USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PRE-WAR PLANNING FOR A POST-WAR IRAQ

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>18 FEB 2005</td>
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Pre-War Planning for a Post-War Iraq

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
Robert Mendenhall

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
See attached.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT  b. ABSTRACT  c. THIS PAGE
unclassified  unclassified  unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
32

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The postwar situation in Iraq following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a result of failed planning efforts between the U.S. State Department and Defense Department. The State Department spent over nine months planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. OSD assumed postwar planning just two months prior to the invasion; while disregarding the efforts, team, and information already completed by the State Department's Future of Iraq Project. Disagreements and personal beliefs at the heads of the State Department and Defense Department lead to a failed postwar planning effort. The situation in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein was not what the U.S. expected. OSD believed that following the removal of Hussein from power, U.S. and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators by the Iraqi people. Soon afterwards looting and lawlessness ensued. U.S., coalition, and Iraqi security forces have been battling an insurgency making it extremely difficult to establish effective governance and reconstruction. Over 1500 U.S. military and countless Iraqi civilians have been killed, most after major combat ended. Recommendations are made to avoid risk of such failure in postwar efforts in future military operations. Postwar planning must be done early with emphasis in the interagency process with the overall objectives of the U.S. as the goal, not personal agendas.
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PRE-WAR PLANNING FOR POST-WAR IRAQ

This essay is not a post mortem of sorts of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It will be years before historians and other experts will complete the final analysis on the success or failure of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The situation in Iraq immediately following the fall of Baghdad is not what the U.S. expected. Of particular challenge today, even in the aftermath of free elections, is the persistent insurgency. This essay argues that the situation in Iraq, especially in the months following the end of major combat, was the result of a failure of the interagency process to prepare a coherent plan for an Iraq after Saddam Hussein. The U.S. Department of State spent about 14 months analyzing a post Hussein Iraq. By contrast, the Department of Defense spent about 90 days planning for postwar Iraq. In an attempt to join the two efforts, Secretary of State Colin Powell dispatched his team to the Pentagon. Once word of State’s efforts reached Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he quickly “dismissed” key Department of State players. Rumsfeld wanted control of the process and the outcome. He and others did not see State as “players” with the same view as Defense.

This essay begins with a review of the situation in Iraq from the toppling of the Hussein government up to the time of the elections in January 2005. Even though free elections were an objective of the Bush Administration, they came at an unexpected cost. The premise here is that the unstable post-war Iraq is attributable to disjointed efforts within the interagency. The Bush Administration efforts evolved from conflict primarily between “hawks” in Defense and “doves” in State. Administration officials did not intentionally fail to plan, but their differences prevented a coherent post-war planning effort for Iraq. Finally, this essay recommends the interagency process be strengthened by formally placing responsibility for post-war stabilization efforts within the State Department, especially following major conflicts or conflicts resulting in a regime change.

SITUATION

Postwar efforts have an important role in ultimately preparing a country for transition to a stable and ultimately peaceful state. Adequate planning for the post conflict phase is therefore central to success in war and the political goals that catalyzed the war in the first place. Postwar planning efforts should have at least the same level of effort as overall planning for the war itself. For the Iraq war, the war planning in the Department of Defense took place over approximately 14 months while the post-war planning was only about three months. The U.S. State and Defense Departments failed to create and capitalize on unity of effort for the postwar phase in Iraq. A disjointed, ad hoc process took the place of serious planning, eroding chances.
of or controlling and shaping the postwar military and political situation. Future postwar planning friction may be avoided through more coherent planning located primarily within the State Department (as recommended in a bill now before Congress), and through more effective functioning of the interagency process.

Iraq postwar Phase IV operations commonly referred to as Stability and Security Operations (SASO), fell victim to bureaucratic pathologies that prevented coherent coordination between the State Department and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). As a result, nearly 20 months later, the military and political situations in Iraq appear distressed at best. As of this writing, over 1500 U.S. military personnel and scores of Iraqi military and civilians have been killed. There were 143 U.S. military deaths through the end of major combat in May 2003; there have been over 1350 since. U.S. military forces, Iraqi interim security forces, and Iraqi police are fighting determined insurgents in Fallujah, Najaf, Baghdad's Sadr City, and practically everywhere else with frequent reports of increased resistance. The weapon of choice has been suicide car bombs, with 14 occurrences in September 2004 alone. Approximately 135 U.S. military personnel were killed in November 2004 during the U.S. led assault to reclaim Fallujah. In the days leading up to the January 30, 2005, elections violence against Iraqis and U.S. personnel increased. Since the successful elections the insurgency has continued its persistent campaign, but has been more focused on the Shi'ite majority.

Further, the Iraqi interim government, even with U.S. military and financial support, continues to experience great difficulty in attaining a favorable security environment and providing basic services. For example, most analysts agree a stable security environment includes an Iraqi military force, however, as of December 2004, only 50,000 of 135,000 police, 40,000 of 61,000 National Guard, and 3,500 of 27,000 Army are trained. In total, only about 42 percent of the U.S. Department of Defense goals (by 2006) are met. Employment and reconstruction has been at a considerably slower pace, too, than expected. As of September 2004, 111,000 Iraqis were employed while eight out of ten remained unemployed and thus possible recruits for insurgents. Economically, Iraq's infrastructure depends a great deal on imported oil. However, oil exports have been frequently cut or interrupted for extended periods of time due to insurgent attacks on the oil pipeline infrastructure forcing a decline of about 160,000 barrels a day. U.S. troop strength increased to 150,000 – 160,000 to support future stabilization operations in the lead-up to the January 2005 elections. Since the elections troop U.S. troop strength has dropped back to about 140,000. During prewar debates on troop strength, the estimates of requirements ranged from Col Douglas MacGregor's (USA, Ret) 50,000 to
Army Chief of Staff, Gen Eric Shinseki’s estimate of “several hundred thousand”. CENTCOM’s invasion troop strength ended at approximately 140,000. However, once Saddam Hussein fell, looting and lawlessness made it painfully clear that this number was not sufficient for internal security.

Costs associated with war in Iraq have spiraled. The U.S. has spent about $128 billion dollars rebuilding war-torn Iraq. And this year (FY05) the White House plans to submit a request for $70 -- $80 billion more. Some estimates put the cost by the end of 2005 at approximately $212 billion to $232 billion. While some officials placed the estimate to invade and re-build Iraq at about $200 billion prior to the invasion, the Bush Administration held back and would not commit itself to a figure. For example, Lawrence Lindsey, (then) White House economic advisor placed the cost at somewhere between $100 billion and $200 billion. But the Administration declined to place a number on the likely cost of the war in Iraq. Washington journalist James Fallows pointed out, “Before the war the Administration exercised remarkable ‘message control’ about financial projections... It was also politically essential, in delaying the time when the Administration had to argue that regime change in Iraq was worth a specific number of billions of dollars.” Rumsfeld refused to acknowledge any estimated cost projections (or inevitable war) because of his “unknowability of the future”.

GOING TO WAR

Many would argue the conflict with Iraq did not start in March 2003, or on September 11, 2001, but rather in August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. began a nearly 12-year effort to keep Iraq "in a box" of sorts through Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH. Operation NORTHERN WATCH was designed to prevent Iraqi forces from flying over Northern Iraq, particularly over Kurdish populated areas; SOUTHERN WATCH was designed to prevent Iraqi forces flying towards or threatening Kuwait. Both operations primarily enforced “no-fly” zones. During the decade of enforcement actions, U.S. forces flew thousands of sorties and bombed targets as needed for enforcement as well as defense. Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. began a march to war with Iraq.

War planning itself began well before the final declaration made on March 17, 2003. On the heels of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks on September 11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld promptly raised with his staff the possibility of going after Iraq as a response to the terrorist attacks. In this record of events we can see an early determination to remove Saddam Hussein. President George W. Bush also set his sights on Iraq following the
attacks of September 11, 2001. Although none of Bush's top advisors were in agreement, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, was a strong advocate for going after Saddam Hussein first. From Wolfowitz's point of view Saddam Hussein and Iraq would be an easier task than chasing Osama Bin Laden through the tough terrain in Afghanistan.

Additionally, Wolfowitz had long believed Saddam Hussein should be removed from power and was a leading advocate for this position. New Yorker Magazine reporter Peter J. Boyer characterized Wolfowitz as "a major architect of President Bush's Iraq policy and, within the Administration, its most passionate and compelling advocate." Wolfowitz believed that leaving Hussein in power following the 1991 war "spelled danger" to the U.S. He was not alone in this belief; then Secretary of Defense Cheney, Lewis Libby, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (now Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff) and Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, agreed with him. Further, during the first Bush (George H.W.) administration, Wolfowitz authored a defense policy paper outlining a doctrine of pre-emption to be used against "countries escaping the constriction of the superpower system," and among these countries was Iraq. He held Saddam Hussein in the same light as that of Hitler and believed the world should stand up to his tyranny and remove him from power. Wolfowitz was among a group of "neocons" who also believed that removing Saddam Hussein from power was a positive step forward in the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. In short, one way of securing Israel's future was the "domino effect" of spreading democracy in the Middle East.

Other neocons in the Bush Administration pulled alongside Dr. Wolfowitz. For instance, in January 2001, prior to George W. Bush's inauguration, Vice-President-elect Richard Cheney wanted the incoming President briefed on Iraq very quickly. He wanted to forgo the normal "around the world" brief for the in-coming President and get right to Iraq. Vice-President Cheney was Secretary of Defense for President George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) during the 1990-91 war when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Cheney had a "sense of unfinished business" from the earlier administration. On September 12, 2001, in a meeting at Camp David, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld brought up the subject of attacking Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell was "adamantly" against it. A vote was taken among those principal advisors present which resulted in a "4-0-1" against attacking Iraq at this very early juncture in the war on terror. Secretary Rumsfeld was the lone abstention.

Those trumpeting an invasion of Iraq put forward a series of rationales for it. One goal was to get U.S. forces out of Saudi Arabia. U.S. troops had been in Saudi Arabia since the end of the first Gulf War (1991) and lead to Saudi Arabia becoming a target of Osama Bin Laden too. Additionally, Wolfowitz was "confident" that Iraq was behind the first World Trade
Center bombing in 1993. He asserted that the only remaining fugitive of this bombing was probably in Iraq under Saddam Hussein's protection. Another link between the events of September 11, 2001, and Saddam Hussein was the belief that Iraq was connected, certainly in some way, to al-Qaeda. There is, however, a great deal of controversy over the evidence for this—or lack of evidence. Nonetheless, the Bush (43) Administration began exploring options to attack Iraq within a couple of months.

Planning basically followed two tracks. One of those was located in the State Department. According to journalist James Fallows, "In late October of 2001, while the U.S. military was conducting its rout of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the State Department had quietly begun its planning for the aftermath of a 'transition' in Iraq." In March 2002 the State Department established the Future of Iraq project led by Thomas Warrick. Mr. Warrick was a State Department expert in Arabic affairs and his team was an assembly of Arabic experts. Mr. Warrick's team was divided into six working groups: Democratic Principles and Procedures, Transitional Justice, Public Finance, Oil and Energy, Water, and Agriculture and Environment. This fully scoped effort addressed a myriad of issues from preventing looting and lawlessness, to maintaining continuity of the country's infrastructure (oil, water, and electricity), to installing a democratic government. The strength of this group was in its composition: it included Middle East, Arab and Iraqi experts from the State Department and some outside dissidents, to include Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iyad Alawi's Iraq National Accord (INA). Chalabi and Alawi's presence in this scenario later became a source of conflict between the State Department and Defense Department.

A second track was concentrated in the Defense Department. As of March 21, 2002, personnel under CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks began planning all phases of the invasion, which became OPLAN 1003V, focusing primarily on combat operations. From the onset of planning this effort concentrated explicitly on war fighting, but CENTCOM did not ignore Phase IV issues. Gen Franks understood that considerable reconstruction efforts would be required. These efforts had to be under civilian leadership so as not to appear as a military occupation force. He also preferred to leverage remaining Iraqi military forces too. A major impediment to planning for Phase IV was the continued disagreement between State and Defense over identifying an Iraqi leader to follow Saddam Hussein. Friction between State and Defense on who would run Phase IV planning and operations took its toll.

On the diplomatic front, President George W. Bush presented several speeches highlighting Iraq as an enemy of the U.S., starting with his January 2002 State of The Union Address when he declared Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil." Six months later in
a commencement speech at the United States Military Academy, West Point, the President underscored the possible need for preemptive strikes -- which became known as the Bush Doctrine. Accordingly, President Bush emphasized the United States' inherent right to defend itself through preemptive strike if there is judgment of an imminent threat against the United States. President Bush continued his public pursuit in other key speeches throughout the end of 2002. The U.S. Congress had been briefed and consulted, and passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of military force if needed on October 10, 2002. On August 14, 2002, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, presented the Administration's objectives and goals during a principals meeting at the White House. She listed Administration objectives as: free Iraq to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and Iraqi threats to its neighbors and its own population and assist in creating a democratic government, cut Iraq links to terrorism, maintain Iraq's unity and territorial integrity, liberate the Iraqi people, and assist them in creating a society based on democracy. She listed Administration objectives as: prevent WMD use against U.S. personnel and allies, to minimize regional dangers, to keep Iran and Syria from supporting Iraq, and to keep the oil flowing.

Later, on February 5, 2003, in a key presentation to the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary of State, Colin Powell articulated seemingly definitive arguments to the U.N. on the need to take military action in Iraq if Saddam Hussein continued to ignore valid U.N. sanctions, as he had over the past 12 years. Finally on March 19, 2003, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq.

PRE-WAR PLANNING

The planning effort itself was splintered between the State and Defense Departments. When State Department personnel and the CIA tried to coordinate planning efforts with the Defense Department, they were marginalized. For example, in early 2002 State and CIA attempted some "war-gaming" and invited defense planners to participate. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense or OSD learned of these efforts, defense personnel were ordered not to participate. After months of meeting and planning, the President designated the Defense Department as the lead agency for planning the post-war phase. Again, the State Department tried to coordinate efforts with the Defense Department in lead, but was rebuked. The State Department dispatched Mr. Warrick and his Future of Iraq experts to the Defense Department. Shortly after arrival Secretary Rumsfeld "kicked them out". According to Bob Woodward Secretary Rumsfeld's reason was: "...that as they got into postwar planning, the work needed to be done by those who were truly committed to this and supporters of the change and not those
who have written or said things that were not supportive." Secretary Powell and Warrick were seen as counter to the Administration's goal of regime change and a democratic Iraq. Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney were doing all they could to keep State, and those who did not come on board, out of the planning processes. They feared that the State Department did not harbor the ideological zeal that OSD and the Vice-President wanted applied to all elements of the regime change in Iraq.

General Franks, in his book *American Soldier*, briefly discusses this friction between State and Defense. In short, the "rift" was not simply a personality conflict between two very powerful people, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, but reflected deep bureaucratic divisions between the two departments. Franks saw the lines drawn as differences in diplomatic efforts versus military efforts; Rumsfeld vehemently believed the project should be a military effort. In Franks' opinion, "In many cases State viewed Defense as a bunch of hawks – advocating military action without regard for regional or international consequences. And Defense viewed State as a bunch of bureaucrats, fond of having meetings and writing papers, but slow to act on important issues." OSD was not convinced that State would provide them with the outcome they wanted, ultimately. This was basically a conflict between hawks and doves.

Expectations within the State Department were detailed in its Future of Iraq Project report. Among other issues, the report forecast looting, lawlessness, and power struggles. Members of the project's working groups expressed considerable concern about controlling a situation with the potential to spiral out of control and about the Arab perception of the U.S. military as an occupying force. Also, all parties seemed to ignore a study conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College forecasting nearly everything that would later go wrong in a postwar Iraq, add offering planning recommendations for these problems.

Some individuals in the Department of Defense had prescient concerns. For example, General Franks did not treasure the thought that he would be "MacArthur of Iraq," and worried about a long occupation, reconstruction, and American public expectations. Franks was concerned about security as well. Governing had to be turned over to civilians as soon as possible, but to whom? On January 20, 2003, National Security Presidential Directive #24 set up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in the Department of Defense. This was done a mere two months prior to the invasion and orchestrated by Rumsfeld. This was too little, too late. Jay Garner, a retired Army Lieutenant General and a veteran of the first Gulf War -- pivotal in preventing a humanitarian disaster among the Kurds in Northern Iraq -- was identified as the provisional authority and subordinate to General Franks. ORHA, lead by Jay Garner, was to be the key postwar planning cell for Iraq.
When Bush placed ORHA under OSD, Powell did not object. After all, following the conflict the military would have tens of thousands of people in the country available for reconstruction efforts and possibly better equipped and resourced than State to handle the effort. When Rumsfeld fired Warrick he left Garner's team considerably handicapped. According to Bob Woodward, Rumsfeld did not believe State was committed to war efforts; therefore, Warrick was not a welcome member of Garner's (Rumsfeld's) team. This turned out to be a planning effort initiated too late by those who were unfamiliar with important work already done and would leave the administration with a high risk of failure in the postwar effort, arguably the most difficult part of a conflict: winning the peace.

Other key individuals in DoD and the White House believed that U.S. forces would be openly welcomed – that they would be greeted by flag-waving, gracious Iraqis, contrary to Franks' opinion. In a pre-war interview on Meet the Press Vice President Cheney made a statement indicative of this belief..."I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators." This was an echo of Mr. Chalabi who OSD supported as an interim government for Iraq. Chalabi became a favorite of OSD in part because he gave the impression that ruling a postwar Iraq would not be that difficult. In an interview with James Fallows, Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy says, ""The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that everything was going to be swell." Chalabi did not rise to this recognition over night or by chance. His involvement goes back to the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act. President Clinton, under Congressional Legislation, was required to "designate" a replacement for Saddam Hussein should Hussein be ousted. Under the provisions of the act, Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress (INC) was designated. This elevated him to the top choice even though he was not favored in the State Department or the CIA. First, Mr. Chalabi had a checkered past: he had questionable financial dealings in the Middle East; he had not maintained close contacts in Iraq for the last 30 years; he was badly out of touch with the Iraqi people; and he had not won the confidence of regional leaders.

The likelihood of postwar success was undermined as well by a lack of unity of efforts after major combat ended. The State Department wanted to set the conditions for reintegration of ranking Iraqis to rebuild their country, but this communication failed to reach L. Paul Bremer, Pro-Consul for Iraq. The U.S. installed Bremer (superior to Garner) in early June 2003. Richard Clarke, whose last post in the Bush 43 administration was National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, gave an accounting of misdirected intentions. He described a situation whereby the U.S. asked Iraqi forces not to fight: "The message sent to Iraqi commanders through a variety of means was 'Don't Fight,' just let us get rid of Saddam."
But Paul Bremmer did not use that message. Instead he "fired" all the Iraqi Army officers, Baath Party members, and the Iraqi police, creating a huge unemployment problem. This move surprised Garner because it went against his plans to "vet" these people and to reintegrate them into Iraq and help with reconstruction. It equally created a huge wave of distrust among some targeted Iraqi's (mainly military generals) for trusting the "signal" they had received.5

Hawks vs. Doves: Bureaucracy in Conflict

In the previous section we observed two bureaucratic departments that had "locked in" on differing ideas. Their differences lead to considerable conflict that prevented effective planning. This section outlines how beliefs and bureaucratic decisions affected post-war planning.

One could characterize the conflict over a post-war Iraq as one between hawks and doves. Conflict arose primarily between the doves and hawks in the Bush Administration. For the most part, doves were centered in the Department of State (Colin Powell and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of State); the hawks were in the Department of Defense (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith). Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), privately characterized the Department of State as "dovish," or "The Department of Nice." Secretary Powell insisted on presenting the U.S. case to the U.N. prior to launching military action. Those like Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz and Secretary Rumsfeld saw this position as simply a "delay" of the inevitable. In describing Powell's position, Washington Post reporter Dana Priest put it this way, "Powell's vision of the world was not, as we see, the one shared by the other alpha males in the cabinet. And there are a group of them that are really formidable. George Tenet, Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld - they're all such dominant characters." Secretary Powell insisted on presenting the U.S. case to the U.N. prior to launching military action. Those like Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz and Secretary Rumsfeld saw this position as simply a "delay" of the inevitable. In describing Powell's position, Washington Post reporter Dana Priest put it this way, "Powell's vision of the world was not, as we see, the one shared by the other alpha males in the cabinet. And there are a group of them that are really formidable. George Tenet, Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld - they're all such dominant characters." Hawk supported military force: Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, Under Secretary Feith, and Vice President Dick Cheney saw an immediate chance to remove Saddam Hussein from power beginning in September 2001.

While organizational behavior is fairly predictable and cannot be ignored, an important character of bureaucrats is the "lens" through which they view issues...primarily their own. Political Scientist James Keagle in describing personal bureaucratic behavior explains the lenses through which people see the world. "Each player sees the world uniquely, through his or her perceptual lens. Belief systems and ideologies are part of these lenses as players define situations, develop operational codes, and promote their interests as they compete for various stages and prizes – for example, leadership, promotion, pay raises, prestige. No matter how hard we try, ultimately each of us views the world through only one pair of glasses – singularly
The personal lens is arguably the most important lens. And this personal lens was a very strong "lens of departure" between State and Defense.

Secretary of State Colin Powell spent two tours in Vietnam. As a result of his experiences he vowed never to repeat Vietnam. Later, while he was a military assistant to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, Weinberger introduced what became the Weinberger doctrine defining circumstances for the application of military force. Powell's career included several tours in Washington including Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under President Ronald Reagan. From 1989 through 1993 he served as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), during, both the Panama invasion and first Gulf War, DESERT STORM. During his tour as CJCS he advocated a position that became known as the Powell Doctrine. It holds that when military force is required then it should be "overwhelming and disproportionate" to the enemy. Later, as Secretary of State, he was not convinced that invading Iraq was the best course of action. And his views clashed with Rumsfeld's desire to undertake a regime change with a relatively small force compared to the Iraqi force strength. In the case of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a concerted effort was made to avoid the Powell Doctrine, an implication to keep the force size to the minimum necessary determined by planners.

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, had a long history of public service including a previous appointment as Secretary of Defense under President Ford in 1975 – 77. He came into office in his current service with a belief that the U.S. military was stagnant, unimaginative, out-of-date, and too large. His most aggressive agenda was "transformation" of the military. General Franks, Commander for US Central Command (USCENTCOM), believed too in a much smaller force relying on surprise and speed. Indeed, Franks' ideas were largely in line with those of Rumsfeld. In the end Powell, Rumsfeld, and Franks saw the events in Iraq through distinctly different lenses.

Paul Wolfowitz, in turn, has his own agenda. His strongly held belief going back to the first Bush Administration had been that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power. As Will Lyman, the Narrator for Rumsfeld's War describes it: "for neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz, changing the status quo meant getting rid of Saddam Hussein." As he saw it, a peaceful, like-minded, democratic Iraq was key to the Middle East peace process. With the neocons in control in the Pentagon and White House, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz would get what they wanted.

Even though the hawks were centralized in the Pentagon while the doves were the State Department, differing beliefs did drive differing agendas among the principal players in both departments. Secretary Rumsfeld was driven by his effort to "transform" the Pentagon. The
attacks of September 11 also demonstrated to Rumsfeld that the military was unprepared to move quickly and nimbly. When the President asked for a plan to go after Bin Laden in the days following the terrorist attacks the CIA was ready with a group of paramilitary personnel to work with Afghan warlords. The Pentagon had to scramble to come up with a plan for inserting special forces to work with warlords. Washington Post reporter Dana Priest paints the picture rather well describing the scene for PBS' Frontline, "And Rumsfeld's kind of caught flat-footed there because Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is giving him a plan that would take far too long to execute for anybody's taste and too many troops, something that's not nimble and flexible."

Political Scientists, David Kozak and James Keagle present 12 ways in which behavior may be viewed. Without detailing all 12 factors we can understand the dynamics of the Department of State and Department of Defense by examining just a few of Kozak and Keagle's points. For purposes here we will look at bureaucratic interests, organizational politics, and the possible impact of organizational changes.

First Kozak and Keagle argue bureaucrats and bureaucracy are driven by agency interests. Generally, both Department of State and Defense are interested in carrying out the priorities of the administration. However, the two departments address administration priorities from the perspectives of their respective departmental interests. The Department of State staked its position on diplomatic efforts in the United Nations and its "Future of Iraq" project. The Defense Department position was clear: Saddam Hussein had to be removed from power by force. OSD believed that the time for diplomacy was well past due and that any further efforts in the U.N. or otherwise would simply delay the inevitable. Both efforts saw an Iraq without Hussein, however, the question of who should be in charge after the fall of Saddam Hussein elevated the interagency conflict. OSD had its candidate.

Chalabi had been working his prior relationship with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith and others since the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act. Additionally, Chalabi had been working with a little known group, Office of Special Plans, headed by Feith at the direction of Rumsfeld. The objective of OSD's group was dissimilar to State's Future of Iraq project. OSD was trying to establish a interim Iraqi government with reliance on Chalabi as the new Iraqi leader. State had a broader approach to a postwar Iraq, and, along with the CIA, had doubts about Chalabi due to his checkered past. The Defense Department relied on Mr. Chalabi while the CIA pushed for Mr. Ayad Alawi, leader of the Iraq National Accord (INA), a former Baathist who fled during the first Gulf War. The CIA had funneled money to Alawi since the early 1990s in failed efforts to overthrow Hussein. The choice of Alawi to lead the interim government now, instead
of Chalabi, was also a compromise deal lead by the United Nations and worked through the United States.67

Secondly, the impact of politics is easily understood in bureaucracies. According to Kozak and Keagle, bureaucracies and their leaders have "certain resources and strategies" which make them successful in bureaucratic politics.68 Within this framework falls the strategy with which bureaucrats employ as well as the skills with which the bureaucrat is "endowed".69 A list of strategies could be infinitely long. Ralph Sanders, Professor of Public Administration, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington D.C. presents a few, which include reorganization, information manipulation, coalition building, and deadline manipulation. "Sometimes these ploys and stratagems are used to further the advocacy of a position; at other times, they are applied to counter advocates."70 Few would disagree that Secretary Rumsfeld has a great deal of political "savvy" from nearly 40 years of public service. He has honed his skills into an aggressive style that gets the results he wants. James Fallows has argued that Donald Rumsfeld was near the zenith of his influence as the war was planned.71 The Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) documentary, "Rumsfeld's War", revealed a defiant and confident Secretary Rumsfeld as he is handling critics, press and pundits alike following the U.S. military successes in the Afghanistan.72 The documentary underscored Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts at reigning in a Pentagon that he saw as slow, cumbersome and unable to respond quickly to crises. USA Today reporter, Susan Page, noted that among Rumsfeld's broad beliefs, known as Rumsfeld's Rules, one is: "Behold the turtle. He makes progress only when he sticks his neck out."73 He believes in taking risk (some argue too much risk), and, with few exceptions does not change key personnel in the middle of operations.

Another point argued by Kozak and Keagle is that "a major precept of organizational change and reform are essentially political phenomena."74 Secretary Rumsfeld displayed considerable dedication to an aggressive plan for transformation of U.S. military forces. Transformation was to lead to smaller, faster, flexible forces leveraged by technology. Rumsfeld's penchant for transformation drove his involvement in determining deployment units and the force structure that would eventually be used. Gen Shinseki indicated in a congressional statement that 250,000 troops would be needed; however, Mr. Wolfowitz quickly discounted the General's estimate. Michael Gordon, a writer for the New York Times, and recognized military author, related an interview with former Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White, "Rumsfeld just ground Franks down. If you grind away at the military guys long enough, they will finally say screw it, I'll do the best I can with what I have. The nature of Rumsfeld is that you just get tired of arguing with him."75 Even within the State Department, Secretary
Powell voiced concerns over the size of the invasion force. Secretary Powell challenged General Franks on the numbers but Secretary Rumsfeld quickly silenced the challenge. The confrontation seems to be simply quelled with General Franks' response, "it's not the same military". Secretary Powell remained the consummate General who quickly "follows orders" when the debate is over. Secretary Rumsfeld insisted the numbers be cut. But the underlying motivation for these statements was to maintain the momentum of his transformation efforts. Rumsfeld insisted on smaller, faster, more nimble, more technological operations which could invade quickly while maintaining a small footprint then turn the country over to civilian control. But Rumsfeld's early transformation demand left the military ill-prepared for stabilization and reconstruction, inviting looting and lawlessness as Baghdad fell.

Paul Wolfowitz, through Secretary Rumsfeld, saw, as an extension of a war on terror, to attack Iraq too, possibly even before going after Bin Laden. A big dividend to attacking Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein was that the U.S. could finally move its troops out of Saudi Arabia where U.S. forces had been for practically 12 years. A democratic Iraq also fit Wolfowitz's view of a democratic Middle East. Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism added momentum to the invasion argument.

In the Department of State (whose primary role is diplomacy and interfacing with other governments) Secretary Powell exerted pressure from a diplomatic standpoint. Secretary Powell's background served as a caution against a military action without a detailed plan on stabilization. Secretary Powell attempted to exert his department's influence and expertise not only in the international environment but within the administration too. But he was outnumbered by those who were drawn to an attack on Iraq.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Many lessons have come from the Iraq experience. One is that in the future the U.S. can not get involved in military operations resulting in a change of government without clear plans including plans for post-war responsibilities. A second is that the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion was a result of a failure by the State and Defense Departments to plan for a post-war environment, which could have lead to earlier successes after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The U.S. State Department as well as the Defense Department have the opportunity now to prevent future operations deteriorating in the same way as the immediate aftermath of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Certainly, to do nothing and allow a repeat would be unacceptable. In light of the risks that the U.S. faces in the world today, including international terrorism, future failures cannot be accepted. Continued interagency struggles will erode
confidence by allies and the U.S. public -- whose blood and treasure are expended in war -- as well as increase the cost on all sides. A couple of options for change are outlined here. One is to establish more formal controls for deliberate postwar planning under the Defense Department. A second is to establish an Office of Security and Stabilization within the State Department. Third, a "hybrid" approach is contained within a recent Defense Science Board recommendation.

First, the Department of Defense could take the lead and do a more comprehensive planning effort for post conflict operations. Although a great deal of planning expertise resides in the Department of Defense, it should not be the lead agency for Phase IV operations. DoD does have the manpower, economic resources, and equipment to implement a multitude of plans and provide a great deal of assistance under a myriad of circumstances. But nation-building is not a DoD core competency. However, DoD has not kept up training in areas required for building governments. According to the 170-page Defense Science Board report, 2004, "Instead of treating postwar rebuilding as a key tenet of defense planning, the Defense Department does not regard it as a core mission."

The report also underscores the fact that DoD has not included stabilization and reconstruction as its mission, concentrating instead on fighting militaries force-on-force. A DoD lead with armed military personnel also gives the impression of a military occupation which, in turn, may lead to a great deal of discontent within a foreign population.

A second option is to establish an office in the State Department with mandated duties to lead the effort in establishing security, stabilization, and governing a failed state. Such a mandate will require all other U.S. agencies to support this effort rather than allowing differing interest groups to pursue their own objectives at the expense of unity of effort. A lead governmental agency with resources and supported by the interagency process will add strength, talent, credibility and a wider dimension of expertise. This may also require transferring some economic resources from DoD to the State Department. A U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute recently argued, "To be successful, an occupation such as that contemplated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailed interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military commitment, and a national commitment to nation-building."

The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, December 2004, recommendations are based on two broad "dimensions -- management discipline and building and maintaining certain fundamental capabilities." Management discipline refers to the methods DoD uses in preparation for its operations, such as, training,
resource allocation, exercises, etc. Stabilization and reconstruction; strategic communication; knowledge and intelligence (to mention a few), are critical capabilities in postwar environments.

Beyond these two broad areas the study recommends that the U.S. Army be designated as the executive agent for stabilization and reconstruction and that DoS should be the “locus for this reconstruction integration.” On the surface this appears to set up the same relationship that prevented effective coordination and planning. Details in the study state that the U.S. Army needs to take stabilization and reconstruction activities as seriously as combat operations. A postwar environment transitions quickly to chaos if the military is not equipped, trained and prepared to initiate operations to improve safety, security, stability and force protection. The report author’s position is that the military must take actions to provide an environment favorable for the initiation of reconstruction. The military “creates a window of opportunity during which political and economic changes -- reconstruction -- can take place, thereby allowing a society to move from conflict to peace and democracy.”

In conjunction with the military, DoS should be responsible for the quick initiation of civil actions for stabilization and reconstruction. The DoS assumes control and coordination for civil activities and civilian involvement in reconstruction activities. These activities include deploying civil personnel as required, incorporating international and nongovernmental organizations, executing a portfolio detailed plans specific for the situation.

To avoid planning failures as seen in Iraq, the report recommends a presidential cabinet level coordinating effort. As an example it recommends DoD, through the combatant commanders, prepare detailed plans, particularly in countries, regions, or areas, where U.S. intervention is assumed to be likely. This contingency planning will be coordinated through a joint interagency task force (full time task force) with focus on the affected area or country. Depending on the level of interest or likelihood, the NSC will head coordination of stabilization and reconstruction planning efforts. One major point the report acknowledges is that these efforts will require more resources. The Army is not presently manned to provide dedicated stabilization and reconstruction focused efforts. DoS is not manned to provide the full range of efforts needed to fulfill report recommendations and neither the Army nor DoS budgets support these recommendations.

Senate Bill S.2127 (referred to as the Lugar-Biden bill), The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004, formally assigns security, reconstruction and transitory government responsibilities to the State Department. The bill calls for establishing an office within the Department of State with the responsibility for postwar stabilization and reconstruction. “The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 is
designed to strengthen the capacity of civilian foreign affairs agencies to respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises, including post-conflict and other complex emergencies.\textsuperscript{84} This bill is also supported by recommendations within the Defense Science Board study. The Bill authorizes a standing staff with DoS as well as $100 million funding. The bill, however, did not make it out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 108\textsuperscript{th} Congress. One step in the right direction, though, has been the establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State Department, headed by Ambassador Carlos Pasqual.\textsuperscript{85} The Ambassador heads an office staffed with 35 personnel from across the U.S. government to include OSD, JCS, DOJ, and several others.

The Department of State should take the lead while the Department of Defense provides necessary support in stabilization operations. Either department on its own does not have all the resources for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. But, both have core competencies required in a post-war stabilization phase. They need to cooperate. The best solution requires a renewed effort of cooperation across the interagency as recommended by the Defense Science Board accordingly: "The new approach is aimed at giving new structure to a process -- seen most recently in Iraq -- in which post-conflict plans and funding have largely been cobbled together in ad hoc fashion, delaying stability and reconstruction."\textsuperscript{86} Cobbling together postwar reconstruction should not be the accepted norm.

2Senators Lugar and Biden introduced Senate Resolution S.2127 (currently under review in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) to create an Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction in the U.S. State Department.


8Walter Pincus, "Senate Panel To Set Hearings On Iraq Insurgency, Shortages," Washington Post, 15 December 2004. In this article Gen George Casey is quoted as saying troop levels will grow to approximately 155,000 to 160,000 at least until after the Iraqi elections.


10Peter Grier, "The Rising Tab For US War Effort," Christian Science Monitor, 17 December 2004. "The cost of the war through the end of 2004 will be some $128 billion, according to Mr. Cordesman’s figures. That does not include major maintenance, the replacement of destroyed equipment, and costs associated with the need to recruit more troops and retrain those deployed to Iraq. Through 2005, the cost of military operations in the Iraq theater will be between $212 billion and $232 billion, according to Cordesman. By the end of 2007, it could be as high as $316 billion."

11Ibid.


13Ibid.


15Ibid., 26.
A "neoconservative" is generally defined as those who believe the U.S. should use its power, if necessary, to promote U.S. values. They support preemptive military action, unwavering support for Israel, Israel is a cog in the U.S. plan to democratized the Middle East, advocate a democratic Middle East starting with Iraq, and believe the U.S. is unnecessarily hampered, at times, by multilateral institutions. The term originated in the 1960s and 70s in response to other political and social issues at the time. (*Neocon 101.* The Christian Science Monitor online; available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/neocon/neocon101.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.)

20 Woodward, 9.

21 Ibid., 9.


24 Ibid., 25.


26 Ibid., 9.

27 Keegan, 99.

28 Fallows, 4.

29 Ibid., 5.


George W. Bush, Commencement Address to West Point, June 6, 2002 [on-line]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>; Internet; accessed 5 Oct 2004. “And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”


George W. Bush, Address to The Nation, 17 March 2003 [on-line]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>; Internet; accessed 5 Oct 2004. “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals -- including journalists and inspectors -- should leave Iraq immediately.”

46 Woodward, 283.
47 Fallows, 20.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 15.
50 Ibid., 2.
51 Franks, 421.
52 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 272.
56 Woodward, 284.
59 Ibid., 77.
60 Doug DuBrin, “Military Strategy: Powell Doctrine.” Public Broadcasting System (PBS) Newshour Extra; available from: <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/iraq/powelldoctrine_short.html>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2005. After the end of Persian Gulf War in 1991, Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined his vision for efficient and decisive military action. His plan is now referred to as the Powell Doctrine, although there is not an actual formal document named as such. Powell, currently the U.S. secretary of state, has recently invoked the Doctrine in articulating the justifications for the Bush administration’s preparations for war in Iraq. Essentially, the Doctrine expresses that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong support for the
campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.

61 Kirk and Gilmore, 6.
62 Ibid., 16.
63 Kozak and Keagle, 5-10.
64 Ibid., 6.
67 Ibid.
68 Kozak and Keagle, 7.
69 Ibid.

71 Fallows, 24.
72 Kirk and Gilmore, 18.
73 USA Today, 10 December 2004, Section A, 9.
74 Kozak and Keagle, 9.
76 Franks, 394.
78 Crane and Terrill, 1.
80 Ibid., ix.
81 Ibid.
62Ibid.


64Ibid., 1.

65Carlos Pasqual, Remarks at "The Challenge of Civilian Management in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies: The Lugar-Biden Initiative" Symposium. "My office was created within the Administration in response to a decision taken by National Security Council Principals in April. I was asked to take this position in June. I stated in July. In August we became official when funds were reprogrammed with the consent of the Hill. We now have 35 staff in what is an interagency office in the State Department. We have individuals from USAID, the Office of the secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, Joint Forces Command, the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Treasury, CIA, and soon we will have someone from the Department of Justice. This has really been essential to create a capability that not only provides a range of skills, but gives us the capacity to reach back to individual agencies for support, and frankly sometimes just to translate because there are so many cases where we have simply not understood each other across the interagency because we just spoke a different language. And getting over those vocabulary barriers in and of itself has been an important contribution. (Remarks presented by Ambassador Carlos Pasqual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls>; Internet; accessed 6 March 2005.

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