WHY DID THE US WANT TO KILL PRIME MINISTER LUMUMBA
OF THE CONGO?

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## Abstract

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WHY DID THE US WANT TO KILL PRIME MINISTER LUMUMBA?

...What happens to this land and its people will obviously play a decisive role in what happens to the areas around it. Should the Congo crumble into chaos and become a successful object of Communist penetration, the Soviet bloc will have acquired an asset without price...The avoidance of this very real danger is the immediate objective of our policy in the Congo...George W. Ball

At some time during that discussion, President Eisenhower said something – I can no longer remember his words – that came across to me as an order for the assassination of [Prime Minister] Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on...Robert Johnson, member of the NSC staff

The US role in the Congo crisis has always been analyzed in terms of the Cold War. The argument put forward by Washington at the time to justify Western intervention was that Soviet expansion needed to be checked. But does this argument stand up to the facts? It is true that the year 1960 surely marked a climax in the East-West conflict. On May 1, 1960, a U-2 spy plane was brought down in Soviet air space. At a summit meeting in Paris, Khrushchev called Eisenhower a liar. The summit was cancelled. The Congo crisis turned into a war of words. Washington and Brussels accused Moscow of wanting to get its hands on central Africa. Prime Minister Lumumba of Congo was called a “Communist” and a politician who was willing to open the door to Soviet intervention. During the UN General Assembly in the autumn of the same year, Khrushchev replied vehemently, accusing Secretary-General Hammarskjöld of being an agent of imperialism, intent on safeguarding the UN’s interests in the Congo.

On closer inspection, however, the Congo crisis was not really a war between East and West with hegemony in central Africa at stake. Moscow was certainly not opposed to extending its influence in the world. The Kremlin had neither the political will nor the means to threaten the West’s supremacy in the Congo. The Kremlin certainly did not want to support Lumumba unconditionally; it was more interested in a propaganda victory: Khrushchev denounced Western intervention to reinforce his diplomatic position in the Afro-Asian world. For the Kremlin,
Lumumba and African nationalism were throwaway items. Khrushchev told the US ambassador in Moscow, off the record, that “he was sorry for him [Lumumba] as a person when he was in prison but that his imprisonment actually served Soviet interests. What had happened in the Congo and particularly the murder of Lumumba had helped communism.” On the whole, Moscow’s support for the Congolese nationalists was only a symbolic gesture. Was it not significant that the US ambassador in the Congo, who had inundated Washington in the summer and the fall of 1960 with messages about the Soviet danger in central Africa, recognized later, during a (behind closed doors) Congressional hearing, that the Soviet support for the Lumumbists was never more than a “trickle.”

If the Communist danger in the Congo was largely exaggerated and almost non-existent, why did the US then invoke this argument? Why was the US policy built on such themes as “Saving Africa from the Cold War” and “Containing Soviet influence in the process of decolonization”? Why didn’t the US understand that Congolese independence was primarily an expression of the anti-colonial revolution and an outburst of African nationalism? And why did the Eisenhower Administration want to kill Lumumba?

These questions will be answered by analyzing the American foreign policy in the Congo during the Eisenhower administration (June 1960-January 1961). I have sought to determine what US policies were, how they were made, and on what assumptions they were based. I have also tried to set forth the social, cultural, psychological, and historical factors that gave rise to these assumptions.

**The beginning of the crisis**

The Congo became independent from Belgian colonial rule on June 30, 1960. A week after independence, the Congolese army in the capital Leopoldville and in nearby situated Thysville
mutinied (*Appendix A: Map of the Congo in 1960*). Other army units were soon involved in the mutiny. There was widespread looting and rampage directed mainly against the Belgians and other European nationals living in the Congo. Neither Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, President Joseph Kasavubu, nor the Parliament could stop the confusion. On July 10, 1960, Belgian paratroopers were sent into Congo ostensibly to protect Belgian lives and property. The Congolese saw this intervention as an attempt to reimpose Belgian colonial authority. The turmoil got worse. On July 11, Moïse Tshombe, president of the Southern province of Katanga, declared Katanga an independent state. Tshombe had the political and economic support of Belgium, the services of the Belgian military and civilian personnel, and the financial support of the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*, the Belgian Mining company. On 12 July, the Congolese Government appealed to the United States for military help to restore order and the crisis became a foreign policy issue for President Eisenhower.

**US policy**

What were the main options for American policy? Basically, there were three possible courses of action, as has been clearly summarized by George W. Ball: the US could do nothing, it could agree to the Cabinet request for American troops, or it could encourage a move into Congo by the United Nations. The US exercised the third option and chose to tackle the Congo’s chaos by a hastily assembled international peace force. Why did it do so? What factors influenced the decision-making process? And how did the interagency process affect this choice?

On the eve of its Independence, American officials viewed the Congo in light of **two broad assumptions** that were to influence their interpretations of individual events and the selection of alternative policies. These assumptions were shaped by **social, cultural, psychological, and historical factors**. The first assumption was the *International Communist Threat*. American
officials believed the basic premise of Cold War ideology, the threat of aggressive, monolithic communism led by the Soviet Union, to be valid for Africa too. They knew the Congo would be a valuable prize for the Communists due to its size, central location in Africa, and vast mineral wealth. They also thought that pro-Communist Congo would jeopardize Western sources of strategic raw materials. Most importantly, American policy-makers had some concrete ideas about how the Communists might take over the Congo. It was taken for granted that the Soviets would take advantage of chaos and turbulence in a country to push it towards Communism: this is the from-chaos-to-Communism syndrome. The second assumption concerned NATO solidarity. After World War II and the birth of NATO, America’s principal concern in Africa was for the sensibilities of its colonialist allies. The US was careful not to interfere and wanted to defer to its allies. Since Belgium had the major interest in the Congo, the US government considered she would take care of whatever problems developed; America’s role would be largely that of an understanding friend.

The US policy in the summer of 1960 showed the primary occupation of the policy-makers in preventing Soviet penetration and preserving the goodwill of NATO allies. Where the two considerations clashed, the communist danger was given priority. A brief illustration of these findings is in order.

**The assumptions - Arguments**

The first reactions of the United States government after the start of the turmoil stressed Belgian responsibility for order. On July 8, the American, British, and French consuls in Katanga’s capital Elizabethville made a joint plea for Belgian intervention. On July 10, Kasavubu and Lumumba met Ambassador Timberlake regarding US technical aid. Since they had spurned Belgian help, and since Timberlake knew that the American government was not
anxious for any unilateral involvement supplanting the Belgians, he suggested an appeal to the United Nations, which was made the same day.\textsuperscript{12} Timberlake’s initiative got the full approval of the State Department.\textsuperscript{13} Two days later, when the Congolese request for UN technical assistance had not produced immediate results, the impatient Congolese government contacted Timberlake again. This time they asked the US ambassador for 2,000 American troops “to insure the maintenance of order in the lower Congo and Leopoldville.”\textsuperscript{14} Consultations in the State Department on the transmitted request produced a policy statement. Secretary Herter called the Summer White House in Newport to get President Eisenhower’s approval, and the US position was announced the same day, refusing categorically the request and advising that multilateral aid through the UN was preferable.\textsuperscript{15}

This second encouragement of UN action was based on somewhat different considerations as the first. With spreading disorder throughout the country after the proclamation of independence of Katanga and the deterioration of Congo-Belgian relations after a Belgian military intervention in the port of Matadi on July 11, the from-chaos-to-Communism syndrome became the urgent and central preoccupation of American policy-makers. Their principal concern was that the Soviets would offer troops or military advisors to the desperate Congo government if the US would do nothing or if it would agree on the request for American troops.\textsuperscript{16} This last alternative would give the Russians an excuse to offer a contingent themselves – either to the Congo government or a fraction thereof, either now or in the future. Besides, the US was not anxious for a heavy involvement in mid-Africa, an area outside the line of direct military responsibility and lacking substantial American investment.\textsuperscript{17} Nor was it likely that Congress would approve an expeditionary force in Africa, especially when its immediate purpose was to restore order rather than to resist Communist aggression. Letting the UN stop the riot through a
peacekeeping force which excluded the great powers, seemed the most reasonable course, since it promised to block chaos and Communism at a relatively small cost to the United States. Thus, the United Nations would be the “umbrella” for US anti-Communist policy in the Congo.\textsuperscript{18}

Even as Herter was conferring with Hammarskjöld on means of injecting the UN into the situation, the US underlined its fear of Soviet intervention by dispatching the aircraft carrier \textit{Wasp} to the Congo coast. Officially the mission was to evacuate American civilians if needed.\textsuperscript{19} In reality there was a strong political motive. Eisenhower writes that while we sent no combat troops to the Congo, “we did station an attack carrier near the mouth of the Congo River.”\textsuperscript{20} It was quite clear that if Soviet troops entered any part of the country, American troops would follow.

The desire to prevent a US-Soviet confrontation and fear of Soviet penetration also prompted the US government to support the Security Council Resolutions of July 14, July 22 and August 9 1960 and the General Assembly Resolutions of September 20 and November 17, 1960.\textsuperscript{21} These resolutions, among other provisions, (1) called for the withdrawal of all military personnel in the Congo, especially Belgian troops, (2) reaffirmed multilateral aid and intervention through the UN, (3) urged respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the Congo, (4) ‘completely’ rejected the claim of Katanga as a sovereign independent nation, (5) condemned the Katanga secession and armed rebellion, and (6) declared ‘full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo…to maintain law and order and national integrity.’ The NATO allies did not support these resolutions.\textsuperscript{22}

US policies also showed deference to the policies of Belgium where these policies did not conflict with the desire to prevent Russian penetration. Washington approved the use of UN forces partly because Belgium had requested so on July 12. The US argued that Belgium had a
constructive role to play in the Congo. In the UN debates, the US delegate sought to prevent Belgium from being branded as an aggressor. US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the Security Council promptly dismissed any charges of Belgian aggression and insisted that the Belgian troops would be withdrawn if and when the UN forces were strong enough to restore order. The US government was therefore most satisfied with the policy of the UN Secretary-General at this stage of the Congo crisis.

However, the possible Soviet penetration remained the main US preoccupation. This concern culminated in a fierce reaction when by mid-August 1960, Lumumba accepted unilateral Soviet aid (18 Ilyushin planes with Soviet crews, 100 Soviet and Eastern European technicians, as well as nearly 100 trucks with spare parts). The CIA-station in Leopoldville cabled a flash message to CIA headquarters on August 18: “Congo [is] experiencing [a] classic Communist effort [to] takeover [the] government. There may be little time left in which [to] take action to avoid another Cuba.” The White House hastily called a meeting of the National Security Council. At the NSC meeting that same afternoon discussion centered on Lumumba. “…We are talking of one man [Lumumba] … being supported by the Soviets … and forcing us out of the Congo,” President Eisenhower declared. The tenor of Eisenhower’s remarks about Lumumba was strong enough for two officials at the meeting to conclude that the president had authorized Lumumba’s assassination. Robert H. Johnson, an executive member of the NSC, recalled “my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President’s statement came as a great shock to me.” Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray, later told the Special Group (in charge of covert operations) that his “Associates” (a euphemism for the President) had expressed “extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action” against Lumumba. The implication was that removal from office was not enough.
Accordingly, the Special Group agreed on August 25 not to rule out “any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.”

The next day, August 26, CIA Director Allen Dulles sent a cable to CIA Station Chief Lawrence Devlin in Leopoldville in which he stressed that, in the view of “high quarters here”, Lumumba’s “removal must be an urgent and prime objective.” Devlin was given still “wider authority…including more aggressive action” than he had been given before in order to remove Lumumba.

Shortly after Dulles’ cable to Leopoldville, CIA scientists began preparing a deadly poison that was to be put into Lumumba’s food. This “first aid kit” was flown to Leopoldville in September. It would be the first of three American attempts to kill Lumumba.

**Factors that shaped the assumptions**

In retrospect, the decision to assassinate Lumumba seems puzzling. Soviet intervention was certainly cause for concern, but hardly for panic. By the time the Soviet planes and crews arrived in Leopoldville, a UN army of 10,000 had already been assembled to keep the peace. Under these circumstances, the possibility that 100 Soviet and Czech technicians could pull off a “classic communist takeover” was remote, to say the least. Why, then, the decision to assassinate Lumumba? The answer, in my opinion, has to do with human overreaction: overreaction by an administration as a result of the social, cultural, psychological, and historical factors that shaped the assumptions of the officials and that blinded their judgment, not only with regard to Lumumba, but in the whole decision-making process during the beginning of the Congo crisis.

Responsibility for the Congo policy belonged to a small group of high-level officials who advised President Eisenhower. The option to use a UN peacekeeping force was recommended unanimously to the President by a group of officials consisting of Christian Herter, Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State, Livinston Merchant, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The most outstanding common characteristic of these officials was that they were mostly career foreign service officers trained in cold war diplomacy with a very ‘euro-centric’ view. After World War I, Herter had worked on the European Relief Council, and, as a Republican Congressman in 1947, he headed a House committee that surveyed European relief needs. Dillon had begun his diplomatic career as Ambassador to France.\textsuperscript{30} Former Under Secretary Robert Murphy, who retired in 1959, led the US delegation to Independence Day ceremonies in Leopoldville and was still a very influential advisor on Congo policy in 1960. As Ambassador to Belgium he had traveled in the Congo in 1951 and had become an ardent supporter of Belgian colonialism.\textsuperscript{31} Ambassador Clare Timberlake in Leopoldville, who was also a career diplomat, maintained close association with European diplomats in the Congo’s capital and was a strong advocate of European interests. Within this group and their subordinates, there was, therefore, fundamental consensus on the priority of communist challenge and NATO solidarity. These reflexes were also partly the result of past estimates of Europe’s strategic and politico-economic importance vis-à-vis Africa. As Senator Morse has put it in February 1961, historical choices were institutionalized in “the senior and powerful position of the European Bureau of the State Department” and the African Bureau “is largely staffed by persons who have spent many years on assignment in European countries and have well in mind the European point of view.”\textsuperscript{32}

An examination of top policy-makers’ social background helps explain their assumptions. Under Secretary Dillon was a life-long investment banker with worldwide interests. Dillon’s family firm had made a $15 million loan to the Congo in 1958 for investments in Katanga. Robert Murphy became, after his retirement, director of Morgan Guaranty Trust. Morgan was the
American bank that showed the most interest in the Congo. In 1959 and 1960 Morgan was the syndicate manager and a participant in two $20 million loans to the Congo, guaranteed by Belgium. Morgan had a participation in the Banque du Congo, led by the Société Générale, the holding company that controlled the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*. Further, Morgan was a principal banker for North-American mining companies with vast interests in Katanga. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense, was closely tied to Morgan interests through his family’s investment banking house, Drexel and Co. This firm has been in partnership with Morgan since 1850. Gates did not break his association with Drexel when he became Secretary of Defense.

The American ambassador to Brussels, William Burden, maintained during his ambassadorship, a directorship in American Metal Climax, whose Rhodesian copper interests were to make it the leading corporate defender of a conservative order, i.e. Tshombe, in Katanga. Therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that the Eisenhower Administration’s perspectives on the Congo, particular its attachment to Katanga, may have been strengthened by tangible interests. Certainly, they have affected the assumptions of certain policy-makers.

Historical and psychological factors have also influenced the American decision-making process in 1960. They clouded clear thinking and caused an overreaction by an administration fed up with Russian threats and ready to believe the most superficial of evidence that Lumumba was a “Soviet instrument”. In the summer of 1960, the Cold War was at its iciest. The United States had suffered a series of stunning setbacks abroad: the loss of Cuba, the expansion of the communist insurgency in Laos, the U-2 incident, and most disturbingly, the bitter confrontation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at their summit in Paris in May 1960. Especially, this last incident left the President furious at the Russians and bitterly resigned to the hopelessness of achieving peace in what remained of his presidency. In this context, the
perception of Lumumba became very troubling. Although he was considered the most capable politician in the Congo – he even had been the “unofficial” American candidate for premier in the spring of 1960 - and although he never publicly denounced the US, not even after his appeals for aid were turned down in Washington, no considered profile of Lumumba ever emerged from the NSC deliberations or from communications to the field, but rather an assortment of negative labels that descriptively ascended over time. At first, Lumumba was “radical” politically. Then, by some leap of perception, he became a “dangerous Marxist.” His acceptance of Soviet aid revealed him as a “Soviet instrument” according to Eisenhower and endowed him with a “harrowing background” according to CIA Director Dulles. Dulles found it also “safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba had been bought by the communists”. The role of the CIA in shaping the perceptions about Lumumba was very important and favored the decision for his removal.\(^34\) The Agency stressed more than once the analogy of Cuba, which by a single caricature obscured a multitude of Congolese realities.

**Other players**

The role of other players in the decision-making process on the Congo in 1960 and their influence on American policy was very limited. The military representatives in the NSC generally agreed with the point of view of Secretary Herter and their estimates of the situation in the Congo supported the ones of State Department officials. This was merely a result of the policy-making process set up by the State Department. An inter-departmental committee headed by Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite was responsible for preparing and implementing decisions. The State Department, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force were represented on this committee. Decisions were passed up to Under Secretary Merchant and Secretary Herter for their approval. Merchant also maintained a regular channel of
communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Problems and policy disagreements not settled by the interdepartmental group were discussed at this higher level. Unresolved matters were passed up to yet another higher level of decision-making. Herter, however, had the final say. This hierarchical process of making decisions with Secretary Herter at the apex ensured the predominance of pre-European and pro-Cold War sentiments.35

The involvement and influence of Congress in this stage of the Congo crisis was, surprisingly, very modest. The controversy over policy extended into the US Congress only after February 1961. Congressional opposition to US support of UN policy rose in August 1960, but was vague, and the role of Congress in overseeing policy-making stayed very limited during the Eisenhower Administration.

Conclusion

The key policy decisions during the Congo crisis were most of the time made in small groups, either at the NSC or within the State Department. There was always a high degree for cohesion and a drive for consensus. This clearly shows the presence of the concept of “groupthink” during the decision-making process. Another of Graham Allison’s findings about governmental politics also played a role in the policy-making. “Participants who represent certain organizations are influenced by that organization’s notions of its task, missions, routines, and associated culture. Individuals can be deeply affected not only by their organizational background, but also by long-standing association with a community of like-minded professionals sharing distinctive outlooks on the world.”36 This was certainly the case for the high officials in the Eisenhower Administration who had to deal with the Congo. The Europeanists and Cold War strategists in the State Department determined largely the course of action in 1960. They had a common professional background and some of them shared the same
social and business environments with other involved decision-makers. The culture in the State Department, materialized in the powerful position of the European Bureau, seriously influenced the choices. Additionally, the interpretation of certain events was affected by preceding historical events. As a result, American officials viewed the Congo in light of the assumptions of international communist threat and NATO-relations. There was very little feeling for African nationalism and even less understanding for the Congolese anti-colonial revolution and Lumumba’s role in it.

**Epilogue**

The Congolese authorities arrested Lumumba in December 1960. Belgian officials engineered his transfer to the breakaway province of Katanga, which was under Belgian control. A Belgian parliamentary commission of inquiry into Lumumba’s assassination revealed in its report in November 2001 a telegram from Belgium’s African-affairs minister, essentially ordering that Lumumba be sent to Katanga. Anyone who knew the place knew that was a death sentence. When Lumumba arrived in Katanga, on January 17, accompanied by several Belgians, he was bleeding from a severe beating. Later that evening, Lumumba was killed by a firing squad commanded by a Belgian officer. Lumumba was 35.

The same report also revealed that, although there is no suggestion of Washington’s involvement in the final plot, the CIA was fully informed of Lumumba’s transfer and the possible consequences.\(^{37}\)
Notes


3 Director of Central Intelligence A. Dulles cited in the “Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council, July 21, 1960”, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, op. cit., Document 140; Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Herter and the Belgian Ambassador to the USA, July 15, 1960, in *Foreign Relations*, op. cit., Document 128.


The province of Katanga was the domain of the Union Minière de Haut-Katanga, founded in 1906 by the Société Générale de Belgique, Belgium’s largest holding, which controlled about 70 percent (!) of the economy of the Congo. Katanga was pretty much run by the Union Minière; the company controlled the exploitation of cobalt, copper, tin, uranium and zinc in mines, which were among the richest in the world. The colony’s tax on the Union Minière made up 66 per cent of its revenues. In the fifties, Congo was the world’s fourth copper-producing country and the cobalt extraction in Katanga represented 75 per cent of entire world production. Most of the US’ uranium was imported from Katanga. Katanga had only just seceded when the Union Minière paid 1.25 billion Belgian francs (= 35 Mio USD) into Tshombe’s bank account, an advance on the 1960 taxes which it should in fact have paid Lumumba’s government. See: Ludo De Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, (New York: Verso, 2001), First published as De Moord op Lumumba by Editions Uitgeverij van Halewyck 1999, pp. 31-32.

US Ambassador in Leopoldville Timberlake attended a Cabinet meeting of the Congolese Government, at which were present the Vice Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Defense. Prime Minister Lumumba was not present. Timberlake received from the Cabinet a written invitation for the United States to send 2,000 troops to the Congo to maintain law and order. See: Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables. The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy, (New York: MacMillan, 1982), p. 8; Telegram From the President’s Assistant Staff Secretary to Staff Secretary Goodpaster, at Newport, Rhode Island, July 12, 1960 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. XIV: Africa, op. cit., Document 116. The request was discussed the same day by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter; see Ibid., Document 117.

George W. Ball, op. cit., pp. 6-7.


The United States has now before it an official appeal for assistance from the Congo Government, and the United States believes that any assistance to the Government of the Congo should be through the United Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included... I think you could also add that it is the opinion of the President and the Secretary of State that such military assistance would be better for the Congo if it did not come from the USA or any large Western nations", Press statement of the White House Press Secretary, cited in Stephen R. Weissman, op. cit., p. 59.

The military shared the State Department’s view on this issue. See Foreign Relations of the United States, Ibid., Document 119.

In the first half of the sixties it was appropriate to consider the UN a satisfactory vehicle for American policy. In the Security Council, the West held for example in 1960 four out of five permanent seats and three out of six elected seats. Also here was the veto. In the General Assembly the Western and Latin American states needed only 12 Afro-Asian votes for the usual two-thirds majority, and could easily block a hostile vote. In the Secretariat a high percentage of the staff was at least basically Western in outlook. Americans, British, and Frenchmen held 49 of 102 senior positions. Hammarskjöld’s closest advisors were all Americans. See Catherine Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 112; Harald K. Jacobson, “The Changing Nation”, in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (eds.), Foreign Policy in the Sixties, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 67-89.


See, as an example, the Documents 122, 135, 145, 156 and 165 of Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit.

Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, op. cit., Volume 3, Appendix B.

See, as an example, the Documents 124, 126, 139, 143 and 160 of Foreign Relations of the United Sates, op. cit.

CIA cable, Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60, in the Church Committee Report, op. cit. , p. 14.

26 The *Church Committee Report*, op. cit., p. 15 and p. 60.

27 Ibid., pp. 15-16 and p. 52.

28 Ibid., pp. 21-26.

29 About the two other attempts to kill Lumumba during the fall of 1960, *see* Ibid., pp. 42-43 and pp. 46-47.

30 Biographical information has been drawn from these sources: *Current Biography Yearbook*, 1958, pp. 191-193 (Herter); *Current Biography Yearbook*, 1953, pp. 161-163 (Dillon); *The International Year Book and Statesmen’s Who’s Who*, 1960, pp. 886, 971, 1101, 1260, 1280 and 1388 (Burden, Dillon, Gates, Herter, Merchant, Murphy, Satterthwaite).


Appendix A