

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: ENABLING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interests of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences in accord with the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS). Public diplomacy helps shape global perceptions of U.S. policies and objectives and is a key enabler of our foreign policy. An ongoing debate on American public diplomacy convincingly argues that current efforts are ineffective and in need of significant overhaul. This paper examines the effectiveness of public diplomacy and the implications of its success or failure on the 2006 NSS. The examination includes: discussion of public diplomacy as an enabler of foreign policy; consideration of public diplomacy as a strategy of engagement; assessment of the effectiveness of America's public diplomacy strategy; and finally, discussion of the implications of ineffective public diplomacy for success in achieving our 2006 National Security Strategy objectives.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: ENABLING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) charts a path of leadership for America.¹ The two foundational pillars of the 2006 NSS -- promote freedom, justice, and democracy, and lead a growing community of democracies in the quest to solve the complex problems of today's world -- require the United States to align with other countries around the globe in pursuit of common policy objectives. However, virulent anti-Americanism and a growing resentment of U.S. foreign policy is eroding America's influence around the world. Even the leaders of some traditional American allies have found it convenient and politically advantageous to disparage America.² The 9/11 terrorist attacks clearly demonstrated that anti-American sentiment abroad could have real and disastrous consequences. Public opinion surveys by the Pew Research Center have exhaustively documented the precipitous decline in favorable attitudes towards America across large swathes of the globe.³ The problem of growing anti-Americanism is especially acute in the Middle East and among predominantly Muslim populations. Gallup polls in December 2001 and January 2002, arguably a period when international public opinion was overwhelmingly supportive of the United States, highlight the depth and breadth of the animus.⁴ Public opinion polls in successive years have reported similar results and according to Pew, foreign publics' opinions of America appear to be steadily declining.⁵ Failure to reverse this trend of widespread anti-Americanism will undermine America's ability to achieve critical foreign policy objectives and portends failure for our National Security Strategy.

Public diplomacy promotes the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences in order to impact the behavior of foreign governments.⁶ Ongoing debate on U.S. public diplomacy convincingly argues that current efforts are ineffective and in need of overhaul. This paper examines U.S. public diplomacy and the implications of its success or failure on the 2006 NSS. The examination includes a discussion of public diplomacy as an enabler of foreign policy; consideration of public diplomacy as a strategy of engagement; and an assessment of the effectiveness of America's public diplomacy strategy. Finally, the implications of ineffective public diplomacy for the success of the 2006 National Security Strategy are discussed.

Foreign Policy Enabler

Throughout the world, the public face of the United States generates strong opinions, positive and negative. These public attitudes directly affect our ability to achieve our foreign policy...⁷

Since the 9/11 attacks, it has become clear the United States is involved in a generational and global struggle of ideas – a struggle that pits the power of hate against the power of hope.⁸ In the wake of the attacks, people around the world expressed shock and support for America. As time has passed international support for U.S. policy objectives has dwindled and negative attitudes about America have increased and intensified. The launching of the Iraq War resulted in a sharp downturn of foreign publics' opinions of the United States, not only in the Arab and Muslim world, but even among America's closest allies.⁹

The strategic environment today is radically different than prior to 9/11. The U.S. currently faces a war on terrorism, intensified conflict within Islam, and insurgency in Iraq. Global transparency, driven by new media and low cost technologies, shape the new strategic landscape.¹⁰ Worldwide anger and discontent are directed at America's tarnished credibility and the way it pursues its goals. The challenges America faces in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are great, and the 2006 NSS is an ambitious strategy designed to address these challenges. Success in the GWOT will require sustained cooperation between the United States and other nations and America's image needs a makeover if this cooperation is to be achieved.¹¹ The two foundational pillars of the 2006 NSS require the United States to align with other countries in the pursuit of common policy objectives. The NSS lists nine essential tasks America must undertake to successfully face the security challenges of the 21st century.

- Champion aspirations for human dignity.
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.
- Transform America's security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
- Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.¹²

Clearly, the achievement of these goals depends on U.S. engagement with foreign governments and their constituencies. Shared vision, cooperation, and a coordinated plan of action between the United States and its friends and allies are required if the 2006 NSS is to

succeed. Widespread anti-Americanism and resentment of U.S. foreign policies are growing obstacles to achieving the international unity of effort necessary to ensure success of the 2006 NSS. If not reversed, these obstacles portend failure for key aspects of America's National Security Strategy.

Effective public diplomacy helps shape global perceptions of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, and can influence foreign governments and other international actors to support them. Public diplomacy is a component of foreign policy the United States employs to increase understanding of American values, policies, and initiatives and to counter anti-American sentiment and misinformation about the United States around the world.¹³

Effective public diplomacy enables U.S. foreign policy because it informs foreign audiences and promotes dialogue with other nations. Credible information helps dispel misconceptions of America's motives and intentions. Dialogue begets the understanding and cooperation between nations necessary to solve the complex challenges of the 21st century. Effective public diplomacy has enormous potential to positively influence the world's opinion of America's policies, objectives, culture and people. Unfortunately, the inverse is true, and ineffective public diplomacy can undermine American foreign policy and hamstring successful implementation of our national security strategy.

Strategy of Engagement

While public diplomacy has received widespread attention in recent years, the concept is not new. The U.S. government first officially acknowledged its use of public diplomacy during World War I when President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information to convince foreign publics of the nobility of American foreign policy goals.¹⁴ In public diplomacy's early years, much of what was disseminated in an effort to "whip up domestic support" for U.S. foreign policy and counter foreign propaganda was heavy handed and lacking in credibility.¹⁵ During the 21st century, public diplomacy played a central role in the battles against fascism and communism. In the famous "Campaign of Truth" speech in 1950 President Harry Truman declared that the Cold War was a war of ideas, "a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men." Winning the hearts and minds of people living under communist regimes was deemed essential to victory and President Truman's speech launched an aggressive public diplomacy campaign designed to undermine communist ideologies by exposing them to western ideas and values.¹⁶

Public diplomacy has evolved dynamically, and today its scope extends far beyond the original concept of how government officials publicly communicated, argued, and attempted to

influence foreign policy. In modern public diplomacy, government increasingly conduct international relations through communications media and by dealing with a wide range of nongovernmental entities for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments¹⁷ Public diplomacy can be understood by contrasting its fundamental characteristics with that of traditional diplomacy. While both types of diplomacy attempt to influence the behavior and policies of governments, traditional diplomacy is often opaque, and generally confined to government-to-government interaction. Public diplomacy is transparent and principally aimed at foreign publics instead of their governments.¹⁸

The modern concept of public diplomacy was first developed at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy during the Cold War. Dean Edmund A. Gullion is credited with coining the term when the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy was established in 1965.¹⁹ At that time, the Murrow Center's institutional brochure stated that:

Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on formation and execution of foreign policies... Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas.²⁰

The U.S. Department of State defines public diplomacy as “government sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries.”²¹ However, this definition falls short of explaining the *why* of public diplomacy, which is to influence foreign policy decisions of other nations in support of U.S. policy. Public diplomacy informs, *for the purpose of persuading*, foreign governments and publics.²² Public diplomacy acknowledges that foreign public opinion plays a role in creating foreign policy and therefore seeks to influence these publics.²³ Former U.S. Public Affairs Officer, Hans Tuch, defined public diplomacy as “official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and other nations.”²⁴

Joseph Nye, former Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, brought the definition of public diplomacy into the 21st century when he described it as “a policy expression of soft power.” Nye defined soft power as “the power of getting others to want the outcomes you want. Instead of resorting to threats or physical force, soft power rests on the ability to seduce people into creating certain outcomes.”²⁵ In American politics, public diplomacy is sometimes mistakenly viewed as a “soft tool” of national power to be employed only during times of international crisis in a perception management role. Effective public diplomacy, however, is not about achieving the short term goals of a particular administration, or solely for strategic crisis management, but instead takes a longer view of opening constructive dialogues between

nations in order to shape the geopolitical environment. Public diplomacy involves not only shaping the message(s) a country presents abroad, but also analyzing and understanding the ways the message is interpreted by diverse societies and developing the tools of listening, conversation, and persuasion.²⁶ The U.S. government recognizes that achievement of its foreign policy objectives in the 21st century is inextricably linked to its ability to shape the perceptions and attitudes of foreign publics. American public diplomacy is a strategy of engagement that enables foreign publics to make informed judgments about America's policies, its society, and the relationship of both to their own interests.²⁷

Assessing American Public Diplomacy

American public diplomacy and the 2006 NSS must complement each other for both to succeed. Public diplomacy must effectively shape an international environment that facilitates U.S. foreign policy goals and enables its national security strategy. America's foreign policy and national security strategy must reflect and reinforce what its public diplomacy is telling the world about America. This is the essence of the relationship between public diplomacy and the NSS. But is America's public diplomacy enabling U.S. foreign policy and shaping a geopolitical environment that supports implementation of the new national security strategy? To answer this question, this paper assesses America's public diplomacy strategy using the criteria of feasibility, acceptability and suitability.

Feasibility examines whether a strategy can be accomplished with available resources. In the global struggle of ideas, the United States must understand what it takes to convince the world to follow American leadership, and it must possess the resources to get the job done. In recent years, public diplomacy has gained a new urgency and has become the "holy grail" of American foreign policy. Searching for a silver bullet for the dilemma of America's waning power and influence, the Bush Administration thought it found one in stepped-up public diplomacy. As Charlotte Beers, the State Department's first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs stated in November 2001, in many countries America's message is often "distorted," "one-dimensional," or "simply not heard." If only the rest of the world enjoyed unfettered access to accurate information and independent media, they would understand the U.S. does not seek an empire, the "war on terror" is in every civilized nation's interest, and American values are universal. If only the United States clearly articulated its message then surely the rest of the world would jump on the American bandwagon.²⁸ This assumption motivated increased funding for public diplomacy activities²⁹ and quick fixes such as a State Department-coordinated series of Madison Avenue-like "brand USA" marketing

campaigns.³⁰ But the solutions to America's image problem do not lay in short term manipulative public relations, and not surprisingly, these initiatives have thus far produced no real change in foreign public opinions of America's actions and intentions.³¹

Improved marketing of our message, apparently will not result in significantly reduced levels of anti-Americanism. Other countries are not buying what the U.S. is selling, no matter how slick or sophisticated the sales pitch. It's not the packaging others dislike, it's the product.³² Enduring results will depend on a fundamental transformation of the message the U.S. communicates, the consistency of that message, and a sustained long-term approach at the level of ideas, cultures, and values.³³ In an address to the *2005 Forum on the Future of Public Diplomacy*, Karen Hughes, U.S. Department of State (DoS) Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, unveiled America's current strategy for U.S. public diplomacy. The key components are:

- Offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America's belief in freedom, justice, opportunity and respect for all
- Isolate and marginalize the violent extremists; confront their ideology of tyranny and hate. Undermine their efforts to portray the west as in conflict with Islam by empowering mainstream voices and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures and contributions
- Foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths throughout the world³⁴

While proposed as a "new" strategic framework to guide U.S. public diplomacy, this strategy is based on the traditional premise that the world hates us, because they don't understand us.³⁵ Available evidence indicates this new strategy has been relatively ineffective thus far at reversing the virulent, global anti-Americanism. Sadly, it appears the problem is not that the world misunderstands America, but rather that America may not truly understand the rest of the world.

Arguably the primary resource necessary to prevail in the global war of ideas is influence. America must be able to persuade others that its policies, perspectives and values are worthy of emulation; that the American way is indeed in the world's best interests. There is, however, widespread agreement that America's image abroad needs burnishing and that America's power to persuade is in a state of crisis.³⁶ In his introduction to the 2006 NSS, President George W. Bush addresses the historic dichotomy of American foreign policy, the choice between isolationism or world leadership. He equates the path of isolationism to a path of fear history shows that isolationism increases the nation's security challenges. The path of

leadership was equated to a path of confidence, consistent with the great tradition of American foreign policy. In walking the path of leadership, the United States seeks to shape the world and influence events for the better. The path of leadership rests on strong alliances, friendships, and international institutions that enable America to promote freedom, prosperity, and peace in common purpose with like-minded nations.³⁷ In closing, the 2006 NSS states, “the challenges America faces are great, yet we have enormous power and influence to address those challenges.”³⁸ The premise of the NSS is that the U.S. has both the power and the influence necessary to implement its national security strategy. If this premise is flawed, then America must reassess whether or not its current strategy of public diplomacy is feasible. The 2006 NSS is an ambitious strategy, and boldly declares that America views itself as a leader among the world’s nations. Current trends would argue that maybe America is not the leader she once was, and as a result, its influence has diminished.

Acceptability determines whether the strategy is worth the cost and whether it is politically supportable. Is the Administration requesting, and is Congress providing resources for public diplomacy that are commensurate with the magnitude of the problem? In 1980, the U.S. government spent \$518 million on public diplomacy activities, and funding increased each successive year for most of the following decade. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, and perhaps because of complacency with the U.S. position in the world, some in American government and academia circles began to view public diplomacy as a relic of history. In the years between 1989 and the events of 9/11 both Congress and the various administrations downplayed the importance of funding public diplomacy activities. Public diplomacy often was viewed as less important than political and military functions and was seen by some as a pot of money that could be tapped for funding other activities deemed more important or more popular with constituents. While actual funding increased during this time, and levels in 2000, 2001, and 2002 were higher than in 1980, funding in constant dollars during these three years actually dropped below 1980 levels.³⁹ In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA), America’s primary public diplomacy agency, was folded into the U.S. Department of State as part of an effort to reorganize the foreign policy agencies (largely for budget savings purposes.)⁴⁰

The President’s fiscal year (FY) 2007 budget request of \$1.6 billion set the record for U.S. government public diplomacy expenditures. While an impressive figure, in constant dollars FY2007 U.S. Government expenditures for public diplomacy are less than 1994 expenditures and equal to what was spent on public diplomacy activities during 1987. Between 2002 and 2006, public diplomacy activities have received about \$245 million within emergency supplemental appropriations.⁴¹

Public diplomacy increases are meager in relation to military and counterterrorism expenditures. Since 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations has consistently recommended that funding for public diplomacy should be increased to “significantly higher levels” to be more in line with its role as a vital component of U.S. foreign policy.⁴² Some assert that as the world shrinks due to information technology, being vigilant of foreign population’s attitudes of America is as important and less costly, perhaps, than a buildup of military strength.⁴³ However, if present funding levels are any indication, Congress and the Administration do not concur with this viewpoint

Acceptability is linked to a longstanding public debate as to whether or not public diplomacy is simply cleverly packaged propaganda, and therefore morally suspect. Propaganda is defined as “the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person.”⁴⁴ In 1955, Oren Stephens, author of *Facts to a Candid World: America’s Overseas Information Program*, called such programs (now known as public diplomacy), “propaganda” and referred to the U.S. Declaration of Independence as being “first and foremost a propaganda tract.”⁴⁵ During his 1963 testimony to a House of Representatives subcommittee the internationally recognized journalist and then USIA Director, Edward R. Murrow referred to his agency’s activities as propaganda.⁴⁶ Since then the term has come to connote falsehood, and public diplomacy practitioners bristle at the use of this word as a descriptor of their activities. At a 2002 forum on Press Coverage and the War on Terrorism co-sponsored by the Brookings Institute and Harvard University, Former Ambassador Christopher Ross articulated this when he said, “When I hear the word propaganda I imagine a much more manipulative kind of process than I would like to think public diplomacy is.”⁴⁷

Suitability assesses whether the strategy can reasonably accomplish its objectives. Suitability considers resources, effects, and the timeline for implementing the strategy. The apparent mismatch of resources and priorities for American public diplomacy has been addressed.

The United States is involved in a generational and global struggle about ideas. The 2006 NSS details America’s strategy to achieve victory in this struggle and states that it will be “the work of generations.”⁴⁸ A transformational public diplomacy strategy will only succeed if it is properly resourced and is persistent. This strategy will take at least a decade to have a significant impact. In the United States, election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped public diplomacy for more than half a century.⁴⁹ Will the current public diplomacy strategy reasonably accomplish its objectives? Only if America changes the paradigm of how it

resources and implements this strategy and then sustains the effort over an extended period of time.

Implications of Ineffective Public Diplomacy

If effective public diplomacy is a key component of U.S. foreign policy and vital to the success of its national security strategy, then it follows that ineffective public diplomacy can undermine America's ability to achieve its foreign policy and national security objectives. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) supports the NSS by establishing the following objectives to guide Department of Defense (DoD) security activities.⁵⁰

- Secure the United States from direct attack and counter, at a safe distance, those who seek to harm the country.
- Secure strategic access to key regions, lines of communications and the “global commons”⁵¹ of international waters, airspace, space and cyberspace.
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships by helping other nations increase their ability to defend themselves and protect common security interests
- Establish security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners while working to expand the community of like minded nations.⁵²

From these strategic objectives flow the missions of our armed forces. In this final section the implications of ineffective public diplomacy on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish its mission are considered.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, the United States stood alone as the only nation that had worldwide interests coupled with the capability to project decisive military power throughout the globe. Since World War II, America has maintained forward based and forward deployed military forces around the world. The presence of these forces have strengthened alliances, reassured allies, deterred potential foes, promoted stability, and projected an aura that the United States was everywhere. America's ability to project military power at the time and place of its choosing translated to influence – the ability to produce an effect on the world scene without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of authority.⁵³ Today, America is the sole superpower and its ability to project military might anywhere on the globe is unrivaled. From this one might infer that U.S. influence around the world is dominant and unassailable. Unfortunately, despite its position as the world's preeminent economic and military power, the deterioration of its reputation and credibility abroad is resulting in a decline of America's worldwide influence.

So what does increased anti-American sentiment and the resultant loss of American influence mean to our armed forces' ability to accomplish the objectives set forth for it in the NDS and NMS? What are the future capabilities of the U.S. military to deploy and forward base around the world? The answers to these questions are not encouraging and foreshadow a hobbling of the mighty American warhorse. The primary effect of America's penchant for unilateral action and perceived U.S. led globalization is a growing international loathing of the United States.⁵⁴ Second and third order effects of this negative trend are -- increased foreign public support for terrorism directed at Americans, adverse impacts on the cost and effectiveness of U.S. military operations, and a weakening of our ability to align with other nations in pursuit of common policy objectives. These effects negatively impact the U.S. military's ability to accomplish its global missions of defense, deterrence, and fostering stability. However, the trend of increasing anti-Americanism and declining American influence can have other negative effects on American military power. Using the context of the four overarching defense objectives set forth in the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) this final section explores some of these effects.

Secure the United States from direct attack – The enemy America faces today is a complex network of ideologically driven extremists. Their objectives are to terrorize America's citizens, undermine its partnerships with other nations, and erode its global influence.⁵⁵ Victory on foreign battlefields alone will not defeat this foe. In order to secure the U.S. homeland from direct attack, the NDS states that, "we will give top priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the United States directly, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction."⁵⁶ Achieving this objective requires a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks the sanctuaries and resources they need to operate and survive.⁵⁷ Ongoing military operations around the world to find, fix, and destroy the enemy are the main thrust of this effort. As an enabler, public diplomacy's objective is to remove obstacles to cooperation and coordination between nations so there is unity of purpose and a shared vision in this generational struggle to eradicate the global threat. Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media enables extremists to coordinate and execute operations with minimal risk.⁵⁸ American public diplomacy must employ these same tools to discredit terrorists and their message by promoting truthful and peaceful messages.⁵⁹ However, with America's influence and credibility declining, the world may increasingly reject its message, and other nations may increasingly unite *against* American policies and interests rather than unite *in support of* them. Unless this trend is arrested, America may be challenged to achieve the international unity of effort necessary to "counter, at a safe distance, those who seek to harm [America]".⁶⁰

Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action – The U.S. military cannot defend America's security interests in areas it cannot reach. While its global strike⁶¹ capabilities are impressive, America's armed forces require strategic access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons to enable these capabilities and set conditions for follow-on decisive operations. Agility gives U.S. commanders the ability to contend with the principal characteristic of today's security environment—uncertainty. Agility is the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions. Agility ensures the U.S. military can act swiftly and decisively to protect our interests abroad.⁶² Strategic access is the key to agility: access to bases and ports in foreign countries, pre-positioning of strategic assets, and over flight and transit rights. America's ability to project military might at the time and place of its choosing hinges on strategic access. Experiences in the Iraq War provide telling examples of how U.S. strategic access is tied to America's relationships with not only Iraq's neighbors, but with allies far removed from the theater of operations. From Turkey's refusal to allow U.S. combat forces to attack into Iraq from their country, to current day restrictions against launching combat missions from airbases on foreign soil, it is apparent that the U.S. military depends heavily on America's relationships with other nations for its global freedom of action.

Strengthen alliances and partnerships –The NDS declares that international partnerships and alliances are a principal source of military our strength. Mutual alliances between like-minded nations provide far greater collective security than any one nation can achieve on its own.⁶³ DoD's Security Cooperation Program is one of America's principal vehicles for strengthening alliances and partnerships. This program encourages partners and allies to increase their military capability and willingness to operate as part of international coalitions. Security cooperation spurs the military transformation of key allies through the development of a common security assessment and joint, combined training and education; combined concept development and experimentation; information sharing; and combined command and control. One of America's most effective tools in prosecuting the GWOT is training indigenous forces.⁶⁴ The growing trend of anti-Americanism and resentment of U.S. policies may undermine America's relations with other nations to the point where they will deem it politically expedient to curtail their participation in the DoD's Security Cooperation Program. Indeed DoD obliquely recognizes this in the NDS when it states, "our capacity to address global security challenges alone will be insufficient; some allies and partners will decide not to act with us; our leading position in world affairs will continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance."⁶⁵

Establish favorable security conditions – America “will create conditions conducive to a favorable international system by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a common appreciation of threats; the steps required to protect against these threats; and a broad, secure, and lasting peace.” These objectives will be accomplished by assuring America’s allies of our commitment to their physical defense, by dissuading potential allies, by deterring aggression, and countering coercion.⁶⁶ Effective public diplomacy will be critical to the success of these actions. The United States must credibly communicate to the world its commitment to international partners and consistently demonstrate the will to resolve conflicts on terms favorable to itself and its friends and allies. Ineffective public diplomacy can undermine American credibility abroad, allow misconceptions of America’s military capabilities and national resolve, and inadvertently communicate to friends and allies that America’s commitment is wavering. To achieve this objective, the U.S. military will increasingly rely on collaboration with like-minded nations to bring about a common appreciation of threats; protection against these threats; and a broad, secure, lasting peace.⁶⁷ Ineffective public diplomacy undermines America’s ability to assure, dissuade, deter and coerce, and threatens the establishment of security conditions necessary for a favorable international environment.

America’s national security interests increasingly require that other nations around the world share a common view of the solutions to the challenges and uncertainties of the 21st century. America’s public diplomacy must counter the growing trend of world-wide anti-Americanism. Failure to do so will negatively impact our ability to implement key tenets of our national security strategy. While improved public diplomacy alone will not arrest the decline in America’s image and influence abroad, failure to dramatically improve what America is telling the rest of the world will increasingly hamstring the ability of our Armed Forces to defend America’s vital interests at home and abroad.

Endnotes

¹ President George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C: National Security Council, 16 March 2006), Introductory letter.

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³ David M. Edelstein and Ronald Krebs, “Washington’s Troubling Obsession with Public Diplomacy,” *Survival* 47 (Spring 2005): 90.

⁴ Wolf and Rosen, 1.

⁵ Ibid., 2.

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⁴⁴ The Reader's Digest Association, *Merriam-Webster's Deluxe Dictionary, Tenth Collegiate Edition* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1998), 1466.

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⁴⁸ General Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2005), 1.

⁴⁹ Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 5.

⁵⁰ Myers, 1.

⁵¹ The "Global Commons" are those areas of the Earth shared by all. It is the atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and cyberspace. A.P. Palmer, Institute of Cambrian Studies, Boulder, CO.

⁵² Secretary Donald R. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense, March 2004), 6-7.

⁵³ Merriam-Webster's Deluxe Dictionary defines influence as "the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command." *Merriam-Webster's Deluxe Dictionary, Tenth Collegiate Edition* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1998), 944. In order to fit the context in which it is used, the definition of influence in this paper is a slightly reworded version of the above definition.

⁵⁴ Edelstein and Krebs, 94-95.

⁵⁵ Rumsfeld, 6.

⁵⁶ Ibid., iv.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁸ President George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, September 2006), 5.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 17.

⁶⁰ Myers, 1.

⁶¹ Global Strike is defined as “responsive joint operations that strike enemy high value/payoff targets, as an integral part of joint force operations conducted to gain and maintain battlespace access, achieve other desired effects and set conditions for follow-on decisive operations to achieve strategic and operational objectives.” Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, ver 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: Defense Technical Information Center, 10 January 2005), 2.1.

⁶² Myers, 6-7.

⁶³ Rumsfeld, 4-7.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁶⁵ Rumsfeld, 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁷ Rumsfeld, 7.