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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

Updated March 17, 2004

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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 17 MAR 2004		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2004 to 00-00-2004	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington, DC, 20540-7500				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 14	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary

In recent years, the ruler of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, has embarked upon a limited course of political liberalization and aligned Qatar firmly with the United States. In 1992, Qatar and the United States concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement that has been progressively expanded. In April 2003, the Bush Administration announced that the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East will be moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar's Al-Udeid airbase, which served as a logistics hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as a key center for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Camp As-Sayliyah, the largest pre-positioning facility of U.S. equipment in the world, served as the forward command center for CENTCOM personnel during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Qatar also has assisted the United States in the war on terrorism by stepping up its efforts to prevent Al Qaeda from engaging in money laundering. With the third largest proven gas reserves in the world, U.S. companies, such as ExxonMobil, have worked to increase trade and economic ties with Qatar. Qatar has the highest per capita income of any country in the Middle East.

As part of Qatar's experiment with limited political liberalization, the Qatari monarchy started Al Jazeera, the Arab world's first all-news network. In a national referendum in April 2003, Qatari voters approved a new constitution that provides for a partially elected national assembly and grants women the right to vote and run for office. This report will be updated when significant changes occur. For further information, see CRS Report RL31889, *The Al-Jazeera News Network: Opportunity or Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, and CRS Report RL31533, *The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy*, 2003.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

Domestic Political Structure

Qatar, a small peninsular state bordering Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, is a constitutional monarchy governed by the Al-Thani family and headed by the Emir, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.¹ The country gained full independence from Britain on September 3, 1971. The Emir is head of the executive branch and appoints members of the Al-Thani family and other notables to a governing Council of Ministers (cabinet), which is headed by the monarch's brother, Prime Minister Abdallah bin Khalifa Al-Thani. The country's newly approved constitution (April 2003) stipulates that the rule of the state is hereditary within the Al-Thani family and that future successors to the throne follow the line of the Emir's male offspring.² The constitution also states that legislative authority reside in the hands of a 45-member Advisory Council (*Majlis al-Shura*), two-thirds of which is directly elected and one-third appointed by the Emir from among ministers or others.³ The Advisory Council has oversight authority over the Council of Ministers and can propose legislation and review budgets. The constitution also empowers the Advisory Council to issue motions of no-confidence against a government minister; the motion must be approved by two-thirds of the Advisory Council. Women have the right to vote in elections and can run for office.

Figure 1. Qatar and Its Neighbors



¹ The term “Shaikh” (or Sheikh or Shaykh) is an honorific title, which can mean a ruler, a tribal leader, or a venerable religious figure. It should be pronounced with a long A (as in “say”), not a long E (as in “see”). The term “Emir” (or Amir), often translated as prince, can also mean a monarch or a ruler in the Gulf region.

² The constitution was approved in a nation-wide referendum in which 96.6% of the voters (68,987) approved the constitution and only 3.3.% opposed it (2,145).

³ Prior to the establishment of a partially elected national assembly, Qatar had a fully-appointed, 35-member advisory council that could only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers. Qatar’s old Provisional Constitution provided for a modified electoral procedure in choosing members of the Council and a three-year term; nevertheless, the Council remained appointive in practice, and terms of the Council members were extended in three or four-year increments since 1975.

Council members serve four-year terms. National elections for the new Advisory Council will most likely take place in early 2004.

On June 27, 1995, in a bloodless palace coup, Shaikh Hamad replaced his father, Shaikh Khalifa, who had ruled Qatar for 23 years. The former ruler had been living out of the country in Cannes, France most of the time and had turned over many routine affairs of state to his son, Shaikh Hamad, then crown prince and commander of the small armed forces. The ruling Al-Thani family rallied behind the new ruler, who quickly consolidated control. In February 1996, supporters of Shaikh Khalifa unsuccessfully attempted a counter-coup.⁴ The coup attempt prompted Shaikh Hamad to initiate civil proceedings against his father to retrieve an alleged \$3-\$12 billion of state assets supposedly in his possession. Saudi Arabian mediation facilitated an out-of-court settlement, and the Emir and his father have reconciled, although the former Emir has not returned to Qatar.

Shaikh Hamad, at age 53,⁵ has been described as representative of an emerging new generation in Gulf leadership. Like King Abdullah II of Jordan, Shaikh Hamad is British-educated, with degrees from Cambridge University and Sandhurst Military Academy. As part of his modernizing agenda, Shaikh Hamad helped establish the CNN-style satellite news network, Al-Jazeera in 1996. In a major departure from his more conservative-minded father, Shaikh Hamad has borrowed heavily from foreign banks in order to modernize Qatar's energy infrastructure. Shaikh Hamad and his younger generation of advisers have pressed for social, political, and economic liberalization. Qatar also has invested heavily in education reform. In October 2003, Sheikha Mozah, the wife of Sheikh Hamad, helped launch Qatar's new "Education City," a new campus that offers degrees from several U.S. universities including Weill Cornell Medical College, Texas A&M University, Virginia Commonwealth University, and Carnegie Mellon University. Qatar recently hired the RAND Corporation to evaluate and recommend reform options for Qatar's educational system. RAND also is monitoring the progress of reform in Qatar's schools.

In November 2002, Qatar established diplomatic ties with the Holy See. Qatar plans to grant the Roman Catholic Church and other Christian denominations designated plots of land for the building of churches. Qatar does not ban alcohol, which is available in licensed premises such as the bars of major hotels and clubs. Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, officially adheres to the Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam; however, in contrast with Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi tenets are not strictly enforced.

⁴ Some Qataris believe that Saudi Arabia supported Shaikh Khalifa in his attempt to return to power in Qatar. See, Craig S. Smith, "A Tiny Gulf Kingdom Bets its Stability on Support for U.S.," *The New York Times*, October 24, 2002.

⁵ In 1997, the Emir underwent kidney transplant surgery. Since then, there have been no new reports regarding the Emir's health.

Economic Overview

Oil and natural gas production is the mainstay of Qatar's robust economy, which has experienced an average annual growth rate of 9% over the last 5 years.⁶ Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are the leading importers of oil from Qatar. Qatar Petroleum (QP), the state-owned oil company, has increased its output significantly from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to over 854,000 b/d in 2002.⁷ Qatar is aiming to produce about 1,000,000 b/d by 2004. However, with oil reserves likely to be exhausted by 2020 at current production rates, Qatar is rapidly moving to exploit its natural gas reserves.⁸ As part of a long-term development strategy, Qatar has tapped international financial markets and invited foreign investment in recent years in order to finance the expansion of its liquified natural gas (LNG) production.⁹ Qatar intends to expand its yearly LNG output, which is not subject to OPEC production quotas, from 4.5 million tons per annum in 2002 to 14 - 18 million tons per annum by 2010. Although Qatar's LNG industry has low capital costs due to government investment, it has high operational costs, requiring Qatar to develop economies of scale in order to be more competitive with established LNG exporters such as Indonesia and Nigeria.¹⁰

Qatar has signed several agreements with U.S. energy companies (ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil) and other international companies to develop facilities to export LNG to the United States, the UK, Spain, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. Qatar also is in the midst of building the largest gas to liquids (GTL) plant in the world. Under Project Dolphin, Qatar is planning to build underwater pipelines to export natural gas to Kuwait, Oman, and the U.A.E. Qatari government officials estimate that by 2007, gas revenue will outstrip oil income for the first time.¹¹

⁶ Moin A. Siddiqi, "A 21st Century Success Story," *The Middle East*, June 1, 2002.

⁷ Qatar is the smallest oil producing member of OPEC. Revenues from petroleum exports account for 60-70% of government revenues.

⁸ With proved oil reserves of 3.7 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf producers, such as Kuwait (96.5 billion barrels), Iraq (112 billion barrels), and Saudi Arabia (252 billion barrels). However, Qatar has the third largest natural gas reserves behind Russia and Iran. Qatar's supply of natural gas doubled almost overnight in 2002, when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar's north field.

⁹ Qatar's government has a 60-70% stake in two joint partnerships with foreign firms, including ExxonMobil (USA), TotalFinaElf (France), KoGas (South Korea), and Matsui (Japan).

¹⁰ Interview with Qatari executives at Ras Laffan, Qatar's LNG industrial city, January 14, 2003.

¹¹ "Squaring the Circle," *The Middle East Economic Digest*, October 18, 2002.

Human Rights and Political Liberalization

The U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights for 2002 states that the government of Qatar “generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, its record was poor in some areas...”¹² According to the report, the rights of non-citizens are at times abused, particularly among domestic servants from the Philippines and South East Asia. As in other Gulf countries, expatriate laborers are vulnerable to exploitation by employers who capitalize on their fear of deportation. Citizenship is withheld from foreign workers, who outnumber native Qataris in the labor force by an estimated ratio of more than 5 to 1.¹³ In response to Qatar’s dependence on foreign labor, the government has embarked on a program of “Qatarization,” which is designed to set aside higher-level government and energy jobs for Qataris only.¹⁴ Although the government in 1995 lifted formal censorship of the media, journalists tend to exercise a degree of self-censorship. Al-Jazeera devotes less air time to coverage of Qatari affairs. Al-Jazeera, which does not generate enough advertising revenue to be profitable, is partially dependent on the Qatari government for its financing.¹⁵ Internet service is monitored for pornography and other material considered insulting to Islam. The government maintains strict limits on the freedom of assembly and association. Political parties and demonstrations are not allowed in Qatar, and private professional and cultural associations must register with and are monitored by the state.

Since assuming power, Shaikh Hamad has embarked upon a limited course of political liberalization. In April 1998, he permitted about 3,700 business community leaders to elect a Chamber of Commerce, which selected 17 members from a slate of 41 candidates. In November 1998, in a speech before the

QATAR IN BRIEF

Area:	11,437 sq km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)
Population (2002):	793,341
Literacy:	79.4%
Religion:	95% Muslim
Ethnic Groups:	40% Arab, 18% Pakistani, 18% Indian, 10% Iranian, 14% other
GDP (2002):	\$28,000 per capita
Inflation (2001):	2.8%
Foreign Debt (2002):	\$6 billion
Oil Reserves:	3.7 billion barrels
Gas Reserves:	900 trillion cubic feet
Armed Forces:	11,800 active personnel, 34 tanks, 18 fighter aircraft

Source: The United States Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 2002.

¹² Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2002,” March 31, 2003.

¹³ The new Qatari constitution does not address the rights of foreign guest workers.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Meeting with Al-Jazeera producer, Mr. Khalid Al Mahmoud, January 11, 2003. Qatar started Al-Jazeera with a \$140 million grant. Advertising revenue only covers 35-40% of Al-Jazeera’s operating expenses.

Advisory Council, Shaikh Hamad signaled his willingness to proceed with political liberalization, declaring that “to meet the requirements of the future...it is necessary to reinforce the role of constitutional institutions, activate meaningful, constructive popular participation in the process of decision-making and supervise proper execution of decisions.”¹⁶ In March 1999, the long-anticipated election for a Central Municipal Council occurred. 248 candidates (including 6 women) competed for 29 seats, and all adult Qatari citizens, with the exception of members of the police and armed forces, were allowed to vote and run for office. This was the first time a Gulf country enfranchised all male and female citizens in a nation-wide election.¹⁷ In April 2003, elections for the Municipal Council resulted in the first electoral victory for a Qatari female candidate, Sheikha Yousef Al-Jiffri, an appointed officer at the Education Ministry who ran unopposed.¹⁸ Two other female candidates withdrew from the election for unknown reasons. Although the council functions primarily in an advisory role to the Ministry of Municipal and Agricultural Affairs, some observers view it as a stepping-stone to wider political liberalization. On May 5, 2003, the Emir of Qatar appointed Sheikha bint Ahmed al-Mahmoud, daughter of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, as Education Minister. This appointment signified the first appointment ever of a female cabinet minister in any Persian Gulf state.

Some observers and Arab commentators have questioned the timing of Qatar’s reforms, calling them symbolic and primarily geared toward satisfying U.S. policy goals of promoting democracy in the region. In response to this criticism, one Qatari politician wrote that “the truth is that this constitution is not a reaction to these events, and as a Qatari politician, I can assert that the democratic trend and the desire to establish a state of institutions and rule of law represents a deep conviction that the Prince of Qatar beholds ... even before he became a Prince.”¹⁹

Foreign Policy

Qatar is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the latter a sub-regional organization consisting of six states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) bordering the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It is also a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

¹⁶ “Qatar Plans to Set up First Parliament,” *Reuters*, November 16, 1998.

¹⁷ All 6 female candidates were defeated in the elections.

¹⁸ “Qatar Elects First Woman to Council Doha,” *Gulf News*, April 8, 2003.

¹⁹ “The Constitution’s Referendum: Proof of the Democratic Experience in Qatar,” *Dar Al-Hayat*, April 22, 2003.

Gulf States

Qatar's relations with its neighbors have fluctuated over the last decade. Territorial disputes have marred Qatar's relations with Bahrain. In the past, both Qatar and Bahrain have claimed the nearby Hawar island chain, along with the abandoned town of Zubarah on Qatar's northern border. On March 16, 2001, after seven years of deliberations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah, and that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar islands.²⁰ Since the resolution of the dispute, Qatar and Bahrain have discussed a plan to construct a 28-mile causeway, aptly named the "Friendship Bridge," which would connect the two kingdoms.

Relations between the new Emir of Qatar and Saudi rulers were strained in the first few years of his rule. Some Qatari officials accused Saudi Arabia of plotting to restore the former ruler of Qatar in 1996. Since then, Al-Jazeera's treatment of Saudi Arabia in its programming has been the largest point of contention between the two regimes. In protest, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador from Doha in September 2002 in response to an Al-Jazeera program that criticized the kingdom's founder, King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. The following month, Kuwait closed Al-Jazeera's local office in response to an allegedly insulting report on a member of the Kuwait royal family.

Iraq

A combination of factors — strains with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and aspirations to a more influential role in regional affairs — has contributed to Qatar's increasingly independent foreign policy since 1992. Although it was an active member of the allied coalition formed during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and has been a participant in post-war security arrangements, Qatar adopted a conciliatory stance toward both Iraq and Iran before the other members of the GCC did. Qatar restored diplomatic ties with Saddam Hussein's regime shortly after the 1991 Gulf war, hosted visits by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and called for relaxing economic sanctions against Iraq.

Nevertheless, Qatar played an important logistics role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, providing headquarters for the U.S. Central Command and pre-positioning facilities for U.S. tanks and armored personnel carriers. At the same time, the Al-Jazeera news network, which is privately owned but partially financed and based out of Qatar, was criticized by some U.S. officials for being sensationalistic and slanted in its coverage of the U.S. military operation. Qatar will most likely continue to serve as an important base of operations for U.S. forces in post-war Iraq, particularly after the transfer of the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center from Saudi Arabia to Qatar. On May 8, 2003, President Bush hosted the Emir of Qatar at the White House, thanking him for his steadfast support during Operation Iraqi Freedom and highlighting his role as a reformer.

²⁰ "The Islands Dispute - Resolved," *The Middle East Economic Digest*, September 28, 2001.

Arab-Israeli Issues

Although Qatar and Israel do not have formal diplomatic ties, Qatar has been in the forefront of Arab-Israeli talks on expanding economic ties during periods of progress in the peace process. Qatar's position regarding the Arab boycott of Israel is governed by the September 1994 decision by the GCC to terminate enforcement of the indirect boycotts, while maintaining, at least in theory, the primary boycott. Qatar has hosted meetings of multilateral Arab-Israeli working groups and then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited in April 1996. In addition, Qatar agreed to the establishment of an Israeli trade mission in Doha, Qatar's capital city, although relations cooled after the peace process slowed down in 1996. Since the beginning of the second Palestinian uprising in 2000, Qatar has claimed to have shut down the office; however, according to Qatari officials, it continued to operate at a very low level.²¹ Prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Israeli Foreign Ministry closed the trade mission in Doha and evacuated three Israeli envoys and their families. Israel promised to reopen the office after the war.²² Despite pressure from some other Arab states, Qatar hosted the fourth annual Middle East/North Africa Economic Conference (MENA) in November 1997. This was a gathering that brought together some Arab and Israeli business and political leaders to discuss regional economic cooperation.

In May 2003, Qatari and Israeli Foreign Ministers met in Paris to discuss ways of reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The meeting took place only a week after the Emir's visit to Washington DC, prompting speculation that President Bush encouraged Qatari officials to take a more active role in the peace process. Shaikh Hamad has acknowledged that Qatar is keen to play a role in encouraging negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, but that it is too early to open full diplomatic ties with Israel.

February 2004 Assassination in Doha

According to press accounts, on February 13, 2004, a Chechen guerrilla leader named Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was allegedly assassinated in a car bombing outside a mosque in Doha.²³ In the past, the Russian government had accused Yandarbiyev of funding Chechen terrorist activity. Qatari authorities reportedly arrested two Russians who may have been involved in the car bombing and have filed criminal charges against them. Russian and Qatari officials have been conducting negotiations over the release of the two Russian detainees.

²¹ Meeting with the Qatari Minister of State, Ahmed Abdullah al-Mehmood, January 12, 2003.

²² "Israel Shuts Qatar Mission, To Reduce Staff in Egypt, Jordan, Muaritiaia," *Yedi'ot Aharanot*, March 3, 2003, translated by the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), Document ID: GMP20030311000208.

²³ "In Qatar, Standing Up to Putin, *Washington Post*, March 16, 2004.

Defense and Regional Security

With its small territory and narrow population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on external cooperation and support for its security. Qatar, like other Gulf states, contributes military units to a small GCC rapid deployment force of 5,000 - 10,000 known as Peninsula Shield. With a personnel strength of 11,800, Qatar's armed forces are the second smallest in the Middle East. (Bahrain, with an estimated 11,000-member force, has the smallest) France has provided approximately 80% of Qatar's arms inventory. Since the 1991 Gulf war, Qatar has pursued a limited program of force modernization. To date, however, it has not been a purchaser of U.S. weapons.

U.S.-Qatari Relations

A U.S. embassy was established in Doha in 1973, but U.S. relations with Qatar did not blossom until the 1991 Gulf war. During the fighting in January 1991, Qatari armored forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji. The United States promptly recognized the assumption of power by Shaikh Hamad in June 1995. Analysts regard Qatar's exchanges with Israel, though limited, as broadly in accord with U.S. efforts to foster an expanding dialogue between Israel and Arab states.

Trade between the United States and Qatar has increased since the 1990-1991 Gulf war. U.S. exports to Qatar amounted to \$320 million in 2001, consisting mainly of machinery and transport equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar, mainly textiles and fertilizers, totaled \$501 million in 2001.²⁴ Although the bulk of Qatar's trade continues to be with a few European countries and Japan, several U.S. firms, including ExxonMobil, Occidental, and Pennzoil are active in the development of Qatar's oil and gas resources. Despite the presence of U.S. firms in the Qatari hydrocarbon industry, the U.S. imports virtually no oil from Qatar. In June 2002, Qatar's Minister of Energy, Abdallah bin Hamad Attiyah, held talks with U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham over possible cooperation in the gas sector.

Bilateral defense and security cooperation have expanded since the Gulf war. On June 23, 1992, the United States and Qatar concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement that provided for U.S. access to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of United States materiel, and combined military exercises.²⁵ Qatar built Al-Udeid airbase in 1996 at a cost of more than \$1 billion. The U.S. government also has invested considerable amounts to upgrade the base in order to handle U.S. aircraft, equipment, and personnel. This investment was rapidly expanded following the terrorist attacks

²⁴ United States International Trade Commission, "U.S. Trade Balance by Partner Country 2001," online at [http://dataweb.usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/cy_m3_run.asp].

²⁵ Library of Congress, Federal Research Division (Helen Chapin Metz, ed.) *Persian Gulf States: Country Studies*, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 194. In December 2002, the United States and Qatar signed an agreement to upgrade Qatari military facilities and expand U.S. access to them.

of September 11, 2001. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Air Force has conducted approximately 14-16 supply flights per day to Afghanistan out of Al-Udeid.

The airbase houses between 5,000-6,500 U.S. troops and civilian contractors. The United States has constructed a 76,000 square foot hangar at Al-Udeid airbase, which can hold a maximum of 40 aircraft. Al-Udeid can accommodate a total of 10,000 troops and 140 aircraft. The base is home to the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, which includes 17 KC -135 Stratotankers and KC 10-A Extenders for in-flight refueling of attack aircraft and fuel shipments to Afghanistan, which is 2.5 hours away.²⁶ Most importantly, Al-Udeid now features the region's main combat air-operations center, which had originally been built as a backup to U.S. operations in Saudi Arabia.

Qatar also has allowed the United States to construct the As-Sayliyah Army base, the largest pre-positioning facility of U.S. equipment in the world. The climate-controlled warehouses at As-Sayliyah held hundreds of M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles prior to the recent Iraq war.²⁷ As-Sayliyah also features a new command center for CENTCOM personnel. Currently, there are approximately 3400 troops and civilian contractors at As-Sayliyah. After the base received warnings of a potential threat in 2000, U.S. personnel were confined to the base for 45 days.

War on Terrorism

In addition to increased military cooperation, Qatar has assisted the United States in the war on terrorism. Qatar has passed a money laundering law, which closed all bank accounts for foreign charities. Also, Qatar National Bank has provided its entire staff with a four-day course on fighting money laundering and terrorist financing.

According to several counterterrorism experts who formerly worked for the U.S. government, Qatar's current Interior Minister and royal family member, Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al-Thani briefly harbored Al Qaeda terrorists in 1996, including the suspected mastermind of the September 11th hijacking plot, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.²⁸ The Emir of Qatar appointed Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al-Thani to the post of Interior Minister during an expansion of the cabinet in January 2001. It is unclear what types of discussions the United States has conducted with the government of Qatar regarding the allegations against Qatar's Interior Minister.

²⁶ Meeting at Al-Udeid Air Base, January 13, 2003.

²⁷ Meeting at As-Sayliyah Army Base, January 13, 2003.

²⁸ "Qatar's Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 2003.

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Qatar

Emir	Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani
Heir Apparent	Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani ²⁹
Prime Minister	Abdallah bin Khalifa Al-Thani
Deputy Prime Minister	Muhammad bin Khalifa Al-Thani
Foreign Minister	Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al-Thani
Energy Minister	Abdallah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah
Finance Minister	Youssef Hussein Al-Kamal
Ambassador to the United States	Badr Umar Al-Dafa

²⁹ In August 2003, the Emir named his fourth son as heir apparent, replacing his third oldest son, Jassem bin Hamad Al-Thani, who reportedly was either dissatisfied with his lack of responsibilities, or did not have an interest in continuing to serve as crown prince. The Emir has two other sons, one of whom is a businessman and the other is involved in Islamic charities.

Figure 2. Country Map of Qatar



Source: Shaded Relief Country Map of Qatar, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995.