

CRS Report for Congress

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

Updated November 14, 2007

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**Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress**

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 14 NOV 2007		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 101 Independence Ave, SE, Washington, DC, 20540-7050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 14	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Summary

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. Pakistan does not have a stated nuclear policy, but its "minimum credible deterrent" is thought to be primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan's top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan's international proliferation network.

Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years.

Current instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, it is uncertain what impact continued instability in the country will have on these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, *Pakistan - U.S. Relations*, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.

Contents

Background	1
Nuclear Weapons	1
Delivery Vehicles	3
Nuclear Doctrine	4
Command and Control	5
Security Concerns	5
Proliferation Threat	8
Pakistan's Response	9

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

Background

The political instability and imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan on November 3, 2007, has once again called attention to the issue of the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and how the world can be assured they remain in safe hands during potential transitions of power. Some observers fear scenarios in which Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets are given to or stolen by Al Qaeda sympathizers or other terrorists, or a future government in nuclear Pakistan that might be hostile to the United States.

Measures to improve the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons have been ongoing and include some cooperation with the United States. Since Pakistan and India's nuclear tests in 1998, increased attention has been given to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries have most recently come to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002 over Kashmir, and realizing the dangers, have developed some nuclear risk reduction measures to prevent accidental war.¹ Pakistan has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. After the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, the Pakistani government has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.

Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan's nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that reportedly triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program. Defense against India is said to be the primary motivation for Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Observers point to the peaceful nuclear explosion by India in 1974 as the pivotal moment which gave urgency to the program. Pakistan's path to the bomb was through uranium enrichment technology, mastered by the mid-1980s. Pakistan gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, and

¹ See CRS Report RL31589, *Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan*, by Sharon Squassoni.

missile technology from China. In 1989, the United States learned that Pakistan had assembled a nuclear warhead, which then led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment.² When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998, Pakistan's government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests at the Chagai Hills test site in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.³ The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests (these were lifted after the September 11th, 2001 attacks).

Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for about 60 nuclear weapons.⁴ Pakistan's nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of highly enriched uranium (HEU), approximately 15-20 kg per warhead.⁵ Pakistan reportedly continues to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kg per year.⁶

Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads since the 1990s and continues to produce plutonium for weapons. Pakistan has received Chinese assistance for its plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998. A second heavy water reactor is being built at Khushab, which will at least double Pakistan's plutonium production capacity.⁷ Pakistan's nuclear weapons complex also includes the 300-megawatt reactor at Chasma, a reprocessing plant at Chasma, fuel fabrication plant, tritium production facility, etc.⁸ The continued expansion of the complex and production of weapons materials indicates plans to increase its nuclear weapons

² The Pressler Amendment (August 1985) linked aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid 'will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device. For background summary of sanctions legislation, see CRS Report 98-486, *Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan*, by Jeanne Grimmett, and CRS Report RS22757, *U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan*, by Richard Grimmett.

³ Seismic data showed yields less than what was officially announced by Pakistan and India. See Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennet, "False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty," *Arms Control Today*, May 1998 [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_05/vimy98.asp].

⁴ "Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan's nuclear forces, 2007," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 63, no.3, May/June 2007; Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, [<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.asp>]; "Global Fissile Material Report 2007," *ibid.*; SIPRI Yearbook 2007.

⁵ "Nuclear Notebook," *ibid.*

⁶ "Global Fissile Material Report 2007," International Panel on Fissile Materials [http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf].

⁷ David Albright and Paul Brannan, "Commercial Satellite Imagery Suggests Pakistan is Building a Second, Much Larger Plutonium Production Reactor: Is South Asia Headed for a Dramatic Buildup in Nuclear Arsenal?," *ISIS*, July 24, 2006.

⁸ See chart of facilities in Pakistan chapter of Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

arsenal in the near future. Pakistan may be partially responding to India's ambitious plans to build a nuclear triad.⁹

Delivery Vehicles

Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft under the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles under the Pakistan Army. Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s purchased from the United States, provided modifications are made. It is widely believed that Pakistan has made modifications to the F-16s previously sold to them. Concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia.¹⁰ The U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F-16s to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power.¹¹ The contract for provision of an additional 36 aircraft was signed on September 30, 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those aircraft, and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan's F-16A/B model aircraft. Pakistan's F-16 fleet will therefore be expanded, but it is unclear what portion of the fleet will be capable of a nuclear mission. Mirage III and V aircraft could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5's may have been modified to carry a nuclear payload.¹²

After India's first test of its *Prithvi* ballistic missile in 1988, Pakistan jump-started its own missile program. Three types of ballistic missiles are thought to be nuclear-capable: the solid fuel *Hatf-III (Ghaznavi)* and *Hatf-IV (Shaheen)* with a range of 100-290 and 200-650 km respectively; and the medium-range *Hatf-V (Ghauri)* with a 1200 km range. The *Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2)* is under development.¹³ Reports also indicate that Pakistan may be developing a nuclear-capable cruise missile, the *Hatf-7 (Babur)*, with ground, sea and air-launched versions.

⁹ "India Working on Sea-based Nuclear Missiles," *Defense News*, October 15, 2007. [<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3079617&C=landwar>].

¹⁰ CRS Report RL33515, *Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications*, by Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmett, and K. Alan Kronstadt; Zachary Ginsburg, "US Renews Fighter Exports to Pakistan," *Arms Control Today*, September 2007. [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/USPakistan.asp].

¹¹ "Release of these systems would not significantly reduce India's quantitative or qualitative military advantage. Release of these modifications to Pakistan will neither affect the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology as this level of capability or higher already exists in other countries in the region." Defense Security and Cooperation Agency news release, June 28, 2006. [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2006/Pakistan_06-11.pdf].

¹² CRS Report RL30623, *Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress*, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

¹³ Nuclear Notebook, *ibid.*; "Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories," *Arms Control Today Fact Sheet*, [<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp>]; and Mahmud Ali Durrani, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37*, July 2004. [<http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2004-3375p.pdf>].

A.Q. Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories, maintained that only the medium-range *Ghauri* missiles would be usable in a nuclear exchange (given fall-out effects for Pakistan of shorter-range missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50 *Hatf-II* short-range (300km) missiles (modified Chinese M-11s) as potential delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. *Ghauri* missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly are based on the North Korean *No-Dong* and *Taepo-Dong-1*, are capable of reaching New Delhi with large payloads.¹⁴ Pakistan continues to carry out ballistic missile tests, but notifies India in advance in accordance with the bilateral missile pre-notification pact of October 2005.¹⁵

Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan's strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, but prominent officials and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic tenets.¹⁶ They have indicated that Pakistan's posture is designed to preserve territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main rival's conventional superiority. "Minimum credible nuclear deterrence" is the guiding principle.¹⁷ Statements of high level officials point to four policy objectives for Pakistan's nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia.¹⁸

Pakistani officials state that they have already determined the arsenal size needed for a minimum nuclear deterrent and they will not engage in an arms race with India. Pakistan has also pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out first-use against a nuclear-armed aggressor that attacks Pakistan — for example, India. Analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence against India's conventional superiority. Others argue that keeping the first-use option against India allows Pakistan to conduct sub-conventional operations while

¹⁴ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2002.

¹⁵ "Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles." Full text on the Henry L. Stimson Center website: [<http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207949>].

¹⁶ Peter Lavoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability," Paper presented to the Conference on Pakistan's Nuclear Future, Nonproliferation Education Center, Washington, DC, April 28, 2006: [<http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070121-Lavoy-PakistanNuclearPosture&PDFFolder=Essays>].

¹⁷ For an in-depth discussion of minimum deterrence, see Naeem Salik, "Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan," Landau Network Centro Volta South Asia Security Project Case Study, January 2006. [http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/South%20Asia%20Security%20Program_file%5CDocuments%5CCase%20Studies%5CSalik%20-%20S.A.%20Case%20Study%202006.pdf].

¹⁸ Mahmud Ali Durrani, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37*, July 2004. [<http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2004-3375p.pdf>].

effectively deterring India at the strategic level.¹⁹ Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through second strike capability, possible hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, road-mobile missiles, air defenses around strategic sites, and concealment measures.²⁰

Command and Control

Pakistan's command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. Pakistan's command and control system is based on "C4I2SR" (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). The system has three components — the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands.²¹ The NCA was created in 2000 and for the first time the nuclear program was under military control with oversight. The SPD acts as the secretariat for the NCA and coordinates with the strategic forces commands. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their respective strategic force command, but operational control remain with the NCA. The authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA. The NCA is a 10-member body, which consists of the President, Prime Minister, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the Ministers of Defense, Interior and Finance, the Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division, and the Commanders of the Army, Air Force and Navy.²² The NCA Chairman, who is the President of Pakistan, casts the final vote.²³

Security Concerns

Pakistan's nuclear weapons are reportedly stored unassembled, with the fissile core separated from the non-nuclear explosives. These components are stored separately from delivery vehicles. A Department of Defense report says that Pakistan can probably assemble the weapons fairly quickly.²⁴ Nevertheless, separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon.

As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after 9/11, President Musharaff reportedly ordered Pakistan's nuclear arsenal be

¹⁹ Kanti Bajpai, "No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context," *Pugwash Workshop No. 279*, November 2002. [<http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/bajpai.htm>].

²⁰ Lavoy, *ibid.*

²¹ Durrani, *ibid.*

²² Salik, *ibid.*

²³ See Lavoy, Slide 19, *ibid.*; and Naeem Salik, "Changes within Pakistan's Nuclear Security Structure since 1998," Presentation to the Partnership for Global Security Conference, "Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security," June 20, 2007. [<http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/Projects/Globalizing%20Threat%20Reduction%20Project/index.asp>].

²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, January 2001, p. 28.

redeployed to “at least six secret new locations.”²⁵ This action came at a time of uncertainty about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. In President Musharraf’s speech justifying his decision to assist the United States against the Taliban, he cited protection of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for the dramatic policy shift.²⁶ Pakistan’s leadership was uncertain whether the U.S. would decide to conduct military strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear assets if it did not do so. These events, in combination with the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict with India at the Line of Control and revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, inspired a variety of reforms to secure the nuclear complex. Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999 Kargil crisis, when the Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped missiles.²⁷ It should be noted that even at high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no reports of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems.²⁸

In the fall of 2007, Pakistan faces another crucial moment in its history and some observers have recently expressed concern about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal if the current situation persists.²⁹ Former Prime Minister and now opposition leader Benazir Bhutto said in an interview on November 5, 2007, that while President Musharraf says he is firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she is afraid this control could weaken due to instability in the country.³⁰ U.S. military officials have also expressed concern about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.³¹ Experts worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.³²

Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on November 7, 2007 expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not at risk. He said he believes there is “plenty of succession planning that’s going on in

²⁵ Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons - Musharraf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 2001.

²⁶ “Partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf’s televised speech asking the people of Pakistan to support his course of action,” September 19, 2001. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/pakistantext_091901.html].

²⁷ Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series, 2002. [<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/reidel.pdf>].

²⁸ Lavoy, *ibid*.

²⁹ “Opinions Mixed on Pakistani Nuclear Security,” *Global Security Newswire*, November 6, 2007. [http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/recent_stories.asp?category=nuclear#6783E660].

³⁰ Also see comments by David Albright in the same interview. “Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir Bhutto,” *CNN*, November 5, 2007.

³¹ “Lieutenant General Carter Ham Holds a Defense Department Briefing,” *CQ Transcripts*, November 7, 2007.

³² Also see comments by David Albright in “Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir Bhutto,” *CNN*, November 5, 2007.

the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”³³ President Musharraf has said that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “total custodial controls.”³⁴

The issue of U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani government were famously addressed in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s confirmation hearing in January 2005. In response to a question by Senator John Kerry asking what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if there was a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”³⁵ On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, the Pakistan Foreign Office said, “Suffice it to say that Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty.”³⁶ The Foreign Office spokesman also emphasized that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been under “strong multi-layered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998.”

The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon after September 11th, 2001.³⁷ U.S. assistance to Pakistan, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has included the sharing of best practices and technical measures that could help prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability.³⁸ Some press reports say that the United States provided Pakistan with Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, although former Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed PALs for their warheads without assistance.³⁹ PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. Pakistan reportedly requires the “standard two-man rule” to authenticate access to nuclear

³³ House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Democracy, Authoritarianism and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan, November 7, 2007.

³⁴ “Pakistan Nukes Under Control: Musharraf,” *Agence France Presse*, November 13, 2007.

³⁵ “The Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State,” Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18 and 19, 2005. The concept of a contingency plan to take over Pakistan’s nuclear assets was first somewhat sensationally written about by Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads,” *The New Yorker*, November 5, 2001.

³⁶ “Strategic Assets Are Safe, Says FO,” *Dawn*, November 12, 2007.

³⁷ Alex Wagner, “U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan,” *Arms Control Today*, December 2001. [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/paknucsecdec01.asp].

³⁸ Joby Warrick, “U.S. Has Concerns Over Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2007; David Sanger and William Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” *The New York Times*, November 17, 2007.

³⁹ Kaushik Kapisthaham, “Guarding Pakistan’s Nuclear Estate,” *Asia Times*, April 6, 2005. [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD06Df04.html]; Robert Windrem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear History Worries Insiders,” *NBC News*, November 6, 2007. [<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660667/>].

release codes, a standard practice in nuclear weapon states.⁴⁰ Security at nuclear sites in Pakistan is the responsibility of a 10,000-member security force, commanded by a two-star general.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed that there has been U.S. assistance in this area. In a recent interview, he said the US was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.”⁴¹

Proliferation Threat⁴²

Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.⁴³ Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.⁴⁴

Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States “received fragmentary information from an intelligence service” that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had “sent emissaries to establish contact” with the network.⁴⁵

Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda “had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a

⁴⁰ David Wood, “Crisis Raises Alarm Over Arsenal,” *Baltimore Sun*, November 8, 2007.

⁴¹ “A Conversation With Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,” *PBS: The Charlie Rose Show*, November 6, 2007.

⁴² This section was prepared by Paul Kerr.

⁴³ For more information on Pakistani proliferation, see CRS Report RL32745, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options*, by Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni. Also see CRS Report RL33498, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

⁴⁴ Libya obtained uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weapons designs that could support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea currently has a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, but it is unclear whether it also has a uranium-based one. Iran is suspected of pursuing both plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs.

⁴⁵ Tenet, George and Harlow, Bill, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, HarperCollins: New York, 2007. p. 261.

nuclear explosion.”⁴⁶ Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.

The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007 statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.”⁴⁷

However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:

I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say that.

Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007 report that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could ... resume their black-market business.”⁴⁸

Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had “personal, consistent access” to Khan, but added that he did not “have all the details of everything we’ve done.” Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet been able to interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative in its investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.⁴⁹

A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation “closed.”

Pakistan’s Response

Undersecretary Burns testified in July that the Bush administration has “told the Pakistani government that it is its responsibility ... to make sure” that neither the Khan network nor a “similar organization” resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the Khan network, Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to what extent these efforts have been successful is not yet clear.

⁴⁶ The report can be found at [<http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html>].

⁴⁷ Unclassified Statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.

⁴⁸ See [<http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm>].

⁴⁹ Personal communication, November 9.

Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials.⁵⁰ For example, Pakistan adopted new national export controls legislation in September 2004. This legislation includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for “goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use” of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. According to an April 2007 presentation by Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director of Pakistan’s Arms Control and Disarmament Division,⁵¹ the lists, which were issued in October 2005, include items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.⁵²

The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has established a Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV) and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary.

Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear security. For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is “implementing a National Security Action Plan with the [IAEA’s] assistance.” That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S. — and Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

The United States has also provided relevant assistance to Pakistan. Burns described several such efforts in his June testimony.⁵³ And according to an October U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Islamabad was during fiscal years 2003-2006 the second-largest recipient of bilateral U.S. assistance designed to improve target countries’ export controls. Pakistan received such assistance from the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Details of Pakistan’s nuclear-related legislation can be found in the country’s reports to the UN 1540 Committee. Both can be found at [<http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.html#P>].

⁵¹ Presentation given to Partnership for Global Security Worskhop “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” April 30, 2007.

⁵² The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multilateral, voluntary group of nuclear supplier states which have agreed to coordinate their exports of civilian nuclear technology and materials in order to prevent importers from using them to produce nuclear weapons. Pakistan is not a member.

⁵³ Burns mentioned Pakistan’s participation in the Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative. Under these programs, “the United States and Pakistan worked together to install screening and radiation detection equipment to scan U.S.-bound cargo.” He also stated that the Department of Energy “is working with Pakistan on radiation source security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings.”

⁵⁴ GAO Report, *Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results*, October 31, 2007.

Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making its security clearance procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security: Workshop Synopsis. April 30, 2007.