


ARCHIVE COPY

98-E-6.

c.1

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE



U.S. Military Readiness: Taming the Dragon of Change

LT COL GARY ROGERS, USAF
COURSE NUMBER 5605
SEMINAR B

FACULTY SEMINAR LEADERS:
COL LEE BLANK & MR. LLOYD SALVETTI

FACULTY ADVISOR:
COL LEE BLANK

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 1998		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1998 to 00-00-1998	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. Military Readiness: Taming the Dragon of Change				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 17	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Change is like a dragon and there are only three ways you can control this dragon of change:

- *You can ignore it and when you turn your back on it, it eats you.*
- *You can try to control it but sooner or later it will wear you down and then it eats you or,*
- *Or you can ride it and adapt, anticipate, grow and prosper with change.*

- General Charles Krulak

INTRODUCTION

As General Krulak's statement suggests, the Department of Defense is faced with a decision on how to control the dragon of change. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has attempted to maintain Cold War paradigms for readiness and force structure. Congress has directed numerous Department of Defense studies of strategy, force structure, and readiness. From the Bottom-Up Review to the Quadrennial Defense, GAO Audits and informal studies have nibbled at the edges of force structure and readiness and have yet to address the hard issues. Even in response to the 1997 National Defense Panel Review the defense establishment has either ignored or tried to control the dragon of change.


This paper looks at how ignoring the dragon is impacting readiness and what should be done to change today's system to prepare for tomorrow. Current defense policies are maintaining operational readiness at the expense of future readiness. The Cold War force structure and strategies are de-capitalizing the United States military and must be abandoned to re-capitalize the force for the future. In response to the current de-capitalization, policies, programs and systems must be changed to prepare the United States Military for the future.

The readiness equation is complex and broad in scope. Military readiness is more than a measure of training or equipping forces. In actuality, it closely parallels the Department of Defense definition of military capability¹. Readiness spans time and is quantifiable in current and future capabilities. Today's decisions on military strategy, force structure, resources, modernization and

readiness levels impact tomorrow's readiness. Readiness also requires direction and planning to be effective. The current readiness assessment program forces a myopic, near-sighted view of readiness and does not lend itself to objective long-range planning for readiness capability.

WHAT IS READINESS?

The Department of Defense defines readiness as "the ability of United States military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy."² Kenneth Betts describes military readiness as the relation between available time and needed capability. He concludes that a country is militarily ready when the time needed to convert potential capability into the actual capability is not longer than the time between the decision to convert and the onset of war (Table 1). A country is not ready when the desired level of readiness is not deliverable when



needed.³ In Table 1, a readiness gap exists at Time A and not Time B. The readiness level before mobilization is irrelevant; the ability to generate the desired level of readiness over the time is the important factor. The operative

phase in the traditional definition of readiness is "meets the demand." Possibly a better definition of Military Readiness is the ability of military forces to meet the demands of the national military strategy over a given time. The trick then becomes building a coherent readiness plan to attain a military strategy and not allowing readiness to become an end to itself.

THE READINESS PIE

Beets further breaks readiness into sub-sets of mobilization readiness, structural readiness and operational readiness.⁴ Mobilization readiness pertains to the ability to close the operational readiness gap. Structural readiness is the mass (quantity) and quality of forces and equipment available. Operational readiness is the efficiency of a force and is a measure of training and effectiveness. Each of these, when factored over time results in a level of readiness capability. A lean, highly trained and ready military would possess a high level of operational readiness. A large, less trained force armed with high quality weapons possesses a high structural readiness. The current United States military has high states of both operational and structural readiness. Over time, structural readiness declines if the quality of weaponry declines through obsolescence. Furthermore, reducing operational and structural readiness risks not having enough mobilization readiness to realize the desired end state - the level of readiness needed to gain the military objective.

READINESS FOR WHAT?

Although "maintaining readiness is the Department of Defense's highest priority,"⁵ in the absence of a clear and easily defined threat, answering the question of what the United States military is supposed to be ready for has become difficult. Undoubtedly, the United States military should be ready to fight and win our wars. During the Cold War, strategists could answer this question which in turn resulted in both force structure and readiness decision. To counter the quantitative structural superiority of the Soviet military, the United States opted to maintain high qualitative structural and operational

readiness. Critics of the current National Military Strategy note the striking similarities of today's strategy to the Cold War era strategy despite the fall of the Soviet Empire and the emergence of the mono-polar global security environment.⁶

During the Cold War readiness proponents were able to readily identify a threat, build detailed plans to defeat the threat, and work through the bureaucratic process to resource the plans. The threat and the strategy drove the military to maintain a high state of operational readiness and a mindset developed which equated national survival with a keen, sharpened operationally ready force. This mindset did not fall with the Berlin Wall. As Builder says,

"the strongest threads to the past are not in the apparatus or forces; they are in our thinking processes - forged, honed, and enshrined during 40 years of successful intellectual wars to win National Security resources."⁷

The threads of the Cold War strategic thinking include readiness planning - a Cold War strategy demands Cold War readiness: to support the two nearly simultaneous Major Theater War strategy, the United States requires a high state of operational readiness.⁸ This mindset is having a major impact upon resources available now and what state of readiness the United States will have in the future.⁹

READINESS RESOURCES

The continued heightened states of readiness demanded by the current strategy leaves the military on the horns of a dilemma. Pay now or pay later? Does the military use available resources to maintain a high state readiness now or invest in the future? Resources must be expended to maintain equipment, train forces and incrementally modernize a given force structure. The post Cold War era de-capitalization effects of downsizing have lowered available stocks and negatively impacted the military-industrial base.¹⁰ Mobilization and future structural (quality) readiness is being exchanged for current operation readiness. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted the National Security demands

the military remain on the cutting edge of developments in military technology. The problem is whether to invest in long-term readiness or near-term operational readiness. The problem is further complicated by the reality of flat or shrinking defense budgets and a popular consensus that a large military is no longer necessary.¹¹

FORCE STRUCTURE

In the post-Cold War era force structure has reduced linearly despite the changing security environment.

The Bottom-Up Review force was endorsed by the Quadrennial Defense Review resulting in significant force reductions. Since 1988, defense downsizing has seen significant reductions (Figure 2).¹² The mix and type of

Figure 2: Defense Downsizing, 1988-1997

	Reduction
Defense Spending	30%
Active Military Manpower	34%
Division-Equivalents	40%
Combat Aircraft	43%
Naval Combatants	40%

Source: Richard Kugler and Tony Vanderbeek, *Where is NATO's Defense Posture Headed?* Strategic Forum, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, No. 133, (February 1998), p. 2

forces remains essentially the same as during the Cold War. The Armored Division remains the backbone of Army, the Fighter Wing for the Air Force, and Carrier Battle Group for the Navy. There are just fewer of each type of unit. When the National Military Strategy moved from the Cold War deterrence and containment to the post-Cold War strategy of engagement and cooperation the force structure did change. Failure to link force structure to a readiness strategy has placed the military in a position of high readiness for war and low readiness for engagement and cooperation missions. Is the current Cold War paradigm force the type of force the United States needs to accomplish its national security objectives in the emerging security environment? General Sheehan stated that one of the primary impediments to adapting our military to function in this new era is the Cold War force structure.¹³

READINESS REPORTING

The current process of assessing readiness is another remnant of the Cold War. During the Cold War it was important for Commanders to know their operational readiness, a snapshot in time and space of their ability to perform assigned missions (Figure 3). The

Department of Defense built a complex reporting system to measure readiness. The Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) has become the methodology of defining military readiness. SORTS generalizes a unit's readiness based upon specified areas of interest and include sustainment criteria. The capability of the system is limited, subjective and wrought with reporting loopholes. The inability of the system to provide a simple and accurate picture of United States military readiness has raised


numerous questions regarding both the system and actual military readiness.

Government Office Accounting (GAO) audits were directed due to Congressional concerns to investigate military readiness of units assigned to Bosnia in 1996 and the military readiness system in 1997. Both studies found the subjective nature of the reporting system led to confusing and often conflicting results.

Furthermore, the 1997 study pointed at three major weaknesses in the system:

- 1) Lack of emphasis on reporting long-term readiness
- 2) Use of insufficient indicators for a comprehensive assessment
- 3) Inability to measure integrated readiness of joint forces¹⁴

In response to previous GAO audits and congressional pressure, the Department of Defense has taken many steps toward "fixing" the readiness reporting system. The Joint Readiness Review process which provides the



commanders input into the readiness assessment still short term and subjective. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) attempts long-term assessment but fails to provide a broad look at future readiness.¹⁵ The current readiness assessment program is myopically focused on near term readiness, which hinders long-range forecasting.¹⁶

HOW MUCH READINESS IS ENOUGH?

The level of readiness the United States decides to maintain its military force is a major factor in the overall cost of defense. Numbers and types of troops maintained need training and exercises to maintain a given level of operational and mobilization readiness. Furthermore, if an accurate assessment of both current and future readiness were available, the planner's problem would be further simplified. Ideally, the entire equation is driven by a strategy to attain a particular military objective to counter a known threat to national security. Today, there is no significant military threat to United States security and a major war is unlikely to occur.¹⁷ Future military needs are uncertain. The question boils down to one of policy.

The cyclical nature of the Department of Defense budget dramatically shows demobilization after World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War (Cold War).¹⁸ The notion that the downward slope in United States defense expenditures is not likely to reverse while maintaining current levels is an optimistic viewpoint. During a April 16, 1998 panel discussion at National War College the panelists agreed that the decision to maintain a 2MTW force was a matter of policy. One panelist used, for example, President Nixon's decision to abandon the Two-War Strategy for the 1 1/2 War strategy in order to save money. The panelists further agreed that at the current force structure and readiness levels the defense budget was under-funded. A visiting Congressman noted that politically, in his opinion, the end-strength has bottomed out and that additional force cuts would probably not be supported.¹⁹

ALTERNATIVES

In light of fiscal realities, four options face defense planners that determine the amount of funds available to invest in future (structural and mobilization) readiness:

OPTION #1

This option is the QDR approach and the current Department of Defense policy. Maintain the two near simultaneous Major Theater War (MTW) strategy and a high state of operational and structural (quantity) readiness. De-capitalize the existing force structure through consumption and reduce structural (quality) and mobilization readiness. While characterized by less risk on the short-term, this option may actually be imposing more long-term risk by not modernizing the force or preparing for future missions. As COL Jablonsky noted, post-WWI Britain, when faced with dwindling resources, chose to spread its military around the empire siphoning funds from equipment, modernization, training, and schooling.²⁰

OPTION #2

Maintain the two near simultaneous Major Theater War strategy and lower operational and structural readiness to gain future readiness through modernization and investment in structural (quality) and mobilization readiness. This approach returns the force to the "Hollow Force" footing of the 70's to invest in the future. The risk of this option is that sufficient mobilization readiness or time will not be available to react in a crisis. An alternative to an "across the board" readiness reduction would be a policy of Tier Readiness as recommended by Senator John McCain in 1996²¹ and, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. Rudy DeLeon, in 1997.²²

OPTION #3

Reduce strategic assumptions allowing a smaller force while maintaining a high state of operational and readiness. Reduce de-capitalization with less consumption while gaining structural (quality/quantity) and mobilization

readiness. The risk of this option is that if the force sizing assumption proves wrong, the structural readiness will not be available nor mobilization readiness sufficient in crisis.

OPTION #4

The National Defense Panel recommended this option. Reduce strategic assumptions allowing a smaller force while reducing operational readiness and increasing investment in structural (quality/quantity) and mobilization readiness. This option risks that the force sizing assumptions might be wrong and that operational and structural readiness will not allow military actions in crisis. Some risk could be lessened through tiered readiness as in Option #2. This option is the riskiest of the four options presented.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER?

The NDP provided a refreshing look at transforming the United States military for the 21st Century while the QDR essentially rubber-stamped the Bottom-Up Review downsized force. Analysts agree that the current level of defense funding is not enough to support the two near simultaneous Major Theater Wars strategy while preparing the force for the future anticipated needs. The defense establishment must, as General Krulak said, ride the dragon of change.

The two near simultaneous major theater wars strategy under current funding levels is trading operational readiness, current structural and mobility readiness at the expense of modernization.²³ By failing to modernize, future structural and mobility readiness are lessened. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense, by maintaining the old Cold War readiness system, cannot manage or objectively forecast future readiness. The effect of the today's policy on future readiness cannot be quantified; bureaucratic politics rather than actual need is driving decisions.

It is difficult to move away from a proven, conservative approach to military policy. The current strategic "pause" does, however, provide a golden

opportunity to break with the past and prepare for the future. I propose a middle road for future readiness.²⁴ Option #3 outlined above provides less risk than Option #4 (the NDP approach) while providing for the future.

CHANGE REQUIREMENTS

By cutting the current structural readiness, additional funding will be available for investment. This drastic departure from the current readiness plan would require:


- 1) Cut structural readiness of both quality of equipment (cut current modernization efforts) and quantity (cut numbers of units) to something less than a two near simultaneous major theater wars and redirect investment in future readiness.²⁵
- 2) Provide a smaller force that can be maintained at a high state of operational readiness to reduce strategic risk.
- 3) Reductions in the use of military operationally. There won't be enough troops to go around.²⁶
- 4) SORTS should be retired for a more forward-looking system. The United States Air Force has proposed an integrated long-range readiness assessment and planning tool.²⁷ The envisioned systems would meet the needs of readiness planning by integrating programs into structure thus giving commanders a far reaching capability planning tool rather than a short-term analysis of selected items of interest.

Tier Readiness as proposed by Senator McCain and others should not be implemented unless a readiness management program is built. The system that AF 2025 envisioned is an excellent model to begin with and should be studied in detail. Once a readiness management program is in place, Tier Readiness could be implemented for additional savings. Tiered Readiness would prove to be very risky without a robust readiness management program.

READINESS MODEL

The National Military Strategy discusses the uncertainty of the current security environment and establishes the objective to respond to the full spectrum of conflict from "humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning major theater wars, and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingencies."²⁸ Because

no formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning such as exists for contingency and execution planning, efforts to shape readiness to meet future needs have no direction. The NDP calls for experimentation and suggests the United States must accept some failures (and risks) with a transformation strategy. To reduce risk and focus readiness efforts, a readiness model can be used to evaluate modernization programs. A simple example of the type model which could be developed using the AF2025 template is shown in Figure 4 which was derived from the Betts concept of readiness discussed earlier in the paper.



In this model, S is the size unit needed for any given mission, R equals the measure of readiness (actual readiness, potential readiness or readiness effort) of a unit and T equals time. This model suggests that reducing the size of a unit needed to perform a particular mission would lessen both the time necessary to increase a state of readiness and the steady-state level of readiness needed by the unit to perform a given mission. Furthermore, efforts to improve mobilization

readiness by shortening the time necessary to increase readiness would also be favored. The model drives efforts in doctrine, equipment and force structure toward efficiency (operational readiness) and seeks to lessen quantitative structural readiness and increase qualitative structural readiness.

While the logic of the model is intuitive, its use will result in a lighter, more effective force. Personnel requirement will be less, logistics tails shortened response time reduced and lethality unmatched. Technological advances which show promise in reducing readiness would be pursued while less promising technologies abandoned. For example, using the model to evaluate a new fuzzy logic technology, the Navy finds it can reduce manpower on a ship. The development of this technology would receive priority over a new technology that would require more manpower. Lessening the size will result in reducing both cost and risk.

Automated tools described in AF2025 would model the acquisition and development of project and weigh their value based upon objective readiness planning criteria. The United States faces the possibility that modernization efforts will become enamored with technology and as the NDP stated, with some failures in direction due to uncertainty and technological advances. If the readiness model is used, programs will be judged on value rather than emotion or subjectiveness.²⁹ Doctrine, exercises and training, and force structure changes could all be modeled using readiness criteria with similar results. Readiness capability modeling might lead to a totally new force structure, new missions for the National Guard and Reserve or research and development into a new technology that will improve efficiency.³⁰ Modeling will allow technology, policy, and force structure to become strategic means instead of ends unto themselves.

Budget constraints and finite resources demand revival of old and familiar clichés: work smarter not harder. Using readiness capability planning provides a more descriptive "ends" for the National Defense Panels Transition Strategy.³¹

Directing the efforts of the Department of Defense toward readiness and a capability based force structure will result in a military tuned to the needs of the nation.

CONCLUSION

To embark upon this change, numerous policy decision and improvements to existing systems must take place. The Department of Defense must abandon the Cold War two nearly simultaneous major theater wars strategy and force structure. Funds saved by lowering current operational readiness should be redirected into investment in future readiness. Furthermore, the Department of Defense must build a Readiness Planning capability that combines readiness assessment with readiness forecasting capability. Roles and missions must also be redefined for a smaller force structure. Finally, a readiness based modernization model embedded in the Readiness Planning System will provide direction for modernization efforts.

Using a readiness based model for modernization and force structure decisions will provide focus to modernization efforts. Readiness (operational, structural, and mobilization) metrics objectively quantifies efficiency of military acquisition and force structure decisions to reduce waste and security risks. The Department of Defense is trying to both ignore and control the dragon of change. The dragon is poised to defeat us by not modernizing for future readiness. The Department of Defense is also ignoring the new reality of the post-Cold War by maintaining a legacy force structure despite increasing budgetary pressure. The time is ripe to control our military destiny. It is time to ride the dragon by taking advantage of the strategic pause and investing in future readiness.

END NOTES

¹ Joint Electronic Library, Definition of Terms and Craig S. Moore, J.A. Stockfish, Matthew S. Goldberg, Suzanne Holyrod, and George G. Hildebrandt, "Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability," *RAND Report R-3842-DAG*, RAND Corporation, (September 1991), p 2. Military capability includes force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. For the purposes of this paper military readiness embraces ALL these factors.

² Joint Electronic Library, Definition of Terms

³ Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., (1996) p 27-28.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 40-52.

⁵ Jim Garamone, "Shelton Says U.S. Readiness Acceptable," Armed Forces Press Service, (February 1998), viewable at www.dtic.mil/afps/news/9802132.html.

⁶ Carl H. Builder, "Rethinking National Security and the Role of the Military," *RAND Corporation, Report No. P-7943*, (1995), Reprint p 7

⁷ *Ibid*, p 7.

⁸ Richard K. Betts, "Power, Prospects, and Priorities: Choices For Strategic Change," *Naval War College Review*, (Winter 1997), Vol. L, No. 1. Reprint, p 15. Dr. Betts states it would be a mistake to optimize current capability for two MRC

⁹ Baker Spring, "Calling the Pentagon's Bluff on Defense Review," *The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1124*, (June 1997), viewable at

<http://www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/library/categories/natsec/bg1124.html> Spring points out that the QDR was driven by budget not strategy and the friction between congress and the QDR because the QDR failed to address strategy as directed by congress.

¹⁰ Cliff Sobel and Loren Thompson, "The Readiness Trap," *Policy Review*, (Spring 1995), viewed at: http://www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/p_review/spring95/thompth.html

¹¹ Courter and Bernstein, "The QDR Process: An Alternative," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Summer 1997), p 23

¹² Richard Kugler and Tony Vanderbeek, "Where is NATO's Defense Posture Headed?" *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, No. 133, (February 1998), p 2

¹³ General John J. Sheehan, USMC, "Building the Right Military for the 21st Century," *Strategic Review*, (Spring 1997), p 11

¹⁴ GAO, "Military Readiness Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness," Testimony, March 11, 1997, (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107), p 1.

¹⁵ "Management Tools for Staying on Top of Readiness," viewable at <http://dticaw.dtic.mil/prhome/readtool.html>

¹⁶ Training directly affects readiness. Training is necessary to maintain operational readiness and is also integral in mobilization. Training sharpens the edge of a fighting machine. Training, however, requires resources and time to be effective. Furthermore, for any given unit, a point of diminishing return is attained as training levels and readiness increases. Peak military readiness is also a fleeting status and requires continuous reinforcement and thus is very expensive. A determination of the level of training necessary for a unit to attain a given level of readiness is also difficult. The United States military is currently implementing a DoD-wide program to define tasks, conditions and standards for training. While this program will provide a commander with data necessary to determine readiness for specific tasks it falls short of determining training readiness to perform specific assigned missions. Joint Tasks at the Strategic, Theater Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels have been identified. This effort enables the commander to determine training effectiveness and accurately identify mission requirements but falls short of determining readiness to perform specific missions. Exercises combine task training to meet exercise objectives. The current Joint Training System fails to link exercise requirements and

objectives to missions or operational plans. The Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) only captures an assessment of exercise objectives. Unit-level and below training will gain visibility of task readiness that in turn will be reported in the SORTS program. The military should be training for proficiency and exercising for readiness. Are we training for the sake of training? The recent 15% reduction in Joint Training to cut Operational and Personnel Tempo should have no discernable impact on readiness if unit and individual training tasks are performed -- readiness doesn't enter the current exercise and training equation. A thorough discussion of exercise and training is beyond the scope of this paper but worth investigating

¹⁷ George J. Tenent, Director of Central Intelligence, "Worldwide Threat Facing the United States," Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 105th Congress, First Session, (February 6, 1997), p 22.

¹⁸ Kevin N. Lewis, "The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning," *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough*, edited by Paul K. Davis, Rand Corporation, (1994), p 104.

¹⁹ In the spirit of academic freedom, the names of the panel participants and the visiting Congressman were omitted. Interesting enough the diverse viewpoints of all the participants seemed to converge regarding the force structure (size) and posture.

²⁰ David Jablonsky, "The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning For Use of American Military Power," *U.S. Strategic Institute*, Boston, MA (1996), p 12.

²¹ McCain, p 14-15. Tiered Readiness is a concept to marginalize an overall reduction in readiness. The concept maintains select crisis response and forward deployed units at a high state of readiness. The top tier units are specifically the units most likely to deploy. The bulk of the force maintained at lesser readiness. Senator McCain depicted a three tier system linking readiness with the likeliness of being deployed. The Department of Defense states that Tier Readiness is not practicable. DoD states the gains would not justify the investment in training facilities and equipment needed to surge during mobilization. Tiered Readiness sends shivers up the spine of military people who survive the Hollow Force era of the 70's. A Tiered Readiness program is likely to be met with exceptionally strong resistance from the military establishment. Besides dislike for the concept, Tiered Readiness would require a level of sophistication in readiness reporting and planning the military cannot provide. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning such as exists for contingency and execution planning. See also The Quadrennial Defense Review rebuttal of Tiered Readiness (Section VI - Readiness), "Assessment of Tiering "

²² Senate Armed Forces Committee Confirmation Hearing for Rudy DeLeon as Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, July 17, 1997. Mr. DeLeon suggested a Tiered Readiness during his confirmation hearing.

²³ Report of the National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century", *National Defense Panel*, (December 1997), p 5.


²⁴ Senator John McCain, "Statement of Senator John McCain on the Quadrennial Defense Review," Press Release, Tuesday, May 20, 1997, viewable at <http://www.senate.gov/mccain/qdr.htm>. This proposal offers the opportunity to fix what Senator McCain states as disconnect between near-term readiness and future modernization.

²⁵ John F. Troxell, "Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRC's as a Force Sizing Framework," *Strategic Studies Institute*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (1997), p 1 - 41. In this paper, the author suggest a force planning model which combines capability and threat-based planning. This hybrid model is an interesting compromise over a pure capability or threat based system

²⁶ Combined with policy to establish criteria for use of military force. See John Hillen, "American Military Intervention: A User's Guide," *The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1079*, (May 1996), viewable at:

<http://www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/library/categories/natsec/bg1079.html>

²⁷ Lt Gen Jay W Kelley, "AF2025," viewable at <http://www.au.af.mil/2025>. Chapter 5 The report entitled "Joint Readiness Assessment and Planning Integrated Decision System (JRAPIDS): Combat Readiness and Joint Force Management," proposes a system to replace SORTS. The proposal would incorporate force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability reporting into a system to forecast readiness (force capability). The focus is removing subjective assessment and replacing capability assessment with objective data using advanced modeling techniques. The JRAPIDS model is depicted below:



This system is elegant and flexible. I was very impressed with the proposal, visiting the AF 2025 web site is worth a trip. The readiness model described in this paper when combined with JRAPIDS would be an extremely powerful forecasting tool and provide the NCA with a system capable of planning and modeling readiness and capability. The Readiness Model presented in this paper would be a sub-system of this system AF 2025 recommends. Note the similarities between the JRAPIDS recommendation, Betts' structure and the Readiness Model in this paper.

²⁸ "National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now A Military Strategy for a New Era," (1997), p 2.

²⁹ The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is designed to. conduct joint warfighting capability assessments, consider overall balance between programs between near term programs and programs to recapitalize the force, and to evaluate the Service's programs. The envisioned system would not replace the JROC but provide a tool for objectively assessing programs. The diagram above is taken from the discussion in the AF 2025 paper. It shows how the Chairman's Readiness program takes input from the Services (traditional readiness) and the CINC's (joint readiness). The JROC oversees the process for CJCS. Please see Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley, "AF2025," viewable at <http://www.au.af.mil/2025>. Chapter IV, for a more in-depth discussion.