- und Militaerfirmen in bewaffneten Konflikten*, 30.

²⁸⁴ White Paper 2006. 42. The German Luftwaffe adds that Transformation is a “self obligation towards capability oriented thinking and acting.” It is the spirit of the latter this paper explores. „Was ist Transformation.” www.luftwaffe.de accessed March 8, 2008.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 38-42.

²⁸⁶ Political Guidance (CPG); Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006 at the Riga Summit: Part 2, par.17. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b061129e.htm> accessed March 3, 2008.

all agencies and organizations acting in a specific engagement space. NCW addresses by definition mainly the tactical level of analysis.²⁸⁷ These terms are part of a key concept for NATO for the transformation of the allied forces in order to operate successfully in the new strategic environment.²⁸⁸

Besides the *status quo* of EBAO in NATO, a particular view is directed towards Germany. Because EBAO emphasizes the interagency approach, the different business cultures of the various agencies must be taken into account. For the purpose of this paper the construct of Innere Fuehrung is considered as the military equivalent of an organization's business culture.

This chapter examines, whether other approaches to strengthen the mental backbone of military forces and their roots in society, such as the German concept of civil military relations namely Innere Fuehrung, lead to a different perception of EBAO as a rather strategic concept.

1. EBO, EBAO or NCW?

It is no surprise or coincidence that the two headquarters (NATO ACT /USJFCOM) are collocated. The impetus for the last RMA came from the U.S. and made its development via "Desert Storm" 1991 to its preliminary climax in the "Operation Iraqi Freedom" 2003. Information and the timely distribution for crucial information were the main driving factors for this RMA. Especially in the U.S. the trend towards the

²⁸⁷ Network Centric Operations or for example the German version NetOpFue (Vernetzte Operationsfuehrung), which is an evolution to NCW but still based on the ideas of the advantage of a net formed out of soldiers who can act simultaneously as sensors and effectors. Another hint for the connection can be found in the Riga CPG in par. 17, where there is a reference to "*enhancing situational awareness, timely operational planning and decisionmaking, improving links between commanders, sensors and weapons*" which actually is the core of NCW. Ibid. Part 2, par.17. The discussion about RMA, Transformation, NCW and NetOpFue from a German perspective can be found at Collmer, Sabine. "Der flexible Soldat: Vom Landesverteidiger zum Soldaten im Einsatz." In: Wiesendahl (ed.), *Innere Fuehrung*. 139–153.147–148.

²⁸⁸ Although surely more in depth documents exist, the "ACT Trifold" as of November 2007 is unclassified and gives an understandable overview of the concept of the Alliance's Transformation. <http://www.act.nato.int/media/5-Multimedia/Doclibrary/trifoldfall07.pdf> accessed February 28, 2008. A deeper analysis can be found at: Meyer zum Felde, Rainer. *From NATO's Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)*. 55–75.

information age and its implications was eagerly and early applied to military forces.²⁸⁹ Without referring to the present situation in Iraq, a few basic principles from the last and still lasting revolution in military affairs can be drawn from the Iraq theatre. The technological cornerstones are the advance of information technology, high mobility of forces and precision guided ammunition.²⁹⁰ However, as for this paper the U.S. interpretation of EBAO—as a developed form of Effects Based Operations (EBO)—is only considered in part.

The comparison of the definitions strikingly revealed that especially the U.S. interpretation of revolution in military affairs as well as transformation places, from a non-American perspective seen, too great an emphasis on the hegemony of technology.²⁹¹ This might be credited to a certain extent to the perception, that Americans tend to have a more open attitude towards the use of technology.²⁹²

In 2002 Edward A. Smith published a book with the title *Effects Based Operations*, where he described the state of the art of the contemporary U.S. way to fight wars and how to organize future forces.²⁹³ The presented ideas based on the successful Desert Storm campaign and the modifications as applied over time through USJFCOM. It then seemed that EBO are a form of applied NCW not only in war but also in peace and crisis. This U.S. centered view was based on the assumption, that four instruments of (U.S.) national power exist, which would apply the many sources of national power. These instruments were composed out of four different areas, the so-called DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) spectrum, while the source stemmed from the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information) domains. The idea of a systemic approach was the underlying basic assumption: links and

²⁸⁹ Leonard G. Litton, “The Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War.” <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Litton.html> accessed March 8, 2008.

²⁹⁰ Schreer, “Die Transformation der U.S.-Streitkräfte im Lichte des Irakkriegs.” http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=680 accessed March 8, 2008. 25.

²⁹¹ Vego, Milan N. *Effects-Based Operations: A critique*.

²⁹² Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe*. Cambridge, Ma et al.: Harvard University Press 2005. 286–287.

²⁹³ Edward A. Smith, *Effects Based Operation (EBO)*.

nodes of the social net where the points to apply power in order to create effects. Close connections to the (U.S.) intelligence community were obvious. Despite its attractiveness, for an Alliance of sovereign nation states such an approach had a genetic birth defect, since it was tailored to the use of force of one single state, with limited need for arrangement between the entities of the DIME-spectrum. In addition to a strong executive power the dominant military component saw less need for information interagency with other less equipped military.

As a consequence NATO started to emphasize the comprehensive element and the interagency with other actors in the engagement space. How one should imagine the NATO version of EBO was presented in 2005 in the CAFJO, the Concepts of Alliance Future Joint Operations. This concept was revised in February 2006 and found its manifestation in the CPG endorsed in Riga. Some terms used in the CAFJO differ slightly, while others especially where there is a political need for arrangement between the states sound different. The DIME spectrum for example is replaced by the PMEC (political, military, economic, civil) term.

Basically, the ideas behind both versions (EBAO/EBO) are very similar. Both are visions, both are systemic approaches with the need for a holistic view of the engagement space and both are based on the assumption, that information superiority will lead to decision superiority which finally will lead to a coherent deliverance of adjusted effects. Furthermore, both need a network, a physical one for the information exchange as well as a mental one.

Since EBAO and NCW are often mentioned simultaneously a brief description of the relationship between these two terms is needed. One discriminator is the level each term addresses. EBAO addresses the strategic level, while NCW and its variations are the technical backbone of the before mentioned approach, the net were everybody is a sensor and effector at the same time. Critics are attracted by this combination since for one part of them the technological difficulties are way to big to overcome while the other portion of critics sees in this the total control of each single soldier. This in turn would degrade

the soldier into a simple bullet fired at will of a general far away from the scene.²⁹⁴ With this quality NCW reaches deep into the tactical level.

Yet this does not imply that NCW is mainly about technical specifications and EBAO mainly on the conceptual level. Neither does it qualify the importance of these terms. Both are important in order to achieve the before mentioned deliverance of coherent effects. They act as the blades of a scissor; it simply does not matter which blade cuts the paper first. It is of importance that the design of the scissor enables the better cut than two single blades.

2. “EBAO After Riga”

Although any Comprehensive Political Guidance resembles at best a successful compromise and often is seen as a tradition of already existing predecessors because they are agreed documents, this Riga CPG once more emphasizes the changed security environment.²⁹⁵

Furthermore, these CPG state at various places that the timeline or the horizon for the expected answer to the changed security environment for the necessary changes will be the “next 10–15 years.”²⁹⁶ This raises the question, whether it is too early to search for any results or already to take stock. Given the relative inertia or lethargy of military organizations as well as any other governmental organization or even like most NGO’s to structural and organizational changes, it is amazing, that some parts of the CPG are already begin to work out. Yet it is still a long way to go.

a. NATO and EBAO

As for EBAO, the smoke has gone; the “fancy” topic has lost something of its newness. Roughly sixteen months after the CPG it can be assumed, that these ideas for such an approach have taken roots in the various headquarters and first steps are

²⁹⁴ Jim Storr, “A Critique of Effects-Based Thinking.” *RUSI Journal* 150, December 2005, London. 32-35. www.au.af.mil/au/au/bibs/ebo.htm accessed April 14, 2008.

²⁹⁵ CPG, Riga. part 2, no. 4 and no. 5.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., introduction no. 1, part 1 no. 2 and part 3 no.16.

undertaken. It is not surprising that especially air forces are more open to the changes EBAO might and NCW will bring to military structures since it is about communication, openness, speed and a timely situational picture.²⁹⁷ All of these are domains modern air forces usually claim as their trademark.²⁹⁸ The Joint Air Power Competence Centre where many NATO air forces try “to provide timely and innovative advice” in matters of air power, for example is very active in spreading the EBAO-thoughts.²⁹⁹

Although not directly sponsored by NATO, significant milestones in turning EBAO into reality are the USJFCOM sponsored Multinational Experiment (MNE) Series.³⁰⁰ Throughout this series, the main problem areas of EBAO in a multinational environment gradually turned out. Among others, these are timely and simultaneous planning, communication abilities such as a common communication platform, a technical as well as a “spiritual” one. These valuable experiments and their national variations have shown that the focus on business cultures becomes more and more important.

Although as seen today the various organizations work more or less simultaneously in the same security environment, it will remain an illusion to coordinate at all time the actions in an efficient way. Effective might be, but is this still the desired outcome of those who dictate that there is a war “light” in the sense of the illusion of a controllable blow and hence it is possible to make a surgical use of deadly force?

²⁹⁷ A typical product for the positive reception of Transformation by air forces in general is the flyer of the Luftwaffe with the title “Transformation.” Although made for a broader distribution it still manages to explain the connection between Transformation, NetOpFue (German version of NCW) and the mission the Luftwaffe has as a part of the Bundeswehr. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General T. Michael Mosley gives a strong summing up for the role and quality of air power in his December 2007 CSAF White Paper.

²⁹⁸ Lieutenant General Stieglitz, Klaus-Peter. “The Luftwaffe of Tomorrow.” *Luftwaffe 2005: The German Air Force, Today and Tomorrow*. St. Augustin: CPM Forum, 2005. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General T. Michael Mosley gives a strong summing up for the role and quality of air power in his December 2007 CSAF White Paper: “The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force.” www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080207-048.pdf accessed January 12, 2008.

²⁹⁹ Lieutenant General Stieglitz, Klaus-Peter. “The Luftwaffe of Tomorrow.”

²⁹⁹ JAPCC Web site: <http://www.japcc.de/mission.html> accessed March 6, 2008. The JAPCC is located in Kalkar, Germany.

³⁰⁰ United States Joint Forces Command web site <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/pa060806.htm> accessed March 7, 2008.

b. Germany and EBAO

EBAO addresses the strategic level in order to combine all available capabilities of all agencies and organizations (military and non-military) acting in a specific engagement space. This requires a holistic view, where coherent planning across all agencies (military and non-military) is executed throughout the whole operation and hence automatically raises the question of interagency cooperation and the respective competencies between the various agencies that by nature have different business cultures. Therefore, the “business culture” of the Bundeswehr, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* acts as case study.³⁰¹

The same developments as seen in NATO concerning the reception of the idea can be seen in Germany. Officers of the Luftwaffe for example have contributed in various articles towards the topic as well as the Luftwaffe was the first branch to develop conceptual documents which were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe in spring 2007, only a few months after the CPG were endorsed in Riga.

EBAO, however, is more than a mere military concept. It also involves non-military agencies of national power and thus it involves other business cultures. Another focus of this paper therefore is how the respective business cultures can successfully interact. Since this thesis is limited in pages, the sole examination and depiction of *Innere Fuehrung* must answer the question, where there might be intersection for such an interagency of business cultures. The ZDv 10/1 in its number 634 demands that working in a multinational environment all members of the Bundeswehr doing so have to be familiar with organizational principles and the business cultures of military forces of other nations as well as of those of non governmental organizations.³⁰²

Here might further future research of other business cultures help to illuminate the path all agencies of national power might have to go. This section examines whether

³⁰¹ The idea of *Innere Fuehrung* as a business culture of the Bundeswehr where it creates a corporate identity can be tracked back in parts to the “mental father” Wolf Count Baudissin (1907–1993). A more detailed description of the of connection how an assembly of ethical thoughts can lead to a business culture can be found at Elmar Wiesendahl, *Innere Fuehrung*, 17–19.

³⁰² ZDv 10/1. No. 634.

Innere Fuehrung remains valid despite changes in technology and the emergence of new operational requirements, including interagency cooperation with different organizations. As Chapter IV shows Innere Fuehrung puts an emphasis on the soldier as a human being responsible for fulfilling his moral and legal obligations.

D. EBAO, TRANSFORMATION AND THE GERMANS—A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION

This section examined the *status quo* of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) and the framework within the Alliance seeks to realize its three transformation goals. Transformation and EBAO are intertwined. The characteristic assumption of the vision called EBAO is that all available resources are used in the most efficient and effective way possible. In its origins EBAO addresses mainly the military instrument; the “M” in P MEC. Unfortunately here lies some danger; recent operations showed that the “M” is capable of delivering effects that lead to a favorable situation but not to an end state. Here all the other instruments, the “P,” “E” and “C” are required. In order to guarantee the success of such an approach the guidance in order to make really use of all instruments must be in the hand of the respective politicians. This is as well a question of legitimacy as of practicality, since it is hardly imaginable, that over the entire operation the other elements with the culture of risk avoidance will be led by the one element with the completely opposing business culture: risk management.³⁰³

Yet in this context the basic reason for the appliance of military power as politics continued in the Clausewitzian sense should never be forgotten. War, or to be more modern, the use of kinetic force, must at all times remain the *ultima ratio*, the very last resort. Military power is no end in itself, nor can it be used isolated for a longer time, its use must be careful since war is always costly and never effective for all parties.³⁰⁴ An enhanced efficiency and effectiveness must not lead to an improper use of the military instrument. However, it must be credible for any opponent that the use of military force

³⁰³ The usage of the word “operation” is for most Germans yet another indicator for its military origin.

³⁰⁴ Harper, *American Visions*, 29.
Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 78.

is an option. The same way an altered security environment demands a flexible use of all available instruments. This contradiction is the split; future research will have to answer.

The White Paper 2006 clearly states the role of Germany as an international actor with distinct interests. Once more Germany explicitly reassures its neighbours and allies the values and goals of German security policy. Security for Germany is a multinational and multilateral approach. The three determining organizations are the United Nations, the European Union and NATO.³⁰⁵ The future lies in the approach of a so called networked security, wherein network here has a different meaning than among U.S. technocrats in uniform. In order to reach such structures the military forces have to be transformed as outlined in the Bundeswehr Concept as of August 2004. This transformation is in full swing.

Given the above mentioned strict adherence to NATO as “cornerstone of Germany’s future security and defense policy” and its role as “link between two continents” it is of less surprise that the way Transformation as seen in NATO does not differ to a large extent from the way Transformation is seen in Germany. Yet the construct of Innere Fuehrung helps to prevent Transformation from becoming to technology oriented since it points out the importance of the human being in the whole process.

Nevertheless, this chapter concludes that a mere combination of copies of military operational art of the past with current and future technological military capabilities at best will lead to short-term operational success. Therefore, Transformation is not only about budgetary restrictions fostering creativity; it is—or mainly should be—about strategy, corresponding concepts and human beings. The danger of neglecting strategy or the inner cohesion of democratic armed forces is immanent and counter-productive.

³⁰⁵ White Paper 2006. 28.

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IV. INNERE FUEHRUNG TODAY

Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. ... For mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined, and disloyal; they are brave among their friends and cowards before the enemy; they have no fear of God, they do not keep faith with their fellow man; they avoid defeat just so long as they avoid battle; in peacetime you are despoiled by them, and in wartime by the enemy.

— Niccolo Machiavelli³⁰⁶

This study embodies the profound belief that, despite astonishing technological possibilities, the emphasis in the art of war still remains on the quality of human beings.³⁰⁷ Only well educated and trained individuals who serve their democratic society as citizens in the best sense and regular forces are able to defend this society with its constitutional principles and values. Still this stricture affords no absolute guarantee for success or prevention of war crimes.³⁰⁸

With the above in mind, this chapter examines the military culture of the Bundeswehr based on Innere Fuehrung, as directed by the German Basic Law, and points out where transformation might have its limits for the Bundeswehr. One aim of this chapter then is to determine whether the Bundeswehr still follows its own guiding principles or if in the face of Transformation Innere Fuehrung has become a mere mask for public relations.

This chapter illuminates the close relationship of Innere Fuehrung and the Bundeswehr as a conscript force, in view of the fact that conscripts play a vital

³⁰⁶ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*. George Bull, (trans.). London et al.: Penguin, 1999. 40.

³⁰⁷ Such an attitude however, is not a reflection of hostility toward the use of technology for military purposes as one could observe at German officers throughout centuries. Walle, Heinrich, “Technikrezeption der militaerischen Fuehrung in Deutschland.” In: Peter H. Blaschke, (ed.). *De Officio: Zu den ethischen Herausforderungen des Offizierberufes*. 2nd completely revised edition. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000. 319–338.

³⁰⁸ This study does not refer in detail to the various uses and shapes of contractors in times of outsourcing of tasks that are not considered genuine militarily. Not all contractors are mercenaries in the sense of this study. For the purpose of this study mercenaries are those members of private companies who pursuit rather robust security tasks including the use of armed force. In other words, tasks that one expects to be in the hand of regular forces exercising a state’s monopoly over force.

democratic role in the life of the armed forces, owing in part to the anti democratic record of German soldiers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As the previous chapter has shown Transformation is not only related to the latest technological advancements. Strategy and ideology are still playing an important role as corrective factor. Limitations to Transformation result from well exercised civil-military control as well as the thoughtful use of military power respectively the role of military force in the political process as the “*ultima ratio*.”

The danger is that the transformation of today’s military forces, which is an undoubted necessity based on a changed security environment and budget restrictions, might end up in a perverted mockery. Such tendencies can clearly be seen in the use of modern mercenaries, which at first glance seem to be cheaper than regular forces, but are definitely beyond political control. Outsourcing of the monopoly of power has its limits. Therefore Machiavelli and his reflections on mercenaries remain entirely relevant today.

A. TRANSFORMATION AND INNERE FUEHRUNG—A CONTRADICTION?

As defined before, Transformation for the German Armed Forces has the purpose to create a “capable, modern and highly motivated” Bundeswehr that is able to fulfill its tasks as instrument of German security policy in a “security environment [that] has altered fundamentally.”³⁰⁹ In other words, it is often assumed that Transformation has the only goal to transform the Bundeswehr from cold war armed forces with the main objective of defending the own or the territory of allies into a strictly efficient *Einsatzarmee*—expeditionary forces. Forces of a kind, where the fighting spirit and the need to apply deadly force and at the same time the recognition of the possibility to die is more important than the moral fiber Innere Fuehrung. Even worse, Innere Fuehrung in this connotation is regarded as hindering the qualities required for combat.³¹⁰

Despite the challenges resulting from the contemporary security environment and a changed society, one should not forget that this concept was introduced more than five

³⁰⁹ White Paper 2006. 4–5.

³¹⁰ Juergen Rose, *Kaempferkult*. <http://www.linksnet.de/artikel.php?id=1517> accessed March 1, 2008.

decades ago at the time of the reintroduction of conscription in West Germany and in the wake of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism. The skeptics of Innere Fuehrung were wrong in the past as they are wrong today as concerns the ideals that undergird the democratic role of the Bundeswehr.³¹¹

As one can see today, there exist three groups with different attitudes towards the necessity of change for Innere Fuehrung.³¹² The first group can be labeled “keepers” (*Bewahrer*) since they consider Innere Fuehrung sacrosanct and therefore consider the principles of Innere Fuehrung as untouchable.³¹³

The second group is the “protectors” (*Bewaehrungsposition*). They consider a few principles of Innere Fuehrung as untouchable and try to keep as much as possible since Innere Fuehrung is “tried and tested” (*bewaehrt*). The “protectors” can be found mainly at the MoD level and hence resemble the “official” view and guide line. The current ZDv 10/1 is expression of their view.³¹⁴ A certain sense for openness to discussion finds its manifestation in those sentences of the FM which acknowledge the existing change. This openness however, is contrasted with a clear message: the core of Innere Fuehrung is unchangeable.³¹⁵ The “protectors” however, see that Transformation in the guise of an expeditionary force partially questions Innere Fuehrung and some principles. The “protectors” try to find appropriate answers, since they see the danger of isolation the “keepers” face with their strict rejection of emerging questions as outlined above.

The third group can be labeled “revisionists.” This group in turn splits into two fractions, those who totally oppose Innere Fuehrung in the face of Transformation and those who partially want to revise Innere Fuehrung.³¹⁶ Their motives vary from the

³¹¹ Rose, *Kaempferkult*, 2.

³¹² The grouping refers to Elmar Wiesendahl, “Zur Aktualitaet der Inneren Fuehrung von Baudissin fuer das 21. Jahrhundert. Ein analytischer Bezugsrahmen.” In: Wiesendahl (ed.), *Innere Fuehrung*. 11–28. Wiesendahl counts for groups. This study sums the opponents of Innere Fuehrung as one group.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 13.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

³¹⁵ ZDv 10/1. No. 108.

³¹⁶ Wiesendahl, *Zur Aktualitaet*, 14–15.

revival of the archetypical fighter instead of the citizen in uniform up to a pure technocrat view of Transformation while their rejection ranges from total to moderate.³¹⁷

A dialogue under the condition of the unchangeable and hence nonnegotiable core of the ZDv 10/1 is necessary. It is the task of Innere Fuehrung to give answers and not the task of Transformation to dictate answers tailored to its need. Nevertheless, like Transformation, Innere Fuehrung is a process and not a product. It must be clear that this construct and its set of values are at all times the guideline of each single soldier. There is no room for military necessities derived from secret or dubious tasks to block this concept or simply undermine it. Using the ZDv 10/1 as spiritual club however, is not helpful in order to convince those who obviously have their problems understanding what Innere Fuehrung is all about.

If today's military tasks differ from those of the cold war and are closer to combat then it is a wrong signal to look back into history and search for traditional samples where German soldiers last time mostly performed combat operations. Innere Fuehrung and the closely related *Traditionserlass* from 1982 clearly prohibit such ill-fated endeavors.³¹⁸ As a logical consequence this decree is an appendix to the central field manual ZDv 10/1. Parliamentary control and the rather typical and healthy modern German anti-Nazism reflex will lead sooner or later to public discussion and respective consequences.

The White Paper 2006 dedicates a complete subchapter (3.4) to Innere Fuehrung “as the guiding principle of the Bundeswehr.”³¹⁹ Given the close relationship between Innere Fuehrung and the universal conscription, it seems as a logical consequence, that the latter forms the next subchapter (3.5).³²⁰ Drawing on the other hand the conclusion that Innere Fuehrung cannot exist without universal conscription is wrong. Innere Fuehrung is a universal principle that applies for all soldiers of the Bundeswehr in order to bring “the conditions under which mission-capable military forces operate” “into

³¹⁷ Wiesendahl, *Zur Aktualitaet*, 15.

³¹⁸ Abenheim, *Soldier*, 80–82.

³¹⁹ White Paper 2006. 78–81.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 81–83.

harmony with the principles of a free and democratic state.”³²¹ However, universal conscription is often regarded as the anchor of the armed forces in society, since it guarantees public interest in military matters and public identification with the military tasks these soldiers have to bear.³²²

The White Paper 2006 clearly states the healthy relationship between Transformation and Innere Fuehrung: “Especially in a world that has become more complex, [Innere Fuehrung] proves an indispensable aid to military personnel in finding their orientation.”³²³ Transformation and Innere Fuehrung are no contradiction as long as Transformation and the German Basic Law are not a contradiction. Innere Fuehrung is the guiding path the soldiers of the Bundeswehr can relate to in times of change. This principle based on the values enshrined in the German Basic Law more than ever enable German soldiers to apply their capabilities in an effective way. Especially in a changed security environment the respectful, unexcited, and professional demonstration of the incorporation of the values of a successful constitution most probably is more effective than any efficient weapon ever might be.³²⁴

Innere Fuehrung can help to create the necessary atmosphere where Transformation is accepted as a chance for future forces. Once more it can act as an anchor for armed forces in its society.³²⁵ It can prove that soldiers are part of this society and not distant warriors in the shape of mercenaries.

The German armed forces are the military forces of the German parliament and thus the military forces of the German people. They are no estranged functional military caste. Those who wrongly criticize the performance of the Bundeswehr and its limitations

³²¹ White Paper 2006. 78.

³²² Hartmann, *Erfolge*, 35.

³²³ Ibid., 81.

³²⁴ Ibid., 172.

³²⁵ Ibid., 159.

in contemporary military operations should therefore aware that such criticism embodies an assault on a highly democratic standard and thus sovereign decision of policy.³²⁶

B. INNERE FUEHRUNG: A GERMAN INHIBITION?

The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr deemed it necessary to provide the soldiers of the young Federal Republic of Germany with a value-based concept, including the famous idea of the citizen in uniform as a guideline.³²⁷ This idea was fashioned by soldiers and civilians who responded to the abuse of the German (and the European) citizen in the Wehrmacht and the manner in which German soldiers had seemed to be anti-democratic for the century and more preceding the creation of the Bundeswehr. This concept can be seen as a fundamental basis of ethics and motivation in the Bundeswehr based on the democratic values embodied in the German constitution. Every soldier is obligated permanently to reassess his decisions, behaviour and actions based on the constitutional and legal aspects of his mission.³²⁸

This German concept of civil-military relations is an approach to strengthen the mental backbone of military forces and their roots in society. At the same time it specifies the role of the Bundeswehr as an instrument for defence against external threats and makes an internal use highly regulated.³²⁹ Based on this role of its military force Germany easily embraces an overarching approach like EBAO. Innere Fuehrung puts an

³²⁶ As an example for a highly questionable since obviously based on a rather dubious historical connotation is the article of Roger Cohen in the *New York Times*. "Time for the Bundesmacht" by Roger Cohen, October 25, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/opinion/25cohen.html> accessed November 11, 2007.

³²⁷ Hartmann, *Erfolge*. 25.

³²⁸ Ibid., 31.

³²⁹ The German Basic Law protects itself in a very effective way. Even if the majority of the German parliament votes for the approval of a law the highest German court still can reject such a law if it considers it not in accordance with the German Basic Law. A remarkable example one can see in the rejection of the *Luftsicherheitsgesetz*. The court denied the state the possibility to shoot down high jacked aircrafts that are possibly used to commit crimes. The right of life of the passengers has a higher priority than for example a possible but not yet proven outcome of the terrorist action.

emphasis on the citizen in uniform therefore interagency with non-military agencies is easier since the “citizen *not* in uniform” is not that scared at the idea of contact and interagency.³³⁰

More than ever one soldier can have remarkable effects on the outcome of a whole operation. This raises the question whether the operational concepts are right as well as whether the personnel have been properly selected, educated, trained and prepared for their mission. The ability to trust in the individual soldier’s competence and reliability becomes more and more important. This ability is a logical consequence of Innere Fuehrung.

Whoever claims that Innere Fuehrung prevents the effective soldier i.e. that soldier who can fight and kill has on the one hand a rather limited view of soldiers while on the other hand definitely has not understood the concept of Innere Fuehrung. This concept does not foresee armed civil servants wearing battle dress uniforms. Au contraire, this concept deals with a remarkably maturity with the ultimate sacrifice a soldier can offer: his or her life.³³¹ Since it continues to see this soldier as a citizen in uniform, i.e. a part of society it wants this citizen to think about these consequences and it calls for education that might lead to answers. Soldiers of the Bundeswehr always knew that there has been more than fun behind driving a tank, flying a jet airplane or sailing the seas. Neither were the years of the bipolarity in the shade of multiple nuclear death a cosy and safe dreamland nor do the often proclaimed new challenges to the security environment change that. It is true though that the concept of Innere Fuehrung prevents drilled killer machines without own will and blind obedience.

Innere Fuehrung faces new challenges and cannot provide universal or eternal answers. Even more than five decades of the existence of the Bundeswehr, the German society still is interested in its military forces. They have not become estranged and this is partly credited to the successful concept of Innere Fuehrung as well as to the still existing

³³⁰ Hartmann, *Erfolge*, 151.

³³¹ ZDv 10/1. No 505 and No. 609.

shape of a conscript force.³³² However, the current public discussion whether to reinstate a medal for bravery maybe in the shape of the Iron Cross might be an indicator that the undoubted democratic outline of the Bundeswehr too easily is to be connected with the very dark part of German history.³³³ Discussions about medals and related symbols are even older than the Bundeswehr.³³⁴ Because Innere Fuehrung is intrinsically based on the values of the German Basic Law, it can by no means act as an inhibition. Otherwise the German Basic Law would be an inhibition, too.

The civil-military relationship is not a one-way street. Undoubtedly in a successful democracy democratic elected representatives exercise control over those they endowed with deadly force. High-level militaries are nevertheless obliged to show their fellow citizens the limitations and consequences of military force applied. The Clausewitzian reflections on war are not a universal applicable checklist, but they are timeless. War is always costly and ultimate. About this ambivalent civil-military relationship Strachan wrote: “Politicians need to be militarily informed, and soldiers—more controversially—need to be politically integrated.”³³⁵

³³² Hartmann, *Erfolge*, 123.

³³³ R. Mueller, “Dem Tapferen Soldaten” in <http://www.faz.net> accessed March 7, 2008.
St. Schultz, “Ex-Generale befuerworten Eisernes Kreuz” in <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/0,1518,539842,00.html> accessed March 7, 2008.

³³⁴ Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*.

³³⁵ Strachan, Hew. *The Politics of the British Army*. Oxford (UK): Clarendon Press. 1997. 2.

V. CONCLUSION—IS INNERE FUEHRUNG A SUPERIOR CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP?

The answer to the chapter-titular question here must be a definite “No” because Innere Fuehrung more than a concept of leadership. Furthermore a claim that Innere Fuehrung is a superior concept of leadership ignores the performance of other military forces or bluntly discredits the specific solutions other reputable democracies have found to integrate their military forces. Innere Fuehrung is the German version of civil-military control that contributes to a great deal to the business culture of the Bundeswehr. It enables leadership on the foundation of the citizen in uniform and hence creates a specific style of leadership. This particular style of leadership is based on a respective code of behaviour that inevitably leads to a code of conduct. Innere Fuehrung puts a great emphasis on the maturity of its citizens who happen or chose to be soldiers.

Innere Fuehrung has proven its effectiveness in its context. What had not been self-evident for German soldiers for the century preceding the foundation of the Bundeswehr has now become self evident: The Bundeswehr is the legitimate force of the German Parliament; it is integrated in society, and its soldiers are motivated because they can identify their task based upon the German Basic Law—which they want to protect because this law in turn offers universal protection for those following its principles. Innere Fuehrung is a process that has grown over the years and has overwhelmed time after time its critics. Open anti democratic tendencies rather sooner than later disqualify them facing a military force following the abstract principles of the German Basic Law. The short historical analysis in Chapter II provided the necessary background to understand why the concept of Innere Fuehrung is more than a concept of military ethics or simply a soldierly philosophy.

The new challenges to the security environment demand, if not new answers, at least revised answers how to cope with such challenges. Today’s operations are rather conducted in a parallel fashion than in a linear and sequential one. This is credited to the various levels of intensity modern conflicts can show today. Military forces share the engagement space with a multitude of civilians of governmental as well as non-

governmental organizations. Especially the later often are prone to a certain dislike of soldiers. This stems amongst others from the supposedly different ethical background and the derived solutions to solve conflicts. In other words, ethics play in this case a role as well two completely diverging cultures. While civilian help organizations prefer the culture of risk avoidance military forces usually follow culture of at times robust risk management.

Innere Fuehrung by its basic construction can help to overcome the perceived problem of diverging ethics. As one often can see throughout many recent operations at the tactical level is the reliance of civilian organizations on direct or indirect military protection. Furthermore military forces are still the only organizations in the world that can bring many people and equipment at any place and under almost any condition in a short amount of time.

Therefore, it cannot be a question of concurring interests but rather it is a question of mutual supplementation. Limited and declining budgets and the resulting restrictions are one driving factor while the present security environment is another factor that calls for new approaches. The 2006 NATO Summit in Riga called in its CPG for such a new overarching approach. Innere Fuehrung as a rather open and yet mature business culture can contribute to such an overarching process as outlined in the Riga Summit.

A few challenges, however, remain like the present discussion about the burden sharing for example in Afghanistan shows. In our media dominated world it has become fashionable to follow those who are the loudest or the ones with the most media presence and media power. In other words not always he who has reasonable arguments gets heard but he who shouts the loudest or in generally the most. Unfortunately those with good arguments sometimes get impressed by the volume and are ready to give up positions against one's best knowledge. Instead of remaining steadfast on good reasons they fall for the trap of bargaining. Impressing enough the existence of such a situation of bargaining is the reward for those who had little than public noise and loud mouthing to offer based on their agenda in order to cover own deficiencies.

The challenge in this case is to agree on a viable strategy before going into action. A process constructed like EBAO with the intention of a Comprehensive Approach might

help to identify possible problems well ahead of time. Additionally, it could help to set a timeframe when the most probable initial military engagement gradually could be replaced by the other instruments of national or supranational power. Still, this would not constitute a guarantee that readjustments are needed once an operation has started.

It is in this light that the present sounds are shrieking in some ears. Germany has gone a long and remarkable way towards sovereignty after the “total defeat” of the Third Reich and the catastrophe that particular regime had brought to the world. Only five years after the end of World War II foresighted allies recognized the need for a German contribution to defend Europe against Soviet expansionism. To turn this way into a success story was only possible together with the allies. It was due to their political and financial support in connection with a unique window of opportunity that the West German sovereignty was achieved in great parts within a decade after the war. It is true that this process was helped by the German willingness to share the military burden of NATO in order to guarantee Europe’s existence.

In times of a polarized discussion not even surreal seeming themes on rather respected platforms are surprising anymore. Still, it is more than disconcerting if some figures call for the Germans to give their Bundeswehr a touch of Wehrmacht in a prominent forum like the *New York Times*. Such might be credited to an obscure interpretation based on a questionable knowledge of history. What is even more disturbing is the willingness of a certain German clientele to go with this discussion for reasons one might only speculate.

This has not the least to do with fouling one’s own nest or a backwards oriented eternal humility or a mental submission posture. The mindset of today’s Germans is very different from the mindset of the Germans of the Third Reich. As for the soldiers of the Bundeswehr, this was achieved to a great deal by the means and principles *Innere Fuehrung* provides. Killing other people for the sake of international recognition is simply not that what the German Basic Law foresees. National maturity is not expressed in the numbers of dead soldiers or showing false bravery by taking over dangerous missions. Whoever argues that national maturity is expressed that way displays a wide

array of intellectual poverty or at least is sure that he or his children are not the ones that get killed for—if not dubious but at least questionable—reasons.

Whoever argues that way shows a frightening inner distance towards his soldiers. He does not see soldiers anymore as part of the society, he rather sees soldiers as “*sui generis*,” a condition *Innere Fuehrung* tried to overcome and successfully has overcome at last. Now, one could argue that except for conscripts it is up to the individual decision to become a soldier, this might be partially right, however, it would bring soldiers of any military force of a democracy in close proximity to mercenaries. Amazingly it happens in a time when others seem to embrace those factors that contribute to the prevailing success of *Innere Fuehrung*: the educated soldier who can use the tools of humanities in order not to become a mere tool!

Neither one can turn back time nor is it the intention of this study to be deluded by a soothing since simple seeming past. Learning to fight in order not fight was the cold war motto for the Bundeswehr. The cold war is over but the motto still seems to make sense. The world unfortunately is not the place where people live according to Kant’s Categorical Imperative. The political use of soldiers however, is limited.

Additionally, labeling German soldiers as cowards or as afraid of getting into danger is hilarious. No matter how loud a few opinion-makers demand that Germans have to kill and have to be ready to be killed in dangerous mission and above that they have to learn how to kill and get killed; a few dead German soldiers would not solve the crisis of NATO as a few see in Afghanistan. Moreover these people most probably do not know or seem to have forgotten that *Innere Fuehrung* explicitly demands that all soldiers have to reflect upon questions of the own death or severe injury as a consequence of an operation or as a consequence of being a soldier in general. This is not just lip servicing. The Bundeswehr already has had their *Gefallene*, soldiers killed in action.³³⁶

The world does not get a better place when the number of dead German soldiers increases for dubious reasons or wrong strategy. Politicians and other responsible decision-makers in democracies throughout the world are asked to come up with better

³³⁶ Kuemmel, Gerhard and Leonhard, Nina. “Death, the Military and Society: Causalities and Civil-Military Relations in Germany.” *SOWI-Arbeitspapier 140*. Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr. Strausberg, 2005.

ideas than seeing their soldiers as a dispensable product for political purposes. In the days of the cold war the strategy for Germans worth dying for if necessary was nothing less than to defend the rights and freedom of Germany or the values as written down in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty together with their allies.

It suits Germany well to be a reliable and powerful partner in the alliance or in the world in general but it suits Germany also well to remember its past and hence trying to act accordingly. Despite a steadily seeming change of paradigm since the 1990s for the German society war still remains the “ultima ratio.” This can be traced back to devastating consequences the last war caused by Germans had. Once more it must be pointed out, today’s Germans are different. That war was not their fault, the responsibility to prevent horrible events like that war, however, remains.

The will of the German society as expressed in the decisions of the German Parliament clearly indicates that it is hard to find easy decisions on this topic.³³⁷ The economic potential of Germany is still strong; however, the inversion of that argument that the military power has to be accordingly is not inescapably logic. In times where the whole alliance is at stake when the Germans are not ready or willing to kill, other solutions to the problems with most probably deeper roots are needed. One such better solution might be the consequent following of a Comprehensive Approach or EBAO despite the underlying assumption that this might imply the active, i.e. easy use of military force in order to pursue foreign policy goals. The use of the Bundeswehr as a military force subject to parliamentary decision leads to a different perception of a comprehensive approach. EBAO becomes more the rather strategic and holistic concept the way it actually is designed. This study is based upon the belief that an interagency driven process like EBAO with the background of a Comprehensive Approach is necessary. However, there is still a long way to go without knowing how the concept finally will be called and how it will look like in detail.³³⁸

One finding of this paper is that Innere Fuehrung remains valid, despite changes in technology and the emergence of new operational requirements since it naturally

³³⁷ Biehl, Heiko. “Zustimmung unter Vorbehalt. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und ihre Streitkrafte.” In: Wiesendahl (ed.) *Innere Fuehrung*. 111.

³³⁸ Drexler, Stefan et. al. “Effects-Based Air Power—Die Rolle von Luftmacht.” 60.

includes interagency cooperation with different organizations. Innere Fuehrung puts an emphasis on the soldier as a human being responsible for fulfilling his moral and legal obligations. The soldier's ability to meet the high demands at every level of modern operations is more crucial than ever. Technology gets a supporting role and not the central issue. The ability to trust in the individual soldier's competence and reliability becomes more and more important. Another finding is that this ability is a logical consequence of Innere Fuehrung correctly applied. Information superiority is enhanced by Innere Fuehrung and will automatically contribute towards the desired decision superiority, one of the three Alliance transformation goals. Innere Fuehrung is not the concept that sends lawyers or political advisors in the field. It is however the concept that enables the citizen in uniform to bring his knowledge into effect in accordance with military necessities. The question of good or bad, i.e. what is allowed or not must be part of the education a citizen already had before becoming a soldier. Innere Fuehrung enables and protects this soldier at the same time it helps this soldier to broaden his knowledge and attain further education.

The range from sources where one can learn what constitutes "good" or "bad" is wide. Kant's Categorical Imperative, the incorporation of (criminal) law or conscience coined by religion are only a few possibilities. Because Innere Fuehrung addresses the citizen in uniform this concept must reflect society and its foundations. Innere Fuehrung does recognize that the values of the German society are derived to a great deal from the belief in God.³³⁹ The explicit mentioning of the role of military pastors and the spiritual welfare and the exercise of religion as an additional domain are proof for such reflections.³⁴⁰

One must not confuse or mix up multiple reasons that inevitably lead to a growing dissatisfaction: The momentary lack of suitable equipment, the chronically under financing of the Bundeswehr, a pity promotion rate in some areas and the perception of transformation as an uncoordinated sequence of rapid changing detachments while at the

³³⁹ The preamble of the German Basic Law still starts with the following sentence: "Conscious of their responsibility before God and man..."
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf accessed May 1, 2008.

³⁴⁰ ZDv 10/1 Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

same time being considered a pawn on the international chessboard. These reasons can form a combination that fosters doubts and might have decreased motivation. Such a lack of motivation however is not credited to the principles of Innere Fuehrung. It is credited to Innere Fuehrung that reveals such problems since the soldiers are politically informed and they have their possibilities to criticize. They can identify the reasons and they are protected from arbitrariness of any kind while articulating them.

Innere Fuehrung works; in case there is a mismatch between strategy and goals or strategy and capabilities it is time for the responsible persons, be they high ranking generals or members of parliament to bring the goals as well as the capabilities in line again with strategy. Such an obligation to speak up however, does not abolish the obligation to do it in the appropriate style. Going public in newspapers might guarantee publicity. One should not mix up the intentions of Innere Fuehrung, the “primacy of politics” and mere promotion of the publicity of the protagonists and those who want to become protagonists.

Despite some high ranking critics Innere Fuehrung was healthy enough to withstand many attacks ranging from simple neglecting to open disgust. The reasons are actually simple: Innere Fuehrung incorporates the values of the German Basic Law. It thus has become its own reality. Whoever opposes Innere Fuehrung opposes these very values and consequently violates these laws.

This study started with the claim that the term Innere Fuehrung still defies a translation into English. In order to close this study an offer for a translation is made. This rather personal attempt does not claim universal validity since it solely is based on own experiences as well as having had the luxury to write this study. Having served the Federal Republic of Germany since 1989 the author was able to see the principles of Innere Fuehrung in action. During his basic training the topic Innere Fuehrung was one of the first briefings he ever received as a soldier. Throughout the years not only many more were to come but he was able to realize based on observation that Innere Fuehrung actually constituted the business culture of the Bundeswehr in general and especially in the German Air Force.

The label “leadership development and civic education” is a useful but somehow bulky attempt to come close to the core of this concept. Innere Fuehrung definitely is a process to develop leadership and this development is based rather upon education than on primarily military training. Innere Fuehrung as characteristic of German civil-military relationship protects the soldier and thus gives guidance how to treat these soldiers. Therefore one of the main qualities of Innere Fuehrung is the guidance it can give as a universal concept where ethics, morale and soldierly philosophy complement one another in a harmonic way. It is the guidance how a citizen in uniform can and is supposed to act as a responsible soldier in order to defend this society. Where the situation is a map and education is the legend, then Innere Fuehrung is the ethical compass that helps to guide the way. Why should it not be translated as “Inner Guidance”?

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