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14. ABSTRACT When the American Civil War ended in 1865, Northern expectations were that a properly executed reconstruction plan would result in the South's restoration and rapid entry back into the Union. Due to a poorly planned, misguided approach, however, Union efforts in the South did not achieve the objectives of a re-unified republic and equal opportunity for its citizens. Instead, white Southerners resented the North, despised the idea of equality for their former slaves, and spawned an insurgency that resulted in their dominance over blacks in the South--arguably until the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. Today in Iraq, the Sunni populace laments its loss of power and is fighting to ensure that Shiite Arabs and Kurds are not successful in their bid to participate in a representative government. By studying Northern efforts during Reconstruction and the roots of the resultant Southern insurgency, leaders in the United States today can understand the pitfalls of incomplete Phase IV planning and the roots of insurgency. By using the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)--objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance--leaders can overcome similar mistakes in Iraq and ensure a government representative of all Iraqi people is established.					
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The Failure of American Civil War Reconstruction:
Lessons for Post-Conflict Operations in Iraq

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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15 May, 2005

Abstract

When the American Civil War ended in 1865, Northern expectations were that a properly executed reconstruction plan would result in the South's restoration and rapid entry back into the Union. Due to a poorly planned, misguided approach, however, Union efforts in the South did not achieve the objectives of a re-unified republic and equal opportunity for its citizens. Instead, white Southerners resented the North, despised the idea of equality for their former slaves, and spawned an insurgency that resulted in their dominance over blacks in the South--arguably until the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. Today in Iraq, the Sunni populace laments its loss of power and is fighting to ensure that Shiite Arabs and Kurds are not successful in their bid to participate in a representative government. By studying Northern efforts during Reconstruction and the roots of the resultant Southern insurgency, leaders in the United States today can understand the pitfalls of incomplete Phase IV planning and the roots of insurgency. By using the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)--objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance--leaders can overcome similar mistakes in Iraq and ensure a government representative of all Iraqi people is established.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Strategic Backdrop to Civil War Reconstruction	2
The Rise of Southern Insurgency	3
Postwar Union Strategy	6
The Failure of Reconstruction	10
Operation Iraqi Freedom	11
Principles of MOOTW: Solutions for Counterinsurgency Challenges	13
Conclusion	18
Bibliography	20

Introduction

It has a familiar ring: The war is won. The United States moves quickly to eliminate the old repressive regime, setting up new democratic institutions and holding elections. U.S. troops remain to ensure a smooth transition to democracy, but it's assumed that this transition will be both peaceful and swift, and that a prolonged military presence will not be necessary. Tragically, this is not to be.

Much of the population sees the United States as an occupier. A violent insurgency develops, undermining the new institutions. The United States is unable to win over the hearts and minds of the people, or crush the insurgency. Finally, after more than a decade, with both Washington and the nation losing interest, the effort is abandoned. Troops are withdrawn, the new institutions collapse, and an evil, repressive regime emerges in its place.¹

Though the account above might appear to predict the outcome of U.S. operations in its Iraq today, the author was actually describing the outcome of America's own Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction period. When the American Civil War ended in 1865, Northern expectations were that a properly executed reconstruction plan would result in the South's restoration and rapid entry back into the Union. Due to a poorly planned, misguided approach, however, Union efforts in the South did not achieve the objectives of a re-unified republic and equal opportunity for its citizens. Instead, white Southerners resented the North, despised the idea of equality for their former slaves, and spawned an insurgency that resulted in their dominance over blacks in the South--arguably until the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. Today in Iraq a similar situation exists; with the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni populace laments its loss of power and is fighting to ensure that Shiite Arabs and Kurds are not successful in their bid to participate in a representative government. A violent insurgency has risen with a goal of undermining the newly elected government and driving U.S. forces from the country.

¹ Cynthia Bass, "Post-Civil War Era a Template for Iraq," San Francisco Chronicle, 19 December, 2004.

There are inherent risks in comparing the American Civil War with U.S. operations in Iraq today. They are, after all, separated by 140 years in time; one is a civil war, the other a forced change of regime from an outside invading power; and the post-combat aftermath of the latter is characterized by much greater insurgent violence than the former. By defining the sources of unrest in both conflicts and by studying lessons learned, however, modern day tools of operational art can be used to attack the Iraqi insurgency's center of gravity today and to better manage protracted wars of insurgency in the future. As stated by Douglas Southall Freeman, one shouldn't "... ignore the yesterdays of war in your study of today and tomorrow."²

The Strategic Backdrop to Civil War Reconstruction

When the Civil War ended in 1865, President Lincoln faced a devastated nation that had lost 622,511 of its population due to combat and disease (in comparison, 126,000 and 407,000 were lost in World War I and in World War II, respectively).³ Lincoln's dilemma was how to re-build the South, bring the Southern states back into the Union, and simultaneously ensure that former slaves were allowed equal representation. As one would expect, Southerners were none too ready to rejoin the Union from which they had attempted to secede. Four years of bloody battle, fought mostly on Southern soil, and the devastation of the Southern economy resulted in a tired, humiliated and broken populace. Of the South's white male population who had been old enough to perform military service when the war

² Douglas Southall Freeman, Leadership, Lecture delivered at the Naval War College on 11 May 1949. Reprinted by permission from *Naval War College Review* XXXII (March–April 1979): 3–10. Published by the Naval War College.

³ Stetson Kennedy, After Appomattox: How the South Won the War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), 19.

began, fully one fourth were dead or incapacitated⁴ and due to the emancipation of the slaves, Southern slave owners had lost an estimated two to four billion dollars.⁵ Even General William T. Sherman, Northern leader of the destructive “March to the Sea,” was moved by conditions in the South. In addressing his veterans, he described:

cities in ashes and fields laid waste, their commerce gone, their system of labor annihilated and destroyed. Ruin, poverty, and distress everywhere, and now pestilence adding the very cap sheaf to their stack of miseries; her proud men begging for pardon and appealing for permission to raise food for their children; her five millions of slaves free and their value lost to their former masters forever.⁶

Sherman’s demoralizing march across the South likely convinced Southerners of the hopelessness of the rebel cause and more quickly brought about the end of the war, but it did nothing to encourage the Southern populace to trust Northerners as they sought to re-build the South.

Conversely, a large population of newly freed slaves throughout the South saw opportunity in this new environment and sought to gain “the same political and legal rights, the same opportunities, and the same advantages and disadvantages that prevailed among whites.”⁷ Many former slaves desired redistribution of the land and hoped to take advantage of such privileges as the 40 acres and a mule granted by General Sherman’s Special Field Order #15.⁸ In this environment, a clash between old power whites and newly freed blacks became a foregone conclusion.

⁴ Hodding Carter, The Angry Scar: The Story of Reconstruction (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959), 43.

⁵ Ibid., 32-33.

⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁷ Otto H. Olsen, “Southern Reconstruction and Self-Determination,” in A Nation Divided, ed. George M Fredrickson (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1975), 123

⁸ Special Field Orders, No. 15, Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 16 Jan. 1865. Orders & Circulars, ser. 44, Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconstruction/40acres/ps_so15.html> An order issued in an attempt to stem the rampant growth of refugees following his Army in Georgia.

Rise of the Southern Insurgency

Suspicious of northern motives and consumed with a desire to regain power, Southern whites quickly realized that whoever controlled the majority vote controlled Southern government. The Southern voting block, in other words, was the Republican (or pro-Union) center of gravity, the former slaves that made up the majority of voters comprised a Republican critical capability, and their votes defined a critical requirement. By influencing the black vote, Southern Democrats could nullify the majority black influence, ensure that Republicans were not elected, and could, in the long term, win back control; the black vote, in other words, constituted a Northern critical vulnerability that could be exploited. In searching for ways to exploit this Achilles' heel, the South's past rulers, however, "discovered that the difficulty with poor and illiterate black voters was not that their vote could be controlled but that it could not be."⁹ Having finally been granted their freedom, blacks were not going to willingly return their former masters to power. In response, white Southerners turned to violence to regain control.

Having considered and rejected guerilla warfare against the Union Army,¹⁰ they instead initiated a low-intensity, terror-based insurgency targeted at members of the Republican Party, black or white, who were members of the government or were in position to vote against Democrats in the South. In November of 1868, in the weeks preceding the presidential election, violent manhunts of blacks and Republicans were rampant. "In Louisiana alone, such hunts took more than 2,000 lives. In a two-day hunt through the woods and swamps of St. Landry Parish the Klan killed or wounded some 200 Republicans, most of

⁹ Olsen, 127.

¹⁰ James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 848. At Appomatox, a subordinate of General Lee suggested guerilla warfare as an alternative to surrender, Lee replied that guerillas would become "mere bands of marauders" and "would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country years to recover from."

whom were black. A pile of 25 half-buried bodies was found in the woods. In Bossier Parish, 125 bodies were recovered from the Red River.”¹¹ The Southern white attitude towards regaining dominance was clearly expressed by General John McEnery in Louisiana when he said, "We shall carry the next election if we have to ride saddle-deep in blood to do it.”¹²

Spreading this terrorism across the South were secretly-run organizations like the Ku Klux Klan that acted as the army for the Southern insurgency. Operating with impunity and dressed in costumes resembling Confederate ghosts to frighten superstitious blacks, Ku Klux Klan members drove from the polls anyone who had expressed Republican support. Their long term goal was restoration of “political and social control of the South to the whites who held it before the loss of the war.”¹³ “Not only was the Klan destroying Republican leadership . . . but, by exposing the inability of the Republican governments to protect person and property, it contributed to the declining appeal of Reconstruction in the South and its ultimate abandonment by the North.”¹⁴ In addition to gaining support from the local populace by creating fear within pro-Unionists, the Ku Klux Klan also took advantage of long-standing white fears of Negro insurrection and induced thousands of citizens to ally themselves with the Klan as a measure of self-defense.¹⁵ Though the majority of the population did not participate outwardly in the violence, they accepted it as the lesser of two evils. Additionally, in instances where Klan members were arrested and brought to trial for their crimes, “it was not unusual for the judge, sheriff, and arresting posse to be the grand Cyclops, grand magi,

¹¹ Kennedy, 89.

¹² Ibid., 262.

¹³ William L. Richter, American Reconstruction, 1862-1877 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1996), 244.

¹⁴ Olsen, 135.

¹⁵ Stanley F. Horn, Invisible Empire: The Story of the Ku Klux Klan, 1866-1871 (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith Publishing Company, 1939), 28.

and ghouls of the local *** [Ku Klux Klan] den.”¹⁶ Making the most of the “home field” advantage in this war of insurgency, Southern whites deduced the Northern center of gravity early in the Reconstruction period, devised a way to defeat it, and had the will to continue fighting until their objectives were met.

Postwar Union Strategy

Faced with a determined insurgency for which it had not prepared, the Union government was in need of a clear strategy. Essential elements to the success of Reconstruction were restoring an effective government, providing security for the entire population, re-building the economy, and establishing and maintaining equality for Southern citizens--black and white, Democrat and Republican. In 1865, after four years of bloody fighting, the sooner these goals could be accomplished the sooner the nation could return to normalcy.

In their efforts to re-establish Southern government, the North found itself in an awkward predicament. If Northerners or Union sympathizers filled all positions in the civilian government, Northern aims could be more easily carried out; however, the Southern populace would be hard-pressed to accept them. If Southern leaders were re-instated to their former positions to take advantage of their experience, one could argue that the war had been fought in vain. Worse still was to make no clear decision on who should be allowed to govern. When Reconstruction objectives were formulated at the war's end, disagreement within the Union government resulted in vague objectives being handed to those charged with carrying out the rebuilding of the South. During the war, President Lincoln had issued his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction clearly stating that a rebel state could return to

¹⁶ Richter, 244. The “***” annotation was used as a secret code to denote “Ku Klux Klan.”

the Union as soon as ten percent of its voters in the 1860 presidential election had taken an oath of future loyalty to the Union. Acceptance of emancipation was required for readmission and high-ranking Confederate officials were prohibited from taking the oath, but the plan did not otherwise impose penalties for having been in rebellion.¹⁷ As the war came to a close, however, the dynamics of North-South relationship were changing and he admitted that “he had no plan for reorganization, but must be guided by events.”¹⁸ No plan, widespread congressional dissension, and Lincoln’s assassination subsequently resulted in muddled guidance for the military leaders tasked with carrying out Reconstruction. Lacking strategic guidance from the government, the military was hard pressed to put together an operational plan, and district commanders were forced to use their own interpretations of reconstruction to govern.

James Sefton describes early Union efforts:

After hostilities ended, the Army administered Southern affairs without specific guidance from Washington, pending the formulation of national policy. President Johnson soon announced a program of reconstruction, which the Army administered for six months. But the Congress disagreed with the President, and the Army watched with apprehension as Congress inaugurated its struggle with Johnson over control of policy. The result was a period of fifteen months during which the Army amidst great confusion, administered a policy no longer purely presidential but not yet clearly congressional.¹⁹

In addition to establishing the government, Union forces were faced with the mammoth task of maintaining order throughout the South. Unfortunately, at the war’s end, General Grant had been so confident that conditions would remain peaceful in the South that he had actively pushed to de-mobilize the army, going so far as to tell Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton that ““submission was perfect” throughout the region and that the number

¹⁷ William L. Barney, Battleground for the Union: The Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction 1848-1877 (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 208.

¹⁸ Barney, 228.

¹⁹ James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 3.

of soldiers left “to secure order and protect the freedman in the liberty conferred upon them” had been reduced, “as continued quiet and good order have justified it.”²⁰ In spite of the growing insurgency during the two years following the war, the number of Federal troops fell from 200,000 to 20,000.²¹ The North quickly became overwhelmed in meeting the demand for security; even in areas where troops were deployed, they were ineffective. As described by Sefton, this force-space mismatch resulted in deficient security for the populace the troops were sent to protect:

The rural character of the South was an advantage to the Klan and all criminals of such magnitude that even the presence of a squad of men in every village could not have overcome it. The melancholy fact was that no amount of troops could have prevented assaults on Negroes when the crimes took place on remote stretches of country roads by disguised men. Concealment of identity partially counteracted the troops’ psychological impact, at least as long as the criminals remained unknown. It also made victims unwilling to testify for fear of retribution without warning and, therefore, made it difficult for the Army to protect those who did agree to testify.²²

Making the Northern occupation even more onerous to the South was that the first Union forces sent to provide security were predominantly composed of black regiments; if Union occupation was vexing to Southerners, it was made more so due to the fact that many of the soldiers were their former slaves. “Bottom rail on top this time, Massah, bottom rail's on top now”²³ -- a reversal of fortune had taken place and blacks were quick to point it out. Any hope of attaining cooperation from former Confederates was made doubly difficult by this poorly conceived provocation.

²⁰ Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 113.

²¹ Lewis C. Cochran, The American Civil War, the United States Army, and the Ku Klux Klan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 36-37.

²² Sefton, 224.

²³ Reconstruction: The Second Civil War, produced and directed by Llewellyn M. Smith, 2004 <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconstruction/filmmore/pt.html> [12May 2005]. A saying attributed to newly freed blacks when they encountered their former White masters.

The last elements of Union strategy were the re-building of the economy and the establishment of equality in a society that had been built on slavery. Leaders of the newly established Freedman's Bureau,²⁴ instituted to protect the interests of former slaves, were faced with colossal responsibilities. In the words of Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois, executors of the Freedman's Bureau were tasked with making:

a general survey of conditions and needs in every state and locality; to relieve immediate hunger and distress; to appoint state commissioners and upwards of 900 Bureau officials; to put laborers to work at regular wages; to transport laborers, teachers and officials; to furnish land for the peasants; to open schools; to pay bounties to Black soldiers and their families; to establish hospitals and guard health; to administer justice between man and former master; to answer continuous and persistent criticism, North and South, black and white; to find funds to pay for all this.²⁵

Military commanders, the Freedman's Bureau, and the South's burgeoning civilian government all had to work together if these extensive goals were to be met. Instead, lack of guidance and disparate aims among leaders resulted in disrupting the unified effort so necessary to reconstructing the Union.

Compounding the problem were corrupt, politically-minded agents in positions of authority who established associations known as Loyal Leagues. Ostensibly organized to "protect, strengthen and defend all loyal men, without regard to sect, condition or race," and to secure equal civil and political rights for all men,²⁶ these leagues became institutions in which former slaves could turn the tables on their former masters and gain dominance in the South. Those blacks who were viewed by the Leagues as too loyal to their former masters were threatened with death, badly beaten and sometimes murdered. "Incendiary organizers and white League officials, often employees of the Freedman's Bureau, encouraged Negro members to turn upon the Southern whites, so that Loyal Leagues contributed more than any

²⁴ Short for the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.

²⁵ Carter, 57.

²⁶ Ibid., 60.

other Negro activity to the spread of the Ku Klux Klan.”²⁷ In short, the inability of Bureau leaders to remain neutral and act with restraint resulted in actually expanding the violence they were tasked with eradicating. Losing sight of efforts to revive the economy and establish the equality of the South’s population, Union leaders became focused on retribution and lost the crucial popular support needed to succeed in the South.

The Failure of Reconstruction

If the principal role of operational art is “to soundly sequence and synchronize” or “to “orchestrate” the employment of military forces and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in a given theater,”²⁸ the Union was clearly unsuccessful during Reconstruction. For an operation to succeed, a coherent end state must first be established and objectives must be defined. Not only were Union operational objectives ambiguous, the efforts of military and nonmilitary sources of power were clearly not orchestrated. Though the Union had plainly achieved a military victory over the Confederacy, Northern leaders had given little thought to post-combat operations; without clear reconstruction objectives, the North could not succeed in properly re-building the South. A lengthy list of failures provides a view into why Reconstruction failed: lack of strategic guidance; poor coordination of civil-military efforts; an inability to maintain security; alienation of the population through abuse of power; a loss of popular will in the North; and a Southern white rejection of Republican-dominated authority. Combined together, these missteps led to the failure of establishing a peaceful, re-united nation able to ensure equal opportunity for all its citizens. Twelve years after the Civil War ended in Southern military

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, (Newport: Naval War College, 2000), 1.

defeat, the Confederate side had effectively resisted Northern Reconstruction efforts and had actually achieved *its* goal of self-determination.

It may seem to require amazing mental agility to conclude that the Confederacy had won victory. Yet if one takes as one Confederate goal the self-respect of a people, as another goal the preservation of the notion that Americans anywhere had a constitutional right to deal with their own people and institutions as they desired without outside interference, and, as a third, the desire to exercise that right in respect to their own black population, one has only to look at the century between the first and second Reconstructions to see that . . . the South had indeed preserved its view of the Constitution, white supremacy, and honor.²⁹

U.S. military occupation ended in 1877 and the South, for the next hundred years, became “a nation unto itself, poorer, more economically backward and less educated than the rest of the nation, with a unique legal system unashamedly founded on racism. So divorced was the South from the rest of America that Vicksburg, Miss., which had fallen to Gen. Ulysses Grant on July 4, 1863, did not celebrate Independence Day until World War II.”³⁰

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Today, one hundred thirty years after Reconstruction, the United States is again facing a nation-building/counterinsurgency mission. Though it is doing so in an area outside its own borders, the setting is nonetheless very similar to the post-Civil War American South. A war has been fought and won, a regime has been driven from power, a large population is in need of post-war relief, and a new government must be re-built to ensure equal opportunity of the country's citizens. Although the President of the United States declared an end to “major fighting” in Iraq in May, 2003, America has for two years faced a determined insurgency aimed at driving U.S. and coalition forces from the country. Members of the insurgency, led

²⁹ Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 417. The “second” Reconstruction refers to the Civil Rights movement started in the 1950s.

³⁰ Bass, “Post-Civil War Era a Template for Iraq.”

predominantly by former Baath party Sunnis, hope to regain the dominance and influence they enjoyed while Saddam Hussein was in power; meanwhile, a large population stands quietly by, attempting to avoid becoming the target of that insurgency.

As in the Civil War, the strategic objective of combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was “clearly expressed and militarily achievable. It included the end of the Saddam Hussein regime; the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the capture or driving out of terrorists who had found refuge in Iraq; and the securing of Iraqi oil fields and resources.”³¹ What U.S. leaders did not foresee, however, was the reaction of the Iraqi people to the toppling of their government; the United States had again failed to properly plan for post-combat operations. In a pessimistic analysis by the Defense Intelligence Agency, prospects for a diminishing insurgency and peace in Iraq are limited.

Insurgent groups will continue to use violence to attempt to protect Sunni Arab interests and regain dominance. Subversion and infiltration of emerging government institutions, security and intelligence services will be a major problem for the new government. Jihadists will continue to attack in Iraq in pursuit of their long-term goals. Challenges to reconstruction, economic development and employment will continue.³²

Having lost site of lessons available from its own Civil War past, the United States must now recover from a lack of postconflict planning and continued insurgency in Iraq. Through the many wars and conflicts that have been fought since the 1860s, considerable experience has been gained and much has been written concerning post war operations and fighting insurgencies. To find a solution to the dilemma in Iraq, the United States needs only study its own joint doctrine to find the essential planning and execution principles necessary to defeat its enemy.

³¹ Milan Vego “Learning from Victory,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 129 (August 2003): 32.

³² Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement For the Record - Senate Armed Services Committee*, 17 March 2005.< http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2005_hr/050317-jacoby.htm> [8 April, 2005].

Principles of MOOTW: Solutions for Counterinsurgency Challenges

In modern day parlance, post-Civil War Reconstruction would fall within the category of “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW)--military operations involving “elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations.”³³ The principles of MOOTW--objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance³⁴--all had significant roles during Reconstruction; perhaps if these principles had been formulated prior to the first half of the 19th Century, post-combat operations in the South might have been planned and executed more effectively. Today, though much of the damage of incomplete planning for Iraq is irreversible, incorporating these principles will improve ongoing operations in Iraq and will benefit future planners

First, the principle of objective--“directing every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective”³⁵--was clearly used in the largely successful planning and execution of Phases I through III of OIF. In Phase IV, however, a clearly defined and attainable objective was not formulated. Described by the Washington Post, “postconflict planning apparently started late and was poorly done. Its execution was even worse. The planning reportedly was based on some overly optimistic assumptions regarding the attitude of the Iraqi population and underestimated the difficulties of restoring some basic needs in the aftermath of the collapse of the tyrannical regime in Baghdad.”³⁶ Just as Civil War leaders failed to foresee that their wartime objective should go beyond defeat of military forces in the South to reconstruction of the entire Union, the objective of OIF was

³³ Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), I-1. In future joint publications the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) will be replaced with Stability and Support Operations (SASO).

³⁴ Ibid., II-6.

³⁵ Ibid., II-2.

³⁶ Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Slevin, “Iraq's Ragged Reconstruction,” Washington Post, 9 May 2003, p. A1; quoted in Milan Vego “Learning from Victory,” 32-36.

incompletely determined and therefore partially executed. Saddam Hussein was driven from power, but an effective plan was not implemented to ensure that a replacement government could be quickly put in place to fill the vacuum. A population that was initially supportive of the regime change quickly came to resent the occupying force. “Liberators” became “invaders,” and street crime became insurgency.

The second principle, unity of effort, was also violated between military and civilian authorities before, during and after combat operations in Iraq. Similar to efforts within the Freedman’s Bureau during Reconstruction, civilian and military efforts in support of OIF were executed in a “stovepipe” fashion with little coordination between the two. Early on, as the prospect of a war in Iraq began to gain support in the U.S. government, the Department of State developed plans that would take into account “almost every question likely to confront a post-Hussein Iraq: the rebuilding of infrastructure, the shape Iraqi democracy might take, the carrying out of transitional justice and the spurring of economic development.”³⁷ Poor relations between the Departments of State and Defense, however, resulted in those plans being disregarded when the Defense Department was tasked with overseeing both combat and post-combat planning.³⁸ Even the Defense Department’s own Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), established to integrate “humanitarian relief, reconstruction and civil administration” in post-war Iraq, was reportedly so neglected by military commanders in Baghdad that it was seen as largely ineffective.³⁹ When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was set up in Iraq to take its place, a dual chain of command--one from CPA’s Paul Bremer to the Secretary of Defense, and one from General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command to the Secretary of Defense--also made a unified

³⁷ David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” The New York Times, 1 November 2003.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

effort difficult to achieve. Without a single leader to unify the diplomatic, information, military and economic sources of power, the goals and objectives of all agencies were and will continue to be numerous and disjointed.

Security, a third principle of MOOTW, is undeniably critical when fighting an insurgency. Today in Iraq, not only is it critical to protect the officials filling the new Iraqi government, the populace as a whole must be kept safe. An insurgency is, by its nature, a fight for the will of the people. If a government is unable to protect its people, public confidence in that government will quickly be lost, and the people will look elsewhere for leadership. In counterinsurgency operations, Anthony Joes states,

it is essential that the government side establish and maintain the perception that it is going to win; it must give the appearance of strength, confidence, and unshakable permanency. If this is done, then many who support the insurgents will change sides or become neutral, and, many neutrals will shift toward the government.⁴⁰

U.S. and coalition forces thus far in Iraq have a mixed record in providing security to Iraqis. Having replicated the Reconstruction mistake of too few troops on the ground, U.S. leaders are hard-pressed to meet the demands of protecting the Iraqi populace while simultaneously attempting to rebuild the infrastructure and economy. More importantly, as U.S. forces begin their third year of operating in Iraq, the more they take on the appearance of long term occupational forces. The United States and its coalition partners must train Iraqi security forces and transfer security responsibilities as quickly as possible to demonstrate that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. military, is protecting the people in Iraq.

A fourth principle, restraint, goes hand in hand with security to win the support of the population. While an insurgency can conceivably be weakened by heavy-handed military action, the results in the end are at best ineffective and at worst likely to result in losing the

⁴⁰ Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 235.

war. Basil Liddell Hart observed that “the more brutal your methods, the more bitter you will make your opponents, with the natural result of hardening the resistance you are trying to overcome.”⁴¹ Described in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual, “caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum of loss of life.”⁴² In order to convince the population that its government is acting for the benefit of the people, the government must act fairly, refrain from using excessive force, and tread the moral high ground if it is to establish itself as the leadership of choice. During Reconstruction, Loyal Leagues, filled with rancorous Northerners and former slaves, actively prodded Southerners to react with violence. Abuses today such as those perpetrated by guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq might aid in collecting intelligence in the short term, but could result in losing the long term fight for the support of the Iraqi people. An airstrike might destroy a justifiable tactical target, but disproportionate collateral damage may convince the local populace that the liberators in Iraq are more dangerous and disruptive than the insurgents. Though it is tempting to fight insurgents using their own underhanded, vengeful tactics, the judicious use of restraint while maintaining security will result in greater legitimacy of effort.

Legitimacy, “the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions,”⁴³ is the fifth principle and the key to convincing the population

⁴¹ Basil Liddell Hart quoted in Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, 158.

⁴² United States Marine Corps NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition). (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987), 32. Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

⁴³ Joint Publication 3-07, II-5.

that a cause is just. The military by itself will not persuade the people that its cause is worth supporting; assistance from other elements of power is needed. Information must be managed and focused on influencing not only the people of Iraq, but on the American public, as well. The Iraqi insurgency, knowing that it cannot militarily win in combat, pursues an asymmetrical approach to de-legitimize the U.S. effort and lessen the U.S. will to fight, while simultaneously attempting to influence the populace around them. To win this battle for “hearts and minds,” it is imperative that the United States reach a broad audience with a convincing story that coalition forces are in place to facilitate security, equal opportunity, and new government for the Iraqi people. An example of integrating diplomacy, information, and economics to this end can be seen in an effort by Charles Krohn. Previously the deputy chief of public affairs for the Army and later, spokesman and media adviser for the Program Management Office (PMO) in Baghdad, his goal in November, 2003 was to publicize the extensive re-building being done in Iraq. The PMO had more than \$18 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds for use in Iraq, and faced “a Herculean task with two goals: to rebuild the country and, in the process, to win the Iraqi people's goodwill. Reconstruction, to Krohn and Nash [David Nash, a retired Navy Admiral and head of the PMO], was the way to win the peace and thus protect U.S. soldiers.”⁴⁴ Krohn’s goal was to invigorate a stalled media effort and influence the fight; by taking the focus away from the violence, he could show both the Iraqi and the American people that progress was being made and U.S. and coalition efforts were legitimate.

A last principle, essential when fighting an insurgency, is perseverance. Wars of insurgency tend to be long and drawn out; perseverance, not only within the local population,

⁴⁴ Shane Harris, “Krohn's Rules, 'The Truth Hurts' is an Unlikely Credo for a Military Public Affairs Officer.” Government Executive, September 15, 2004, 52.

but more importantly, within the American public is critical for success. As insurgents continue to commit murder and cause mayhem day after day in Iraq, they hope to break the will of their own people and “to convince the American public and its leaders that the war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure.”⁴⁵ As demonstrated in Vietnam over thirty years ago, if support from the American public is lost, the U.S. government will likely have a difficult time continuing its efforts in Iraq. In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll released in the first week of May, 2005, fifty-seven percent of respondents said Iraq had not been worth the war's cost. Addressing the lowest measure of support since the war had begun two years ago, a senior administration aide said, “People will inevitably look for some semblance of progress, whether it's less bloodshed or a U.S. troop drawdown. Otherwise they'll turn weary and frustrated.”⁴⁶ If not addressed by U.S. leaders, that weariness and frustration could result in victory by the insurgents who are willing to fight for their cause without stopping. As stated by Thomas Mockaitis in British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, “perseverance may be the most formidable weapon in the counterinsurgency arsenal.”⁴⁷

Conclusion

In 1877, after four years of civil war and twelve years of post-war reconstruction, the U.S. Army left the South. Though the North could claim an operational victory, the strategic Southern landscape had changed little over those sixteen years. The majority black population arguably was not much better off in its freedom than it had been under slavery.

⁴⁵ Andrew Krepinevich, The War In Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare, Center for Strategic & Budgetary Studies, June 2, 2004, <<http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20040602.NatofInsurge/B.20040602.NatofInsurge.pdf>> [2 Oct 2004].

⁴⁶ Scott Johnson and John Barry “A Deadly Guessing Game,” Newsweek, 16 May 2005. <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050509367385.html>> [9 May 2005].

⁴⁷ Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester, 1995), 129; quoted in Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, 257.

The white minority, having conducted a successful insurgency, had outlasted the Union struggle to ensure equal representation for all citizens. Union supporters and former slaves in the South were not secure in their own towns or even in their homes. Having won the war, the North failed in Reconstruction.

In the ensuing years, the United States has grown to become the most powerful nation on earth. Nonetheless, it has continued to fare poorly in protracted fights against less powerful, asymmetric opponents. Today in Iraq, America is again faced with fighting an insurgency; to succeed, it must learn from its past experience in these “small wars” and apply the requisite operational principles in preparing for and conducting the fight. General Anthony Zinni, former Commander in Chief, Central Command, is adamant that the United States owes its military members better planning and execution in future wars:

They should never be put on a battlefield without a strategic plan, not only for the fighting--our generals will take care of that--but for the aftermath and winning that war. Where are we, the American people, if we accept this, if we accept this level of sacrifice without that level of planning?⁴⁸

In assessing U.S. involvement in Iraq, Cynthia Bass suggests that,

American politicians and policy-makers would be well advised to look to our own past for a realistic understanding of the challenges we face. The time is now for them to ask whether we want to continue wasting blood and treasure on what a disillusioned Northern reconstructionist bitterly called "a fool's errand."⁴⁹

Perhaps a more pertinent question is, “Do we want to give up on Iraq today as the North did with the South, and waste the blood and treasure we’ve spent thus far?” We have the tools today to defeat this insurgency--the coalition soldiers that have died and the Iraqi people who have suffered through this war deserve our best efforts to use those tools now and in the future.

⁴⁸ General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), Address at the Naval Institute Forum 2003, 4 September, 2003.

⁴⁹ Bass, “Post-Civil War Era a Template for Iraq.”

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