ENDING THE DEBATE: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, AND WHY WORDS MATTER

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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### Title
Ending the debate: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and why words matter.

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### Abstract
There is an ongoing debate within the Special Forces community whether unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are applicable in the contemporary and future Special Operations environments, based on current doctrinal definitions and operational concepts. For unconventional warfare, the debate surrounds its current broad and confusing definition and whether it can be an overarching term for efforts against nonstate actors in the Global War on Terrorism. The foreign internal defense debate is not over definitions, but responsibilities, as the conventional military begins to play a larger role in foreign internal defense, a legacy Special Forces mission. This thesis argues that unconventional warfare needs a clear and concise definition, such as "operations by a state or non-state actor to support an insurgency aimed at the overthrow of a government or occupying power," that unconventional warfare should not be "transformed" to fight global insurgency; that there is an identifiable relationship between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense called the "transition point" signifying the change from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense, and that this relationship can be modeled; that operational preparation of the environment is not unconventional warfare, but an emerging operation requiring its own doctrine; and that unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and operational preparation of the environment will be the dominate Special Forces missions in the Global War on Terrorism.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


There is an ongoing debate within the Special Forces community whether unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are applicable in the contemporary and future Special Operations environments, based on current doctrinal definitions and operational concepts. For unconventional warfare, the debate surrounds its current broad and confusing definition and whether it can be an overarching term for efforts against non-state actors in the Global War on Terrorism. The foreign internal defense debate is not over definitions, but responsibilities, as the conventional military begins to play a larger role in foreign internal defense, a legacy Special Forces mission. This thesis argues that unconventional warfare needs a clear and concise definition, such as “operations by a state or non-state actor to support an insurgency aimed at the overthrow of a government or occupying power,” that unconventional warfare should not be “transformed” to fight global insurgency; that there is an identifiable relationship between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense called the “transition point” signifying the change from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense, and that this relationship can be modeled; that operational preparation of the environment is not unconventional warfare, but an emerging operation requiring its own doctrine; and that unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and operational preparation of the environment will be the dominate Special Forces missions in the Global War on Terrorism.
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In the fall of 2003, I began developing ideas presented in this thesis while trying to explain the doctrinal differences between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense to twelve of my student officers enrolled in the third phase of the Special Forces Officer Qualification Course. It is hard to believe three years later that this project has finally reached fruition. This thesis would not have been possible without the support of the following:

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**De Oppresso Liber**
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<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Coordinator of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<td>DET 101</td>
<td>Detachment 101</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>JP</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>USASFC</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of a definition is to clarify. The term or concept in question should be more understandable once its definition has been presented. Generally, the ideal definition should leave little or no room for ambiguity.¹

David Charters and Maurice Tugwell

If you spend more than 30 seconds debating what it means, it isn’t clear enough for the users.²

Clinton J. Ancker III

Since its birth in 1952, Special Forces have had the exclusive responsibility within the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct unconventional warfare. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines unconventional warfare as:

Military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence gathering, and escape and evasion.³


²Clinton J. Ancker III, Doctrine Imperatives, PowerPoint briefing, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Director of the Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, 2005).

Although not clear in this definition, doctrinally and historically unconventional warfare is “the culmination of successful [military] efforts to organize and mobilize the civil populous against a hostile government or an occupying power.”

United States (US) Army unconventional warfare doctrine also has an addition not found in the joint definition stating that this operation is “predominantly conducted through, by and with indigenous or surrogate forces.”

A comparison between the current unconventional warfare definition and the definition from 1955 highlights how little has changed in over fifty years:

[O]perations . . . conducted in time of war behind enemy lines by predominantly indigenous personnel responsible in varying degrees to friendly control or direction in furtherance of military and political objectives. It consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states.

US unconventional warfare has historically been used in one of two ways: either to support or shape the environment for the larger conventional campaign or as a unilateral effort, generally conducted covertly. Examples of unconventional warfare shaping for conventional military operations are well known, such as the Allied support to the resistances in France, the Balkans, and the Far East in World War II and most recently in Northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unilateral unconventional

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5Ibid. This version of the definition is also used in FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 30 April 2003), 1-1.


7FM 3-05.20, 2-3.
warfare efforts have been much less well known, mostly due to their covert nature, but include operations behind the Iron Curtain to develop resistance capabilities, in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s, and again in Afghanistan after the events of 11 September during Operation Enduring Freedom.

The unilateral examples cited above have primarily been conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which also maintains a covert unconventional warfare capability, referred to as paramilitary operations or special operations. As William Daugherty notes that for the CIA, a special operation “means paramilitary operations—military-type actions utilizing non-military personnel [indigenous personnel or surrogates].” The CIA has generally been responsible for conducting covert unconventional warfare as a tool of foreign policy when the president wants to have plausible deniability, especially during peacetime. Covert operations are “planned and executed to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that the emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation.” In times of conflict, when military forces are employed, the DOD takes the lead responsibility for unconventional warfare. The CIA conducted numerous covert paramilitary activities during the Cold War against communist regimes and most recently shaped the environments in Afghanistan and Iraq for Special Forces to conduct successful unconventional warfare.

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8 William J. Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 15, 84-85.
9 Ibid., 15.
10 FM 3-05.20, Glossary 7-8.
In the early 1960’s, President Kennedy called upon Special Forces to use its unconventional warfare skills and knowledge developed to support an insurgency to defeat the Cold War communist-sponsored insurgencies or wars of national revolutions threatening to expand globally if not checked. This new mission was called foreign internal defense and was successfully prosecuted by Special Forces teams at the tactical and operational levels of the Vietnam War. JP 1-02 defines foreign internal defense as, “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”11 JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, further categorizes foreign internal defense into three types of support:

Indirect--focuses on building strong national infrastructure through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self sufficiency.”12

Direct (not involving combat operations)--the involvement of US forces providing direct assistance to the host nation civilian populous or military.13

Combat--the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the host nation civilian populace or military.14

As noted in JP 3-07.1, “These categories represent significantly different levels of US diplomatic and military commitment and risk.”15

11JP 1-02.


13Ibid.

14Ibid.
At the same time, President Kennedy tasked the CIA with the same mission but conducted clandestinely. The clandestine foreign internal defense mission would later be known as “special activities.”

As William Daugherty explains,

The CIA’s paramilitary cadre is most often employed in training foreign military and security forces . . . however, training that falls under the rubric of special activities but which requires the support of the Agency’s covert action infrastructure--rather than actual combat operations--was by far the most common mission of the paramilitary element.

Even though the CIA mission presented here seems confusing, the covert finding is the constraining document that provides the detailed operational limitations and political goals, alleviating any confusion.

By the end of Vietnam, Special Forces had also conducted special reconnaissance against the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia and direct action in the highly-publicized raid on the Son Tay prison camp in an attempt to rescue American prisoners of war, which would later be added to Special Forces doctrine as personnel recovery. With the strategic military and political failure of Vietnam, Special Forces tried to distance itself from foreign internal defense, which carried with it the stigma of Vietnam. At the same time, Special Forces all but forgot about its unconventional warfare roots because the likelihood of successfully conducting unconventional warfare in the nuclear age seemed remote. Instead, Special Forces focused on less politically-charged missions, such as special reconnaissance and direct action, which both fit nicely in the operations plans of the Cold War.

15 Ibid., I-4.
16 Daugherty, 85.
17 Ibid., 84-85.
In the 1980s, Special Forces conducted foreign internal defense to defeat an insurgency in El Salvador and Honduras and provided support to the CIA’s covert unconventional warfare efforts to support the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua. All of these operations proved successful, although Special Forces had only been utilized in a supporting role during the two unconventional warfare campaigns. The success in El Salvador began a string of successes for Special Forces, conducting special reconnaissance, direct action, and foreign internal defense in places such as Panama, Desert Storm, Bosnia, and Kosovo, adding other missions, such as combat search and rescue and coalition support to its repertoire as well. By 2001, few thought that unconventional warfare would ever be conducted again and there were numerous studies to determine the relevancy of unconventional warfare in future conflicts. 

In the summer of 2001, senior Special Forces leadership attempted to ensure continued Special Forces viability by placing all Special Forces missions under a broad category of unconventional warfare. These included not only Special Forces’ missions to date, but now included counterproliferation, combating terrorism, and the other collateral activities, such as humanitarian demining operations, and coalition support. However, their efforts would be disrupted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September.

Less than two years later, Special Forces had successfully prosecuted two unconventional warfare campaigns, one a decisive combat operation in Afghanistan, using indigenous forces instead of massive conventional formations, and the other a

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19 FM 3-05.20, 2-1.
shaping operation in northern Iraq, using the indigenous Kurdish insurgents to fix thirteen of twenty Iraqi divisions north of Baghdad, lessening the burden on the conventional combined forces land component command’s southern invasion force. Now, in the postconflict phase of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Forces should doctrinally be conducting foreign internal defense, helping the indigenous government forces to defeat internal threats, in an attempt to secure the environment and allow the political processes to develop.

To date, however, Special Forces have been primarily employed in unilateral actions, focused on “kill or capture” missions. This unilateral employment has all but negated the force multiplying capability inherent in Special Forces operations through training and advising indigenous government security forces. Instead, the conventional Army has taken on the majority of the training and advising roles in both theaters. Although Special Forces touts working by, with, and through indigenous forces as its core competency, Special Forces found ways to remove itself from the burden of training and advising indigenous conventional units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Using the Global War on Terrorism as a reason, a similar pattern of passing missions to Marines or contractors is evident in other foreign internal defense operations, such as the Georgian train and equip mission and the African Crisis Response Initiative, now referred to as ACOTA or African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance.²⁰

As of the spring of 2006, the debate continues throughout the Special Forces community as to whether unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine are still applicable in today’s contemporary operating environment and future conflicts. Studies being conducted seem to continue to suggest that current unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine and definitions need to be “transformed” for a new application against non-state actors. This is a new twist on an old debate. However, all of these studies seem to gloss over the fact that in Afghanistan and Iraq, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense have been the primary operations being conducted by Special Forces.

The success of these operations with regards to Special Forces’ efforts is due to the application of legacy unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine. Therefore, current attempts to redefine and apply these doctrinal operations in an effort to “transform” them for the current operations against non-state actors such as al Qa’ida and its associated movements have been difficult for one simple reason—historically and doctrinally unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are only applicable to a single nation state, not a non-state entity. These operations were never meant for anything other than supporting insurgencies and or defeating insurgencies within a nation


state and thus have proven themselves to be just as applicable today as in the days of their inception.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense have been operationally linked as never before. At some point in time during both of these operations, combat operations shifted to stability operations, and with this shift, Special Forces should have changed mission orientation from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense. However, few within the special operations community identified this transition and continued to define Special Forces operations, in both theaters, as unconventional warfare. The major obstacle to understanding this linkage is the fact that Iraq and Afghanistan seem to be high-intensity combat theaters, nothing like the low-intensity or traditional peacetime foreign internal defense missions in theaters like Columbia, Thailand, or the hundreds of other countries that Special Forces conduct foreign internal defense as part of the geographic combatant commander’s theater security cooperation plan.

The last historical example of a transition from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense was in France, the Balkans, and Southeast Asia at the end of World War II, when the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and British Special Operations Executive (SOE) conducted operations to weaken the occupying Axis powers. However, even these case studies are flawed because there was almost no US involvement in the postwar stability operations in these countries after World War II. Germany and France were the only two countries that the US conducted full-scale stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations, but since there were no viable resistance organizations for the OSS and the SOE to support, they are of no use to this study. In the countries in
which OSS and SOE had operated, the resistance apparatus was either demobilized--disarmed, paid, and returned to civilian status, or turned over the newly re-established governments. Therefore, no relationships between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense were established, which led to “demobilization” becoming part of the legacy of US unconventional warfare doctrine.

Current foreign internal defense doctrine was developed out of Special Forces experience from communist wars of national liberation in Vietnam and Latin America, as well as US nation building efforts in countries like Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Special Forces did not conduct unconventional warfare--US sponsored insurgency--during these operations even though its mode of operation may have been by, through, and with indigenous forces.

Understanding the distinction between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense will be extremely important with the adoption of pre-emption and regime removal as doctrinal concepts. The US military has to be ready for the same kinds of operations that it has observed since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where there are unconventional warfare efforts in pre-conflict and conflict phases, which then transition to foreign internal defense operations in the postconflict phases, and finally return to peacetime engagement. In developing future major campaign and operational plans, understanding the roles of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, as well as how and when these two missions are related will be extremely important for the planner. A solid doctrinal model for this relationship may be the basis for joint and interagency coordination throughout the campaign.
Research Questions

The primary research question this thesis will answer is if unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, as currently defined, are still applicable to current and future Special Forces’ operations. To answer the primary question, three secondary questions must be answered: what are unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, and how are they related? In answering the secondary question of what unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are, similar tertiary questions must be answered for each: what is the doctrinal and operational history of Special Forces and CIA with respect to these two missions, what is their application against non-state actors and global insurgency, and should they be redefined? With regards to the secondary question on the interrelation of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, the tertiary questions are: Is there an identifiable transition point between the two and can a relationship be modeled?

Assumptions

The major assumption of this research project is that the simple meanings of words can have a significant effect on the operational employment of Special Forces and are not just a matter of semantics. Another assumption is that senior Special Forces leaders will be willing to address the findings of this project if they are contrary to current thoughts and frameworks.

Limitations

This thesis is written as an unclassified manuscript using public information that is available through the Combined Arms Research Library and other electronic and
internet databases that are generally available to the public. Although the research may be in the classified and unclassified realm, only unclassified materials and references will be used in the thesis. All references will be listed in the bibliography for further research of the reader.

Case studies used in the research and presentation of this thesis will be studied through secondary sources and will not involve visits to the battlefield or areas of operations due to lack of dedicated funding for such study. In case studies related to Kosovo or the efforts in Northern Iraq, first hand knowledge may be relied upon and checked with other sources.

Scope and Delimitations

This study will assess current unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine of the US Army Special Forces and joint doctrine. This study will also address the current missions that are being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan and compare them to other unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions from history. Classified missions or units will not be discussed by name, although unclassified terms for these missions and elements may be included. This may lead to confusion for some readers that lack special operations background and, therefore, will be avoided as much as possible. This study will also describe joint and interagency relationships necessary for Special Forces employment during unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. This study will not describe in detail the other core tasks of Special Forces, unless they have a direct bearing on some finding or recommendation. This study will use Special Forces throughout due to the historical significance of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense to Special Forces. The Special Forces branch is the proponent for
unconventional warfare doctrine as well. However, special operations forces could be used interchangeably where Special Forces are used to describe operations from 1990 to today.

**Significance of this Study**

The current trend in the Special Forces community is to use unconventional warfare as an overarching term to describe any operation conducted by, through, or with indigenous or surrogate forces, even operations that are clearly not aimed at the overthrow or removal of a hostile government or occupying power. Some reasons for using the term unconventional warfare are: to ensure a niche mission for special operations forces, it is a popular term today for the civilian leadership who view unconventional warfare as the opposite of conventional warfare, fitting nicely into the Global War on Terrorism, and a broad definition would seem to un-constrain Special Forces operations since all missions could invariably be called unconventional and gain larger political and budgetary support. The last point was evident in the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* that recommended a significant increase in special operations forces to prosecute the “Global Unconventional Warfare” campaign.²²

Based on Special Forces’ contemporary experiences, the continued misunderstanding of unconventional warfare and the resulting attempts to redefine it as an overarching term, may have unforeseen and unanticipated consequences on today’s battlefield and in future campaigns. For example, the rules of engagement in “classic”

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unconventional warfare aimed at overthrowing or removing a government is much less restrictive than the rules of engagement in a foreign internal defense mission. In the latter mission, the rules of engagement are very restrictive. Thus, using unconventional warfare as an overarching term could have ramifications in places where Special Forces’ efforts are purely to train and advise a host nation to deny sanctuary to its enemies. In this case, the restrictions keep US military efforts from being directly employed, such as in Colombia. The rules of engagement are directly tied to the most important word when dealing with operations that require the support of the local populations and international opinion legitimacy.

For the US to support an insurgency or to support a government fighting an insurgency, the question of legitimacy is primary. According to Timothy J. Lomperis, “an insurgency is a political challenge to a regime’s authority by an organized and violent questioning of the regime’s claims to legitimacy.” Based on this definition, when the US is conducting unconventional warfare in support of an insurgency, it is also challenging the legitimacy of the regime, and may be using conventional military means as well. When the US is supporting a government using foreign internal defense, then it is supporting the claims of legitimacy of the host nation. Based on the recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is obvious that at some point, when the transition from conflict to postconflict, or unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, The US military

23 Major Peter McCollau, Email discussion with author on the nature of rules of engagement at the transition point on 16 May 2006.

must constrain its use of military action to legitimize its efforts and those of the new
government. Not understanding this leads to the misuse of its firepower-centric
conventional military capabilities that ultimately decrease ones legitimacy. This point is
highlighted in JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal
Defense:

The nature of US tactical participation in HN[Host Nation] internal conflicts
requires judicious and prudent rules of engagement (ROE) and guidelines for the
application of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to US
forces may easily reduce the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported
government. In addition, these incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-
American sentiments and assist the cause of the opposition.25

This is further evidenced by the outcry over the use of “torture” to gather intelligence; the
environment has changed and legitimacy may be more important for long-lasting support
than the short-term gains of torture.

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the doctrine and attempt to end the nearly
fifty-five year old debate, determine the relationship of unconventional warfare and
foreign internal defense, and determine what the application of these two missions will be
in the Global War on Terrorism. In this “long war,” as Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld calls it, understanding exactly what kind of operation is being undertaken and
the environment will be critical for maintaining legitimacy of US efforts and those of
friendly insurgencies and governments to maintain local, regional, and international
support for the Global War on Terrorism.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are numerous sources available on both the topics of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. These sources include books, professional civilian journal articles, military doctrinal manuals, and military journals, specifically, *Special Warfare* magazine produced by the United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The use of unconventional warfare in these publications runs the gambit from describing support to insurgency to the use of special operations forces conducting unilateral operations. In some cases counterinsurgency is also described as a component of unconventional warfare. The literature review shows that there is obviously a lot of confusion on terms and definitions related to unconventional warfare.

The most current information on unconventional warfare and Special Forces operations can be found in three different manuals. The first is US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations* (1999); the second is Change 1, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (2004); and third, FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (2003). All three manuals use the unconventional warfare definition found in the 2001 Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Currently, the final draft of the newest FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* is being reviewed. Due to its final draft status and classification, none of the newest changes will be directly addressed in this thesis. There is currently no joint doctrine for unconventional warfare.
Some of the useful historical unconventional warfare related documents are the FM 31-20 series of manuals (1961 and 1965). These manuals are the last “untainted” versions prior to the lessons and doctrine from Special Forces involvement in Vietnam being incorporated into doctrine. The Special Forces manuals after 1965 increasingly show the effects of mission creep and a graying of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. It was out of this confusion that today’s broad unconventional warfare definition arose.

In the summer of 2001, the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) completed a study called *Unconventional Warfare 2020*. The aim of the study was to define Special Forces’ future concepts and ensure relevancy for the force as the Army was concurrently conducting similar revisions and doctrinal updates as part of *Joint Vision 2020*, now referred to as “transformation.” Colonel Michael Kershner, former Deputy Commander of USASFC, summarized the findings of this study in a series of articles such as the one that appeared in the Winter 2001 edition of *Special Warfare* titled “Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations.” However, the events of 11 September would put these efforts on hold. In 2003, the newest version of next FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, was published. This version should have captured the findings from the Unconventional Warfare 2020 study, but in fact they had been lost. To date they have not been addressed with the focus now turned towards the application of unconventional warfare against non-state actors.

Foreign internal defense references are even more plentiful and the term more commonly understood. The volume of work on this subject is due to the renewed interest
in the subject based on the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the publication of the DOD Directive 3000.05, titled *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction* (SSTR). However, there are few works that address foreign internal defense in a high-intensity environment. Others only describe foreign internal defense as training missions in support of host nation governments.

There are two excellent foreign internal defense manuals, FM 21-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, published in 1994, and the Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* which was updated in early 2004. These manuals are the clearest and most concise documents dealing with foreign internal defense. This is most likely due to the fact that foreign internal defense doctrine is much more black and white than unconventional warfare doctrine. An extremely detailed historical study of the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine leading up to the formal foreign internal defense doctrine can be found in Larry Cable’s book *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* published in 1986.

There are no sources that address any type of transition between the unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. There are, however, some references to the transition or termination point between conflict and postconflict operations of conventional forces that may be applicable to defining the unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense transition. The most significant problem with these studies is that they were written prior to 11 September and focus on the termination of combat operations versus the termination of hostilities or the return to peacetime engagement.
Special Warfare magazine also provides a sense of past and current trends of understanding of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense from the perspective of Special Forces concept and doctrinal development. The large body of articles in Special Warfare highlights the confusion surrounding unconventional warfare. The most recent example of senior Special Forces leader misunderstanding unconventional warfare is found in the May 2004 Special Warfare, in which now retired Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, former commanding general of the Special Warfare Center and School, explains that, “Special Forces’ niche is unconventional warfare, which includes counterinsurgency [authors’ emphasis] and guerrilla warfare.”

A more recent issue, April 2005, had an article titled, “Operation White Star: A UW Operation Against An Insurgency,” by Major Dean S. Newman, in which he describes the use of unconventional warfare to fight insurgencies and terrorism. His premise is based on his historical analysis of the White Star program a clandestine CIA special activity program to support indigenous Laotian Hmong tribesmen to disrupt North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh Trail and sanctuary areas inside of Laos. While commonly referred to as an unconventional warfare program by many historians and authors, White Star was actually a clandestine foreign internal defense operation using an indigenous element to fight an insurgency when the host nation government did not want to get involved. The article is fraught with contradictions and misuse of terms and ideas. Had Major Newman approached this topic from the point of view that the North Vietnamese were “occupying” these Laotian sanctuary areas and that the Laotian government was unable to regain control, he may have been able to substantiate his argument that White
Star was an unconventional warfare operation. However, his argument that unconventional warfare can be used against an insurgency is still an oxymoron.

One of the best sources on the future of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense is Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-5.20, *Military Operations: Future Force Concepts for Army Special Operations Forces*, dated 14 January 2004. This pamphlet provides the conceptual foundation for the transformation current Special Forces operations into what is referred to as full spectrum Special Forces operations. In the full spectrum Special Forces operations concept, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are two of the three major mission sets. This is a departure from the Unconventional Warfare 2020 findings since it once talks specifically of two separate missions, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. This publication was not published by the doctrine branches of the Special Warfare Center and School which may account for its significant departure from the mainstream of Special Forces doctrine published by the Special Warfare Center.

Historical references for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are mostly detailed studies of the history of Special Forces. An example of this is Thomas Adams’, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, Susan Marquis’, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces*, and most recently, Hy Rothstein’s, *Afghanistan and The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, published in 2006. The best book for understanding the original intent of unconventional warfare is found in Colonel Aaron Bank’s autobiography, *From OSS to Green Berets*. Bank, who recently died at the age of 101, was known as the “father of Special Forces.” His book describes in detail how he worked on developing the
Special Forces in the early 1950s. This is one of the few primary sources from one of the original authors of Special Forces doctrine. With respect to foreign internal defense primary sources, Charles Simpson provides an excellent account of the first thirty years of Special Forces in his book *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years*.

There have also been numerous Command and General Staff College, Master of Military Art and Science, and School of Advanced Military Studies thesis papers on both unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense and their application across the spectrum of operations. One School of Advanced Military Studies’ thesis by Major Duke C. Shienle provides some insight on the use of indigenous forces developed for unconventional warfare in the postconflict phase and uses “unconventional operations” to highlight the overarching use of indigenous forces in both missions. He also suggests renaming the final phase of unconventional warfare from demobilization to postconflict to highlight the use of indigenous forces in both environments.

Review of the literature indicates there are no definitive studies that answer the questions proposed here. Indeed, most of the literature on these topics have not provided suitable definitions of unconventional warfare and continue to demonstrate a lack of common understanding or agreement as to what unconventional warfare is. With respect to foreign internal defense, numerous articles have been written on this subject, but none have presented options for the employment of Special Forces found in this thesis, and no articles have been written on trying to redefine foreign internal defense. Finally, no articles have been written that have tried to explain the relationship between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: THE PAST IS PROLOGUE

The purpose of this research is to determine if unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, as traditionally defined, are still applicable to Special Forces operations in the contemporary and future operating environments. This chapter will begin to answer the tertiary research question, “What is the doctrinal and operational history of the Special Forces and the CIA with respect to unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense?” This will be accomplished using three research methods: doctrinal development comparison, historical comparison, and case studies.

The doctrinal development and historical comparisons will be intertwined due to the nature of this subject, in which doctrine and historical developments happened concurrently. This study will chronicle the doctrinal development of US unconventional warfare from the British development of this concept prior to World War II to today’s operations. The comparison will be made in relation to the SOE, the OSS, the CIA, and finally the US Army Special Forces. This construct was chosen because it allowed the chronological development of unconventional warfare doctrine and practice, from the original concepts developed by the forefathers of the British SOE, to the establishment of the American OSS, and the growing and employment pains of unconventional warfare in World War II.

The study will then focus on the sometimes rough transition from the OSS to the CIA and the history of the agency’s use of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense up to the events of 11 September. As for the Special Forces, the study will
analyze the history of Special Forces and with respect to unconventional warfare and later foreign internal defense, from the initial concepts for a military unconventional warfare capability in the early 1950 to the present.

Each historical analysis will be summarized with respect to the type of operation--unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense, the signature of the operation--overt to covert, the operational relationship--decisive or shaping, and finally, the operations approach--indirect, direct, and combat--the same support pattern from foreign internal defense doctrine. Lastly, in the unconventional warfare cases, an analysis will also be made as to the mode of transition of the resistance forces, whether they were demobilized, turned over to the government immediately, or if US efforts or ties to the organization were stopped with no transitory event.

The Roots of United States Unconventional Warfare Doctrine

Introduction

World War I witnessed the first modern use of unconventional warfare as an economy of force operation by both the British and Germans in peripheral campaigns outside of continental Europe. In essence, unconventional warfare is the support to an indigenous insurgent or resistance group aimed at overthrowing a constituted government or an occupying power, respectively. Unconventional warfare can be used to support to resistance elements, also known as partisans, resisting an occupier as an economy of force during major operations by forcing the commitment of enemy conventional forces to guarding rear areas instead of being employed on the front lines.

The primary benefit of unconventional warfare is the disproportionate resources that a government or an occupier is forced to commit against a relatively weak opponent.
The insurgent, if employed correctly, maintains the initiative by deciding the time and place of its attacks. In other words, they never conduct an operation unless success is likely or outweighs the risk to the insurgent movement. For the hostile government or occupier, large amounts of resources, including personnel, money, and equipment, are necessary to secure lines of communication, key facilities and capabilities, and key terrain. When in support of a conventional military effort, these enemy resources are kept from being deployed to main conventional battle areas. By World War II, unconventional warfare had become a great threat to modern armies because of their “absolute dependence . . . on industrial and economic bases in their rear, and on lines of transportation.”

During World War I, unconventional warfare was used by both the British and the Germans. The young British Captain (later Colonel) T. E. Lawrence, an advisor to Sherif Feisal, the future King of Iraq, used the Arab Army to help the British defeat the Turks. In East Africa, the German Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck commanded a guerrilla army of 14,000 which successfully tied down the efforts of 160,000 British, Portuguese, and Belgian troops. Both of these efforts were successful not due to the tactical outcome of their efforts to support partisan forces, but at the operational and strategic level, by diverting enemy forces from other fronts. Both of these efforts proved


the concept of supporting indigenous resistance elements, but given the scale and
devastation of World War I, especially on the Western Front, the British failed to initially
assimilate these lessons into their doctrine, assuming that the next great power war would
not occur for at least ten years.\textsuperscript{29}

During the interwar years, unconventional warfare was virtually forgotten until
the rise of Adolph Hitler energized the study of unconventional warfare by the British.
These studies began in 1938 when Adolph Hitler annexed Austria, and the British began
to look seriously at the possibility of another war against Germany. The British War
Office, driven by the impending German threat to Europe, tasked individuals, each with
varying degrees of experience in irregular warfare, to study irregular capabilities and
operations, as well as to develop operational concepts for the employment of such forces.
To their credit, they produced extraordinary results considering the complexity of these
types of operations. As a result of these studies, the British developed the SOE in mid-
1940.

The British Unconventional Warfare Visionaries

One of the first individuals to be tasked with the detailed study of unconventional
warfare concepts was Major Lawrence Grand assigned under Admiral “Quex” Sinclair,
the head of the British Secret or Special Intelligence Service to look at “the theory of
secret offensives: how could enemies be attacked, otherwise than by the usual military
means?”\textsuperscript{30} Simultaneously, other officers were given similar tasks and as happens with

\textsuperscript{29}M. R. D. Foot, \textit{The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946} (London: British

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 10-11.
projects surrounded in secrecy, none of them knew of the parallel efforts. From this emerged another unconventional warfare visionary, Lieutenant Colonel J. C. F. Holland, who became interested in “irregular warfare” based on his experiences in Ireland and his first-hand knowledge of the T. E. Lawrence’s operations against the Turks. As M. R. D. Foot describes Holland’s studies:

[He] collected reports on Boer tactics in the South African war . . . on Lawrence and his partners; on guerilla activities in the Russian civil war . . . the Spanish Civil War . . . the struggle between China and Japan . . . the smouldering [sic] Arab-Jewish conflicts in Palestine . . . and of course on Ireland.  

Holland became an advocate of irregular warfare, which at the time included guerrilla warfare and psychological operations, and had sufficient backing by the deputy director of British Intelligence that his ideas would become the foundation of the yet-to-be-formed SOE.

Another visionary that would tie all of these studies together was Sir Colin Gubbins. Described by S. J. Lewis as “one of the most important personalities of the SOE,” Gubbins would later rise to distinction as the commander of the SOE.  

Gubbins wrote two field manuals or pamphlets, *The Art of Guerrilla Warfare* and *Partisan Leaders’ Handbook*, both of which would become the core training documents for future SOE operatives.  

The final visionary and a man with sufficient knowledge and political influence to provide the strategic vision for an organization such as the SOE was Dr. Hugh Dalton,

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31Ibid., 11-12.


33Ibid.
who was the Minister of Economic Warfare in 1940. After a meeting in mid-July of 1940, aimed at trying to decide who would head an organization for conducting irregular warfare, Dalton wrote a letter that laid out the intent of such an organization and a basic strategy for its employment. As Dalton explained, “We have got to organize movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable to the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland, [and] to the Chinese Guerillas now operating . . . against Japan.”

He described this organization as a “democratic international” and suggested that it “must use many different methods, including industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.”

He suggested that there needed to be “a new organization to co-ordinate, inspire, control and assist the nationals of oppressed countries who must themselves be the direct participants. We need absolute secrecy, a certain fanatical enthusiasm, willingness to work with people of different nationalities, [and] complete political reliability.”

Dalton would become SOE’s first chairman responsible to the chief of staff of the War Cabinet, who would provide him with the strategic intent for SOE operations. He was ordered by Churchill to “set Europe ablaze!”

While there were others that were involved in the development of the SOE these four visionaries stand out as the most important to the overall development of British unconventional warfare capabilities leading up to the establishment of the SOE.

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34 Foot, 19.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 30.
The Greatest Weapon of the Special Operations Executive - The Resistors

The SOE’s most powerful weapon, and what set SOE apart from MI6--the British intelligence service whose primary mission was espionage, was SOE’s ability to organize armed indigenous populations in occupied territories to resist their occupiers. SOE operatives were simply the facilitators to make the resistance organizations a viable threat to the occupying forces. With the advent of man-portable, long-range communications and aerial delivery systems, these populations were now within reach and could be supported by bringing material by air, as well as synchronized into the larger theater campaign. What made this such a worthwhile venture was the large number of potential recruits thanks to the interests and actions of the German occupiers. As F. O. Miksche explains, “Precisely as in the First World War, the German war aims . . . were too vague and indefinite to offer any attractions to the people of Europe . . . the Germans, in both world conflicts, were psychologically incapable of gaining the sympathy of the masses.”

These operations would force the Germans and their allies to expend exponentially increasing numbers of troops the farther they advanced from Germany. As Miksche notes, “Hitler’s armoured legions, which were able to first surround the enemy forces, were themselves ultimately surrounded by wholly hostile populations.” It would be these populations that the SOE would organize, train, and advise.

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38 Miksche, 45.

39 Ibid., 73.
Concept of the Special Operations Executive
Unconventional Warfare Operation

The conceptual applications of unconventional warfare by the British and their actual operational successes were a testament to the capabilities of the resistance. The British SOE was originally based on small teams that would be able to organize resistance cells and intelligence networks. These SOE operatives would infiltrate into a denied area by air, boat, or rat-line—a clandestine means of moving personnel overland by different techniques. They would then link up with the indigenous resistance force and develop the force for further operations and intelligence collection. The organization for an average network or circuit included an organizer, a courier who was often a woman, a wireless operator, and a sabotage instructor. Once on the ground, the organizers and wireless operators, if not one in the same, minimized contact as much as possible because the wireless “was always the circuit’s weakest point.”

Initially the SOE established small clandestine cellular networks in German-occupied territory called “reseaux.” In such an environment the first step in establishing a network was for a single agent to parachute in to pave the way for the network leader, who would follow a number of days later. The initial agent was responsible for establishing or making contact with intelligence and support networks. The network leader would then parachute in and continue to expand the network. He would receive further augmentation over time depending on his requests. The network leader could also

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40 Foot, 106.

request low-density specialties if necessary. This was the case when Francis Sutill, head of the Prosper network in Paris, requested an operator skilled at identifying and establishing air landing zones. Three months after the establishment of the Prosper network, Henri Dericourt, a former French pilot arrived and was able to organize landing areas that would receive over sixty-seven agents.\(^{42}\)

The SOE was also capable of supporting and organizing larger resistance organizations, especially in countries such as Yugoslavia where the resistance had liberated areas in which the resistance armies could grow relatively unhindered by Axis counterinsurgency operations. This was also possible in France, but security concerns lengthened the time for these networks to grow into substantial numbers. The French Jockey network led by Francis Cammaerts developed into a large network carefully over time. Cammaerts accomplished this by establishing a true self-healing cellular network of independent, but linked groups that kept the network safe even if one of the independent cells was disrupted. This network grew to an amazing army of 10,000 resistance members that encompassed areas from Lyons to the Mediterranean coast to the Italian and Swiss Frontiers.\(^{43}\) In support of Normandy, SOE, and the US OSS formed the Jedburghs, which operated “under secrecy but more exposed and apt to be in uniform . . . [which] was more appropriate for close cooperation with invading Allied troops.”\(^ {44}\)

\(^{42}\)“Special Operations Executive,” available from http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsoe.htm; Internet; accessed on 2 December 2005.

\(^{43}\)Ibid.

\(^{44}\)Brook, 69.
Special Operations Executive Unconventional Warfare Operational History

The SOE traces its lineage directly to the British Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI6. After MI6’s embarrassing loss of its intelligence networks in most of occupied Europe to German penetration, it would take Dalton’s SOE to reestablish intelligence and operational networks that would support Allied operations throughout the war. A short time before the German invasion and occupation of France, the chiefs of staff of the British War Cabinet identified one British strategic objective as “the creation of widespread revolt in Germany’s conquered territories.”45 To this end, they realized that an organization would have to be established to meet this goal. Lord Neville Chamberlain, whom had resigned as the British Prime Minister after mishandling Hitler at Munich, was still a powerful influence as a member of the War Cabinet and signed the founding charter of SOE on 19 July 1940. This charter established, by name, the SOE and its role “to co-ordinate [sic] all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas.”46

The SOE’s original capabilities came from the MI6 Section D, EH, and MI R. Section D, which stood for destruction, had been MI6’s sabotage section.47 The Electra House, or EH as it was known, was the site of Sir Campbell Stuart’s Department, a subsection of the Foreign Office of MI6.48 MI R stood for Military Intelligence

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45 Foot, 18.
46 Ibid., 20-21.
47 Ibid., 22.
48 Ibid., 253.
Research.\(^{49}\) Originally, SOE was subdivided into three special operations branches: SO1, SO2, and SO3. SO1 was the propaganda section, but in August 1941 it was taken away from SOE after numerous arguments and turned into its own department, the Political Warfare Executive. SO2 was the active operations department while SO3 was for planning.\(^ {50}\) There were also compartmentalized sections for each occupied country and a liaison relationship existed with the governments in exile or representatives of independent resistance organizations.

The rivalry between the MI6 and SOE would continue throughout the war for one simple reason, as Roy Godson explains:

> There are invariably tensions between the [clandestine collectors and covert action officers]. Clandestine collectors frequently work with sources who have political goals, the same kinds of people who would also be targeted by covert action officers. Covert action officers’ connections, meanwhile, are almost by definition good for the collector.\(^ {51}\)

Nigel Morris describes MI6’s reservations about the SOE, “[The] Head of SIS [Secret Intelligence Service], Sir Stewart Menzies, stated repeatedly that SOE were ‘amateur, dangerous, and bogus’ and took it upon himself to bring massive internal pressure to bear on the fledgling organization.”\(^ {52}\) The other “secret rivals” as Foot calls them included not only the propaganda branches, but with the Admiralty over SOE maritime operations, the

\(^{49}\)Ibid., 254.

\(^{50}\)Ibid., 22.

\(^{51}\)Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher, 2004), 34-35.

Air Ministry over air clearance, and with the Royal Air Force over who was more
effective.\textsuperscript{53} Morris also noted that, “Bomber Command also despised SOE and resented
having to loan aircraft for ‘unethical’ clandestine missions. They wanted to win the war
by bombing Germany to its knees.”\textsuperscript{54}

Some of the more famous and unclassified operations that the SOE conducted
include the sabotage of the Pessac power station in France, the assassination of Reinhard
Heydrich in Czechoslovakia, the destruction of the Gorgopotamos rail bridge in Greece,
and the destruction of the German heavy-water plant in Norway. The destruction of the
Pessac power plant disrupted German U-boat operations at the port in Bordeaux. The
assassination of Heydrich was carried out to counter his new posting and strong arm
counterinsurgent tactics which included round-up executions. The Gorgopotamos rail
bridge linked a secondary supply route for the German effort in North Africa. Finally,
destruction of the heavy-water plant and associated barges crippled the German’s atomic
weapons program in 1943.\textsuperscript{55} The most notable resistance operations took place in support
of the D-Day landings, by disrupting German reserves, logistics, and by providing
intelligence and guides to advancing Allied forces. As Foot highlights, “All told about
10,000 tons of warlike stores were put into France by SOE, 4000 of them before and
6000 after the landing in Normandy: arms for about half a million men, and a fair amount
of explosives.”\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53}Foot, 26-27.

\textsuperscript{54}Morris.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56}Foot, 222-3.
The British employed about 5,000 SOE operators during the war, the largest contingent going to France and Yugoslavia, followed by Greece, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Albania, Abyssinia, Burma, Malaya, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Hungary, Romania, Siam, the Dutch East Indies, and lesser operations in Turkey and China. Resistance forces supported by the SOE, while not decisive, shaped the battle space by tying up numerous Axis divisions in each country. In 1942, the exiled governments of the Czechs, Dutch, French, Norwegians, and Poles suggested to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that there should be a single headquarters to direct irregular operations in occupied Europe. As Foot notes, “[they] were each astonished to receive his reply that such a body had already existed for almost two years . . . [which] ‘left the Allied commanders breathless; SOE was so secret that its name and existence had never been disclosed to them.’” The most extreme example of these combined operations was in Poland at the maximum reach of SOE’s air branch. Polish resistance received 485 successful drops during the war, three hundred SOE operatives and twenty-eight couriers, all but five which were Polish, and 600 tons of war material.

In January of 1944, SOE and the US OSS which was modeled after the SOE in 1942, merged headquarters for the invasion, called the Special Forces Headquarters. In 1946, the SOE rivalry with MI6 ended with many of the SOE networks, to include its world wide communications, being shutdown or transferred to MI6 under Menzies. Thus ended the SOE.

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58 Ibid., 152.
59 Ibid., 191.
Special Operations Executive Summary

While some would argue that SOE’s contributions were negligible in the overall scheme of the war, they are best summed up in a letter from General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gubbins on 31 May 1945:

In no previous war, and in no other theatre during this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort. While no final assessment of the operational value of resistance action has yet been completed, I consider that the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of German road moves and the continual and increasing strain placed on the German war economy and internal security services throughout occupied Europe by the organized forces of resistance, played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory.  

With respect to the analysis model, the operational term that best describes the SOE operations is unconventional warfare. The operational signature was clandestine, hiding the act versus the operation, in this case the support to resistance elements. It was not covert per say, since it was generally known that the Allies were conducting these operations. The SOE operations were shaping operational, versus decisive, supporting the Allied efforts before and after D-Day. Lastly, the operational approach was for the most part combat support, with each element conducting combat advising. However as the networks grew and cadres were trained by the SOE operators, as in the case of the Jockey network, the individual cells conducted operations coordinated by the Special Forces Headquarters, but not directly supervised by the SOE operatives, thus the approach was more direct than combat support.

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60“Special Operations Executive.”
The Office of Strategic Services and Unconventional Warfare

Introduction

With America’s sudden entrance into World War II, the US scrambled to gain a war footing and mobilize for war. One of its weakest areas was the lack of capabilities to gather strategic intelligence. This weakness was highlighted by the failures of any coordinated intelligence effort to provide early warning of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The US looked to the British for help with establishing an intelligence capability. Roy Godson points out that for “all intents and purposes US security [was] being run for [the US], at the President’s request, by the British.”61 The British agent of influence was William Stephenson of the British Security Coordination, who had the ear to the President in much the same way the British had influenced US commitment in World War I. Stephenson would help the legendary William “Wild Bill” Donovan organize the first American centralized intelligence organization initially called the Coordinator of Information (COI) on 11 July 1941, which in 1942, became the OSS.62

The COI organization had three sub-branches, all focused on intelligence gathering: The Radio News Branch, the Research and Analysis Branch, and the Visual Present Branch. Eighty to ninety percent of the intelligence gathered by the Research and Analysis Branch came from open sources, such as its Division of Special Information, Library of Congress.63 When COI was transformed into the OSS organization in 1942,

61 Godson, 23.
62 Ibid.
63 Brook, 89.
the organizational changes were significant. First, the organization’s main operational elements were split into two deputy directorates: the Deputy Director of Strategic Services Operations and Deputy Director of Intelligence Services. The Strategic Services Operations were further sub-divided into six subordinate elements: Special Operations, Morale Operations, Maritime Units, Special Projects, Field Experimental Unit, and Operational Group Command. The Intelligence Services was sub-divided into five units: Secret Intelligence, X-2 or Counterintelligence, Research and Analysis, Foreign Nationalities, and Censorship and Documents.

As Lawrence McDonald noted, “General Donovan believed that the principal contribution of OSS would be strategic intelligence, which is the basis for the formation of national policy.”64 It would reason then, that the primary effort for collection and analysis would fall upon the offices of the Director of Intelligence, however, McDonald explains that, “Some of the most valuable information contributed by the OSS . . . was the tactical or field intelligence often provided by the Special Operations Branch (SO) teams working behind enemy lines with resistance groups.”65

Before the COI initially lacked any organization or doctrine for conducting clandestine and covert operations, it would learn from and copy a great deal of the infrastructure already established by the British SOE and MI6. This relationship benefited both countries. For the US, the benefits included intelligence, training, and the vast experience base that the British had in place with MI6 and then with the SOE. For the British, the US brought money and resources that the British were able to benefit from

64McDonald, 93.
65Ibid.
due to its close relationship. The British, at first, were protective of their operations and agents in occupied Europe, fearful that the America’s inexperienced could harm their current operations. Over time these relationships strengthened although there were still some problems depending on political constraints or desires that one country had over the other.

Special Operation Branch

Lawrence McDonald provides an excellent description of the Special Operation (SO) Branch, “The foremost concern of SO teams and missions was liaison with the resistance, providing weapons and supplies to the indigenous underground forces, training them, and planning and coordinating their sabotage with Allied operations.”66

The SO was also responsible for some collateral activities, including gathering operational and strategic targeting information and for recovering downed Allied aircrews.67 SO took place in Europe and Asia, with operational patterns and methods for supporting resistance movements much like the SOE. As Michael Warner highlights, “This emphasis on guerrilla warfare and sabotage fit with William Donovan’s vision of an offensive in depth, in which saboteurs, guerrillas, commandos, and agents behind enemy lines would support the army’s advance.”68

66Ibid.
67Ibid.
It was this common ground between the British SOE and US SO that allowed the first bonds to be strengthened. The Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff decided that the SOE and SO would operate together, an idea from which were born the Jedburghs.

The Jedburghs

The Jedburghs dropped into Belgium, Holland, and France on or after the Normandy invasion to support the Allied efforts as they moved inland. The Jedburghs, or Jeds, were specially-trained three-man teams composed of different nationalities to assist local resistance forces during the final weeks of German occupation. Of the three men on team, one was an enlisted radio operator, with the other two being officers. One of the officers was native to the country the team deployed to while the other officer was either British SOE or American OSS. The Jeds primary task was to disrupt “German reinforcements to the Normandy beachhead or . . . the Allied landings in southern France.”69 They also provided valuable tactical intelligence and were able to provide guides and security for advancing Allied units. The efforts of the Jedburghs and their resistance counterparts may have kept eight German divisions from reaching the beachheads.70

The after-action review of the Jeds highlight the growing pains in the evolution of the integration of SO and SOE supported resistance groups within the overall conventional campaign plan. A common problem was the need to be infiltrated into the


70Ibid.
operational area weeks or months early to capitalize on the full potential of resistance groups. Infiltrating on or after D-Day did not allow the Jeds enough time to train their counterparts or develop intelligence networks. Because of this, they were not able operate at their optimum capability. The flow of information was lacking and timeliness of reports affected ground operations. Senior conventional commanders were unaware of the capabilities of the Jedburghs and their resistance groups for providing accurate intelligence, guides, and interpreters. These operations generated so much information that, “the SFHQ [Special Forces Headquarters] message centers were receiving so much traffic that it became impossible to analyze, act upon, and disseminate information.” 71 Despite these difficulties, the Jedburgh concept was, as Lewis point out, “ahead of its time. . . . One of the more important successes for the Jedburgh operations was the psychological impact the teams had on the citizens of occupied France . . . [as] harbinger of liberation and a call to action.” 72 With the end of the European theater, the OSS was redeployed to the Pacific, and continued their exploits.

**Detachment 101**

The most famous OSS detachment of the Burma campaign was Detachment 101, or DET 101. The Burma campaign centered around lines of communications, such as the Ledo-Burma Road, which had to be secured in order to allow the Allies to reestablish contact with the Chinese nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek. The mission was to gain control of the Ledo-Burma Road from Japan’s 15th Army and was, as noted by Warner,

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71Lewis, 62.

72Ibid., 65-66.
“the closest to realizing General Donovan’s original vision of ‘strategic’ support to regular combat operations.”

Donovan had been trying to establish an OSS presence in the China-Burma-India theater and proposed a plan for using agents to sabotage Japanese rear areas. Donovan took advantage of General Stillwell’s lack of “no” as an opportunity to get operations going before Stilwell could stop the mission. The mission was given to a Captain who had served under Stillwell. After standing up DET 101, rushing through training, of which little was applicable to the Far East, DET 101 arrived in theater only to find Stillwell waffling on DET 101’s employment. Stilwell did not have the resources to drive the Japanese from the area around the north Burmese city of Myitkyina, which was hampering air operations and the completion of an alternate route. Stilwell gave DET 101 the mission.

After some difficulty getting into the area of operation, DET 101 infiltrated and began to transition from sabotage to guerrilla warfare, but more importantly were able to develop an extensive intelligence network that provided Stillwell with valuable intelligence. With less the 120 Americans at any one time, DET 101 had recruited over 11,000 native Kachins. By the end of DET 101’s mission, they rescued over 400 downed pilots, and provided eighty percent of 10th Air Force’s targets. In addition,

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73 Warner.


75 Warner.

76 Hogan, 111.
DET 101 had successfully developed an indigenous force that fixed two Japanese divisions during the final Allied offensive in Burma.\textsuperscript{77}

The Operational Groups

Operational Groups (OGs) were developed to conduct behind-the-lines commando operations and were composed of US Army soldiers. General Donovan’s concept for the OGs was based on his “belief that the rich ethnic makeup of our country would provide second generation American soldiers with language facility who . . . could be parachuted into enemy occupied territory to harass the enemy and encourage . . . local resistance organizations.”\textsuperscript{78} They were designated to fight in uniform and had no connection to the OSS, thus protecting them from being shot as spies if captured.\textsuperscript{79}

The OGs were organized fifteen man detachments, with two officers and thirteen noncommissioned officers. They were all trained in physical conditioning, land navigation, night operations, explosive training, weapons, light infantry tactics, and hand to hand fighting. Two member of the OG received additional training, one as a radio operator and the other as a medic. Depending on their likely area of operation, the OGs received additional training such as ski training, special parachute training, or maritime training.\textsuperscript{80}

\footnote{John Prados, \textit{Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf} (Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), 16.}

\footnote{Art Frizzell, “Operational Groups,” available from http://www.ossog.org/overview.html; Internet; accessed on 3 December 2005.}

\footnote{Warner.}

\footnote{Frizzell.}
The first operational OGs were infiltrated from Algiers into Italy to work with the local resistance and harass the German 90th Panzer Division. Other OGs were parachuted into Italy to help recover US prisoners as well as a blind drop into Italy to give the Italian command the details of the Armistice and cease actions against the Allies. As the Germans withdrew, some resistance elements were liberated and were ready to return to the North to harass the withdrawing Germans. By mid-1945, when the Germans surrendered, there were ten OG missions totaling 120 men in northern Italy. For up to two weeks the OGs and their resistance elements governed their areas until Allied military governments arrived. During this time OGs had to maintain order and receive drops of humanitarian items for the local populous.

In 1943 another OG was stood up at the request of the Greek government in exile to assist Greek guerrillas hiding in the mountains. The mission for this OG, which arrived in Greece in April of 1944, was to delay and harass 80,000 German troops withdrawing from Greece. The British also participated and provided the Raider Support Regiment.

The OG operations in Yugoslavia were one part of the British-led Allied efforts in Yugoslavia. The purpose for the Allied effort in Yugoslavia was conducting as many offensive operations as possible against German troop concentrations. The operational base for this operation was a British garrison which included British Commandos, a Raider Support Regiment, some naval and air support, and a number of Yugoslavian

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82 Ibid.

resistance units, all together totaling several thousand. There are three categories of OG missions in Yugoslavia: mainland operations, reconnaissance patrols, and island operations. The mainland operations for OSS were unsuccessful and stopped after only two failed attempts.

The island operations began in January of 1944 and were aimed at conducting raids to inflict casualties on German garrisons and outposts. These OG raiding parties were at time large and combined efforts with other British and partisan units. For example, the first mission against Hvar Island had 33 OGs, 150 British Commandos, and 75 partisans, while others such a linear ambush on Korcula Island in April of 1944 had a party of only seven OGs and a few partisans. The size of this operation grew, especially when aimed at relieving pressure on Tito during German offensives. One extremely large operation included the British Commandos, a British Infantry battalion, the Raider Support Regiment and an undisclosed number of partisans, with OG units A and B serving as flank security and liaison between the partisans and the British artillery. The mission succeeded in drawing the Germans from along the coastal regions, as well as another German division from the interior and is regarded as successful in relieving some pressure from Tito’s partisans.

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The French OG group was originally composed of 200 volunteers. The French OGs were ready to deploy at the completion of their training in the fall of 1943, but they were delayed because military leaders in conventional commands were reluctant to deploy OGs for lack of understanding of their employment. In an attempt to remedy this misunderstanding the French OGs participated in field training exercises with airborne units from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in December of 1943. The French OGs were still in limbo, conducting environmental training in Virginia and Colorado, when they received orders attaching the groups to the Seventh Army in Algiers. They arrived in Algiers and were forced to wait once again, until finally being assigned missions in support of the Normandy invasion.

There were two operational groups deployed into France, the French OG and the Norwegian OG. The French OG flew from England nearly a month after the invasion, parachuted into France, and operated north of Lyons. The Norwegian OG flew from Algiers and operated in southern France south of Lyons. The total number of teams deployed to France was twenty all with the missions to: cut enemy lines of communications, attack vital enemy installations, organize, train, and boost the morale and efforts of local resistance elements, and to gather intelligence for the advancing Allied Armies.

The Norwegian OG, which was stationed and trained at Camp Hale, Colorado, was made up of 100 officers and noncommissioned officers. In December 1943, the Norwegian OG was moved to England and was assigned to the OSS SO Headquarters, subordinate to the Scandinavian Section. As was previously stated, the Norwegian OGs deployed to France and upon the liberation of France, the Norwegian OG was reduced in
size. As the Norwegian OG was being drawn down Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces became concerned with 150,000 German troops that were in northern Norway that intelligence estimated would be moved south to defend Germany. SHAEF wanted to ensure that the Germans were forced to take sea routes, so the OG’s mission would be to disrupt the rail lines. The commanding officer for the operation split the OG into two units, identified as NORSO I and NORSO II for Norwegian Special Operations.  

NORSO I consisted of three officers and thirty enlisted soldiers and was the main effort. NORSO II consisted of one officer and eighteen enlisted soldiers and was to serve as the reserve, prepared to reinforce NORSO I if necessary or to complete a separate mission. The NORSO I target was identified as the Nordland Railway, more specifically the Grana Bridge plus lesser targets along the line. The operation was plagued with numerous difficulties from weather to deadly plane crashes; however, it did go on in less than optimal conditions. They successfully destroyed two and a half kilometers of track disrupting the troop movements. A month later, they were told the Germans had capitulated, and NORSO I and II then participated in the disarmament procedures and performed policing duties in the areas of German surrender.

Finally, the Chinese OG mission was much different than what the OG missions in Europe. The mission entailed “the formation, training, equipping, and attachment of

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American personnel for twenty Chinese Commandos.”

This mission was generated from an agreement that Chinese divisions, led by veteran Americans would be more effective than a regular Chinese division. The agreement was made in January of 1945 and the nucleus of the OG personnel for this mission was the recently redeployed French OG, elements of the Norwegian OG, and a third OG that had conducted amphibious operations in Burma. Additional officers and enlisted men were brought from replacement centers in the US, raising the total number of US personnel to 160 officers and 230 enlisted, all under the command of a lieutenant colonel. Each Commando unit, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 9th and 10th, consisted of 154 Chinese and 19 Americans. The units were task organized into a headquarters, three rifle sections, a 60 millimeter mortar section, a light machine gun section, and a demolition section. In the initial plans it was thought that there would be 3,000 Chinese troops, but due to physical readiness, only a quarter were available. In the eighth week training cycle, the Commandos showed major improvements and for the Chinese, being selected and becoming a Commando were achievements to be proud of. Seven of the Commando units conducted operations, with hostilities ending before the others could be stood up and trained.  

Office of Strategic Services Summary

The OSS had gained valuable experience first from the British, who taught Donovan’s agency everything they had learned conducting clandestine and covert operations in the first years of the war. The partnership between SOE and OSS helped the


90Ibid.
OSS get through its fits and starts. Donovan’s vision made the OSS an organization that, at the end of the war, was an organization with an extremely effective strategic intelligence and unconventional warfare capability. Donovan had opened the Pandora’s Box of irregular warfare for which the politicians and conventional military leaders were not ready and contributed to the OSS being disbanded at the end of the war. However, with the post-World War II environment looming, it would not take very long before it became evident that these types intelligence and unconventional warfare operations would become the norm of covert activity during the Cold War.

Demobilization of the different resistance groups throughout the world ran the gambit of no demobilization and just turning the elements over to the reinstallled government to collecting up arms and returning the resistance members back to their pre-war lives. Will Irwin provides a glimpse into the minds of the exile governments with respect to resistance elements and their post-war status, in this case the French, “Special Force Headquarters received [a] Jedburgh . . . message requesting a parachute drop of arms and ammunition to the Paris resistance. . . . But . . . de Gaulle’s London-based commander of the [French Forces of the Interior], postponed the operation . . . in hopes that the arrival of Allied forces in the city would preclude the need to further arm the Paris resistance . . . because it was predominantly communist.”91 The fear at the time was that the communist resistance would take over Paris with French commanders “anxious to install a provisional noncommunist government in the city as soon as it fell.”92 This is

91Irwin, 145.
92Ibid.
exactly what they did after Paris was liberated, “[wasting] no time in occupying
government buildings and establishing political control.”93

With respect to the analysis model, the operational term that best describes the
OSS operations is unconventional warfare. The operational signature was clandestine,
hiding the act versus the operation, in this case the support to resistance elements. Like
the SOE, the OSS operations were shaping operational, supporting the advance of Allied
troops. Finally, the operational approach was combat, with each element conducting
combat advising or in the case of the operational groups conducting their own operations.
As with the SOE, some resistance groups, they received direct support in the way of
weapons and supplies, but no combat advisory support. The operational groups were
somewhat different in their application, more commando-like, and probably low-
visibility versus clandestine in nature. Depending on their mission profile, they may have
conducted unilateral direct action missions, special reconnaissance, or, working with
resistance elements, conducted unconventional warfare.

The Central Intelligence Agency and Covert Paramilitary Operations

Introduction

At the conclusion of the war, President Trumann, who disliked Donovan and his
agency, gave the order to disband OSS immediately. The SO capability was dropped, the
Research and Analysis Section went to the State Department and everything else went to
the War Department. Because the Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy, had saved SI
and X-2, this would constitute a peacetime intelligence service. McCloy then named this

93Ibid., 145-6.
organization the Strategic Services Unit, which was then confirmed by directive from the Secretary of War. Michael Warner explains that the Executive Order also directed the Secretary of War to “liquidate” OSS activities that were not in line with national interests. Seeing that most of the work that Donovan had accomplished with respect to developing an irregular warfare capability, all of it was counter to the conventional-minded military leaders who were happy to get rid of this threatening concept for war that they considered ungentlemanly anyway.

Within two years, a new organization, no longer in the War Department, was established by the President and Congress initially called the Central Intelligence Group. The CIG became the CIA with signing of the National Security Act of 1947. The 1947 Act gave the CIA the responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities within the US government, including gathering, analyzing, and distributing intelligence products. A follow-on act in 1947 provided the CIA with “confidential fiscal and administrative procedures,” which was appropriate for the kind of work the CIA was conducting.

With the end of World War II, the Cold War was beginning to emerge and communist ideology was beginning to spread. In this conflict, in which both sides had nuclear weapons, they could threaten each other, but could not resort to war as had been known in the past. Now the US and the USSR, jockeyed for position and began to give covert support to governments and indigenous resistance forces to influence countries and regions in order to expand control. One of the tools that had been looked upon by the

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94 Warner.


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regular military with such disdain, supporting resistance forces, would now play a major role in the Cold War.

Common sense told many politicians within the Truman administration that covert actions should be the responsibility of the military. Their argument seemed easy—during World War II, the military was responsible for covert and clandestine operations, such as deception, psychological operations, subversion, sabotage, “behind-the-lines” unconventional warfare to support indigenous elements, raids, and even assassinations. However, as was mentioned earlier, the uniformed leaders within the Pentagon did not want to get stuck with a controversial and unorthodox method of warfare and enthusiastically gave it up to the CIA. “[JCS] apparently was fearful of what it perceived to be the stigma of having the military accused of engaging in subrosa [sic], cloak-and-dagger activities.”96 Although the CIA retained control of the peace time operations, they had wanted not only the covert paramilitary activities during peacetime as stipulated by National Security Council 10/2 in June 1948, but in wartime as well.97

However, in the early 1950s, the DOD would once again develop a capability to support indigenous resistance forces with the stipulation that it would only do this in wartime, leaving the peacetime operations to the CIA. The Special Forces were born and prepared for operations behind enemy lines in Germany should the Cold War turn hot. It is also notable that the term chosen by the CIA for support to insurgency was

96Bank, 161.

“paramilitary operations,” which John Prados defines as, “The type of clandestine operations that creates forces resembling regular military units.”

The Three Disciplines

The “three disciplines” within the CIA are: intelligence collection and analysis, counterintelligence or counterespionage, and covert action. As William Daugherty points out, the first two operations, collection and counterintelligence are meant to be clandestine, in other words, “the actual operations, their participants, and their results are intended to . . . remain, hidden from view.”

Intelligence collection is the collection of raw intelligence data from any number of sources, including human and technical means. This is the classic form of intelligence work and the primary role of the CIA, and the one that it is most famous for. This raw intelligence is then analyzed and is provided to the policy makers as “finished” intelligence upon which they can make decisions regarding threats or intentions of other nations or non-nation actors.

Counterintelligence or counterespionage functions to deny an advantage to its adversaries. This can be done in numerous ways, such as turning foreign intelligence agents to provide information on their fellow spies or ensuring adequate protections are in place to protect sensitive information. Both collection and counterintelligence share many of the same techniques and requirements.

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98 Prados, 17.
99 Daugherty, 9.
100 Ibid., 12.
The final discipline and the one that applies to paramilitary operations, is covert action. Daugherty defined covert action simply as “influence”—influencing foreign audience, in the case of paramilitary operations, by using covert military operations preferably through a third-party actor. Covert action results are visible, but the perpetrator cannot be identified. Daugherty further highlights the application of this to the US government by quoting the 1981 Executive Order 12333, “special activities [covert operations] conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly.”

Thus with respect to paramilitary operations, the indigenous or surrogate force provides the “front” to the operations and keeps the action or influence from being directly attributable to the US. As Daugherty explains, “the covert aspect is that the ‘sponsor’ (i.e., the government behind the program) remains hidden, leaving the observers to believe that the actors are indigenous citizens acting entirely of their own volition in events that are local in origin.”

Interestingly, the first official definition of covert action was articulated by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 in Executive Order (EO) 12333. The definition reads:

[S]pecial activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic

\[101\] Ibid.

\[102\] Daugherty, 13.

\[103\] Ibid.
activities or the collection or production of intelligence and related support functions.\textsuperscript{104}

Other key points of Executive Order 12333 are that intelligence activities are not primarily covert action; covert actions must not be conducted within the US; and “it explicitly and unambiguously assigns all peacetime covert action missions to the CIA.”\textsuperscript{105}

The executive order has worked well enough that it was amended into a federal statute in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991. The federal statute defines covert action as:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{[A]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include: (1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence. . . . (2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities.}\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

One of the confusing points of Executive Order 12333 is the use of the words special activities versus covert action. At first glance they seem similar, but they do not have as much in common as it would seem. Daugherty explain that included in the special activities rubric are:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{[P]rograms such as . . . training of foreign military, security, and intelligence services; . . . [which] have been especially important to presidents not because the programs seek change in a hostile regime, but because they work to preserve a friendly regime.}\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 15.
So now that these two definitions show that covert action and special activities are related but not the same thing. Unlike covert actions, special activities “are not intended to produce any overt event to influence an audience, but instead are operations that are meant to remain clandestine in all aspects.”\(^\text{108}\) With respect to this thesis, paramilitary operations are thus covert unconventional warfare operations to influence, such as overthrowing a government, and special activities are clandestine foreign internal defense operations, which could be used when a foreign government did not want overt US support and training.

Central Intelligence Agency Versus Department of Defense Covert Action Capability

Since the end of World War II, the US military has not had the lead role in any covert action programs aimed at supporting indigenous forces. The military supported CIA covert operations at times, such as providing training teams for operations. According to Bob Woodward, Special Forces soldiers accompanied CIA paramilitary operatives into Northern Iraq before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which provides an example of once easily definable peace or war lines of separation becoming harder to discern.\(^\text{109}\)

William Daugherty provides a list of reasons why DOD has not been able to conduct peacetime covert operations:

DOD does not possess nor has it ever possessed the statutory authority to conduct classic covert action, except:

\(^{108}\)Ibid., 16.

During a war formally declared by Congress.

During any period covered by a report to Congress under the War Powers Act.

When DOD is specifically tasked by the President because it is determined that the military is more likely to achieve particular objectives.

CIA already has existing infrastructure to conduct covert actions, such as its fleet of civilian-registered aircraft and maritime vessels.

CIA already has recruited agents, third-country nationals, to carry out the required operational and support activities in foreign countries.

DOD covert action forces would either have to give up protection of their Geneva Convention rights or any covert actions that were discovered, they could be considered an act of war.

CIA already has a presence in many of the 190 sovereign nations in the world, which give them long operational reach, support, and clandestine infrastructure.

CIA has almost instantaneous reaction or response time in any crisis situation, to include the capability to travel in alias, under civilian cover, and with non-US travel documents.

CIA has a core of career covert action specialists in each of the four broad categories of covert action – propaganda, political action, paramilitary, and information warfare.\textsuperscript{110}

The obvious advantages currently go to the CIA; however, these same capabilities could be developed within DOD with help of the CIA, who is reluctant to share any of their “toys,” as Daugherty alludes to throughout his book.

\textbf{Covert Central Intelligence Agency Operations}

CIA covert operations were widespread throughout the Cold War. While some of these programs remain classified, there are a few notable paramilitary actions and special

\textsuperscript{110}Daugherty, 62-69.
activities that provide an interesting comparison to Special Forces operations during this same period. As William Daugherty points out:

> From Truman’s time through the Nixon years, covert action programs served only two purposes: they were intended either to stop the spread of Communism to countries that were not under the Soviet thumb by strengthening or supporting whatever regimes were in power, or to weaken Communist or Communist-supported government by ‘eroding their internal support.’

From the Nixon years on, covert actions began to be used against non-Communist targets.

**Eastern Europe 1949-1956**

With the Soviet occupation of the Eastern European satellite nations, the US and Britain began a subversion campaign almost immediately. The Ukraine was the first country the MI6 and CIA actively sought to raise anti-Soviet resistance capabilities. In 1945, MI6 was able to reestablish contact with the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. When the State Department agreed to proceed with support, the mission was given to the foreign intelligence bureau and the Office of Policy Coordination responsible for paramilitary operations.\(^{112}\)

The Office of Policy Coordination started numerous training camps in West Germany to train Eastern émigrés from the Soviet Union and Ukraine. The first group of agents was infiltrated into western Ukraine by parachute in 1949. The long-term plan was to infiltrate 2,000 agents throughout the Eastern Bloc countries. The mission of the agents

\(^{111}\)Ibid., 124.

was to report Soviet preparations for offensive operations against the west and support resistance organizations to disrupt any Soviet operations against the west.\textsuperscript{113}

The CIA also infiltrated agents into Lithuania which in 1944 had 30,000 resistance members of the group the “Forest Brotherhood.” Latvia was thought to have 14,000 well-armed fighters.\textsuperscript{114} However, none of these operations was able to keep an agent alive for any period of time after his infiltration, most succumbing to immediate arrest or death. For the CIA and Secret Intelligence Service, no goals had been reached despite a large expenditure of money and resources. Daugherty offers these observations on why these operations failed:

\begin{quote}
[U]nrealistic goal of ‘rolling back’ Communist domination . . . organizers mistakenly assumed that . . . émigré groups could be made secure from Soviet . . . penetrations . . . [and] Soviet military and intelligence units conducted formidable counter-insurgency operations in the target countries, relentlessly hunting down the émigré guerilla force. Last, these operations were betrayed by [a] KGB double agent.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

Albania offered another opportunity for use of unconventional warfare, this time aimed at the regime of Enver Hoxha, “the dictator and secretary-general of the Albanian Communist Party.”\textsuperscript{116} The goal of this combined British and US effort, as Peter Harclerode explains, “was to wrest the country from the Soviet’sand assist the establishment of a democratic pro-Western government.”\textsuperscript{117} The concept for this

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{115}Daugherty, 127.
\textsuperscript{116}Harclerode, 35.
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
operation was to instigate an uprising to overthrow Enver Hoxha with operations taking place from 1949 to 1954. For this operation, 250 Albanians were recruited by the exiled Albanian National Council which would comprise Company 4000 and led by an American officer. Three platoons were raised and trained in varying levels of guerrilla warfare and then parachuted into Albania. Although able to infiltrate members of the company, most were quickly captured or killed by the effective internal security apparatus of the Hoxha regime. By August of 1954, it was decided to disband Company 4000 and dismantle the training school located in Western Germany. The remaining recruits were demobilized and then were dispersed throughout the US, Britain, and other locations. A CIA officer is quoted by Peter Harclerode providing significant insight into the lessons learned from this operation:

The Albanian operation was the first and only attempt by Washington to unseat a Communist regime within the Soviet orbit by paramilitary means. It taught a clear lesson to the war planners. Even a weak regime could not be overthrown by covert paramilitary means alone.118

The activities against the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the early years of the Cold War provide and interesting beginning to post-World War II unconventional warfare. All of these efforts were plainly unconventional warfare aimed at using resistance organizations to disrupt of Soviet expansion, and if war broke out to act as shaping operations forcing the commitment of Soviet combat power to rear area security. These operations were all indirect, using training areas in third-party countries and then infiltrating these elements into the target country unilaterally with the radio being the only connection to their CIA handlers.

118 Ibid., 71.
Korea

Korea provides a great example of two simultaneous unconventional warfare efforts, one by the CIA, with a cover name of Joint Advisory Commission Korea, and other efforts by of conventional military officers, with the most prominent effort being that assigned to the Guerrilla Division of the 8240th Army Unit. The conventional military cadres had little or no formal unconventional warfare training or experiences.\textsuperscript{119} These efforts were not coordinated until a year into the conflict when the Far East Command, which in 1953 would be redesignated as United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea, established the Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities-Korea to synchronize these unconventional warfare efforts.\textsuperscript{120} Before the establishment of the Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities-Korea, a single officer, Colonel John McGee who had worked with the Filipino guerrillas in World War II, was assigned to the Far East Command G-3, Operations, as the sole member of the Miscellaneous Division. His initial task was “to prepare a staff study on the possibilities of conducting guerrilla operations against the North Koreans using some of the refugees from the north.”\textsuperscript{121}

The CIA’s mission was to “step up pressure on the Chinese Communists by supporting guerrilla movements on the mainland of China, especially along lines of communications.”\textsuperscript{122} The CIA successfully established a network of covert intelligence

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., 179; and Col Ben S. Malcom, (ret), and Ron Martz, \textit{White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea} (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), xi.

\textsuperscript{120}Malcom and Martz, 14-15, 27.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., 15.

bases along the North Korean coast from which Korean agents could be dispatched. However, the operation was never able to establish any significant resistance networks.

The 8420th was able to establish a substantial resistance effort primarily due to location and a large refugee population of willing supporters, but the overall effects are arguable since the resistance was rewarded for their actions, based on their own reports, truthful or not. Part of the operational constraints was that no American could operate in North Korea due to the political risks which made it difficult for the American cadres to exploit the efforts of the resistance. In some cases, there were documented successes by American advisors, such as then 1st Lieutenant Ben Malcolm, that had special permission or “clandestinely” went ashore, not having the consent of their higher headquarters.

The motivation for much of the resistance effort was the belief that the United Nations would conduct a counteroffensive against the Chinese. As Ben Malcolm explains, the assumptions being that when the offensive happened, “the partisans would prove invaluable at their harassment and interdiction of enemy forces. It was classic unconventional warfare strategy, using the partisans as an auxiliary to conventional forces on the attack, helping to shape the battlefield.” An example of the effectiveness of some of these units, such as the 8086th Army unit, which in less than a year claimed to “have conducted 710 operations . . . killed 9,095 and wounded 4,802, and captured 385,”

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123 Ibid., 183.

124 Malcom and Martz, 17.
and in the process, destroyed thirty-seven road bridges, twelve railway bridges, and twelve tunnels, and . . . seven hundred weapons.”

Demobilization of the partisan forces was called Operation Quicksilver and called for the “integration of the partisans into [Republic of Korea] units.” As Ben Malcolm explains, “Quicksilver called for those partisans with at least two years of service to be honorably discharged and given their uniforms, mess gear, four blankets, two hundred pounds of rice, and transportation to their city of choice in South Korea.” Those opting to enlist for two years got the same incentives, plus an extra one hundred pounds of rice. For their transfer from American to South Korean control, the US only required them to “turn in their weapon and, for some unexplained reason, their canteen cup.” However, less than half of the 22,000 partisans disappeared in a year, and as Ben Malcolm surmises, some went south and some ostensibly went north, with some elements still requesting support by radio “well after the armistice was signed.”

The unconventional warfare operation in Korea can be summarized as covert shaping operations aimed at disrupting the Chinese forces in support of the larger United Nations mission, thus these operations were shaping operations. With regards to the operational approach of these operations, they are mostly direct support, with only a few examples of sanctioned combat advisory support.

125 Ibid., 26.
126 Ibid., 190.
127 Ibid., 190-1.
128 Ibid., 191.
129 Ibid.
Tibet

In the case of Tibet, five years elapsed between the beginning of the Chinese invasion and the Tibetan uprising in 1956. President Eisenhower authorized covert support to the unorganized “Tibetan internal resistance movement.” The intended effect was “to confront, thwart or harass” the Chinese Communist government. The program began in 1956 and ended by President Richard Nixon thirteen years later in 1969. While eventually unsuccessful, certain aspects of this covert action are intriguing. Beginning in December of 1956, an operation codenamed ST CIRCUS commenced with a small groups of handpicked Tibetan resistance members were exfiltrated out of the country by the CIA and taken to different training bases in the Pacific and later America. As Peter Harclerode explains:

At a training camp established by the CIA, the six Tibetans. . . underwent four and a half months of extensive instruction in guerrilla warfare. . . . In addition to small arms, they trained in the use of light support weapons, including the 57mm recoilless rifle and 60mm mortar, and well schooled in tactics, fieldcraft, map-reading, navigation, demolitions, mine-laying, sabotage, booby traps and first aid. They also received instruction on intelligence-gathering skills and in [long range, encrypted communications].

These teams also learned to parachute and establish drop zones for receiving personnel and equipment. These teams were then parachuted back into Tibet to organize

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130 Daugherty, 144.
131 Ibid.
132 Harclerode, 348-9.
133 Ibid., 350.
134 Ibid.
resistance forces. Although the program generated mixed results, the concept was a proven means of conducting indirect support.

The program was shut down in 1974 after relations with China had warmed during the Nixon administrations. The Tibetans were left feeling “discarded by the United States which no longer needed them now that they had served their purpose.”\textsuperscript{135}

There was no demobilization, instead the US “terminated” support, not only paramilitary assistance, but political recognitions and support in the United Nations, and the financial support to the exiled government.\textsuperscript{136}

This indirect unconventional warfare program was also covert and unique in that the majority of the training took place in the continental US at different locations, but all under extreme secrecy. This program was a strategic shaping operation aimed at indirectly influencing China.

**Cuba**

Almost immediately after President Kennedy entered the White House in January of 1961, he authorized the CIA to begin to conduct covert operations against the Castro Government. One element of this extensive covert action program, that included psychological operations and sabotage, was a paramilitary effort. This paramilitary, infamously known as the “Bay of Pigs,” would end in tragedy and failure. The plan was

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 393.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
to conduct an invasion of Cuba using exiled Cuban resistance members and overthrow Castro. The training for this operation took place in a Guatemala, a third-party country.\textsuperscript{137}

Regardless of the failures of this operation, it does provide an interesting unconventional warfare case study for analysis. With respect to the operational signature, it may have begun as a covert operation, but the supporting efforts, such as “air strikes from US Navy and Marine squadrons on nearby aircraft carriers,” would have definitely changed the signature and thus the deniability of US involvement. As to whether this was a decisive or shaping operation, its failure masks the true intent--a decisive overthrow of Castro. This operation began as an indirect unconventional warfare effort with training conducted in a third party country, and arms and equipment provided by the CIA. Had the air support been provided as promised, then this operation would have taken on a direct or combat role depending on the level of naval air involvement. While this was a definite covert action gone bad operation, it still provides a great lesson in the strengths and weaknesses of unconventional warfare.

Laos

The operation in Laos in the 1950’s and 1960’s is often incorrectly identified as unconventional warfare, when in fact it is more correctly a covert action in this case a special activity, to increase the Laotian government ability of defeating internal and external threats.\textsuperscript{138} Richard L. Holm, a former CIA officer, describes the situation in Laos, “Lao communist forces, known as the Pathet Lao (PL), were challenging the

\textsuperscript{137}Daugherty, 155.

government’s Royal Lao Army (FAR) throughout the country. Although badly organized and poorly trained and equipped, the PL was bolstered by support from North Vietnam, whose units were call the VC (Vietnamese Communists).”\(^{139}\) As Richard Holm explains, “The CIA’s paramilitary efforts in Laos were divided roughly along geographic lines,” north, central, and southern Laos, and involved working with different tribal and ethnic groups.”\(^{140}\) Although the Pathet Lao threat to the Laotian government, for the US government greater concern was the North Vietnamese use of eastern Laos to support its efforts in South Vietnam.

The initial programs were under the auspices of the US Agency for International Development and its advisors before becoming a covert action to “bolster” the Laotian government.\(^{141}\) Special Forces were also involved in White Star, initially under the command of Lieutenant Colonel “Bull” Simons, legendary for leading Son Tay Raid--the prisoner-of-war rescue mission--some ten years later.\(^{142}\) In the original program twelve teams were under the auspices of the Agency for International Development, Project Evaluation Office, later renamed the Military Assistance Advisory Group. The effort was initially called Operation Ambidextrous, later to become Operation White Star.\(^{143}\)


\(^{140}\)Ibid.

\(^{141}\)Ibid.


\(^{143}\)Ibid.
The program ended in earnest in July of 1962 the Geneva negotiations on Laos were signed stipulating that all foreign military personnel had to withdraw from Laos. The White Star advisors left the country as required, while less than fifty of an estimated 10,000 North Vietnamese soldiers passed through international observer checkpoints. The Laotians were not demobilized, but continued to receive covert support from the CIA. However, with the end of the Vietnam war, all US efforts in Laos ended and the tribes, who continued to fight were decimated, many becoming refugees in Thailand.

The operations in Laos were covert foreign internal defense shaping operations in the larger context of the growing problems in South Vietnam. However, the White Star operation was never able to successfully deny eastern Laos to the North Vietnamese. It is arguable whether the operational approach was combat or direct support, but based on the fact that Special Forces’ suffered one killed-in-action and four missing in action during this operation there were obviously combat advisor taking place.

Vietnam

In early 1961 President Kennedy tasked the CIA with initiating covert operations against North Vietnam, wanting to “turn the heat up on Hanoi and do to them what they were doing to the US ally in South Vietnam.” The real problem was that putting agents and developing resistance forces in the North was that it was a denied area, which some

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145 Specialoperation.com.

considered to be a tougher environment than the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, and North Korea.\textsuperscript{147} Over the next two years, the President grew increasingly impatient with CIA operations in North Vietnam and in 1963 turned over a majority of the programs to military control in what was called “Operation Switchback.” This was a world-wide replacement of CIA leadership of clandestine paramilitary operations.\textsuperscript{148}

While there were many CIA programs developed, a majority were turned over to the military to run early in 1963. However one program that was an interagency effort to defeat the insurgency, called the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), was established in 1967. Later to the “Revolutionary” would be changed to “Rural,” but the programs goals did not--pacification of South Vietnamese rural areas.\textsuperscript{149} The CIA’s role in CORDS was what initially was known as the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program, later to be renamed Phoenix.\textsuperscript{150} The aim of this portion of Phoenix was to identify and neutralize the Viet Cong insurgent underground organizational infrastructure in the rural towns and villages. The Phoenix programs emphasized four areas to attack the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI): district intelligence centers to identify VCI, neutralize verified members of the VCI by either capturing, killing or conversion, established rules for prosecuting VCI, and placed the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{148} Simpson, 138.
\item\textsuperscript{149} Major Ross Coffey, “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq,”\textit{Military Review} (March-April 2006), 24.
\end{itemize}
emphasis of these efforts on local militias and police instead of the military. In a four year period beginning in 1968, Phoenix neutralized 81,740 Viet Cong.

The operations in North Vietnam proved that it is difficult to create a resistance or insurgency from scratch, especially in a denied area. The programs were covert, indirect, unconventional warfare operations with the goal of shaping the strategic environment. The Phoenix program was a low-visibility counterinsurgency program, thus a foreign internal defense. It also was a shaping operation for the larger objective of CORDS pacification plan and its operational approach was to empower local militias and police, so it was direct support.

**Nicaragua**

The covert actions Finding for Nicaragua were signed by President Carter within two weeks of the Sandinistas National Liberation Front rise to power in 1979. However, Carter’s Finding entailed nonlethal covert action only. It was not until December of 1981 that President Reagan would signed a Finding authorizing “covert funding and assistance for the anti-Sandinista rebels,” better known as the Contras. The initial funds and authorities provided funds to Argentina “to organize and train a five-hundred-man anti-Sandinistas unit for deployment in the Central American region . . . but with a proviso that the funds could not be utilized to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.”

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151 Daugherty, 190.
152 Ibid., 203
153 Ibid., 204.
By the end of the program a second Finding authorized operations in Nicaragua “costing close to $100 million per year, and the five-hundred-member Argentine unit was transformed into a multi-thousand Nicaraguan rebel force.”\textsuperscript{154} As Lynn Horton highlights:

\textit{[I]t is possible that 30,000 or more Nicaraguans fought at some point with antigovernment forces, making the contras [sic] one of the largest armed mobilizations of peasants in contemporary Latin American history. In addition, thousands more peasants participated in civilian collaborator networks that provided contra [sic] troops with food, shelter, and vital military information.}\textsuperscript{155}

Despite the controversy in the US with the program, the war ended in 1990 after the Sandinistas National Liberation Front was defeated in the election that year. The forces were not demobilized by the US, with some reverting to insurgency as necessary over the next decade. This controversial, but successful program was a covert unconventional warfare operation that ended up being a decisive operation, through indirect support from the different agencies in the US government.

\textbf{Afghanistan and the Soviets}

The US had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of a Soviet-supported third-world country, Vietnam. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan the Carter administration saw an opportunity to return the favor. As President Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested, “We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{156} The Carter administration had already started covert operations months

\textsuperscript{154}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{156}Daugherty, 189.
before the Soviet invasion including a propaganda campaign, indirect financial aid to insurgents, direct financial assistance to Afghan émigré groups, lethal and nonlethal aid, and offered training and support.\textsuperscript{157} Afghanistan would prove to be the largest CIA operation in history and one of the most successful. As Anthony Joes highlights CIA’s success, “It was perhaps the most satisfying experience the Americans ever had with guerrilla warfare.”\textsuperscript{158}

The Afghan mujahideen were much weaker militarily and politically than the Vietnamese had been, and they were facing a superpower that was not squeamish about using brutal tactics against insurgents. The other element that the mujahideen lacked was unity of command and effort, which was a huge obstacle, but was partly due to the tribal and warlord nature of the society.

The amount of money the US expended was initially relatively small, around 80 million dollars a year, but this jumped to 470 million dollars a year in 1986, and to 700 million dollars by 1988.\textsuperscript{159} The only major obstacle that the CIA faced was in its dealing with the Pakistani intelligence service that favored four Afghan groups and ensured that the majority of weapons, over 70 percent, were given to these groups. However, the Pakistani Intelligence Service took an active roll in training and supporting the Afghans to include numerous schools which trained over 80,000 mujahideen by 1988.\textsuperscript{160} The

\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., 188-189.

\textsuperscript{158}Anthony James Joes, \textit{America and Guerrilla Warfare} (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 279.

\textsuperscript{159}Ibid., 310.

\textsuperscript{160}Harclerode, 536.
British were also very active throughout Afghanistan supporting the CIA efforts.\textsuperscript{161} The CIA also took advantage of the situation and was able to capture or recover some of the Soviet’s premiere equipment, including a Mi-24 attack helicopter.\textsuperscript{162} The real coup was the introduction of the Stinger missile which accounted for nearly 500 aircraft in 1987.\textsuperscript{163} By 1988 the situation was untenable for the Soviets, they had lost domestic support for the war. The Afghan mujahideen had succeeded in defeating the Soviets. Once again, the US did not demobilize these elements, although some effort was made to track the usage of Stingers and to have unused Stingers turned back in.

The efforts in Afghanistan provide a good example of coalition unconventional warfare, with numerous nations providing some type of support to the covert efforts. Afghanistan was an operational and strategic decisive operation, removing the Soviets from Afghanistan, but also from the world scene leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The operational approach varied depending on the nation, some providing indirect monetary and political recognition of the effort, to other efforts that were direct support in nature, providing training and sanctuary outside the borders of Afghanistan. Finally, there were some combat advisory efforts by the US, Pakistan, India, China, and other countries from the Middle East in the form of intelligence agents and paramilitary advisors.\textsuperscript{164}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 540.
\item\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 543-544.
\item\textsuperscript{163} Joes, 311.
\item\textsuperscript{164} Harclerode, 512.
\end{itemize}
Central Intelligence Agency Summary

After a rough Post-World War II period, the CIA proved to be a world class intelligence organization. From the first British visionaries who saw the potential of unconventional warfare, it has been proven time and again to be a viable method of warfare. It has been used to defeat the US and the Soviets, and it continues to haunt the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on recent experience as a nation, covert paramilitary operations are now proven foreign policy tools.

The Special Forces, Unconventional Warfare, and Foreign Internal Defense

Doctrinal Developments

In 1951 Lieutenant Colonels Aaron Bank and Russell Volekmann were given the charter to develop a DOD unconventional warfare capability by then chief of the Army Psychological Warfare, Brigadier General Robert McClure. Both men understood unconventional warfare due to their first-hand experiences in World War II working with indigenous resistance organizations. Lieutenant Colonel Bank was an OSS veteran, having supported resistance groups in France as a member of a Jedburgh team and later in China.165 Lieutenant Colonel Volkmann had organized the US Forces in the Philippines--Northern Luzon, “one of the largest and best organized guerrilla operations on Luzon.”166 He had also written the first Army Field Manual (FM) on guerrilla warfare, FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla [sic] Warfare, that was published just

165 Bank, 13.

as he and Bank began to develop the concepts for unconventional warfare and Special Forces.  

The combined experiences of Bank and Volckmann ran the gambit of unconventional warfare: one conducted clandestine operations in an environment where he could speak the language and blend in, while the other in a environment that he could not blend into; one trained in clandestine unconventional warfare the other with no formal unconventional warfare training; one in a combination urban and rural environment, the other in a rural jungle; one as a member of a highly trained team, the other as part of an ad hoc organization; and one conducted unconventional warfare operation of generally short duration, the other conducted long-term unconventional warfare; and finally, one had experience using unconventional warfare to support conventional operations, while the other had experience conducting unconventional warfare operations as the only effort, until late in the war.

However, even with all of their experiences, their most difficult task was to battle conventional mindsets, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that disliked the idea of unconventional warfare. As Bank explained, “It apparently was fearful of what it perceived to be the stigma of having the military accused of engaging in sub-rosa, cloak-and-dagger activities in the event of disclosure.”  

This contrasted to the new CIA that wanted sole responsibility for unconventional warfare, not just covert paramilitary activities during peacetime, as stipulated by National Security Council 10/2 in June  

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168 Bank, 161.
1948.\textsuperscript{169} Bank and Volckmann set out to establish an organization that could conduct UW based on an operational element, later the Operational Detachment Alpha, which they envisioned as “a cadre that would mushroom into a huge guerrilla force, actually a phantom army.”\textsuperscript{170}

The same confusion that surrounds unconventional warfare today, also haunted Bank and Volkmann, as Bank explains,

Neither of us liked the fact that so much terminology was being bandied around concerning behind-the-lines operations. The terms unconventional warfare, clandestine operations, unorthodox warfare, and special operations were being used interchangeably.\textsuperscript{171}

When they refined the operational term, they called it Special Forces Operations, which had a sole purpose of supporting resistance movements. The operational concept envisioned by Bank and Volckmann was:

to infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy-controlled territory and to stay, organize, equip, train, control, and direct the indigenous potential in the conduct of Special Forces Operations. Special Forces Operations were defined as: the organization of resistance movements and operation of their component networks, conduct of guerrilla warfare, field intelligence gathering, espionage, sabotage, subversion, and escape and evasion activities.”\textsuperscript{172}

The focus on organizing resistance movements in this concept was Bank and Volkmann’s attempt to separate Ranger-style missions from what they envisioned as Special Forces missions.


\textsuperscript{170} Bank, 166.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 179.
This was important too since Bank and Volkmann had been under pressure from the beginning to combine these two forces together. This combined unit was supposed to conduct all aspects of behind the line operations, from unilateral raids and sabotage to support to guerrilla movements. Bank explains the differences: “The Rangers were strictly short-term, shallow-penetration units, whereas [Office of Strategic Services] had long term, much more complex, strategic capabilities.” The Special Forces Operations concept was meant to separate the purposes of Special Forces and Rangers. Over the next fifty years, Special Forces added many of the missions which Bank and Volkmann fought so hard to keep from the Special Forces charter. However, in times of budget cuts and force reductions, Special Forces had to adapt to the times to maintain the force and relevance. Vietnam and the Cold War would provide the impetus for developing new capabilities that were not in the original charter developed by Bank and Volckmann.

In the 1960’s, as the Cold War began to be fought by communist-backed revolutionists, insurgents and guerrillas, President Kennedy called upon the men who trained to fight as guerrillas, to now fight against these threats in an effort to contain communist expansion; in other words, “fight fire with fire.” President Kennedy set out in earnest in the early 1960’s, through a series of letters to the Army, to get the military as a whole to change the conventionally-bound military mindset to adapt to this new type of political-insurgent warfare. Thomas K. Adams explains the reaction of the conventional military to the request of the President:

President Kennedy called for “a wholly new kind of strategy; a wholly different kind of force and therefore a new and different kind of military training.” What he got was business as usual but with [unconventional warfare] trimmings:

\[^{173}\text{Ibid., 144.}\]
regardless of the wrapper, the contents of the package remained conventional warfare. Describing the Army’s reaction to Kennedy’s program, Maxwell Taylor remembered feeling that “all this dust coming out of the White House really isn’t necessary.” It was “something we have to satisfy, but not much heart went into [the] work.” He sounded a long standing theme when he added that he felt the Special Forces were not doing anything that “any well-trained unit’ couldn’t do.”

Thomas Adams also noted, as a result of these letters, what occurred was, “an attempt to fit the existing military structure to the counterinsurgency problem.” There were numerous studies and conferences on topics such as special warfare, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla operations during this time. However, the outcome of all these studies was a limited counterinsurgency capability based on conventional light infantry tactics with no change in understanding of the complex cultural and political elements of the problem.

In the 1960s, despite the problems with the conventional military establishment accepting its role in counterinsurgency, Special Forces proved highly successful in fighting insurgencies and guerrillas throughout the world. In Vietnam for example, Special Forces programs, such as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Mobile Strike Forces, were highly successful operations using indigenous or surrogate forces, the Montagnards and Chinese Nungs, respectively. Doctrine began to catch up to the counterinsurgency actions with subtle shifts in 1965, to include discussions of Special Forces’ roles in counterinsurgency in FM 31-20, Special Forces Operational Techniques, and FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations.

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175 Ibid., 73.
176 Ibid.
With the addition of counterinsurgency in these manuals, the confusion between counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare began with a mixing of terms. One such example is found in the 1961 FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, in which a new command structure is introduced, called the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force. This task force would provide command and control to operational elements within the theater of operations.\textsuperscript{177} This headquarters concept was put into practice in 1964 when the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group was created as a joint unconventional warfare task force. As Thomas K. Adams explains that this Studies and Observation group was “responsible for special operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam, and border areas of China.”\textsuperscript{178} In hindsight, including unconventional warfare in the task force name was probably a misnomer since all of the operations encompassed in the region were either overt or covert foreign internal defense and special reconnaissance, and to a lesser extent direct action. The only unconventional warfare operations during this period were the failed attempts to establish and support a resistance force in North Vietnam.\textsuperscript{179}

In the 1963 version of FM 31-22, *US Army Counterinsurgency Forces*, a new counterinsurgency unit, called the Special Action Force, appears.\textsuperscript{180} The Special Action Force “is a specially-trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, ready force.


\textsuperscript{178}Adams, 118.

\textsuperscript{179}Shultz, 3.

available to the commander of a unified command for the support of cold, limited and
general war operations.”\textsuperscript{181} This Force is build specifically around a Special Forces group
with the mission of “providing training, operational advise and assistance to indigenous
forces.”\textsuperscript{182} The manual suggested that the Special Action Force be task organized with,
“civil affairs, psychological warfare, engineers, medical, intelligence, military police, and
Army Security Agency detachment.”\textsuperscript{183} Another interesting feature of this organization,
as explained in the FM 31-22 is the conventional army, brigade-sized, backup force. As
the manual describes, “Brigade-size backup forces are area oriented and designed to back
up a particular [Special Action Force]. These forces are committed to an operational area
when the capabilities of the [Special Action Force] . . . have been exceeded.”\textsuperscript{184}

Charles Simpson III explains the real world application of the Special Action
Forces concept:

Four Special Action Forces came into being . . . one on Okinawa built around the
1st Special Forces Group for the Far East (SAFASIA); one in Panama around the
8th Special Forces Group for Latin America; one in Panama around the 8th
Special Forces Group for Latin America; and tow at Fort Bragg, organized around
the new 3rd and 6th Groups for Africa and the Middle East. In Europe, the 10th
Special Forces Group…assumed functions much like those of the large [Special
Action Forces], but without their resources.\textsuperscript{185}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{181}{Ibid., 16.}
\footnote{182}{Ibid., 20.}
\footnote{183}{Ibid., 16.}
\footnote{184}{Ibid., 42.}
\footnote{185}{Simpson, 69.}
\end{footnotes}
By 1972 the Special Action Force concept had ended, with no group ever fully deployed, instead being piecemealed throughout the theaters.\textsuperscript{186} One of the major shortcomings of the program was the fact that a Special Action Force had to be requested by the ambassador, which was unlikely to be supported by the rest of the country team which had civilian capabilities that were similar to the SAF. This interagency rivalry significantly reduced the effectiveness and usefulness of the Special Action Force concept and led to the concepts demise.\textsuperscript{187}

A doctrinal shift occurred with the 1969 publication of FM 31-21, \textit{Special Forces Operations}, which addressed new missions of support for stability operations and unilateral operations--the precursors of foreign internal defense, direct action, personnel recovery, strategic or special reconnaissance. This manual is still focused heavily on unconventional warfare, with this topic covered in the first nine of eleven chapters, however, one chapter devoted to support for stability operations, and one to covering the employment of Special Forces “in additional military operations.” Stability operations, in this manual, are defined as:

\begin{quote}
internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

It also clarifies that unconventional warfare doctrine is “not entirely applicable to overt stability operations” and stipulates that:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{186} Adams, 100.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Simpson, 68-9.
\item \textsuperscript{188} FM 31-21, 10-1.
\end{itemize}
Many [unconventional warfare] tactics and techniques, such as those employed to gain the support of the local population, to establish intelligence nets, and to conduct tactical operations, such as raids and ambushes, may be adapted to stability operations.\textsuperscript{189}

The manual also describes “additional military operations” as “unilateral deep penetrations to: conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, attack critical strategic targets, recovery of friendly personnel in remote or hostile areas, and training of US and/or allied personnel in Special Forces operational tactics and techniques.”\textsuperscript{190} Also of note is the definition of direct action mission, “Overt or clandestine operations in hostile or denied areas which are conducted by US [unconventional warfare] forces, rather than by US conventional forces or through US direction of indigenous forces.”\textsuperscript{191} This is interesting because it denotes difference between the unilateral direct operations and the use of indigenous forces.

Unconventional warfare would continue to be the primary operation and bases for all the Special Forces field manuals throughout the 1970s. Foreign internal defense emerged in the mid-1970s in Special Forces doctrinal manuals. The definition of foreign internal defense in the 1978 Special Text 31-201, \textit{Special Forces Operations}, is directly out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, and is defined as the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion lawlessness, and

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 11-1.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., Glossary 1.
insurgency.”¹⁹² It also describes a Special Action Force-type organization based once again on a Special Forces group, augmented with “highly specialized skills need to assist a host country to develop internal defense.”¹⁹³ This special text notes that a augmented Special Forces group can train, advise and assist the host country’s regular or paramilitary forces, as well as compliment or expand the US security assistance efforts of the country team for short periods of time.¹⁹⁴

Between late 1970 and 1990, the changes in Special Forces doctrine were not captured in writing. The 1990 publication of FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, superseded the last FM 31-20 from 1977.¹⁹⁵ This new manual detailed eight Special Forces missions and activities: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, collateral activities, and other special operations activities.¹⁹⁶ While the definition of unconventional warfare is exactly the same as today, it is still obvious that unconventional warfare is directly related to “insurgency or other armed resistance movements.”¹⁹⁷ Of note, this manual begins to address the change in insurgent environments from rural based to urban based. In


¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.


¹⁹⁶Ibid., Index.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 3-2.
response the manual explains that “global urbanization dictates a shift in emphasis from rural [guerrilla warfare] to all aspects of clandestine resistance.”198 This is the first time in the doctrinal manuals that clandestine operations are discussed with regards to the urbanization of insurgency.

The Gulf War revitalized Special Forces having conducted numerous operations employing special reconnaissance and coalition support. Like many missions, coalition support was a necessary mission with only a couple of options for manning this force--Special Forces was the most qualified. In a misguided attempt to keep unconventional warfare current to the times, coalition support operations were added to unconventional warfare. This idea was further explained in the June 2001 FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, “The conventional coalition forces trained, organized, equipped, advised, and led in varying degrees by SF and US allies represents the newest evolution of UW-related surrogate forces.”199 The argument could be made that elements of the 10th Special Forces Group conducted unconventional warfare using Kuwaiti military units that had fled the Iraqi invasion. Although the actual operational impact was small due to the small size of the “free” Kuwaiti force, the civil-political impact of having a Kuwaiti unit help in liberating its country was huge.200 The use of surrogates, or “someone who takes the place of or acts for another,” was first addressed in the 1990 version of FM 31-20 in

198 Ibid.

199 FM 3-05.20, 2-6.

response to coalition warfare.\(^{201}\) The 2001 FM 3-05.20 tries to explain this concept to prove coalition support is a valid unconventional warfare operation, “From a US point of view, these coalition forces and resources are surrogates and act as substitutes for US troops and resources, reducing US commitment.”\(^{202}\) The manual also highlights that “conventional coalition forces trained, organized, equipped, advised, and led in varying degrees by SF and US allies represent the newest evolution in UW-related surrogate forces.”\(^{203}\)

After the Gulf War, as evidenced by the emphasis that coalition support was “the newest evolution,” unconventional warfare was standing on shaky ground within the Special Forces community.\(^{204}\) The general feeling within Special Forces was unconventional warfare no longer was a viable mission in the post-Cold War environment and should be relegated to a lesser role or dropped altogether. John Collins highlights this feeling when he wrote, “Congress therefore might weigh the advisability of discarding [unconventional warfare] as a statutory role,” in favor of foreign internal defense.\(^{205}\)

In October of 1994, Colonel Mark Boyatt, then the Commander of 3rd Special Forces Group, wrote an article in *Special Warfare* recommending unconventional warfare

\(^{201}\)FM 3-05.20, 2-5.
\(^{202}\)Ibid., 2-6.
\(^{203}\)Ibid.
\(^{204}\)Ibid.
and the other Special Forces core missions should fall under the umbrella of a new term, unconventional operations.\textsuperscript{206} This concept did not catch on and in fact received some critical reviews from his contemporaries. One of his critics was Colonel Glenn Harned who explains that a single catch-all mission like unconventional operations would not allow a Special Forces element to stay proficient in all the skills sets necessary required to be “unconventional operations qualified.”\textsuperscript{207}

In October of 1998, the Commanding General of the United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), then Major General William Boykin asked for input on the relevance of unconventional warfare.\textsuperscript{208} Although the results of this question are difficult to determine from a doctrinal standpoint, one of the replies highlights the misunderstanding abound in the branch. In answering this question, Commander of the 3rd Special Forces, Colonel Gary Jones and Major Chris Tone coauthored an article that attempted to explain that although unconventional warfare had replaced the term guerrilla warfare, guerrilla warfare was still the primary mission of Special Forces. They further highlighted that “In the minds of most [sic] [Special Forces] soldiers, [unconventional warfare] doctrine has been oversimplified. [Unconventional warfare] is just [foreign internal defense] in a denied area.”\textsuperscript{209} The authors go on to further misrelate insurgency


\textsuperscript{207} Colonel Glenn M. Harned, “Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?” \textit{Special Warfare} (October 1995), 10-14

\textsuperscript{208} Kershner, 84.

\textsuperscript{209} Colonel Gary M. Jones, and Major Chris Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces,” \textit{Special Warfare} (Summer 1999), 6.
and guerrilla warfare when they state, “The contrast between the operational environments of the two unconventional warfare missions are striking. [Guerrilla Warfare] is conducted when our nation is at war; insurgency is conducted when our nation is at peace.”210 This article received a lot of positive feedback throughout the community. One supporter said that it “marked the beginning of a [unconventional Warfare] renaissance in the [Special Forces] community.”211 However, retired Colonel J. H. Crerer wrote a critical review highlighting the mistakes of the authors, for example: “First, [unconventional warfare] includes [guerrilla warfare], so it would be illogical to use the terms interchangeably. Second, and more important, [unconventional warfare] also includes subversion and sabotage.”212

In 2000, the United States Army Special Forces Command again broached the question of unconventional warfare’s relevance and attempted to refocus the branch on unconventional warfare to ensure Special Forces relevancy as the Army was concurrently conducting similar revisions and doctrinal updates. The end result was a Special Forces Command’s concept called Unconventional Warfare 2020. Colonel Michael Kershner summarized the findings of Unconventional Warfare 2020 in a series of articles in the spring of 2001 that highlighted the confusion with unconventional warfare and redefined unconventional warfare. Colonel Kershner’s explained that the new definition of unconventional warfare would encompass all of the other core Special Forces missions,

210Ibid.


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to include foreign internal defense.\textsuperscript{213} This subtle change to the definition was widely accepted by the Special Forces branch, which had been struggling for years to find a more definitive description of unconventional warfare that would ensure a “niche” mission that no other military unit could conduct. As Colonel Kershner explained in an interview with Dennis Steele for an article in \textit{ARMY Magazine}, “We don’t want to be stuck in the past or step into the future in a way that is irrelevant. We must focus on relevant and unique capabilities, and [unconventional warfare] is our most unique capability.”\textsuperscript{214}

One other major point of departure from the legacy unconventional warfare doctrine discussed by Kershner was the removal of the seven phases of US-sponsored insurgency from doctrine. Kershner stated that this seven-phases construct was “outdated . . . [and it was] more appropriate to describe [unconventional warfare] in terms of current US doctrinal phases--engagement, crisis response, war-fighting and return to engagement.”\textsuperscript{215} The theory that US sponsors unconventional warfare in seven phases, emerged in the 1965 version of FM 31-20, \textit{Special Forces Operations} (the 31-20 series being the predecessor to 3-05.20). However, even earlier, Russell Volkmann’s 1951 FM 31-21, \textit{Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare}, provided a similar phasing

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\textsuperscript{213}Kershner, 84.


\textsuperscript{215}Ibid.
construct in which he discussed “several operational phases” including psychological preparations, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, and exploitation.”

Although not part of his suggested phases, Volkmann discusses demobilization as a separate chapter. The unconventional warfare efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq after 11 September would validate the seven-phased construct. However, in Afghanistan and Iraq the phases were compressed due to political constraints and then the tempo of operations. The only phase that was not validated during operation in Afghanistan and Iraq was the seventh phase, demobilization. While some resistance elements were demobilized and returned to society, a vast majority continued to serve in the postconflict phases. The seven-phase construct had been developed based on the experiences of World War II in which there was a rapid demobilization of forces at the end of the war. The new experiences with postconflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may force a change in this final phase of unconventional warfare as it transitions to foreign internal defense.

Less than six months after Kershner’s articles were published the events of 11 September transpired. By the summer of 2003, unconventional warfare had been successfully conducted in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and had been used to support the conventional offensive operations against Saddam Hussein. In each of these efforts, unconventional warfare would transition to foreign internal defense of an intensity and scale that had not been encountered by US forces since Vietnam. The events of 11 September had one more effect, the results of the Unconventional Warfare 2020

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216 FM 31-21, 37-38.
217 Ibid., 227-232.
218 Author’s own experiences from Northern Iraq, April 2003.
studies were lost and not incorporated into the 2003 version of FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*. The first paragraph in the manual describes the aspects of unconventional warfare explaining, “The intent of Unites States (US) [unconventional warfare] operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic objectives.”

It also began to capture some of the lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom, the most important being that unconventional warfare operations may be supported by conventional operations, instead of the more traditional role, unconventional warfare supporting conventional operations. As the manual explains, “there are times . . . when introduction of conventional forces does not take the main effort away from unconventional operations; in fact, the conventional forces may support the unconventional forces.”

The newest FM 3-05.201 is currently in final unreleased draft form and is classified SECRET. This will be the first unconventional warfare manual that has been classified in its entirety. In the past, a classified supplemental pamphlet supplemented the unclassified manual, such as the 1961 version of FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, with a classified supplemental, FM 31-21A.

In mid-January 2004, the “Cody Conference” was held in Cody, Wyoming, “to identify concepts that will be necessary for shaping the future of . . . Army Special

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219 FM 3-05.201, 1-1.

220 Ibid., 1-3.
Forces.”²²¹ The twelve members of this conference included a number of senior, active duty and retired, Special Forces officers, as well as representatives from acclaimed members of the media, academia, and private sector.²²² With the war on terrorism as the focal point the conference studied the current conflict and worked to define Special Forces role against this new threat. Major General Lambert highlights that, “Special Forces’ niche is unconventional warfare, which includes counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Special Forces should be chartered to monitor and combat insurgencies, even though other US forces will move on to new priorities.”²²³ One of the recommendations of this panel was the development of a “standing, deployable Special Forces Headquarters” that would be capable of conducting “sustained guerrilla warfare.”²²⁴ These last two points highlight the continued confusion of unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency that reaches even the highest levels of Special Forces.

The conference did develop a number of recommendations in addition to the just mentioned deployable headquarters, including the need for a “global environment of seamless information- and intelligence-sharing; [improving] coalition, allied and surrogate intelligence and operational capabilities,” and “[Conducting] . . . area-denial,


²²² Ibid., 27.

²²³ Ibid., 23.

²²⁴ Ibid.
area-control and remote-area operations, either directly or with partners.”

Unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense would obviously play a significant role in establishing this global capability by empowering the coalition partners to defeat or disrupt their own internal and external threats, as well as remove unfriendly regimes that could be providing sanctuary for ones enemies, as the Taliban did for Al Qa’ida. Major General Lambert also mentions the importance of Special Forces as a “force multiplier” that “conserves conventional military force for the main efforts.”

In 1990, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, the first manual specifically written for low-intensity conflict was published in a joint effort by the Army and Air Force. The writers explain that, “This manual fills a void which has existed in the Army and Air Force for some time. It complements warfighting doctrine by providing operational guidance for military operations in [low intensity conflict] from which implementing doctrine can be developed.”

FM 100-20 also described an organization, called the Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force which could augment or support the Security Assistance Organization in “situations that range from conditions short of open hostility to limited war. They may locate strategically and vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements.”

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225 Ibid., 22.
226 Ibid., 24.
228 Ibid., A-7.
very similar to the previous described Special Action Forces of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The implementing doctrine for FM 100-20 took the form of FM 31-20-3, published four years later and titled, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*. The manual provided an extensive “how to” handbook for foreign internal defense. The concepts of indirect, direct, and combat support to foreign internal defense was not portrayed in this manual or its parent manual, FM 100-20. The 1996 joint foreign internal defense manual, JP 3-07.1 was reverse engineered from the Special Forces manual. However, the joint manual was much more detailed and had more depth.

The family of Army manuals, FM 100-5 and FM 3-0, *Operations*, manuals have only provided a basic description of foreign internal defense and to a much lesser extent, unconventional warfare. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 combines support to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in three paragraphs total.\(^{229}\) The 2001 version of FM 3-0 provides a much more in-depth description of foreign internal defense than the previous FM 100-5.\(^{230}\) However, support to insurgencies is covered in three sentences in the “stability operations” chapter, explaining in essence that it takes a National Command Authority (term no longer used) for Army forces to support an insurgency, that Army


special operations forces are best suited for this supporting role, and that conventional forces can support these operations if necessary.\textsuperscript{231}

The manual addresses special operations in a supporting role only, “[Special operations forces] can reinforce, augment, and complement conventional forces. . . . In war, [special operations forces] normally support the theater campaign or major operations of the [joint force commander].”\textsuperscript{232} Finally, the FM 3-0 describes the battlefield organization as “the allocation of forces in the [area of operation] by purpose. It consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining.”\textsuperscript{233} Decisive operations “are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements.”\textsuperscript{234} FM 3-0 further defines shaping operations as “[creating] or [preserving] conditions for success of the decisive operations.”\textsuperscript{235}

While FM 3-0 does not directly relate these operations to unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense, examples exist that provide ample evidence that these operations can be decisive and shaping. With regards to unconventional warfare, operations supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 were decisive and resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban, while the operations in Northern

\textsuperscript{231}Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{232}Ibid., 2-8.
\textsuperscript{233}Ibid., 4-22.
\textsuperscript{234}Ibid., 4-23.
\textsuperscript{235}Ibid.
Iraq supporting the Kurdish resistance fixed thirteen of twenty Iraqi divisions in the North, shaping the battlefield for the conventional forces invading from the south. An example of a Special Forces foreign internal defense effort that was decisive is the direct support to the El Salvadoran military to defeat the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and a shaping operation is the success Special Forces had in South Vietnam developing indigenous counterinsurgency forces in support of the larger conventional campaign. None of these examples have found their way into the joint or Army doctrine. The new FM 3-0 is currently in un-releasable final draft form.

Much like the Army operations doctrine, the 2001 JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, takes only a paragraph to describe unconventional warfare, calling it support to insurgency. This paragraph reads:

Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a legally constituted government through the use of subversion and armed action. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but are not normally involved in the conduct of combat operations.236

The current draft of the new JP 3-0, now called Joint Operations, has added one component to the above definition: “The United States may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US [sic] interests (e.g., US [sic] Support [sic] to the Mujahadin [sic] resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion).”237 While the both publications capture some elements of US support to insurgency such as training and logistics support, it has obviously not been updated since Operation Iraqi Freedom based on the final

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statement that US forces “normally” don’t conduct combat operations. However the
description differs from the description found in FM 3-0, *Operations*, in one respect, it
provides a real-world example of unconventional warfare describing US efforts to
support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets.

Another important concept in the soon-to-be published Joint Publication 3-0
provides a new operational “phasing model,” shown in figure 1, which has some
applicability to this study.238 This model is important to this study because it provides the
first doctrinal recognition that any campaign is going to have multiple phases occurring
simultaneously, and that operations do not stop at what has previously called conflict
termination—the end of combat operations. For this study it will be important to
determine how the seven phases of US sponsored unconventional warfare fit within this
phasing construct. This conceptual models has six phases—one phase covering peacetime
engagement and five the phases of an operation.

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238Ibid., IV-33. Graph can also be found in US Department of Defense, *Capstone
Office, August 2005); available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/
concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf; Internet; accessed on 17 February 2006.
Figure 1. The Joint Phasing Model


The “Phases” of the Joint Phasing Model

Phase 0-Shape-(Prevent and Deter). This is the normal peacetime engagement environment in which the US forces are conducting operations to support the theater security cooperation plan.
Phase 1-Deter-(Crisis Defined). This is the first step in resolving conflict by demonstrating military capabilities and the resolve of the US and its partners in an attempt to deter an opponent from acting or forcing the US to react.

Phase 2-Seize the Initiative-(Assure Friendly Freedom of Action and Access to Theater Infrastructure). During this phase, joint forces are applied to the problem to set the condition for the dominate phase and may include military action and diplomatic efforts.

Phase 3-Dominate-(Establish Dominate Force Capabilities and Achieve Full Spectrum Superiority). This is the phase that is focused on “breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment.”

Phase 4-Stabilize-(Establish Security and restore services). This phase is required when there is “limited” or “no functioning, legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may have to perform limited local governance.”

Phase 5-Enable Civil Authority-(Enable authorities and Redeploy). During this phase, the US joint forces support the legitimate government and, more importantly, it marks the military end state and redeployment.239

The new JP 3-0 also highlights that the “Stabilize” phase may characterize the transition from “sustained combat” to “stability operations.” It also rightly explains, “Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering.”240 However, the model does not provide a description of how to identify this transition. The importance of this graph will become apparent during

239 JP 3-0, Joint Operations, IV-33 to IV-37.

240 Ibid., IV-36.
the analysis portion of this thesis, especially with respect to phasing unconventional warfare and the transitions between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

Other documents are available to provide some insight into the future of Special Forces doctrine with respect to unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense in lieu of these soon-to-be-released doctrinal manuals. These are the 2004 National Military Strategy, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and finally the 2006 US Special Operations Command Posture Statement. These three documents may hold the keys to future unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine.

The 2004 National Military Strategy identifies six capabilities required for the US to win decisively: “conventional warfighting, unconventional warfare, homeland security, stability and postconflict operations, countering terrorism and security cooperation activities [italics-authors’ emphasis].”241 This statement has enormous implications for Special Forces in the future since three of these capabilities are Special Forces-specific and are tied directly to unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is another important document with respect to the future of unconventional warfare. One of the Quadrennial Defense Review decisions is to “Further increase [Special Operations Forces] capability and capacity to conduct low-visibility, persistent presence missions and a global unconventional warfare

campaign.” The key point here is the idea of a “global unconventional warfare campaign” and determining exactly what that means.\textsuperscript{242}

The term “global unconventional warfare” is used in the 2006 \textit{US Special Operations Command Posture Statement} but is not defined. The posture statement does define unconventional warfare as “working with, by, and through indigenous or surrogate forces” and foreign internal defense as “training host nation forces to deal with internal and external threats.”\textsuperscript{243} These definitions are not supported by current joint definitions of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, adding to the overall confusion. The posture statement identifies five missions that will “help establish the conditions to counter and defeat terrorism:” unconventional warfare, psychological operations, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance and civil affairs.\textsuperscript{244} It is interesting that direct action and counterterrorism are not mentioned in this list of operations since these two operations are the major capability that the Special Operations Command provides to the overall military effort.\textsuperscript{245} Not addressing these terms may be an indicator that current studies on unconventional warfare are pointing to direct action and counterterrorism operations against non-state actors and their infrastructure as being unconventional.


\textsuperscript{244}Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 1; see glossary for definitions.

\textsuperscript{245}FM 3-05.20, 2-1; see glossary for definitions.
The history of Special Forces unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine provides a window to the past. The history of unconventional warfare doctrine is plagued with confusion from the beginning. From vague definitions to mission creep, the concepts of supporting insurgencies, found in the Special Forces unconventional warfare doctrine, has been proven since 11 September. The current attempt to change the unconventional warfare doctrine to align with the “Global Unconventional Warfare” is not a new concept either and is the direct result of the vagueness of the unconventional warfare definitions. This idea is reinforced by studying foreign internal defense doctrine which provides by far the most clear and concise definitions and doctrine.

South Vietnam

The confusion over unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense reached its climax in Vietnam. Michael McClintock explains in terms of guerrilla warfare (unconventional warfare) and counterinsurgency (foreign internal defense), “The confusion of guerrilla warfare with counterinsurgency was in evidence from the inceptions of the American effort to wage counterinsurgency in Vietnam. What is extraordinary is that very little thought appears to have gone into this distinction.” He suggests that “the [Special Forces] generally went about the task of counterinsurgency as if engaged in guerrilla operations behind enemy lines.”\(^\text{246}\)

Regardless of the confusion, the Special Forces programs were easily among the most productive in the entire war effort. The main Special Forces efforts were with the

Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, the Mobile Guerrilla Forces, and Mike Forces. Another effort that is sometimes confused with unconventional warfare was the cross-border operations conducted by the Studies and Observation Group which utilized surrogates, such as Chinese Nungs, and turned former Viet Cong guerrillas, in what would more precisely be called special reconnaissance. The nearly decade-long Civilian Irregular Defense Group, as Charles Simpson highlights, “involved thousands of Vietnamese civilians, millions of dollars, and approximately 100 camps spread out from the Demilitarized Zone to the Gulf of Siam.”

This program, unlike the Strategic Hamlet Programs, did not relocate villages, but trained them to defend their own villages, which is captured by its original name--Village Defense Program. While originally defensive in nature, it later evolved into an active defense sending out combat patrols as early warning as well as interdicting Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units when these villages were located in strategic locations, such as astride to enemy lines of communications.

Another successful program that grew out of the necessity to have a quick reaction force to react to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on the Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps was the Mobile Strike Forces, better known as “Mike Forces.” The Mike Force was originally established in 1965 and formed from a battalion of Chinese Nungs, which is a tribal group originally from the Chinese and North Vietnamese border. The tenacity of these fighters had endeared them to the French and

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247 Simpson, 95.

248 Ibid., 99.
were raised into “Nung Divisions” by the French and were settled into enclaves in South Vietnam.\(^\text{249}\)

A similar program to the Mike Force was created, called the Mobile Guerrilla Force, “to conduct guerrilla warfare in the vast stretches of enemy-controlled territory outside areas of operations of CIDG Camps.”\(^\text{250}\) An average Mobile Guerrilla Force was made up of one Mike Force Company and a reconnaissance platoon. As Charles Simpson notes, “The concept was to infiltrate these company-sized forces, usually by foot, and to operate against the enemy’s lines of communications, usually branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.”\(^\text{251}\)

All of these programs were without a doubt foreign internal defense missions despite their “guerrilla-like nature.” These indigenous forces were developed into specialized, but irregular units and capabilities, all in an effort to defeat the Viet Cong insurgents and disrupt North Vietnamese main force resupply and movements. This was a shaping effort for the overall US effort and was also overt. It consisted of combat support, with Special Forces not only advising but actually commanding and leading these units.

**North Vietnam**

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Observations Group was established in 1963 with the task to pick up where the CIA had failed, to conduct

\(^{249}\) Ibid., 120.

\(^{250}\) Ibid., 124.

\(^{251}\) Ibid., 125.
operations in Laos and North Vietnam.” The Studies and Observation Group had four principle covert missions under OPLAN 34A: to insert and develop agent networks, to establish a fabricated resistance movement and misinformation campaign, to conduct maritime interdiction along the coast of North Vietnam, and to conduct cross border reconnaissance operations in Laos. While considered the largest covert unconventional warfare program since World War II, the eight-year program, from 1964 to 1972 had mixed results. At one end of the spectrum were the five hundred agents that upon infiltration were neutralized or turned by the North to the successes in 1968 when the North Vietnamese government began to fear the growing subversion. However, the US policy makers feared a destabilized North Vietnamese government and for all intents and purposes shut the programs in North Vietnam down once the Hanoi had been persuaded to begin negotiations. The most interesting aspect of this program was the use of deception to make the North think a resistance was active. The most noteworthy of these efforts were the kidnapping of North Vietnamese citizens and exposing them to the fake resistance organization, known as the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League, then returning them to report to the information to their government.

This was a covert unconventional warfare program and strategic shaping operation. While it was unsuccessful establishing an actual resistance, the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League was an interesting method that qualifies as an example of indirect

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252 Shultz, xiii.
253 Ibid., x-xi.
254 Ibid., 330-331.
support, by using North Vietnamese citizens to unwittingly spread the rumor of the fake resistance organization.

**El Salvador**

Special Forces operations in El Salvador were a successful example of foreign internal defense to help the military defeat the FMLN. While this was an exceptional example of how Special Forces could conduct foreign internal defense in direct support to the El Salvadoran military, it is routinely called an unconventional warfare operation. In fact it is identified this way in the manual that governs Special Forces operations, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*. The FM 3-05.20 explains:

> [Special Forces] operations in El Salvador during the 1980s are an example of [unconventional warfare as the decisive operation]. In this instance [unconventional warfare] operations are conducted during what would appear to all but the [unconventional warfare] participants to be operations to promote peace, never progressing through operations to deter aggression and resolve conflict or actual combat.\(^{255}\)

US direct support foreign internal defense was provided to El Salvador after a rocky period of diplomatic engagement in which the US cut off economic and military aid due to El Salvador’s ruthless counterinsurgency operations against the FMLN which included extensive human rights violations. In early 1981 the FMLN had a nearly ten thousand-man army poised and ready to overthrow the government until President Carter chose the lesser of two evils and lifted the economic and military sanctions which turned the tide

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\(^{255}\)FM 3-05.20, 2-4.
and allowed El Salvador to thwart the insurgents. When President Reagan came into office he was much more aggressive in his desire to thwart communist expansion.256

While other economic aid was being provided, the US military group was allowed by Congress to have a total of fifty-five personnel assigned to train, equip, and advise a military that initially numbered around 12,000 and would grow to nearly forty-two thousand troops over a four year period.257 The Special Forces advisors were part of the Brigade Operational Planning and Assistance Training Teams (OPATT) were also restricted from conducting any direct combat operations. Each OPATT team consisted of three individuals assigned to a brigade which it was hoped would lead to better human rights behavior and combat employment.258 As Cecil Bailey highlights, “For nearly eight years OPATTS cycled through the brigades, each one extending the progress of the proceeding team.”259 The three-man teams generally consisted of “a combat-arms major, preferably with an [Special Forces] background, and two [Special Forces non-commissioned officers] or warrant officer.”260

The OPATTS were also not allowed to conduct combat operations with their counter parts. As Cecil Bailey notes, “The restrictions against US military members accompanying . . . units on operations was especially onerous to the advisors, who often


257 Ibid., 333.


259 Ibid.

260 Ibid., 21.
cited the restriction as affecting not only their relationship with their counterpart but also their professional credibility.”

Cecil Bailey highlights the accomplishment of the OPATTs, “Contemporary studies evaluating the US military role in El Salvador often praise the brigade advisers as being the leading contributors to combat effectiveness, improved human rights performance and professional behavior supporting constitutional democratic values.” Considering that a few more than 140 Special Forces OPATT advisors were employed during this conflict from 1985 to 1992 and were able to advise forty battalions, 40,000 soldiers, is impressive. The best measure of effectiveness of this foreign internal defense program comes from an FMLN commander, Joaquin Villalobos’ when he explained that “putting American advisers in the brigades was the most damaging thing that happened to them during the war. He believed that the adviser’s influence on the [El Salvadoran military] made them more professional and less abusive, . . . [denying the FMLN] much of its earlier propaganda advantage and recruiting appeal.”

Analysis of this conflict clearly shows that this was not unconventional warfare but instead foreign internal defense, conducted overtly and in direct support to the El Salvadoran military, although years later it would become clear that many of these advisers were conducting combat advisory missions as well. The OPATT advisory program was the only military program conducted, with no other conventional military units participating, thus making this a decisive operation.

261 Ibid., 24.
262 Ibid., 28.
263 Ibid., 27.
Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan

The operations in Afghanistan after 11 September provide a window into the future of unconventional warfare. The DOD had not been involved in an unconventional warfare campaign of this magnitude since the Korean War. The interoperability between the CIA and special operations was unprecedented as well. The preparation phase happened from the moments after 11 September until the first CIA elements began to infiltrate into Afghanistan, which included political preparations for coalition support and assistance with airfields and over flight rights, as well as preparing the international community and the American population for the armed response to 11 September. The CIA then established initial contact or reestablishing contacts from previous efforts in Afghanistan. Due to the compressed time schedule, numerous Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas infiltrated concurrently with the CIA paramilitary teams and rapidly organized, built-up, and employed their Afghan counterparts. The Special Forces and CIA paramilitary worked in concert. The Special Forces employed the Afghans guerrillas in concert with US airpower to produce overwhelming combat power that outmatched the Taliban. At the same time the CIA subverted the Taliban by turning many of the Taliban’s units through fear of destruction or through other incentives, the most popular being monetary “rewards” for changing sides. Buying loyalty brought a whole new meaning to the often used “by, with and through” is literally “BUY, with and through.”

The Taliban was overthrown in less than two months, with the interim government of Hamid Karzai being established in mid-December. This marked the shift

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264 CPT (now Major) Glenn Thomas, conversations with author, 2004-2005, Fort Bragg, NC.
from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense as efforts transitioned to protect
the new government and its legitimacy over the coming months, while at the same time
developing an internal security capability to disrupt or defeat future Taliban and Al
Qa’ida threats. This effort continues today.

Until the transition, this was initially a clandestine effort to infiltrate into
Afghanistan, then transitioned to low-visibility operations. The Special Forces
unconventional warfare operations became a decisive operation, although this was not the
original plan in which they were to support the introduction of conventional forces. This
was also an example of the first, large-scale unconventional warfare operation utilizing
Special Forces in combat advisory approach since the OSS operations in World War II.

The Afghans were not demobilized to a large extent, but instead were used for
some time as militias supporting the Special Forces until they were transferred to national
control or sent home. Later in the foreign internal defense operations, the remaining
militias were replaced by Afghan Army units and finally disbanded or demobilized, but
unlike the doctrinal seventh phase, demobilization, this took place sometime after the
conflict ended. Once the conflict transitioned to the postconflict and unconventional
warfare transitioned to foreign internal defense, the signature became overt, and all
efforts by Special Forces became a supporting effort to the larger conventional
headquarters. The operational approach had remained combat support, with the goal
being to return to peacetime engagement and only a direct or indirect operational
approach necessary.
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines

Operations in the Philippines after 11 September were another component of Operation Enduring Freedom campaign. Referred to as Operations Enduring Freedom-Philippines, the mission was to support the Philippine government’s counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts to defeat the Abu Sayyaf, an extremist-Islamic insurgent group with ties to Al Qa’ida. Although a classic foreign internal defense mission, the actual mission statement for the post-11 September counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines uses unconventional warfare as the operational term:

On order, in support of Operation Freedom Eagle, FOB 11 . . . conduct[s] [unconventional warfare] operations in the southern Philippines through, by and with the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to assist the GRP [Government of the Republic of the Philippines] in the destruction of terrorist organizations and separate the population from those Groups.”

In this definition the correct operational task should have been foreign internal defense or even counterterrorism, not unconventional warfare. This mission statement also did not help the Philippine government that was telling its citizens that the Special Forces were in the Philippines conducting counterinsurgency training, which it called “Exercise Balikatan” which means shoulder to shoulder. Because of the negative political implications for the elected Philippine government, they imposed a US force cap, limiting the number of American personnel involved to six hundred.266

To date this foreign internal defense operation has been extremely successful, having forced Abu Sayyaf from the Basilan Island and operations continue to defeat this


organization while training the Philippine Army to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations against the other insurgent groups that are a continued threat to the government. Despite the use of unconventional warfare in the original mission statement, this effort has been a classic, overt, foreign internal defense mission. Since there is no other US military effort in the country, it is the decisive operations at the operational-level and a shaping operation in the larger context of the Global War on Terror. Unlike the operations in Afghanistan, the operational approach in the Philippines is direct support.

**Operation Iraqi Freedom**

Operations with the Kurdish resistance organization in Northern Iraq provide an excellent example of unconventional warfare supporting conventional maneuver forces. It is even more spectacular that an American Special Forces Group, in this case 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), numbering 5,200 personnel (and not all of these were inside of Northern Iraq), was able to coordinate the efforts of over fifty thousand Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and to succeed in fixing thirteen of Saddam Hussein’s twenty divisions along a 350-kilometer front.\(^{267}\) Also of interest is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s division-sized attack to regain occupied salient along the border of Iran which was controlled by the Al Qaeda affiliated group called Ansar al Islam. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan were supported by a Special Forces Company working as advisors to coordinate indirect fires and close air support.

From the night of infiltration, the longest since World War II, into Northern Iraq, the timeline was once again compressed and Special Forces detachments began to engage the Iraqi’s along the forward line of troops, known as the green-line.²⁶⁸ Combat operations started quickly because the Kurdish resistance was already a large, well-organized insurgent organization that had been working with the CIA for decades and only needed minimal training in the lethal aid that was provided by the US.²⁶⁹ Although combat operations along the green-line began within hours of the infiltration, the first major event was the attack on Ansar al Islam which began the morning of 28 March 2003. This two day attack saw Ansar al Islam routed and the Kurdish Peshmerga able to liberate this salient. Once this threat was eliminated, the focus turned to the green-line. Ten days later Kirkuk and Mosul fell and operations in the North transitioned to what seemed like postconflict stabilization. Special Forces had successfully conducted the second unconventional warfare operations in less than two years.²⁷⁰ One other lesson of this conflict was the unprecedented work that Special Forces conducted in concert with the Kurdish underground. Most of the Special Forces’ doctrine is focused on “guerrilla warfare” versus the clandestine arts of working with undergounds.

It is also interesting to note that 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was unable to develop a similar capability with Shia in Southern Iraq. However, unlike the Kurds, the Shia did not have a self-governed sanctuary like the Kurds, and were heavily oppressed

²⁶⁸ Author’s personal experiences in Northern Iraq.


²⁷⁰ Author’s personal experience in Northern Iraq.
by the Iraqi regime. A final unconventional warfare effort was attempted using Iraqi ex-patriots, who received only rudimentary training prior to being inserted into Iraq, generally called the Free Iraqi Force. Part of this force had been trained by the conventional Army in Hungry prior to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Elements of 5th Special Forces Group were given the task to advise the Free Iraqi Forces, but the general sense among those involved was that the these Iraqis did not have the training, nor did the Special Forces advisors have the relationships with these counterparts, to be an effective force. This was an example of a good idea, gone bad in many respects. Had Special Forces trained these elements, developed strong relationships with their counterparts, and then been inserted with them into Iraq as part of the overall plan, their effectiveness as a political tool might have been increased.

The Special Forces would then be called upon to continue the hunt for former regime elements. At the same time they began to train and operate with the 36th Commandos. These operations were successful, but the growing insurgency was not addressed until it had already grown exponentially. Special Forces did everything in its power to keep from conducting advisory support and were finally let off the hook when

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271 Author’s personal experiences in Northern Iraq; and Robinson, 275. Some confusion rings the FIF, which was used to describe two groups of Iraqi ex-patriots, one that was trained in civil affairs in Hungary and another element of soldiers. Because they were all commonly referred to as FIF, this is the convention that is used here.

272 Author’s personal experiences in Northern Iraq and numerous discussions with individuals involved with this mission in Southern Iraq from August 2004 to the May 2006; and Robinson, 299.
the conventional military, out of necessity, established the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.\textsuperscript{273}

Operations in Iraq had once again proven the usefulness of unconventional warfare and at the same the limitations. In the north, during the first few days after infiltration, the Special Forces were operating clandestinely until major combat operations in the north began. This was an example of unconventional warfare shaping the environment for the conventional decisive operation using combat advisors and support, including coordinated air interdiction. Finally, there was no demobilization of Kurdish resistance members by Special Forces, however there were inquiries into the demobilization plan for each of the Kurdish factions.\textsuperscript{274} It became quickly evident that this was a task of enormous size when the current militias may be needed in the future. Because of this, these elements were not demobilized but continued to operate as militias in support of US Special Forces teams conducting foreign internal defense.\textsuperscript{275}

In the south, efforts failed to generate a resistance force, first because of the pre-existing constraints on the Shia and second, the war’s tempo was so fast, the requirements for an unconventional warfare effort to support the invasion were overcome by events. The Free Iraqi Forces were another element of the unconventional warfare puzzle in Iraq, but their contribution, even politically, was less than stellar. Had the correct amount of

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\item \textsuperscript{274} Author’s personal experience in Northern Iraq, April 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
time, energy, and Special Forces advisors been elements of this program, it might have been more successful.

Summary

The history of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, whether overt or covert, provides an interesting backdrop to the argument of whether these two missions continue to be viable today and into the future. Fifty years after the birth of Special Forces and before the events of 11 September the decision was made that unconventional warfare, as defined by the Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann, was no longer a viable mission and would never be conducted as envisioned. Less than three years later Special Forces has successfully prosecuted two unconventional warfare campaigns, one a decisive combat operation in Afghanistan using indigenous forces instead of massive conventional formations, and the other a shaping operation in northern Iraq, using the indigenous Kurds. However, despite these successes, the current debate focuses on the use of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense against non-state actors in a short-sighted version of the previous fifty year argument.
With an understanding of the historical background of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine, this chapter will answer the secondary questions: What is unconventional warfare? What is foreign internal defense? and How are they related? Also, this chapter will determine if unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are applicable against non-state actors, the final tertiary question. The combination of these answers will set the conditions to the answer the primary research question, in chapter 5, are unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, as currently defined, applicable to current and future Special Forces operations?

To answer these questions, a comparison must be made between the results of the last chapter, the historical application of these two missions, and their current definitions. The analysis will determine if there is a relationship between the two missions, and will conclude with the future of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, with special emphasis on their application in the Global War on Terrorism and against non-state actors.

**Analysis of Unconventional Warfare**

**Analysis of the Unconventional Warfare Definition**

In introducing this problem, unconventional warfare was defined in chapter 1 to provide the reader a point of departure for determining if the definition adequately captured the historical application of unconventional warfare. Once again, the definition of unconventional warfare is:
Military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence gathering, and escape and evasion.\(^{276}\)

An analysis of this definition provides some interesting findings when applied to the historical examples presented in the previous chapter. First, the definition is correct that these are “military and paramilitary operations.” They are military operations in that unconventional warfare is used as an armed tool in place of conventional military operations or to support other conventional operations.

Second, it is true that most of these operations have been of long duration, however, the length of the operation is dependent on three factors: first and foremost is how much risk the political leadership is willing to take by putting Special Forces soldiers into the target country earlier than declared hostilities to build an effective insurgent force; second, if the unconventional warfare effort is the decisive operation or if it is a shaping operation. If it is the decisive operation, then it will generally take longer, but if it is a shaping operation, the length of time, historically, has been shorter. While historical examples may show that shaping operations are shorter, operations such as the Jedburghs and more recently 10th Group in Northern Iraq, would have been more effective if infiltration had occurred earlier. The two contemporary examples of unconventional warfare, Afghanistan and Iraq, validate this theory, Afghanistan taking longer because the unconventional warfare effort was the decisive operation, so from infiltration of teams in early October it took until mid-December to overthrow the

\(^{276}\)JP 1-02.
Taliban. In Iraq, unconventional and conventional operations started at the same time, with the Special Forces having very little time to organize or build up forces, and within three weeks the Coalition had successfully overthrown a much tougher opponent, Saddam Hussein.

Based on current and proposed operational concepts which suggest the US military can successfully defeat a country like Iraq in days, versus weeks, unconventional warfare that begins concurrently with combat operations would not be viable, as the unconventional warfare effort in Southern Iraq demonstrate. In this concept, it will be imperative to begin unconventional warfare months or weeks earlier than the planned invasion. The final conclusion to be drawn from this is that a time standard on this type of operation may not be of use any longer; however, there are serious repercussions for not giving Special Forces the time required to build an effective insurgency or resistance.

Third, unconventional warfare encompasses organizing, training, equipping, supporting, and directing of the indigenous insurgent organization. Each of these elements are tasks in and of themselves that can be done indirectly, directly, or in combat support roles. They could be done indirectly, such as conducting all of these tasks in a third-party country or even through a third-party organization or front. Examples of the direct method may include conducting all these tasks in liberated, sanctuary or safe areas that do not include combat. Obviously combat support would involve these tasks being conducted while in a combat environment, with the Special Forces or supporting agency taking the same risks as the insurgents.

277Brigadier General David Fastabend, “A Joint and Expeditionary Army with Campaign Capabilities” (briefing slides for Joint Forces Command, 12 April 2004), slide “Relevant and Ready Landpower.”
Fourth, one often missed component of the definition is the “external source.” This means that this is not a US-only definition, but applies universally. In other words the “external source” could be Iran, Syria, China, Cuba, North Korea, and even al Qaeda, not just the US. In fact, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq are nothing more than an al Qaeda “Special Forces” advisors conducting unconventional warfare by providing training, advising, funding and a form of precision targeting—the suicide bomber—to the Sunni insurgents.278 Although not part of the definition, this also highlights the requirement to define the type of external support provided: indirect, direct, and combat, in much the same way foreign internal defense support is described.279

Fifth, the definition attempts to capture all of the oddities of unconventional warfare, including the tactics—guerrilla warfare, subversion and sabotage, as well as the environments and signatures of these operations—direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine. The final part of the definition discusses “intelligence gathering” and “escape and evasion.” However these two elements apply to every Special Forces mission and are not unconventional warfare specific. This has led to the confusion of skills versus missions, the most notable being Advanced Special Operations Techniques, which are advanced skills that apply to all Special Forces missions and therefore cannot be a mission in itself.

278 Major D. Jones, “Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter,” (5 February 2005); scheduled to be published in the summer of 2006 as part of the Joint Special Operation University’s annual essay contest special report.

279 Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Mark Grdovic, Numerous conversations on this topic with author from June 2003 to May 2005, Fort Bragg, NC.
Lastly, the definition fails to capture the essence or purpose of unconventional warfare—that it is the support to an insurgency. Joint Publication 1-02 defines support to insurgency as the “support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”\(^{280}\) This definition clearly defines the purpose of unconventional warfare, in much the same way the foreign internal defense definition provides a purpose—to help another country free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The purpose is important as Hy S. Rothstein shows, because the lack of purpose may be the entire reason for the confusion about unconventional warfare:

Unfortunately, the purpose of . . . unconventional warfare . . . is not so easily defined. Certainly, it must serve the national interests of the United States. However, there is no clear task so easily defined as the “destruction of the enemy army” and no method so easily specified as “the direct application of violent force”. . . . Consequently, the basic questions about unconventional war have never been adequately answered.\(^{281}\)

While Hy Rothstein is correct in that the purpose and task is not defined in the definition, if the definition is taken in the context of the unconventional warfare doctrine then they are readily apparent; the task is to support an insurgency against a hostile regime or occupier and the purpose is to overthrow the regime or remove the occupier. Addressing the task and purpose as outlined here may clear up the misunderstanding of the definition.

\(^{280}\)JP 1-02.

Analysis of the Phases of United States-Sponsored Unconventional Warfare

There are seven phases of US-sponsored insurgency, the military definition being unconventional warfare. The seven phases are: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat employment, and demobilization.\(^{282}\) There have been arguments as recently as 2001 by senior Special Forces leaders that the seven-phased unconventional warfare model is no longer valid. However, based on the most recent operations, the seven-phased model is extremely accurate in describing the support to the insurgency, although the phases may have been compressed by the same circumstances that affected Jedburgh operations in France--Special Forces were not infiltrated into the sector until conventional combat operations were already underway.\(^{283}\)

Phase I of unconventional warfare, “preparation,” includes the decision to use military force against a threatening nation, the planning and the preparations for its use, and the psychological preparations of the threatening nation’s population, the international community, and the American public.\(^{284}\) Some confusion exists with respect to another operational term, operational preparation of the environment, which is easily confused with this phase of unconventional warfare. Thomas O’Connell, DOD Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, provides some insight into what operational preparation of the environment is and is not during an interview with

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\(^{282}\) Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, April 2003), 1-11 to 1-17.

\(^{283}\) Kershner, 2-2.

\(^{284}\) FM 3-05.201, 1-11.
Linda Robinson, “It’s becoming familiar with the area in which you might have to work. . . . It’s nonhostile recon. It’s not intrusive. Others without military background may view it as saber rattling, but it’s as far from that as you can get.”

Linda Robinson continues, “In the 1980’s, O’Connell said, special operations forces spent lots of time preparing to respond to hijackings, kidnappings, and takeovers of embassies. To do that, they visited embassies and airports and examined possible helicopter landing zones and assault zones.”

An example of the residual confusion can be found in an article by Colonel Walter Herd, “In war fighting, if your fighting by, with & [sic] through indigenous forces or if you’re collecting intelligence and conducting operational preparation of the environment by, with and through indigenous forces, your conducting unconventional warfare.’” This confusion is politically sensitive in terms of how another nation may define unconventional warfare. If they define it as support to an insurgency, then obviously just conducting operational preparation of the environment, if it is mistaken for the first phase of unconventional warfare, could have grave repercussions, much like the mistaken unconventional warfare mission statement during Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines discussed in the previous chapter. Thomas O’Connell is correct when he stipulates that operational preparation of the environment can apply to any special

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286 Ibid.

operations mission, from counterterrorism to counterproliferation. With respect to unconventional warfare, it may allow long-term relationships with host nation partners to develop just like they do during normal foreign internal defense training missions, that may ease the initial contact phase of unconventional warfare if that were ever necessary.

An example of this relationship--US Special Forces conducted foreign internal defense in a country, then for some reason the government was overthrown, and these former military personnel that had worked with the Special Forces are now the cadre of the insurgency. In fact, due to vast number of coalition operations and combined training exercises, the long-term relationships that are developing throughout the world may change the nature of the second phase--initial contact. Instead of initial contact it may be reminiscent of the CIA contacting former associates in Afghanistan or in Northern Iraq about a new endeavor--overthrowing the current regime.

Phase II. “initial contact,” was originally in the CIA charter.\textsuperscript{288} The purpose of this phase is to conduct “an accurate assessment of the potential resistance . . . and [arrange] for the reception and initial assistance” of the US operational elements that will be infiltrated during the next phase.\textsuperscript{289} This is generally a covert or clandestine activity normally conducted in one of two ways. First of all, this initial contact is likely to be the first time that a representative of the US government contacts or approaches an insurgent organization that has only recently emerged or has never been contacted by the US before. This could be due to any number of reasons, such as political or geographic isolation. The second type of approach, the inherently easier of the two, is with a

\textsuperscript{288}FM 3-05.201, 1-12; and Bank 160-2, 173.

\textsuperscript{289}FM 3-05.201, 1-14.
previously contacted group that is now in a position of influence that the US would like to capitalize on to further US national interests. Although in contact with US representatives prior to this time, in Phase II, this group is being asked for the first time to work with the US in an unconventional warfare campaign to overthrow the regime. As explained in the description of Phase I, having contacts with numerous groups throughout the world greatly benefits the US and increased the speed of response in a crisis. Also during this phase, if the security environment is high risk for US personnel, resistance personnel could be exfiltrated, trained in a third party country, and when ready, inserted as the only operational element that will infiltrate in phase III--infiltration--instead of US operational elements.

Phase III, “infiltration,” is the entry of the first DOD operational elements into the insurgents’ areas and has been the doctrinal hand-off between the other governmental agencies and Special Forces. This will be the first significant presence in theater, which may now include forward operational bases or other command, control or logistics nodes supporting the committed operational forces. In indirect approaches, this may not be the infiltration of US operational elements, but newly trained indigenous operational assets.

Phase IV, “organization,” ensures that the indigenous forces are effectively organized for the buildup phase, Phase V. This has historically included in-processing, issuing weapons, pay, oaths to the future government, and medical screenings. However,

\[290\] FM 3-05.201, 1-15, 3-1, 2; and Banks, 172-175; and John M Collins, “Roles and Functions of US Special Operations Forces,” Special Warfare (July 1993), 25.

\[291\] FM 3-05.201, 1-15.
this process has been much more difficult to accomplish in the compressed timelines and large numbers of insurgents to in-process during the last two unconventional warfare efforts. The concept is sound and protects US interests by providing a record of what training was conducted and weapons were issued. It also provides a means of providing the emerging government some records of those with training that could work as militias or conventional soldiers. The end state of this phase is an insurgent force that is organized by function and mission, capable of growth if necessary, and with the appropriate command and control structures in place.

Phase V, “build-up,” is the growth of the insurgency. The operational elements must balance the assigned mission with security and logistical support capability. In insurgency it is not the size that matters but effects and survivability. Therefore, the size of the insurgent force is not based on preconceived end strength, but on three aspects: effect that needs to be generated for mission accomplishment, the constraints of the security environment, and the logistical constraints.292 In a less security-constrained environment with freedom of movement, such as liberated areas or sanctuary areas, then larger forces can be organized and built-up. In a constrained security environment, for example urban areas, smaller cellular networks are used for security and survivability. The last aspect of build-up is the ability of the area to support an insurgent organization. In rural or agrarian societies that mass produce food, then the population will be able to logistically support a larger insurgent group. In a constrained environment, such as a city

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or if the counterinsurgency forces have implemented rationing, then the area is going to be less capable to support a movement larger than a small cell.

Phase VI, “combat employment,” begins with the offensive air or ground campaign by conventional forces or if purely an unconventional warfare campaign, such as Afghanistan, a Special Forces and indigenous ground campaign. The insurgents will conduct operations either until link-up with conventional forces or the defeat of the government or occupying forces, leading to the eventual take over of the country. If the insurgents are unable to gain victory or control of the environment, they may be forced into one of the following options: (1) conduct a retreat, withdrawal, or delaying action to trade space for time, (2) disperse into small cells and hide within the population or restricted terrain, (3) establish a defense in restricted terrain if a larger force, to regroup, reorganize, and prepare for further offensive operations, or (4) withdraw to sanctuary areas, which may be in an adjoining country. The worst case would be for the insurgents to be decisively engaged and destroyed.

Phase VII, “demobilization,” has historically meant disarming and disbanding the insurgents’ overt military forces, such as guerrillas, and returning them to their pre-crisis place in society. However, if the experiences since 11 September are an indicator, in the future the majority of insurgent forces will transition to local militias and general-purpose forces in preparation for establishing a secure environment until national police and military forces can take over this role entirely. At such a time as a nation-wide security force is employed then the remaining “militias” or “irregulars” will be demobilized by their government. Historically, US unconventional warfare efforts have ended in three

\[^{293}\text{FM 3-05.201, 1-17, 3-1.}\]
ways: demobilization, termination of support with no demobilization, and recently, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgent forces have become local militias and in some cases national forces and are not actually demobilized until well into foreign internal defense operations. Because of these three possible outcomes, “demobilization” may not be the best description of this phase. Even in the unconventional warfare doctrinal manual, FM 3-05.201, demobilization is said to be a “major activity of transition.”

“Transition” is a much more accurate term than demobilization.

Foreign Internal Defense

Analysis of the Foreign Internal Defense Definition

Interestingly, the epitome of a clear definition is Foreign Internal Defense. JP 1-02 defines Foreign Internal Defense as, “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”

JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, further categorizes Foreign Internal Defense into three types of support: indirect, direct (not involving combat operations), and combat support. As noted in JP 3-07.1, “These categories represent significantly different levels of US diplomatic and military commitment and risk.”

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294 Ibid., 4-2.
295 JP 1-02.
297 Ibid., I-4.
There is also some debate if Special Forces conduct foreign internal defense or instead conduct a lesser operation under foreign internal defense, such as counterinsurgency or training, since this is an overarching term for a myriad of interagency programs that span all the elements of a supporting nation’s national power. The argument is valid, although the clarity of this operation comes from the part of the definition that states the conditions to be met, “to free or protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.” This portion of the definition is the driving factor behind efforts of Special Forces. The fact that this effort takes an interagency effort supporting another government’s internal defense and development plan provides context to the solution which is important in this day of the military assuming a heavy burden in Iraq and Afghanistan. A similar argument could be made with respect to counterinsurgency, and if the US actually conducts this operation or only supports another country’s counterinsurgency efforts. However, if insurgency is an overarching term for any type of armed resistance aimed at either the overthrow of a government or the removal of an occupying power, then there are instances, such as Iraq, where the initial counterinsurgency efforts may be a unilateral US effort or as a coalition. As the new government is established the operational approach begins to shift from combat support. In efforts such as the Philippines, the effort is direct support to help the host nation defeat an internal threat while meeting US national objectives of defeating al Qa’ida associated networks.

298 LTC (retired) Mark Lauber, Multiple discussion with author on this topic, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006.
So although debate may exist about the role of Special Forces in foreign internal defense, the definition is clear, where the unconventional warfare definition is not, in the condition or end-state of the operation. The foreign internal defense doctrine also provides the three levels of support which further clarifies the types of support provided. These two elements may be the solution for clarifying the unconventional warfare definition.

**Relationships between Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense**

Although it is easy to understand that unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are different and likely opposite in their end states, considering the historical background presented in the last chapter, it is difficult to tie this directly to why words matter. Some may say that as long as the Special Forces operators understands what they are supposed to be doing on the ground at the tactical level, everything else will fall in place. However, this argument is much more fundamental than it would seem. Regardless of the similarities in tactics, techniques, and procedures at the tactical level, it is the end state that matters most. Iraq provides a good example of this concept. Abu Musab Zarqawi beheaded prisoners while videotaping the brutal execution and received relatively minor international reaction. Compare this to the global reaction and international outcry when the US soldiers humiliated the prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. Although the actions of the US soldiers were extremely unprofessional and an embarrassment to the US, the prisoners did not die horrendous deaths. The beheading de-legitimized the US and Iraqi efforts because it added to the sense of insecurity and violence and appealed to younger members of the Muslim society that were prone to
jihadi-propaganda. At the same time, the acts of the US soldiers de-legitimized the US and Iraqi efforts by completely countering the US information operation’s efforts to portray the US as a liberator. The US wanted to show how the US was freeing the Iraqis from the oppression of Saddam, yet the Iraqi citizens were being mistreated by their so-called liberators. Had the soldiers understood the concept of legitimacy and that every one of their actions either helped or hurt the US and the fledgling Iraqi government’s legitimacy, and with it the chances of success, they may not have made these mistakes.

The same can be said of US military’s preference for kinetic effects versus nonkinetics in counterinsurgency. Had the US military understood from the beginning of the postconflict phase that legitimacy was the most important commodity for US efforts, then “cordon and search” would have been replaced with the “cordon and knock” early in the conflict. Instead this concept took nearly two years to be implemented across Iraq. While these are not specifically Special Forces examples, they are used here since the background knowledge is more widely known.

Logical Lines of Operations

One method for clarifying the relationship between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense is a logical lines of operation comparison. Logical lines of operations are defined by Dr. Jack D. Kem as, “a cognitive operational framework/planning construct used to define the concept of multiple, and often disparate, actions arranged in a framework unified by purpose. . . . All logical lines of operation should lead
to the [Center of Gravity or COG]”²⁹⁹ In the following examples, the short title for the logical line of operation is labeled and the operational objectives, the conditions, decisive points, or effects that must be met along that line, are defined by boxed number at the bottom of the chart. The corresponding numbered boxes are then placed on the lines of operations which they support. As Dr. Kem explains “[operational] objectives in a logical line of operation depict causal relationships that are both linear and nonlinear. Operational objectives are depicted along a logical line of operation; the same operational objectives may be depicted along more than one logical line of operation.”³⁰⁰

While both of the lines of operation charts provide large number of operational objectives, boxes or circles and their corresponding numbers, it should be noted that the actual objectives chosen will depend on the operational considerations--environment, signature, relationship, and approach. In fact, some of the objectives could become lines of operations of their own, especially as these lines of operations are translated into mission orders for subordinate units. It should also be noted that the following lines of operations are for the most part military lines of operations and support or are supported by the interagency and the conventional military lines of operations across the elements of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--when appropriate. Finally, because information operations are so important to this type of warfare, they are integral to every objective and therefore there is not an additional information operation line of operation.

²⁹⁹Dr. Jack D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (Fort Leavenworth, KS; Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, nd.), 34-35.

³⁰⁰Ibid.
Unconventional Warfare Logical Lines of Operation

Figure 2 provides an example of the logical lines of operation for unconventional warfare. The diagram captures all of the operational considerations-environment, signature, relationship, and approach and the logical lines of operation. The operational considerations have a significant effect on how the operational objectives are reached. For example, one operational objective might be to organize an indigenous resistance. How this is done depends on the environment and the constraints of the operational signature. So in a covert operation conducted in a hostile environment a direct or combat approach may be used. However, under the same considerations, but in a denied area where US personnel cannot penetrate the security environment, indigenous personnel may have to be trained in an adjacent country and then reinserted into the operational area.
Figure 2. Unconventional Warfare Operational Considerations and Logical Lines

The logical lines shown in figure 2 are examples of the types of Special Forces specific logical lines of operation along upon which they would apply their unconventional warfare advising, training, and equipping capabilities and skills. In this example, the logical lines of operation and the longer descriptions are:
1. **Gain Popular Support.** US advisors ensure that all operations take into consideration the population. Operations are also conducted to show the ineptitude of the government and its failings to protect the population and its basic needs, which would include attacks on governmental infrastructure.

2. **Gain International Support.** Actions must also take into consideration the international community. One of the key elements of this effort is the insurgent’s ability to adhere to the laws of land warfare in order to gain belligerent status throughout the conflict. Other factors include highlighting the governments or occupiers excessive use of force or human rights violations.

3. **Develop Insurgent Infrastructure.** Organize and employ operational, intelligence, logistics, and political infrastructure; infiltrate government agencies; develop capabilities tied to the desired effect; provide lethal and nonlethal support.

4. **Defeat Government forces (or the occupying forces).** This is done either physically or psychologically by attacking the security forces center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities and capabilities while protecting the insurgent force and US effort; support Coalition land forces during invasion if conducting shaping operations.

5. **Prepared for Postconflict.** The insurgents with the help of the US begin to develop the long-range plans on preparing the environment for the postconflict phases by establishing underground or shadow governments from the local to national level, identifying the personnel that will take over the key government positions at the transition, secure or protect key infrastructure, and psychologically prepare the population for the transition.
6. Shape for the Combined Forces Land Component Commander. When unconventional warfare is a shaping operation for a larger conventional decisive operations, then the insurgents set the conditions, such as forcing the continued commitment of forces to rear area security, providing intelligence and guides, establishing downed aircrew networks, and seizing or securing limited objectives.

In this case, the center of gravity is the population. The unconventional warfare end state would be the de-legitimized hostile government or an occupying power overthrown and conditions set for the establishment and protection of a new government.

Foreign Internal Defense Logical Lines of Operation

Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis provide a good example of the logical lines of operation in foreign internal defense: information operations, security operations, development of security forces, reestablishing essential service, developing government infrastructure, and promoting economic growth. All of the logical lines of operation are aimed at the center of gravity--the people. Like the insurgents, the government must gain and maintain its legitimacy from the people. The foreign internal defense end state is a “secure and stable environment . . . maintained by indigenous . . . forces under the direction of a legitimate national government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism.”

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302 Ibid.
Figure 3 provides another example of possible logical lines of operations again related to Special Forces foreign internal defense capabilities. They are:

1. Security Operations. The first priority for any government facing an insurgency is to establish a secure environment through population control measure, offensive operations, such as search and attack, cordon and search, or cordon and knock to deny the insurgents’ access to the population and freedom of movement.

2. Gain Popular Support. Gaining and maintaining the support of the population is the overall goal and path to victory since the population is the center of gravity, therefore it is imperative for long-term success that the population views the government as legitimate. It is equally important for the US effort to be viewed as legitimate versus being viewed as an occupier or supporting a puppet government.

3. Gain International Support. It is also important for the government’s internal defense efforts to be legitimimized, accepted and supported by the international community. To be successful, most governments will rely on the international community to provide economic aid or relief of debt and moral support.

4. Defeat Insurgents. If done correctly, the first three lines should de-legitimize the insurgents and lead to their lasting defeat. This line will attack the hard-core insurgents. Some may succumb to offers of amnesty, but most will need to be killed or captured through offensive operations.

5. Develop Host Nation Internal Security. Internal security forces, such as local and national police forces, key facility protection corps, diplomat security personnel, coast guard, criminal investigation, paramilitary forces for counterinsurgency, local and national level special weapons and tactics capabilities will be necessary to defeat the
internal threat as a law enforcement matter. The coalition forces will provide security for the entire country. Then as the internal security forces are trained, the coalition will transition to only protecting the nation from external threats until such a time as the actual national military force is trained, equipped, and can conduct unilateral operations.

As in the unconventional warfare model, the population is once again the center of gravity. The end state is a legitimate government that the population trusts and is able to detect and defeat internal and external threats.

Figure 3. Foreign Internal Defense Operational Considerations and Logical Lines of Operation.
Comparison of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense Logical Lines of Operation

Figure 4 now builds on the previous two sections and shows the significance of the differences between these two operations. In the figure the center of gravity is depicted by the box. The sphere floats in this box and its legitimacy is affected by the success, or failures, of US support. Although both unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are depicted simultaneously, only one operation would be conducted at anyone time against a government. Beginning with the unconventional warfare effort on the left, the logical lines of operations affect the legitimacy of the government. In a perfect situation, the government is unable to counter this threat and the government loses legitimacy and ultimately fails, leading to the insurgent victory which takes place when the “sphere” is dislodged to the right. This success can be further enhanced if conventional forces are added to the equation, which in theory will cause a much faster defeat of the enemy government.

Figure 4. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense Relationship Model
If, on the other hand, this is a foreign internal defense mission, the US efforts along the logical lines of operation are aimed at supporting the government and attempting to defeat or dislocate the insurgency. If operations progress well along the logical lines of operation, then the population begins to favor the government, pushing the sphere to the left. If done correctly, the sphere will continue to move left as the military, in concert with a responsive government, provides a secure environment and will ultimately lead to the separation of the insurgents from the populations. Success for this foreign internal defense is a strong, legitimate government capable of identifying and defeating subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency on their own.

The Transition Point between Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense

There is no discussion in doctrine of a transition between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. In fact, the idea that unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are related has never really been articulated. In a major operation or campaign involving conflict and postconflict environments, there is an identifiable transition period between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. The transition between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense happens at the point when US or Coalition forces have removed the regime and have become the occupying power or have installed an indigenous governing body, even if only for the interim.

US forces had a difficult time identifying that the insurgency was growing. Special Forces understood that something was happening, but didn’t understand clearly
that what was taking place was a transition from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if they may have suspected that the transition was taking place, finding and neutralizing the top fifty-five of the former regime in Iraq and senior al Qa’ida and Taliban leadership in Afghanistan became priority one. This was likely due to the fact that the goal was regime removal, but the order to kill or capture the top fifty-five led to the over-focus on this task by Special Forces and the other special operations forces.

In Iraq, more so than Afghanistan, the insurgents spent the first two months establishing their underground or clandestine command, control, intelligence, and lines of communication networks. Once their networks were established and secure, then they began to increase their capability to prosecute terrorism, guerrilla warfare and in some place, like Fallujah and An Anbar province, a low-level form of mobile warfare having been able to organize and employ large forces capable of holding terrain for short periods of time. In Afghanistan, due to a much smaller population of pro-Taliban and al Qa’ida fighters and less urbanized terrain, the insurgency has grown much more slowly over the last five years and will continue to grow at a slower rate. By the time that Special Forces and the conventional military identified a transition to foreign internal defense, the insurgency had already escalated well into the guerrilla warfare stage. Had this transition been identified earlier, counterinsurgency operations could have been conducted to disrupt the insurgents’ clandestine networks before they could be established and the insurgents could gain the initiative.
The unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense transition point can be modeled using “the State” versus “the Counter-State” relationship.\(^\text{303}\) The State is the enemy government or an occupying power. The Counter-State would be the insurgent elements assisted by or in conjunction with US forces. The goal is to either remain or become the State. For example, the US and its coalition partners, including the supported insurgents, are the Counter-State and use military force to overthrow the regime or the State.

The transition point is the point at which the Counter-State successfully defeats the regime and becomes “the new State.” An important revelation for the new State happens at the transition point. The new State must immediately switch its mindset and tactics to protect itself in order to now remain the State. The transition from the Counter-State to the State corresponds to the transition between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, as well as the transition between conflict and postconflict.

So what happens to “the old State?” At the time the old State becomes the Counter-State it has two options; accept defeat or not. If it chooses defeat, then the postconflict nation building will occur more rapidly and with less violence than has been encountered in Iraq, as in the case of Germany and Japan after they were occupied by the Allies in World War II. If the Counter-state does not accept defeat, then it begins using

\(^{303}\) The State versus Counter-State theory was originally based on a presentation on the relationship between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent by Dr. Gordon McCormick, US Naval Post Graduate School, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Division, presented at the Unconventional Warfare Conference, August 2003, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC.; for further discussion of Dr. McCormick’s “Diamond model”, see Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt’s article “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare (September 2005), 5.
tactics appropriate to its capabilities, either political or military, or a combination, to regain its State status. William Flavin explains these options in his article on conflict termination, “When the friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare.”  

The former regime elements in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan are examples of new Counter-States that have not accepted defeat.

The confusion between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense comes, much like it did in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the US and the Coalition became the State prior to the end of major combat operations. Flavin explains that the transition point, or what he calls conflict termination, is “the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict.”  

In Iraq, after the regime was defeated, combat operations were still ongoing, but inadequate steps were taken to ensure that the US and coalition protected the interim government and themselves as the State.

The fact that Special Forces never positively identified this transition and continued to conduct what they thought was unconventional warfare versus attempting to disrupt the budding insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is important. This failure to identify the shift from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense had a detrimental effect on US stabilization operations. First, the unconventional warfare mindset focused Special Forces’ continued efforts on hunting former regime elements or

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305 Ibid.
on other activities that were tangential or irrelevant to securing the State. The mindset
was that the mission was not over until all of the key members of the former regime were
killed or captured. In Iraq, this focus was provided by the “55-most wanted” deck of
cards. In Afghanistan, the hunt for Usama bin Laden and his associates continued
unabated, with all efforts focused on him.

In both cases, Special Forces efforts were focused on single individuals with little
regard for other more crucial missions aimed at securing the environment and the State.
This allowed the insurgents and the foreign fighters to establish underground elements--
command, intelligence, operational, and support networks. The establishment of
underground organizations allowed the insurgency to transition from a latent or incipient
phase to the guerrilla warfare phase.

The Transition Curve Model

One of the key observations of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is that at
some point in both conflicts, the operations shifted from conflict to postconflict and for
Special Forces particularly, from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense. The
question that arises is where did this “shift” or “transition” take place, with relation to
time, space, or effort? As shown in figure 5, graphing these operations with respect to
time and overall US effort, including unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense
operations, a pattern emerges that models what would be the “best case” scenario--a nice
clean bell curve that goes from minimal US effort and Special Forces presence in the
peacetime engagement phases and begins to rise as the decision is made to use military
force to overthrow or defeat another government. At the decisive point, the conflict phase
has been successful and the enemy government is defeated, which signifies the shift from
conflict to postconflict. This model provides a framework for mapping progress and for planning campaigns.

The Transition Curve (see figure 5) was originally developed to model Special Forces’ participation in full spectrum operations focused first, on the seven phases of US-sponsored unconventional warfare; second, on the identification of the conflict termination point which marks the transition from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense; and finally to model a nine-phased foreign internal defense operation and the eventual return to peacetime engagement. The graph was developed to correct the doctrinal misunderstanding surrounding the Special Forces missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The transition point draws a distinct line between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense to reduce confusion.

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306 The nine-phased foreign internal defense model was developed by the author based on his experience in Kosovo to capture the salient steps that must take place to return to prewar levels and peacetime engagement. For this study, they will only be referred in general terms.

307 The author developed the graph as an instructor at the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification course in September of 2003.
Figure 5. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense Transition Curve Model
The unconventional warfare phases are the same as discussed above, although “transition” has been substituted for demobilization. For this study, a non-doctrinal-phased foreign internal defense model was developed and used to allow the phases to be mapped on the transition curve. The nine phases used here start at the transition point (signifying the establishment of an interim government or occupation decree): phase I-gain control; phase II-secure the environment; phase III-humanitarian response; phase IV-training and employment; phase V-reconstruction; phase VI-sovereignty; phase VII-revitalization; phase VIII-neutralization; and phase IX-normalization.  

Modeling Afghanistan and Iraq

Now that the phases have been described, the transition curve will be used to model operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Afghanistan model (see figure 6) only shows the initial year to keep the focus on the transition phase and not what is happening today. Afghanistan is unusual, since it began with such a small decisive force, initially there were only three Special Forces operational detachments-Alphas, later building up to a total of seventeen by December of 2001 with very few conventional forces engaged, until the transition point and the establishment of the interim government. At the transition point, in mid-December 2001, larger US and coalition force build-up took place. However, the only areas that were secure were the major cities. Everywhere else was called the “wild, wild West.” The continued lack of security had made it difficult for any reconstruction effort outside the major cities forcing some nongovernmental

308 The nine phases were developed from the author’s combined experiences in Kosovo and Northern Iraq.

309 Captain T, interview.
Figure 6. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense Transition Curve of Operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom)
organizations to withdraw. US military civil affairs teams and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have become more active in an effort to pacify many of the unsecured areas.\textsuperscript{310}

The level of insecurity has been steadily increasing over time. This security problem can also be tied to the efforts of US military. In most cases, Special Forces have not changed their mission since the war began, to stay on the offensive against remnants of the Taliban and Al Qa’ida. Special Forces at this point should simply focus on establishing a secure environment by taking an active role in training indigenous police and military forces and acting as advisors to these units as they deploy in the outlying areas. This, in turn, will make the population feel more comfortable about providing human intelligence, which can then be acted on to neutralize the insurgent remnants.

For Iraq (see figure 7) it is obvious that the country is not secure and is potentially getting less secure as the insurgents continue to disrupt the stability and reconstruction efforts. This difficulty began with the uncontrolled looting at first, and now the US is playing catch-up to the insurgents. It was not until the insurgency had become organized that the coalition began trying to disrupt it, instead of disrupting it before it ever had a chance to get started.

The other interesting aspect of this graph is with respect to force numbers. Immediately after the conflict, it may have taken 130,000 coalition troops to secure the most difficult areas in and around the “Sunni Triangle.” However, over the first several months the insurgency began to grow in strength at the same time the conventional army

\textsuperscript{310}Dobbins, 140-141.
Figure 7. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense Transition Curve Model of Operations in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom)
was forced to take on multiple roles, such as training and advising, economic reconstruction, and local governance. All of these secondary tasks meant that there were few forces to establish security. Add to this the collapse of the Iraqi police and the disbandment of the Iraqi Army, as well as the US attrition based counterinsurgency efforts, the insurgency grew exponentially during the first two years. Now with current coalition and Iraqi troop levels, the security situation is still unfavorable, yet there are nearly twice as many troops with a total of 211,700 Iraqi security forces trained and equipped.\textsuperscript{311} The graph also shows that the US conventional forces have to make up the differences between the current indigenous force levels and what they need to be. Until this line grows to meet the US Force levels, then the US will have to continue to commit large numbers of ground troops.

Comparison of the Transition Curve Model Phasing and the Joint Phasing Model.

One question that arises from this analysis of the phases of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense is how do these phases and the transition point correlate to the new joint operational phasing? Figure 8 provided a visual example of the joint phases and the corresponding phases of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

It is apparent upon further analysis that how these phases match up to the joint phasing diagram depends if the unconventional warfare effort is the decisive operation or the supporting effort. It should also be noted that operational preparation of the

\textsuperscript{311}Department of the State, \textit{Iraq Weekly Status Report} (Washington, DC: Department of State, 30 November 2005), slide 8.
environment happens prior to the operational plan being approved by the President. In this sense operational preparation of the environment ends with the approval of the operational plan and the first phase of unconventional warfare begins. Once again this highlights that operational preparation of the environment is a different mission set from unconventional warfare and is applicable to any mission.

Figure 8. Joint Phasing Diagram with the Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense Transition Curve Superimposed.

The Future of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense

Unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense have a permanent place in the future range of military operations doctrine. The 2006 US Special Operations Command posture statement highlights this fact, stating, “[Special operations forces’] key role in the long-term fight will be conducting [unconventional warfare] and [foreign internal defense] to build foreign capabilities that deny terrorist organizations the ability to sustain their efforts.”\(^{312}\) However, in the same posture statement they define unconventional warfare as “working with, by and through indigenous or surrogate forces,” and foreign internal defense as “training host nation forces to deal with internal and external threats.”\(^{313}\) What are not clear are the differences in indigenous forces and host nation forces, nor does this definition of unconventional warfare provide the purpose of working with, by and through. The idea that unconventional warfare is working by, with, and through other forces, indigenous or surrogates, is not a new concept or point of confusion found only in the US Special Operations Command posture statement. The Special Forces definition of unconventional warfare found in FM 3-05.20 is the same as defined in JP 1-02, except that through, with, and by are added, “[Unconventional Warfare] is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.”\(^{314}\)


\(^{313}\)Ibid.

\(^{314}\)FM 3-05.20, 2-1.
One of the difficulties applying unconventional warfare as an overarching term to the war on terror is the context of the doctrine which shows that unconventional warfare is used to support armed indigenous forces aimed at overthrowing the government of a nation-state and therefore does not apply against the than it cannot be used against a non-state actor. Other than Afghanistan, al Qa’ida has not yet successfully occupied any other foreign nations. Operations using indigenous or surrogate forces that are not aimed at the overthrow of a government would more precisely be called foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism or counter-proliferation. All of these operations can doctrinally be conducted with surrogate forces, but are not unconventional warfare.

This subtlety is another important aspect of why words matter. An example of this is the CIA’s training of an Afghan unit to capture Usama bin Laden in 1998—a classic example of counterterrorism, not unconventional warfare as some would stipulate.315 Another example of this concept comes from World War II when Aaron Bank was given a mission to “raise a company strength unit of German defectors, military and civilian; conduct subversion, sabotage, and guerrilla actions; and above all capture high-ranking Nazis” in what was believed to be their last holdout areas in the Austrian Alps.316 Merely by the subversion, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare aspects of this mission it would seem to be a form of unconventional warfare, however, due to the short duration and limited


316 Bank, 72-74.
objectives of the mission of harassment versus overthrow it better qualifies it as a direct action mission.

In determining the future usefulness of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, three threat models have to be addressed: those within the borders of a state, those that transnational or non-state actors, and those in the amorphous “ungoverned spaces or failed nations.

In the first case, threats within the border of a nation, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense will always have important roles. The possible nation state threats are: hostile nations (Iraq), rogue nations (North Korea), states that sponsor terrorism and insurgency (Iran and Syria), and states that are seized or controlled by al Qa’ida, most likely within the caliphate boundary, are exactly what unconventional warfare was developed for—to overthrow regimes by supporting insurgency.

As the previous example and the historical analysis demonstrate, the future foreign internal defense possibilities and applications are endless. As has been witnessed, foreign internal defense can be used across the spectrum of conflict—from peacetime to high-intensity postconflict environments—where a government friendly or passive to the US needs help to effectively combat growing or potential insurgency, subversion or lawlessness. Thus, foreign internal defense is likely to be the primary mission due to the number of friendly countries that face insurgency while unconventional warfare will be reserved for the cases where there is a hostile, rogue, failed, or terrorist-sponsoring country.

The second case is against non-state actors or transnational threats that threaten regions or seek to upset the global balance and are not bound by borders. The problem
with applying unconventional warfare against a non-state actor that is not in control of a nation is that unconventional warfare was designed for use against a hostile government or occupying power within a state. Al Qa’ida is neither a state nor an occupier as of yet, although the Taliban-led and al Qa’ida supported Afghanistan could be the closest model. Al Qa’ida and its associated movements are better classified as a global insurgency. All three of these elements eliminate unconventional warfare as the correct overall operation term to be used to counter al Qa’ida or other non-state actors. The “global” aspect of this insurgency also does not support the use of foreign internal defense as an overarching term either, since the problem is bigger than a single nation, yet it is related to the defense of the current global systems or global status quo. In these cases, there will be some countries that are threatened by insurgencies supported by non-state actors, such as the insurgencies in Iraq and the Philippines, in which case foreign internal defense will the operation that has to be conducted to defeat these elements. In the case of a hostile regime that either supports a non-state actor, is a puppet of the non-state actor, or in fact has been taken over by the non-state actor, than unconventional warfare will be used to overthrow these unfriendly regimes.

The final threat model is that of the failed nation or ungoverned spaces. Failed states are best described as states that have no or minimally functioning governments. The Taliban run Afghanistan, without its al Qa’ida influences, provides a good example of a failed nation. Even in failed states, a State and a Counter-State can be identified. In the case of a hostile State, unconventional warfare could be used by supporting the Counter-State. The Taliban State and the Northern Alliance Counter-State in Afghanistan prior to 11 September may provide a good example of this relationship. In the case of a
failed nation, but with a friendly State, foreign internal defense could be conducted to strengthen the legitimacy and capability of the friendly State in hopes of developing a functioning government.

These failed states and the above premises on the State and Counter-State could also easily be described as ungoverned spaces as well, but in the context of this analysis, ungoverned spaces are areas where there is no effective government control, even though these areas are within the borders of a sovereign nation. This area may also extend across the border into neighboring countries as well, such as the tri-border region in South American, where Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina intersect, and there is no effective government control which enables criminal activity to thrive. In these cases the solution is to conduct foreign internal defense to help the government regain control of the ungoverned spaces, as the US tried during the White Star program in eastern Laos during the Vietnam War. Another solution, when there is no viable government to support in these efforts is to use a United Nations sanctioned operation or another international coalition effort, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to move in and provide security and build a government. The US could do this unilaterally, but based on the current operations and domestic support, it is unlikely that the US commit to such a mission. This mission would be the far end of the foreign internal defense scale and would resemble the US efforts in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and no effective government system operating.

The discussion on Special Forces unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense roles in the future is further complicated by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review which uses the undefined term “global unconventional warfare campaign” to
describe the campaign against al Qa’ida and its associated movements. Global unconventional warfare defined within the complete doctrinal context of unconventional warfare means “support to global insurgency.” Certainly this was not the intention of calling it unconventional warfare, but it does bring up a larger debate about the missions that Special Forces will be conducting. One problem is the misunderstanding of the definition and doctrine of unconventional warfare and the other problem is that there is a sense that anything that is not conventional must be unconventional with little thought going into the meaning of the words. Although well-intentioned, at some point the use of this terminology will likely have some semblance to the failed attempts in the summer of 2005 to change the global war on terror to global struggle against violent extremism or war on extremism because the global war on terror did not correctly describe the war. In the same way, “global unconventional warfare” has some political baggage based on the missing doctrinal context of unconventional warfare definition.

This leads to the final question, “what is the role of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense in the context of the Global War on Terror?” Regardless of how “transnational” these movements are, the sovereignty of the nation-states is still going to constrain US and coalition operations. Because of this, there are really three situations that unconventional warfare will be used for:

1. Operations against Rogue, Hostile Regimes or State Sponsors of Terrorism—a proven operational concept having been used successfully twice since 11 September in Afghanistan and Iraq. These operations will either be the decisive or shaping operation depending on the political sensitivity of the target country.
2. Operations against what will be referred to in this study as al Qa’ida states (AQ States) in which al Qa’ida is able to overthrow one or more of the regimes within the boundary of the 7th century caliphate. Unconventional warfare would be used to overthrow these regimes.

3. Operations in failed states when there is no effective government, but an element within the population, such as a tribe or ethnic group, is the State for all intents and purposes. In this case unconventional warfare will be used to overthrow this State.

In each one of these cases, as soon as the unconventional warfare or conventional operations have been successful, then they will shift to foreign internal defense in the same way Afghanistan and Iraq transitioned to foreign internal defense. Therefore, regardless of the operation, the end state will likely include foreign internal defense conducted once a friendly government is established.

For this very reason, foreign internal defense will continue to play a significant role in US engagement strategies. In a flashback to the past, foreign internal defense will be conducted for three reasons as well:

1. Primarily to protect friendly states threatened by insurgency, especially al Qa’ida sponsored insurgency, such as the Sunni insurgency in Iraq supported by al Qa’ida affiliated Abu Musab Zarqawi or state-sponsored insurgency such as the Shi’a insurgency supported by Iran.

2. Foreign internal defense during peacetime engagement under the Theater Security Cooperation Plan or during postconflict mission after the transition from unconventional warfare and or conventional operations.
3. To gain control of ungoverned spaces by supporting a weak government or some portion of the population that is in these areas and will support US and coalition efforts, such as the Hmong tribesmen in Laos, to regain control of these areas. In extreme cases, international intervention could be used, such as United Nations or other internationally recognized coalitions or alliances to gain control, establish a secure environment, and establish a government able to gain and maintain control.

Therefore, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense will be the primary missions of Special Forces in the future. Figure 9 provides the actual framework for Special Forces role within the Global War on Terror. The figure shows clearly the types of operations that will be conducted depending on the situation. Analysis of the US Special Operations Command threat model and the types of operations required for each threats pictured in figure 10 also supports the above conclusions.

Finally, figure 9 also shows the relationship between operational preparation of the environment and other missions. Operational preparation of the environment is not unconventional warfare, but applies to every Special Forces missions. Figure 9 shows operational preparation of the environment as the precursor to different types of operations. Because this mission has its own tasks associated with it, this may be the operation that emerges as a new operational concept. Another concept shown on the map is counterinfrastructure instead of counterterrorism to signify that this mission can be carried out against a regime’s infrastructure or the infrastructure of an insurgent group. This would also be a more proactive mission versus the current counterterrorism operations and could easily use “surrogates” or indigenous forces to conduct these operations, yet would not be unconventional warfare.
Figure 9. Special Forces Operations within the Global Counterinsurgency Effort

NOTE: CBRNE, AQL, AQOC and corresponding U.S. SOF effort icons are notional.

UW - Unconventional Warfare - Operations to overthrow or remove occupying powers or governments that are hostile, rogue, state sponsors of terrorism (those that provide external support or sanctuary), or are al Qaeda controlled.

UW/DO - UW efforts are Decisive Operations with conventional forces supporting (ex. Afghanistan).

UW/SO - UW efforts are Shaping Operations supporting conventional forces (ex. Northern Iraq).

FID - Foreign Internal Defense-Support provided to another government to protect the host nation from lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency while also denying sanctuary, disrupting freedom of maneuver and communication, and denying tacit support for global insurgent networks.

CI - Counter Infrastructure-To defeat/destroy/disrupt/capture hostile regime infrastructure or insurgent infrastructure and actions (Proactive; before an incident).

OPE - Operational Preparation of the Environment.

CP - Counterproliferation- To deny weapons of mass destruction (CBRNE) usage or proliferation by global insurgents.

CT - Counterterrorism- Hostage rescue or item recovery. (Reactive; after an incident)

HN/UN/NATO- Host Nation/United Nations/North Atlantic Treaty Organization efforts supported by the U.S. as necessary.
Global Unconventional Warfare against Global Insurgency?

For those that argue that unconventional warfare can be used to defeat an insurgency, David Galula provides some interesting insights. First he explains why insurgent warfare does not work for the counterinsurgent:

Insurgency warfare is specifically designed to allow the camp afflicted with congenital weakness to acquire strength progressively while fighting. The counterinsurgent is endowed with congenital strength; for him to adopt the insurgent’s warfare would be the same as for a giant to try to fit into dwarf’s clothing.317

David Galula also explains that if the counterinsurgent could operate as a guerrilla he would have to have the support of the population, which in turn means that the actual insurgents do not have the support. Therefore, if the insurgent did not have the support of the populous in the first place, then there would be no need for the counterinsurgent to operate in these areas. However, he does not discount the use of commando-style operations in limited forms. As he notes, “They cannot, however, represent the main form of the counterinsurgent’s warfare.” 318

Another applicable comment from David Galula has to do with the possibility for the counterinsurgent “to organize a clandestine force able to defeat the insurgent on his own terms,” the essence of the Global Unconventional Warfare concept. As David Galula explains:

Clandestinity [sic] seems to be another of those obligations-turned-into-assets of the insurgent. How could the counterinsurgent, whose strength derives precisely from his open physical assets, build up a clandestine force except as minor and secondary adjunct? Furthermore, room for clandestine organizations is very limited in revolutionary war. Experience shows that no rival—-not to speak of hostile—clandestine movements can coexist for long. 319

Summary

This chapter answered the secondary questions showing that unconventional warfare is the support to insurgency while foreign internal defense is the support given to a government to help that government defeat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The description and subsequent models of the transition from unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense help to clarify the relationship between these two operations: The

318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
final question on the role of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense with respect to non-state actor, determined that they are applicable as individual operations depending on the enemy threat in each country, but that global unconventional warfare is a misnomer. This chapter sets the stage to answer the primary question in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

This study set out to determine if unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, as currently defined, are still applicable to contemporary and future Special Forces operations. Without a doubt, the most confusing aspect of this fifty-year old debate is the definition of unconventional warfare:

Military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence gathering, and escape and evasion.\(^{320}\)

Although some would argue that the broad statement provides leeway in its application, what has actually happened is that in providing leeway, Special Forces have historically misunderstood the most basic element of the definition--support to insurgency. Much of the blame for this confusion is evident in the historical analysis presented in chapter 3--Special Forces leaders were trying to provide a niche mission that would assure Special Forces’ relevance throughout the turbulent periods after Vietnam and with the end of the Cold War.

However, the attempts to make unconventional warfare an overarching term and the birth of the idea that unconventional warfare is any operation conducted by, with, and through an indigenous force has had a grave impact on the forces’ understanding of unconventional warfare. With the rise of the non-state actor, there is new emphasis to

\(^{320}\)JP 1-02.
adapt unconventional warfare to this new threat regardless if it is the correct mission or not. The bottom line with respect to the current definition of unconventional warfare is that taken in the context of unconventional warfare history and current doctrine, it is applicable to today’s contemporary environment, as evidenced by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by itself, could be and is inadvertently applied to missions it was never intended. As the analysis shows in chapter 4, unconventional warfare has a significant place in future Special Forces’ operations when regime removal is necessary as in the cases of rogue or hostile regimes (Saddam Hussein’s regime), regimes that support terrorist or global insurgent organization (Taliban), and finally if al Qa’ida successfully seizes power in a country within the caliphate. In each of these cases, unconventional warfare will be a weapon of choice as either the decisive operation or as a shaping operation for other elements of national power.

As for foreign internal defense, the definition is clear and based on the analysis of the history of foreign internal defense, it will, without a doubt, continue to be applicable to future Special Forces’ operations. This is especially true in operations to overthrow regimes through conventional operations and or unconventional warfare operations, which will rollover to foreign internal defense. The clarity of the definition leaves little room for misunderstanding, “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”\footnote{Ibid.} The foreign internal defense definition provides one significant aspect that the unconventional warfare definition does not--it provides the conditions that are to be met by the operations “to free
and protect a society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency,” which leaves little doubt of the purpose of these operations from peacetime engagement to high-intensity and high-threat environments like Vietnam and Iraq. The foreign internal defense doctrine defines three types of support--indirect, direct, and combat--which provides further clarity. In today’s environment and the future, the key to success against the global insurgency will be through foreign internal defense to enable US partner nations to do exactly what the definition says protect themselves from “subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency,” all three ingredients necessary to deny al Qa’ida and its associated movement sanctuary, support, freedom of movement, and access to weapons of mass destruction.

Special Forces is the only branch specifically trained and ready to conduct these operations. Although the conventional military is doing its best to develop military training teams, they will never have the training, experience, and cultural awareness in these types of operations that Special Forces bring to the table. Special Forces is standing in the door of a new paradigm shift. The branch will either stay its current course, continually looking for relevancy, or it can seize the opportunity and take its place as a decisive or shaping force, able to conduct unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense as a key economy of force component of the Joint Forces range of military operations.

Recommendations

First, unconventional warfare should be defined as operations by a state or non-state actor to support an insurgency aimed at the overthrow of a government or an
occupying power in another country.\textsuperscript{322} In this definition, insurgency would an inclusive term for resistance or partisan operations as well. Like foreign internal defense, there would be three types of support or operational approach: indirect, direct and combat, the application of which would depend on the political and security environments.\textsuperscript{323} This would make the definition of unconventional warfare as clear as the current definition of foreign internal defense and would finally end the confusion by providing a purpose. Also like the foreign internal defense definition, the new unconventional warfare definition would be universal. In other words external support could be provided by Iran, Syria, China, Cuba, North Korea, and even Al Qa’ida.

With regards to the three types of support, or operational approach as used throughout this study, each would be used depending on the environment, whether hostile or denied. Indirect support would be used when the environment is denied. The indirect approach would focus on the insurgency’s self-sufficiency by indirectly providing lethal and nonlethal aid, money, and training through a third party or, in the case of training, in a third party country or in the US, as was done with the Tibetans. Direct support would include all aspects of support, but would put Special Forces in sanctuary or liberated areas within the vicinity of the conflict, but not in direct contact with the hostile government’s forces, as was the case with the Contras. However, during this type of

\textsuperscript{322}Jones. Although part of the recommended definition in the above mentioned article, upon further research the author has dropped “constituted” from the definition since there are fewer “constituted” or even governments as historically defined in the likely hotspots of today. Instead more and more governments are like the Taliban--not a government in the true sense of the word, but strong enough to seize and maintain power as the “state” versus some minority or weaker element, the “counter-state,” such as the Northern Alliance.

\textsuperscript{323}Grdovic.
support, there could be risk to Special Forces personnel if the hostile government launched punitive strikes or raids into these areas to disrupt or destroy the insurgents. Finally, if the operational approach is combat support, than Special Forces would conduct all of the supporting tasks mentioned above and would participate in combat operations as advisors to the insurgency and coordinate other US assets, such as close air support.

Second, the post-11 September unconventional warfare operations also validated the seven-phase concept of US sponsored insurgency. However, the final phase, demobilization would be better served if called transition. Thus Special Forces would begin to shape the postconflict environment as combat operations ended to ensure success in the stability phase by identifying potential threats, providing security, and transitioning the insurgents into local militia units that would disrupt any attempts by former regime elements to establish an insurgent infrastructure. The unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense transition point should also be captured within unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine.

Third, ensure a broader understanding of unconventional warfare throughout the military and interagency by describing unconventional warfare in detail in core joint and service doctrinal manuals. Currently, for example, unconventional warfare is not mentioned in the 3-0 family of capstone Joint publications or the Army’s field manual on operational doctrine. Instead, support to insurgency, with no reference to unconventional warfare, is described in single paragraph under stability operations. The success of unconventional warfare in Afghanistan demonstrated that SOF can perform economy of force operations by supporting insurgencies, the Northern Alliance in this case, and that these combined forces can conduct decisive offensive operations. SOF’s unconventional
warfare efforts in Northern Iraq advising the Kurds also validated the concept of using insurgents to conduct shaping operations in support of conventional forces.

Fourth, the Global Unconventional Warfare campaign needs to be dropped in favor of a better term that captures the counterinsurgency nature of this war, possibly global counterinsurgency, counter global insurgency, global internal defense, or global counter irregular warfare. To do this, the problem, global insurgency, must first be defined. A recommended definition is: operations by one or more networked non-state entities with the goal of overthrowing or dramatically changing the global status quo or disrupting globalization. The possible definition for the counter to this would be similar to the foreign internal defense definition, but on a grand-strategy scale:

A broad range of direct and indirect interagency, coalition, special operations, and conventional military efforts to defeat global insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness by denying sanctuary, freedom of movement, external support mechanisms, mass popular support, access to weapons of mass destruction, psychological and propaganda effects, operational intelligence, and armed offensive capabilities.

Under this definition a single overarching term may not be needed, but it would be the combined “effects” of operations across the globe. For Special Forces this would include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, operational preparation of the battlefield, direct action, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, special reconnaissance, and a new term, counterinfrastructure. Counterinfrastructure would entail destroying, defeating, disrupting, or capturing hostile regime, non-state actor, or insurgent infrastructure. This is a more proactive type of operation than counterterrorism which is generally reactive in nature. This operational term describes the current global interdiction of al Qa’ida and associated movements, as well as the operation taken to
capture former regime elements and insurgent leaders in Iraq. This operation would also include the use of surrogates.

Fifth, operational preparation of the environment needs to be added to the core special operations forces core mission, or more correctly, operations. This operation is not unconventional warfare, but an operation, in and of itself, that can set the conditions for the execution of the other core tasks. By making it a stand-alone mission, specific doctrine could be published for operational preparation of the environment instead of capturing this doctrine in other core mission doctrine which adds to the confusion.

Sixth, if unconventional warfare becomes an overarching term for operations by, with, and through indigenous or surrogate forces then the confusion over unconventional warfare will continue. A possible solution would be to define each of the Special Forces missions separately under this umbrella term. The above recommended unconventional warfare definition would instead be used to define a new term, such as support to insurgency or STI. The big three “by, with, and through” missions would be support to insurgency, operational preparation of the environment, and foreign internal defense. However the other operational terms, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, counter-infrastructure, direct action and special reconnaissance could also be conducted by through and with indigenous and surrogate forces and use the same three operational approaches as outlined for unconventional warfare. When used this way they could also fall under this overarching unconventional warfare term.\textsuperscript{324}

\textsuperscript{324}Jones. On further analysis of this problem, this is a better solution than the one outlined in the Why Words Matter paper which suggested support to insurgency and operations against non-state actors would fall under this overarching term. Based on the US Special Operations Command 2006 posture statement, the use of surrogates and
Seventh, this study has also highlighted a deficiency in the joint doctrine’s definition of insurgency. The current joint definition for insurgency does not address resistance or partisan operations against an occupier, reading: “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.” Instead of this definition, a new recommended definition for insurgency is “an organized movement or resistance aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government or removal of an occupying power through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”

Finally, one of the byproducts of this study was the identification of a trend which tries to leverage “unconventional warfare skills” to separate Special Forces from the rest of the special operations community. To some these are the skills that make up the warrior-diplomat capability of Special Forces. However, Special Forces soldiers use these same skills regardless of the mission and this is what sets Special Forces apart. If Special Forces are truly “special” compared to the rest of the special operations community it is because of the nature of their training and mindset that have not been readily transferable to other special operation forces. Therefore, these unconventional warfare skills are actually Special Forces skills and should be captured in this manner to not only leverage indigenous forces during other types of operations must be clarified based on the noted fact that direct action and counterterrorism were not listed as one of the operational missions of Special Operation Forces having been rolled up under unconventional warfare.

325 JP 3-0, V-13.
326 Rothstein, 102.
their uniqueness, but also to reduce the confusion between unconventional warfare the operation and a set of skills.

Areas for Further Research

During the research of this project, numerous other areas of research came to light that warrant further study:

First, was the Special Forces direct action and intelligence collection focus the most efficient use of these high-demand and low-density assets or could they have been employed as trainers and advisors to produce a larger positive effect on the growth and success of the Iraqi and Afghani security forces while simultaneously reducing the insurgency?

Second, would a large-scale employment of Special Forces detachments be a better long-term choice for training and advising than the conventional military training team concept? This is based on the premise that US domestic support for the prolonged operations in Iraq is a direct reflection of continued conventional force deployments. Therefore, these deployments could be shortened by using Special Forces to conduct economy of force operations and allowing the conventional military to withdraw.

Third, conduct a detailed study of counterinfrastructure operations. This would include not only unilateral US efforts, but host-nation, partner, and surrogate operations, and operations using former elements that have been “turned” in what are called “pseudo-operations.”

Last, could a Special Forces deployable task force and the related command and control structure and training capacity be able to develop a host nation military and internal security forces and systems filling the role of the Multi-National Security
Transition Command –Iraq. This idea comes from the doctrinal based premise that an operational detachment alpha can train, equip, and employ an indigenous battalion. Therefore, based on a logical progression of capabilities, a Special Forces company, also known as an operational detachment bravo, should be able to train and advise an indigenous brigade; a Special Forces battalion, an operational detachment charlie, should be capable of training and advising an indigenous division; a Special Forces Group then would be able to train and advise an indigenous Corps and a deployable Special Forces task force headquarters, such as a Joint Forces Special Operations Component commander of appropriate general officer rank, and his staff, would be able to train and advise an indigenous Army. This final level would be capable and prepared to do exactly what the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, has done, but instead of being an ad hoc organization, it would be an inherent Special Forces capability and responsibility.
**GLOSSARY**

**Antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

**Biometrics.** The measuring of physical human features to ensure that a person, once registered, can be identified later, even if his or her identity documents or facial characteristics change. (US Army Battle Command Battle Lab) **Campaign Plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

**Civil Administration.** An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (JP 1-02)

**Civil Affairs.** Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

**Civil Affairs Activities.** Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility

**Civil-Military Operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

**Combatant Command.** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

**Combatant Commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02.)

**Combatting Terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

**Conventional Forces.** (1) Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (2) Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

**Counterdrug.** Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (JP 1-02)

**Counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (FM 1-02, 1-47).

**Counterintelligence.** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorists activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

**Counterterrorism.** Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

**Country Team.** The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

**Direct Action.** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material (FM 1-02, 1-60).

**Foreign Internal Defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

**Host Nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations
**Hostile Environment.** Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (Upon approval of the JP 3-0 revision, this definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

**Indigenous.** Native, originating in, or intrinsic to an area or region. (FM 3-05.20)

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

**Internal Defense And Development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

**Joint Task Force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

**Military Assistance Advisory Group.** A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance

**Military Civic Action.** The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

**Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR).** Department of Defense activities that support US Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing US interests. (DoDD 3000.05)

**Paramilitary Forces.** Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

**Permissive Environment.** Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to
assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Upon approval of the JP 3-0 revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

**Special Operations.** Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas (FM 1-02, 1-173).

**Special Operations Forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

**Special Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (FM 1-02, 1-174).

**Stability Operations.** Operations that promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime development, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to a crisis (FM 1-02, 1-175).

**Stability Operations.** Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. (DoDD 3000.05)

**Subversion.** Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

**Support to Counterinsurgency.** Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

**Support to Insurgency.** Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**Surrogate.** someone who takes the place of or acts for another; a substitute. (FM 3-05.20)

**Terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)
Transition Point. Author’s definition for the point of phase shift from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense operations, or conventionally, a shift from conflict to postconflict.

Uncertain Environment. Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (Upon approval of the JP 3-0 revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

Unconventional Warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)
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