

A STUDY OF POSTWAR JAPAN (1945-1950): WHAT INSIGHTS AND
LESSONS CAN BE GAINED FROM THE UNITED STATES
LED REBIRTH OF JAPAN?

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Military History

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF POSTWAR JAPAN (1945-1950): WHAT INSIGHTS AND LESSONS CAN BE GAINED FROM THE UNITED STATES LED REBIRTH OF JAPAN?,
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Many look with amazement at the rebirth of the nation of Japan from the ashes of World War II. This is a study of the postwar military government and administration of Japan. It will examine the detailed preparation, the initial objectives, and the execution of the occupation by the United States (US)-led forces. The military government and civil affairs doctrine used, will be analyzed. The lessons gained from this study should be useful to the expeditionary army today. The military government teams that executed the policies of the occupation at the prefecture level will be a focus of this study.

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ACRONYMS

CATS	Civil Affairs Training Schools
FM	Field Manual
GHQ	General Headquarters
PH&W	Public Health and Welfare
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SMG	School of Military Government
US	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Occupation lasted for six years, seven months, twenty-eight days. It was not a neatly ordered process of orders dispatched and automatically obeyed. It was a mixing-bowl process in which plans, pressures, counter-pressures, and sheer happenstance were swirled together. The Occupation ordered; the Japanese maneuvered to temper the orders; bargains were struck, original intentions changed, and more bargains were struck. But when it finally ended, the old Japan was hardly recognizable.¹

William Chapman

The modern nation of Japan was formed from the ashes of World War II and has been a democracy with peace and stability for almost sixty years. The end of World War II left the United States (US) and its Allies with the monumental task of overseeing and implementing a new government in Japan and transitioning from combat operations to peace and stability. This is a study of the postwar administration of Japan. This study is focused on the preparation, the initial objectives, and the execution, by a US-led military government, of these plans for the successful occupation of Japan. A presentation of the insights and lessons gained from this study should be useful to the expeditionary army today.

Many look with amazement at the new democratic government and rebirth of Japan after World War II. Japan has been and remains a leader among the countries of the Far East. The success of the Japanese democracy since the end of the World War II and the successful establishment of a new government leads to the following question: What was the foundation of the new society and government in Japan after the Second World War?

After the Japanese agreed to the “unconditional surrender” mandated by the Allies, they cooperated graciously with the US-led occupation forces. The postwar period in Japan was remarkably peaceful. The transition from a militarist empire to a democratic state was accomplished by a relatively small occupation force. Japan’s disciplined and homogeneous society could be credited with much of the success of the occupation programs. However, the US-led occupation provides an example of military government and civil affairs principles being used on a large scale. Many of the principles used in postwar Japan are still relevant today. This study will highlight some of the policies and principles used while governing postwar Japan. It will also examine some of the policies or procedures that were not as successful.

As the Second World War was drawing to a close, the Cold War had already begun. The competition between democratic, socialist, and communist ideologies and ways to govern was quickly developing. The Allies, led by the US, wanted to expedite the establishment of a democratic form of government in Japan. Japan needed a workable and stable government of self-rule established before the harmful influences of nondemocratic forms of government could interfere.

Well before the war ended, the US invested much time and resources to develop the plans and policies for administering Japan. When combat operations were complete and the military victory was won, it would be time to implement these postwar plans. This study will explore the plans, policies, and stated objectives for creating a stable, self-ruling Japan after its total defeat by the Allies. This study will answer the thesis question: What insights and lessons can be gained from the postwar government and administration of Japan?

There is a wealth of material written on the history of the US-led occupation of Japan. The hard victory for the Allies came after almost four hard-fought years of combat in the Pacific theater. Just as the combat operations of the war were well documented, so were the postwar occupation and administration of Japan. The lasting peace and prosperity of modern-day Japan has spurred on continued study and writing about this very successful endeavor by the US and its Allies. Now with the Global War on Terrorism being waged, interest in this successful experience of military government and civil affairs has drawn renewed attention.

The early documentation and writing about the occupation were very matter of fact. This early period, defined for the purpose of this literature review, was from 1945 to 1955. The highlighted sources from this era consisted of firsthand documentaries and diaries of personally witnessed events and interactions. Courtney Whitney, a major general, and head of the government section of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), in 1955 wrote *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History*. This was a personal account of his involvement in developing the new Japanese constitution and years of service in SCAP. In 1948, Mark Gayn, a Tokyo correspondent and writer for the *Chicago Sun*, wrote *Japan Diary*. This eyewitness account of his travels with the military government and civil affairs teams throughout Japan was very insightful. The last highlighted source from this early era was *The Allied Occupation of Japan* written by Edwin Martin in 1948. This was a succinct documentation of the policies, plans, and execution of the occupation. His book was published by Stanford University Press. It is notable that Stanford was one of only six Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) during the war.

The middle era, from the 1960s to the 1990s, also provided a wealth of writings on the postwar occupation of Japan. The memoirs of Prime Minister Yoshida, General MacArthur, and Ambassador Sebald. The Yoshida Memoirs were written in 1962. MacArthur's memoirs, *Reminiscences*, were written in 1964. William Sebald, an Ambassador and Political Advisor to SCAP, wrote *With MacArthur in Japan* in 1965.

Two additional sources of note, written during this middle era, were *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* and *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*. John Perry wrote *Beneath Eagle's Wings* in 1980. It provides a view from thirty years after the occupation. Richard Finn's *Winners in Peace* was written in 1992. This book provided an insightful documentation of the events that occurred between the SCAP headquarters and the newly formed Japanese government.

Two recent studies on the postwar occupation of Japan are of note. First is James Dobbins' RAND Corporation study, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, written in 2003. Dobbins' studied eight of the America's most-recent occupations or nation-building actions. He provides some general principles and characteristics that were common to these operations. Last, is a study published at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2005. This Combat Studies Institute study, written by David Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, analyzed the postwar occupation of Japan (1945-1952) and compared and contrasted with actions in Iraq, in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cavaleri used the principles developed from the RAND Corporation study to analyze what was done in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

As valuable as these previous works are to the understanding of the occupation of Japan, there remain a number of critical issues that are unexamined. This study will focus on the prior preparation and planning that was done before the occupation began. It will present perspectives from the military government teams, embedded journalists, and primary source documents from the occupation. This study will examine what made the occupation of Japan so successful. How did this rehabilitation of Japan occur?

The first step in the rehabilitation of Japan began at the training institutions established during the war to train persons in military government and civil affairs. Over two thousand Army and Navy officers were trained by August of 1945 for duty in Japan as military and civil affairs specialists.² The training centers established and civilian universities involved in this effort were significant.

The extensive prior planning for postwar Japan had established initial policies for the occupation to implement. One of the policies for postwar Japan was to leave the Emperor in place after defeating the Japanese military. Another was to use the existing government structure as much as possible. Many of these policies were specified in the US Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan which was transmitted by the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee to the US military leadership in the Pacific on 29 August 1945. Additionally, the joint services manual, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, Field Manual (FM) 27-5, provided principles which were noted by the State Department “as a suitable guide.”³ This manual, published in 1943, will provide insight into the principles and doctrine used by the occupation forces in Japan.

President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur to be the SCAP in Japan. During the occupation, MacArthur became the focal point of authority in Japan. MacArthur was a controversial leader, who was loved and idolized by the conquered Japanese. He was criticized and chastised by many in Washington for being independent and self-empowering. This study will analyze the SCAP headquarters operations in Tokyo and the implementation of postwar policies by the subordinate Eighth US Army. The insights gained from this analysis and study of postwar Japan will be presented for use by future planners and executors of military government and civil affairs operations.

Chapter 2 of this study, “The Plan and Objectives,” will review the contents of the original documents that guided, and in some cases, dictated how postwar Japan would develop. These four major documents that laid the foundation for the occupation were the Cairo Conference, the Potsdam Declaration, The US Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan, and the Instrument of Surrender. These documents will be analyzed to reveal the initial policies and objectives for postwar Japan.

There were many areas of Japan’s society and government that were altered and reformed during the occupation. Some of these changes were drastic, while others were only minor. The two most important objectives of the occupation were the disarmament and demobilization of the former Japanese war machine. These and other lesser objectives for rebuilding Japan will be discussed in this chapter. Some of the lesser known objectives and reforms of the occupation will be presented. These include reforms in education, reorganization of the police, revitalizing the economy, and the creation of land ownership laws.

Chapter 3, “The Government and the New Constitution,” will discuss Japan’s form of government and constitution prior to the occupation. As the basis for democratic rule in Japan, the Meiji Constitution will be analyzed. The basis for democratic self-rule in Japan will be examined. Additionally, the three major points of the new constitution, adopted in 1947, will be examined.

Japan’s postwar constitution has remained a functioning and living document for almost sixty years. It has remained in effect with virtually no changes or amendments during this time. This is true even though the origins of the constitution were somewhat controversial. The process used for drafting the new constitution and who actually drafted it will be analyzed in chapter 3. Also, Emperor Hirohito’s full endorsement of the new constitution provided instant and lasting legitimacy. This subject of legitimacy will be discussed and analyzed for any lessons that may be gleaned.

In chapter 4, “Execution of the Plan” the actions taken by the occupation forces to implement the plans, will be presented. The original source document, *Provisional Manual for Military Government in Japan-8th US Army*, will be examined and discussed in this chapter. This document reveals how the civil affairs teams were organized and used in each of Japan’s forty-six prefectures. This chapter will include a description of how these teams provided the liaison and reporting to SCAP during the execution of the many sweeping changes implemented in postwar Japan. Additionally, the after-action reviews of the 24th Infantry Division, Occupational History of the 24th Infantry Division for February-June 1946, will be reviewed. This will provide a perspective from the soldiers on the ground. The 24th Infantry Division, under the Eighth US Army, provides a representation of the missions executed by the soldiers during the occupation.

Chapter 5, “Insights and Lessons,” will highlight the successes of the postwar military administration of Japan. It will discuss and emphasize those lasting principles that are relevant today. This chapter will also include a review of those things that could have been done better. This concluding chapter will discuss whether the objectives of the Allies were met during the postwar administration of Japan.

Sixty years of peace and prosperity have proven that the Allied administration of Japan was both effective and successful. The war conducted to subdue the Japanese and German aggression was a huge undertaking. The peace and stability operations at the end of the war were also executed on a grand scale. This study will review and analyze what was done to rebuild and stabilize Japan after its crushing defeat, focusing on insights into recurring principles and standards that should be considered in future operations.

¹William Chapman, *Inventing Japan: The Making of a Postwar Civilization* (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1991), 19.

²John Curtis Perry, *Beneath the Eagles Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1980), 46.

³Eric H. F. Svensson, *The Military Occupation of Japan: The First Planning, Policy Formulation, and Reforms* (Denver, CO: University of Denver, 1966), 41.

CHAPTER 2

THE PLAN AND OBJECTIVES

The occupation of Japan was the largest foreign policy operation in the history of the United States in its duration, the number of Americans involved, and the tremendous authority they wielded. Washington made the basic plans and preparations; the organization and implementing actions were largely the handiwork of General MacArthur and his staff.¹

Richard B. Finn

Prior to the completion of the Second World War, the State and War Departments conducted extensive planning for the policies and directives to use during the postwar administration and government of Japan. The doctrine from the *Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, FM 27-5 was closely followed in postwar Japan. This manual states that the theater commander will be transmitted “a civil affairs plan in the form of a directive.” SWNCC transmitted to General MacArthur just such a directive. On 29 August 1945, he received the US Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan. This directive provided much of the foundation for the postwar occupation and administration of Japan.

In addition to the policy documents, the military had set doctrine on how to conduct military government and civil affairs. This doctrine was in a 1943 joint services manual, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, FM 27-5. This manual clearly outlined the doctrine for military government and civil affairs during this period of history. The first section of this manual was titled “General Principles and Policies in the Conduct of Civil Affairs.” This section lists eighteen guiding principles with brief descriptions of their application.² These principles, even

though they are over sixty years old, are relevant to civil affairs operations today. This chapter will examine the planning, policies and doctrine that were integral to the conduct of the occupation of Japan.

FM 27-5, *Military Government*, was first written in 1940 by the Office of the Judge Advocate General.³ A revised version of this manual was published jointly by the War and Navy departments in 1943. The joint publication was titled, the *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (FM 27-5), and superseded the older 1940 version. This joint publication was detailed, yet a concise handbook on military government and civil affairs. The manual was republished in 1947 without any significant changes. This was the handbook for military government and civil affairs doctrine used during postwar operations in Japan.

The joint manual, FM 27-5, was a sixty-page document with seven major sections: (1) General Principles; (2) Civil Affairs Responsibilities; (3) Organization of Military Government; (4) Personnel; (5) Planning; (6) Proclamations, Ordinances, Orders, and Instructions; and (7) Military Commissions, Provost Courts, and Claims.⁴

The first section, “General Principles,” defined the basic terms of military government, occupied territory, and civil affairs. It included doctrine on the degree of control, object of control, period of control, and the authority for control during an occupation. Additionally, in the first section of this manual, the “General Principles” and “Policies in the Conduct of Civil Affairs” are listed. These eighteen principles provide a comprehensive list of items that should be considered when conducting military government and civil affairs operations in a foreign land. These eighteen principles, listed a. through r., were: (a) Military Necessity; (b) Supremacy of Commanding Officer;

(c) Civil Affairs Jurisdiction; (d) Economy of Personnel; (e) Flexibility; (f) Continuity of Policy; (g) Treatment of Population; (h) Retention of Existing Laws, Customs, and Political Subdivisions; (i) Retention of Local Government Departments and Officials; (j) Political Prisoners; (k) Economics; (l) Health; (m) Respect for Religious Customs and Organizations; (o) Speech and Press; (p) Archives and Records; (q) Mail and Documents; and (r) Shrines and Art. The principles in FM 27-5 were mentioned numerous times in the correspondence between the War Department, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Provost Marshall School while the program of instruction for military government and civil affairs was being established.⁵ The principles from this manual will be used as a framework to present the conclusions and insights of this study in chapter 5.

The basis for initial policies and objectives for the Allied occupation and administration of Japan were contained in four documents: (1) The Cairo Conference; (2) The Potsdam Proclamation; (3) The United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan; and (4) The Instrument of Surrender.

The Cairo Conference was held between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek. A statement issued on 1 December 1943, after this conference, said that the Allies would strip Japan of the islands and territories that were seized between 1914 and the outbreak of World War II. The territories of Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores would be restored to the Republic of China. The enslavement of Korea was also acknowledged. The Allies pledged to restore Korea's freedom and to eventually provide for an independent Korea.

The Potsdam Proclamation was issued on 26 July 1945. This was less than two weeks before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945.

The Potsdam Conference was held between the heads of state for Russia, the US, and the United Kingdom. The Potsdam Proclamation gave Japan an opportunity to end the war by surrendering “unconditionally.” It stated that since the Nazi regime had been defeated, the Allies were determined to “strike the final blows” on Japan.⁶ It reiterated that the terms of the Cairo Conference would be carried out. Upon surrender, the sovereignty of Japan would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku. This proclamation explained that Japan would be occupied by the Allies only for the time necessary to disarm and destroy their war-making power. It proclaimed that “stern justice” would be administered to all war criminals.⁷ It specified that the Allies’ occupation would end as soon as the listed objectives were accomplished. Japan was called upon to proclaim an unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces or face the alternative of “prompt and utter destruction.”⁸

The US Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan was issued on 29 August 1945. It gave two ultimate objectives for the postwar occupation of Japan. The first objective was to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the US or to the peace and security of the world.⁹ The second objective was to “bring about the eventual establishment of peaceful and responsible government.”¹⁰ It is notable that the second objective did not require a democratic Japan. However, the encouragement of the desire for individual liberties and the democratic process were greatly promoted by the US and the Allies.

The US Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan specified that the “authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander.” It directed that the Supreme Commander would exercise his authority by utilizing the

Japanese governmental structure, including the Emperor. This was done to the extent that it satisfactorily supported the US objectives.¹¹ This policy statement included the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces. Another highlight of this policy statement was the instructions for the trial of war criminals.

The final document which provided the basis for the postwar policies was the Instrument of Surrender which was signed on the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945. This brief but important document directly referenced the Potsdam Proclamation and formalized the “unconditional surrender” of Japan. The Japanese were to cease all hostilities and immediately liberate all Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. It stated that “the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers.”¹² It is noteworthy that the Emperor was acknowledged and given continued legitimacy even though his powers were greatly diminished.

The two major tasks of the military occupation were the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces. Also, during the military occupation, the war criminals would be tried and brought to justice. Over 30,000 prisoners of war were to be freed and repatriated to their home countries.

During the disarmament phase, the US Eighth Army supervised the destruction of “10,000 Japanese airplanes, 3,000 tanks, 90,000 field pieces and one million tons of explosives.”¹³ This disarmament occurred very rapidly and was essentially completed during the first six months of the occupation. This phase was a top priority in the postwar plan. Japanese naval facilities especially concerned Allied planners. Their huge shipyards and submarine locks had to be rendered neutral of any military capabilities.

By the end of World War II, Japan had occupied many countries to include Korea, large parts of Manchuria, South East Asia, Malaya, Burma, and numerous islands throughout the Pacific. The demobilization included the movement of millions of Japanese military and civilian personnel back to Japan. At the end of the war, there were 2,200,000 soldiers on the Japanese homeland to demobilize and 3,300,000 overseas troops to bring home to Japan. There were also 3,200,000 Japanese civilians, including women and children, who had to be repatriated and returned from Japan's wartime empire. Additionally, a number of prisoners of war and other foreign national prisoners were freed and returned to their homelands. These foreign nationals included 1,250,000 Koreans and Formosans.¹⁴ Many of the Japanese soldiers that boarded US ships thought that they were being taken to prison camps instead of being returned to civilian life in their homeland. This requirement to move so many people put tremendous pressure on the Japan's limited shipping assets.

There were many sanitation and health control issues caused by the huge numbers of displaced civilians at the beginning of the occupation. The SCAP headquarters planned for a large Public Health and Welfare Section (PH&W) to develop the health and welfare policies for postwar Japan. The plan to conduct large scale vaccination, DDT dusting, and epidemic disease prevention was developed prior to the end of hostilities.¹⁵

The demobilization of the Japanese military and the release of prisoners of war and foreign, interned laborers caused some problems during the initial occupation. More than one third of Japan's coal miners were Korean. When the war ended and the Koreans were no longer required to work for their Japanese bosses, coal production plummeted.¹⁶ Prior to the war, Japan had relied on imported food from occupied countries and

transported it with their extensive merchant marine fleet. Now at the end of the war, most of Japan's navy and merchant marine were inoperable or nonexistent. They no longer had occupied countries to exploit for resources or the merchant marine assets to transport those resources. The problem was compounded by the millions of unemployed former military and civilian persons from overseas posts.

The US Eighth Army had the responsibility of executing the postwar military government in Japan. Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger commanded Eighth Army. His forces numbered approximately 230,000 at the onset of the occupation. MacArthur's SCAP headquarters numbered approximately 5,000 at its peak. This headquarters developed the local occupation plans, but Eichelberger and his Eighth Army performed the role of military government in Japan. Despite starting with nearly 230,000 troops, by the end of 1948, after only three years in Japan, the number of troops had been reduced to 117,580.¹⁷ These numbers reflected the general demobilization of the US military following the war.

MacArthur credited much of the occupation's success to Eichelberger's "extroverted and friendly" personality. Eichelberger's social and administrative skills were a good complement to MacArthur's "reclusive and academic tendencies."¹⁸ Eichelberger's Eighth Army provided the structure to implement an extensive civil affairs plan in postwar Japan. Eighth Army would need a large number of officers trained in civil affairs and military government to implement and advise the new postwar government. Luckily, the US government had considered the requirements soon after the Second World War had begun.

As early as 1941, the War Department identified the need to establish facilities and curriculum to train officers in civil affairs and military government.¹⁹ Prior to the end of combat operations in the Far East, the training of military government officers had been extensive.²⁰ The War Department authorized the School of Military Government (SMG) to open in May of 1942 in Charlottesville, Virginia. The SMG assumed that all the attending officers would have a technical or professional skill relevant to military government. The curriculum at the SMG covered subjects in public health and safety, civilian supply, international law, public administration, and public finance. Additionally, SMG officers reviewed and studied previous American and foreign occupation experiences.²¹ The SMG curriculum was designed to equip its graduates with the skills necessary to administer the military government at the general staff level. Each of the SMG students was accomplished in a relevant area of public service. Each had previous experience in local government, state government, law, law enforcement, public health, education, or transportation. The SMG curriculum was designed to familiarize the students with the staff organization of the Army. Additionally, it armed the students with foreign area knowledge.²²

In addition to the SMG, CATS were established in civilian universities in March of 1943. By 1944, there were six CATS training civil affairs officers for use in the Far Eastern theater. They received six months of training at one of the following CATS: University of Chicago, Harvard, University of Michigan, Northwestern University, Stanford, and Yale.²³ By August of 1945, more than 2,000 Army and Navy officers had been trained for duty in Japan.²⁴

The CATS trained mostly junior officers who were designated for operational field assignments in Japan and the Far East. This differentiated the CATS students from the more senior SMG students. The CATS students studied very practical information. The Provost Marshal expected the CATS graduates to function in direct contact with the populace in occupied areas. The CATS graduates would lead the Civil Affairs Teams in Japan and Korea. The more senior SMG officers were expected to deal with their own Allied staffs.²⁵

Critical to the Allied plan for occupation of Japan was the insertion of CA teams at the lowest levels of Japanese public life. The Eighth Army plan outlined the use of a civil affairs team for each of the forty six prefectures and one for each of the seven administrative regions in Japan. These civil affairs teams were the first hand observers of how well the policies and new government was implemented by the Japanese populace. These civil affairs teams reported through Eighth Army to SCAP. The personnel trained for civil affairs and military government were put to good use during these critical months and years following Japan's surrender.

One of the major objectives of the occupation was to bring all suspected war criminals to justice. In addition to the war crimes trials, all militarists were removed from positions of authority and responsibility in the government of Japan. Although referred to as a purge, it meant they lost their job or position of authority.

Compared to the war trials in postwar Germany, the war trials in Japan were not extensive. There were twenty-eight defendants in the top category of war criminals. Seven of these were put to death and sixteen were sentenced to life in prison. MacArthur,

as the designated reviewing authority, upheld all the tribunal's sentences.²⁶ One person that was not tried as a war criminal was Emperor Hirohito.

A discussion of the plan for postwar Japan would not be complete without mentioning this monumental decision to leave Emperor Hirohito on the throne as a symbol of State in postwar Japan. Even though Emperor Hirohito was present and presided over all of the War Cabinet meetings, he was not tried with seven of the others. This was a strategic decision made by the US-led occupation. There was evidence that Hirohito was in fact a war criminal. However, since the Japanese people nearly worshiped the emperor, the decision to leave him in place has been proven by history to be a good one. Hirohito provided legitimate endorsement and support to the US-led occupation. He also provided the glue to hold the Japanese people together during the trying years of rebuilding and rebirth after a devastating war.

There were other major reforms to be implemented in Japan in addition to the initial tasks of demilitarization and the trials of war criminals. Some of the largest reforms were in the areas of education, police, agriculture, land ownership, and the economy. These tasks of reform were critical in the overall success of the occupation and the Japanese movement to self rule.

Education reform, during the postwar years in Japan, was high on the list of priorities. The Americans believed that the war was fought by the Japanese based on the militarism and extreme nationalism they acquired in the schools. Within the first six months of the occupation, the American Educational Mission, chaired by Dr. A. J. Stoddard, the President of the University of Illinois was sent to Japan. Its mandate was to observe and make suggestions for education reform in Japan. This commission looked at

the areas of “teachers, content, methods, administrative ways, and scope.”²⁷ This group of approximately two dozen prominent American educators made some important recommendations for change.

The American educators made comments on the length of compulsory education, military drill, language reform, and school administration. The mission decided that compulsory education should be extended from six years to nine years for all Japanese students. Military training and drill were abolished from the school curriculum. The written language was to be simplified from the very difficult “kanji” that existed to a roman script that could be learned more easily by all Japanese. Decentralized control of the schools was also suggested. Instead of controlling the schools from Tokyo, local school boards were established. These new school boards were to be popularly elected. The recommendations and findings of these experts augmented the Japanese existing appreciation of education. This paved the way for the success of the educational reforms.

The restructure and reorganization of police was another major reform implemented during the occupation. The repressive atmosphere and militaristic rule in Japan during the 1930’s and early 1940’s was embodied by the police. Lewis J. Valentine, the former police commissioner of New York City, was brought in to advise the reorganization of the police force in Japan. The new force was based on “kindness, gentleness, and sympathy . . . along the lines of the New York force.”²⁸ The Japanese people needed to continue to respect the police, but not fear them. SCAP ordered that the special military and political police, the “kempeitai,” were to be abolished. During this reorganization and purge, almost all police officials of high rank were removed and replaced by new officials who were not key players in the former militaristic government.

The police reform was an integral part in the democratization of Japan. One of the objectives of the occupation was to destroy the tight control a small number of Japanese had over their countrymen. The new police force was not allowed to limit civil liberties. Rather, all police functions were clearly defined and limited to maintaining peace and order. In the new Japan, the policeman was a public servant. Additionally, the new police force was decentralized. Every town of 5,000 or more was to be responsible for their own police force.²⁹ The reforms of the police were critical in the movement of the Japanese toward self rule.

One of the most ambitious reforms dealt with land reform and agriculture in general. The US State Department and MacArthur's SCAP headquarters supported the passage of a law aimed at breaking the power of the feudal farming class by forcing the landowners to sell most of their holding to their tenants. At the end of the war, over one half of all employed Japanese worked as farmers.³⁰

The establishment of a free economy was another of the objectives of the occupation. In conjunction with economic reform, the breakup of the Zaibatsu was announced as a major aim of the occupation. The Zaibatsu were a small group of banking and industrial combines in modern Japan. There were a few dozen large conglomerates known as the Zaibatsu owned by families that wielded huge power in Japan. The anti-Zaibatsu movement did allow for each citizen to participate in Japan's emerging economy. "In short, the American reformers sought to establish and encourage free enterprise in the Japanese economy because they believed economic democracy was integral to political democracy."³¹ The economic reforms included the passing of antitrust legislation to prevent further development of conglomerates. However, in the

1950's and 1960's, economic groups based on the old Zaibatsu reemerged under the new name of Keiretsu.

The plans and objectives developed by the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee for the administration of postwar Japan were very clear and well laid out. The expertise gathered well before the war's end developed a good road map to use when the war was abruptly brought to a conclusion by the use of the atomic bomb. Progress was generally rapid and more than satisfactory.

¹Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1992), 28.

²US Government, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 5-13.

³David F. Trask, *Army Historical Series: Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945-1950* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 8-9.

⁴US Government, Table of Contents, III-IX.

⁵Harry L. Coles, *United States Army in WWII, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1976), 9-11.

⁶US State Department, *Occupation of Japan Policy and Progress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 53-55.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹US State Department, 73-81.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²US State Department, 62-63.

¹³Paul Chwialkowski, *In Caesar's Shadow: The Life of General Robert Eichelberger* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 151-152.

¹⁴Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 21.

¹⁵Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 190.

¹⁶Perry, 91.

¹⁷Finn, 35.

¹⁸Chwialkowski, 157.

¹⁹David F. Trask, *Army Historical Series: Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 11.

²⁰Carl J. Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc.), 321.

²¹Trask, 10.

²²Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 3-4.

²³*Ibid.*, 39.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 46.

²⁵Trask, 11.

²⁶William J. Sebald with Russell Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1965), 166.

²⁷Perry, 133.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 147.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 148.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 160.

³¹*Ibid.*, 157.

CHAPTER 3

THE GOVERNMENT AND NEW CONSTITUTION

Democracy cannot be imposed upon a nation. It is a thing of the spirit which to be lasting and durable must impregnate the very roots of society. It is not to be instilled from above.¹

General Douglas A. MacArthur

Democracy and self-government were not completely new concepts to the Japanese. Emperor Meiji had given the Japanese a constitution in 1890. This constitution gave the Japanese the responsibility of self-rule and formally empowered the Emperor with complete authority. The Meiji Constitution was a “gift” from the Emperor to his “subjects” and could have been revised or revoked by the Emperor at any time. It was written in draft by a small and prominent group of political leaders. The existing privy council ratified this constitution, with the active participation of Emperor Meiji. The constitution was promulgated on 11 February 1889 and took effect on 1 November 1890. The Japanese had been operating under this constitution and system of government for almost fifty years when the postwar occupation began in 1945. The Meiji constitution had allowed the Japanese to have political parties, parliaments, and elections.² During the Meiji period, Emperor Meiji allowed the establishment of elective assemblies in the prefectures, cities, and villages. Thus, Japan had integrated representative government at the local level since the early twentieth century. This experience would help the Allies in their transition, but the imposition of a new democratic form of government would still be very difficult.

Before the occupation, Japan was divided administratively into forty-four prefectures, “ken,” and three urban areas, “fu.” These urban areas were Tokyo, Osaka,

and Kyoto. Japan defined a city as an urban community of at least thirty thousand inhabitants. As of 1942, Japan had ninety five such cities with their own municipal governments. There were also six “premier” cities in Japan: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, and Yokohama.³ Today, there are forty seven prefectures in Japan.

Emperor Meiji, in the late nineteenth century, had allowed for local government at the prefecture level. The Meiji constitution was given to his subjects but names the Emperor as the supreme head of the Japanese nation. Under this constitution, the Emperor was the source of all power and the personification of the nation’s unity. The Emperor was not important to the Japanese as a person, but rather as an institution. The Meiji constitution established a bicameral legislative body called the Diet. The lower house of the Diet, the House of Representatives, was elected by popular vote. The Emperor appointed the members of the upper house, the House of Peers. The Emperor would choose distinguished statesmen and scholars to this upper house. The Meiji constitution specified the rights and duties of the Japanese citizens, called “subjects.”

As mentioned, before the occupation, the Emperor was the center of the Japanese government. All authority resided with the Emperor. In this government, there was a Premier, Lord Privy Seal, Privy Council, and a Cabinet. These were all appointed by the Emperor. The Emperor had delegated the administration of the government, but still had complete authority to repeal or disapprove any decisions or actions made by the government. His position was central to all workings within the government. (See figure 1, Emperor at the Center of Authority, Meiji Constitutional System.) He did not usually exercise this authority, but did possess it under the old constitution. Any changes to the constitution would first have to be approved by the Emperor.




Figure 1. Emperor at the Center of Authority, Meiji Constitutional System
Source: Military Government Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, M354-2, Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Section 2A: Government and Administration (Washington DC: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1944), 7.

Under the Meiji constitution, the Premier was appointed by the Emperor after consulting with three of his appointed officers. The Emperor also appointed the Lord

Privy Seal. He was the highest permanent advisor to the Emperor. His primary duty was to keep the Imperial and State seals. He had great influence derived from his close contact with the Emperor.

The Privy Council was composed of twenty four councilors and a non-voting President and Vice-President. This council was appointed by the Emperor after advisement by the Premier. The Privy Council was a purely advisory body with the primary purpose of serving the Emperor. This council was made up of elderly men and was a stabilizing factor in the government. This reflected the honor and high position held by elders in Japanese society.

The Cabinet was the chief continuous advisory body to the Emperor on current and political and administrative matters. The Cabinet consisted of the Premier and twelve ministers. Each minister had his particular area of expertise. The Cabinet was primarily responsible to the Emperor, but was also influenced by the Diet.

During World War II, the Diet lost most of its power to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. These organizations drew their power from the military elite. During the war, even though the constitution still existed, the preponderance of control was in the hands of the military. This was one of the reasons for revising the existing Japanese constitution during the occupation. The older Meiji constitution did not have a good system of checks and balances.

When the occupation began, as called for in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies had the Japanese develop a new or revised constitution that would guarantee a democratic form of government in Japan. This new constitution would be written by the Japanese,

but with the following stipulations from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. First, the Emperor would remain the head of state, but with greatly reduced power. Second, the Japanese would abolish the sovereign right to wage war. And thirdly, the feudal system in Japan would cease to exist. Even though the Japanese had the Meiji Constitution, their government was not a democracy. It was much more of a dictatorship with a flavor of a theocracy. The Emperor was the supreme head of state and the national religion, or State Shinto. This sacred position in the State Shinto reinforced the Emperor's control over the people.

The Japanese have an ancient religion called Shinto. This religion was much more of a mythological worship of Japan and its gods and heroes. State Shinto was modeled after the older Shinto, but was revised and used as a State religion in modern times. State Shinto was more of a cult than a religion. There were three primary beliefs that formed the basis of State Shinto. First was the belief in the divine sovereignty of the Emperor. It was believed that the Emperor descended from the sun goddess, Amaterasu Omikami. The second belief was that Japan is the "Land of the Gods." State Shinto taught that the Japanese islands were the offspring of the shy-father and the earth-mother, and were therefore divine. The Japanese were part of divine nature and were a special concern of the gods. The third belief was that Japan had the benevolent mission to save the world. These beliefs of State Shinto were taught to all Japanese in the schools and were symbolized in over 110,000 shrines served by over 15,000 priests.⁴

The occupation took into account the previous progress by the Japanese towards democracy. Even though the revision of the constitution was not a specified task of the occupation, the SCAP requested that the Japanese write a new constitution using their

existing constitution as a base. Initially, the Japanese produced a constitution that was little different from the existing Meiji Constitution. After this failed attempt to significantly rewrite their constitution, MacArthur tasked the Government Division of his SCAP headquarters to draft one. In about ten days, the Government Section of SCAP, headed by Major General Courtney Whitney, drafted a new constitution for Japan. This new constitution, drafted by SCAP, was accepted by the Japanese Diet, and approved by the Emperor. With only minor changes, this document became law in May of 1947.⁵ Interestingly, since the new constitution was adopted, it has not been significantly amended. This speaks well of the wisdom and judiciousness that went into Japan's new constitution.

The new constitution provided for two equal and popularly elected houses in the legislature or Diet. This Diet was to have the highest power of the state and be the sole lawmaking body of the State. This is a major change from the former constitution. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Diet was the least powerful branch or section of the government. The new constitution set the term of office for the House of Representatives at four years. In the House of Councillors, the term of office was set at six years, with half of this house being elected every three years. Today, the House of Representatives has 480 members. The House of Councillors has 247 members. Women currently hold 8 to 10 percent of the seats in the Diet.⁶ This is significant in a society which has not fully recognized the rights of women. Also, they received their right to vote with the new constitution in 1946.

The new constitution vested the executive powers in the Cabinet which consists of a Prime Minister and not more than seventeen Ministers which are called Ministers of

State. The Prime Minister is designated from among the members of the Diet by resolution of the Diet and then formally appointed by the Emperor. The Prime Minister appoints all the Ministers of States (see figure 2). The government and ministries in Japan today are almost identical to the postwar structure of government provided for in the 1946 constitution.

Under the new constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with all the judicial power. Chapter VI, Article 81 of the constitution states: “The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.” The Supreme Court presides over the inferior courts, such as the High Courts, District Courts, Family Courts, and Summary Courts.

Under the new constitution and national government, major changes to the local prefecture, city, and town governments were not required. The Japanese were holding elections and were exercising democratic ways before the occupation under the old constitution. The new constitution and subsequent postwar government, at the local level, was in many ways, a return to what Japan was like prior to the war years. The first postwar Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, said that democracy was not something new and “about to be introduced with the revision of the constitution.”⁷ It must be reiterated that for over fifty years prior to the occupation, Japan had a functioning system of government. It was, however, under an emperor.




Figure 2. Japan's Government Structure Today
 Source: Ministry of Finance Japan, Homepage; available from <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/index.htm>; Internet; accessed on 1 June 2006.

Perhaps the most dramatic of the constitutional reforms was Article 9. This Article titled the *Renunciation of War*, and now known as the “no war clause.” With this, the Japanese forever renounced the sovereign right to conduct war. This part of the constitution was first suggested by Prime Minister Shidehara when he visited MacArthur on 24 January 1946.⁸ This no war clause has withstood the test of time, even though it has been challenged a few times during the past fifty years. It was first challenged during the Korean War period (1950 to 1953), when the US wanted the Japanese to strengthen their armed forces for the purpose of national defense. Most recently, the Japanese have considered amending their constitution to change this clause in response to the actions of the North Koreans and others in the region who could possibly threaten the peace and security of the Japanese nation. However, to this day, there have been no amendments to the original postwar constitution.

The new constitution made Japan a true democracy by reducing the power of the Emperor to a symbol of State. He was made a symbol of both Japan and the unity of the people. He performed ceremonial and official actions with the advice and approval of the Cabinet. Among other duties, he appoints the Prime Minister and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as designated by the Diet and Cabinet respectively.

Before the occupation, the Emperor possessed all the sovereign power in Japan. He was rarely seen or heard from directly. His ruling was done through others. He was not a public figure and did not make many appearances. However, after the surrender and beginning of the occupation, the Emperor “was the object of the greatest public relations campaign in history.”⁹ Hirohito was portrayed as a good Emperor who was forced by his military leaders to wage a war of aggression. SCAP recommended that Hirohito get out

and visit the Japanese public to include factory workers and common laborers. Hirohito became jokingly known as “Ah, so-san” by the Japanese because during his numerous public visits, he would listen to the Japanese worker’s concerns and respond with “Ah, so, Ah, so” (which means I see.)¹⁰ The Japanese maintained their respect for the Emperor, but he became more real and human to them during this public relations process.

As the Emperor’s powers were reduced, women’s rights were increased. Chapter 3, Article 15 of the new constitution provided “universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials.” Today, there is universal suffrage in Japan for all adult citizens twenty years of age or older. Article 14 of Chapter 3 provides the Japanese people with a Bill of Rights. It specifies that “all of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination . . . because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” But, in fact, women still hold an inferior position in Japan.

On 5 March 1945, Emperor Hirohito declared by Imperial Rescript to the Japanese people that “it was his desire that the Constitution of our Empire be revised drastically upon the general will of the people.”¹¹ This Imperial Rescript by the Emperor preceded by one day the announcement of the new constitution by MacArthur. This new constitution was submitted to the Japanese people by the Emperor and the Government of Japan. This provided instant legitimacy to the new constitution and allowed Hirohito the opportunity to exercise his new role as the symbolic Head of State. Hirohito’s public endorsement of the new constitution smoothed the road for its approval and adoption as the law of the land.

The US-led occupation made a conscious decision to use the existing government in Japan to the maximum extent possible. This was facilitated by both the policies of FM 27-5 and the fact that Japan had been on the road to democracy for some time prior to World War II. The constitution formally specified the democratic principles and basic human rights that Japan would live by. The use of the existing Meiji Constitution, with the endorsement by the Emperor, made for a quick and efficient transition to a new government. The study of the system of government and culture of the Japanese, as a people, provides a basis for understanding the methods and strategies used during the execution by the occupation.

¹Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), 288-89.

²Perry, 142.

³John Embree, *The Japanese Nation* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1945), 77-80.

⁴*Ibid.*, 91-92.

⁵Finn, 89.

⁶Fukui Haruhiru, *The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition* vol. 15, (Danbury, CT: Grolier, Inc., 2003), 802-813.

⁷Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs* (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1962), 139.

⁸Douglas A. MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: Da Capo Press Inc., 1964), 303.

⁹Paul Manning, *Hirohito: The War Years* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), ix of introduction.

¹⁰Gayn, 137-38.

¹¹US Department of State, Appendices.

CHAPTER 4

EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

The fundamental Occupation task, demobilization and demilitarization, became SCAP's easiest and most thorough accomplishment, . . . Japanese government agencies substantially completed disarmament and demobilization by December 1,--less than three and one-half months after the surrender.¹

William J. Sebald

The initial occupation of Japan proceeded very peacefully. There was no military resistance as the Allies oversaw the demobilization and demilitarization of the Japanese war machine. Eighth Army had the responsibility of supervising the initial tasks of the occupation. These tasks of disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese were designed to eliminate Japan as a threat to the peace and security of the world.² The rapid success of this initial phase of the occupation indicated that a new and free Japan was forming. Those that executed the initial occupation functions were military personnel. They were there as a victorious military force, but would become military governors.

Many of the functions and actions performed by the civil affairs or military government teams were political in nature. These functions were often performed by civilians. However, it must be understood that these military civil affairs personnel were the only ones available at the onset of the occupation. They were the only ones trained in the basic Japanese language and culture. The surrender documents gave the ultimate authority in Japan to the SCAP. It is this military authority that the Japanese recognized and respected.

The number of troops in Japan peaked at approximately 450,000 right after the surrender. These troops were part of the US Eighth and Sixth Armies. Sixth Army was

disbanded by the end of 1946. This left only Eighth Army with troops numbering approximately 200,000.³ Even though the initial number of occupying troops available was large, the average number of troops in Japan during the occupation was approximately 100,000.⁴ The Allies had two full armies, but began reducing these forces as the occupation peacefully progressed. The cooperation and nonviolent attitude of the Japanese quickly allowed the troop strengths to be drawn down.

Eighth Army assumed the execution role for military government under SCAP. Eighth Army's mission was "to effect surveillance and supervision of the Japanese in executing directives issued to their government by the Supreme Commander."⁵ To execute this, Eighth Army fielded fifty three military government teams across Japan. There was a team for each of the forty six prefectures and a team for each of the seven administrative regions (See figure 3).

Civil affairs teams, in many cases, headed by a young Army lieutenant were the norm. These civil affairs teams were tasked to investigate, inspect, and then report up through Eighth Army to SCAP. These teams were not perfect, but provided the eyes and ears needed by the SCAP headquarters in Tokyo. These teams inspected the former war plants and possible black market locations. They monitored the newspapers and visited schools to ensure compliance with occupational directives. These civil affairs teams, together with military and local police, were present at any riots, public disorders, and demonstrations.⁶ These teams, integrated well with the existing structure of Japanese government, gave the occupation what it needed most, when it needed it most. Much of the success of the occupation can be attributed to these well trained and well placed teams.




Figure 3. Location of Military Government Teams

Source: Eighth US Army, *Manual of Military Government in Japan (Provisional)* (Tokyo, Japan: Locally printed, 1948).

The structure of Eighth Army's military government organization coincided directly with the existing Japanese civil districts and zones. Eighth Army divided the military government into sections which reflected the major SCAP sections in Tokyo. These sections were economic, legal and government, civil education, civil information, public health, public welfare, finance and civil property, customs and immigration, and civil employment.⁷ The number of military government personnel in Japan was very small. The prefecture teams only numbered about 2,500 officers, enlisted men, and civilians.⁸ These prefecture teams had the job of observing and reporting back to the SCAP staff on how well the Japanese were following the occupational guidance and

directives. These teams were directed to be in close contact with the Japanese people and directly observe conditions.

One of the first tasks of the occupation was to try suspected war criminals as directed by the Potsdam Declaration. An International Military Tribunal was convened on 19 January 1946 in Tokyo. Its purpose, as per the Potsdam declaration, “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals.” There were twenty eight major war criminals brought to trial. In all, seven of these were sentenced to death. Sixteen were sentenced to life in prison. General MacArthur was the designated reviewing officer for the proceedings. He upheld all the tribunal’s sentences with no changes.⁹ Overall, the Japanese public was impressed by the procedures and trials. There was no perceived ill will generated because of the war trials.¹⁰ The war tribunals were considered a negative action of the occupation

Two of the more positive actions of the occupation were the liberation of the tenant farmers through land reform and setting the conditions for a free labor movement to develop in the Japanese work force. The liberation of the farmer was accomplished by enacting land reform legislation. Over one half of all Japanese worked as farmers by the end of the war. Land reform legislation allowed the common farmer for the first time to own the land that they farmed. Prior to this, the Japanese agriculture system was based on a feudal system. Each farmer had to pay up to one half of all his earnings to lease the land and pay for seed and harvest storage. This land reform was well timed in Japan’s state of democratic development. It provided protection against the introduction of Communism in rural Japan.¹¹

After the Japanese Diet passed the land reform bill, more than one third of the cultivated land in Japan changed ownership. This redistribution of land was a very real change that the Japanese embraced. During a two year period “thirty million plots of land were bought, thirty million were sold.”¹² The land reform in Japan was a notable part of the move to self rule and away from the tight control of a ruling class.

Land reform was a very visible change for the new democratic Japan. Even though the Japanese implemented this new program, the military government teams had the responsibility to oversee and report progress. Under the new land ownership laws there would be no absentee landlords. A person who physically worked the land could own up to 7.5 acres. Someone who lived in a village near their land could own 2.5 acres. All larger plots exceeding these limits were bought by the government and sold to tenant farmers.¹³ By 1950, over five million acres of farm land had been redistributed. This was 89 percent of all the arable land, which now was owned by those who lived and worked on it.¹⁴ Japan was quickly converted to a nation of free land owners. This land reform program created a large constituency of Japanese with a vested interest in preserving the new form of government in Japan. Because of the land reform, agriculture was one of the first elements of the national economy to recover after the war.

The role of the prefecture teams, or military government teams, was to observe and report to SCAP from the grass roots level. They reported the extent to which the policies and reforms of the occupation were implemented. To provide this close view of the Japanese countryside, the teams were located across Japan, in all forty six prefectures. The teams were relatively small, numbering twelve or less. The regional teams in the seven regions numbered approximately twenty five personnel.¹⁵ The daily tasks of these

military government and civil affairs teams were quite broad, but there were a few tasks that were common to most.

A typical day of duty for a military government team would include impromptu visits to schools, former war production plants, and just general reconnaissance. Additionally, these teams would inspect their assigned areas for illegal hoarding of supplies such as fuel, food, and fire arms. The teams would visit newspaper offices, potential black market locations, and large gatherings or demonstrations.¹⁶ Most of the activities performed by these teams were merely presence patrols which did not require the use of force. However, sometimes the military government teams, with US military police, participated in preventing large public disorder, by breaking up demonstrations. These more forceful activities were conducted by the Japanese prefecture police, but were accompanied by the military government and military police as was deemed necessary.¹⁷

The civil affairs and military government troops also had oversight of the agriculture, food production, and distribution within Japan. The production, storage, and distribution of food were top priorities during the first few months of the occupation. Food could not be allowed to be wasted or spoil in the warehouses. SCAP requested additional grain to be supplied by the US to offset the food shortages in Japan. MacArthur stated that he had to move fast to prevent a food shortage disaster. He imported 3.5 million tons of food to Japan from US Army supplies built up in the Pacific area.¹⁸ The civil affairs teams worked with the existing agricultural directorates to ensure that maximum benefit was gained from the food that was available. These prefectural teams were to “observe and report” the situation to their special staff section at SCAP.¹⁹

Another program that the civil affairs teams helped to facilitate was the massive PH&W program. The PH&W Section, headed by Brigadier General Sams, was created in October of 1945. This section was charged with preventing epidemic diseases, restoring basic sanitation, and developing health and welfare policies.²⁰ The revamping of the PH&W system was one of the least known but most successful efforts during the occupation. These health and welfare reforms were estimated to have saved up to three million lives.²¹ The civil affairs teams at the prefecture level oversaw the Japanese implementation of the PH&W policies and procedures.

The land reform was very important in the rural areas of Japan, but the people of the urban areas benefited more from the labor reform measures. The establishment of a free labor movement was another of the original objectives of the occupation of Japan. Labor unions could be formed and labor strikes were allowed to be conducted. SCAP issued directives encouraging the organization of labor. Forming labor unions had been forbidden prior to the end of the war. SCAP announced further efforts to build a strong democratic labor movement in Japan. Emperor Hirohito lent his enormous support when he issued an imperial ordinance which pledged his approval of such organization of labor.²²

The labor strikes for the most part were peaceful and did not disrupt the normal flow of progress. The transportation strike conducted by the mass transit train workers was an example of this peaceful method. This strike was conducted without stopping the trains. Instead, the striking workers operated the trains but did so without charging any fares.²³ The newspaper employees also fell under close scrutiny by SCAP and the new

Japanese government when they began coordinated strikes. During some of these strikes, the US military police teamed with the Japanese police to step in and break them up.

On 1 February 1947, the Japanese unions called for a general strike. The communists had obtained control of some of the unions. In reaction, MacArthur banned the planned general strike. Even though he wanted Japan's newly organized laborers to assert their rights, he could not allow a few radical labor leaders to use the strike as a "social weapon."²⁴ MacArthur issued an edict forbidding the strike in Japan's "present impoverished and emaciated condition." After this edict, the Japanese did not conduct the planned strike.

The occupation had a unique challenge dealing with a large population of Koreans. This was both a labor and a demobilization problem. These Koreans were freed from hard labor at the end of the war, and were gathered in large cities waiting to be sent home to Korea. The Koreans made up 95 percent of Japan's alien population numbering approximately 1.5 million by 1945.²⁵ They were involved in black market activities, petty crime, and civil disturbances during the occupation period. There were numerous riots and brawls between the Japanese and the Koreans. They were usually localized and easily dispersed by the joint US and Japanese police forces.²⁶

In addition to organizing labor, the occupation had the objective of breaking up the large combines of industry in Japan. These large combines, called zaibatsu, controlled a majority of Japan's industry and commerce. These zaibatsu were industry giants such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, and Sumitomo. Many of these combines were directly linked with the militarists during the war years. The Mitsui were closely associated with the Army. The Mitsubishi had intimate ties with the Navy and merchant marine.²⁷ In the long

run the zaibatsu were not destroyed, but were weakened and reshuffled. The revitalization of Japan's economy became more important than the break up of these zaibatsu corporate giants.

In addition to the zaibatsu, the police forces were in need of major reform. During the 1930s and the war years, Japan had grown into a militaristic police state. The police embodied and characterized the harsh atmosphere of this period of militaristic rule. One of MacArthur's first directives was for the abolishment of the special thought police or kempeitai. The US military police worked closely with the reformed Japanese police. The new Japanese police were much more decentralized and under prefectural control. The police were very important to the security and well being of the Japanese populace. The civil affairs teams provided the early warning in the cases that required additional forces present.

The schools and the education system in Japan were reformed just as the police had been. The oversight of the removal of ultramilitarist teachers was an assigned mission of the occupation. This was done on a large scale. Many of the teachers that were removed later returned to other jobs within the same town or area. The civil affairs teams conducted inspections of the schools as a method to ensure the SCAP directives were being followed. During these impromptu inspections of schools throughout Japan, the civil affairs teams would look at the text books used in classrooms. One of the occupation's directives was the removal of all militaristic and ultranationalist text books from the schools. The Japanese again, were the textbook reviewers, but the SCAP and military government teams ensured compliance with the directives of the occupation. Over 300 new textbooks were approved for use in the schools by February of 1946.²⁸ The

old text books were very militaristic and anti-American. The inspections ensured that militaristic teachers were not teaching and no more military drill was conducted in the schools.

The Japanese were very difficult to surprise with inspections. However, these unannounced and somewhat random inspections performed the function of observing and inspecting. This became the ultimate function of the military governors and civil affairs teams during the occupation. The civil affairs teams conducted inspections, but were also very supportive of the Japanese government. There was a reciprocal relationship from which each obtained legitimacy.

The SCAP policy of supporting the Emperor and Prime Minister during the first year of the occupation is notable. During this very turbulent time, there were riots and newspaper strikes which threatened the stability of the establishment in Japan. There were cases of censorship, curbing the right to strike and even freedom of assembly. This was done by SCAP to solidify the newly established administration in Japan. Even though this procedure was criticized by some media reporters, it was deemed necessary by SCAP and the military government in Japan.

The occupation forces gave full support, and even helped keep in power, early established leaders in Japan. This was especially true with Shigeru Yoshida, the first Japanese Prime Minister in postwar Japan. Mark Gayn, a reporter with the Chicago Sun, believed that “had headquarters (SCAP) stayed out of the newspaper strike, Yoshida would have been forced out” of government.²⁹ The occupation supported the early established leaders because they brought stability to Japan. This stability provided for the

conduct of free elections. These free elections were leading Japan down the road to democracy.

Free elections were held in Japan only six months after their surrender. The first postwar elections were held on 10 April 1946. This was the first time in Japan's history that women were allowed to vote. The turnout for the election was excellent. More than twenty seven million Japanese, which was seventy three percent of the electorate, voted. Additionally, 66 percent of all eligible women voted.³⁰ Prior to these elections, members of the US Women's Army Corps educated the Japanese women about their rights and encouraged them to vote.³¹

¹Sebald, 79.

²Chwialkowski, 151-152.

³Finn, 35.

⁴Ibid., 35.

⁵Eighth US Army, *Manual of Military Government in Japan (Provisional)* (Tokyo, Japan: Locally printed, 1948), 4-6.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 4.

⁸Ibid., 60.

⁹Sebald, 166-9.

¹⁰MacArthur, 319.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 161.

¹³Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1983).

- ¹⁴MacArthur, 314.
- ¹⁵Eighth US Army, appendices.
- ¹⁶Department of the Army, *Occupational History of the 24th Infantry Division for February-June 1946* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1946).
- ¹⁷Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), 332-336.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*, 306.
- ¹⁹Perry, 59.
- ²⁰Takemae, 190.
- ²¹*Ibid.*, 405-412.
- ²²US Department of State, 44.
- ²³Gayn, 299.
- ²⁴MacArthur, 308.
- ²⁵*Ibid.*, 90.
- ²⁶Department of the Army, 8-10.
- ²⁷US Department of State, 41-42.
- ²⁸*Ibid.*, 33-35.
- ²⁹Gayn, 356.
- ³⁰US Department of State, 26.
- ³¹Takemae.

CHAPTER 5

INSIGHTS AND LESSONS

The Occupation was unique because it was so successful. Never before in recorded history had a great power thus moved in upon another, taking over its affairs almost completely at first, gradually relinquishing control, and finally restoring sovereignty with such a minimum of friction and such a large measure of benevolence. Never before had a thoroughly defeated power been so fully rehabilitated by its conqueror.¹

Walt Sheldon

During the Allied occupation, the need for an outside military government was completely necessary. The cities of Japan were in shambles. With the exception of Kyoto, which was spared for cultural and historic reasons, every major Japanese city had been heavily bombed by American air forces. Over 40 percent of all Japan's urban buildings were destroyed. Approximately seven hundred thousand Japanese civilians, out of a population of seventy two million, had perished.² There was an immediate need for the military government to maintain law and order. The critical tasks of providing food and shelter to the Japanese were implemented by the occupation. The Japanese took the lead in executing the work, but the Allies provided the leadership, resources, and stable conditions needed to accomplish these tasks.

Now, more than sixty years later, most people would agree that the occupation of Japan was successful. The objectives of demilitarization and democratization were accomplished quickly and completely. The many peaceful and prosperous years that followed have shown that the changes in Japan during the occupation were both genuine and lasting. John C. Perry, the author of *Beneath Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* concludes that "the Occupation of Japan was a landmark in human history."³ The

US-led occupation of Japan was successful and is worthy of study and review. People study the behavior of great leaders to understand leadership. They study the techniques used by great baseball players to learn to become better baseball players. It follows that military professionals should study the general principles, practices, and policies of successful post conflict operations, or “occupations,” to become better at conducting post combat peace and stability operations.

A well-known literary maxim states, “to get a new idea, read an old book.”⁴ The “old book” used as a guide for the occupation was a 1943 joint services manual, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*. This manual, previously discussed in chapter 2, was a clear outline of the doctrine for military government and civil affairs. The first section of this manual is titled “General Principles and Policies in the Conduct of Civil Affairs.” It lists eighteen principles that after analysis, have proven to be critical factors in the success of the military occupation of Japan. The principles also include brief descriptions of their application. All eighteen are applicable to modern civil affairs operations. However, a selection of nine of these “general principles and policies,” will be used to frame the conclusions the insights of this study. These principles are: (1) military necessity; (2) supremacy of commanding officer; (3). economy of personnel; (4) flexibility; (5) continuity of policy; (6) retention of local government departments and officials; (7) economics; (8) health; and (9) speech and press.⁵ There will be no silver bullet, or one line solution presented. However, the lessons and insights gleaned from the study of postwar Japan, 1945 to 1950, are relevant and valuable today.

The first principle from the 1943, FM 27-5, is that military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. This means that the commanding officer has the duty “to exercise such control and to take such steps in relation to the civil population” that will help him achieve his overall objective or end state.⁶ All objectives or end states are not always directly associated with the military. The military is often times the means to get to the political and civil objectives. The conduct of civil affairs or military government actions are not an end in themselves. Military government is only a vehicle, or a way, to get to the final political and or military end state.

An example of this was the initial landings at Atsugi airfield in late August of 1945 (see figure 4). The US forces that landed, did not know what to expect. They were prepared to secure the area by force if necessary. MacArthur’s staff was opposed to the early landing at Atsugi and referred to it as a gamble.⁷ However, military necessity did not require the use of force. The Emperor’s request for the Japanese to lay down their arms had been followed. The extent and number of occupation forces was also determined by the principle of military necessity. The number of military forces used for security, were quickly reduced as it became apparent that the Japanese were completely faithful in their surrender.



Photo # USA C-1732 Gen. MacArthur arrives at Atsugi, 30 Aug. 1945

Figure 4. MacArthur and His Staff at Atsugi Airfield

Source: Naval Historical Center, Homepage, available from <http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/japansur/js-6k.htm>; Internet; accessed on 1 June 2006.

The second principle highlighted from FM 27-5 is that of supremacy of the commanding officer. The principle of supremacy of the commanding officer is a common thread in the *Basic Post Surrender Policy for Japan* and FM 27-5. The post surrender policy stated that “the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government will be subject to the Supreme Commander.” It also specified that the Supreme Commander will possess the powers necessary to carry out the policies of the occupation and the control of Japan.⁸ This principle is repeated in FM 27-5 which states “the theater commander must always have full responsibility for military government.”⁹

There is often debate over whether a postwar government should be civilian or military. This debate was alive and well with the Allies during World War II. The British

discussed between their war office and state office the issue of who should be in charge of governing the lands retaken from the Japanese control. It was decided that a military administration must be established first and then, when conditions permitted, the return of civil government would be allowed. The reason the British decided to have the military in charge was to avoid any ambiguity in the chain of responsibility for the conduct of civil affairs.¹⁰

The principle of supremacy of command is closely related to the principle of unity of command. The principle, of unity of command and supremacy of the commanding officer, was utilized effectively in Japan. Today, the US and its Allies, are much more reluctant to place such a large power and authority with one person or office. The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers was a very powerful position. Never before had an American wielded such power over a foreign country. MacArthur, appointed to this command position, became the symbol of the occupation to the Japanese people.¹¹ The principle of supremacy of command was executed very effectively during the post combat occupation in Japan. Perhaps the best example of the effectiveness of this principle was SCAP's unilateral and timely decision to order the huge amount of stockpiled food and supplies to be brought to Japan for immediate use by the Japanese. This decision was made, on the spot, by MacArthur, who was given the command authority to make it. The commitment of these funds and supplies to be used by the defeated Japanese could have been delayed by political debate. However, MacArthur was able to use his best judgment and supreme command authority to avert a large hunger crisis. The SCAP headquarters was given full authority and responsibility to execute the plans transmitted from Washington.

Another principle from the FM 27-5, was the economy of personnel. The value of having an adequate number of civil affairs trained personnel was critical. These specially trained military personnel were used to stimulate and supervise production. They also maximized the use of available local resources which reduced the burden on shipping and supply. In the long run, the civil affairs personnel lessened the need for traditional garrison forces. When the civilian population and manpower were mobilized, the military presence could be reduced.¹² This assumed that both security and law and order in the area had been attained.

Flexibility, the next principle was required in both the planning and conduct of the civil affairs operations. The ability to be flexible was necessary as the threat of combat declined or ceased entirely. FM 27-5 included a discussion of different parts or areas of an occupied country requiring different degrees of control. Other factors such as geography, extent of existing government, and destruction caused by combat operations would affect the degree of control required.¹³ The postwar occupation of Japan was very flexible. There was a willingness to delete or lessen initial objectives of the occupation and develop or enlarge others as the occupation progressed. The degree of control used by the occupation forces was adjusted throughout the years of the occupation.

The two main objectives of demilitarizing and democratizing Japan were accomplished quickly, and in flexible fashion. As the occupation progressed, the vanquished Japanese were quickly viewed as future allies in the simmering Cold War. The Zaibatsu were initially to be broken up. However, the revival of the economy became a much higher priority. This shift in priority caused a less aggressive pursuit of the policy to breakup the Zaibatsu. The democratization of Japan was first intended to provide the

Japanese with a form of self rule. Later in the occupation, the democratization was expedited and directed to stem the spread of communism to Japan and the Far East. All of these events reflect a high degree of flexibility in the administration of Japan. Some of these policy adjustments were driven by the political environment in the US while others were driven by world events such as the aggression of the communist regimes in Korea and elsewhere in the Far East.

The next principle discussed in FM 27-5 is the continuity of policy. Much of the success of the postwar occupation could be attributed to the continuity of policy and personnel in Japan on both the civilian and military side. The SCAP, General MacArthur, served continuously for over five years with Tokyo as his headquarters. The commander of Eighth Army, Lieutenant General Eichelberger, served continuously from 1945 to 1948. He provided continuity to the execution of the civil affairs and military government mission in Japan. Eichelberger, as the commander of troops, set a continuous command climate which resulted in an even handed approach and demeanor throughout his command. MacArthur publicly stated that Eichelberger's social and administrative skills were invaluable. He strongly believed that Eichelberger's presence in Japan was vital to the success of the occupation.¹⁴

This continuity of personnel extended to the civilian side of the occupation as well. Ambassador Sebald served in Japan from 1945 to 1951. He served as the US Political Advisor to SCAP. He had over twenty years of experience in the Japanese language, culture, and law. The SCAP and State Department staffs were in place for years at a time. Additionally, the President, Harry S. Truman, was the only US president during the occupation years, 1945 to 1952. Even though this was not planned, it was

fortuitous. President Truman gave great latitude to SCAP to implement the postwar policies in Japan. Until MacArthur's recall by President Truman in 1951, there was a high degree of continuity of policy and personnel in the administration of postwar Japan.

Another principle in FM 27-5 was that of retaining the existing local government, departments and officials. This was done for many reasons. Sometimes it was done out of expediency and other times out of realistic necessity. A country as large as Japan with over seventy million people would be a monumental challenge to govern. The ability to indirectly govern through the existing local government, made this task more manageable.

FM 27-5 called for the removal of the high officials in most cases. Also, it called for the retention of local government officials and members "so far as practicable."¹⁵ This was exactly the approach used during the occupation in Japan. Most of the heads of government were purged from the government. However, local governments were retained which allowed SCAP and Eighth Army to indirectly govern Japan. This indirect approach prevented problems and delays caused by changing personnel. Japan had a relatively modern form of city and prefecture government. Combined with the new constitution and changes at the national level, the local government could be retained to a large degree. The systems for running a city, such as train networks, radio stations, and newspapers, were in place at the end of the war. These systems, with minor modifications or changes, were revitalized quickly in postwar Japan. The Japanese continued to have most of the services they had prior to the occupation.

Economics also became a key principle for American civil affairs personnel. At the beginning of the occupation, the wartime economy of Japan was in disarray. The

economy of Japan was completely focused on the war effort. When Japan was defeated in August of 1945, the forces of the economy had to be shifted back to the basic needs of food, fuel, medicine, and clothing. The equitable distribution of these human necessities was a top priority for the economic department of the occupation. FM 27-5 lists “reviving the economic life and stimulating production” as key economic tasks during a military government occupation.¹⁶

The military government in Japan had a separate economic division which had responsibility for stimulating production in manufacturing, fishing, and agriculture. This economic division was responsible for initiating plans for rationing and suppressing black market activities. The civil affairs teams out in the prefectures were the observers and inspectors that ensured these economic programs were being properly administered. The civil affairs teams ensured that warehouse facilities, used to the storage of foodstuffs, were serviceable. The military government had the resources available to repair roofs, place storage pallets, and safeguard these critical supplies. The military government provided the resources, oversight and direction, while the Japanese executed the tasks.

Japan’s economic recovery did not occur miraculously overnight. Well into 1948, the Japanese had experienced a long plateau with little sign that Japan would reach the high ground of political stability and economic growth.¹⁷ It took the long-term effort during the occupation, combined with the Japanese drive and desire to succeed that eventually got the economy moving.

Another civil affairs principle was health. FM 27-5 states that, if possible, the occupation forces should work towards the “safeguarding and improving the health of the population in the occupied area.”¹⁸ This included the burying of the dead, sanitation and

garbage management, and food inspections. Insect control was also conducted to prevent the spread of diseases.

During the initial years of the occupation, a large vaccination policy was executed. At the end of the war in 1945, diseases such as smallpox, diphtheria, and typhoid were still epidemic in Japan. Tuberculosis was also a national problem. The occupation conducted a mass inoculation and vaccination program. These vaccinations for smallpox, tuberculosis, diphtheria, and typhoid greatly reduced the occurrence of these diseases. Cholera, for example, was completely eradicated.¹⁹ In addition to these vaccinations, extensive pesticide spraying and dusting was done to greatly reduce the ability for insects to spread disease. It was estimated by the SCAP medical officers that approximately three million lives were saved by implementing these health measures during the first two years of the occupation.²⁰

The last of the principles to highlight from FM 27-5 was that of speech and press. FM 27-5 states that “to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press should be maintained or instituted.”²¹ Japan, at the end of the war, had an extensive radio and newspaper infrastructure. However, like most everything else, the militarists had been in firm control of these media outlets for the past five to ten years. Once the militarist leaders of the radio and newspaper industry were purged, they became fairly representative of the new democratic Japan.

There were some who criticized the occupation for filtering the press or suppressing stories that were against MacArthur, Hirohito, or Prime Minister Yoshida.²² However, to a large extent, the news and radio industries were free to release and broadcast their stories and news items as they wished. Most Americans and Allies wanted

the occupation to be a success and for Japan to be stable and productive again. Freedom of speech and the press was a large part of the growing democracy in Japan.

Using the principles and analysis provided in earlier chapters, this study concludes by offering these four specific insights about this successful military occupation. These four insights are quite relevant today and worthy of further discussion. They are: (1) Utilization of a well trained civil affairs and military government teams; (2) Establishment of legitimacy in the new government; (3) Flexible execution of policies to achieve objectives; (4) Stay focused on the Objectives, for the “Long Haul.” These lessons are specifically relevant to the current situations and obligations in Afghanistan and Iraq. They will continue to be relevant to post conflict operations.

First, there was extensive preparation for the postwar strategic and political policies to be used in Japan after victory. Since the fall of 1942, Japan experts in the State Department had been called together to think, write, and talk about what America should do with Japan after attaining victory. These experts were gathered from universities as well as from the Foreign Service. Their combined efforts resulted in the core of American postwar political policies.²³ A committee was also formed to mesh the activities of the defense and state departments. This was the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee. “Swink,” as it was called, pulled together the best ideas, drafts, and discussions that ultimately led to policy. The large amount of capital and resources were committed to the planning for postwar Japan.

In addition to the prior planning by State-War-Navy Coordination Committee, the War Department had authorized the creation of a civil affairs and military government training school at the University of Virginia, in Charlottesville. This civil affairs and

military government school trained the officers for overseas duty. These officers received six weeks of training in the principles of military government at the University of Virginia. Following this course, they received an additional six months of language and culture training at one of the universities designated as a CATS. These officers became the key players in the occupation. When conditions in Japan were found to be peaceful, many of these personnel were sent to Korea to perform their mission in another area within the theater of operations. These civil affairs personnel were trained and ready!

The next insight concerns political legitimacy. The success of the Allied occupation of Japan had a great deal to do with the retention of the position of the Emperor and the legitimacy he lent to the occupation government. The Japanese wanted to retain the Emperor and the imperial system in Japan. By allowing the Emperor to remain, MacArthur and the occupation government forces had a person, revered as a god by the Japanese, to legitimize their actions. The Emperor decided to surrender, unconditionally. He then broadcast by radio his wish for all the Japanese to lay down their arms and cooperate completely with the Allied occupation forces. Next, the Emperor lent his support to the new constitution. He issued an imperial rescript that told the Japanese it was his desire that their old constitution (Meiji) be revised drastically upon the basis of the will of the people and the principle of respect for the fundamental human rights.²⁴ The Emperor, not by his person, but by his position lent legitimacy to the policies of the occupation.

The flexibility of the occupation was another insight gained from this study. Good plans are flexible. The plans and policies for postwar Japan were made with clear goals and stated objectives, but allowed room for a flexible execution. In Japan, the

demobilization and demilitarization proceeded much faster than the plans had anticipated. This was a very good thing. The occupation of Japan now could spend fewer resources to establish law and order, and more resources to feed, clothe, and shelter over 70 million Japanese.

The flexibility of the priorities or even the adaptation of these priorities made the postwar military government responsive. This responsiveness was a result of good observation and reporting by the civil affairs teams out in the prefectures. These teams gave the SCAP a reliable feedback system. They provided a true picture of what was happening at the grass roots level of the occupation.

The fourth and last major insight concerns continuity of both the policy and the personnel during the occupation. An occupation must continue until stated objectives are attained. The occupation of Japan lasted over five years. In 1945, the mindset was to complete the mission. The hard fought victory over the Japanese in the Pacific would not be squandered by a mediocre occupation or postcombat operation. The peacefulness of the occupation made the initial going easy, but the mindset remained to fully implement the policies transmitted by SWNCC to SCAP in August of 1945.

The leadership of the occupation, from MacArthur, to Eichelberger, on down through the SCAP staff was in Japan for the long haul. The lesson on establishing a reliable, stable government in a postwar foreign land has historically taken years and not months. These were the lessons of the successful postwar occupation of Japan. They are still relevant today.

This study covered the years from 1945 to 1950. However, the occupation did not end until 1952. The long haul attributes of the policies and the personnel that executed them were key to the success in Japan.

The success of the occupation in Japan can be attributed to extensive prior planning of policies, preparation of civil affairs teams by extensive culture and language training, executed by a flexible unified headquarters which was committed, for the long haul, to achieving stated objectives. The planning for postwar Japan began nearly three years prior to the end of the war. The civil affairs schools were established in time to produce over 2,000 trained officers, who were ready for duty at the end of combat operations. Finally, the flexibility and continuity of the military government personnel was a strength during the occupation. These military government and civil affairs personnel were well trained and culturally astute. Now, looking back over sixty years, a peaceful, free and democratic Japan was their legacy.

¹Walt Sheldon, *The Honorable Conquerors: The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), x.

²Robert C. Christopher, *The Japanese Mind* (New York: Linden Press, Simon and Shuster, 1983), 18.

³Perry, 215.

⁴The “maxim” quoted from Clark Becker, Lort Lytton, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Georg Lichtenberg in CGSC AY 2005-06, H100: *Transformation in the Shadow of Global Syllabus and Book of Readings* (Ft Leavenworth, KS:, Department of Military History, 2005).

⁵US Government, 5-13.

⁶*Ibid.*, 5.

⁷MacArthur, 269.

⁸Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1948), 108.

⁹US Government, 5-13.

¹⁰F.S.V. Donnison, *British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943-46* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 37.

¹¹Sebald, 11.

¹²US Government, 5-13.

¹³*Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁴Chwialkowski, 157.

¹⁵US Government, 9.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 11-12.

¹⁷Finn, 105.

¹⁸US Government, 11.

¹⁹MacArthur, 312-313.

²⁰Takemae, 410-412.

²¹US Government, 13.

²²Robert A. Textor, *Failure in Japan* (New York: The John Day Co., 1951).

²³Perry, 38-41.

²⁴US Department of State, Appendices.

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