NATION BUILDING: A JOINT ENTERPRISE

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The Department of Defense must perform nation building roles and functions in order for the United States to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these functions could be performed by other organizations. Some argue that the Department of Defense should be responsible for performing the tasks of nation building following a conflict until other organizations build the capacity or show the willingness to assume these roles. This paper explores the issue of the military developing ‘joint nation building organizations’ to meet these requirements and the joint implications of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
NATION BUILDING: A JOINT ENTERPRISE

Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, the artillery and air teams, by Soldiers living in the rains and huddling in the snow. But wars are won by the great strength of the nation – the Soldier and the civilian working together.

—General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

The Balance between Authority and Responsibility

Consider the following questions. The Army is at war, but is the nation at war? Has the nation sufficiently mobilized the elements of national power in support of a global war effort? Has the average American changed his life because of the war? Is popular support for the war in Iraq sufficient to mobilize the nation for war? Public opinion polls in January 2007 showed that support for the President’s handling of the war was at an all time low of 26%. Similar polls suggested that 54% of the American public believed that the United States was losing the war in Iraq. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, began his remarks to the House Armed Services Committee on 27 June 2006 with these words.

America’s Army remains at war. And we will be fighting this war for the foreseeable future. This is not just the Army’s war. Yet in the light of the scale of our commitment we bear the majority of the burden, serving side by side with Marines and our sister Services and coalition partners.

General Schoomaker identified the crux of the issue; America relies upon the Army, and moreover, from a joint perspective, the Department of Defense, to fight and win the nation’s wars. The American people have every expectation that the military will succeed when committed. They hold the military accountable for achieving victory. Yet the military does not command or control the elements of national power essential for achieving victory.

Intellectuals argue that wars are won or lost by nations and not by the military. However, the military makes a significant contribution to the eventual outcome of a war. Many believe the military is responsible for the outcome of a war in spite of other factors. For example, America lost the war in Vietnam even though the Army did not lose a battle. Many blame this loss on the national strategy and hold the military accountable for failing to provide a better strategy. Similarly, in Iraq, many claim the war is being lost and blame the leadership of the Department of Defense for making strategic errors. This brings back the issue that the military is accountable to fight and win America’s wars.

Others question why the military needs to be involved in nation building. The military as an element of national power is employed to protect the United States’ national interests. The military is in Iraq because national leaders believed that overwhelming national interests were at
The United States performs nation building activities to establish conditions to further national interests. Many countries need assistance with nation building, but the military is not providing direct assistance to all of these countries. United States national leaders must not consider national interests sufficient to warrant military deployment to these areas. In Africa, the region has a predominance of the poorest nations in the world. Genocide, famine, disease, and failed governments are legitimate causes for the United States military to deploy and provide nation building assistance. Yet, the military is not deployed throughout Africa. The world has more needs than the United States has the capacity to provide solutions. National interests serve to prioritize the employment of the United States military.

A pragmatic approach would suggest that the military lead development of the capabilities needed to succeed across the full spectrum of conflict, even if these capabilities exist in other elements of power. The military has already adopted measures to enhance Service capabilities in war. The United States military is transforming; reorganizing to train as it fights. Examples of these initiatives include Army Modularity, Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ (CE)), Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), and the Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOC). These initiatives strive to improve command and control and facilitate synchronization and harmonization of efforts. In short, they seek to improve unity of effort and potentially provide the greatest impact in the shortest period of time. The military should further develop these programs while leveraging existing capabilities.

The counter argument to this approach is that the military concentrates on exclusive war fighting capabilities that are not found in other elements of national power. This argument has great appeal to those who dislike a large standing military and its expense. However, it may be more cost effective for the military to have the organic capabilities for nation building to facilitate a faster transition to civilian authority at the conclusion of military operations. In fact, history is rich with examples of the United States military performing across the full spectrum of operations. The Iraq conflict is not the first time the military has faced the challenges of nation building, reconstruction, or counter-insurgency operations. This paper explores the joint implications of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.

Strategic Guidance
The President has significant latitude in determining how to develop and execute foreign policy. Article II of the United States Constitution establishes the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and gives him authority to make treaties. Congress established The National Security Council in the Executive Office of the President with the National Security
Act of 1947. The President can organize his cabinet to accomplish his agenda. The President issues Presidential Directives to establish the structure and authorities needed to enact his priorities. President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56) in May 1997 to formalize the governmental process for managing complex contingency operations. This directive established roles and responsibilities for government agencies to deal with ‘complex contingency’ operations abroad but did not apply to domestic military operations. This directive is often cited as a result of the lessons learned from operations conducted in Bosnia, Africa, and Iraq in the 1990s. These operations demonstrated a trend of increasing demand for humanitarian assistance operations and the need for better interagency coordination.

President George W. Bush rescinded this directive in 2001 and established his National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) to enact his priorities. National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) established the current administration’s cabinet organization for national security. Management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization are addressed in the President’s National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44).

Some claim that the Department of State should be in charge of reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Prior to NSPD-44, much discussion occurred regarding the confusion of who should be in charge of nation building efforts in Iraq. NSPD-44 designates the Secretary of State as lead for coordinating and integrating efforts among government agencies.

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.

This directive establishes the Department of State as lead for coordination, but coordination does not mean the Department of State must have the capabilities to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations. Others believe, in accordance with this directive, that the Department of Defense is responsible for reconstruction efforts associated with combat operations in Iraq.

The responsibilities for Services in the Department of Defense are identified in Title 10 of the United States Code. Chapter 307 addresses the Army and specifically states “It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.” This reference is the cited source that requires the military to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations as a logical extension of combat operations on land.
DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, dated 28 November 2005, supported this belief and accepted SSTR operations as core military missions. It further directed the Department of Defense to include plans for SSTR operations in all military plans. The excerpt below illustrates the clear meaning of this directive.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.20

Some of the tasks addressed in the directive include developing representative governments; rebuilding indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; reviving the private sector economic activity; and constructing necessary infrastructure. These tasks are all part of nation building. The intent of this directive is to ensure the Department of Defense has the capabilities needed to succeed in SSTR operations without the immediate assistance of other agencies. This directive clarifies the debate within the military on whether nation building should be a core task. It does not, however, provide any of the resources to accomplish this mission or prevent debate outside of the Department of Defense.

Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine is authoritative within the military. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) Coordination During Joint Operations establishes the fundamental principles to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense and other agencies. This document advances the discussion of the challenges facing the military and the joint task force commander in achieving “unity of effort” in coordinating the elements of national power. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations, also addresses the challenges of achieving unity of effort, but focuses on coordination with civil authorities, the general population, and institutions to facilitate military operations.21 It contains a greater emphasis on civil affairs than Joint Publication 3-08. It is clear that unity of effort is critical to achieving objectives, but the method used to achieve them is less clear.

There is no common definition of “unity of effort.” It is not defined in Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, states: “Unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations … in any alliance or coalition.”22 This definition
describes what is required but does not define the term. Joint Publication 5-0 (Signature Draft), Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, acknowledges this deficiency and proposes language for the next edition of these publications. It states:

…the successful synchronization and/or integration of joint and single-service operations with the actions of supporting combatant commands, or other military forces, non-military organizations...host nation agencies; international organizations; and nongovernmental organizations. Unity of effort is the result of successful unified action.23

Unity of effort does not rely on unity of command. Many organizations and governments provide assets for a common purpose without entering into formal command relationships. The military, United States government agencies, and civilian organizations can coordinate resources without the strict senior subordinate relationships that are common in a bureaucracy. However, these relationships create challenges that lead back to the initial issue of balance between authority and responsibility.

Unity of Effort Challenges

Several factors complicate achieving unity of effort. First, unity of effort is convoluted by the diversity of organizations that require 'successful synchronization.' Representatives of these organizations must have the authority to make policy decisions to direct their resources in a common direction. However, authority over resources is often fragmented in a bureaucratic organization among different departments. Representatives from these organizations may only have the ability to commit resources within their department. Often representatives lack decision making authority and serve only as a liaison for coordination with their organization. This lack of authority complicates achieving synchronization of efforts in a timely manner. Additionally, most organizations have unique cultures which do not mirror the military model that provides direct command authority to facilitate unity of effort. Further, many non-governmental organizations are primarily interested in performing niche roles. Their organizational goals may not coincide with the broader military objectives. They may prefer to remain separated from the military to maintain a perception of neutrality to accomplish their missions. Some believe an organization that associates with the United States Military may be at risk of physical attack from the enemies of the United States.

Second, the scope of the mission further obscures synchronization of efforts. The challenge of reestablishing order to facilitate civilian authority is complex, vast, and difficult to quantify. For example, the area in Iraq is inhabited by over 10 million people who have historical ethnic and religious clashes that may be irreconcilable. No organization, other than
the military, has the equipment, personnel, and resources to address a problem this complex. Traditional dependency upon a single ‘lead agency’ to resolve the problems in Iraq may not be appropriate. Resolution of this conflict may be beyond the capacity of any one ‘lead agency.’ The SSTR operations challenge requires national strategic unity of effort of all elements of national power. By law, the President of the United States is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort. Additionally, the President has many other requirements to coordinate beyond Iraq. Therefore, he must delegate the coordination and execution of his strategy to achieve unity of effort to trusted members of his cabinet. These agencies have requirements of equally high importance that vie for resources with supporting operations in Iraq. Most agencies do not have the manpower to provide liaisons or dedicate project teams to solely coordinate with the military on operations in Iraq. Representation at the geographic combatant commander level may be the only support some organizations can provide.

Third, theater diversity also inhibits unity of effort. Theater diversity prevents the combatant commander from developing ‘standard solutions.’ Standard solutions would facilitate unity of effort if they could be applied throughout the region. Programs that are successful in one province, or district, may not be effective in another area. Many theaters have non-homogeneous populations that create unique regional challenges. The combination of these factors makes it difficult to centrally control an approach that requires near unique solutions. This diversity complicates unity of effort by placing a premium on local situational awareness, nearly at the village level, to determine what actions will be effective. Additionally, many organizations lack the broad regional focus of a geographic combatant commander. The Department of State, for example, organizes by country rather than by region. These factors suggest the military develop a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort.

In conclusion, the military has a clear requirement to prepare to conduct nation building tasks. Debate continues on whether the military should be the lead agency for all operations or just for operations associated with conflict. Since the military must be able to perform across the full spectrum of conflict, the result of this debate is largely inconsequential. The military must have the capability to perform SSTR operations and the ability to globally project these capabilities. Other organizations can augment these capabilities, relieve the military of these tasks as the situation matures, or be the lead for coordination. However, these organizations will continue to rely upon the military to restore stability.
Recommendations

The Department of Defense will change doctrine to develop a common understanding of unity of effort. This will establish a common vocabulary for the discussion of future challenges. This incorporation will not, however, provide any new capabilities to perform the tasks associated with stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The Department of Defense should take concrete steps to address this problem.

Establish Joint Nation Building Organizations

The Department of Defense could develop ‘joint nation building organizations’ as a way to improve unity of effort. The President has initiated a serious national security dialog to address the balance between military missions and resources. This debate provides an opportunity to address the resource requirements of SSTR operations. The military should provide a comprehensive proposal of what resources are required to establish the capabilities required in DODD 3000.05 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A Joint functional area analysis can identify the changes required to provide the SSTR operations capabilities considering doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). This analysis needs to be a joint endeavor to incorporate the unique strengths of each of the individual services.

These new organizations must be organic to the military to provide the combatant commander the ability to immediately respond to the requirements of SSTR operations until other organizations, agencies, or governments can respond. The occupying military can lose popular support when basic services are not quickly restored or are destroyed in combat. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people can be as critical to achieving victory as defeating the enemy military force.

Once the functional area analysis establishes the required capabilities, military force development specialists can design these ‘joint nation building organizations.’ The term ‘joint nation building organization’ does not imply the size of the organization because it is still ill defined. Analysis may recommend an organization approaching the typical 3,500 member Army brigade. However, labeling this unit a brigade may imply that it will only exist in Army organizations. Once designed, each geographic combatant commander should be assigned one of these organizations to enable a regional specific focus.

Current Army initiatives use the metaphor of developing Army officers to be ‘pentathletes’ or ‘multi-skilled athletes’ rather than experts in a specific area. These terms suggest that Soldiers must be flexible and prepared to perform across the full spectrum of operations.
However, this does not address the specific training required to perform many of the SSTR operations tasks. Soldiers are not currently trained to establish governance, judicial systems, or create economic growth. This lack of institutional training reinforces the need for a thorough assessment of the implications of SSTR operations and the establishment of ‘joint nation building organizations’ to meet the immediate needs of a combatant commander following combat operations.

Developing these estimates and force capabilities takes time and makes for a long term solution. Force structure changes may not occur fast enough to make a difference in the current conflict in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is still essential that the military has the equipment, manpower, and resources to accomplish the national military strategy. It is imperative to start the process to change the force structure as soon as possible.

For at least the last decade, military experts have argued that the assigned active component force structure was inadequate to conduct two near simultaneous major combat operations. Further studies suggested that the Army required 671,000 ground forces to accomplish the national security objectives. Current Army active component strength is approximately 512,000. Additionally, the protracted struggle in Iraq requires the military develop a larger rotation base or change the deployment policies. These challenges are huge. The nation must adequately resource the Department of Defense to perform all assigned missions. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, has repeatedly stated that the defense budget and manpower levels are inadequate for mission accomplishment. His estimates suggested that the Army can increase at a rate of 7,000 personnel a year. Capacity of the industrial base and the accession base further limits how fast the Army and the other Services can grow. Funding increases alone cannot fix these complex problems. However, the task is not impossible; the Department of Defense must initiate actions now to provide for the future defense of the nation.

Leverage Initiatives

Command and control changes can provide a great foundation to leverage existing capabilities within the government. The Department of Defense could further develop several of the existing command and control initiatives centered on the geographic combatant commander’s headquarters. Increasing headquarters capabilities to coordinate SSTR operations can have the greatest impact in the shortest amount of time.

The Department of Defense should fully resource the incorporation of Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ (CE)) at each of the combatant command
headquarters. Incorporating SJFHQ (CE) has advanced joint understanding and increased operational preparedness. The SJFHQ (CE) was established to reduce the time it takes to organize and equip a joint task headquarters.\textsuperscript{30} Prior to this initiative, most joint task force headquarters were assembled as ad hoc organizations after a crisis occurred. This method of establishing a joint task force led to headquarters trying to execute missions while they were still being assembled. Although many are in agreement on the benefits of the SJFHQ (CE), commanders have been directed to resource this requirement with existing manpower. This practice leads to a discussion of what responsibilities a commander should abandon if new responsibilities are added to his headquarters. The Department of Defense must address this concern or the desired solution creates unintended problems. An unresourced mission assignment leads to dual tasking of personnel and detracts from the organization. The Department of Defense should take steps to increase Service end strengths to account for this increase in joint mission requirements and billet growth. The result should be an increased acceptance of the joint initiatives associated with SJFHQ (CE) and increased efficacy. Further, these initiatives will provide a cadre of resident trained personnel that commanders can rely upon in future operations with established habitual relationships within their respective disciplines.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also suggested expanding the concept of SJFHQ (CE) to additional two and three star component headquarters.\textsuperscript{31} This initiative would greatly enhance component commanders’ ability to form joint task force headquarters more rapidly. Similarly, this initiative would require additional joint growth, and consequently, Service end strengths should be increased to fully account for this growth. Many of the SJFHQ (CE) billets require field grade officers. Although it takes years to develop a field grade officer, promotions and retention can still influence the available inventory in the short term. Regardless of the inventory, the Department of Defense should establish the requirements as a first step in providing a fully resourced solution. Commanders have increased capabilities with existing resources already. At some point, the mission increase must trigger a corresponding increase in resources. The Service force management processes must account for growth of these joint requirements.

The Department of Defense should expand the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) much like the SJFHQ (CE) model to each of the two and three star component command headquarters to enable better coordination of all elements of national power as a joint task force headquarters. Regardless of the resources available, the Department of Defense should establish requirements that enhance capacity and address current security challenges.
Arguments for incorporating a JIACG at the combatant command level are similar to those made for the benefits of the SJFHQ (CE). Again, enacting this concept would require an integrated joint DOTMLPF solution that is fully resourced. The Department of Defense could leverage the development of the QDR Joint Command and Control Roadmap to accomplish this effort. Providing the personnel, equipment, and expertise to coordinate all elements of national power organic within a joint task force headquarters would greatly increase the commander’s ability to achieve unity of effort.

The Department of Defense should develop Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in much the same way as the SJFHQ (CE) model above. Doctrinally, the Executive Steering Group recommends the organization of a CMOC to the joint task force commander based on an assessment of the mission requirements. The result of this process is that the CMOC is formed after the initial requirements are determined. Much of the same discussion that led to the formation of SJFHQ (CE) should apply to this discussion. All organizations would be better served by establishing a core element that is resourced, trained, and equipped within the military to establish a CMOC. As commanders clarify mission requirements, the appropriate organizational representatives can assemble on a pre-existing organic, interoperable structure. Combatant commanders can develop habitual relationships and exercise these relationships in training environments to further enhance the military and civil coordination capabilities. Again, this would require a Joint DOTMLPF recommendation to identify the resources needed. Once identified, the Department of Defense must ensure these resources are provided to the combatant commander. It is likely that future joint operations will continue to involve coordination with civilian elements of power in populated areas. Therefore, it is increasingly important that the Joint task force commander improve civil military coordination capabilities.

Establish Regional Training Centers

The Department of Defense should develop regional training centers to facilitate the coordination of all elements of national power in each of the geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. These centers can be as elaborate as a current United States military training installation at Fort Benning, Georgia. The centers can offer a full multipurpose range facility, maneuver space for training and operations, and academic facilities for institutional training. Military training may be a good starting point to initiate this concept; however, the centers should not just be for military training. The military should lead planning for this initiative and invite other agencies within the government to participate. Likely participants include elements of the Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, as
well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Corps of Engineers. These centers would become a vehicle for coordination and execution of regional national security objectives across a range of departments and agencies. The synergistic effect of this cooperation could create a center of excellence for regional awareness training for the United States Government. As foreign partners increase capacities, it may also relieve some stress on United States resources. Additionally, investing in this type of facility reinforces the perception of a United States regional commitment which may foster increased regional cooperation in a number of other areas.

International partners also stand to benefit greatly from these centers. Combatant commanders could develop these centers as a multinational shared endeavor in regions that can afford to contribute to construction. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies exemplifies this concept. This Center promotes a dialog between nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia on contemporary regional security issues. It is based on United States-German bilateral agreements and is distinct from NATO institutions. Some regional security centers currently exist. However, they are largely academic institutions. For example, the Marshall Center, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and the African Center for Strategic Studies. The purpose of the proposed regional centers should be much broader. They should offer skill training as well as academic instruction and conferences. Just as these academic institutions foster dialog and cooperation, training centers could facilitate regional cooperation. The regional centers do not need to appear as United States led projects to succeed. In fact, it is advantageous for the world to perceive the United States as a supporting player in some regions in order for the initiative to succeed.

The military institutional training model employed at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) provides a good example of lead effort by the military. Instruction is provided at this institution on a variety of subjects from basic military skills to helicopter pilot training. All instruction is conducted in Spanish. Conducting training in the regional language enables the countries of Central and South America to send the most highly qualified personnel. Many of these countries have applauded the advantages of this approach in contrast to sending its personnel to the United States Army resident schools. It enables the foreign governments to select their best leaders for the training, as opposed to leaders who speak English for the training. The WHINSEC has guest instructors from many Latin American countries who are subject matter experts. Many of the students participating in the command and general staff course have completed their nation’s command and general staff course and
have had to compete with their classmates for attendance at WHINSEC. The potential benefits of bringing the future leaders of each foreign nation’s militaries and agencies together to study and build relationships are difficult to quantify, but logically should enhance future regional cooperation.

A multinational regional training center of excellence for SSTR operations with all elements of national power participating has unlimited potential. Many militaries and foreign government agencies have a long history of successfully dealing with SSTR operations and can bring significant credibility to a regional center. Regional experts could join forces to address current regional challenges. Additionally, United States agencies could advance their regional goals. The possibilities are limitless for such a collaborative endeavor. The initial effort can start as a small cadre of personnel from each agency that develops the base for future growth. As these centers develop, each agency should gain an increased understanding of the other agencies, which should improve future coordination. The United States stands to gain at least as much as its partners in this effort. The combined effects of establishing these training centers as a collaborative effort will enhance a commander’s ability to achieve unity of effort. Again, this would require a Joint DOTMLPF recommendation to identify the resources required. The greater the investment in this effort, the greater the potential returns for nation.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense is the best agency to lead the coordination of all elements of national power for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Faced with reconstruction of Europe in 1949 Winston Churchill stated “…it is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems.”36 Similarly, today’s nation building challenges require an integration of all elements of power, civil and military. In order for the Department of Defense to be successful, it must embrace this reality. The Department of Defense should leverage each of the geographic combatant commander’s regional power bases to integrate all elements of national power and provide a sound foundation for future military operations. Further, it must ensure the national security debate includes an understanding of the military resources necessary to defend the nation. Finally, it must continue efforts to fully resource the critical coordination elements required for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
Endnotes


3 Ibid.

4 Opening remarks of General Peter Schoomaker before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Washington, D.C. 27 June 2006.


14 Ibid.


17 Number of employees in the Department of State, approximately 48,000 employees, frequently asked questions, social studies; available from http://future.state.gov/educators/social; Internet; accessed 29 January 2007.


24 Joint Publication 0-2, I-3.


26 Congressional Budget Office, Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century, December 1997, Section 2.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 3.


