

The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference

A Personal Memoir

Herbert Goldhamer

Foreword by Andrew W. Marshall

Introduction by Ernest R. May

RAND

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
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Ongjin
Peninsula
Seoul
Yonan
Peninsula
Yellow Sea
Pusan

Preface

A reader familiar with Herbert Goldhamer's normally measured, judicious statements and carefully organized texts may well be surprised by the informal, conversational style and the unguarded comments that appear in these pages. The reason for this departure from the Goldhamer standard lies in the genesis of the material.

In December 1951, Herb had just returned from a stay of several months in Korea and Tokyo with the United Nations team that was attempting to negotiate an armistice in the Korean conflict. As Herb himself points out in a short preliminary statement that introduces his *Memoir*, he felt compelled to record his impressions as an observer and participant in these negotiations while they were fresh in his mind. It was for this reason that, immediately after his return, he dictated them into a Sound Scriber (the state-of-the-art recording device of that time). As Herb explained in the February 13, 1952 cover memorandum he sent along with the resulting transcription to Victor Hunt, head of RAND's Social Science Division in Santa Monica:

> This is the complete first draft of my Korean "Memoirs."... [It] is being transmitted in the form in which it came off the Sound Scriber discs and I have made virtually no attempt to smooth out the presentation. I would appreciate it if you would convey to any of the people who read this that this is simply a "dictation version."

Because the passage of time has conferred upon this *Memoir* the status of an historical document, the editorial hand has been largely stayed; and so it is the "dictation version," in the form of a RAND Paper, that is now laid before the reader.

While the substance of the transcript remains intact, minor errors in punctuation and grammar have been quietly corrected. Occasional long segments of text have been broken into separate, more assimilable paragraphs, and a few subheadings and explanatory footnotes have been inserted. In addition, certain bibliographic aids have been added to the original. The reader will find a map of Korea on which most of the places referred to in the text are noted. A list of abbreviations and of persons named in the text will be found in the front matter. Finally, a copy of the report Herb delivered at a meeting of the RAND Board of Trustees in February 1952, which was found among his papers and which highlights his major findings, has been added as an Appendix.

It was, of course, Herb's intention to use this off-the-top-of-the-head transcription as raw material and one day to organize it into a formal report. The press of day-to-day work interfered with that intention, and the Korean *Memoir* was put aside as something to be taken up again in retirement. When that time came, however, Herb was totally committed to his last work, *Reality and Belief in Military Affairs*, which itself was interrupted by his death in 1977. After the day in 1951 when he dictated this *Memoir*, Herb himself never again touched the manuscript, although it circulated in its original form within RAND.

A few words might be in order about the history of this manuscript, so long unpublished. The transcript was protected at the classified level until 1971, when it was downgraded and designated "For Official Use Only." Lifting of that restriction means that the *Memoir* can now be made available to the general public. Current developments in Korea and the Balkans make its publication timely even at this late date.

I want to express my gratitude to a number of people who believed that this document merited wider distribution and whose support and efforts in that direction over the years are responsible for its appearance now. Foremost among this group is Andrew W. Marshall, Herb's longtime friend and colleague, who wrote the Foreword to this Paper. Thomas Schelling, who brought the *Memoir* to Ernest May's attention, deserves special thanks for that act with its happy consequence: May's enthusiastic response to the *Memoir* led to his contributing the present Introduction. Several RAND alumni, most prominent among them Alexander George and Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter, have long urged that the *Memoir* be made available to a broader audience. Their efforts and moral support have been most heartwarming for me.

Many persons from RAND's present staff have also helped make the dream of wider distribution a reality. In the face of other priorities, Michael Rich gave the signal to proceed with publication. Malcolm Palmatier read the transcript and kept his highly refined editorial eye on balance and nuance. Margaret Schumacher, head of Publications, smoothed the path along the way. One could not have asked for a more sympathetic, careful, and intelligent editor than Denise Woerner. Corinne Maiers mustered her ample creative skills to design a cover that fit both the budget and my personal taste. And Rod Sato produced a serviceable map practically out of thin air. Roberta Shanman, RAND's Research Librarian, resourceful as ever, was able to help resolve puzzles about abbreviations and acronyms out of use for forty years. Where those resources failed us, old RAND hands James Digby and Alexander George came to our rescue with the answers. And special thanks are due Eric Larson, a RAND Graduate School Doctoral Candidate in the Defense and Technology Planning

Department, who read the *Memoir* first because of its possible relevance to his dissertation topic, and then again, at my request, so that he—as someone who had missed the 1950s—might alert me to matters that required clarification for present-day readers.

I am grateful to all of the above—and to many more friends and colleagues whose names do not appear here—who have urged publication of this *Memoir* over the years.

Joan Goldhamer
Los Angeles
June 1994

Contents

Foreword

On his return to RAND in late 1951, Herbert Goldhamer dictated a lengthy account of his experience as an adviser and observer at the Korean Armistice Conference between the United Nations representatives and those of North Korea and China. Those few who read his *Memoir* at that time felt it was an outstanding piece of analysis. It was the result of a fortunate conjunction of events, the right man at the right place at the right time.

Herbert Goldhamer was an extraordinary man. Readers of this volume will come to understand something of the strength and subtlety of his mind. Herb was by training a psychologist. He was born in Canada, went to school there and, after attending the University of Toronto, then went as a Rockefeller Fellow to the London School of Economics. In the mid-1930s, he was a graduate student at the University of Chicago in the Sociology Department, where he obtained his doctorate. I believe that he then, in the late 1930s, joined the Stanford University faculty. In 1942, he became a United States citizen. During World War II, he served in the United States Army as a medical psychologist and Chief of the Research Division, European Theatre, in a hospital unit that moved into France from North Africa, into Provence and up through Germany. After the war, he returned to the University of Chicago in the Sociology Department. I first met him in the fall of 1948, shortly after he had joined The RAND Corporation. Soon after that, I became a colleague and assisted him in a project that he was undertaking, which became the book *Psychosis and Civilization.*

What is most relevant for understanding his special competence as an analyst and commentator on the Korean Armistice Conference is his strong interest in the art of statecraft. He had read widely in the western literature on political analysis, the classical authors, Machiavelli, and so on. He had a special interest in how clever, astute leaders succeeded in increasing the power of their states, e.g., Louis XI of France. But he also had a strong background in classical Chinese literature on statecraft, including the Legalists: Lord Shang, Han Fei Tzu, and Ssu-ma Chien. He was particularly interested, given this background in the writings of Machiavelli and the Chinese literature, in the role of advisers to princes, kings, and presidents. He later wrote a book, *The Adviser*, which summarizes much of his reading and analysis of the special role that some men have played in the affairs of kingdoms and states. Indeed, in *The Adviser* Goldhamer has nearly as many citations to the ancient Chinese sages as to

western works. He was admirably prepared to observe, comment on, and analyze the strategies, tactics, successes, and failures of both sides of the negotiations.

Goldhamer had many other strengths. He was the junior chess champion of Canada and all his life maintained an interest in chess, as player and analyst. In the middle 1950s, he designed, organized, and directed the first political-military crisis game played at RAND, which was probably the first such game played in the United States. This is reported in a 1959 article in *World Politics*. Toward the end of his life he was the central figure in developing analyses of the political and psychological effects of military forces. Before he died, he was working on the political role of perceptions of power, which often contrast with the reality of military capabilities. The first three draft chapters of his planned extensive study, *Reality and Belief in Military Affairs*, edited by his wife Joan, were published by RAND after his death in August 1977.

The opportunity to be involved in the negotiations arose because Goldhamer had arrived in Korea at the end of April in 1951 to conduct a study based on interviews of Chinese and Korean prisoners about how the Chinese and North Korean armies organized, indoctrinated, and controlled the manpower at their disposal. He wanted to understand how the troops responded to the Communist systems of control and the impact of U.N. military actions upon them. And perhaps most important, he wanted to understand what psychological warfare measures might best exploit the weaknesses in the psychological dispositions of the Communist troops. As he undertook this study, he came to believe that contrary to the prevalent assumptions at higher levels in the U.S. military and the U.S. government, the Chinese were in a weak position and were having some trouble in controlling their troops. Desertions and, more particularly, desire to desert had increased considerably following the failed Communist spring offensive and the U.N. counter-offensive. He believed that the Chinese forces could not possibly afford to mount another offensive in mid-1951 or in the immediate future. He thought that a better designed psychological warfare effort by the U.N. forces could result in wholesale unit surrenders. Therefore, he concluded that the Russian intercession in the United Nations indicating that negotiations might be possible was based on weakness and was not a ruse or device to allow time for them to prepare to mount some further attacks. These findings were communicated to officers in the U.S. Air Force command with which he was working and subsequently to General Ridgway. This led to an invitation by an Air Force General involved in the negotiations to visit and observe the negotiations. What was initially planned as a two- or three-day visit became a stay of several months.

The result the reader will now be able to see. Initially Goldhamer's *Memoir* was seen as rather sensitive because the Korean situation was unresolved and because of comments that were made about some of the U.S. negotiators. Now Goldhamer's analysis and commentary will have a wider audience. My own experience of rereading the document after almost 40 years is to marvel again at the subtlety of the analysis, and the special insights into the strategies and tactics of *both sides*, that he was able to provide. An illustration drawn, not from the analysis of the negotiations, but from a talk that Goldhamer gave about his study of the prisoners will show what one can expect:

> I should like to note however that the CCF and NKA prisoners are on the whole quite talkative. They have little of the Western tradition of giving name and serial number and then shutting up. They received no indoctrination as POWs, although their total indoctrination time is far in excess of what any American soldier would tolerate. This illustrates a point of considerable importance in assessing Communist armies. The Chinese and NK soldiers receive no indoctrination of this sort first, because capture and surrender were not officially recognized except as treason or at least lack of military discipline. And secondly, because it would have run counter to another element of indoctrination, namely that the United Nations killed its prisoners. Few advantages in this world are secured without cost and the Communist attempt to secure one type of gain made the Communist soldier more vulnerable in other respects.

Goldhamer then adds that one of the aims of his study was to learn not only how to counteract Communist measures, but also how to identify and exploit new weaknesses these very measures themselves create. As in all strategically inclined minds, he understood that focusing on an opponent's weaknesses and exploiting them is central to success in war and statecraft and in all competitions.

In his *Memoir* on the Korean Armistice Conference, Goldhamer shows how American beliefs and values made for disadvantageous negotiating performance. He points out how members of the U.N. side were determined to behave honorably. The North Koreans and Chinese were able to take advantage of this attitude by constantly challenging their ethical behavior, forcing them to demonstrate their morality, sometimes to the detriment of the U.N. position. Also, in a section entitled, "Strength Leads to Failure, Weakness Leads to Success," Goldhamer points out that because the U.N. negotiators assumed the North Koreans and Chinese would be intransigent, ". . . there was a tendency to assume, in considering any possible line of action, that if the action was a strong and aggressive one the outcome would probably be a failure. . . . On the other hand, any action that was a sign of weakness, for instance a concession, was in some obscure way looked upon optimistically." What he has to teach future

American negotiators about themselves is potentially important, although it is perhaps difficult to see how to change the behavior patterns that are criticized.

Goldhamer's analysis has many valuable aspects. First, it adds to the historical record not only about the negotiations themselves, but about the perceptions and calculations of the time. It also sheds light on problems typical of U.S. negotiating teams. Those involved in such undertakings will find other useful insights, as suggested above. For example, the analysis can also shed light on the tactics of others, in this case those of the Chinese and North Koreans. While these negotiations took place a long time ago, these patterns and behaviors have probably changed rather slowly. The particular style, practices, and strategies exhibited by both sides in behavior reflect social and cultural conditions that persist over long periods of time.

If we look ahead to the next 20–30 years, Asia and some Asian countries will be increasingly important in the world. Understanding more of their approaches to statecraft and ways of negotiating with others, especially Westerners and Americans in particular, will be increasingly valuable. Herb Goldhamer's analysis should be of some significant help to those who interact with statesmen and representatives from China or those societies heavily influenced by Chinese traditions of statecraft.

Andrew W. Marshall
Washington, D.C.
June 1994

Introduction

Ernest R. May

Students of American history and students of international relations should be grateful to RAND for at last publishing Herbert Goldhamer's once Secret *Memoir* on the Korean War truce negotiations. Though the *Memoir* concerns only four months of negotiations that ran on for almost two years, it is a document illuminating not only the negotiations but the war as a whole. Perhaps more importantly, the manuscript provides insight into negotiation as a general process. Goldhamer's lucid, clinical analysis of what he experienced and witnessed is reminiscent of Machiavelli or at least of Callières.

To recognize the value of the Goldhamer *Memoir* as a historical document, one needs some sense of common generalizations about the Korean War. Prior to the 1980s, most histories described Truman as having decided to intervene to defend collective security, not Korea. In a massive two-volume history of the origins of the Korean War, Professor Bruce Cumings has arrayed evidence showing that many of Truman's advisers thought South Korea important in its own right, partly as a shield for Japan, partly as a possible point of departure for rolling back Communism in Asia. In a comparably exhaustive general study of American foreign policy from 1945 to 1950, Professor Melvyn Leffler presents evidence that Truman himself had by that time come around to a view that any Communist accession of strength, anywhere on the globe, would jeopardize American national security.[1] What is still not in doubt is that Truman and nearly all his advisers regarded Western Europe as the paramount theater of West-East competition, believed that the North Korean attack on South Korea was inspired by Moscow, feared that it was a rehearsal for a comparable attack on Western occupation zones in Germany, and lent military support to South Korea, nominally enforcing a

[1]Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981–1990), esp. II, chapters 19 and 21; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), esp. chapter 9.

U.N. call for restoration of the status quo ante, hoping that the U.S. military commitment could be limited both in scale and in duration.[2]

General Douglas MacArthur, presiding over occupation forces in Japan, became commander of U.S./U.N. forces. Rag-tag units sent from Japan succeeded in keeping a toehold in South Korea. With World War II combat veterans hurriedly recalled to duty and shipped across the Pacific, MacArthur end-ran the North Koreans via Inchon. The North Koreans fled. MacArthur pursued them deep into North Korea. Reluctantly or gladly, Truman let him proceed. (On this, historians have continuously differed.[3]) The Communist Chinese came into the war. It was then the U.S./U.N. turn to flee. MacArthur's forces finally rallied in the neighborhood of the original North Korean–South Korean boundary along the 38th parallel. MacArthur asked to enlarge the war by bombing bases in China, blockading the Chinese coast, and using Chinese Nationalist troops. With the support of General George Marshall (then Secretary of Defense) and General Omar Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Truman vetoed MacArthur's proposals. MacArthur appealed to admirers (and Administration opponents) in the Congress. Truman fired him. MacArthur returned to the United States, and it seemed for a time as if he might rally the public to his side. Truman's favorable rating in Gallup polls fell to an unprecedented low—23 percent. As Senate hearings went on and on, however, the fever for MacArthur fell. By summer 1951 the public and Congress seemed to have accepted General Bradley's memorable argument that a larger war in Korea would be "the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time."

While hubbub about MacArthur's firing continued in the United States, the Russians suggested the armistice negotiations that Goldhamer would observe. Truman agreed. So did the South Koreans and North Koreans and the Chinese. The war slackened. No actual truce was arranged, however, until 1953, after Eisenhower had been elected as Truman's successor, had gone to Korea, and, amid hints of possible use of nuclear weapons, retreated from stands taken by Truman on issues such as involuntary repatriation of prisoners of war. Also, by that time Stalin was dead.

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[2]Cumings, II, chapters 10 and 17–19, questions the extent of any Soviet initiative. Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), and Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *Journal of American–East Asian Relations*, II, no. 4 (Winter 1993), 425–458, provide strong confirmation for the American presumption of 1950.

[3]Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), chapter 6, makes a still-persuasive case for presidential reluctance; Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 80–88, arrays the evidence to the contrary.

Until the 1980s, the question of a possible larger war in Asia was seen as having been decided by Truman's firing of MacArthur. To most commentators of the time and to historians relying on official statements, newspaper and magazine reportage, and memoirs, the negotiations exemplified Truman Administration steadfastness. The Communists were thought to have strung debate out in hope that the Americans would lose patience and go home. Though some revisionists took a different tack, portraying the negotiations as evidence of stubborn American refusal to accept the fact of a Cold War setback, they, too, took the war's eventual outcome to have been determined by MacArthur's removal and the beginning of truce negotiations. Witness Stephen Ambrose, then in a revisionist phase, writing in 1976 that Truman could have had a cease-fire in 1951 but preferred an "acceptable" level of battle deaths in order to keep up public support for rearmament, but saying, "MacArthur's alternative of victory . . . had been rejected . . . . The Cold War would be fought Truman's way. There would be clashes on the periphery but none between the major powers."[4]

When internal U.S. documents on the armistice negotiations and U.S. policies in 1951–1954 began to be declassified and released in 1983–1984, they revealed that the actual course of events had been much more complex and more terrifying, and that the Korean War came much closer than most contemporaries recognized to becoming a much larger war, perhaps even World War III.[5] Though the new evidence has since been analyzed in some detail by Professor Rosemary Foot, among others, a new picture of the war has not yet imprinted itself on the minds of most Americans—not even those

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[4]Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938–1976* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1976), 215.

[5]U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1951*, vol. VII: *Korea and China* (1983) and *1952–1954*, vol. XV: *Korea* (1984). Actually, some of the story was disclosed earlier in Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), a volume in the official series, *United States Army in the Korean War;* but Hermes wrote in the reticent days before *The Pentagon Papers*, and his text only became fully understandable when the original documents were declassified. The other major sources appearing before release of official documents were Admiral C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), supplemented by Allan E. Goodman (ed.), *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); J. C. Murray, "The Korea Truce Talks: First Phase," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, LXXIX (Sept. 1953), and Andrew J. Kinney, "Secrets from the Truce Tent," *This Week* (Aug. 31, 1952). Murray and Kinney were colonels on Joy's staff. Joy's book and diary, though improved by his collaborators and editors, bear out the common opinion in Korea, as reported by Goldhamer, that Joy was "a somewhat bungling, oldish and indecisive person." There is, incidentally, yet another diary of the conference, this one kept by Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, a participant of much higher intelligence and perspicuity than Admiral Joy. It is still in manuscript but will be extensively used by David Alan Rosenberg in a forthcoming biography of Burke.

of professional historians who write textbooks on United States history.[6] Publication of the Goldhamer *Memoir* may help to make the truth better understood.

At the time of the Russian armistice initiative, U.S./U.N. forces had just stopped retreating, stabilized a line, and begun to push the Communists back. MacArthur's successor, General Matthew B. Ridgway, and Ridgway's successor as commander of the Eighth Army, General James A. Van Fleet, suspected that it was Russia's aim to demoralize and distract the West and provide cover for the North Koreans and Chinese to prepare a further offensive. Intelligence reports on movements of troops and supplies were entirely consistent with such a hypothesis.[7]

In agreeing to armistice negotiations, Ridgway and Van Fleet felt that they were yielding to pressure from Washington, which they interpreted as stemming from the State Department. They insisted that negotiations relate exclusively to military arrangements and that the principals be Ridgway and his North Korean and Chinese opposite numbers. To conduct actual negotiations, Ridgway named Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy and three less senior flag or general officers also subordinate to him in Tokyo. This team did not communicate with Washington except through him, and he and the Joint Chiefs combined to resist assignment of any high-level State Department or other civilians as official advisers to the delegation or to him.[8]

Ridgway had been a gallant paratroop leader. He was a methodical and sometimes inspiring commander, thought to care more about his men, and less about his own reputation, than had MacArthur. Later, as Chief of Staff of the Army, he would oppose the Eisenhower Administration's strategy of "massive retaliation." Because of this and because of the earlier contrast with MacArthur, he was lionized by some "defense intellectuals," then mostly Democrats. But Ridgway was not their kind. He was no Maxwell Taylor. The hand grenade he habitually attached to some part of his uniform was more than symbolic. Ridgway had not disagreed in principle with MacArthur's recommendations. He kept around him many of the staff officers who had helped to frame them. The attitudes prevalent at his headquarters are suggested in a document Ridgway signed in early August 1951. It described for the benefit of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the general instructions he was giving to Joy and the negotiating team:

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[6]Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

[7]See, for example, CinCFE (Ridgway) to JCS, July 2, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, VII, 610–611.

[8]JCS to CinCFE, July 9, 1951, ibid., 640ff.

> The armistice talks are military. They are neither political nor diplomatic. Hence, in these discussions, the language of diplomacy is inappropriate and ineffective.
>
> The discussions are between soldiers. [Half] of them are Communists who understand only what they want to understand; who consider courtesy as concession and concession as weakness; who are uninhibited in repudiating their own solemn obligations; who view such obligations solely as means for attaining their ends; who attained to power through murderous conspiracy and who remain in power by that and other equally infamous practices.
>
> To sit down with these men and deal with them as representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride one's own dignity and to invite the disaster their treachery will inevitably bring upon us.
>
> I propose to direct the U.N. delegation to govern its utterances accordingly and while remaining, as they have, scrupulously factual and properly temperate in word and deed, to employ such language and methods as these treacherous savages cannot fail to understand, and understanding, respect.[9]

With such attitudes and constant concern about a possible surprise attack, Ridgway often directed the negotiators to take hard lines on particular issues. A circular area around Kaesong, inside Communist lines, had been declared a neutral zone for meetings of the two teams. Early on, the Communists protested that an American plane had made a strafing raid within the zone. They offered physical evidence. U.S./U.N. investigators pronounced this evidence plainly fabricated.[10] Ridgway denied that the raid had occurred at all. The talks stopped. Thereafter, low-level intermediaries from the two sides discussed possible resumption. Ridgway made it a sine qua non that they not resume at Kaesong. Washington questioned whether the location actually made much difference. Ridgway implied that he might resign if ordered to change his stand. It took weeks to work out a solution, with Ridgway finally accepting advice (originating with Paul Nitze of the State Department) to offer the Communists any meeting place except Kaesong and the Communists agreeing to hold future meetings at Panmunjom, the U.S./U.N. crossing point into the neutral zone centered at Kaesong.[11] This episode suggests the extent of stubbornness that Ridgway was prepared to show the "treacherous savages."

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[9]CinCFE to JCS, Aug. 7, 1951, ibid., 787–788.

[10]Joy to CinCFE, Aug. 23, 1951, ibid., 848–850. Goldhamer testifies to the Communist fabrication of evidence. He notes, however, that they sometimes fabricated additional evidence even when their allegations had some basis in fact.

[11]*FRUS, 1951,* VII, 923ff. The Nitze suggestion is recorded in "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting," Sept. 25, 1951, ibid., 941.

In Washington the view did prevail that other parts of the world were more important than Korea. On the other hand, Marshall and the Chiefs of Staff trusted Communists no more than did Ridgway. (Truman felt similarly. In September 1951 he was to say publicly that no agreement with them was worth the paper it was written on.[12]) The Chiefs shared Ridgway's apprehensions about a surprise offensive.

By late October, when negotiations resumed (at Panmunjom rather than Kaesong), the Joint Chiefs had concluded that the U.S./U.N. side was stronger than earlier supposed, and the other side weaker—but they saw Soviet MIGs coming into North Korea at the rate of a hundred a month while U.S. *production* of F-86s still lagged at eleven to twelve a month. They feared that by the winter of 1951–1952 the Communists would have absolute air superiority.[13]

Duty required the Chiefs to lay plans for the contingency of a complete breakdown in negotiations. At the same time, prudence reminded them that public support for the war had plummeted once the Chinese came in and American casualties went up.[14] Their plans therefore emphasized responses other than dispatch to Korea of fresh ground combat troops. Instead, they proposed to bomb air bases on the Chinese side of the Chinese-Korean border and to blockade the Chinese coast. These plans were known to and generally approved by the State Department and the President.[15] The civilians saw no attractive alternative.

Military men and civilians in Washington recognized that Ridgway was not happy fighting a limited war. "Lightnin' Joe" Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, commented later, "I don't believe Ridgway ever did what we suggested." Bradley said more tolerantly, "When you are so close to those sons-of-bitches, you have different views."[16] The fact was that, as the Kaesong-Panmunjom affair indicated, Ridgway was prepared to see the negotiations collapse over minor issues. If that happened, Washington's contingency plans called for a larger war in Asia. Just how large, we cannot calculate. It certainly would have been a war to be settled in Beijing rather than Pyongyang. It could have

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[12]Remark at Constitution Day ceremonies at the Library of Congress, Sept. 17, 1951, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1951*, 522.

[13]State-JCS Meetings, Sept. 25, Sept. 26, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, VII, 939–944, 955–962.

[14]George C. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971* (3 vols.; New York: Random House, 1972), II: *1949–1958*, 939.

[15]JCS to Secretary of Defense, July 13, Nov. 3, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, VII, 667–668, 1107–1109. State Department knowledge of these plans is indicated in the meetings cited in note 13, above. See Foot, *The Wrong War*, chapter 5.

[16](Collins) State-JCS Meeting, Nov. 12, 1951, ibid., 1123; (Bradley) State-JCS Meeting, Sept. 26, 1951, ibid., 957.

been wider yet. The 1976 version of the Soviet official history of Soviet foreign policy said:

> In these critical days the Soviet government, at the request of the government of the People's Republic of China, moved several Soviet air divisions to the northeastern provinces of China. In air combat Soviet fliers knocked out dozens of American planes and safely screened North East China from bombing. Soviet fliers participated in battle operations. Against a possible worsening of the situation the U.S.S.R. prepared to dispatch to Korea five divisions to aid the People's Republic of Korea in repelling the American aggressors.[17]

Earlier versions of the Soviet official history did not speak of Soviet participation in the air war or of preparations for participation in the ground war. The first certainly occurred. U.S./U.N. intelligence analysts saw ample evidence. They did not see Red Army units poised for intervention. Whether they were in place or not, we may soon know, as the archives of the former Soviet Union begin to be explored. If they were, the war following from a breakdown in the Korean armistice talks could have been a very large war indeed.

Goldhamer's *Memoir* explains why the armistice talks did not break down. It also offers a detached analysis of lessons that this particular negotiation may teach for all negotiation, at least as conducted by representatives of a republic.

Goldhamer had been working on a RAND project with, among others, Alexander George, subsequently one of the doyens among political scientists specializing in international relations. At the time, RAND did most of its work for the Air Force. Goldhamer had been studying prisoner-of-war interrogation reports and sharing his conclusions with the chief of intelligence for U.S. Far East Air Forces. He had come early to the view that the Communists sought negotiations because their prospects were parlous, not because they planned a new offensive.[18] It followed from his analysis that the U.S./U.N. negotiators should be able to exact concessions. He relayed this view to Major General Laurence C. Craigie, the Air Force member of Admiral Joy's team. He also saw Ridgway who, after hearing Goldhamer's

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[17]A. Gromyko (ed.), *Istoriya Vneshnei Politiki SSSR* (2 vols.; Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka,' 1976), II, 165–166. On June 20, 1951, George Kennan had cautioned Secretary of State Dean Acheson that his instincts—not any positive intelligence—told him there was "the most extreme turmoil of decision in the Kremlin, and that the hour of Soviet action, in the absence of a cessation of hostilities in Korea, may be much closer than we think." (*FRUS, 1951*, vol. VII, 537–538). At the time, Kennan's antennae were still very sensitive. He was the first to sense Soviet interest in promoting armistice talks.

[18]Goldhamer was not alone in this assessment. See MemCon by Windsor G. Hackler, May 25, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, VII, 455–456.

line of argument, agreed to his accompanying Craigie to Panmunjom, even though he was a civilian.

Goldhamer's hard line was not the same as Ridgway's. In his *Memoir*, he recalls being briefed by Ridgway's staff on the "treacherous savages" guidelines. It "was an incredibly naive performance," Goldhamer writes, "and almost turned my hair gray." He criticizes Ridgway's refusal to return to Kaesong as excessive rigidity over a matter of little consequence. In his view, the general was putting high stakes into a penny ante game.

But Goldhamer does not claim responsibility for the delegation's taking a softer line. He is no less critical of it than of Ridgway. According to his report, he always argued for pushing the Communists to make concessions. He took the position that it was they who wanted and needed an armistice and that they should be made to pay for it. He set a high discount on the likelihood of their walking out for good. He may have been right. In any case, it was certainly not Goldhamer's advice or influence that caused the Americans to concede points at issue.

The genius of his *Memoir* is that it explains why, in spite of Ridgway's position and in spite of the delegates' regarding themselves as hard-liners and in spite of his own encouragement of such a tendency, the delegation was *bound* to act as it did. His text calls to mind Machiavelli and Callières in part because he stands in the classical tradition of Thucydides and Polybius, as they do, taking what happened as fated to happen and explaining not how it could have happened otherwise but why, like it or not, it will happen again. That is what makes his observations about these negotiations applicable to a whole series of other negotiations by Americans, running from the naval limitations talks of the interwar years to the most recent G-7 summits, and seem not wholly inapplicable to negotiations by the British or by other nations with parliamentary or republican forms of government.

Goldhamer comments on the extent to which the negotiations were internal as much as external. He gives sharp portraits of Joy and the others. Craigie's replacement, Air Force Major General Howard M. Turner, Goldhamer characterizes, for example, as like "the big physically overgrown boy who is always a little at a loss in handling his more alert and quick-minded playmates." He comments of Lee Sang Cho, the South Korean general attached to the delegation, that he had a habit of periodically expressing "little messages of thanks in a peculiarly formal fashion as if he were addressing a huge gathering."

Goldhamer makes the point that relationships within the delegation had a great deal to do with shaping its positions. Joy's team he thought to be unusually free of personal rivalries and private agenda. Still, it had its hard-liners and soft-liners and fence-sitters so that the delegation's positions became in some degree the products of its own interplay. Goldhamer describes, for example, how the junior naval member, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke (later Chief of Naval Operations) obtained support from the less hard-line but less mentally nimble Army member of his subdelegation, Major General Henry I. Hodes. Burke's technique, says Goldhamer, was to employ an "outrageously obvious form of flattery which never seemed too outrageously obvious to General Hodes." Reporting to Joy and the others, Burke "would make the most exaggerated statements about how General Hodes had given the Communists hell or how he had outwitted them . . . while he, Admiral Burke, had just sat by more or less inactive, lost in admiration." But Burke sometimes went too far. He would provoke into opposition someone else who took amiss his handling of Hodes. The delegation's positions could shift accordingly.

Goldhamer describes a second set of internal negotiations—those between the delegation as a unit and outsiders supposedly on their own side. One such outsider was Ridgway. The delegates felt that they had to play him in such a way as to prevent his overruling them. Worse yet were all those other outsiders in Washington, assumed to be ignorant, blinded by belief that they saw the "big picture," and at odds with Ridgway. Goldhamer points out the extent to which the delegation's stands were shaped by its members' collective views as to what would be palatable in Tokyo and not protestable in Washington rather than by their estimates of what would be desirable or attainable in negotiations with the Communists.

The effects of internal bargaining were intensified by procedural restraints. Conclusions about one day's session had to be reached quickly. The delegates had to send Ridgway immediate reports on meetings with the Communists. They wanted then to give him their interpretations and recommendations before he or his staff had time to formulate different or contrary judgments. That usually gave them only an hour or an hour and a half in which to make up their minds. Much else was done equally hastily, in response to incoming messages. Answering questions from Tokyo or Washington took priority over thinking about what to do. And thinking about what to do took the form of putting positions on paper and quarreling over language because that was how members of the delegation could bargain with one another. Something not reduced to writing might not be

binding. This encouraged concentration on the short term and on what was to be said. It discouraged spending time on strategy, or even tactics, because those subjects did not as easily lend themselves to deals among delegates. They required choices rather than compromises, and allowed too much discretion in interpretation.

At least equally influential were internalized values that the delegates brought to negotiations both with one another and with the adversary. They felt it important to "show reasonableness." They found it hard to speak uncompromisingly for demands that were not actually minimum demands. In part this was because they shrank from seeming later to back down. In part, Goldhamer argues, it was also because they felt guilty if they made false pretenses. "The U.N. delegates," he comments, "essentially had no capacity for bluffs. This incapacity in its turn was conditioned by a sentiment that bluff was an immoral or humiliating tactic to pursue. It is interesting to note that Americans who consider themselves poker players par excellence were unable to bring to bear on the negotiations problems the most elementary principles of 'bargaining' as it is exemplified in a poker game."

This weakness Goldhamer found compounded by a common urge to make progress. Inactivity was frustrating. The delegates felt that they would be to blame, or at least would be held to blame by others, if they did nothing while soldiers continued to die. They assumed that progress involved concession. Immobility, refusal to concede, was equivalent to non-progress. If the other side didn't make a concession, then their side must. Concession, it was also assumed, invited counter-concession. As Goldhamer puts it, their unacknowledged premise was: "strength leads to failure, weakness leads to success."

Implicit in Goldhamer's description is the further proposition that the negotiators represented their nation. Their behavior and attitudes mirrored those of the American public or at least of the interested, articulate, manifest public. With regard to foreign policy in general, the impact of public opinion is often questioned. Some scholars have concluded that officialdom is so insulated as to be little affected by voices outside. Others take the view that public opinion is something that officials create and manipulate and then cite as pretext.[19] In this instance, the concrete evidence argues against both theses. Goldhamer describes Admiral Joy watching every sign of public reaction almost as a farmer watches the weather. The admiral received the air edition

[19]The clearest, most careful statement of the first position is in Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).

of the *New York Times*. He clipped every column concerning the negotiations. He arranged for the Navy to send him editorials and stories from newspapers across the United States. He was himself the addressee of many letters from individuals. He read them all and personally answered a large number. When Gallup polls appeared, the delegation debated their significance.

Though organized and instructed to negotiate uncompromisingly, the delegation in fact made concession after concession. It was unable to hold out for a cease-fire line other than the actual line of battle. It compensated for Ridgway's intransigence over the negotiating site by gratuitously fixing the line so that Kaesong, the onetime capital of Korea and a potential military stronghold, went to the Communists. Though the negotiations were to continue for another seventeen months before the cease-fire actually took effect, this pattern was to continue.

Goldhamer's *Memoir* explains why this was so, and why, in other circumstances, the pattern is seen both before and since. It is a wonderful document.

Abbreviations

AA Attacks	Anti-aircraft attacks
AUFERG (FE HRRI)	Air University Far East Research Group (Far East Human Resources Research Institute)
CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
DDT	Chlorinated hydrocarbon compound used as an insecticide
FE	Far East
FEAF	Far East Air Force
GI	Enlisted person in the U.S. armed forces
G1	Army Manpower and Personnel
G2	Army Intelligence
G3	Army Operations and Plans
GHQ	General Headquarters
HQ FEAF	Headquarters Far East Air Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSPOG	Joint Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force) Plans and Operations Group
KMAG	Korean Military Assistance Group
MPQ2	Mobile Pulsed "Special" (an early target-location radar)
NKA	North Korean Army
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
ORO	Operations Research Office (Army)
PA	People's Army [probably a short form for NKPA]
PIO	Public Information Office
POW	Prisoner of war
PW	Psychological warfare
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCD	United Nations Command Delegation to Armistice Conference

Negotiators and Others Named in the Text

Members of United Nations Command Delegation (UNCD) to Armistice Conference

U.S. Air Force

Banfill, General	FEAF Deputy for Intelligence
Brentnall, Major General	Assistant Deputy Commander FEAF
Craigie, Maj. Gen. Laurence C.	Delegate; FEAF Vice Commander
Darrow, Col. Don O.	Top Air Force Staff Officer
Hill, Lt. Col. Lawrence G., Jr.	Staff Officer
Hurr, Col. Arthur P.	Staff Officer
Kinney, Col. Andrew	Staff Officer, Liaison
Latoszewski, Col. Edwin J.	Staff Officer
Nuckols, Brig. Gen. William P.	Staff, Public Information Officer
Turner, Maj. Gen. Howard M.	Delegate, Senior Air Force representative

U.S. Army

Bradley, Gen. Omar N.	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Butler, Lt. Col. Albert	Staff Officer
Galloway, Col. Donald	Staff Officer, Top representative GHQ(JSPOG)
Hickman, Col. George W., Jr.	Staff Officer, Legal adviser
Hodes, Maj. Gen. Henry I.	Delegate; Eighth Army Deputy Chief of Staff
Levie, Lt. Col. Howard S.	Staff Officer
Norell, Col., James A.	Staff Officer
Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B.	Commander-in-Chief, UN Command
*Underwood, Lt. R. F.	Staff Officer
Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A.	Commanding General Eighth Army
Vardas, Lt. Col. Constantine L.	Staff Officer
Wu, Warrant Officer Kenneth	Staff Officer, Chinese interpreter for UNCD

U.S. Marine Corps

Murray, Col. James C.	Staff Officer, Liaison

U.S. Navy

Ball, Lt. Commander George	Staff Officer
Briggs, Capt. Harold M.	Staff Officer, Secretary to the Delegation
Burke, R. Adm. Arleigh A.	Delegate; Deputy Chief of Staff to Adm. Joy
Jacoby, Lt. Commander Oswald	Staff Officer
Joy, V. Admiral C. Turner	Senior Delegate
Libby, R. Adm. Ruthven E.	Delegate (replaced Adm. Burke)
Muse, Commander George R.	Staff Officer
*Underwood, Lt. H. G.	Staff Officer

*Goldhamer refers to a Lt. Underwood who served as Korean interpreter at the negotiation meetings, but mentions no first name or initial. The roster in Adm. Joy's *Diary* lists two Lt. Underwoods and identifies both as interpreters (p. 464).

South Koreans—ROKA

Lee, Lt. Col. S. Y.	Liaison Officer, Aide to Paik Sun Yup
Lee, Maj. Gen. Hyung Koon	Delegate (succeeded Gen. Pak)
Paik, Maj. Gen. Sun Yup	Delegate; Capital Division Commander
Pak, Gen.	Sub-delegate

Members of the Communist Negotiating Team

Chinese

Hsieh, Maj. Gen. Fang	Chinese Communist, sub-delegate

North Koreans (NKPA)

Kim, Gen. Il Sung	North Korean Leader
Lee, Maj. Gen. Sang Cho	Sub-delegate
Nam, Lt. Gen. Il	Senior Delegate

Other Persons Named in the Text

Acheson, Dean	Secretary of State
Bohlen, Charles	Department of State
George, Alexander L.	RAND, Social Science Division
Hunt, Victor	RAND, Head of Social Science Division, Santa Monica Office
Kennan, George F.	Diplomat, historian, adviser to Acheson 1949–1950
Leites, Nathan	RAND, Social Science Division
Lippmann, Walter	Foreign policy analyst, columnist for *New York Herald Tribune*
Malik, Jacob	Soviet Ambassador to United Nations
McDermott [first name unknown]	Department of State
Muccio, Ambassador John J.	U.S. Ambassador to Republic of Korea, responsible for Korean Military Assistance Group
Morgenthau, Hans J.	International relations scholar
Rhee, Singhman	President, South Korea
Schnitzer, Ewald	RAND, Social Science Division
Speier, Hans	RAND, Head of Social Science Division, Washington and Santa Monica

Part I

The United Nations Negotiating Team

The Korean Armistice Conference

These notes are set down in order to fix memories and impressions before they disappear. They do not constitute an account of what happened or of my activities at the conference. At a later time I hope to elaborate and systematize these notes.

Herbert Goldhamer
December 1951

The United Nations Negotiating Team

How I Became Associated with the Work of the Armistice Conference

Toward the end of June and the beginning of July I became convinced from the POW materials being gathered in Pusan that the Communist[1] armies in Korea were in a perilous condition. It seemed to me that the CCF and the PA were at the end of May and early in June incapable of exercising adequate control over their own troops. While this had a background of continuous military pressure by the U.N. and shortage of supplies arising from U.N. air activity, the immediate occasion of this breakdown was the failure of the Communist spring offensive and the gains made by the U.N. in its counter-offensive. I felt that the Communist bid for a ceasefire towards the end of June was in considerable measure not the result of physical military losses (manpower and materiel), but was the result of their incapacity to maintain adequate control over their troops. It seemed clear to me that a major PW effort on the part of the U.N. might have, and especially at the end of May would have had disastrous consequences. I interpreted the ceasefire bid as a fear of such possibilities. These interpretations were noted in my memos to the [RAND] Washington office (HG-8 and HG-9, dated July 7 and July 11). About July 25 my increasing conviction of the correctness of these interpretations led me to go to Tokyo, where I discussed them with General Banfill, the FEAF Deputy for Intelligence, and Major General Brentnall, the Assistant Deputy Commander of FEAF. Both of these men seemed to be considerably impressed by the findings I presented to them and asked me to dictate a statement. This I did. I then returned to Pusan and after going over additional materials I prepared a more adequate statement, dated 29 July, which was transmitted to the Deputy for Intelligence of FEAF and also to General Ridgway. I should add that my dictated statement was also discussed with General Ridgway by General Banfill.

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[1]Current usage calls for upper case "C" only when the word "communist" refers to the Communist Party or its members. Consistent application of this principle, however, proved impracticable in this manuscript. Party membership and policies or behavior dictated by the Party were often difficult to discriminate. The reader will find, therefore, that the word "communist" appears throughout with an upper case "C."

In my discussions with General Banfill and General Brentnall I also discussed problems of negotiation with Communists and offered some comments on the current negotiatory situation. I also spoke of RAND's interest and work in this field and referred these people to Leites' book on the Politburo.[2] In my memo of 29 July I appended to my remarks on the state of the Communist military comments on negotiatory problems. Early in August I returned to Tokyo in order to immure myself in the Imperial Hotel, where I wanted to write up an analysis of Alex George's material on weapons effectiveness.[3] I planned to return to Washington after completing this paper. While I was in Tokyo this time I was able to speak with General Craigie. He had received a copy of my memo to the Deputy for Intelligence and was interested not only in the comments on the military situation but also my comments on the problems of negotiation. General Craigie, I should add, was one of the U.N. negotiators. We had a discussion which led to a suggestion by General Craigie that he would ask Admiral Joy to invite me to the camp for a two- or three-day period so that I could discuss with the other negotiators some of the points I had raised with General Craigie.

As a result of this I received an invitation to proceed to the peace camp at Munsan-ni and a B-17 was placed at my disposal for transportation purposes. It was arranged on August 22 for me to leave on August 23. Owing however to bad weather the flight was cancelled and I did not depart until August 24. On the night of August 22–23 there occurred the celebrated air attack incident with a great deal of fabricated evidence which led the Communists to break off the meetings of the negotiators. [See pp. 75–78.] Nevertheless no indication came for me to cancel my trip, and I proceeded as scheduled to Munsan-ni, consequently arriving after the negotiations had been broken off.

I remained with the negotiating team in the camp from August 24 until, I believe, September 3. At this time the likelihood of an immediate resumption seemed somewhat remote and the U.N. negotiators, together with a number of their staff including myself, returned to Tokyo to continue their deliberations there.

We remained in Tokyo, working at GHQ, from this date until October 9. By this time the liaison officers were already at work preparing for a resumption of the talks. Although the negotiators, including myself, returned on October 9, actual resumption of the talks did not take place until October 25. However we were physically at the camp from October 9 on.

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[2]Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.

[3]This document, written by Herbert Goldhamer in collaboration with Alexander L. George and E. W. Schnitzer, appeared in December 1951 as a classified RAND Research Memorandum.

About November 20 or 21 it became apparent that the negotiations on Item #2[4] would very shortly be concluded. I had earlier pretty much made up my mind to pull out after the end of Item #3 of the Agenda and possibly after the end of Item #2, should the discussion of this latter item be considerably extended. About November 20 the Communist delegation asked for a two-day recess in order to consider a U.N. proposal. Admiral Joy decided to spend this time in Tokyo and I took the opportunity to go along with him on the *Bataan* and to indicate to him that in view of the fact that Item #2 was pretty much completed I thought I would remain in Tokyo and go on to return to the United States. I saw Admiral Joy at his home, where we had dinner on November 22, I believe, and this was my last contact with the U.N. delegation. I remained in Tokyo for three or four days and then departed for Washington.

Personal Relations

On the whole the personal relations among the members of the delegation and the camp can be described as very good. This does not mean that there were not periods of tension and irritation or signs of clashes from time to time between particular persons. These will be described below. In saying that the relationships were on the whole good I mean to emphasize more particularly that whatever tensions did arise did not seriously affect the efficiency of the personnel or did not lead them to maintain positions or attempt to secure actions based on personal considerations such as prestige or their dislike of their colleagues. There were marked differences of opinion but these never seemed to form themselves in terms of oppositional tendencies toward a particular person or persons. There was one noteworthy case where I believe the opinions expressed were the result of personal ambitions, but even in this case the opinions cannot be said to have been biased by virtue of the relationships of this individual to his colleagues. The case I am referring to is that of Colonel Kinney, one of the liaison officers. I will discuss this matter later.

Admiral Joy and Admiral Burke

That the tensions that did exist in the camp were not based on inter-service rivalry is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that one of the more notable

[4]There were in all five items on the Negotiating Team Agenda. These were: Item #1, Development of the Agenda; Item #2, Establishment of the demarcation line and demilitarized zone; Item #3, Arrangements for a cease-fire and the guaranteed enforcement of the armistice; Item #4, Exchange of prisoners of war; and Item #5, Recommendations to governments concerning political settlement of the conflict.

instances of interpersonal difficulty arose between the two Navy members of the delegation. During August and September this was not particularly apparent but came more sharply to a head in early October when the delegation returned from Tokyo to the camp but the sub-delegation meetings with the Communists had not as yet resumed. Admiral Burke tended to "ignore" Admiral Joy and sometimes to kid him. These kidding remarks while formally and on the surface within the limits of collegial behavior nonetheless reflected at a deeper level a basic attitude of disrespect. It is quite likely that Admiral Joy was able to sense that this was the case. Admiral Burke's attitude and behavior was only one particular reflection of a more widespread attitude among several people in the camp that tended to view Admiral Joy as a somewhat bungling, oldish and indecisive person who was more an obstruction to proper policy and action than a guide and leader in achieving these ends. The particular tension between Burke and Joy developed not on the basis of a personal disinclination as such but in terms of a fairly basic difference of outlook between Burke and Joy. Burke was in some respects and certainly considered himself even more so a "strong man" on the delegation. He, together with General Craigie, were the two persons on the delegation who were most willing and anxious to secure the best possible bargain from the Communists and who were least intimidated by Communist action. Admiral Burke's attitude toward Admiral Joy was thus particularly conditioned by the fact that the senior delegate was a hindrance to the pursuit of an adequate policy within the delegation as Admiral Burke saw it. Admiral Joy was the person who had to be "looked after," "jollied along" and in general "kept in hand." It seemed quite likely that Admiral Joy appreciated that he was being viewed as a problem child by Admiral Burke. Admiral Burke's attitude toward Admiral Joy had, however, a broader background in which apparently similar impressions had developed. In October Admiral Burke and I had several very private and delicately confidential talks in which he hinted more or less explicitly at some of the problems that had to be overcome within the delegation itself and among other members of the camp. I was extremely cautious but Admiral Burke became increasingly outspoken with me on these matters. On one occasion he told me that he had been brought into the Theater as a sort of counterpoise to his superior, Admiral Joy, who apparently was viewed in higher naval circles as not having sufficient firmness and organizational capacity. Admiral Burke delicately conveyed the idea that he was looked upon as being a firm and strong person and that he was sent into the Theater to try and counteract some of the results and feeling from the lack of these characteristics in Admiral Joy.

Admiral Joy tended to defend himself against his colleague by becoming quite sarcastic at the expense of Admiral Burke. I do not know what ultimately went

on in private, but suddenly Admiral Burke began to show a very marked and formal politeness toward Admiral Joy, addressing him for instance as "Sir" and doing this in an emphatic way that was almost embarrassing, at least to me as an onlooker. This behavior tended to suggest to me that the two had had a private blowup and that Admiral Joy had told off Admiral Burke and made him toe the line at least from a formal protocol standpoint. This occurred before the sub-delegation meetings resumed on October 25, and the sense of strain between the two persons seemed to dissipate very rapidly once active negotiations with the Communists started up again.

A reappearance of fairly marked signs of tension between Admiral Burke and Admiral Joy occurred on November 18, shortly before I left the camp. This was associated with Admiral Burke's request for relief from further duty with the delegation and Admiral Joy's disposition not to recommend such relief to General Ridgway. I am not entirely sure of this interpretation but I think it is probably correct. I should add here that Admiral Burke's request for relief was not particularly based on his relations with Admiral Joy, but was at the time motivated by his feeling that he could not any longer continue fruitful activity as a delegate under the conditions imposed by JCS policy. I will discuss this matter under another heading. [See pp. 119–122, 155–159.]

General Craigie and General Hodes

These two generals also manifested a tendency toward subdued friction, which was never as apparent, except in one particular instance, as the friction between Joy and Burke. Here again the friction developed out of the positions these persons stood for in the work of the delegation and does not seem to have any relationship to the particular personality characteristics as such that either one found intolerable. General Craigie was in favor of a strong line with the Communists, whereas General Hodes tended to take the position that all that one really wanted was a ceasefire and any political considerations in the armistice were of negligible importance. This tended to place Craigie and Hodes at odds more particularly with respect to the proposal to be made to the Communists on October 25. It was in connection with one discussion of this problem that took place in October at the camp before October 25 that General Craigie in a mild way lost his temper. He immediately made a quite handsome and "mature" apology and the discussions went on almost, one might say, more effectively because of this outburst of emotion. I have the impression that underlying General Craigie's somewhat negative attitude toward General Hodes was the former's feeling that General Hodes saw things too easily and in too simplified a fashion, whereas for General Craigie the problems of the delegation were

extremely serious and intricate and required profound study and analysis. General Craigie has a real intellectual bent and he took the problems of analysis extremely seriously. In my discussions with him he was always interested in following through with me the implications for action of lines of reasoning that were not always simple or self-evident and would not simply set aside things that could not immediately be understood. General Hodes on the other hand tended to be somewhat more impatient of such intellectual preoccupation with the work of the delegation and probably what aggravated General Craigie most was not this attitude of General Hodes as such, since it existed among others as well, but rather a tendency on General Hodes' part to make quite explicit his suspicions of such intellectuality.

General Turner arrived at the camp in October to be broken in as a replacement for General Craigie, who was being recalled to Washington. General Turner showed a considerable incapacity to grasp matters that were even rudimentary to many of the people in the camp who were themselves by no means overly astute. General Turner is a big, bluff person whose sense of insecurity with respect to his understanding and intellectual accomplishments somehow shows up even more strongly by virtue of his great physical bulk and "virility." He tended to give the impression of the big physically overgrown boy who is always a little at a loss in handling his more alert and quick-minded playmates. He tended to arouse more particularly the irritation of Admiral Joy during General Turner's initial period at the camp. Admiral Joy sometimes seemed to have accumulated so much generalized irritation toward this person with whom the delegation was going to be saddled that he indulged sometimes in rather cruel and biting remarks, somewhat more cruel by virtue of the fact that they were not quite understandable to General Turner. For instance General Turner and Admiral Joy one day at lunch were discussing methods of pheasant hunting and Admiral Joy apparently felt that the method recommended by General Turner was at fault, and he then made a remark critical of General Turner's method, addressing General Turner at this point as "Mr. Bohlen." General Turner did not even know who Mr. Bohlen was and was at a loss as to what the exact implications of this mode of address were. It was quite clear, of course, to me that Admiral Joy was expressing ironically his contempt for General Turner's political understanding by addressing him as Mr. Bohlen. General Turner was aware that somehow a hit had been scored off him, but he was not sure what its exact nature was.

On another occasion General Turner, also at the dinner table, spoke of guerrillas but mispronounced the word quite abominably. There was no question nonetheless as to what word he was referring to. Admiral Joy took the opportunity to ask him to repeat his statement twice without making it at all

clear to General Turner that he was amusing himself by having Turner repeatedly mispronounce the word "guerrilla." On another occasion the person responsible for presenting to General Turner as the senior Air Force representative the flash result of the day's air activity in Korea came up to the dinner table where the delegates were seated to read off the summary of air activities. This was a customary daily five-minute spot briefing that for convenience was done right at the mess table itself. On this particular evening just after the officer had begun to recite the air activities summary Colonel Kinney came up to the table and began a conversation with General Hodes which was listened to by Admiral Joy and Admiral Burke. This intrusion was rather on the rude side, as the Air Force officer was still giving out his summary. Finally, General Turner, feeling that this was too insulting to the Air Force officer and possibly to the Air Force and to himself personally, asked Admiral Joy whether he wanted to have the little Air Force briefing continued or whether the people were going to listen to Colonel Kinney instead. Admiral Joy snapped back that he saw no reason why the Air Force officer could not continue his statement, implying quite clearly and also showing it by his act that he had nonetheless no intention of asking Colonel Kinney to stop his intrusive conversation. General Turner then asked the Air Force officer to continue with his statement, but when the conversation of Colonel Kinney continued he abruptly and angrily told the Air Force officer to stop and told him that he would not permit him to give further Air Force briefing summaries at the dinner table if others were not going to pay attention and listen to it. In this little play General Turner was clearly in the "right" and the lack of courtesy by Admiral Joy, General Hodes and Colonel Kinney tended to throw in sharp relief the disregard or disesteem in which they held General Turner.

During September when the delegation and the staff were working in Tokyo during the long recess of the negotiations, a generalized state of irritability developed. The uncertainty in the minds of most of them, if not all of them, as to whether the negotiations would be resumed, the "frustrations" arising from attempts to get the negotiations resumed and the long hours of discussion, of writing papers, of revising them endlessly all seemed to wear the people down so that the almost complete air of good humor and relaxation that I observed toward the end of August was notably absent in September. I do not mean that the delegates and the members of the staff tended to quarrel violently or to show strong personal aversions. But there was a distinct tendency for a sharp note to enter into peoples' remarks from time to time during the course of discussions, and these contrasted rather clearly with the first week or two that I was with the group when such instances were extremely rare if existent at all.

Admiral Joy and the South Korean Delegates

The South Korean delegate at the time I first joined the camp was General Pak. I saw him only on a few occasions, as he spent most of his time during the period of the long recess with his division at the front. I saw him again briefly on a later occasion when he visited the camp. He was apparently universally esteemed, at least by the other members of the delegation who spoke of him in the warmest terms and with the highest praise. My own brief impression of him is of an extremely warm and sympathetic personality and of one who was anxious not to create any problems for the delegation by virtue of his representation of South Korean interests. In October he was replaced by General Lee for very interesting reasons which I shall speak about in another context.

General Lee is an extremely different person. He is young, about 31, very self-conscious about his military status and about his personal wealth, and rather pompous to say the least. No one seemed particularly to enjoy associating with him, and it was always quite evident that when he dropped in to Admiral Joy's tent for our pre-dinner drinks that his presence was considered a constraining one. This, of course, was partly due to the fact that he was never treated as a full member of the delegation and that the inmost secrets and plans of the delegation were never revealed to him. Thus dispatches from General Ridgway or the JCS were withheld from him. His presence consequently inhibited full discussion of negotiation problems. However in addition to this even when there was no inclination to discuss the work of the delegation his presence was still felt to be awkward. The other members of the delegation always managed to preserve the full courtesies in speaking with him, with the exception of Admiral Joy, who on several occasions tended to snap at him when he made remarks that annoyed the Admiral. Admiral Joy's generalized irritation with General Lee came out somewhat embarrassingly in November, when we were going to the helicopter to be taken to the air field where we were going to be transported by General Ridgway's *Bataan* to Tokyo. General Lee, noting that we all carried coats, asked whether perhaps he ought not to take a coat along with him also to Tokyo. Admiral Joy then very sharply replied, "General Lee, I am not your nursemaid." General Lee was always very concerned, as he undoubtedly had reason to be, with his position vis-à-vis Singhman Rhee. He was constantly speaking of this and indicating in a very plaintive and somewhat undignified fashion the difficult position that he was in. This constant tendency to complain was particularly aggravating to Admiral Joy. General Lee made the mistake on one occasion of making a statement to the press which tended to indicate that South Korea was not interested in an armistice. As a member of the delegation this of course was a very bad statement to make. Admiral Joy from that time on was constantly

warning him that he was not to make any statements to the press or to engage in discussions with the South Korean government and that his sole responsibility was to General Ridgway and to himself.

One of the minor irritations provided by General Lee was his tendency both during work sessions and in more convivial moments with the delegation to break into a speech about how deeply he personally and his government as well appreciated the efforts of the delegation. General Lee expressed these little messages of thanks in a peculiarly formal fashion as if he were addressing a huge gathering. Although they were delivered on almost every occasion on which the delegation members happened to be together, they scarcely varied in content. I suppose that in continually thanking the delegation and also myself for the valiant fight we were all making to secure a fair deal for South Korea General Lee hoped by such expressions of gratitude to place us all in a position of greater moral necessity to live up to these expressions. General Lee was also inclined, in Oriental fashion, to present us with gifts. He presented each of the members of the delegation and myself with a box of ginseng, with Korean dolls and books on Korea. In presenting the ginseng he made it abundantly clear that this was a very expensive gift but that since he was a very wealthy man he could easily afford it. He was also very anxious to entertain the members of the delegation and myself at a dinner party in Seoul. Admiral Joy was not at all inclined to permit such entertainment, since he felt that if word of the dinner party leaked out it would look very bad for the members of the delegation to be enjoying high life in Seoul while American soldiers were dying or else waiting for the armistice to be concluded. Admiral Joy kept putting off General Lee on the grounds that the members of the delegation were at the moment too busy to take time off for such entertainment and did not explain his real motives to General Lee. Consequently General Lee continued to try and set a date, much to the annoyance of Admiral Joy, who continually had to find some reason to put him off. General Lee's real home was in Pusan, but he had an establishment in Seoul as well. Admiral Joy tried to encourage General Lee to spend as much time as possible in Seoul. In short Admiral Joy was interested in keeping General Lee out of the camp and out of the way as much as possible.

During the period that General Lee was a member of the delegation and that I myself was at the camp there was no particular problem about General Lee's behavior in meeting with the Communists, for the simple reason that there was only one morning session which he attended. This was the whole delegation meetings of the U.N. and the Communists on the morning of October 25, when the negotiations were resumed. Since the negotiations were then, beginning with the afternoon, carried on by sub-delegations which on the U.N. side included

General Hodes and Admiral Burke, General Lee did not participate in any meetings with the Communists.

General Hodes and Admiral Burke

These two constituted the sub-delegation on the U.N. side during the actual negotiations with the Communists beginning on October 25 and continuing through to the end of Item #2, which was wound up a few days after I left. Since they constituted the active team dealing with the Communists the relationships between these two persons are of special interest. As I have indicated Admiral Burke was in favor of a strong line with the Communists, whereas General Hodes was willing to settle for anything that would provide adequate military security for the truce in Korea. I have also indicated above that there appeared signs of tension between members of the delegation who were in favor of strong and "weak" lines with the Communists. This however was not true of Admiral Burke and General Hodes. General Hodes was the senior person or leader of the two-man sub-delegation team. Despite the difference in point of view of these two persons they worked together rather well and their personal relations seemed to be excellent. This appears to be the result of Admiral Burke's special efforts to do everything possible to keep General Hodes in a good mood and to hold him to as firm a line as possible. Admiral Burke attempted to do this by engaging in a jovial type of deference to General Hodes and in a rather outrageously obvious form of flattery which never seemed too outrageously obvious to General Hodes. General Hodes seemed to bask very pleasantly in the high praises for his behavior in the sub-delegation meetings which Admiral Burke showered upon him. General Hodes, despite his mannerism of a bluff and tough military man, seems to have been beset by feelings of insecurity which I believe were not simply peculiar to his present situation and work but are basic to his character. Admiral Burke seems to have appreciated this and engaged in a great deal of praise of General Hodes with a view to pleasing General Hodes, giving him a greater sense of self-esteem, and holding him to as vigorous and firm a position against the Communists as possible. These attempts to build up General Hodes' ego took place mostly between five and seven p.m. each day, when the sub-delegation returned from their meetings at Panmunjom. At this time the delegation and myself would foregather in Admiral Joy's tent to get a review of what had happened during the day from the sub-delegation, and to carry on post mortem informal analyses and plan forthcoming action. This was usually done over a drink or two. It was during these periods more particularly that Admiral Burke in reviewing what had happened during the day would make the most exaggerated statements about how General Hodes had given the

Communists hell or how he had outwitted them or how he had carried the ball during most of the day while, he, Admiral Burke, had just sat by more or less inactively lost in admiration of how General Hodes was carrying on. General Hodes seemed to enjoy all this very much, but felt it necessary on occasion to reciprocate and describe how Admiral Burke had got him off the hook on a point or had done something else that was very good. This tended to give their descriptions of what had happened during the day something of the character of a mutual admiration society. So much was this impression apparent that it later became the subject of good-natured kidding in our nightly meetings in Admiral Joy's tent. General Turner more particularly would kid General Hodes and Admiral Burke by saying that the way they talked about each other was such as to lead one to expect that next they would take to sleeping together. Despite this kidding behavior, Admiral Burke never for one moment diminished his tendency to behave in this particular fashion towards General Hodes. To some extent it was this ascription by Admiral Burke of the great leadership capacities of General Hodes that provided some of the basis for the irritation that Admiral Joy had against Admiral Burke.

Admiral Burke's statements tended on the whole to suggest that the work of the delegation, not only actively in the negotiations face to face with the Communists but in general, were under the leadership of General Hodes. The statements made by Admiral Burke thus tended to suggest that General Hodes was the real leader of the delegation, and this seems almost certainly to have become a matter of annoyance to Admiral Joy. On two or three occasions Admiral Joy made it quite clear by blunt statements that he was still the senior delegate and leader of the delegation. It seems to me that had Admiral Burke spent one half of the energy and time that he spent in flattering General Hodes doing the same with Admiral Joy that the work of the delegation might have gone on somewhat more smoothly. However it would seem that it was easier for Admiral Burke to engage in such high praise of General Hodes because they belonged to different services and were not personally involved in a career fashion one with the other. Whereas with Admiral Joy I suspect that Admiral Burke as a member and a junior one of the same service felt more rivalry and less objectivity.

Despite the various cross-currents existing among the delegation members which are described above, it should not be supposed that the delegation in fact or in impressions was in a constant state of tension. As a matter of fact the primary impression that a casual observer would get is of a group of persons who worked and played together in a rather congenial fashion. Nor is this impression one that can simply be dismissed as being superficial. The delegation members, on the whole, tended to enjoy each other's company. They enjoyed talking together

over their drinks, they enjoyed playing endless games of horseshoes together, discussing baseball and football and reminiscing about various members of the services whom they knew about. Thus for example Admiral Joy even at the time when he seemed to be most irritated with General Turner was nonetheless quite content I believe to go out hunting or walking with him. To some extent the developing irritation and conflicts among the members of the delegation were mitigated by a certain gentlemanly tolerance that every officer owes to every other officer who belongs to his general rank. I got the impression that the delegation members felt themselves to be members of a fairly exclusive club and that all members of this club have to be treated as being persons to whom mutual tolerance and respect are owing. With the exception of Admiral Joy, who carried three stars, the others were all two-star general officers. They were all thus in a position to take good humored liberties with each other and this probably helped to carry off some of the accumulating hostility. As I have indicated above, Admiral Joy's extra star did not seem to provide him on the whole with any extra measure of deference, although this was in considerable measure probably due to the weaker personal impression as a character that he made. Let me insert here while I happen to think of it a characteristic type of remark that General Craigie, for instance, felt it quite appropriate to make to Admiral Joy. Admiral Joy, as he was so often engaged in doing, one day made some remark that indicated his strong anxiety about what the public would think of his actions. General Craigie, who probably like Admiral Burke and myself were somewhat fed up with Admiral Joy's constant preoccupation with his personal position in the public eye, said with a very vigorous tone and a certain amount of real sharpness: "For God's sake, Admiral, you've had a better press since the armistice began than you've ever had in your whole life before."

It may also perhaps be taken as an indication that personal feelings did not run too high that on days when something very good happened in the negotiation situation (such as the Communist offer of October 31) the delegation members were all in extremely good spirits and in a general state of temporary euphoria and back-slapping mood. It might be argued that this strong feeling of contentment with each other on these occasions of victory would not have been so evident had the personal tensions between members been extremely deep.

Interstaff Relations

I shall now speak about the relations of the staff people among themselves and to the delegation.

The staff people played a fairly important part in determining the general mood of the camp and in one way or another influencing the delegation. I shall first list the more important staff persons.

Brigadier General William P. Nuckols was the PIO or Public Information Officer, who provided the press with daily statements about what was going on in connection with the armistice negotiations. I shall speak more about him when I deal with the problem of public releases and public relations. General Nuckols was present during most of the time I was connected with the negotiations except for the period of the Japanese peace treaty conference in San Francisco. He was called to San Francisco to handle the public relations work at that conference.

The top representative of GHQ (JSPOG) at the camp was Colonel Galloway. Colonel Galloway conceived himself as being a sort of watchdog who would not permit anything to be done that was not strictly GI. He felt himself to be a watchdog for General Ridgway as the top representative of General Ridgway's own headquarters. He was a person who had little or no understanding of the problems of negotiation with the Communists and whose primary concern seemed to be that nothing should be done that could possibly lead to trouble, either in GHQ or JCS. He was a stickler for following every and any directive or appearance of a directive, no matter how deep a misunderstanding the directive may have been based upon.

Captain Briggs (Navy) was the official secretary to the delegation. Commander George R. Muse and Commander George G. Ball were probably the two other Navy people who had fairly important staff functions. Lt. Commander Oswald Jacoby, the bridge and canasta expert, was also present in the camp. The top Air Force staff officer was Colonel Don O. Darrow. For a considerable part of the time another Air Force colonel was fairly prominent until he left. His name is Colonel Edwin J. Latoszewski. Lt. Colonel Lawrence G. Hill, Jr. was another Air Force officer and also Lt. Colonel A. P. Hurr. Among the more prominent Army people, in addition to Colonel Galloway, whom I have already mentioned, were Lt. Colonel A. Butler and Lt. Colonel Howard S. Levie, Colonel James A. Norell, Lt. Colonel Constantine L. Vardas, and [Colonel Hickman], the legal advisor or legal expert in the camp.

I have only listed above the persons who seemed to be most active and significant. A roster of staff personnel dated 27 October 1951 which I have and which covers personnel of lieutenant colonel grade and over lists approximately 50 officers.

In addition to the staff officers named above special reference must be made to two persons who were of some considerable importance, namely the two liaison

officers, Colonel Kinney (Air Force) and Colonel Murray (Marine Corps). There was a third liaison officer who was a South Korean, Colonel Lee. These three liaison officers were so called since they maintained all liaison activity with the Communist liaison officers and carried on various negotiations in connection with the resumption of the negotiations, in connection with alleged incidents, etc. Colonel Murray and Colonel Kinney also were very active as general advisors to the delegation.

While I had moderately close relations with quite a number of the people listed above I was not in a position to observe how well the staff people got along, as I was in the case of the delegation members themselves. The one apparent rivalry among the staff officers that was of some significance, which I did note was between the two liaison officers, Colonel Kinney and Colonel Murray. Colonel Kinney was formerly the chief liaison officer and there was some rivalry, kept on the whole very well in hand, between him and Colonel Murray. Colonel Kinney was somewhat on the Arrow collar ad side, a person who seemed to pride himself on his smoothness, and who appeared to have very great personal ambitions. He is the one person whom I would suspect of having actually been influenced in his opinions by an attempt to secure personal advancement and prestige from the negotiations. Colonel Kinney fell out of favor during the latter period I was at the camp, and in general, although he still retained his position as senior liaison officer, Colonel Murray really carried more weight with the delegation members than did his colleague. Colonel Murray was very anxious to see a stiff line used against the Communists but had some curious notions as to how this was to be effected and on how to outsmart the JCS. I shall discuss this more fully in connection with the actual negotiatory problems that arose and the tactics that were adopted. Here I will just note that Colonel Murray, like so many of the others who had their doubts about Admiral Joy, was quite outspoken in his derogatory remarks about Joy whenever he spoke to me, especially during the later stages of the period I was there. The staff people did a considerable amount of paper writing in connection with the planning of discussions and requirements for various items or sub-items of the negotiation Agenda and also in preparing "analyses" and statements for the use of the sub-delegation in their meetings with the Communists. They were often put to work under a team head in groups of two, three, or four, and seemed to work together on the whole with considerable amity. The staff people had as their major recreation volley ball and there was also a certain amount of card playing that went on. They seemed to have amused themselves together in a fairly congenial way.

Up until early November the staff people generally with the exception of Colonel Murray tended to take a rather passive and weak and frightened line in

connection with the Communists. Everything tended to throw them into a panic and every possible objective that one might seek from the Communists was always discounted in advance as being entirely impossible. Since, as we shall see in a different section, one of the main mood conditions of the delegation and its staff was that no progress was being made, the staff people tended to express some of their anxieties over this lack of progress by in effect charging the delegation people with irresponsibility and intransigence. Admiral Burke more particularly reacted very strongly against this and said that it was hard enough to have to deal with the Communists, to have to worry about the JCS and also to some extent General Ridgway and Admiral Joy, but that on top of that that one's own staff people should hector and badger one was almost intolerable. He tended more and more to dissociate himself from the staff people, whom he considered to be lily-livered cowards. Later on when the disastrous effect of the concession of November 3 to the Communists became apparent the staff people suddenly became panic-stricken at the consequence of such concessions and began to take a strong line, to beat their breasts as if they had always been in favor of such a line, and to imply a criticism of the delegation for having taken a weak line. This produced some more irritation, especially between the sub-delegation members, that is, Admiral Burke and General Hodes, and the staff people.

My Personal Relations with Those at the Camp

I shall now discuss my own personal relations with the people at the camp. First of all I shall discuss my relations with the delegation members.

I do not know what General Craigie may have told Admiral Joy at the time he suggested to the Admiral that he extend an invitation to me to come to the camp for two or three days. I was rather overwhelmed by the amount of respect and deference which I received from the members of the delegation and from Admiral Joy himself. In part it was apparent that this was predicated on my assimilated rank which meant apparently two things to the delegation: (1) that I was entitled to all the privileges and courtesies of a general officer's rank, and (2) that I presumably was a pretty important person if I had such a rank. In the camp, and possibly this is true of military circles generally, many of the little details of behavior are automatically governed by rank. Thus the process of a group of people getting through a door or seating themselves in the briefing tent tends to be regulated by rank. I found it somewhat awkward to note during my first few days at the camp that the members of the delegation were falling into a pattern of according me the second place in these little rituals, that is, second to Admiral Joy. Admiral Joy himself tended to defer in some of these cases to me

and I found this especially awkward. The difficulty that I felt in what may seem like such a trivial matter was that over any prolonged period I realized that such a pattern would be extremely unwise to permit to get solidified. I felt it would be unwise in terms of the reactions of the staff people in particular. With the delegation I had the impression that they might have incorrect notions of my importance from a power standpoint, either in Washington or in Tokyo. I felt that were this the case inevitably a process of truer appreciation of my particular position in the structure of affairs was bound to develop and that if I permitted this excessive deference to me to continue and accepted it as my proper right that at a later time the people who had accorded me these marks of esteem might feel themselves to have been cheated. I do not mean that I took particular measures to reduce myself simply to a humble servant of no consequence, but I did discourage actions which tended to imply that the normal hierarchy of the camp had been altered. This involved, for instance, discouraging two-star generals from rising when I entered the room. Gradually I got it fixed so that in cases where a definite order based on protocol had to be followed the delegation came first with me at the tail end of the delegation, that is, immediately following the two-star generals, but still as a member of their group. In short the niche that I cut out for myself was one which placed me as a special hanger-on of the delegation and outside the rank of the staff people, but at the same time preserved for the delegation people themselves a protocol superiority to myself. Admiral Joy more particularly struggled constantly against this tendency of mine, but I quite consciously and firmly held to it whenever it would not appear unnecessary stubbornness on my part. I am quite confident that without this behavior on my part there would have been much more resentment in some sectors of the camp toward me than ever did develop. On matters of analysis and interpretation or anything concerning the negotiations or other topics of discussion I never for one moment dampened my opinions or hesitated to express the firmest opposition to any view of a delegation member. This intransigent "intellectual honesty" plus absolute intellectual firmness where I felt convinced of the correctness of my views got, I believe, a more welcome reception and had an added impact in combination with the unwillingness to accept the full honors that people were willing to accord to me.

During my initial period at the camp beginning in late August my closest contacts were with General Craigie. This does not mean that I dealt largely with him, but rather that my relations with him permitted a certain amount of intimate and critical comment on some of the opinions expressed by the other members of the delegation and by members of the staff. General Craigie took a much more intellectual view of the work than the other members of the delegation. With him it was possible for me to do analysis and to work the

assumptions and reasoning of the analysis through with him. He would cross-question me closely on the elements of my line of reasoning and showed a real willingness to make a genuine effort to grasp what was, after all, often a by no means simple set of propositions. To put the matter in another way, one might say that General Craigie was as interested in knowing how a conclusion was derived as he was in the conclusion itself. With the other members of the delegation there was a greater tendency to be interested largely in the conclusion. They would of course want one to defend the position assumed in the conclusion and would listen to the arguments provided in favor of the conclusion. But they never really came to grips with the line of argument itself. Or else they would accept the line of argument and assumptions involved because they could find no immediate objection to them, but this did not represent a true assimilation of the standpoint of the arguments in such a way as to permit the standpoint to be applied by themselves on a later occasion. Because of this difference between General Craigie and the others, General Craigie was a "good student" whose "lessons" had potential significance for his later thinking. General Craigie was also very conscientious in these discussions and would not slur over a point that had its place in the line of argument without coming to grips with it and wanting to be convinced or unconvinced about it. Because of General Craigie's real appreciation of the intellectual tasks that negotiations imposed, my relations with him were always buttressed by his appreciation of the intellectual contribution I could make, of the dialectical skill I could bring to bear and of my capacity to apply these in terms of policy conclusions. General Craigie, like so many of the other military people in the camp and as a matter of fact like almost all of them, had no great facility with the English language. I am sure that part of the esteem which he felt for me and I think this was also true of a number of the others derived from my capacity to use language effectively.

Toward the end of General Craigie's stay when he already knew that he was leaving and General Turner was already at the camp in order to replace him, General Craigie was anxious that General Turner should receive from me the same sort of "coaching" and understanding of the basic principles that underlay the negotiations. At this time I happened to be drafting a general summary statement of what I took the situation to be. I had about six or seven typewritten pages completed which were written largely for their heuristic value. I felt that many of the basic principles I had been inculcating during the earlier weeks and months needed to be restated again to the people in the camp, and it was for this reason that I began to prepare this paper. General Craigie saw the opening section of what I had written and was very enthusiastic about it and thought it would be particularly helpful in getting General Turner as a newcomer to appreciate what some of the problems were. He turned these pages over to

General Turner, who read them and said in the presence of General Craigie and myself that he found that they left him quite cold. General Turner indicated of course that he thought this was purely his own deficiency, but he couldn't really see what it was all about. General Craigie was very much distressed by this remark of General Turner, not only or not primarily because he felt I might be taken aback by this statement concerning my paper but primarily because it was precisely such an analysis that General Craigie felt was of paramount importance if the negotiations were to be carried on correctly. Therefore he felt that General Turner's complete density with regard to the statement which General Craigie thought was very straightforward and extremely valuable, was disturbing to him. I might add that General Turner made the same sort of remark about Leites' book on the Politburo. As it happens I did not place this book in his hands. He arrived after the book had already been distributed and discussed by a number of the people, and I had no further copies. The book was given to him by one of the staff people who I have reason to suspect felt that General Turner had better do some homework if he were going to be of any use. General Craigie tried to comfort himself and myself about General Turner's reaction to a theoretical mode of thought on the negotiations by saying that after all General Turner had just recently arrived and had not yet felt his way into the problems of the armistice negotiations. Nonetheless I suspect that General Craigie was aware that his substitute would, unless he learned extremely quickly, be a threat or at least a person of little value to the armistice team.

I had dinner on two occasions in Tokyo with General Craigie and his wife. On one of these occasions Colonel Latoszewski was also present. We were also joined on this occasion by General Brentnall. On that evening we had a very spirited discussion of the problems arising out of the West Point football cheating scandal. In this discussion I was one against three with respect to positions taken about the fundamental problems of developing sound character and a high level of morality among officers being trained at West Point. However I shall not summarize the discussion here. I am, rather, interested in referring to it simply because the discussion again revealed the passionate preoccupation of General Craigie with the problem of securing good personnel and his interest in analyzing the problem in considerable detail. Whereas the other two persons participating in the discussion were content more or less with cliches and various dogmatic impressionistic statements, counterstatements by myself worried General Craigie a good deal and he was interested in getting me to provide the lines of evidence for my statements. It was also interesting to see the passionate conviction with which he discussed the problem of getting persons who were from the standpoint of personal honor absolutely beyond reproach. I might add here, simply for the record, that I think that General Craigie would someday

greatly appreciate some sort of essay or paper on the problem of training West Point people, not from the standpoint of technical military proficiency but from the standpoint of character.

When General Craigie was about to leave I indicated to him my very deep appreciation of the opportunity he had given me to participate in the work of the armistice and also indicated how much I felt his own activity had been responsible for enabling me to be of any value at all in the work situation of the camp. He told me at that time, possibly sensing that I was uneasy about my position after his departure, that I had a very strong supporter in Admiral Joy and that I would be able to work quite as effectively after he departed.

My relations with Admiral Burke were always excellent and increased considerably in intimacy after the departure of General Craigie. When this happened Admiral Burke became the member of the delegation with whom I had my closest and frankest relations. Admiral Burke was, from my standpoint, generally on the side of the angels. However this was based more on a certain overall or general conviction that one had to be tough and was not as completely grounded in an understanding of the assumptions and principles involved in the lines of policy that I was proposing. However he too was something of a "student." He read my various papers with care and also studied Leites' book. He was engaged whenever time permitted in the writing of a history of the armistice negotiations.[5] He showed me the first hundred or so pages which he had completed by the time we were in Tokyo in mid-September. I made some notes for him on the manuscript and noted that he had already at that time incorporated, sometimes with not too much understanding, matters that I had discussed with him and also matters that I had occasionally written up in papers.

While I am speaking about Admiral Burke's manuscript let me record the following possibility. I asked Admiral Burke what disposition he intended to make of the manuscript and whether it would be possible for RAND to secure a copy of it. I told him that in view of RAND's interest in the problems of negotiation his history of the present armistice conference would be of very great value to RAND. I told him that very few participants in negotiations with the Communists had ever recorded in detail (at least to my knowledge) what went on at the negotiations. He told me that he was expecting to have it printed through some naval office and that he would make a copy available to RAND. On another occasion when I discussed the manuscript with him he indicated that

[5]Admiral Burke, some years later, applied some of the lessons he had learned at the Panmunjom talks to the problems in Vietnam in an article he wrote for *Reader's Digest*. See A. A. Burke, "The Hazards of Negotiating with the Communists," *Reader's Digest*, Vol. 93, October 1968, pp. 119–124.

there might be various red tape difficulties in getting the manuscript processed through the naval office that he had in mind. I told him that although I had no authority to speak on such matters I would like to suggest to him the possibility, if his other outlets did not prove satisfactory to him, of having RAND print and issue the publication for him. He had already seen two or three RAND publications and knew of course that we issue publications from unrestricted up to Top Secret. He seemed rather interested in this possibility and I shall take the occasion, now that he has returned to this country, to explore further whether he still has an interest in turning the manuscript over to RAND. At the time I left the camp he had approximately two hundred typewritten pages done.

Admiral Burke discussed with me toward the end of my stay at the camp his intention of asking to be relieved from further duty with the delegation. I tried to dissuade him from this course of action, telling him that it was quite clear that his experience with the delegation and the point of view that he held to would weaken the delegation if he removed himself from it. He did however ask to be relieved and has been relieved from duty with the delegation and is now back in this country.

Admiral Burke had several discussions with me about the character of the delegation, of the military in general, and of the JCS. He felt that one of the principal contributions that RAND could make to the welfare and security of this country would be to explore the source of attitudes existing in the military that were inimical to proper decision-making. He felt that in the army particularly and presumably also the Air Force, as distinguished from the Navy, such a great premium was based on a cautious compliance with what is considered to be the opinions of one's military superiors, that the possibility of vigorous and decisive action was very much limited. Admiral Burke indicated that this was a problem on which he had done a great deal of thinking and about which he himself felt he would like to do some writing. He indicated as one example of the sort of thing he had in mind a situation during the last war when an opportunity for a considerable naval victory over the Japanese was lost by virtue of the fact that his naval superiors would not permit him to try and outargue a course of action prescribed by a still higher naval officer. The latter's decision was considered by Admiral Burke to be based on lack of information and an undue caution and his own immediate superior felt that neither he nor Admiral Burke had any right to try and argue vigorously for a different course of action. In general Admiral Burke's point is that the selection of persons for high rank and the general pattern of military life imposes a passive compliance which is detrimental to the mission of the services.

After General Craigie left I became Admiral Burke's chief confidante and I believe that he talked more freely to me than to any other person in the camp. I had, of course, the advantage from his standpoint of being an outsider.

Although Admiral Burke was in favor of a firm line with the Communists his analytic understanding of the reasons for such action and of what successes could be expected and what successes would be too much to hope for was somewhat limited. He had a somewhat naive reliance on certain very general maxims such as "power is the only thing that Communists understand." While this is probably a quite sound general maxim it tended in his case to be unsupported by a more detailed and differentiated understanding of the particular problems of negotiating with the Communists. It meant that he had the right general attitude and was therefore amenable to further discussion directed toward such ends, but on the whole his viewpoint was based more on such a general intuitive inclination than a proper analytic capacity for factual knowledge.

My association with General Hodes was during the initial period very limited. He was at the camp when I arrived on August 24 right after the Communists had broken off negotiations. When it became apparent that negotiations would not be immediately resumed General Hodes left the camp and returned to his military duties pending resumption of the talks. Consequently my contact with him extended only through from August 24 until the first two or three days of September. When we returned to Tokyo to carry on our work there pending resumption of the talks General Hodes remained in Korea. Consequently during the long period from early September through to the first week in October I had no further contact with him. Later in October he returned to the camp as the approach of the resumption of talks became apparent. My association with him was consequently broken into two rather different periods. During the initial period General Hodes was on the whole extremely cool and reserved in his relations with me. He is or rather assumes the role of a rather tough soldier who is not taken in by high falutin' intellectual activities. While he always maintained a very correct form of behavior toward me there was not any warmth or genuine cordiality in it, as was true of the other members of the delegation. I think that this tall, rugged Texan probably to some extent even resented my presence in the camp and especially my presence in the highest deliberations of the camp.

When General Hodes returned to the camp in October and the actual negotiations with the Communists resumed my relations with him changed very considerably. He and Admiral Burke, as the two members of the sub-delegation who carried on the actual negotiations with the Communists, now became quite dependent on me. General Hodes required for his work in the sub-delegation the

preparation of advanced papers that he could read to the Communists in the sub-delegation meetings. He also needed to have lines of argument sketched out and some general notions of tactics and strategy to be followed in the discussions of each day. In this connection I performed very considerable service for him and while many of the other staff people also prepared a variety of papers for him he often found these far from satisfactory or in any case found mine to be of much greater value. He consequently relied very considerably on what I would prepare the night before for the meetings of the next day. This changed also his attitude toward me in our general discussions in Admiral Joy's tent. Instead of seeming to resent my presence there and my active participation in these discussions he gradually developed more and more a desire to hear me express my views. When he and Admiral Burke returned from their day's meeting with the Communists General Hodes was usually quite interested in telling me of various things that had happened during the day and the various statements that had been made and getting me to give my interpretation of their significance. I suspect, of course, that he was never entirely able to free himself of a certain distaste in having to rely on and use so largely the assistance of an "intellectual" and a civilian. Nonetheless the requirements of his own task and also I believe a genuine appreciation of my contribution to the work of the delegation itself imposed on him a certain admiration even though perhaps somewhat reluctant and forced.

Being rather conscious of his role as a rugged and tough soldier with a fairly sharp tongue, he could not stand the thought or the actual experience of being outwitted or outtalked by the Communist sub-delegates. In this connection more particularly he found my contribution very helpful, because my own facility with language and whatever dialectical skill I possessed put him in a position to make statements to the Communists that at least from a formal debating standpoint often turned the tables on them, or at least gave General Hodes the feeling that he had given as good in return as the Communists had in their original statements. Although I tried to explain to General Hodes that gaining objectives in negotiations was not a matter of primarily rational argument or having the better debating point or being sharper in one's replies, nonetheless for General Hodes' own wellbeing it was necessary for him to try and keep as much as possible the upper hand and to feel that he was not on the defensive. On one occasion when it seemed to me especially important to present a very strong position in the sub-delegation to convince the Communists that no retreat was to be expected, I prepared a rather lengthy statement for General Hodes to make the next morning. I stayed up pretty much the whole night working on this and went over it with General Hodes the next morning. This statement had quite a good effect. It was found to be so useful, not only in the meeting itself but for

general release to the press that a great part of it was released verbatim to the press people at Musan-ni. The statement had in fact been written by me with the hope that its general sweep would lead Admiral Joy and the others to use it for this purpose. One of the consequences of this special effort is of some interest and it is in this connection that I have really brought up the matter of this particular statement that I wrote. The statement put the Communists on the defensive in the meetings and led the Communist delegate, General Hsieh, to try and undercut the impact of the statement by telling General Hodes that he could not have prepared the statement himself. This tended to indicate that General Hsieh was himself somewhat aware of the personal debating rivalry that was being carried on between himself and General Hodes, or at least would seem to indicate that General Hsieh was aware of the special pleasure that General Hodes derived from making statements that were superior to those of the Communists. At least I interpret with a good deal of confidence General Hsieh's accusation as indicating his desire to spoil General Hodes' sense of gratification and self-importance based on the success of this statement. General Hsieh's remark that General Hodes could not have written the statement himself did in fact succeed in its intention, if I have correctly interpreted that intention, because General Hodes was rather put out by the fact that the statement was made and also by the fact that everyone in the camp knew that the statement had been written by me, as of course were many of the statements that General Hodes used in the meetings. This for a couple of days tended to make General Hodes less interested in having me prepare actual statements for him and for the first time he suggested that perhaps it could be just as simple and just as useful if I were to prepare notes about lines of argument. This suggestion was definitely I am sure an attempt to protect his own pride so that he would not be thought to be just a mouthpiece speaking speeches which I prepared. For the next day consequently I prepared no formal statement for him to make, but simply some notes about general tactics to follow. Although this was in line with General Hodes' own suggestion he missed too much the advantage of having actual statements prepared by me and rather casually and awkwardly rescinded his suggestion of the previous day. Thereupon I resumed my practice of preparing statements for him.

While then during the second period General Hodes and I got along quite well, he was always aware that I was aware that his basic viewpoint on Item #2 of the Agenda was not in agreement with mine. His inability to convince himself that it was necessary to get any solution to Item #2 greater than what was required for strict military security was a continuing source of underlying tension between us, since I of course had made it quite clear that I felt it was of the greatest importance to deal the Communists as big a blow as possible within the limits of

what one could accomplish by negotiatory means, irrespective of whether such objectives were strictly required to preserve the security of U.N. forces during the post-armistice period. This tension came somewhat more to the surface on November 3 and the days immediately after when General Hodes under the instructions of Admiral Joy but almost certainly in agreement with him offered a very inopportunely timed outright concession to the Communists. He himself seemed to realize afterward that this had not been a good move and consequently was rather on the defensive. He was under the necessity of rationalizing his action and to some extent it was impossible for me to permit him to do so with entire success. Generally if an action was taken which I thought to be a mistake I saw no good in crying over spilt milk and concentrated my efforts towards plotting and selling the line of action that was now required in order to make the best of the situation. I did not indulge in post mortems which would not serve any useful purpose and only create aggravation. However even though I had this desire to avoid criticizing actions that had already been taken it was necessary for me to make clear at least in part my view of what had been done since otherwise it was not possible to explain or justify the line of action that I now recommended, nor was it possible to try and preclude further actions of a similar nature without some indication of the disadvantages arising from the action that had already been taken.

My relations with General Lee, the South Korean delegate, were somewhat different from those of the members of the delegation. In the first place I was an object of very considerable curiosity to General Lee. He was constantly attempting during the early period of my association with him to draw me out in order to clarify in his own mind just what I was doing in the camp, what powerful agencies in Washington I represented, what my viewpoint was on issues of significance for the armistice conference and for South Korea. He seemed to attach some very special significance to my presence as a civilian at the camp, particularly because he saw that I was treated with very considerable respect and was a member of the top elite of the camp. I do not know whether he ever was able to disabuse himself of the notion that I was some sort of Washington watchdog. On the whole I suppose that as time went on he began perhaps to realize that my presence in the camp had no greater significance than it actually had. Still it probably was not easy for him to suppose that I had been brought in simply because General Craigie had thought I would be useful.

General Lee was, of course, pleased to note that in my discussions with the delegates I took a very strong line with respect to the Communists and showed no tendency to become frightened or intimidated by any of the usual gestures the Communists made in order to secure a relaxation of U.N. objectives. General Lee

was also very much aware of the strong stand I took on the desirability of getting the Kaesong area in the settlement of Item #2 of the agenda. Since the securing of the Kaesong area was a matter of the greatest importance to the South Korean government my strong stand on this was extremely pleasing to General Lee. General Lee had not much opportunity to talk with me privately since most of our discussions took place at the dinner table or in Admiral Joy's tent. Consequently in October he began to visit me in my tent. These visits had two apparent objectives. One was a desire to find out what my own views were on the developments in the armistice conference and to get my estimates of what was likely to happen. He was also apparently very anxious to note whether I personally showed any change of mind with respect to the Kaesong area. His second major objective appeared to be to use me as a source of information about the thinking of the delegation and about messages that were being received from General Ridgway and the JCS which he was not being shown. Of course here I observed the most correct behavior and never told him anything that Admiral Joy had not already revealed to him. Nor did I, of course, ever express to him any views about the viewpoints or deficiencies of the delegation as I did for instance in my intimate and private conversations with Admiral Burke.

General Lee, although he was probably not the most acute political analyst, nonetheless had a pretty clear sense of how the Communists should be handled. He did not show as much of a tendency as did other people in the camp to take seriously the aggressive gestures of the Communists. He consequently appreciated more especially my own attitude on these matters and seemed to be fully aware that from the standpoint of South Korean interests General Craigie and I and to a lesser extent Admiral Burke were "South Korea's best friends." Before General Craigie left, the South Korean government through its Defense Minister presented General Craigie with a decoration for his work on the armistice team. General Lee afterwards indicated to me that he thought that I ought to have a decoration too. I told him that such a statement coming from him was a gratification that far exceeded the receipt of any actual decoration and that my knowledge of his esteem for my work was more than sufficient reward.

My relations with Admiral Joy got off to a very good start by virtue of my activity of the first two or three days at the camp. When I arrived at the camp the mood of the delegation was very bad. There was deep pessimism and a sense of failure because of the long drawn-out character of the negotiations without any tangible results, together with the fact that the negotiations had just been broken off by the Communists because of the alleged bombing of Kaesong. The delegation members and the staff people to a lesser degree tended to exhibit guilt feelings and to make various remarks that indicated that they felt that they

would be accused of incompetency with respect to the mission which had been given to them. As a defense against such feelings the members of the delegation and more particularly Admiral Joy kept making such remarks as, "The conference was doomed to failure from the very beginning." In this situation I both orally and in my first written paper at the camp attempted to demonstrate to the delegation that the conference was proceeding very much along the lines that one might well expect in dealing with Communists and given the particular military situation that existed at the time. I pointed out several of the plus characteristics of the situation and in general found a number of sound reasons why the delegation could be quite content with the work they had done. Admiral Joy was especially appreciative of this and reacted especially well to statements that I made in which I compared very favorably the activity of the delegation with the behavior of professional American diplomats or other Americans who had engaged in negotiatory activity with Communists. Admiral Joy also found my statements and analyses quite helpful in understanding the course that the negotiations had taken. Although his understanding never got deeply enough incorporated into his thinking to permit him to carry on correct thinking by himself, nonetheless I believe he very genuinely appreciated the clarification that I was able to give from time to time to his own evaluation of the situation. On August 28 I wrote a brief analysis of the significance of the messages being received from the Communists with respect to the incident of August 22–23 and the attempt to secure a resumption of negotiations. This analysis was prepared in order to be sent as an advisory statement to General Ridgway. It was wired to General Ridgway along with several other statements and recommendations by the delegation. General Ridgway replied quite promptly, referring only to the analysis of mine that had been cabled to him and not saying anything about the other statements that the delegation had sent. The fact that General Ridgway picked out my statement and indicated his warm agreement with it and appreciation of it added, I believe, considerably to my early prestige with Admiral Joy.

During these early days at the camp I tended as a matter of protocol to give all of my written statements first to General Craigie, leaving it up to him to pass them along to Admiral Joy and the other members of the delegation. There seemed to be some indication that Admiral Joy saw no reason why my status should be considered as one of attachment, particularly to General Craigie, and that he preferred that I should think of myself as more directly responsible to him, i.e., to Admiral Joy. Consequently I tended on occasion to deal directly with Admiral Joy, although whenever it was convenient and feasible I preferred to talk things over first with General Craigie. My tent was right next to Admiral Joy's and physically that made much easier my constant consultation by him.

All of the members of the delegation in varying degrees seemed to be interested in insuring that I had a good opinion of their activities individually and as a group. There were however variations in the degree to which this was the case. It was least noticeable in the case of General Hodes although his interest in this respect increased considerably during the later period of my association with the armistice conference. It was most marked in the case of Admiral Joy. As a result I have the distinct impression that in a certain way Admiral Joy, once he found that my opinions were of some value and that my grasp of the situation was considerable, became very anxious to have my good opinion. He might in fact in this respect be described as being somewhat afraid of me. This fear was associated with his great sensitivity to what the future would have to say about his activities. This attitude was in part intensified by the fact that my role in the camp was two-fold. In one respect I was a person who was there to provide what assistance I could. In another respect I was there as a RAND research person who was being given the opportunity to observe at first hand the negotiatory behavior of the U.N. team and of the Communists. In my latter role I was, then, a recorder of history in the making and consequently a person who had some power over the reputations of the individuals on the delegation. Apart from one brief period of two or three days my relationship with Admiral Joy seems to have been one of increasing prestige. Nonetheless my presence in the camp and the particular line I tended to take often created a source of tension and difficulty for him. This arose from the fact that I had on a number of occasions to press him with some vigor to prevent him from taking panicky action or to counteract simply his own emotional or intellectual evaluation of the situation. He was therefore to some extent harassed by me. I am not able to recall what particular action or statement of mine may have been at the particular moment too much for him, but during one brief period in October of about two or three days I detected what I thought was a distinct coolness on his part toward me. I made no attempt to placate him but stuck to my guns and avoided for the period during which this mood lasted any more contact with him than was necessary in terms of the routines that we had developed. After about two days of this Admiral Joy suddenly relapsed into an even more marked cordiality and reliance on me than he had previously shown.

During the earlier part of my association with Admiral Joy he exhibited some tendency to attempt to make full use of me without, however, acting in such a way as to create any resentment from other people in the camp. Later he was much more explicit in making it quite clear and in showing no inclination to conceal this point that I was the or a principal advisor to the delegation. He often told me that he saw no point in the general tendency that existed earlier to somehow pretend that officially I was not at the camp. Both he and General

Craigie were a little distressed at the fact that General Ridgway's chief of staff would not permit me to sit in on the meetings in Tokyo at which General Ridgway participated. It was for this reason that General Craigie and Admiral Joy arranged the private conference between myself and General Ridgway. Later, in October, when the negotiations were to be resumed on the 25th Admiral Joy had fully intended me to be present at the actual negotiation sessions with the Communists. At the last moment Colonel Galloway, GHQ's top man in the camp, that is, General Ridgway's top man in the camp, objected extremely vigorously to my being allowed to attend the meetings. Admiral Joy and General Craigie were very put out at this last moment obstruction and both of them were extremely apologetic and amazingly upset by this slight to me. Admiral Joy came to my tent personally to apologize for this action of Colonel Galloway and to explain that they were not going to take it "lying down." Although I could not thus attend the opening meeting of the two delegations on October 25, Admiral Joy sent a helicopter back from Panmunjom to the camp to pick me up and bring me to Panmunjom so that I would be available there for consultation during the noon hour or during any other recess.

Admiral Joy was always very cordial in insuring that everything was done to make me comfortable and to provide me with anything that might operate as some sort of reward or gratification to me for my work. Thus he was anxious, if I would have been willing, to arrange to have me go back to the United States on the battleship *New Jersey*. When we parted in Tokyo in November it was, I believe, with a feeling of real warmth on both sides that we said our mutual farewells.

My relations with the staff people were, on the whole, excellent. As with the delegation it was of very considerable help to me that despite the fact that I was an "intellectual" I was able to hold up my own in endless conversations on baseball, football, boxing, women, etc. A sound appreciation of calendar art glorifying the female form provided a touch of kinship that created a common solidarity in the camp. Being a civilian I was also able to relax more completely with the junior officers and to associate with them more closely and on terms which were, I believe, appreciated in view of the higher levels of association also open to me, and to which I was also entitled by virtue of my assimilated rank. In general my lack of "stuffiness" either intellectually or socially seemed to have been much appreciated. This was fortunate because the situation was one in which a number of the members of the staff were often made quite uncomfortable by my presence and by my activities. This arose from the fact that the principal staff people were constantly engaged in writing papers for the members of the delegation. These staff studies, statements of policy, etc. were

often subject to criticism by me, were often discarded by the delegation in favor of a statement that I had written. Often the members of the staff were instructed to show their papers to me and revise them in the light of my comments. This obviously could have been a serious source of resentment and there is no doubt that to some extent the staff people did find it annoying. On the whole, however, they took it with good grace. Another source of resentment against me arose from the fact that my own views were usually at such variance with those of the staff people. This was true not only with respect to policy to be followed but also with respect to predictions as to what was likely to occur. On one occasion when I felt that the staff people were more particularly disturbed by me as a "trouble-maker," I mentioned this to Colonel Latoszewski in a somewhat joking fashion, suggesting that most of the staff people must find my presence a great nuisance and irritation. He did not deny that this was the case, but contented himself with a compliment by saying that I was "so goddamned congenial" that no difficulty of a serious nature needed to be anticipated in my relations with the staff people. My closest supporter among the important staff people was Captain Briggs, who was secretary to the delegation. We became, as a matter of fact, quite confidential and this no doubt in part arose from his loyalty to Admiral Burke and his awareness that my position and that of Admiral Burke were fairly close and that my own intellectual command over the materials enabled me to support the general direction of Admiral Burke's more intuitive feelings more effectively than Admiral Burke himself could do. With Captain Briggs and also the second liaison officer, Colonel Murray, another element bound us together. Because I had much closer relations with Admiral Joy and the other delegates than they did they found me a convenient object for trying to find out what some of the inner feelings and plans of the delegation members were. This was also true to some extent with other staff people, and I thus operated as an informal liaison person between the staff people and the delegation. Colonel Murray, as a matter of fact, very frankly and openly asked me to present certain opinions that he held to Admiral Joy on his behalf because he felt that Admiral Joy would give them a more sympathetic hearing if I presented them than if he did himself.

One indication of the underlying irritation that my presence caused some of the staff people exhibited itself at the time that General Craigie was about to leave the camp to return to the United States. He made a preliminary trip to Tokyo and the fact of his permanent departure was made known during his absence in Tokyo. When this occurred I noted a tendency on the part of two or three of the staff people to show a much more overt aggressiveness toward me. At one point during this brief period of a couple of days one of the staff officers made a remark in a somewhat joking fashion but with a real undertone of suddenly unconcealed insolence in the remark. This was in a group situation and I had the

impression that with the impending departure of General Craigie there was some expectation that my position would be undermined and that for this reason the "wolves" were now ready to leap at my throat. I answered the remark that I took exception to with considerable sharpness and in such a way as to reveal the intellectual idiocy of the implied criticism. This immediate counterattack on my part seems to have had an excellent effect. All further signs of "revolt" ceased immediately and the staff people who had shown this tendency continued in their relations with me in an equally or even more increased cordiality and deference.

There was one incident in which the pattern of the delegation discarding the work of a staff member in favor of a statement by myself did lead to a momentary loss of control on the part of one of the staff people. This was Brigadier General Nuckols, the Public Information Officer for the armistice negotiations. He at one point wanted to release to the press a statement that was really based on his own knowledge of the thinking and intentions of the delegation rather than being based on what had actually occurred in the meeting with the Communists of that day. Because of his inside knowledge his press statements tended to reveal what had not as yet been revealed to the Communists, although he felt that he was simply reporting what had been said to the Communists in the actual meeting. The delegation people as well as myself saw this and supported very vigorously my warning that the press statement ought not be released in the form in which General Nuckols had written it. General Nuckols was disturbed by this and in the discussion was having great difficulty in trying to revise his statement in a way that would give him the maximum amount of newsworthiness with the minimum amount of danger to the delegation's position. I drafted a revised statement that hit the nail pretty much on the head as far as Admiral Joy and the others were concerned. Although all of us had a common front against General Nuckols on the matter, the fact that I had written the substitute statement tended to concentrate General Nuckols' annoyance on me particularly. He broke out with the statement that he thought that it would be best if Dr. Goldhamer did the briefing of the press. This loss of temper and attack on me was not at all well received by Admiral Joy or the other members of the delegation, and Admiral Joy rather bluntly told General Nuckols that the statement that I had written said exactly what the delegation felt ought to be said to the press and that he should take it as it stood. As usually happened in all of these instances, where some sort of annoyance with me existed, the sequel, at least on the surface, was quite satisfactory. General Nuckols had by the next day resumed his normal good humor and went out of his way to be particularly courteous and affable toward me. Still it cannot be assumed that the sources of tension between myself and members of the staff

completely dissipated themselves, and I feel pretty sure that the members of the staff constantly underwent a real struggle to be quite friendly toward me. I think that I could rather clearly detect a very genuine and sincere effort on the part of a number of the staff people to have full appreciation of my work. There was a certain impulse to live up to a code of inner honor which forbade people to allow personal biases to enter into their relations with me. It was almost, at least in some cases, as if these people appreciated the source of resentment which they might have toward me and made a very conscious "gentlemanly" effort to insure that this did not affect their actual behavior toward me or their work with me. In some respects it was this controlled behavior that gave these persons the quality of being much more "gentlemanly" than if their behavior had been entirely spontaneous.

Colonel Galloway was probably the only person in the camp who consistently resented my presence in the camp and the role I played. This arose not so much out of any difference of opinion about policy or from any clash of personalities as such, but from the strong tendency for Colonel Galloway to be extremely "GI" in all his attitudes. He followed very simple principles which can generally be summarized by the phrase "Do absolutely nothing that anyone could possibly take exception to." Since the armistice was supposed to be a military armistice and the camp was made up exclusively of military people, it was a constant source of annoyance to him to have a civilian in the camp's midst. Although he probably did this with less good will than some of the others, Colonel Galloway nonetheless also exemplified the tendency of these officers not to allow personal prejudice to interfere with their judgment. I recall Colonel Galloway very strongly supporting a statement of mine although it was completely identified as being my own particular view of the matter under discussion. He kept drawing the attention of the discussion back to my statement in an extremely firm manner. However I think in part the occasions on which he did this were at times when the view I happened to express seemed to him to be one which General Ridgway would favor. Colonel Galloway usually was less interested in arriving at any decision in terms of correct analysis than he was in seeing a position arrived at that he thought was consistent with something that General Ridgway had said.

Working Procedures

I shall first say a word about work that went on at the camp before I arrived and which can be described to some extent from an examination of the files that I saw at the camp.

At some time, presumably quite early in the negotiations, teams of staff people were put to work preparing large portfolios on each of the Agenda Items of the conference. These portfolios were intended to provide "answers" and data on all of the various problems that might arise during the course of negotiations on a particular Agenda Item. They must have represented a considerable amount of work. The only one that I really examined in some detail, and this in part at the request of Admiral Joy and General Craigie, was the voluminous portfolio on Item #3 of the Agenda, which was constantly undergoing revision toward the latter end of the period during which Item #2 was being discussed. The portfolio began with copies of any directives that had been received from JCS or from General Ridgway's headquarters concerning lines to be taken on the particular Agenda Item. The bulk of the portfolio was divided into the various sub-items of the Item #3. Under each of the sub-items were contained tentative statements of what U.N. objectives were, what minimum positions might be taken, and what lines of argument might be used. These were often formalized into actual statements that were presumably considered suitable for making in the negotiation meetings themselves. From time to time there were attempts to anticipate Communist arguments and to provide answers for each Communist argument that might arise. Many of the documents appeared to be what are usually called staff studies. I observed during my work at the camp that mostly documents that were called staff studies were distinguished by being a rather miscellaneous hodgepodge of all sorts of considerations that might be relevant to a particular problem. As a matter of fact when I once suggested that a particular document was difficult to follow and to read because it had no organization and seemed to jump from one very different point to another without any order, the form of the document was defended as being o.k. because it was intended as a staff study. This defense was made in all seriousness and without any hint of humor at all.

I might mention at this point that in connection with Agenda Item #5, recommendations by the two delegations to their respective governments, that no real advance work had been done on this. The delegation had apparently at an earlier time requested that they receive some guidance on this Agenda Item from the State Department. From time to time Admiral Joy brought up the fact that no guidance had as yet been received by the delegation from the State Department or through General Ridgway's headquarters. This seemed to indicate that an actual request to the State Department had been made at an earlier period or that at least General Ridgway's headquarters had been requested to secure from the State Department such guidance. Toward the end of my stay in the camp Admiral Joy finally made an explicit renewal of this request to General Ridgway. General Ridgway however refused to take action

on it, apparently on the grounds that he did not want at this particular time to start compromising his position and his freedom of action by actively asking for help from the State Department and drawing them into discussions with his headquarters.

When I arrived at the camp on August 24 the negotiations with the Communists had just been suspended a day before. Consequently during this first period I had no opportunity to observe the manner in which the sub-delegation prepared its material for the day-by-day work of conferring with the Communists. The immediate work of the delegation during this period was concerned of course with the various communications that were being received from the Communists and had to be replied to. There were problems of the investigation of the alleged incident itself, the problems of what statements should be made to the public on the matter, problems of drafting replies to the Communists, sending proposed replies to General Ridgway's headquarters, and various other statements expressing to General Ridgway the interpretation of Communist actions and statements and advising him on the delegation's views as to what should be done.

During this early period in which attempts were made to thrash out the problem of getting the two delegations together again, the work of the delegates and of myself was largely dictated in terms of its tempo and content by the stream of messages that were being received. What was characteristic in this process was that the important decisions and work were done very hurriedly the moment a particular message came in. Thus on August 28 a reply was received the first thing in the morning by the liaison officers from General Kim Il Sung, the chief Communist delegate. As I recall without consulting now the records this was his reply to the U.N. refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the alleged bombing of Kaesong and the U.N. indication that the evidence provided was all faked. Kim's letter indicated that such a reply was of course not satisfactory and gave some sort of indication as to the need for getting U.N. acknowledgment of guilt if the meetings were to be resumed. We assembled in Admiral Joy's tent immediately after breakfast. By "we" I mean the delegates and myself. The message from General Kim Il Sung was then read aloud and studied to the extent that the one or possibly two copies of the letter permitted. The next problem was then to prepare immediately a series of documents. What I want to draw attention to at this point is the absence of any systematic attempt to sit down and translate the message of the Communists in terms of the possible expectations they had, how far they would go, what sort of reply was necessary to maintain the integrity of the U.N. position, and at the same time would permit the Communists to return to the conference table. Everything was done in a state of

great hurry and the drafting of a reply to the Communists did not, for instance, have as a background any clear notion as to what one wanted essentially to accomplish in the reply itself. There was more of a tendency to throw one's self rather feverishly into actual writing. Four statements had to be prepared. One was an analysis of what the Communist situation probably was with respect to the particular issue and how they would probably react to various lines of action and what was required from the standpoint of future U.N. success in the negotiations. Secondly, a draft was required of the reply to the Communists, then another statement for General Ridgway as to why the reply took the particular form that was being recommended, and then finally a statement to the press. All of these things were written in a very great hurry. In part the anxiety to get the statements written quickly and to get them off to General Ridgway at the earliest possible moment was to prevent the opinions of General Ridgway and his staff in Tokyo from hardening too much before he had received the statements of the delegation. This could occur, of course, because as soon as the Communist message was received a copy was immediately wired to General Ridgway's office. That meant, then, that there would be a period from the time which he received this copy of the Communist message and the time that he received any further advice or statements from the delegation. Generally the delegation seemed to feel that it was desirable always to get its own views and recommendations in to General Ridgway as quickly as possible after any message from the Communists had been received. In this way they expected that their own views would play a larger part in the determination of whatever General Ridgway would do. At any rate after about an hour and a half of both meeting and writing time all of the materials were assembled and sent off to General Ridgway. That meant then that the great bulk of the work that might very well have consumed at least three, four, or five hours at the very least was concentrated into a period of about 90 minutes.

Having got off these various statements to General Ridgway, the delegation was then in a position to relax. Momentarily "there was no work to do." This was less true of General Craigie, who used to continue mulling things over in his mind and talking with me about them. Admiral Burke would also at times work away at his history of the conference. Admiral Joy to some extent used a little time to make notes in his diary.[6] But on the whole the next stage was simply to wait and hear how much of what had been recommended and written for

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[6]Admiral Joy's diary was published many years later, after his death. See *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference,* Edited by Allan E. Goodman, Foreword by General Matthew B. Ridgway, Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Admiral Joy had earlier summed up the essence of his experience at the Armistice Conference in *How Communists Negotiate,* published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1955.

General Ridgway was followed and used by him. General Ridgway's reply in this particular instance did not arrive until fairly late in the afternoon. Then another meeting would be held in Admiral Joy's tent in order to discuss the message that General Ridgway had sent.

During this period the staff officers would continue to work on particular jobs they had as teams or on new papers that they were assigned to write. Thus during this early period in late August, one team under Colonel Darrow was working on a new proposal to be given to the Communists, the principal significance of which was that it was an attempt to devise a proposal with a very wide neutral zone. I shall speak about this in its substantive aspects in another context.

Early in September when it was apparent that there was no likelihood of a resumption of talks immediately, the delegation and the chief staff people all went to Tokyo. I accompanied them. Here of course we lived in the greater comfort of Tokyo, and those who had their families with them in Tokyo were able to be at home. Admiral Joy was also in a position then to spend time at his headquarters in Tokyo. The same was also true of General Craigie. Here in Tokyo the routine was somewhat different. We had as our general office for our meetings a very fine conference room in the Dai Ichi Building, that is, in General Ridgway's headquarters. Most days we met about 8:30 to 9:00 every morning. I generally arrived somewhat earlier in order to go over in quiet and peace the various messages that had come in, such as, for example, copies of communist broadcasts in China and North Korea. There were also occasional messages transmitted from the United States Embassy in Moscow summarizing statements that were being made in the Soviet newspapers about the conference and on the Soviet radio. In addition there would be messages from the liaison officers and other people still remaining at the camp in Korea.

The real activity of the group occurred of course, as in Korea, when a new message had been received from the Communists. Then again there was a great flurry of excitement, a tremendous amount of paper-writing, drafts of replies, drafts of analyses, drafts of press releases, etc. Even though the delegation and its staff was now in Tokyo with direct and more or less immediate access to General Ridgway there was the same tendency to rush through the work of getting an answer written. This was true even when as a matter of policy it was known that three, four, or five days would elapse before the message would be sent back to the Communists. This delay in sending a reply to the Communists was a matter of following the Communist pattern of holding off a reply presumably in order to wage a war of nerves. However I shall discuss this more fully later.

In Tokyo because of the physical arrangement by which we met every day in the large conference room a larger number of persons participated in the process of writing replies to the Communists and of discussing and determining whether this or that concession should or should not be made to the Communists in order to get the meetings under way with them again. In Korea the staff people did not have easy or direct access to the members of the delegation, since all of the real delegation work and planning work went on in Admiral Joy's tent. The staff people on the whole could only show up there by invitation. But in Tokyo, since we all met together in the conference room, they were automatically there and in on all of the discussions.

Working efficiency was probably not promoted by the large number of persons who participated in these meetings and in the writings of drafts. By large number I mean a group of probably four to seven or eight additional persons other than the delegates and myself. However the difficulties of working with this size group were not really technical difficulties as such but arose more directly from the opinions held and the mood characteristics of the group. The staff people tended to reinforce the pessimistic judgments of the delegates with respect to whether the Communists really wanted an armistice, whether the Communists would ever come back to negotiate, whether the Communists would ever be willing to leave Kaesong as the location of a conference site, etc. Consequently their discussions and the papers they wrote and the drafts of replies that they proposed to have used generally reflected a panicky and completely mistaken evaluation of the situation. In the midst of a great variety of anxieties, of a great many different proposals as to how to get the negotiations resumed, the problem of getting an adequate reply to the Communists had to be worked out. Great mountains of paper accumulated on the table of the conference room as everyone worked away at writing and rewriting drafts. I was more or less regarded as a major specialist in the writing of replies to the Communists, although it was only in a couple of cases that the job of preparing an initial draft was formally and explicitly put directly in my hands with the general intention of having other people hold off until my proposed reply was available for discussion. However even in these cases it was almost impossible to secure a well thought out reply. Any draft with which one started was immediately subject to competition of other efforts and of objections to this phrase or that phrase or the desire to get in this point or the other point until the final draft of any message was a compound of so many disjointed sentences and paragraphs that it was often a matter of amazement to me that any understandable reply finally emerged from this process. In one case only was a reply that I wrote used finally by General Ridgway almost verbatim as I had written it. This was a reply which because of the particular delicacy of the

situation at the moment was cleared with the JCS. General Ridgway had accepted my reply with only one minor change in the introductory sentence, but the JCS made one other slight change where the flavor of a word apparently struck them as being too harsh. Most of the replies sent to the Communists in the long series of communications that passed between the Communists and the U.N. during the period of August 23–October 25 were not however sent to the JCS for approval, although the JCS were, of course, immediately informed of the content of the reply that was being sent. Often, of course, the intended reply was drafted and available well before the time it was sent off to the Communists and sometimes in these cases General Ridgway would send a copy of the intended reply to the JCS in advance. In these cases however he did not so much ask them for permission or authority to send the reply as simply for their information to provide them with what was going to be sent out.

During this long period in Tokyo we continued to meet almost every day and for a good number of hours on these days. In retrospect it is very difficult for me to recall what in the world could have kept us so preoccupied during this period. Nonetheless it is true that there always seemed to be problems of the greatest urgency to discuss and analyze. Of course a good deal of this work was not concerned with the immediate questions but rather with advanced planning. Thus we had several sessions on the line to be taken with the Communists with respect to POWs. Particularly we had a long meeting devoted to the problem of whether certain classes of persons now carried on the list as POWs and so turned in to the International Red Cross should be stricken from the POW lists and be set down rather as interned civilians.

There were, however, days in which we only assembled for a couple of hours or so and then broke up, and very occasionally there was a day when it was more or less tacitly understood that no one need turn up, especially if the weather was particularly good for golf. This was especially true immediately after a U.N. message had been sent off to the Communists, since it was very unlikely that for the next 24 hours anything would happen that would require immediate attention since the Communists usually took plenty of time before sending their own reply.

From time to time the delegation and two or three of the staff people would have meetings with General Ridgway. These however did not occur very frequently and most of the opinions and work of the delegation was transmitted to him in written form. However Admiral Joy and General Craigie and Admiral Burke sometimes would see General Ridgway somewhat more informally without being accompanied by the staff officers.

Occasionally one of General Ridgway's staff generals would come down to the delegation conference room and meet with us and express what he took to be the general state of mind of General Ridgway.

The people from General Ridgway's headquarters who worked with the delegation, that is, the Army people in Tokyo, came mostly from a section of GHQ called JSPOG. I can't for the moment reconstruct what these letters mean except that the first two are abbreviations of Joint Staff.

On one occasion General Ridgway's G-2 spent a little time with us giving the delegation and its staff his evaluation of what the Communists were up to and whether they really wanted an armistice. This talk was an incredibly naive performance and almost turned my hair gray. We also had a brief talk by another military authority who solemnly assured us that high Japanese opinion felt that the Communists did want an armistice.

During these days and weeks in Tokyo a leading role was played in our deliberations by General Craigie. Admiral Joy was present most of the time, but he seemed to be willing to have General Craigie, Admiral Burke, and myself largely responsible for most of the work, thus leaving him freer to spend time at his naval headquarters. He was always present, however, whenever we deliberated on messages from the Communists or from the JCS, but was more willing to leave the drafting of replies to us.

Early in October the liaison officers back at the camp were already entering into active negotiations for the resumption of the talks. This was after the Communists had agreed to move out of Kaesong. On October 9 the delegation and its staff returned to Munsan-ni with the expectation that the talks would very shortly be resumed. As it happened, of course, the actual talks were not resumed between the delegations until October 25. Between October 9 and October 25 most of the immediate work revolved around the plotting of tactics and strategy for the liaison officers and in making decisions as to how much in the way of concessions would be given to the Communists with respect to the conditions under which the talks would be resumed.

When negotiations were finally resumed on October 25 this was the first time that actual negotiations were being carried on during my association with the armistice conference. The work routine now changed considerably. During the late morning and most of the afternoon the level of activity was quite low. During this period the two sub-delegates, General Hodes and Admiral Burke, were at Panmunjom negotiating with the Communists on Item #2 of the Agenda. The sub-delegations met at 11:00 every morning and usually broke off for lunch about 1:00 and then resumed again in the afternoon and broke off between 3:30

and 5:00. The sub-delegation was normally back in the camp around 4:30 or 5:00. Since they usually traveled by helicopter they arrived back at the camp approximately fifteen minutes after the meeting for the day broke up. During the latter part of November General Hodes and Admiral Burke took to returning from Panmunjom by staff car rather than helicopter, as this apparently gave them a little opportunity to relax and talk between the two of themselves on the return trip. I had the impression that they shifted to this mode of transportation to give themselves a half hour or three quarters of an hour in which to talk over between the two of them the general report that they would present on their return to the camp. While it is not too easy to clarify exactly this impression I had nonetheless the distinct feeling that the two sub-delegates wanted at least a small buffer period between the time they broke off the day's discussion and the time that the people in the camp would descend upon them to hear what had occurred during the day.

When General Hodes and Admiral Burke would return from the day's meeting with the Communists Admiral Joy and I would often meet them at the place where the helicopter landed or else where the staff car would draw up to the camp. We would then adjourn to Admiral Joy's tent in order to receive a summary of the day's activities. At these meetings there were normally present Admiral Joy, the two sub-delegates, General Craigie during the few days he was still there before leaving to return to the States, General Turner, and sometimes although not too frequently General Lee.

The first action to be taken was to draft a very brief summary of what had gone on during the day, which was sent off immediately to General Ridgway. This brief summary, ranging in length from about half a typewritten page to three quarters of a typewritten page, was usually prepared by General Hodes. He would sometimes retire briefly to his tent upon his return to the camp in order to write this message. Then he would join us in Admiral Joy's tent about fifteen minutes later. Sometimes he would write out the actual message in Admiral Joy's tent while Admiral Burke would be telling us about the day's proceedings. It was a matter of very great concern to me that this summary of what had gone on during the day was treated as a relatively insignificant activity and very little discussion of the message or very little opportunity to discuss what should go in the message and what it was important to emphasize ever occurred. In many instances I did not even see the message before it went out. This was not because it was in any way withheld from me but simply was part of the general tendency to consider this a rather routine and not too significant matter. There were occasional days when we would have some discussion as to whether the brief summary stated adequately what the events of the day's discussions had been,

but this was relatively rare. Another difficulty was that this message was prepared by General Hodes to be sent off immediately upon his return to the camp and was thus written before Admiral Joy or I had as yet received a full briefing on the course of the day's discussions. Consequently I personally was not in a position at the time when the message was written and sent out to know as yet how adequately the message conveyed the significant features of the day's discussion. One of the consequences of the daily messages and the fact that they were sent off in this brief and hastily written form was that General Ridgway's initial information concerning each day's activities was apt to be very truncated and often misleading. To be sure he would receive the next day the transcript of the day's proceedings. I do not know whether he read them each day or not. Even if he did there is the real possibility that his major impression of the course of the discussions was nonetheless secured from the inadequate messages that he received during the late afternoon before leaving his office for the day.

After this message had been written and sent off we would then settle down to a verbal report on the highlights of the day. This was in many instances not very thorough and not very systematic. Partly, of course, this was because the full account of the day's activities would be available later in the evening when the transcript of the day's session had been dittoed. Sometimes the transcript of the morning session would be sent back by helicopter to the camp early in the afternoon, so that by mid- or late afternoon a rough draft of the discussions in the morning session would be available. The revised draft together with the discussions of the afternoon session usually became available in dittoed form about any time between 8:00 to 10:00 p.m.

Let me insert here a statement on how these transcripts were prepared. At meetings of the full delegation, such as occurred in July, stenographic reports were taken by both sides. During sub-delegation meetings, and these constituted the meetings in the latter part of August and with the exception of the morning session of October 25 all of the discussions during October and November, the sub-delegates were responsible for the actual negotiations. In the sub-delegations it had been agreed upon by the U.N. and the Communists that stenographers would not be permitted in the conference tent. However each side was free to have two or three staff officers who took down as close to verbatim as they could the course of the discussion. Since everything was translated, the pace was apparently usually such as to permit even unskilled recorders using longhand to get down a fairly full account of everything that was said. Different staff officers took turns going to the meetings each day and assuming these informal stenographic duties. They varied somewhat in their skill. Consequently the records of some days are extremely good and clear whereas on

other days the record does not seem to be so complete or exact. During the noon hour break at Panmunjom and then again upon their return late in the afternoon to the delegation camp, the staff officers who had taken down the record would put their notes together, go over them with the U.N., Korean, and Chinese interpreters and get out a first draft of the day's proceedings. This would then be revised and put into somewhat smoother English later in the evening. On the whole the record is fairly good, but in trying to interpret the significance of particular phrases I often found that it was necessary to consult directly with the interpreters in order to determine exactly the flavor of the original North Korean or Chinese expression. The translation sometimes tended to obscure meanings.

Let us get back now to Admiral Joy's tent in the late afternoon. After some initial discussion of the highlights of the day had occurred we would sometimes break up momentarily while Admiral Burke got into more comfortable clothes or took a bath and then would resume our meeting around 6:00 o'clock or somewhat earlier. These meetings were very informal and were accompanied by a drink or two. It was the practice for the members of the delegation and myself who drank every day in Admiral Joy's tent to contribute an occasional bottle to his stock so that essentially we were drinking our own liquor. Admiral Joy had a large electric refrigerator in his tent. These informal meetings over our drinks were often the crucial meetings of the camp. It was here that the real struggle for men's minds went on. About 7:00 o'clock or a little earlier we would adjourn to the senior mess, where we had dinner. Immediately after dinner the Navy briefing took place in one of the Navy tents. These briefings were excellent and covered the ground, air, and sea war together with bits of political intelligence that came from behind the lines. Earlier in August and early September and also for the first few days in October when General Craigie was still at the camp we used to have a daily Air Force briefing. This briefing was also very well done and concentrated particularly on the analysis of the interdiction program. After General Craigie left, these daily Air Force briefings were dropped and in place of them we had a brief five-minute Air Force summary given to us at the mess table itself at dinner time. This was supplemented by a weekly full dress Air Force briefing summarizing the results of the interdiction program during the preceding week. After dinner there were movies for those who wanted to attend them and during August and early September many of the delegation people including myself did attend them. However during the period in October and November when the negotiations actually got under way again the evening period became a fairly intensive work period for me and also for some of the other staff people. We got the transcript of the day's proceedings and it was at this time that I went over that with very considerable care. Sometimes in the light of these transcripts it became desirable to have meetings either in Admiral

Joy's tent or just informal meetings in which I would drop into Admiral Burke's tent to point out to him some of the things that I thought significant in the day's proceedings. After that I would then retire again to my tent and begin to write up a statement for use by the sub-delegation in the next day's sessions. Sometimes Admiral Burke and to a much lesser extent General Hodes would meet with some of the staff people in the evening to direct them with respect to things that they should write up and have ready for the next morning. As I have indicated in an earlier section Admiral Burke became more and more dissatisfied, as did also General Hodes, with the attitude of the staff people and these evening meetings tended to drop out. On the other hand it should be mentioned that Captain Briggs and also Admiral Burke realized that the staff people sometimes felt a little resentful because the delegation members were not making sufficient use of them or did not take them fully into their confidence.

The next stage of work in preparing for the meetings daily with the Communists occurred the next morning. The sub-delegation did not leave the camp until about 10:30, which gave them plenty of time to get to the meeting tent at Panmunjom by 11:00. From approximately 7:30 or 8:00 a.m. we met in one of the working administrative tents in order to go over the papers that had been prepared and to present them for the consideration of General Hodes and Admiral Burke. These two-hour morning meetings were often quite competitive. Each staff person tended to feel that he had written a statement which was of the greatest value and should be used by the sub-delegation in its meeting with the Communists. Admiral Burke and General Hodes would thus have each morning about 15–25 pages of material that had been prepared for them. They would read these over, make various changes, steal a paragraph here and a paragraph there, and have some of the revised statements retyped. They both seemed to feel uncomfortable if they could not take with them to the meeting a batch of papers on which they could fall back during the meeting itself. It was characteristic in connection with these papers that, as I have noted elsewhere, much time was spent on writing, reading, and revising such papers and much less time on doing any straightforward thinking as to what was required, what sort of impression one wanted to convey to the Communists, and in general what policy to pursue. In this respect I think the sub-delegation would have been very different had General Craigie continued on in the camp.

It was in connection with the preparation of statements to be used by the sub-delegation that my own statements tended to receive very special consideration and generally to be relied on by General Hodes. It was therefore in part this type of work that produced part of the underlying sense of rivalry between the staff people and myself.

After the papers had been read, very haphazardly discussed or in some cases simply ignored, General Hodes and Admiral Burke would leave the tent and return to their own tents for a while before taking off for Panmunjom. Since the preparation of the papers occurred in the evening and their discussions in the morning at these meetings at which Admiral Joy did not participate, there was a tendency for Admiral Joy to play no role in the planning of the content of the day's discussion. I believe, although I am not entirely sure of this, that Admiral Joy found himself sitting rather on the sidelines and finally required General Hodes and Admiral Burke to show up at his tent shortly before they took off for Panmunjom in order to review with him what the content of the papers were that they intended to use during the day.

After the sub-delegation members and the three or four staff people and translators had left for Panmunjom the immediate work of the main people was over. General Turner had been given some responsibility for preparing for work on Item #3 and he occasionally met with a team that was working with him on this Agenda Item. I did some work for this team although I found it almost impossible to have any satisfactory discussions with General Turner.

During the day when the negotiations were going on at Panmunjom, General Turner, General Lee, Admiral Joy and myself were relatively free of immediate burden. During the day I would often be called in by Admiral Joy to talk particular things over with him or else simply to relieve his mind on the general state of the negotiations. Often I would take the initiative and go in on my own in order to discuss with him things that I thought it would be well to try and get clarified. He seemed to welcome these "intrusions" very much and to some extent seemed to get some relief and gratification from having me come in to talk about the negotiation problems with him. In part I think that this was due to the fact that somehow he had a sense of having lost control over the delegation and a sense of not really being an active participant or director of what was going on.

After lunch, which was also to some extent a period during which shop talk was carried on, I usually spent about an hour playing chess with Lt. Commander Oswald Jacoby.

Admiral Joy received the international air edition of the *New York Times* and would spend part of the day clipping it and arranging all the clippings bearing on the armistice negotiations in a sort of scrap book and file. He also received through the Navy very full summaries of editorial comments on the negotiations from papers all over the United States. He read these very closely. He also received letters from friends and complete strangers and answered each of these individually. He told me that there were very few letters that he did not answer.

The ones he did not answer were generally those that took an unsympathetic attitude toward the delegation or which complained of the stubbornness of the U.N. negotiators.

Security Problems

The level of security maintained during the armistice negotiations was on the whole extremely poor. To some extent the best protection that the U.N. had against security leaks was the general confusion, oscillation and uncertainty about the U.N. line of action. Of course were the Communists able to interpret this correctly knowledge of the fluctuating opinions in the U.N. camp would have been of very considerable help to them. However it is unlikely that they would be able to appreciate the true state of affairs and consequently if they were able to get pieces of information these would often probably be difficult for them to evaluate correctly.

I know of only one case where there is evidence of an outright leak of highly important, in fact Top Secret, information. Whether this arrived in Communist hands or not is another matter which everyone can judge for himself in the light of the following account.

Toward the end of the discussions on Agenda Item #2, that is slightly after the middle of November, the situation within the delegation and as between the Communists and the U.N. became quite tense. The Communists were holding out for an immediate marking of a line of demarcation based on the present position of the battle line. They knew that such an actual drawing of a line would give them a virtual ceasefire, since it would become extremely difficult for the U.N. to carry on aggressive military action in a situation where a demarcation line existed and where, if advances were made, these advances could not be incorporated into the final armistice settlement. The U.N. delegation at this stage was trying to hold out for a settlement in terms of the battle line, wherever it should happen to be at the time the armistice settlement was to be signed. This would leave the Communists in the position of not knowing how much military action might be taken and of risking possible military reverses during any period which they used to remain intransigent on later issues. Finally, however, a directive was received from the JCS compelling the U.N. to accede to the Communist proposal. As a matter of fact, as I shall show in a later section dealing with substantive problems, the JCS directive gave the Communists more than they were asking. The delegation held off for approximately 24 hours before giving the Communists the proposal directed by the JCS. This much leeway was permissible to them since the JCS directive only indicated that this

proposal should be made as soon as practicable or some such phrase that could be interpreted to not require compliance on the hour itself. During this 24-hour period we had a desperate hope that the Communists might crack and meet the U.N. requirement before the U.N. was required to meet theirs on the basis of the JCS directive.

On the morning of the final day on which the sub-delegates knew they would have to comply with the JCS directive the new U.N. proposal was written and all copies except two copies in the possession of Admiral Burke and General Hodes were confiscated. For the first time during the entire period of the negotiations, at least that I am aware of, special effort was made to insure that a minimum number of person knew that this concession was about to be made to the Communists. Actually most of the staff people in the camp knew perfectly well that this event was to occur on that particular day, but at least they were not permitted to retain rough drafts or copies of the proposal itself, which General Hodes planned to make to the Communists. It was consequently a very great shock to the sub-delegation and to those of us at the camp when we learned of it to find that when the sub-delegation arrived at Panmunjom for the meeting of that day one of the staff officers, Colonel Levie, was approached by an American newspaperman and was asked if it were true that such-and-such a proposal was going to be made to the Communists. He then described the proposal in terms that exactly paralleled the Top Secret JCS directive. The U.N. officer, Colonel Levie, very sensibly treated the matter quite casually at the time as far as the newspaperman was concerned and simply said that he had no knowledge of any such matter. He did also inquire as to what led the newspaperman to ask this question. In reply the newspaper person said that his office in Tokyo had received a message from their Washington office asking that this matter be checked upon. This would seem to indicate that the leak had occurred in Washington and presumably from either the JCS or possibly the State Department if it were privy to the JCS directive. I know of absolutely no evidence as to how the leak originated, but there were two or three persons in the camp who for no reason that I know of at all thought that it had originated with Mr. McDermott of the State Department. Just on what grounds they based this I do not know, although I recall vaguely hearing that he had intimate relations with I believe a *New York Times* correspondent or some other newspaper people in the United States, but that scarcely of course means anything at all. On the whole there was a tendency in the camp to throw the blame on the State Department out of, I think, general negativism towards the State Department.

The other part of this extraordinary incident is as follows. General Hodes was trying to give himself as much time as possible before making this proposal to

the Communists, which in fact was a meeting of the Communist terms. Consequently he did not give them the proposal until toward the end of the afternoon session of that day. He held off of course in the hope that possibly the Communists would themselves make some sort of compromise proposal during the course of the day. However this they did not do. The point that is of interest in connection with the security incident I am describing is this: About the middle of the afternoon, before General Hodes had read the proposal to the Communists, a Communist messenger, apparently from Kaesong, came into the conference tent at Panmunjom and handed General Hsieh, the Chinese Communist sub-delegate, a message written on a piece of paper. According to General Hodes and Admiral Burke, who described the incident, General Hsieh broke out into a broad smile and look of great satisfaction when he read the message and handed it to General Lee, the North Korean Communist sub-delegate. Now, of course, it is entirely possible that the message that the Communists received had absolutely nothing to do with any advance information about the proposal that the U.N. was about to make. Given the obvious leak that had occurred as indicated by the question of the U.S. newspaperman, there was a tendency of course to see this incident in the tent as related to it.

We had some discussion in the camp that evening about this whole matter, and while a grave view was taken of it, somehow the full import of such a thing happening did not seem to be present among the members of the delegation. The gravity and the significance of this event somehow was dampened by a general sense of defeatism, both with respect to the Communist triumph on Item #2 of the Agenda and a general sense of defeatism conveyed by the notion of "You can't keep anything secret from the Communists anyway." I urged very strongly that the most vigorous representation should be made to General Ridgway to initiate the fullest investigation of the incident in order to force the newspaper people involved to clarify how they got knowledge of a pending U.N. proposal which was contained at least at the Far Eastern end in a Top Secret document. Some communication was sent to Tokyo on the matter, but I left the camp too soon thereafter to learn anything about what the sequel to the whole event was. I think there is no question from having examined the form of the question as the newspaperman put it to Colonel Levie that the question was prompted by a thoroughly exact knowledge of the JCS decision.

The above incident, as I have indicated, occurred quite late in my stay at the camp and in Tokyo. However during my entire association with the armistice talks I was constantly perturbed by what seemed to me to be the tremendous laxity in security provisions. One of the principal sources of possible leaks

seemed to me to be the very great freedom with which telephone conversations were carried on between the camp at Munsan-ni and General Ridgway's headquarters in Tokyo. This applied both when the delegation and staff and myself were in the camp in Korea, from which calls would be made to Tokyo, and also to the period when we were in Tokyo and calls would be made back to the liaison officers or other staff people in the camp in Korea. The telephone was considered as an insecure instrument and technically it was not considered right to discuss confidential matters or matters of higher classification over the wire. This telephone line proceeded overland from Tokyo to the western coast of Japan and there it was trans-oceanic to the camp. I made some inquiries from staff people associated with the armistice conference about the possibility of the overland part of the wire being tapped. As far as I can make out there was no technical problem at all for espionage agents to tap the wire if they really set out to do it. I am not quite sure which was more alarming, either the possibility of this actually occurring or the vagueness with which all of the armistice conference people treated the whole question. In actual fact telephone conversations containing matters that would certainly be classified secret were carried on over this telephone between Tokyo and the armistice camp in Korea. Some of these conversations were from the standpoint of utility to the Communists extremely significant and when I would hear such conversations going on in my presence over the telephone I would almost literally feel my hair rising at the thought that Communist agents might be listening in to such a telephone conversation. People would sometimes excuse themselves for the freedom with which they sent messages by telephone between Tokyo and Korea on the grounds that one was between the devil and the deep blue sea. Either one had to sacrifice some measure of security or else one had to sacrifice the expedience and speed of being able to carry on a two-way conversation. As a matter of fact this defense was as far as I could see perfectly inexcusable. While it is true that one cannot communicate as swiftly especially in a two-way fashion by coded wire, nonetheless the speed with which such communications could be transmitted was, relative to most of the situations that arose, adequate. In any case certainly the delay in time was by no means so great as to justify the tremendous risk that was being taken by carrying these conversations on over telephones not secure against enemy action.

During our daily meetings in Tokyo when a great deal of writing was done in the conference room and various drafts of messages to the Communists were being prepared, a great deal of paper would accumulate on the big conference table. Colonel Galloway seemed to be particularly conscious of all of this accumulated paper, apparently in part from a security standpoint but also I suspect from just a sense of neatness. In any case there was a quite conscious effort to round up all

of these sheets of first drafts, second drafts, and third drafts of various statements and get them properly disposed of and burned. From a couple of standpoints this type of security consciousness had some drawbacks. In the first place a somewhat maniacal preoccupation to get these sheets of paper out of the way meant that various initial drafts that often were superior to the hodgepodge of pasted together paragraphs that emerged at later stages were eventually lost and no longer available later on when it became apparent that the integral version of an initial draft was superior to the various anthology versions that emerged later. This often happened to my own drafts. My own drafts were usually, I think I can say, rather carefully planned and worked out and provided a message that had a definite strategy to it. This draft would be read and discussed and then a process would set in of people wanting to get such and such a point in or feeling that such and such a phrase was unwise. Then a great process of putting together various odds and ends into successive drafts began. After all of this was done it sometimes became apparent that the hodgepodge of selections that were strung together into a later draft were not as effective as the original statement that I had prepared. But in the meantime the original form of the statement had become buried and lost or else already destroyed. It might seem that this difficulty could have been overcome by my retaining some sort of copy of my original version. In some cases this was possible, but actually the mechanics of work often prevented this. A statement on a particular matter would have to be drafted and often this was done sitting right at the table and written out in longhand. One of the junior officers would then take it in to be typed and the copies would then be distributed to the various members of the conference. After revision had set in, Colonel Galloway would rather carefully attempt to collect all copies of drafts that had been discarded so that when later use might have been made of them they were no longer available. A second disadvantage of this particular form of security consciousness was the destruction of a considerable amount of interesting research material. It often struck me that it would be extremely interesting to collect successive drafts of various messages and statements that were prepared in order to analyze later with greater care the particular types of changes that were considered desirable from draft to draft. I sometimes mentioned this to General Craigie and to Admiral Burke in the hope that they would take some initiative in trying to preserve these materials. But they never did and I did not care to do anything that would upset Colonel Galloway's method of work and which might make him feel that I was more concerned with academic research interest than proper security.

In the camp at Korea there were also several weaknesses in the security system. Discussions of the armistice negotiation problems were carried on in Admiral Joy's tent in voices sufficiently loud for any person probably within about ten

yards of the tent to hear anything that was being said quite distinctly. This was probably not too serious, although one might have questioned the wisdom of permitting the orderlies and other enlisted personnel who had access to the area to hear some of the things that were being said. The same problem applied to discussions in the mess during the meal hours. Often discussions dealt with matters that were certainly of the highest secrecy and yet these were carried on in the presence of the enlisted waiters. The point here is that while it would have been considered the most inappropriate thing to permit these enlisted persons to see actual printed documents of a classified nature bearing on the armistice negotiations, it was not considered inappropriate to discuss these things in their presence. It is probably fair to say that much more care was taken to conceal certain matters from General Lee, the South Korean delegate, than from the waiter at the mess table.

The camp contained South Korean personnel who worked not directly in the kitchens themselves but in the sort of outer kitchens where potatoes were peeled and the first stages of food production were engaged in. There were therefore South Koreans present in the camp whose loyalty character could probably not be determined with any real degree of accuracy. The camp did have areas that were called "restricted areas." The restricted areas comprised the residential areas where the officers' tents were and also the areas where the various administrative and work tents were located. The American enlisted personnel had access to these areas if they were orderlies or worked in the administrative tents. South Korean personnel were presumably not supposed to enter these areas except on work details, when they were supposed to be accompanied. However I did see occasional South Korean persons in these areas who were not at least at the moment accompanied by any U.S. person.

Another and perhaps more serious possible source of security leak lay in the fact that a great deal of work of the delegation people was done in their own tents. I was at first amazed when I found that it was considered quite all right to leave very highly classified documents just lying around in one's tent or open on the table in the tent. Apparently this was considered safe enough because the area itself was supposed to be secure and consequently there was no need to fear that unauthorized persons could gain access to anything that was left lying on top of the table. It was true, of course, that the orderlies had free access to the tents and necessarily had to enter the tents often when no one was there just in the course of their ordinary duties. But this did not seem to be of any concern to anyone. I should add that it is very unlikely in my opinion, although I have no knowledge on the matter, that the enlisted personnel of the camp were selected with any particular eye toward security. Another problem in connection with the tents in

which we lived was that the waste paper baskets were not secure, that is, the contents were not burned. It was always possible, of course, if one had material to be destroyed to get it burned in proper style over in the administrative area. But given the amount of jotting down and writing that people were constantly doing in the tents it seems to me that it must have been extremely easy for various notes and drafts to find their way into the general rubbish heap of the camp. I did some agitation about this particular problem and as it happens on the very day I departed from the camp a notification was sent to all members of the camp drawing to their attention the fact that materials thrown in the wastepaper baskets of their tents were not disposed of under security regulations and that therefore they should take proper precautions.

I suppose that the camp itself was probably not too easily open to penetration by any individual who had no authorization to be there. However as far as I could see the number of guards around the perimeter of the camp was by no means sufficient to prevent any determined person from getting into the camp if he had really made up his mind to do so. I rather doubt however whether this direct form of espionage was a very great danger.

Although it does not bear directly on the matter of security in the ordinary sense, there is one incident that I should like to mention under this general heading, because it at least illustrates the type of indiscretion that was possible. When the cold weather set in the showers that we had at the camp were enclosed in a building that contained two rooms divided by a partition. On one side of the partition were showers for lieutenant colonels and colonels and on the other side of the partition were showers for the general officers, flag officers, and myself. One day I was taking a shower and turned the shower off and was beginning to dry myself when Colonel Galloway and Commander Muse entered the shower room on the other side of the partition. Since my shower had been turned off there was no particular sound which indicated to them that there was anyone else on the other side of the partition. Nonetheless one would have thought that in carrying on any conversation that might have repercussions they would bear in mind the possibility that the other shower room was occupied. In any case they began to carry on a conversation about the South Koreans, in the course of which Colonel Galloway expressed himself as being of the opinion that South Koreans were not fit for anything except being bootblacks. What horrified me about this particular conversation was that instead of me being in the shower room it could very well have been General Lee, the South Korean delegate. While I was ruminating rather grimly about the indiscretion of persons in saying things that could very well alienate the South Korean delegate (although probably no one would have worried particularly about this anyway), Colonel

Galloway passed on by a natural transition from a discussion of South Koreans and Orientals to some discussion of the Jews. I thus suddenly found myself in precisely the position that I had visualized General Lee as possibly stumbling into. Colonel Galloway made various remarks about Morgenthau and the manner in which Jewish interests tended to be used in trying to shape policy with respect to Germany in the immediate postwar period and even before the war ended. I was somewhat embarrassed by this conversation that was going on, not because of any personal feelings particularly that I had, but for fear that they would become aware that I had overheard the conversation and thus have guilt feelings that would practically make it impossible for me to have any proper relations with these two officers thereafter. Consequently the moment they began this latter phase of the discussion I slipped out of the shower room as quietly and quickly as possible in order to insure that I would not be revealed to them as someone who had listened in to their conversation.

There is one more point that again is not a matter of security in the ordinary sense but can be discussed under this heading. That is the extremely aggravating practice of permitting newspaper releases, especially in Washington, that provided very real clues that the Communists could use in judging what their own strategy should be. A good example of this is something that just appeared in the newspaper of December 26, that is yesterday, and I use this illustration rather than one that occurred while I was overseas. The newspaper yesterday carried a story to the effect that Washington had given General Ridgway freedom to extend the 30-day period during which present demarcation lines had validity. From such an announcement the Communists might fairly safely be able to infer that the JCS has no intention of permitting increased military activity after the expiration of the 30-day period. An earlier example of the same sort of thing was the announcement that Washington made quite early in the course of the negotiations that the U.N. would not be "trapped" into breaking off the negotiations. It is highly unlikely that such an announcement provided a public relations gain at all sufficient to compensate for the damage that such an announcement did to the U.N. bargaining position. Yesterday in the newspaper there was also an announcement by General Van Fleet that had been cleared apparently after some hesitation by censors in the Far East. This announcement was to the effect that the Eighth Army would not engage in increased military activity with the expiration of the 30-day period, and that the Eighth Army would not endanger to no good end the lives of additional soldiers. While this sort of announcement is open to Communist interpretation as a possible blind to conceal planned military activities, taken in conjunction with other items of information it probably provides them with increased assurance that they do not risk anything by extending the negotiations beyond the 30-day period. The

entire public relations aspects of the negotiations in Korea deserve fairly close analysis, and this "security aspect" of the public relations problem is only one part of the larger problem.

One final minor point with respect to the security problems of the conference. Many of the staff people and also one of the delegates, Admiral Burke, lived at the Imperial Hotel when they were in Tokyo. Whereas we had no information at all concerning the movements of the personnel on the Communist side engaged in the negotiations, the Communists must have had very complete information about the movements back and forth between Korea and Tokyo of persons engaged in the armistice work on the U.N. side. The Imperial Hotel, which housed almost all important visitors to the Theater and people who were moving back and forth between Korea and Japan, was unquestionably under Communist surveillance. As a matter of fact a U.N. counter-espionage raid in Tokyo seized documents showing that the Communists received information from within the Imperial Hotel on the people who were staying at the hotel, who had arrived, who had left, etc.

Part II
The Negotiations

The Negotiations

Introduction

So far I have talked primarily about aspects of the work of the U.N. negotiation team that depend more directly upon immediate observation of the U.N. personnel. Much of the material has had to do with the personal relations of the people in the camp and of my own relations to them. I have given special attention to these matters so far in these notes because they are the aspects of my experience that are not readily reconstructible from the official records of the negotiations or of the communications between headquarters.

I am now going to discuss problems bearing more directly on the tactics and strategy of the actual negotiations. This will also call on observations made during my association with the work of the armistice conference, but these problems on the whole are more directly related to the actual course of the negotiations and are more subject to analysis in the records of the conference. There will, however, be a fair amount of material that could only be secured by observation of the people and work.

How the U.N. people thought about the problems of negotiation, how they formulated objectives, and how they attempted to attain these objectives are of course precisely the problems that are of greatest interest from the standpoint of any RAND interest in negotiatory behavior. In the present notes, however, I am going to deal rather briefly with these crucial problems. The reason for this is that at present I do not have a complete record of the negotiations themselves. Nor do I at the moment wish to study even those records that I do have with the care that a proper analysis of the subject matter of Part II would require. What follows will, then, be rather disorderly notes on the characteristics of U.N. negotiatory behavior. I have some expectation of receiving, at the end of the armistice conference, from the Secretary to the Delegation, Captain Briggs, a complete file of the records of the armistice conference. When these records become available it should be possible to extend the following notes very considerably.

The General Course of the Armistice Talks

The first stage of the armistice negotiations was concerned with the physical arrangement and location of the talks themselves. At this stage the Communists secured just about everything that they insisted on with respect to arrangements for the armistice. They secured the choice of Kaesong instead of the location on the *Jutlandia* in Wonsan harbor. The timing of events was almost entirely in their hands. In general the U.N. was extremely "reasonable" and "agreeable." This reflected right at the earliest stage a two-fold assumption in U.N. thinking. One of these assumptions appears to have been that the only matters that were of real consequence were those that concerned actual rational discussions in the conference room and that consequently compliance with Communist requirements with respect to physical arrangements were of a secondary matter, provided these requirements did not interfere with the possibility of effective discussion. A second assumption seemed to be that by showing such highly reasonable and gracious behavior the U.N. would thereby demonstrate its good faith to the Communists and induce by a process of gratitude similar courteous and gracious behavior from the Communists. A third factor that is illustrated by the early tendency to follow the Communist lead with respect to administrative matters is the U.N. tendency not to calculate with any care the possible consequences of the actions into which they were being led. To some extent the consequences were perhaps dimly realized because by implication the U.N. suggestion for other arrangements in itself indicates that there were reasons why the U.N. people thought that their proposal would provide a better setting for the armistice talks. Compliance with Communist requirements tended thus to reflect an inability to take seriously the loss of the advantages contained in the U.N. proposals. This in its turn reflected an incapacity to take very seriously the possibility that the Communists would in some nasty way exploit the situation as they were trying to shape it. That is, the U.N. behavior appeared to be predicated on the assumption that the Communist requirements were non-rationally motivated, that is, that they had no particular point behind them which later would manifest itself in particular actions or events that would be distressing to the U.N. If the U.N. people asked themselves, why do the Communists want this arrangement rather than the arrangement we are suggesting, the U.N. people presumably answered this question by supposing that it was simply a matter of "face-saving" and a desire to have things done their way. That there were deeper or more ulterior motives which would later manifest themselves in actions affecting the U.N. did not seem to be taken seriously. Partly too we probably have here exemplified the U.N. tendency to want to save time by giving in to the Communists on administrative matters. Time spent in arguing about such matters was considered time lost, since the

only fruitfully used time was time spent in actual rational, reasonable discussions on the substantive issues of the armistice.

Later we shall see that the U.N. attitude, specifically General Ridgway's attitude, changed considerably on such matters in a way that I will describe later.

The U.N. people also probably did not evaluate or attempt to evaluate what significance the Communists would attach to the ready U.N. compliance with the requirements that the Communists imposed. They probably did not stop to ask themselves what effect this was likely to have on later stages of the negotiations nor to wonder whether the attempt to save time by compliance now would not lead to continued demands and aggressiveness that would consume in the end more time than was being saved in the present.

I should mention here that the choice of Kaesong as the site of the armistice talks was extremely crippling later to the U.N. when it became desirable to put on military pressure. Kaesong and the neutral zone around Kaesong anchored the Communist line in the west and made military operations in the west extremely difficult if not impossible. This was precisely the area where military pressure by the U.N., if it were to be exercised at all as in fact it later was, would have had by far the greatest effect. But this was excluded.

Once the negotiations actually began, the first stage of discussion dealt with the Agenda. It is now some months since I examined the transcripts of the Agenda meetings and I shall only make one remark about them. As in so many of the things that I shall speak about in Part II of this report, much more can be said and many valuable lessons learned from a detailed analysis of the records of the meetings. The memory of the transcript that stands out most sharply in my mind is the extraordinarily patient way in which the U.N. delegates attempted to convince the Communists of their misunderstanding of the nature of an agenda. What had happened was that the Communists submitted an agenda which they supported which in fact was not an agenda but rather a set of substantive solutions to the problems of the conference. For example, one point of the agenda was that both parties should agree to withdraw troops and that the 38th parallel should be the line of demarcation. There were hours of discussion in which the U.N. delegates pointed out to the Communists the difference between an Agenda which defines general areas of discussion and points which on the other hand are actual substantive solutions of the Agenda Items. I do not suppose that the delegates actually were convinced that the Communists did not understand what an agenda was, but nonetheless the discussion on these Agenda problems was undoubtedly much protracted by virtue of the U.N. delegates' failure to simply treat the Communist proposed agenda as so much obvious

nonsense. The U.N. of course had absolutely no intention of accepting such predetermined solutions to the problems that the armistice conference was supposed to solve by discussion. Nonetheless it does not seem to have occurred to the delegates to take a flat, firm and simple stand and indicate that such discussion on the part of the Communists was entirely irrelevant and would not for one moment be considered. To be sure, in effect over several days of discussion this was the total outcome. But considerable time was lost by virtue of the attempt of the U.N. delegates to reason the Communists out of this impossible position.

Although the technique of handling the negotiatory problems at this stage was rather poor, the delegation nonetheless seems to have done a fairly good job in securing in the end an Agenda adequate to U.N. objectives. Some question, however, could be raised about the wisdom with which Item #5 of the Agenda as it was incorporated was handled by the U.N. delegation.

During this early stage of the conference various incidents arose involving unsatisfactory treatment by the Communists of U.N. personnel in the neutral area. Very early, for instance, there arose the attempt on the part of the Communists to debar U.N. press people from the area. Increasingly the U.N. personnel seemed to learn the desirability of protesting against types of treatment that were prejudicial to U.N. interests and prestige. Although such counteractions were taken what is disappointing in the method by which they were handled is the rather soft and plaintive manner in which the U.N. complaints were laid before the Communists. There was a somewhat pleading tone for fair treatment and an overtone characteristic of a person who has shown good faith and then finds that wicked people are taking advantage of it.

The manner of U.N. action as described in the two preceding paragraphs seems to have had the general effect of misleading the Communists and inciting them to behavior which the U.N. would not approve of. What I have in mind here is that the U.N. reactions to negative aspects of Communist behavior was of an inhibited kind which always would tend to lead the Communists to feel that they might be getting away with something. Thus it placed a premium on the Communists holding out or trying some new form of humiliation of the U.N., since the U.N. previous reactions were never decisive, clean cut enough and firm enough to convince the Communists that such behavior would result in a clearcut retreat on their part. They were always left with a sufficient indication of possible victory on these minor points to give them an incentive to continue with them.

My impression of the record of the conference is that one never ought to let the Communists get away with anything that they might conceive of as a gratification or victory on their side and a deficit on the U.N. side, no matter how trivial the matter might be. Although the U.N. people became increasingly sensitive over time to these "trivial" matters, nonetheless some of them seemed so completely trivial that they could not bring themselves to react against them. Thus, for example, when the negotiations began the U.N. personnel and Communists sat on opposite sides of a table using the same type of chairs. Because the U.N. negotiators were taller than their Oriental counterparts the U.N. personnel seated at the table were physically looking down at the Communist delegates in their talks with them. This presumably was only a matter of several inches at most, but nonetheless the Communists would not tolerate anything that suggested that they were being "looked down upon." They therefore changed the chairs on the U.N. side of the conference room and provided the U.N. delegates with chairs shorter than their own, so that the two sides would be on a par with respect to height. Had the Communists anticipated this difficulty and originally provided chairs so designed as to maintain a physical equity between the two sides, perhaps it would not have been worthwhile noting this behavior. But in my opinion the U.N. delegates ought to have reacted promptly to this cutting down of the legs of their chairs by objecting that they found such low chairs uncomfortable for persons of their greater height and should have insisted on their original chairs being replaced. I am confident that prompt action on such completely trivial matters would have had real consequences of an advantageous character, that is, such U.N. reaction would have diminished Communist confidence in how much they could get away with in the way of psychological warfare and other attempts to bring pressure on the U.N. delegation. Prompt reaction would also probably have given the Communist delegation a greater sense of the ultimate intransigence of the U.N. position. Since the Communists felt that such a minor matter was of importance to their prestige it seems reasonable to suppose that the U.N. willingness to allow them to engage in this somewhat badgering form of behavior would induce the Communists to impute to the U.N. people a lower degree of self-respect and aggressiveness.

Although on the whole the U.N. people progressively came to understand the importance of keeping a sharp eye on Communist encroachment, nonetheless I do not think I ever succeeded in getting any of the delegates to realize fully the significance of prompt reaction to matters of so trivial a character. They could understand this problem in connection with larger issues, but they never did seem to appreciate that from the standpoint of the type of attitude that the Communists would develop towards them that little, trivial matters might be just

as determinative as their success or lack of success on somewhat larger administrative matters revolving around the armistice conference.

The first Agenda Item was the development of the Agenda itself. When this was settled the negotiators turned to the actual substance of the armistice conference, namely to Agenda Item #2, which dealt with the drawing of a military demarcation line and a neutral zone. The U.N. delegation had attempted to secure a different order of discussion of the Agenda Items. Particularly they had been anxious to get at least some action taken with respect to the prisoner of war problem prior to action on other Agenda Items. In this they did not succeed. It would be difficult without a further examination of the record to say how strenuously they tried to get the POW problem put first on the Agenda list. However it seems almost certain to me that had they made an all out effort to secure such an order of discussion they could have attained it. The U.N. concern to secure immediate discussion and action with respect to the POW Agenda Item was almost certainly motivated by humanitarian, sentimental considerations and undoubtedly pressure from the United States. Post facto it certainly seems that the delegation's decision to secure if possible the discussion of the POW problem first was entirely correct, but probably motivated by reasons less urgent than those which might be cited in support of such a negotiatory strategy. The Communist possession of considerable numbers of U.N. prisoners, the U.N. lack of information concerning their welfare, and the U.N. desire to get such information and to secure an early release of POWs constituted one of the elements of the Communist bargaining position strength. Possibly had it been feasible for the U.N. to secure some tentative resolution of the POW problem first this might have placed the U.N. negotiators in a somewhat better position on later Items of the Agenda. Still it must be pointed out that in fact the U.N. negotiators were able to consume very large amounts of time on Item #2 of the Agenda without any great fuss being raised about the fact that this was delaying the release of U.N. prisoners and imperiling their welfare. It would be interesting nonetheless to analyze with more care whether the U.N. negotiators at this early stage should have insisted first on a resolution of some sort of the POW problem before proceeding to Item #2 of the Agenda.

The discussions on Agenda Item #2 took place among the full members of the two delegations during July and the first half of August. About the middle of August or a few days thereafter the discussion was carried on by a sub-delegation from both sides. This was a step taken on the basis of a U.N. proposal which was agreed to by the Communists. Admiral Joy indicated to me that this was his own idea. The changeover to a sub-delegation with a more informal type of meeting may have been interpreted by the Communists as an intent on the

U.N. side to shift its line, "put its cards on the table" or in general to take some steps which would be more favorable to the Communists but which the U.N. did not wish to take in a full and official plenary session with official stenographic records being taken. If the Communists did think this was going to happen they were, of course, very much mistaken because the idea of transferring discussion to a sub-delegation was not motivated on the U.N. side by any changed content or plan in what the U.N. had to say to the Communists.

On the surface the discussions during July and up until August 23 when the discussions were broken off by the Communists represented a demand on the Communist side for a demarcation line coincident with the 38th parallel. The U.N. line of discussion was directed toward securing a line of demarcation that was north of the battle line. This attempt was justified by the U.N. delegation in its discussions with the Communists on the grounds that it was conformable to the military realities and that it was proper compensation for the fact that in an armistice the U.N. would be withdrawing naval and air action which would enable the Communists to build up their supplies, which under conditions of active warfare were in a difficult state. The U.N. contention roughly was that after a period of a month or two of an armistice the relative military effectiveness of the two sides would so be changed as to give the Communist forces a much greater relative power than it at the present time had, and that this would be due to the withdrawal of air and naval action. The general point here was that an armistice should freeze the relative military balance between the two forces as it existed at the time the armistice went into effect, whereas under the Communist proposal the Communist military effectiveness relative to that of the U.N. would increase considerably by virtue of their capacity to repair their supply lines and to build up supply depots close to the front. For this reason the U.N. contended that they should be compensated by securing a military demarcation line that involved some advance of U.N. forces. During July and August the U.N. insistence on such advances was in considerable measure apparently motivated by the desire to give full and adequate protection to a general defense line known as the Kansas line. At this stage of the negotiations the battle line as it then existed did not secure the Kansas line for the U.N. In part the motivation probably was to secure gains simply predicated on the judgment that the U.N. had thrown back the Communists with very considerable losses, had counterattacked with gains, and that the Communists had asked for the armistice and were therefore the weaker party and should have to make more concessions for an armistice than the U.N. It is doubtful whether the delegation was motivated toward these gains by any particular conception of their political significance in signalizing throughout the Orient and the world the defeat of the Communists. The lack of certainty in my own mind as to the thinking of the

delegation on these matters results from the fact that I was not present at the camp during this period and that attempts at reconstructing what exactly was in the minds of the delegation were not entirely successful.

Of course another motivation that I should have mentioned in the aggressiveness of the U.N. demands was simply the general strategy of asking for a lot on the grounds that this is good bargaining procedure. I suspect that the mixed motives that I have indicated above with respect to the bargaining objectives of the U.N. delegation reflect fairly well the mixed considerations that were behind the U.N. demand for a demarcation line north of the then existing battle line. I am pretty certain that all of these elements made up a single rather vaguely floating complex set of motivations and that it is not a matter of trying to discover which one was the real motivation.

Another motivation for the aggressive demands of the U.N. delegation should have been mentioned above. The members of the delegation were unanimous in their contention that it was impossible for them to offer the Communists a more reasonable or less demanding proposal until the Communists had "gotten off the 38th." Formally the Communists were still demanding that the demarcation line be the 38th parallel and the delegation felt that for them to retreat from their initial demands first before the Communists showed any inclination to give up their demands for a 38th parallel settlement would represent very great weakness.

I will now discuss briefly some of the tactical and psychological problems surrounding this aggressive type of proposal that the U.N. was trying to secure Communist agreement to. In the first place the U.N. delegation felt that the U.N. was in a strong military position. This was probably a quite correct evaluation, but the military situation was nonetheless equivocal from the standpoint of success in the negotiations. The Communists had been in a perilous situation in late May and early June and the morale of their troops was very low. Their military weaknesses, however, required aggressive and persistent military action combined with all-out psychological warfare in order to capitalize on it. The inception of the armistice talks brought aggressive military action to a standstill and thus deprived the U.N. of one of its major advantages in the situation. To be sure, by the time the talks began or even by the time the proposal for an armistice conference was made, the U.N. counteroffensive against the Communists had already slowed up and the line of battle was already fairly well stabilized. Nonetheless the military advances made later during August when the U.N. resumed more active military measures indicate that continued military activity in June and early July would have brought the U.N. at least limited successes which would have been extremely important for the U.N. negotiatory position.

A second weakness in the U.N. negotiatory position arose from the fact that the strong line it was taking in the negotiations in demanding a line of demarcation north of the current battle line was very largely spoiled in its effect by the weak and equivocal method by which these objectives were placed before the Communists. A major difficulty here was that the U.N. delegation did not present to the Communists a clear-cut aggressive proposal for a specific line of demarcation on which the U.N. delegation was prepared to take a strong stand. The Communists had made a perfectly clear-cut proposal on their side. They had proposed the 38th parallel and no matter how completely unsatisfactory that proposal was it provided a base line on the Communist side for bargaining purposes. The U.N. never presented a proposal with equivalent clarity and definiteness. Instead the U.N. delegation made its aggressive requirements for a demarcation line north of the current battle line in a vague and general fashion. Later on, under Communist pressure as to what they were getting at, the U.N. delegation did present to the Communists a map on which "illustrative" lines of demarcation were drawn. The idea of these illustrative lines was to demonstrate to the Communists the general sort of proposal that the U.N. thought was fair and necessary. But at no time did the U.N. delegation draw a concrete specific line of demarcation and say "This is the line of demarcation on which we insist." They did not do this highly advantageous thing despite the fact that the Communists themselves were asking precisely for such a line. The Communists were not interested in illustrations of a general negotiatory position.

It is difficult to say what inferences the Communists made from U.N. behavior on this point. It is my impression that the Communists may very well have been puzzled by the U.N. tactics in the negotiations and may have felt that the U.N. was deliberately playing a delaying strategy or perhaps could not quite make up its mind whether it really wanted an armistice. From this standpoint it might seem that the U.N. behavior could have given the Communists an impression of considerable strength. Nonetheless such a supposition on the Communists' part would make it even more important for the Communists to avoid any open commitment or show any definite proposal to the U.N. that was more favorable than the 38th parallel proposal that they had made. For if the Communists suspected that perhaps the U.N. did not even want an armistice, then a retreat by the Communists from their 38th parallel position might in Communist calculations confirm the U.N. in their disposition to avoid an armistice settlement, at least for the time being.

It is, of course, entirely possible that from a very early stage the Communists did correctly evaluate the significance of the U.N. vague form of aggressive proposal, that is, correctly evaluate it as a form of both weakness and negotiatory

incompetence. In any case it seems likely that as time went on they may have come to this conclusion without perhaps being entirely free of suspicions of the sort that I described in the previous paragraph. Certainly later on after the long break in the negotiations and the return of the U.N. to the negotiations with a much improved proposal from a Communist standpoint, the Communists were probably able to evaluate the earlier U.N. behavior much more correctly and possibly see it in its true light.

The U.N. stand by which it sought a demarcation line north of the battle line was by no means made by the U.N. negotiators with a clear sense of propriety either from a moral standpoint or from a technical negotiatory standpoint. The U.N. delegation showed in late August a very marked sense of guilt and almost outright shame at the demands that they were making on the Communists. Their boldness in asking the Communists to give them a line north of the battle line was shocking to themselves and this tended to be aggravated by the fact that the Communists had broken the negotiations off over the alleged bombing of Kaesong. The delegation members felt, I am rather sure, that they bore some considerable measure of guilt for the breakdown of the negotiations. I believe that they felt that their own old demands had gone too far and thus had led the Communists to break off negotiations. They were thus in a situation where they felt that had they presented more reasonable demands the negotiations might have shown more progress and might not have been broken off. Guilt feelings were sharpened by the apprehension that the break in talks might mean an actual ending of the negotiations. I believe it was this underlying psychological situation that led the negotiators to say so insistently that "The talks were doomed from the very first."

The moral inability of the U.N. negotiators to tolerate their own aggressiveness and boldness vis-a-vis the Communists was nicely illustrated by a discussion that I had with General Craigie during my first two or three days at the camp right after the negotiations had broken off. General Craigie was trying to provide self-justification by arguing that the demands of the U.N. were after all fully justified by the need for compensation for the withdrawal of air and naval power. He was quite definitely trying to get me to say that such compensation was proper and legitimate and constituted adequate reason for attempting to secure a demarcation line north of the battle line. I tended to treat this problem rather casually at first, indicating that I thought it was a useful argument to use but at the same time making it quite clear that I did not particularly see that one needed such a justification for trying to get an advanced demarcation line. I indicated that of course one ought to get absolutely everything one could get within the limit of the costs that would have to be borne by the U.N. in order to secure its

settlement with the Communists. I thus made it quite clear that as far as I was concerned there was no moral problem of determining what the U.N. was morally entitled to in terms of particular justifications such as the compensation principle, but that one simply was entitled to everything one could get provided the costs were worth expending for the anticipated gain. This amoral attitude on my part was at this early stage of my contact with General Craigie a distinct shock to him. My rather casual treatment of the compensation principle suggested to him that I did not really think it was an adequate moral justification for getting the demarcation line north of the battle line. Since General Craigie himself (and this applies to the others) did not have at this stage my amoral attitude, the implication that the compensation argument was not terribly important tended to intensify the guilt feelings of General Craigie and suggest that their aggressive stand had not been justified. As a matter of fact, of course, I had had no intention of casting any doubt on the validity of the argument for compensation for air and naval power and my apparent slighting treatment of the compensation argument arose simply from my personal disinterest in finding moral grounds for securing as much as one could secure from the Communists. When I saw that my statement had precipitated an increased moral dilemma for General Craigie and as I thus began to realize what the real psychological situation of the delegation was, I took definite steps to discuss with them the compensation argument more definitely and carefully in order to show them that it was a quite proper and sound argument. I continued to point out, however, that while the U.N. had every sound reason for requiring compensation for the withdrawal of air and naval power, in my opinion it would still have been important to secure every advance one could secure negotiatorily, even though one did not have arguments that suggested that justice required such an advance.

As I look back at this particular stage of my discussions with the delegates it becomes clearer to me how much my discussions did in fact influence some of the general "atmospheric conditions" of the delegates. The belief that one should or could only ask for those things which were ethically justified was quite strong when I arrived. The notion of getting what you can get was an idea that when I first expressed it in the camp was reacted to with some degree of shock, in fact sufficient shock to make me feel slightly uncomfortable as if I were some sort of immoral monster associating with persons of a finer and more spiritual character. Later on the attitude that one should get what one could get became pretty much ingrained at least at a superficial level in the minds of at least General Craigie and Admiral Burke. Of course this notion of getting what one can get was not presented by me as a sheer lust for acquisition without any rational motivation behind it. It was in connection with this "unethical" position of mine that I developed the argument of the political necessity for such an aggressive stand.

The U.N. delegates' attempt to argue for an advanced demarcation line by claiming compensation for air and naval withdrawal was complicated by a failure in their understanding and execution of their own line of argument. What happened was that the U.N. presented this position and it was attacked and rebutted by the Communists. Because of the ineptness of the U.N. presentation of the argument and their inability to see through the error in the line of argument by which the Communists countered the U.N. argument, the U.N. delegation felt that their argument had been upset and rendered invalid by the Communist discussion. They did not actually I think feel that the arguments of the Communists had entirely destroyed the U.N. contention for compensation, but they could not place their finger on what logically was wrong in the situation. Their confidence in their own line of argument was shattered but at the same time they had some feeling that the Communists had outsmarted them in the discussions. Consequently they were not clear as to whether they really had an argument that justified compensation or not. In any case it is highly significant that their inability to answer the Communists' counterarguments against compensation weakened considerably their feeling that they were entitled to the objectives that they were trying to get at this stage in the settlement of Item #2 of the Agenda.

It is of some interest to show just what the confusion in simple logic was that led to the undermining of the U.N. delegates' confidence in their claim for compensation. The U.N. had stated that an armistice would require them to cease exercising their air and sea power and that since the Communists had no equivalent air and sea power this would give an undue advantage to the Communists in an armistice and would mean that following an armistice period of several weeks the Communists would be able to improve their position relative to that of the U.N. The U.N. delegates had also made a statement that the U.N. air and sea power had made a great deal of trouble for the Communists and had also in this connection either stated or been led to state by the Communists that the preponderance of U.N. air and sea power expressed itself in the situation of the ground forces. I may not get the exact flavor of the argument down correctly here without referring to the actual transcripts of the discussions, but this for the time being is sufficiently close. Now when the U.N. admitted that the current alignment of the ground forces incorporated the effects of air and sea action, they were by no means admitting anything disadvantageous to their claim for compensation. However the Communists countered the U.N. claim for compensation by saying that since the preponderance of U.N. air and sea power expressed itself and was incorporated in the current alignment of the contending ground forces, no compensation was required or legitimate. Since the effect of air and sea action is ultimately intended or at least in large measure intended to

secure success in ground action, then whatever compensation for their air and sea power was due the U.N. was already received in the way of benefits in their military position on the ground. This counter-argument confused and floored the U.N. delegation. What they did not clearly see was that the current disposition of the ground troops incorporates the results of U.N. air and naval superiority only insofar as the fighting continues. While the fighting continues both U.N. air operations and Communists measures to counter and evade them are in effect. The situation at any one time thus expresses the balance of these contending forces. The moment, however, that fighting ceases U.N. air and sea efforts would also cease, but the greater part of Communist measures designed to counter and evade air and sea action are now not only unmolested but could be increased in effectiveness indefinitely. After one month of an armistice unhindered movements and the improvement of all logistic facilities would for some time solve one of the primary problems of the Communist military commanders given their lack of air and naval power. The U.N. negotiators had the impression that where they had gone wrong in their arguments was in admitting that the air and sea power of the U.N. was expressed in or got incorporated into the current disposition of the ground troops. Actually of course this statement in no way harmed the argument. The argument rests on the fact that the ground situation incorporates the results of U.N. air and naval superiority only as long as the fighting continues, but fails to do so the moment an armistice goes into effect. It was this very simple "logical point" that confused the U.N. delegates. Some of them had at least some of the time a feeling their argument had still validity to it, but they were uncertain and in any case were unable to make clear how the Communist argument should be answered until I clarified the matter for them. This, however, took place after the negotiations had broken off and consequently did not play a role in the actual negotiations. This clarification, nonetheless, was of some slight value in giving the delegates a feeling that at least they had been morally justified in insisting on compensation and thus on an advanced demarcation line.

One of the serious deficiencies in the U.N. handling of the negotiations during July and more particularly August was the U.N. failure to understand Communist language in the negotiations. The most decisive illustration of this is the U.N. delegates' contention that when the negotiations broke off on August 23 the Communists were still holding firmly to their position that the demarcation line had to be the 38th parallel. I had indicated that this was also one of the motivations for the U.N. delegation in taking their own aggressive stand for a demarcation line north of the battle line. This impression of complete Communist intransigence with respect to the 38th parallel probably got its start from the sweeping manner in which the Communists began the discussions of

the drawing up of the Agenda by including within the Agenda itself an insistence that the demarcation line be the 38th parallel. Secondly, the U.N. delegates were disposed to take this more seriously because of the fact that Secretary Acheson had in his early statements to the Communists and to the world indicated that the U.N. would be willing to settle on the 38th parallel. The delegates felt that this was a very handicapping statement to have been made. But quite apart from that they also felt that this provided additional evidence of the correctness of their view that in fact the Communists were absolutely determined to get the 38th parallel. Thirdly, and this is quite important, the U.N. delegates tended to be overly impressed by the firmness with which the Communists made their demands for a settlement on the 38th parallel. As I shall point out shortly, the U.N. delegates were never able to bring themselves to take a very firm stand and to use firm language with respect to a proposal or a position which they knew was not the minimum U.N. position. There was consequently a strong tendency on the part of the delegates to project their own pattern of behavior onto the Communists and to assume that the strength of Communists demands as represented by the language of presentation was directly correlated with the stand as they understood it among themselves and in the highest Communist political circles. Whereas the U.N. delegates were aware that in bargaining they themselves started with more than what they were willing to settle for, they did not tend so readily to credit the Communists with a similar negotiatory tactic. Fourthly, the U.N. delegates were not able to appreciate that the Communist statements insisting on the 38th parallel were in considerable measure a formality in order to provide a Communist proposal while engaged in the more essential business of trying to pin down the U.N. proposal and reduce the U.N. demand step by step. The U.N. delegates therefore concentrated their attention on blanket Communist statements to the effect that the line of demarcation must be the 38th parallel and ignored almost completely very open hints given by the Communists that they were interested in U.N. proposals that were obviously not going to be proposals for the 38th parallel. In general the Communist line of talk amounted to saying "Why are you asking for so much, why don't you make a proposal that would be more reasonable, such as the battle line, but don't think for a moment that we will accept anything other than the 38th parallel." Thus in the session of the 21st day of the plenary meetings the Communist spokesman said: "If your proposal were in reality as you claim it to be, the military demarcation line you propose *should have been the present battle line itself.*" This sort of statement sounds very much like an attempt to get such a proposal and an indication that with such a proposal the Communists and the U.N. could really begin to talk business. Of course it also could be interpreted as simply a device to force down U.N. demands and then to keep on pushing back the line of demarcation to the 38th parallel. It is perfectly

true, of course, that the Communists would attempt to push the line as far back as possible but the quoted statement certainly suggests rather strongly, especially taken in conjunction with other additional statements, that the Communists were not intransigently insistent on the 38th parallel. When negotiators say "I won't settle for anything less than X, but if you were gentlemen you would at least have proposed Y"—it generally means that they are interested in proposal Y. In another session the Communist spokesman said, "We oppose the scheme of fixing the military demarcation line at the present battle line, but *in particular* what we cannot possibly tolerate is the absurd proposal that the line be fixed north of the 38th parallel above the present battle line and within our positions." The fact that the battle line is only "opposed," whereas the other proposal *"cannot possibly be tolerated"* was not a significant form of language to the U.N. delegates. Nor did it seem to be of particular significance to them that the Communist spokesman differentiated between what was generally unsatisfactory and what "in particular" could not be tolerated or was "absurd."

Because the U.N. delegates felt that the Communists were quite genuinely adhering to the 38th parallel position, they felt that a major objective had to be to get the Communists "off the 38th." To this end they kept battering away at the Communists with little success, since the Communists refused to indicate more clearly their willingness to compromise than they had already done in their more oblique but nonetheless fairly transparent fashion. Just before the negotiations broke off on August 23 the sub-delegations which were then meeting and had been meeting for about the last six days worked on the problem of getting the Communists off the 38th, by attempting to force from the Communist sub-delegates a statement as to whether they were authorized to consider any solution to Agenda Item #2 other than the 38th parallel. The Communist delegate did not of course want to come out and say openly and explicitly that this was the case. The result was that for several hours the U.N. delegates badgered the two Communist sub-delegates about their authorization to consider a proposal other than the 38th parallel. Finally at the end of the sub-delegation meeting after several hours of this the Communist delegate finally did give a pointblank answer in the affirmative. Even this statement did not alter the U.N. delegates' view concerning the Communist position about the 38th parallel. The negotiations broke off almost immediately afterward and during the subsequent weeks the U.N. camp was pretty much convinced that the Communists were still holding firmly to the 38th as a necessary objective. To some extent my arguments that this was not the case, my discussions of critical passages in the transcripts of the meetings, had some effect but never really convinced the delegates or the people in the camp that the Communists had

given them hints that they were willing to take seriously some solution between the 38th parallel and the U.N. illustrative line that ran north of the battle line.

One of the motives among the delegates for insisting that the Communists had not gotten off the 38th parallel was that if they gave up this belief their guilt feelings would increase considerably. As I indicated earlier, the delegates had some feeling that they had been too bold and gone too far in demanding a demarcation line north of the battle line, and they required as part of their justification for this the conviction that such a position was necessary because the Communists in their turn were making an even more aggressive demand by insisting on a settlement at the 38th parallel.

I have indicated above that the strong U.N. demands were associated with weakness in the method of presentation. Because of their ambiguous feelings and because of their knowledge that the U.N. demand represented a maximum rather than a minimum position, the delegates never presented their strong demands in a firm fashion. They were in fact almost evasive as I have already suggested. There seemed to be two sources at least of this inability to make the strong demands in such a fashion as to suggest to the Communists that the U.N. really expected to get them or something fairly close to them. One source of this inability is the notion that one cannot make a demand with force and vigor if in fact it is not your minimum position. Since it is not your minimum position you may have to retreat from it. In order to retreat from it, it is necessary that the position be stated in such a way as to permit this retreat to be graceful and not to cause a loss of face. It is a matter of some importance to realize that while during the negotiations there was constant talk of the Communists being concerned to "save face," this psychological consideration was in fact probably much more important in the U.N. delegation than for the Communists. We thus have the curious spectacle of the U.N. delegation assuming that Orientals in negotiation are concerned greatly with "saving face" whereas they themselves, that is, the U.N., were the primary consumers of this particular psychological tendency. And they illustrated this tendency in a fashion which was extremely dangerous from the standpoint of negotiatory success.

Another reason why the U.N. delegates could not present their strong demands in a firm fashion was their inability to escape entirely from the ethical demands for truthfulness. This can be put in a somewhat different way. The U.N. delegates essentially had no capacity for bluffs. This incapacity in its turn was conditioned by a sentiment that bluff was an immoral or humiliating tactic to pursue. It is interesting to note that Americans who consider themselves as poker players par excellence were unable to bring to bear on the negotiation problems the most elementary principles of "bargaining" as it is exemplified in a

poker game. I used to point out to the delegates and to members of the staff that there was little utility in making demands upon the Communists if one made those demands in such a way as to lead the Communists to expect that you did not really anticipate getting them. I pointed out that the delegation to some extent was behaving like a poker player who announces that he has a full house or a straight flush but does not back his good cards up by betting appropriate to the hand that he claims to hold. In negotiations the equivalent to the money one bets in poker is represented by the attitude of firmness that one conveys and the amount of time that one is willing to consume to secure one's objectives. The U.N. conception of strength tended in part to be demands for certain types of settlements, but did not include in a sufficiently adequate fashion strength in the manner in which these demands were presented. This latter statement requires some qualification, especially as it bears on the period during which the negotiations had been suspended, but I shall speak of this later.

It is difficult to know which of the motives discussed above was of primary importance in preventing the U.N. delegates from presenting a proposal to the Communists in a vigorous manner. My guess would be that it was primarily notions of the need not to "have to back down" and thus the need to "save face" that prevented them from making their demands in as outright a fashion as was necessary. Even in this case however there would still be two possibilities at least. Such a motivation could be rationally derived from the consideration that if one demanded something from the Communists in such a way as to suggest that the U.N. could not possibly accept anything less, and if one later did have to retreat from this position, it would undermine the U.N. bargaining position during the rest of negotiations. The U.N. delegates did as a matter of fact explicitly state this to be one of the reasons why demands had to be rather evasively made. A second sub-motivation for "saving face" was probably not so much a desire to save national honor or prevent the subsequent weakening of the U.N. negotiatory position, but to preserve one's own individual "face." I think that the U.N. delegates felt uncomfortable at the thought of having personally to retreat from a position that they had indicated they would not retreat from. The U.N. delegates were, then, not entirely free from the tendency to permit indulgence of their own sense of personal esteem to handicap them in their official duties as delegates.

A broader and perhaps more basic deficiency in U.N. thinking, at least as represented at the delegation level, was the absence of any adequate general analysis of what precisely the stakes were in the negotiations, what was to be gained from different types of settlements, and what benefits these varying types of settlements would confer on the U.N., and what the probable costs might be of

securing varying settlements and whether the gains involved in the varying settlements were sufficiently great to justify the costs involved. Because of the absence of any genuine thinking of this sort during the July and August period, the delegates were essentially proceeding without any real steering mechanism. Later under the influence of my discussions with them some degree of clarification on these matters probably developed. I was more especially able to outline for them some of the political consequences for the future of different types of armistice settlements.

The situation in which the U.N. was bargaining, although favorable to the U.N., was certainly not one which enabled the U.N. to dictate terms to the Communists. Consequently the U.N. had to figure what the cost would be to it in time and possible military action in order to secure settlements of varying types. To my knowledge no real thinking on this problem occurred at all. It is true, as we shall see later, that there was considerable concern at different stages of the negotiations about the lack of adequate military action. This however arose from the conviction that successful military action was possible and that military successes would exercise considerable pressure on the Communists in the negotiations. While this was certainly true, such thoughts were not too clearly developed with respect to determining what level of cost was worthwhile expending for given negotiatory objectives. This was particularly true during August, but later on the delegation became somewhat more conscious of this problem, in part as the result of discussions that I had with them.

This, of course, does not mean that it was possible to provide any precise answer that would indicate the relationships between given expenditures of time in the negotiations or of military effort and gains in the negotiations. Nonetheless it was apparent that the U.N. demands during August (which as I have indicated above were in part the result of negotiatory ineptness rather than a definition of objectives) were quite considerable in view of the strong desire of the U.N. for an armistice at an early date. Especially was this so in view of the reluctance of the U.N. to engage in military pressure. The demands in August, therefore, tended to represent an attempt to secure considerable gains without a full realization of what gains of this magnitude might require in the way of effort. When I arrived at the camp I must confess that I was rather shocked when I learned what the U.N. was trying to secure from the Communists. This shock was not due to any sentiment that such objectives were not legitimate, but arose from two considerations: (1) the newspaper and radio accounts available in the *Stars and Stripes* and over the armed services radio had not at all made clear that the U.N. was asking for as much as they were asking. In fact it seems quite clear to me that an attempt was made in the U.N. camp to prevent the full extent of the U.N.

demands from being clearly realized. As a matter of fact, the Communists themselves alleged this on the basis of their reading of the U.N. press releases taken in conjunction with the U.N. behavior in the negotiations themselves. This accusation of the Communists does not seem to be entirely without foundation and also contributed probably to the guilt feelings that the delegates had which I have discussed above. It also reflects their own fear of their boldness and thus suggests that they were not willing to acknowledge how bold they were being in public releases. Of course this "boldness" was not a boldness that was inwardly experienced or based on a firm attempt to get far-reaching gains. But I have already discussed earlier the very mixed motives for the U.N. aggressive demands. (2) My shock at the extent of the U.N. demands was in part the result of my judgment that the demands were not at all appropriate for the type of negotiatory behavior and military policy that was being followed. My own evaluation was that given the high desirability to the U.N. of an armistice at an early date, the limitations on the military action, the aim of the U.N. delegation should have been to effect a compromise with the Communists somewhat equivalent to that which was presented to them later in the proposal of October 25. Such a compromise, especially had it been backed by even a modest amount of military effort, would, I feel, have been effective. It would have provided the U.N. with a settlement of Item #2 of the Agenda that would have signalized a U.N. victory and a Communist retreat at the western end of the line. Such a settlement would thus have secured for the U.N. important political consequences by virtue of the loss of prestige of the Communist forces.

The U.N. did not during August proceed in a fashion which would enable the Communists to come to some such a settlement, as I have indicated above. The vagueness of the U.N. proposals, the attempt to secure advances pretty much all along the line, the absence of military pressure on the Communists led to no new developments in the negotiations. It was at this juncture, then, that the Communists broke off negotiations on August 23 by alleging a bombing of Kaesong. We thus come to the next phase of the armistice, namely the prolonged break-off of discussions that lasted from 23 August to 25 October.

It is difficult to infer the motives of the Communists in precipitating the break in talks that occurred on August 23. From the U.N. standpoint that alleged incident was a complete fabrication. If one accepts this as being the case, then one would at least have to conclude that the Communists did intend a break in the discussions at least for a short period of possibly two or three days. There can be no question, in the light of the investigation made by the U.N., that the very great bulk of the evidence presented by the Communists of an alleged U.N. bombing of Kaesong was fabricated. This evidence was not only fabricated but it was

fabricated in a very crude and inept fashion. The U.N. investigation turned up no evidence of a U.N. plane having been in the area. I do not know whether the overwhelming evidence of fabrication tended to make such inquiry perfunctory or not. At the time there was no question in my mind that the entire incident was created by the Communists. At a later date there was another incident that has raised a question in my own mind. This later incident was one that was acknowledged by the U.N. and involved the strafing of Kaesong by a U.N. plane. Radar sightings and further investigation indicated that in fact a U.N. plane had apparently strafed the area. However in the course of dealing with this incident the Communists presented the U.N. with evidence in the form of machine gun bullets. After the U.N had already acknowledged responsibility for this incident these bullets were subjected, at the insistence of General Craigie, to ballistic analysis. This analysis demonstrated, according to the ordnance authorities who made it, that they could not have been fired by a U.N. plane. It would appear, then, that in this later incident a U.N. plane had in fact strafed Kaesong but that the Communists had added to the evidence in order to make their case presumably clearer. If this is the case it suggests that possibly even in the more obviously manufactured evidence of the first incident of August 22 the same may have happened. It is possible that a U.N. plane may have flown over the area or even perhaps made a strafing run and the Communists decided to use this occasion to build up evidence into a bigger accusation of an actual bombing of Kaesong. In short, then, it is not in my mind entirely certain that the complete incident was a 100% fabrication, although apart from the speculation that I have provided there is no evidence to the contrary.

If there was some slight factual basis for the alleged incidents it would not be too difficult to understand the likely motives of the Communist accusation and the breakoff in negotiations. Such action would have, from the Communist standpoint, the advantages of putting the U.N. in an unfavorable light, providing propaganda for the Communist side, and placing some pressure on the U.N. by showing Communist insistence on securing satisfaction for any breach of the neutrality agreement. On the other hand, if the incident was completely fabricated the motives of the Communists cannot so readily be inferred. The most likely interpretation, however, is that owing to the impasse that had been reached for some time in the sub-delegation meetings the Communists decided to create a break that would bring pressure on the U.N., show Communist indifference to a rapid progress in the negotiations, and in general to provide a "scare." There may also have been some notion that a period of cessation of the talks would lead to a re-thinking of the U.N. stand and a tendency to take some sort of fresh line that would be more favorable to the Communists. In any case I am pretty certain that when the Communists suspended the talks on August 23

they had no intention of and no anticipation that the talks would in fact be suspended for the long period that in fact resulted. I would base this opinion on the Communist communications during the early period of the break which demonstrate rather clearly to me their desire for a resumption of the talks, provided such a resumption could be made without too much damage to their bargaining position and to their prestige.

I did not arrive at the camp until two days after the actual incident, and thus by the time I arrived it was fully known in the U.N. camp that the accusations of the Communists were false. I therefore do not know what the immediate reaction of the delegation and staff people was when the accusation was first made. I suspect, however, from observing their behavior at the time when other accusations were made later on that they were momentarily thrown into a panic by the possibility that the charges were correct. At the time I arrived the prevailing sentiments were outrage at the immorality of the Communists in faking a charge, a considerable fear that in fact the outside world would believe the Communists, and a certain amount of satisfaction over the way in which the Communists had bungled the evidence and thus shown how inept and criminal they were. This latter feeling mitigated to some extent the fear that the public would believe the Communists, but did not entirely remove this concern. From the standpoint of more general problems the incident precipitated in the delegation's minds more acutely the feeling that the Communists did not want an armistice and probably never had wanted one. The delegation and camp people were, for instance, continually saying that probably the Communists wanted to break off the negotiations entirely and this was their method of doing so in order to avoid public responsibility for the termination of the armistice talks. I did not, for one moment, believe that this was the case, and even less so in the light of the communications that developed very rapidly following the incident. My arguments had some impact, but on the whole the delegation and staff people took very seriously the possibility that the armistice talks were in effect over entirely.

The outrageously inept faking of the evidence of a bombing attack provided what seems to have been an excellent press for the U.N. and my impression is that the Communists were rather put out by the boomerang effect of the action they had undertaken. This was indicated in part by the fact that the Communists insisted on a renewed investigation by U.N. personnel. They did not simply state the U.N. made false statements or refused to recognize the evidence but contended that the investigation had been inadequate and some of the evidence had not been properly examined, etc. There is no doubt that they improved the evidence in the meantime, taking advantage of the technical criticisms that had

been made in the U.N. press releases. That they did improve the evidence at this time is indicated by the fact that somewhat later in connection with an inspection of Kaesong arising out of a later incident a U.N. officer noted that the alleged evidence of the first bombing of Kaesong was still present but that the physical stageprops had been changed to conform to the type of accusation made. Thus the metal fragments that had been originally used to show that a napalm bomb had been dropped had been taken away and different metal fragments had been substituted at the exact same place. On the 25th of August General Ridgway, on the basis of the investigation made by the U.N. personnel, rejected the original Communist charge as being false and obviously manufactured. He stated that when the Communists were prepared to terminate the suspension of negotiations he would direct his representatives to meet their delegates. On August 28 the Communists then made their request for a second investigation. This I believe led to the communication by General Ridgway that was the critical turning point in the handling of this incident.

The Communist message of August 27 showed a very much milder form of language as compared with the original message accusing the U.N. of the violation of Kaesong neutrality. The message showed a desire on the part of the Communists to find a form of expression that would enable them to resolve the situation without too much an appearance of retreat, while at the same time carefully avoiding any types of stipulations that would seriously involve the honor or prestige of the U.N. It is true that the Communist message "demanded" a reopening of the investigation of the incident. It also demanded that the U.N. release to the press the various texts of communications on the matter between the two sides. (As a matter of fact, the official communications between the two sides had been released. Presumably the Communists were referring to the reports of the investigating officers.) The principal point about these demands, however, is that in the message they were very carefully dissociated from any requirements for a resumption of the talks. The key statement in the Communist message was as follows: "We hereby once more *propose* to you that this grave act of provocation should be dealt with by your side *with an attitude of serious responsibility. Then* the continuation of the negotiations for a just and reasonable armistice agreement can be guaranteed." It is typical of the Communist mode of writing communications in these situations that they make "demands" that in fact are clearly indicated as demands that do not have to be fulfilled in order to secure a resumption of the talks. It is further typical of the conciliatory spirit of the message and its attempt to secure a resumption of the talks that the one "condition" which would "guarantee" a resumption of the talks is only *proposed.* Moreover this "condition" refers only to the having of a particular attitude. It is apparent from this and other indications

in the letter that the Communists had concocted a message which did not go beyond what the Communists would consider absolutely essential in order to avoid an impression of complete capitulation or intimidation by the failure of their fabricated incident.

The reply to this message of the Communists seemed to me both at the time and also now in retrospect to be an extremely important matter. The very fact that the U.N. had come out quite decisively on top in connection with the incident and that the Communists were now in the position of having to try and get the talks resumed without too great an increase in U.N. aggressiveness resulting from their victory in the incident, in itself created an extremely serious problem. It created a serious problem in the sense that if the U.N. tried to exploit to the utmost the situation there was a danger that they would place the Communists in a position where the Communists would judge that the entire incident had left the U.N. riding so high that they would return to the negotiations with increased self-confidence that would strengthen considerably the bargaining spirit of the U.N. In short, it was a situation in which it was obviously dangerous to "rub in" the defeat of the Communists for fear that such a "rubbing in" would lead the Communists to conclude that it was necessary for them to show an increased amount of stubbornness over the incident and not simply to go back shamfacedly to the negotiation table. For this reason I urged that very careful attention be paid to the formulation of a reply to the Communists. My major objective was that the reply should be quite firm with respect to refusing to acknowledge any responsibility for the incident, refusal to reopen the investigation, or to conform in any way with the Communist reference to press releases. However what I did wish to include in the letter was a firm reference to U.N. guarantees respecting the neutrality of the Kaesong area. This paragraph was intended to provide an answer to the Communist statement bearing on the necessity of an "attitude of serious responsibility." The paragraph that I included in the message on this point ran, according to my notes, as follows: "As for the future, my representatives have already given you in the agreement to the neutrality of the Kaesong area U.N. guarantees that this area will be treated as strictly neutral territory. This agreement and these guarantees remain fully operative." My intention here, of course, was to provide a statement that could be taken with a very slight amount of extension as being the fulfillment of Communist insistence on some sort of reassurance that neutrality would be observed, but at the same time to say nothing that would in any way be apologetic. I thus wanted to provide the Communists with an "out" and to avoid any tendency simply to "kick them when they were down." Such U.N. behavior, I was convinced, would lead the Communists to resort to a further round of communications or some such device in order finally to extract from the U.N. something that would

permit them to feel that they had not been completely defeated on the issue. However it was precisely such U.N. behavior that they were faced with when they received General Ridgway's reply.

General Ridgway agreed with the analysis that I had made, namely that the Communist message was conciliatory and provided only the most minimal type of "condition" (which was only "proposed") and that it showed Communist anxiety to close the incident and resume negotiations. However General Ridgway did not accept the message that I suggested but apparently because he agreed with the analysis of the conciliatory tone employed by the Communists felt impelled to make his message extremely abrupt and humiliating for the Communists. He was thus led to indulge himself in slapping them down hard, apparently in the expectation that their letter indicated that they had no alternative but to come back immediately to the conference table. General Ridgway sent to the camp a copy of a message he proposed sending to the Communists. I shall not now look up the exact wording of this extremely brief, curt message, but in effect it amounted to saying "I have told you I won't discuss the matter further, when you are ready to resume let me know." This extremely "harsh" message alarmed me and in the discussion at the camp General Craigie and Admiral Joy agreed that some statement such as I had included in my version that would provide an out for the Communists was highly desirable. However the prevailing opinion of the others was that General Ridgway had made up his mind, that there was no point in trying to get him to alter the message and that we should simply indicate concurrence with the message. After some discussion I found that the only person who would side with me in the desire to argue with General Ridgway about his message was Admiral Joy. In this case his inclination toward conciliatory action led him to be more interested in the line of action that I recommended, although in general this inclination of his operated the other way. Finally General Craigie suggested a compromise which in effect was a message to General Ridgway saying that his proposed reply to the Communists did not provide any "golden bridge" by which the Communists might more easily return to the conference table, but perhaps it was "exactly what the doctor ordered." The faint suggestion of criticism and willingness to accept the message almost inevitably meant that General Ridgway would send his message off unaltered. And this in fact he did do.

At this time I immediately predicted that in fact the Communists would not return to the conference table following such a message, and that this attempt to squeeze the maximum amount out of the uncomfortable position the Communists were in would lead to several more rounds of communications. I

pointed out that by forcing the Communists into a more intransigent position in order to recuperate that eventually the U.N. might find itself forced to be more agreeable to the Communists later than would be required at the present moment, when only the slightest gesture toward them would have been sufficient to allow them to return. That General Ridgway's message did in fact represent only the first stage in a further series of new communications confirmed my prediction, although of course at the time I had not the least expectation that the breakoff in the negotiations would continue way on into October.

From then on the struggle between the two sides sank deeper and deeper into the mire, each successive step by each side placing the other side in a position where an approach toward agreement might lead to an inference of capitulation and weakness. For the Communists I think the essential consideration was that when they broke off the negotiations the U.N. had been behaving in a vaguely intransigent fashion with respect to their demands for a demarcation line north of the battle line. The dispute over the incident of August 23 required the Communists to find some way of getting back to the negotiations under conditions which would not lead the U.N. to feel that their strong demands were fully justified by a demonstration of Communist anxiety to return to the conference table or by any Communist show of weakness. From the Communist standpoint this would only aggravate the situation that existed at the time when the discussions were broken off. At this time the Communists were very much preoccupied by what they called the U.N. attempt to behave like victors. For the Communists, then, it was essential that the conditions of return to the conference should, if this could be done without imperiling an armistice as such, be so developed as not to give the U.N. an even greater incentive to act like victors. It was from this standpoint, I believe, that the Communists found it necessary to reject General Ridgway's peremptory message of 29 August. Their return following such a message would have in their expectation only fortified the intransigence of the U.N. and possibly could even lead the U.N. to take a tougher line than they were already doing.

U.N. stubbornness, on the other hand, had somewhat different motivations. As I have already indicated, General Ridgway's short, tough message of the 29th was probably motivated by his feeling that he had the Communists on the hip and he was going to make them return under humiliating circumstances. Following this the continued stubbornness of General Ridgway tended to reveal itself as being motivated in considerable part by personal factors. It is rather difficult to extract the various threads that ran through U.N. calculations during the month of September as the impasse between the two parties continued. In part the

firmness of the U.N. in not making any concession to the Communists that would enable them to return to the conference table with good grace was based on a rational calculation that any apologetic tone or any show of anxiety to get the conference resumed as quickly as possible would weaken the U.N. bargaining position. From my standpoint this was the really important consideration. As the conflict became sharper and the problem of who would give in became more defined, the necessity for stubbornness and firmness increased. In this respect the course of events during September confirmed the evaluation I made on August 28. It was then apparent to me that the ideal time had come, in this early phase, for a gesture which would enable the Communists to return without in any way weakening the position of the U.N., but as time went on, it would become either more difficult to make such a gesture or else the U.N. if it wanted a quick resumption would have to make it under much more unfavorable circumstances.

This rational thread underlying the stubbornness of General Ridgway does not, however, tell the whole story. The U.N. had on quite a number of previous occasions shown itself to be very anxious to give in to the Communists on administrative matters or to deal very timidly with respect to such matters although the same rational considerations applied. The fact that such firm stubbornness was shown during September by General Ridgway suggests, in addition to more direct observations, that it was motivated by matters of personal self esteem involved in the situation. Having taken a very strong line on the incident, General Ridgway seemed to find it personally unpleasant to contemplate any gesture which would be subject to interpretation as an undoing of the damage done by his peremptory message of 29 August. This personal involvement was probably much increased by virtue of the nature of the incident itself and the language originally used by the Communists in making their first charges. From the standpoint of the U.N. personnel the Communist tactic was an absolute "outrage." They did not find it possible, psychologically, to experience this incident and subsequent charges as a tactic of Communists which essentially cast no real moral reflection on the U.N. The charges and the total incident were treated much in the same way as an innocent person might treat accusations of having committed a theft or some even greater moral delinquency. It was not, then, treated as a move in a game, which would have insulated the sensitivities of the U.N. from such penetrating attacks. Earlier conflicts between the Communists and the U.N. had in large measure revolved around situations in which the Communists attempted to arrogate to themselves privileges which they denied to the U.N. Some of these actions could be seen as attempts to humiliate the U.N. but they did not involve any statements or actions that explicitly struck at the "honor" of the U.N. or of the U.N. personnel. The

allegation made by the Communists on August 23, however, was a direct attack on the "honor" of the U.N. and the U.N. personnel. The reaction to these charges was, therefore, different from that occasioned by earlier sources of friction. I became more acutely aware of the psychological state of the U.N. personnel by seeing the contrast between my own reactions to the Communist charges and the reactions of the persons by whom I was surrounded. The incident and the Communist charges (for example that the U.N. people were "murderers") struck me as being quite amusing and almost pleasing in the sense that the Communists were behaving so "typically." Thus I tended to react to the incident and the charges in a quite good humored manner seeing it as an interesting maneuver in the negotiatory game. I was, therefore, very much struck to note the grim sense of outrage with which the incident and the charges were received by the members of the delegation and the camp. I am afraid that I have been belaboring the same point, but in summary then I point out that the U.N. policy during September was in part conditioned by the sense of personal outrage and involvement of honor occasioned by the incident. Of course as time went on and each side felt it increasingly necessary to hold firm, rational considerations (even if not entirely correctly calculated) tended to come more strongly to the surface, although the extent to which they were genuinely operative and the extent to which they were rationalizations of other motives is in the case of any particular decision or action always difficult to determine.

I have started outlining some of the considerations involved in the September period of suspension of the talks although from the narrative standpoint of providing a sketch of the events during this period I ended with the initial incident of August 23rd and messages back and forth up until August 29. I shall now continue with a very brief outline of the further events that took place subsequent to these first rounds of messages.

On August 30 or 31 the Communists made three new charges concerning neutrality violations. One was an alleged attack by a plane that dropped flares and the second and third incidents of this set were ground incidents. These renewed allegations were in part interpreted as further evidence of the possibility or the actual reality that the Communists did not intend to resume negotiations. No systematic analysis of the situation would, I believe, lead to any such conclusion; the U.N. personnel, however, tended to take the very simplistic view that when people place obstructions in the way of good relations then it can have only the obvious significance that they don't want any relations at all. I should add that when I say that people interpreted this as a Communist intention to break off the armistice completely that this does not mean that this opinion was firmly, clearly and consistently held. The U.N. interpretation and opinions

were in hourly flux and constituted a whole melange of conflicting and oscillating notions.

There appear to be quite definite events that formed the background of the new Communist charges. I suspect that these events coming as they did only two days after General Ridgway's peremptory message were seized upon by the Communists as a means of transferring the discussion from the first incident in which their fabrication had created a marked U.N. intransigence to new situations where their own charges were somewhat more "reasonable" and thus might permit of an exchange of messages that would enable both sides to express themselves in a manner that would permit them both to return to the conference table without feeling that they had prejudiced their future bargaining power. I do not have before me right now the messages that were exchanged over these new charges. They were however rejected by the U.N.

There are one or two points surrounding these new charges that are of interest. These charges were made by the Communists while I was present at the camp and therefore they represented my first opportunity to note the immediate reactions of the delegation and other personnel to such accusations at the moment when they were received. Of interest is the fact that the immediate reaction was one of mild panic for fear that the charges might be true and that the U.N. would be found to be at fault. Nor was this concern with the possible actual guilt of the U.N. a concern with the possible repercussions such actual guilt might have on the position of the U.N. with respect to attaining the objectives of the negotiation. It was very much a direct concern with the possibility of being guilty of a violation as such. There were, however, other elements involved. There was a concern about public reaction, a fear that the world would believe that the Communists' earlier charges were likewise true, and a sense that was unconscious but that in fact guilt would actually undermine the bargaining position of the U.N. by virtue of the manner in which it would undermine the moral purity of the delegation. The delegation was fully determined to acknowledge U.N. guilt if their own investigation showed them that in fact they had committed a breach of neutrality. Such open acknowledgment of violation of neutrality was assumed as an absolute necessity as a matter of honor. As it happened the three charges were practically impossible to investigate with any success. Flares were dropped in the area and as a matter of fact had been observed in the camp itself and led to a flurry of excitement in the camp including an impromptu blackout and a mild anticipation of possible attacks by the Communists. This incident happened to illustrate very nicely the fairly deep gulf that separated me from other members of the camp with respect to views about Communist tactics and behavior. It was

virtually inconceivable to me to believe that the Communists would try to attack the delegation in its camp. Such a physical attack corresponded absolutely to nothing that had meaning to me with respect to Communist behavior. Yet for the members of the camp the possibility that the Communists might attack the camp in order to do in the delegation and the other members was always held open as a possibility although not one that was ever considered to be extremely likely. Nonetheless the members of the camp on the whole took quite seriously the presence of their little airraid pits or shelters beside their tents and certainly would not for one moment have considered them superfluous.

The other two incidents were ground incidents which may possibly have been occasioned by the movements of South Korean guerrillas. In any case the U.N. investigators could find neither in the case of the flares nor in the case of the ground incidents any evidence that provided even moderately clear indications of U.N. responsibility for violation of neutrality. Consequently the Communist charges were rejected "with a clear conscience" although it was conceded to the Communists that one incident may have been occasioned by South Korean guerrillas but that if this were the case that was purely a Communist responsibility since they have full military responsibility for policing the neutral area. If South Korean guerrillas had entered it that was not anything over which the U.N. command had any control or direction.

So sensitive was the U.N. group to the possibility of being guilty of an actual violation that a good deal of the anger of the people was directed not at the Communists who made the charges but at the South Koreans who may have been the cause of placing the U.N. in an equivocal position. There was also a good deal of talk of the possibility that the South Korean government was intentionally inciting its nationals to actions which would throw a monkey wrench into the armistice talks. It was also considered possible that individual South Koreans might initiate action of that sort themselves. In view of the fact that there was really no evidence of South Korean action in the incident alleged it is of some interest that so much of the speculation should have assumed the very strong possibility of actual U.N. guilt.

It was on September 3rd, after the U.N. reply to the new Communist charges, that the delegation, myself and a number of staff people went to Tokyo. We continued our deliberations and activities there.

I do not remember clearly at this point what the Communist reply was to the U.N. refusal to accept any responsibility for the new charges but on the 6th of September General Ridgway sent in turn his message which must have been in response to a Communist communication. The message of September 6th is

another fairly critical turning point in this period of suspended negotiation. It was in this message that General Ridgway proposed that a new site should be chosen for the armistice conference and also demanded that the Communists should put an end to their "constant deceit." I was strongly opposed to this proposal that the conference site be changed. My objections were that the Communists would be most strenuously opposed to any such change and that consequently the U.N. would be placed in the position of making a proposal which was bound to lead to an almost automatic and very strong rejection by the Communists. Consequently the U.N. would then have to give up their proposal or if they did not give it up enter into a new and prolonged source of dispute with the Communists. I was also afraid that the U.N. would not only have to drop its proposal but that in fact General Ridgway once having made the proposal would feel himself committed to it and thus struggle for a change of site which did not seem to me to be worth the effort that would go into it. General Ridgway, however, had apparently increasingly come to the conclusion that it was not possible to carry on negotiations free from interruption at Kaesong because of the control that the Communists exercised over the area and the possibilities that this control gave them for creating incidents embarrassing to the U.N. Some members of the delegation and the staff shared this point of view and argued very strenuously that the Communists had to be removed to a position where they could not interrupt the conference at will and where they could not create incidents that would threaten the prestige of the U.N. To these arguments I replied that the incidents were not in any way damaging the moral prestige of the U.N., and that any reading of the editorial and press material would show that as a matter of fact these Communist tactics had in the West contributed to a strengthening of the general view that it is very difficult if not impossible to get on with Communists. I also pointed out the Western reaction to the incidents was such that were the U.N. actually to commit a real breach of neutrality the U.N. would only have to deny it in order to appear guiltless before the Western world, so favorable was the Western reaction to Communist incidents and U.N. reputation. I further pointed out that the Communists in any situation that one could construct would always be in a position if they felt it necessary or desirable to bring the meetings to an end by finding some pretext or other. I stated that the interest in moving from Kaesong was a reflection of the over serious manner in which the whole matter of incidents was being treated. The difficulty with such discussions with the delegation and staff personnel was that while agreements with each point might at the moment be arrived at, the opposite opinions might nonetheless be expressed an hour or a day later; or the two sets of opinions would be held virtually simultaneously in the mind of the same person. One motive for agreement with me was that on the whole the delegation and the staff members at this time felt that General Ridgway was being too tough. This view

of General Ridgway tended to develop more fully later but was already developing at this time. There was also a very strong conviction that gathered more force later that the Communists would never agree to leave Kaesong because it would be too great a loss of face for them. My own position was that the Communists could be made to leave Kaesong but that the fight that would be required to make them do so was not one that was necessary or desirable from the standpoint of U.N. interest.

In view of General Ridgway's considerable insistence on the matter of a site change I suggested that the message of September 6th to the Communists should bring up the matter of a possible change of site as if it were intended to satisfy Communist requirements rather than U.N. That is, the intention was that after having rejected Communist requirements or Communist charges, the U.N. could offer to the Communists, if they felt dissatisfied with their security from neutrality breaches at Kaesong, a different site. Thus the proposal for a new site could be made in the form of doing the Communists a favor or offering a "constructive" suggestion in which *they* might be interested. In this way the proposal would not be one which was being made on behalf of U.N. interests and requirements. This compromise formulation was however not satisfactory to General Ridgway who wanted to make a clearcut U.N. proposal that the site be changed. At this time I am fairly sure that he had not as yet reached the point where the question of a new site was a strong or firm inner commitment that he had made to himself. I think he was at this time still quite unclear as to how strongly he was going to attempt to get a new site and that it was only later, after having already made the proposal, that he found himself increasingly in the position that he did not want to let the proposal drop or be rejected by the Communists. Once more he was placing himself in a position which led him to take a firmer line than he probably intended because after having got into the position any other line would have seemed to him like a retreat.

On September 10th a new incident occurred when a U.N. bomber pilot attacked with machine gun fire the Kaesong area. This was the case which I mentioned earlier in which U.N. radar reports and also interrogations of pilots revealed that in fact a U.N. plane had strafed the neutral area. It is the case in which the Communists handed the U.N. personnel machine gun bullets which analysis shows could not have been fired by a U.N. plane. Responsibility for the incident was acknowledged by Admiral Joy to the Communists on September 11th and by General Ridgway on September 12th. During the next ten days or two weeks several rounds of communication occurred which certainly confirmed the previous indications that the Communists had no intention of breaking off negotiations. Nonetheless there was constant concern that this in fact might well

be the case. There continued to be difficulties arising in part from a U.N. tendency to interpret Communist statements made in their messages as being actual requirements for a resumption of the talks. Thus the Communists after belaboring the U.N. for their violations and repeating the necessity for the U.N. to take an attitude of serious responsibility would also throw in vague statements that in the context convinced me completely had no significance for actual content of further discussion between the U.N. and the Communists. Thus the Communists would vaguely refer to the need to "settle" past incidents when the meetings were resumed. Such references tended to throw the U.N. personnel into a tremendous flurry of excitement. Any reference that suggested that the Communists intended to reopen discussion of the incidents upon resumption of talk was a source of virtual panic among the U.N. people. Later when General Ridgway had made it clear that he would not discuss the incident further when meetings were resumed, the great preoccupation with this problem still continued. Elaborate discussions and elaborate plans were drawn up to take care of the eventuality that the Communists would raise the matter of the incident in any future initial meeting between the two sides after they had got together again. I remember one discussion we had in which we were trying to outline what ought to be done in the first meeting after a resumption had been successfully arrived at and that during the course of this discussion one of the people, I cannot recall which one, shouted out in virtually hysterical voice "But what if they raise the old incident again?" It is a little difficult to convey the sense of high pitched, hysterical fear with which this question was precipitated into our discussion.

In the meantime the U.N. had to acknowledge another violation of the neutral area, this time by four South Korean soldiers which constituted a DDT squad and who wandered into the Kaesong area inadvertently with their spraying equipment. (I jokingly suggested that since these four South Korean soldiers were engaged in vermin control it was only natural to expect that they would drift into the Communist-held territory.)

The Communists treated this incident very carefully and very pleasantly. They made no great fuss about the invasion of their territory, treated the four soldiers with politeness and returned the soldiers and their truck and equipment to U.N. hands very quickly. They did not use the occasion to accuse the U.N. of engaging in chemical warfare. At the same time a Communist broadcast once more showed a strong inclination to get the talks started again. The incidents for which the U.N. was responsible and also the continuing indication that the Communists were looking for a means to get the talks under way seemed to have conspired to give General Ridgway an increasing sentiment that he ought to

push for a change in the location of the armistice talks. It is interesting to note that whereas originally one motive for this change was the incident faked and created by the Communists, later the motive that began to take on greater importance were those incidents that in fact were caused by U.N. military action. The U.N. people now seemed increasingly interested in a new site in order to try and avoid situations in which they would have to admit guilt. General Ridgway was not supported in this by the delegation and staff who were all as I recall completely convinced that the Communists would under no circumstances move out of Kaesong. This conviction did not, however, prevent them on occasion from insisting that it was impossible to hold a proper armistice conference under the conditions prevailing in Kaesong where the Communists could invent incidents at will.

Around the 20th to the 22nd of September the primary problem was to arrange for the liaison officers of both sides to meet in order to arrange for a resumption of the talks. These days are of some considerable interest in discussing U.N. negotiatory behavior. General Ridgway was forbidden by JCS directives from making such an issue of the change of site that would prevent a successful resumption of the talks. He had therefore to tread rather carefully, trying to push for such a change without at the same time taking any steps which were equivalent to telling the Communists that either they must change the site or else the U.N. would not resume talks with them. The liaison officers of both sides met on the 24th of September in order to arrange for a resumption of the armistice negotiations. The Communists had inserted in their message agreeing to such a meeting a statement to the effect that the meeting was in order to discuss the date and time for a resumption of the armistice talks. The Ridgway message on the other hand had kept on insisting that at the meeting of the liaison officers it would be necessary for the officers to discuss the conditions surrounding the resumption of the armistice talks. Thus the U.N. requirements for the arrangements for a resumption of the talks were broader than those of the Communists who obviously wanted to avoid any discussion other than time and date, since they were clearly not interested in changing the conditions that obtained during the months of July and August. It is possibly correct to say that while the Communists may have anticipated an attempt on the part of the U.N. to include a change of site in the discussion of "conditions for a resumption of talks," nonetheless the preceding messages probably left them with the impression, and probably a quite justified impression, that the U.N. would not seriously press for a change of site. When the two groups of liaison officers met on the 24th of September they were consequently operating under different sets of instructions which made progress virtually impossible. The U.N. "double-crossed" the Communists by stating that the U.N. did not consider the Kaesong

area suitable for armistice negotiations. The Communists on the other hand refused to discuss anything other than the date and time for resuming the armistice talks under the conditions that previously had existed. A second meeting the following day let to a similar impasse. Consequently the ball was thrown back once more to the commanders of the two sides, and on the 27th of September General Ridgway now came out more openly and firmly for a change of site. He now no longer left it to the liaison officers to simply suggest that Kaesong was unsuitable but proposed a new site eight miles from Kaesong between the lines at the more or less non-existent village of Songhyon. This proposal the Communists rejected. General Ridgway then proposed on the 4th of October that the Communists should select an alternative site that would be between the lines and thus not in territory controlled by the Communists.

On the 6th of October the Communists effected an agreement with this while at the same time preserving a fairly good position for themselves. They proposed that the meetings should be resumed at Panmunjom. I have noticed that in the newspapers here it seemed to have been assumed that Panmunjom was simply another village in between the lines and was thus in a sense "functionally equivalent" to Songhyon, the village that had been proposed by General Ridgway on the 27th of September. This is very far from being the case. Panmunjom is the check point that marks the entrance to the neutral zone surrounding Kaesong and already had long been established as the meeting place of the U.N. and Communist liaison officers whenever they had messages to transmit to each other. It was, thus, a part of the old arrangement under the Kaesong site. Consequently removal of the conference from Kaesong to Panmunjom was by no means as radical a change in site as it might seem on the surface. One might say that it represented a change from the heart of the old Kaesong neutral zone to the periphery of it. Nonetheless to have gotten the Communists out of Kaesong was a considerable accomplishment and certainly indicated, as I think one might have well predicted, that with sufficient U.N. stubbornness the Communists would go a long way in order to effect a resumption of the talks.

Although the new site was agreed to on the 6th or 7th of October and General Ridgway replied to the Communist suggestion of Panmunjom favorably on the 8th of October it was not until October 25 that the meetings were actually resumed. The period of somewhat more than two weeks consumed in effecting a resumption of talks at Panmunjom arose very directly from the failure of the U.N. to specify the conditions under which Panmunjom as a meeting place would be acceptable. Here again a point of some interest in negotiatory behavior emerges. As a physical site Panmunjom was agreeable to General Ridgway, but

no site was agreeable unless it was surrounded by certain conditions that would alter the situation as it had existed in Kaesong. One of these conditions was the desire for a much reduced neutral zone. Kaesong had been surrounded by a zone 5 miles in radius thus giving the Communists an area of some 75 sq. miles free from attack, and this in an area of vital military significance. Further such a large area made it both easier for the Communists to create incidents and also for the U.N. inadvertently to commit violations of neutrality. General Ridgway was determined therefore to secure a set of conditions surrounding Panmunjom that would not repeat what he considered to be the difficulties and errors involved in the conditions that had surrounded the use of Kaesong.

It was perfectly clear to me from the Communist message proposing Panmunjom that the Communists fully intended to keep the old neutral area as a neutral area and that their proposal of Panmunjom was in part based on the presumption that since it was a part of the old neutral zone that they would have an excellent chance of retaining the old neutral area. Their message made this expectation quite clear. I was, therefore, in favor of having General Ridgway accept the proposal for the use of Panmunjom as a site but to specify in his message the conditions (such as the size of the new neutral zone, etc.) in his message. That is, to have General Ridgway accept Panmunjom only conditional on certain specific arrangements being agreed to. This, however, was not done and once more the liaison officers of both sides were set to meet each other when it should have been clear that they would come into immediate conflict over issues which the U.N. was not meeting squarely at the higher level of command. By this time there was considerable pressure both self-generated and other-generated to get the meetings under way. From this standpoint it seemed an advantage to get the liaison officers at least meeting since this would be a visible sign of progress. Hence the U.N. simply closed its eyes to the fact that the liaison officers were bound to come into conflict and that an immediate resumption would not be possible. This led to somewhat over two weeks of negotiation between the liaison officers of both sides, whereas if General Ridgway had stipulated his condition for the use of Panmunjom in his original acceptance of that place as a site I am sure that the meetings would have started much sooner and at the same time the U.N. would have secured a more favorable set of conditions surrounding the use of the Panmunjom area. This particular instance is only one example of a more general tendency to try to avoid facing directly issues which analysis would show are bound to arise and to attempt to conceal them in some vague hope that if they are not faced they will resolve themselves more readily or by some semi-magical means.

The U.N. objective in the arrangement for the new conference site was to secure a very small neutral area around the actual conference tent of several hundred yards and no more. The U.N. wished the roads from Munsan-ni, the U.N. delegation camp, to Panmunjom and from Kaesong, the Communist delegation residence center, to Panmunjom to be free from attack. Also the actual residence areas namely Munsan-ni and Kaesong were to be free from attack but not themselves to be neutral territory in the sense that troops were not allowed to be present in them. The principal point of issue, then, was the abolition of the old 5-mile radius neutral zone around Kaesong. For two weeks these problems were dealt with by the liaison officers of the two sides. I shall not attempt any detailed analysis of these two weeks of negotiation, but summarize them by saying that the liaison officers were not adequate in their attempt to secure U.N. objectives. They lacked firmness in their treatment of the Communists and in part, and this is more particularly true of Colonel Kinney, they seemed to be motivated to make concessions unnecessarily in the hope of reaching an early agreement and thus showing that they were very astute negotiators and could reach agreements with the Communists much more swiftly than either General Ridgway's headquarters or the delegation itself was able to reach agreement with the Communists with respect to the problems with which they dealt. One of the principal failings of the liaison officers in their bargaining with the Communists was their willingness to make concessions instead of making bargains. That is, they would plan in terms of giving the Communists a concession in the expectation that then the Communists on the next point would give one to them, instead of securing a simultaneous swapping of concessions thus ensuring that they got something definitely in return for the concessions that they made. Finally, however, an agreement was reached which gave the Communists a 3-mile radius neutral zone around the city of Kaesong instead of the 5-mile neutral zone that they had originally possessed. This gave the Communists an area of approximately 30 sq. miles which was free from military action, and this was an area that had absolutely no relationship to the new site for the conference talks. There was no rational basis for continuing even a part of the old neutral zone which had significance only for a conference site in the city of Kaesong itself. Nonetheless the Communists extracted this, although I am fully confident that it could have been abolished completely and would have been accepted by the Communists had the U.N. simply acted more vigorously. The curious nature of the situation is that these stronger demands of the U.N. would have probably taken even less time to secure had the U.N. flatly come out and insisted that the old neutral area had no relevance. Because of the "delicate" manner in which the liaison officer negotiations were carried on the Communists were given every incentive to retain at least part of their old neutral zone.

I have now sketched in very rough terms the sequence of events up until October 25th when the negotiations resumed in Panmunjom. However I must now return to this period during which the talks had ceased in order to discuss several other things that were happening simultaneously.

During September there was a considerable amount of military action on limited sectors of the front. The Communists initiated various local attacks which had temporary success but which usually were later thrown back and usually with U.N. advances beyond the point which the U.N. usually held. On the central and eastern fronts U.N. military pressure was fairly strong and through September gradual advances occurred. These advances were made despite heavy Communist resistance and despite the fact that they were not part of a major U.N. offensive. The advances were also made despite the fact that the Communists had now had two months or more to dig in and bring up supplies and to recuperate from their retreat of late May and early June. Further, these advances provided the military with a secure defensive line. The military, that is General Van Fleet, were insistent that no military demarcation line should be established in agreement with the Communists that did not fully secure the Kansas line. The Kansas line was a defense line which General Van Fleet felt he could fully protect even against greatly superior forces provided at least that the current balance of power in the air and on the sea was retained. As I indicated earlier one of the motives in trying to secure a settlement with the Communists which called for a demarcation line north of the battle line arose from the desire to secure the Kansas line. This had now been attained by military action. This in its turn meant that military interest in the line of demarcation to be arrived at in the negotiation became much less. From a strictly military standpoint the Eighth Army now had a line with which it was content. This change in the military outlook was of some considerable importance in determining the subsequent course of the negotiations.

A second development of major interest during the latter part of the period when the negotiations were still suspended was the drawing up of a new proposal for Item #2 of the Agenda to be made to the Communists when the two sides would finally get together again, and associated with this the visit to General Ridgway's headquarters of General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of Mr. Charles Bohlen of the State Department.

On August 26th, two days after I arrived for the first time at the camp at Munsan-ni, I prepared a fairly full statement reviewing what the current situation of the negotiations was and drawing attention to the failure of the U.N. to provide the Communists with a specific proposal. As I have indicated earlier the U.N. was at this time engaging in rather vague, evasive demands for a

demarcation line but never acceded to Communist requests for a specific proposal. As I have also indicated the delegation was rather loathe to prepare a specific proposal partly because it would commit them to a demand on the Communists for something which was in excess of the U.N. minimum position. Also they were afraid of public reaction to a proposal, if it became known, that required the Communists to retreat at some parts of the line. I continued, nonetheless, to be quite insistent that progress would not be made if the U.N. continued to talk about "principles" to be incorporated into a settlement on the demarcation instead of giving the Communists a fixed proposal. I further pointed out that failure to hand the Communists a clear-cut proposal was bound to indicate to the Communists that the U.N. did not have sufficient confidence in its own strength and bargaining position to be able to specify what it wanted and expected to get it or something close to it.

The position I had taken did not receive agreement until General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen arrived in Tokyo. At this time the question was raised with them, or rather I believe with Mr. Bohlen, as to whether it was really correct to make this change in the negotiation procedure. Mr. Bohlen's reply was, as transmitted to me by Admiral Joy, quite unequivocal. He not only agreed but added very firmly that Communists are never interested in anything except what is very specific and what is committed clearly to paper. From this time on, then, it was taken for granted that upon the resumption of the negotiations the U.N. should have ready a definite proposal to give to the Communists.

The visit of General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen while it had some plus characteristics was unfortunate in one major respect. It represented the first more direct form of pressure from the JCS to "get along with the negotiations and show results." This was not indicated to the delegation in any blunt or very direct fashion as far as I know. Indeed the delegation was very much gratified by the fact that General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen did not feel that in order to secure a settlement with the Communists the U.N. should necessarily forgo trying to secure a demarcation line that represented in at least some portions a gain for the United Nations side. That is, General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen did not in any way indicate that the U.N. should be content with a purely 50-50 settlement on the battle line in the strict sense. Nonetheless the fact that they had made the trip, their obvious concern about the progress of the negotiations represented a form of pressure and tended to increase the anxiety of the delegation because as yet they had attained no obvious positive results.

The awareness that "the heat was on" reflected itself in part in the nature of the proposal that was eventually drawn up for presentation to the Communists. This proposal was a quite marked retreat from the position which the U.N. had

been taking, however vaguely they may have expressed it, when the negotiations broke off. This proposal was not, of course, to be criticized on these grounds. It was as a matter of fact a quite good proposal and was the sort of proposal to which the U.N. ought to have been working toward in July and August and which probably could have been secured had the U.N. started with a very specific proposal of a more ambitious character and then permitted itself to be whittled down to the new proposal in the course of bargaining. The proposal which I shall hereafter identify as the proposal of October 25th which was the day on which it was ultimately submitted, was very largely drawn up in Tokyo and then made subject to some modifications in Korea after we returned to the camp in October. This proposal gave the Communists essentially a 50-50 deal throughout the central and eastern sectors of the front. This did not mean that the proposal simply followed the conformation of the battle line itself. It involved some withdrawals by the U.N. and some by the Communists in order to straighten out various salients. These withdrawals pretty much balanced each other. In the West however the proposal secured for the U.N. the Kaesong triangle and thus at least as far as the ground front was concerned gave the U.N. a better deal than the Communists. It should be added, however, that this was not a straight plus gain for the U.N. since it does not take into account the islands off the North Korean coast that the U.N. would be giving up and which in part would balance the U.N. gain in the Kaesong area. The balancing of withdrawals and advances by the two sides on a straight acreage basis would have left the U.N. with a superior position on the basis of this proposal, but it is probably not possible to equate the military value of the islands off the coast of North Korea with an acreage calculation. It was in connection with the preparation of such a proposal and problem of how it should be presented to the Communists that Mr. Bohlen made two rather curious suggestions, both of which complicated considerably the discussions that I was continually having with the delegation.

One of these suggestions (which were of course taken as more than mere "suggestions") was that the proposal should be drawn up as soon as possible so that it would be ready for public release in the event that the Communists broke off negotiations and did not return to the conference table. It was considered important to have the proposal ready in this eventuality so that the U.N. could demonstrate to the world that it had an offer to the Communists that was perfectly fair, just, reasonable and equitable, and that therefore the sole responsibility for the break-off permanently of the negotiations was on the Communists and was not due to U.N. intransigence. This was very shocking to me in several respects. In the first place I was shocked at the notion that anyone so astute as Mr. Bohlen should for a moment, given the situation that obtained at the time he was in Tokyo, believe that there was any danger in the Communists

not returning to the conference table. Further I was distressed that he should by speaking in this way undermine the already waning confidence and increase the anxiety of the delegation. Thirdly, the concern to ensure that the U.N. would be justified in public eyes by means of rushing into print with a proposal in order to convince the world that the U.N. was being or intending to be very fair to the Communists struck me in itself as a somewhat hysterical outlook on the situation and the potential dangers that it might hold. (Let me add here since I will probably not be able to insert it anywhere else in the manuscript that immediately after the incident of August 23rd when the Communists broke off negotiations, Admiral Joy had his staff people prepare a radio speech for him which was to be delivered in the event that the Communists broke off negotiations entirely. The idea of this speech, of course, was to show the world that the U.N. had done everything possible to secure peace in Korea. In part, of course, the preparation of such a paper was simply in line with the military tendency to plan for all contingencies and is thus an indication of not overlooking any possibility. On the other hand it also reflects a quite erroneous conception of the probability that the Communists would actually break off negotiations.)

A second complication introduced by Mr. Bohlen was his suggestion that in presenting the new proposal to the Communists it should be presented under the phrase "as a basis for discussion." Since I was not present in the conversation in which Mr. Bohlen made his suggestion of the use of this phrase I am not too clear about what his actual intention was and can only try to reconstruct it from the reports of Admiral Joy and General Craigie. In addition I must confess that my own memory of their statements, which were in the first instance already rather vague, is somewhat dim. Apparently the phrase suggested by Mr. Bohlen came up originally in connection with the fear of Admiral Joy and some of the other members of the delegation and staff that the Communists would, upon resumption of talks, introduce extraneous subject matters into the discussions (for instance possibly past incidents). But more particularly there was very great concern about the Communists retaining their position on the 38th parallel. The opinion of Mr. Bohlen and this seemed to be shared completely by the members of the delegation, was that if the Communists retained their position on the 38th parallel the U.N. could not possibly offer to them the new proposal since this proposal represented a concession from the situation that obtained when the talks were broken off. The new proposal would thus constitute a concession in a situation in which the Communists had held to their own position.

This then led to the strategy on which a great deal of emphasis was laid that the U.N. must absolutely get its proposal in first because if the Communists started

talking first and said something that indicated their retention of the 38th parallel position, then the U.N. would be debarred of its opportunity to present its proposal. The anxiety of Mr. Bohlen and the delegation was then that the Communists might "inadvertently" do something which would prevent the U.N. from making a concession to them. By some curious mode of reasoning it seems to have been calculated that if the U.N. could quick rush into the meeting room, slap down its proposal on the table, that somehow the fact that the U.N. was making a considerable concession to the Communists over its previous position would no longer be so apparent to the Communists (or possibly to the world at large). In order to try and prevent the Communists from making any proposal of their own that the U.N. might have to discuss and certainly to prevent the Communists from talking about the 38th parallel a notion was developed that one ought somehow to convey to the Communists that the only thing that the U.N. would discuss would be its own new proposal. It was in this context apparently that the phrase "as a basis of discussion" seemed so vital to Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Bohlen was here being hopelessly over-subtle and apparently on the basis of a single incident which he reported to Admiral Joy and General Craigie. As far as I can make out it went something like this. Apparently during some negotiatory situation between the U.S. and the Russians the U.S. delegate had had some expectation that certain things in addition to one central topic would be discussed. The Russians however refused to discuss these other things and in defending their refusal pointed to the fact that in preparing the Agenda or in some documents at any rate relating to the central problem of the conference, the U.S. had used the phrase that this was to be "the basis of discussion." From this Mr. Bohlen made the far-reaching inference that, for Communists, the phrase "the basis for discussion" means that the only object to be discussed is that object to which the phrase has been attached. Consequently he therefore inferred that if the U.N., in this situation, were to say that its proposal is to be "the basis for discussion" in the armistice conference, this would mean that the Chinese and North Korean delegates would thereby understand that the U.N. proposal was to be the sole subject of discussion and thereby by implication to mean that the U.N. would not discuss any Communist proposal, particularly presumably any continued proposal of the 38th parallel. If this recital of Mr. Bohlen's reasoning seems extremely strained and implausible I can assure the reader that while it may not be exact in all details that my perfectly clear recollection is that whatever slight errors in the telling there may be would not alter the impression of complete wildness in the line of talk. Because at the time when the whole conversation was narrated to me and when I therefore had it right in front of me, so to speak, that impression was equally strong in my own mind.

Between October 9 when we returned to the camp in Korea and October 25th when the resumption of the armistice talks occurred, the finishing touches were put to the new proposal to be placed before the Communists. During this period, although there was a fluctuating pessimism because the meetings were being held up by the necessity of reaching agreement with the Communists on the regulations governing the neutrality of Kaesong and Panmunjom, the delegation was in a moderately optimistic mood. This was based not so much on any analysis which suggested that the armistice would now progress more rapidly, but arose rather from the fact that the U.N. now had a specific proposal and this seemed somehow to relieve the delegation of any great necessity to worry about negotiations problems. The existence of the proposal, something which had not existed during July and August, provided a "simple" line of action. The ultimate triumph of General Ridgway in removing the Communists from Kaesong also augured well for the future. Military success during September also added to the optimism. The delegation was further fortified in these positive feelings by the sense that it no longer needed to bargain since the U.N. now had a proposal which was considered to be pretty much rock bottom and consequently required nothing other than simply to stand perfectly firm. General Craigie felt that the new proposal was probably too generous to the Communists and during the period immediately prior to the opening of the talks tried to secure additional high ground north of Kaesong in the proposal. He had some support from Admiral Burke but was opposed by Admiral Joy and General Hodes. In this controversy I sided, on the whole, with Admiral Joy and General Hodes. The reason for this was that the proposal of October 25th as it stood when we left Tokyo was perfectly adequate for securing for the U.N., if the Communists were forced to accept the proposal, a victory with considerable political significance. The inclusion of the Kaesong area on the U.N. side of the demarcation line gave the U.N. a better deal than the Communists and would require them to retreat at this western end of the line and to retreat from a city and area (Kaesong) which because of the location of the first part of the armistice conference had been fully publicized to the world as being in Communist hands. My principal objection to pushing the line still further north to include the high ground north of Kaesong was that it was very likely to lead to feelings of guilt and boldness among the members of the delegation, especially General Hodes and Admiral Joy. I calculated that if this additional territory were included the strong sentiment then existing that the U.N. now had a proposal to which it could stick firmly without any serious alteration would be destroyed. The U.N. by asking for more would find itself under considerable internal pressure to concede this additional territory very early and fall back on the line which had been drawn up in Tokyo. I pointed out privately to General Craigie that this likelihood of a concession was very great and would tend to demoralize the delegation and that it would be

better for them to start with the original line and hold completely to it. I told General Craigie that I would feel more disposed to support his argument for moving the line north of the city of Kaesong were he himself going to remain with the delegation. I pointed out to him the disadvantage of making a proposal that would outrun the willingness and capability of the delegation to stick firmly to it. General Craigie acknowledged the merit of these arguments and did not continue his unsuccessful attempt to persuade Admiral Joy and General Hodes, although there had been earlier one rather heated session in Admiral Joy's tent in which he had tried to persuade them.

During this period between October 9 and October 25 General Turner was working with a small group preparing additional materials on Item #3 of the Agenda, the Item referring to means for ensuring compliance with the terms of the armistice. At Admiral Joy's request I did some work with this group.

Shortly before the armistice talks resumed on October 25th one of the liaison officers, on the basis of a comment made by one of the Communist liaison officers, inferred that the Communists were going to raise the question of past incidents when the meetings resumed. The reported comments did not, in my mind, indicate such an intention in the Communist plans at all. However Admiral Joy more particularly was thrown into quite a state of excitement by this prospect and this feeling of virtual panic tended to diffuse itself to other members of the camp. The absolute necessity of having "clean hands" is reflected by this extraordinary preoccupation with Communist allegation of neutrality violations. General Craigie also was concerned but his concern with incidents was based on a sensitivity to possible reflections on the competence of the Air Force. Every air incident, he realized, suggested the difficulty that the Air Force had in securing compliance with its orders and in carrying out operations according to exact specification. At one time, I believe somewhat later, a flight of Navy planes passed over the neutral Panmunjom area. There was a good deal of good natured ribbing of Admiral Joy based on the fact that this time planes involved had been Navy and not Air Force planes. I should add that in the earlier period and also during the negotiations between the liaison officers to effect arrangements for the resumption of meetings at Panmunjom the right of U.N. planes to fly over the armistice zone was very much in dispute. The U.N. had, of course, guaranteed that no hostile acts would be committed against these areas. The U.N., however, contended that this did not preclude U.N. planes from flying over these areas. The U.N. had told the Communists that they would avoid flying over the areas as much as possible but that they refused to treat the air over the neutral zone as being debarred from U.N. aircraft.

Another curious source of anxiety in the camp was the possibility that the Communists might come in with a "semi-reasonable" proposal. The delegation was afraid of a "good" Communist proposal for fear that it would put pressure on them to sign immediately on the dotted line. This situation is quite interesting because on the one hand the delegation had been afraid that the Communists would stick to the 38th parallel and thus make their own proposal seem too liberal and too full of concessions, and now they were equally afraid that the Communists might show a capacity for reasonable behavior and thus make it difficult for them to hold out for their own proposal. It is thus very difficult to see what sort of Communist behavior would have been reassuring to the U.N. camp.

Let me now give one final paragraph of summary before passing to the period of actual negotiations. After considerable discussion it was agreed that the new proposal to the Communists should be made in firm language that indicated that the U.N. was giving to the Communists a proposal from which they would not deviate apart from minor matters of revision that affected administrative convenience. I wrote a statement introductory to the proposal which was to be read to the Communists at the time the proposal was to be handed to them. It was firmly agreed that the U.N. strategy was now very simple. This new proposal was as good a proposal as the Communists could be given. There was every intention, on the surface, to stick to it and simply let the Communists beat their heads against a stone wall. So fully agreed was everyone on this (largely because, I realize now, the U.N. probably thought the Communists would accept it rather early) that the powers of resistance and firmness of the U.N. seemed quite good. At this time I myself was very optimistic. The air of enthusiasm and conviction that in part was due to a clear-cut line of action and in part was due to general relief that the negotiations were about to resume tended to mislead me. I over-evaluated the capacity of the U.N. camp to stand firm and did not fully appreciate how deeply the lack of an immediate Communist surrender would undermine the enthusiasm and morale of the U.N. personnel. I was also fortified in my personal optimism by signs of tension between the North Koreans and Chinese representatives. (I will speak about this under a separate heading.) I have no doubt that my optimism would have been at least in some considerable measure justified had the agreed to strategy been in fact followed. A more dispassionate and realistic appraisal of the situation would probably have led me to realize that I was placing too much confidence in the ability of the U.N. to hold to a correct strategy and that I was extrapolating from General Ridgway's extremely firm stand on the matter of a conference site to the actual negotiation situation itself. In addition there was the fact of major significance that the Communists had done almost everything possible in their communications and

their stand during the last weeks of September to convince the U.N. that they would not under any circumstances move the conference site from Kaesong and nonetheless they had under U.N. pressure capitulated on this point. (However I should point out that the Communists did avoid at all times explicitly stating that they would never move from Kaesong.) This capitulation on the point of major importance to the Communists demonstrates clearly enough that when the U.N. was willing to make an all-out effort to stand firm positive results could be secured. In this particular case the positive results had been achieved at a cost of considerable time. This time consumption placed the U.N. subsequently under much greater time pressure than the Communists, particularly because of the attitude of the JCS and also the attitude of some members of the delegation. The victory was, therefore, won at considerable expense. Had the U.N. or more specifically General Ridgway not insisted on this victory but had taken instead the more minor victory that was available immediately after August 3rd the U.N. would probably have been able to expend more time being stubborn about substantive matters of the negotiations rather than on matters involving administrative arrangements. However the victory by the U.N. on this administrative matter showed that had the U.N. continued the stubborn line of behavior followed by General Ridgway it could have achieved a much more favorable settlement of Item #2 of the Agenda.

The negotiations resumed on the morning of October 25th in a full meeting of both delegations. The morning meeting was very brief and the major activity of the morning was an agreement by both sides to resume negotiation on a sub-delegation basis as at the time when the discussions broke off in August. General Hodes and Admiral Burke thus resumed negotiations with North Korean General Lee and the Chinese General Hsieh. The various feared and anticipated Communist "tricks" such as bringing up past incidents did not occur and there was nothing to indicate that the Communists were going to try and recoup lost prestige by "monkeying around." Admiral Joy and the other members of the delegation were in a considerable state of enthusiasm when their anxieties on these points were shown to be unnecessary.

According to plan the U.N. sub-delegates immediately presented to the Communists in the afternoon session the new U.N. proposal. This proposal was introduced by a statement, largely written by myself, which emphasized that the U.N. was here providing a solution to Item #2 of the Agenda beyond which it would not go apart from minor changes. The Communists did not attempt to take the floor first but as in their previous meetings with the U.N. waited to see what the U.N. had to offer. The next day the Communists made their proposal. This was a completely unsatisfactory proposal and it seems entirely clear to me

that the Communists had no real expectations of having the U.N. show any interest in it. It did, however, get the Communists "off the 38th parallel" and was thus for this reason pleasing to the delegates. For the Communists their proposal was undoubtedly intended to serve a purpose somewhat similar to their proposal of the 38th parallel, namely to place some sort of proposal pro forma on the record and then to concentrate on driving the U.N. proposal in the direction of something more agreeable to the Communists. It was immediately after the Communists made this proposal on October 26th that I realized that the delegation's capacity for resistance was far less than I had supposed it at this early stage to be. The fact that each side had made a proposal on two successive days provided a spurious sense of "things happening" and a sense of actual and prospective progress. Admiral Joy more particularly seemed to feel that it was necessary to try to continue this velocity of "progress." He argued that the U.N. had made a proposal on October 25th, the Communists had made one on October 26th and now it was the U.N.'s turn to make another proposal to the Communists. Consequently only two days after the U.N. had made its new proposal to which it was supposed to stand firm, Admiral Joy was already beginning to feel the need to make a concession to the Communists. In this way he thought he would induce the Communists to make a concession to the U.N. and by a rapid series presumably of such alternating proposals a quick solution to Item #2 of the Agenda would be reached. It required a considerable amount of "therapeutic work" with the support of Admiral Burke and General Craigie who was just about to leave the camp to prevent Admiral Joy and General Hodes from making an immediate retreat from the U.N. proposal of October 25th.

October 28th was not yet too critical and it was possible on that day to compel an adherence to the U.N. program of standing firm. But October 29th was already very difficult and required constant pressure and discussion in order to hold the line. So critical was the self-generated pressure felt by Admiral Joy that on the night of October 29th and more particularly on October 30th I was already in the position where in order to get Admiral Joy to hold off I had virtually to promise him that I would "permit" a concession if he would agree to hold off for another two days. It was, therefore, with a sense of very considerable anxiety and very little optimism that I waited at the helicopter landing place on the afternoon of October 31 for General Hodes and Admiral Burke to return from their session of that day. I had no expectation that the Communists would make a new proposal only four days after their proposal of October 26th. General Hodes and Admiral Burke returned and with an air of considerable grimness they walked to Admiral Joy's tent. General Hodes then reported in very woeful tones that the day had been a terrible one and that no progress had been made. Fortunately for my own psychological state I began to realize that there was a curious element of play-

acting in the way in which General Hodes was speaking and the manner in which Admiral Burke was standing by. General Hodes then broke down and revealed that he was playing a big joke on Admiral Joy and that in fact the day had been extremely good because the Communists had come out with a new proposal that was much in advance of the one they had offered on October 26th. The fact that the Communists had made two successive proposals within a period of four days was certainly a great triumph for the U.N. and undoubtedly showed the strength of its negotiatory position. It was also a great relief to me because it completely justified the strong pressure I had brought to bear on Admiral Joy and made me feel that the immediately approaching period would be eased by the success of this particular day. How mistaken I was in this expectation I learned within 30 minutes of the time that General Hodes and Admiral Burke announced the glad tidings.

After an initial period of about a half hour of general euphoria and toasts to the health of General Hodes and Admiral Burke and to the success of the U.N. and to ourselves in general, Admiral Joy began to show marked signs of genuine fear and apprehension. The Communist proposal of October 26th had already led him to feel that it was now the U.N.'s turn to make another proposal. Now that the Communists had made two proposals ("concessions") it became for him more necessary than ever for the U.N. immediately to rush in with a concession on its part. This was defended on the grounds that that was how Orientals bargained. Admiral Joy stated that he had spent long enough in the Orient to know that when you buy something in a Chinese market that is exactly the procedure that one follows. Underneath this conception, however, was I am certain his preoccupation with public opinion. Two Communist proposals in a row without any "give" by the U.N. would signalize to the world (according to Admiral Joy's way of thinking) the stubbornness of the U.N. and its indifference to getting an armistice as speedily as possible. This immensely strong impulse to treat signs of Communist weakness as a basis for a weak move on the part of the U.N. was horrifying to me. The situation was additionally complicated by the fact that Colonel Galloway also interpreted the Communist action as requiring a U.N. retreat. The meeting in Admiral Joy's tent that had thus started as a victory celebration continued as a nightmare of having to argue Admiral Joy out of this panicky proposal to offer concessions to the Communists. In this I was, of course, supported by Admiral Burke and even somewhat mildly, as far as I can recall, by General Hodes. Admiral Burke and Admiral Joy were already beginning to show considerable tension of the sort I described in an earlier part of this manuscript. The burden of arguments therefore fell on me, and not only for the reason just mentioned but also because on the whole I represented the outside world to Admiral Joy and was able to bring more pressure on him, often

using lines of argument and expression when necessary in order to try and "frighten" him into taking a firmer stand. The outcome of our discussion was that we should go along for at least a couple of days pointing out that although the Communist proposal was an improvement over their last one that the U.N. had already provided a proposal that apart from minor changes was as favorable to the Communists as the U.N. could agree to. This of course was quite unsatisfactory since one could not suppose that by another two days the Communists would again make further concessions. The outlook was not good, although from the standpoint of the negotiatory position, the U.N. was in an extremely fine situation.

The Communist proposal that was made on October 31 was the first proposal that provided an opportunity for some serious haggling. It was, of course, the very fact that this proposal was in some measure based on "the military realities" that so deeply bothered Admiral Joy. His capacity to remain firm was undermined by the more "reasonable" character of the Communist proposal.

The earlier Communist proposal of October 25 had drawn a demarcation line and attempted to provide a case that the amount of withdrawal to create the neutral zone was approximately equal for the Communist and the U.N. sides. This argument was in large measure dependent upon the fact that the Communists drew the demarcation line when the portion of Korea west of the Kaesong area across the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas . . . [sentence incomplete in original transcript]. Further, the Communist proposal for the neutral zone contained the stipulation that the areas from which the Communists withdrew would be controlled by the Communists and would be "their territory" and the territory from which the U.N. withdrew would likewise be controlled by the latter. Now since the battleline ended in the Kaesong triangle and there was no military action or military front on the two peninsulas the withdrawal of the Communists to a line one-third the way up the peninsulas was a completely meaningless withdrawal. It had no more significance than if the Communists had attempted to secure credit by taking troops stationed at one of their coastal cities further north and withdrawing them ten miles inland. On the map, of course, it looked quite impressive as if the Communists were somehow giving up a good deal of territory by withdrawing troops from an active military front. As a matter of fact it became almost impossible to get the newspaper people to understand clearly that there was no military withdrawal whatsoever involved in these peninsula areas. The newspapers continued to misrepresent the nature of the Communist proposal despite apparently some effort by Brigadier General Nuckols to clarify the matter for them. The new Communist proposal of October 31 gave up this absurd pretention to a withdrawal on the peninsulas and

represented itself as being a strict battle line solution to Item #2 of the Agenda. In terms of Communist presentation the new proposal involved a 4 kilometer withdrawal (2 kilometers on each side) from a military demarcation line that roughly followed the battle line and involved equal amounts of withdrawals for both sides. In fact the Communist proposal as presented on the map did not conform to these specifications. In part the differences were due to different conceptions of where the actual battle line lay (of course the Communists were simply trying to get additional territory here, as the Communists could not have been so completely unaware of the true location of the battle line). In part the difference came from the Communist acceptance of U.N. withdrawals at portions where the U.N. had offered to withdraw in its own proposals but without providing equivalent withdrawals on their own side. Nonetheless it was fairly evident that the Communists were after a battle line demarcation line and that their deviations from a true battle line proposal could be overcome. The real point at issue, and of course this was obvious the moment the U.N. made its proposal of October 25th, was the Kaesong area. The Communists and the U.N. were in agreement on a roughly battle line solution for the central and eastern portions of the line, but in the western extremity of the line the U.N. was asking for the vital Kosong area.

I shall now mention a matter that is probably quite important in evaluating the significance of the fact that the Communists came in with a new proposal on October 31st only four days after their proposal of October 26th. During September there had been a considerable amount of military pressure on the Communists particularly in the central-eastern and eastern portions of the front. These successes probably had considerable effect in leading the Communists to be willing to give up Kaesong as the conference site. When the talks were about to be resumed military activity once more fell off. However, when last minute difficulties began to develop over the new site at Panmunjom and when the difference between U.N. and Communist proposals on the resumption of talks became apparent, the desirability of continuing military pressure seems at last to have led to actual plans for increased military action. I do not know whether this was a decision of General Van Fleet or General Ridgway but presumably the ultimate responsibility and decision must have been the latter's. Such military pressure was one of the most important requirements at this stage for a successful conclusion to Item #2 of the Agenda. An offensive was organized and planned with a jump-off date of November 1. This offensive was not intended to be a major U.N. offensive all along the line. But it represented a fair amount of military effort and would have bitten off a chunk of Communist territory west of the Komisong-ni and Kwansok-dong salient. The Eighth Army people in the camp had absolute confidence that the offensive would proceed according to

plan and that the territory would become U.N. territory without undue difficulty. The Communist proposal of October 31st came, then, 24 hours or less before the jump-off time of the limited U.N. offensive.

As a result of the "encouraging" Communist proposal the offensive of November 1 was canceled. Whose decision this was I do not know. It was not a decision taken at the U.N. camp and it was not known at the camp itself to the best of my knowledge. Everyone was surprised and shocked when it was announced on the evening of November 1 at the briefing that the offensive had been canceled. As far as I know there is no evidence that the Communist proposal of October 31 was motivated by the impending offensive by the U.N. the next day. Nonetheless this seems quite possible and as far as I can make out preparations for the limited offensive might well have permitted Communist intelligence to determine that such an offensive was about to take place, although they might not have been certain of the precise time for which it was planned. Even assuming that the proposal of October 31st was motivated by the U.N. projected offensive, I do not mean to imply that the intention of the Communist proposal was to get the offensive canceled. I do not believe that they could have such confidence in the weakness of U.N. behavior as to suppose that a proposal by them would definitely lead to a cancellation of such an offensive. However even were they not optimistic on this point the making of an immediate proposal would nonetheless be quite important for them. Should the offensive take place and more particularly should it be as it was almost certain to be quite successful, the Communists would very likely be faced with the necessity of making their proposal for some sort of concession after this successful offensive. Obviously were the Communists compelled to make concessions following a successful U.N. military offensive this would be very much more damaging to them and to their negotiatory position than a proposal made prior to the actual manifestation of military pressure. I would therefore suppose that to the extent that the U.N. offensive was linked to the Communist proposal of October 31 it operated to motivate the Communists to move rapidly toward a possible settlement of Item #2 of the Agenda so that Communist concessions would not have the appearance of being extracted under military pressure and by fear of military consequences.

While I am discussing this abortive U.N. offensive I may as well add a few additional remarks about the military situation during this negotiatory period. The U.N. had in the preceding period, that is during the breakoff of the talks in September, made significant advances. These advances were made against stiff Communist resistance and despite the fact that the U.N. attacks were on the whole frontal movements devoid of any major strategic conceptions involving the maneuvering of troops in such a way as seriously to embarrass the

Communist armies because of their transportation inadequacies. The resistance of the Communists at such points as Heartbreak Ridge was generally misunderstood by the press and presumably the people who followed the newspaper accounts. General Hodes was very much annoyed by the name Heartbreak Ridge and pointed out that the action at this point was no more or no less heartbreaking than any other action and had cost no more nor fewer lives than such actions can normally be expected to exact. Heartbreak Ridge was a name apparently invented by a newspaper correspondent and was not devised by the troops themselves. During the period when negotiations were resumed the Communists increasingly began to exercise military action. These military actions were on a small scale, but given the fact that major military news, except in the air and on the sea, was lacking, these small-scale actions by both sides involving often only platoon or company size actions more or less uncoordinated with other military action became the focus of attention in the dispatches bearing on ground warfare. In these small actions the Communists were often the aggressors. In their attacks they often succeeded in wresting territory from U.N. hands. Often, too, when U.N. troops in platoon and company size attempted to seize a high point they were frequently repulsed or if they succeeded in taking the point they found themselves dispossessed by a Communist counter-attack. If one thus takes the surface indications it would seem as if on the ground the Communists were extremely strong and if anything were doing somewhat better that the U.N. Part of the motivation of the Communists in pressing forward along the line was undoubtedly due to their desire to appear as strong militarily as possible and to bring pressure for an early and favorable conclusion to the armistice talks. But the Communists also had a particular and very practical objective in their local action along the line. Early in November both sides began to present proposals which in large measure revolved around a demarcation line following the actual battle line. The definition of the battle line or its exact drawing on a map became increasingly a matter of importance. Up until early November throughout most of the line of ground action the troops of both sides were separated by a moderate amount of no-man's land. Into this open territory both sides continued to send their patrols and often aggressive military action meant primarily the size and number of military patrols that sallied out from the line in order to investigate the line of the other side. The existence of this no-man's land created a problem in defining where the line of military ground contact lay. The U.N. position was that the line of ground contact was fixed pretty much by the point at which the patrols of both sides met and clashed. This of course was not a clear-cut conception since very often a U.N. patrol might proceed as far as the Communist lines or even occasionally penetrate behind them. In these cases there was a tendency to consider the line of contact as being the farthest point that the patrols were able to reach before having to return.

As the line of ground contact became increasingly important in the negotiatory discussion the Communists, not desiring to lose even a hundred yards of territory if it could be avoided, began to close up the gaps between the Communist and U.N. lines so that progressively the width of the no-man's land became narrowed. This led to a situation in which the Communists tended to press forward into the no-man's land advancing their troop positions and ending in a situation which General Hodes described by saying that the Communists were now leaning on our front line positions. In this process of closing up the gap the Communists took the initiative and consequently their military actions tended to picture them as the aggressive military party. This however does not mean that they were the stronger side on the ground. The military situation in November means, as far as I can make out from persons with military judgment in the camp (some of whom were Eighth Army visitors) was as follows. The U.N. was still in a position to crack the Communist lines. But this could not be performed by small-scale actions attempting to seize a hill here or there. It required a concerted attempt at a fairly major military offensive. Not necessarily one across the whole line. As a matter of fact the U.N. did not have sufficient divisions to mount an offensive over the entire ground front. However it appears that the U.N. ground forces were capable of mounting offensives which would penetrate the Communist lines and lead to a warfare of maneuver. This is really the crucial point. The Communists were extremely well and very deeply dug in in their positions and only a breach of their lines which would force them to maneuver troops in a situation in which their transportation facilities were extremely limited would permit the U.N. to secure military gains and cash in on their potential military superiority. General Paik, for example, made it quite clear in a visit to the camp that his division, the ROKA capital division could take Kosong any time that the U.N. wanted it. As a matter of fact, he had troops in Kosong on several occasions, at one time in company strength. Nonetheless military action on a scale that would have secured Kosong permanently for the U.N. was never undertaken. When the 30-day demarcation line was ultimately drawn toward the end of November as a solution to Item #2 of the Agenda, Kosong was in Communist hands although militarily the U.N. could fairly readily have secured this moderately important coastal city. On a larger scale an offensive of much greater magnitude but still confined to the eastern sector of the line was envisaged which would enable the U.N. to drive from a salient northeast to a coastal point well above Kosong. This military project could have been undertaken in conjunction with an amphibious landing on the North Korean coast. The Communists were unquestionably aware of this possibility which existed more especially throughout September and at least the first half of October. They kept rushing troops and supplies into this area and an operation which would have been fairly straightforward at the beginning of October was

judged in the beginning of November to be a quite difficult one. However it is apparent that there were other alternatives open to the U.N. such as the limited offensive planned for November 1st and which was canceled. The point, then, seems to be that despite the apparent strength and even initiative of the Communists on the ground as reflected by newspaper accounts, the U.N. was in a position according to its own military commanders to undertake moderate offensives with complete certainty of success. By complete certainty I refer of course to the evaluation of the military army people who were available at the camp.

I shall add here a comment on the status of air operations. An intensive interdiction program (Operation Strangle) was initiated in mid-August. This program was directed primarily to the knocking out of rail transport, the intention being to destroy the means for rail transport sufficiently so that with a minimum amount of effort it could be kept in a continuous state of disruption and thus later free the 5th Air Force for more intensive work against Communist trucks. This program had considerable success in that it progressively threw rail transport further and further north. This meant that progressively the Communists were compelled, especially in the southern half of their transportation haul, to rely on trucks. A good account of this operation is available in *Air Intelligence Digest* (Secret), January 1952, Vol. 5, No. 1. Although a good deal has been said about the failure of the Air Force to interdict Communist supplies, my own impression is that the operation has been more successful than some of its critics have acknowledged. The success of the operation could only be determined in the course of normal land warfare. This test has not been forthcoming. In addition diminished character of fighting on the ground front meant that the rate of consumption of Communist supplies must have been considerably less than what it normally would be on a highly active ground front. The true test of the interdiction program cannot, it seems to me, be tested in terms of whether supplies still continue to get to the front lines but rather whether given the supply activities under conditions of normal warfare the Communists could have carried on themselves or resisted U.N. full-scale ground operations.

I shall now return to the chronological account. I left off with the new Communist proposal of 31 October and had indicated that immediately thereafter Admiral Joy was anxious to make concessions to the Communists and to retreat from the U.N. proposal of October 25. Admiral Joy managed to keep himself in hand for two days, November 1 and November 2. On November 3 General Hodes made a concession to the Communists in circumstances that are to my knowledge unprecedented for the period I was associated with the

delegation. I do not know the complete story of this incident but it appears that after General Hodes and Admiral Burke had left for the conference tent on the morning of November 3rd, Admiral Joy sent a message to them telling them to offer a compromise on the Kaesong area. The aspect of this action that was unprecedented is that Admiral Joy undertook this without any discussion within the camp. Captain Briggs, the Secretary to the delegation, told me very confidentially that Admiral Joy had undertaken this without any consultation with the staff people and apparently without any prior consultation with General Hodes and Admiral Burke. This order was thus the only major decision that I know of that was undertaken without discussing it the day before with the other members of the delegation, with me and with the senior staff people. During the preceding days the Communists had on two or three occasions used language that suggested that they might be willing to reach a compromise on the Kaesong area which would give the U.N. a considerable share of this area. The moment, however, that the U.N. offered this concession to the Communists this language disappeared and the aggressiveness of the Communist delegation appeared to have increased considerably. It is possible, of course, that Admiral Joy's message to the sub-delegates may have been motivated by a message from General Ridgway and/or the JCS. If so, however, these messages were not revealed to me or other senior people in the camp. A few days later JCS pressure did show itself more overtly but I have no knowledge of any pressure on November 2nd or 3rd that required the precipitate action that was in fact taken.

The concession on the Kaesong area that was made on November 3 was not made in the form of a formal proposal. It was indicated informally by a very broad hint in the course of remarks by General Hodes who told the Communists that the U.N. was prepared to give up part of the Kaesong area. On the evening of November 3rd, when I learned of this upon the return of the sub-delegates to the camp, I argued that no further steps should be taken along these lines. I argued that the U.N. had quite openly shown its willingness to concede part of the Kaesong area and that any further concession would now have to come from the Communists so that a compromise could be effected over the Kaesong area in which each side gave way in part. It was on the evening of this day that General Nuckols wanted to include in his briefing of the press a statement to the effect that the U.N. had made an outright concession to the Communists on the Kaesong area. This incident was described earlier in the manuscript. I objected strongly to this since I felt it important that the U.N. concession be treated as much as possible as simply a hint that the U.N. would be willing to consider a compromise on the Kaesong area and not as a concession that the U.N. was willing to make unconditionally, that is without the Communists likewise making a concession from their stand on the Kaesong area. On this matter the

delegation and myself were in complete agreement, but General Nuckols felt that it was very wrong to withhold from the press the fact that the U.N. was being so generous to the Communists and that an open acknowledgment should be made to the press that the U.N. had already given up part of the Kaesong area. The delegation was opposed to this press release on grounds slightly different from my own. The statement that General Hodes had made in the meeting of that day had in fact been intended as an outright concession and not as a conditional concession if the Communists reciprocated with a similar concession on their part. However since the offer of this concession had been made informally it was possible, given the actual words that General Hodes had used, to treat the concession as having been in fact only a "suggestion" by the U.N. to the Communist which the Communists could pick up if they wanted to play ball and to make a deal. When the delegation saw that this intended concession did not lead to any Communist enthusiasm or inclination to make a concession on its side but rather seemed to put new vigor and strength into the Communist delegation, the delegation then wanted to treat its concession as if in fact it had not been made or intended as an outright concession. They therefore did not want General Nuckols in his press release to treat it as in fact it was really intended, namely as an outright concession. This was somewhat equivalent to a technique of "undoing." Admiral Joy and the delegates and staff generally always seemed to feel that it was important to make such a concession in order to show progress and vaguely they had the expectation that such a concession would lead to progress on the Communist side as well. They did not consider what the position of the U.N. would be if a U.N. concession was simply refused flat as being inadequate. When the Communists did refuse the concessions as inadequate they thus found that they had given something away without receiving anything in return. Consequently in this case they attempted to act as if in fact the U.N. had not really given anything away at all but had only made a "suggestion" to the Communists.

Part of the unwillingness to acknowledge that they had in fact made an outright concession to the Communists arose from a sense of guilt. The delegation had now acted contrary to the firm position to which it had committed itself in Tokyo and later in the camp prior to October 25th. As I have stated earlier the strategy was to offer the Communists the proposal of October 25th and hold firmly to it apart from very minor modifications of administrative convenience. Or at any rate not to make any major withdrawal from the proposal except to secure a final settlement in which the Communists made equally important concessions and thus provided a true compromise and not simply an outright concession on the U.N. side. Having committed a breach of this strategy the delegation on the evening of November 3rd, especially since it saw that the breach of the strategy

had weakened its position without providing any closer prospects of settlement, the U.N. delegation was somewhat overwhelmed with a disturbed conscience. It is my impression that General Hodes had been in full agreement with Admiral Joy in taking this step of November 3rd, since he showed a considerable amount of defensiveness about the fact that the concession had been made. His behavior was that of a person who shares full responsibility for having taken this step.

It is important to emphasize that the U.N. action of November 3rd was the first major sign of highly significant weakness in the actual negotiations on substantive issues. The U.N. had shown negotiatory passivity in the early stages of the armistice talks, especially with regard to administrative arrangements in Kaesong, and it had shown considerable ineptness in the conduct of its negotiations with the Communists. Nonetheless despite this the U.N. had made very aggressive demands on the Communists during July and August and had been very firm and achieved a victory during the recess of the talks in the dispute over the choice of a conference site and the move of the conference from Kaesong to Panmunjom. When the talks were resumed the U.N., to be sure, had offered the Communists a more favorable proposal than was indicated by the position the U.N. took prior to the breakoff of the talks. Still the U.N. had held to this position from October 25 until November 3rd. It was, then, not until November 3rd that the U.N. took any decisive steps that showed the Communists the strong anxiety it had for an armistice and the willingness it had to give up its claims in order to secure as early a settlement as possible. Of course the calling off of the offensive plan for November 1 could also have been a very critical sign of U.N. weakness if the Communists were aware of this change of U.N. military plans.

Although the delegation felt somewhat guilty and shamefaced about the concessions that had been offered to the Communists on November 3rd, the lack of any sign of "progress" on November 4th compelled Admiral Joy once more to take some sort of action that would provide an indication of U.N. good will and desire to secure an early armistice. The concession of November 3rd, which could have been passed off as a "suggestion" or a compromise, was now presented formally to the Communists as an outright concession giving up the northern part of the Kaesong area and placing the city of Kaesong itself in the demilitarized zone. Thus a pattern was set which was to continue of constantly making concessions without trying instead to extract counter-concessions from the Communists. I had the impression that Admiral Joy and General Hodes, but more particularly the former, now were insistent on "throwing good money after bad money." There was an increasing compulsion every day to do something new. All capacity to sit back and wait and maintain a strong front against the Communists was lost. Each day statements would be made in our discussions

that now we would simply have to wait and see what the Communists did, but 24 or 48 hours later the compulsion to act again was too strong to be overcome. The Communists consequently did not have very much to do except to sit and wait to see what U.N. concessions would be forthcoming each day.

By November 8th the U.N. had given up entirely the Kaesong area and was now proposing to the Communists a strict battle line solution to Item #2 of the Agenda. Thus within a period of 5 days, November 3 to November 8, the U.N. had passed from an extremely good negotiatory situation to one in which it was acceding day after day to Communist firmness until on November 8 it was accepting the Communist proposal. The newspaper accounts that I have read here seem to treat the strict battle line solution as being a Communist acceptance of a U.N. proposal. This is only so with respect to the earlier Communist proposals of the 38th parallel and U.N. insistence at that time that the line of demarcation must have a general resemblance to the battle line. In fact, however, the position of the U.N. on November 8 was an acceptance of the Communist proposal. From approximately 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3rd to the end of the session of November 8th the U.N. negotiatory position collapsed with amazing speed. Having given up part of the Kaesong area on November 3rd successive further concessions were made day after day during this period in order to justify the first fatal concession by showing that actually it was possible to get a quick settlement of Agenda Item #2 by removing the Kaesong area as an issue. The fact that negotiations are still continuing as of this date (January 18) demonstrates clearly enough that not only time is not gained by making concessions but in fact a premium is placed on encouraging Communist stubbornness so that time is actually lost.

Although by November 8th the U.N. accepted a strict battle line solution important problems still remained bearing on Agenda Item #2 and the end of discussions on this Agenda Item did not occur until the last days of November. A major problem now was to work out a military demarcation line corresponding to the battle line that would leave the U.N. in as favorable a position as possible with respect to negotiation on the other Items of the Agenda.

One problem was in itself simply securing an accurate specification of the battle line. Under the U.N. conception of a battle line solution this was not immediately necessary, as we shall see for reasons to be discussed very shortly below. During part of this period the discussion tended to oscillate between reaching a solution and also argument as to where in fact the battle line was.

A more important problem arose out of the following situation. The U.N. had long ago at the beginning of the armistice talks laid down the principle to which

the Communists themselves agreed that the Items of the armistice only acquired validity when the armistice was signed as a whole. This meant that discussion for instance on Item #2 of the Agenda while representing tentative agreement on a particular Agenda Item did not become legally effective until the armistice was itself signed. They could therefore be made subject to later revision even though the Agenda Items had already been completed. This problem took on a much more specific and important character with respect to the U.N. proposal of October 25 when the armistice talks were resumed. In making its proposal on that date the U.N. emphasized that the demarcation line it was there proposing would be considered subject to revision if during the course of the subsequent armistice discussion the battle line changed to any great extent. This was a necessary provision in order to prevent the Communists from extending discussion on later Items indefinitely on the strength of the fact that having reached a solution to Item #2 of the Agenda they no longer had anything to fear from military pressure. It was necessary, then, to ensure that any military demarcation line should be subject to revision if the military situation on the ground changed to any great extent. In making this very clear the U.N. was of course expressing its own confidence that if the battle line changed significantly it would be a change in favor of the U.N. The Communists had of necessity to agree to this principle of revision since any attempt on October 25th to object to it would signify that their own military confidence was far less than that of the U.N. It was therefore agreed by both sides that whatever line of demarcation was agreed to would be subject to revision and any side that wanted to be very stubborn about later parts of the Agenda would have to run the risk of military pressure which might make the final solution of the demarcation line less favorable to them than the one already agreed on.

Now when the U.N. agreed to accept as the military demarcation line the strict line of ground contact, the Communists insisted that the line of ground contact as it existed at the moment be determined and that the line of contact so determined and the corresponding demilitarized zone of 2 kilometers on each side of the line be established as the solution to Item #2 of the Agenda. At the same time they began to use equivocal language with respect to the principle that changes in the line of contact would be incorporated in the final demarcation line. In accepting the Communist proposal of a strict line of contact solution the U.N. had firmly announced its adherence to the principle that the line of contact referred to was the final line of contact as it existed at the time the armistice was about to be signed. Without such a proviso the Communists would be able to get a geographically fixed and predetermined line of demarcation and could thus continue negotiations on other points indefinitely without having to fear the consequences of any potential U.N. military action or the consequences of the

U.N. interdiction program. The Communist strategy was to get a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone drawn and fixed now so that the U.N. would be in a position where it was rationally and morally impossible for it to carry on any further ground action. At the same time the Communists could not afford to admit that they were afraid of future U.N. military action or were trying to impose a settlement which would relieve them from military pressure during the rest of the negotiations. Consequently under the pressure of U.N. arguments on this point they had to acknowledge, although often in somewhat twisted and ambiguous language, that the line of demarcation that they wanted to establish now would be subject to revision if the line of ground contact changed between the time it was settled during the discussion of Item #2 and the end of the armistice talks. This admission that the "true" line of contact to which the two sides were agreeing was the line of contact as it existed at the end of the conference and not at the present time meant that any drawing of a present line of contact had no proper meaning or significance. The Communists tried to get around this by saying that the line of contact and the demilitarized zone to be established now during the discussion of Item #2 of the Agenda was a "provisional" line of demarcation. They also conceded that there would be no withdrawal of troops to the boundaries of the demilitarized zone until the end of the armistice talks. However it was clear that they hoped and very correctly so that if it were possible for them to get a provisional line of contact the U.N. would find it even more impossible to carry on military action across such a line than was already the case. The Communists used various arguments that from a debating standpoint could be easily demolished. They spent a great deal of time arguing that the Agenda of the armistice conference required that a solution be found to Item #2 of the Agenda before Item #3 or any other Item was taken up. They argued that an agreement that the final line of contact should be the demarcation line did not conform to the legal requirements of the Agenda and that this required that a line of demarcation, even if only a provisional one, be established now. Of course the answer to this was that since both parties were presumably agreeing that the line of demarcation should be the line of contact as it existed at the end of the conference, consequently no further steps could be taken beyond this agreement until the final line of contact was known at the time when the conference ended. The so-called provisional line of demarcation based on the current line of contact had no legal or functional significance whatsoever. The Communists also argued that establishing a provisional line of contact which later could be modified would be time saving. This contention was of course utterly absurd and could readily be shown to be so. Another Communist argument was that their method of proceeding by establishing a provisional line was in accordance with "scientific methods."

At this juncture of the debate I prepared for General Hodes a very lengthy statement for him to make on the morning of November 12th. The intention of this statement that I prepared was to smoke out the Communists. It was apparent from a certain amount of evasive language and double-talk that the Communist pretense of being willing to make the final battle line the true line of demarcation was in fact not their real intention. They used language which later would enable them to contend that the line of demarcation established during the discussion of Item #2 was the definitive settlement for this Item of the Agenda. In this statement I took the Communist position at its face value and showed that if what they claimed to be saying was in fact the case their position was completely contrary to all logic and common sense. The general drift of the argument that I presented was of course simply that if the final line of contact was to represent the ultimate settlement of Item #2 of the Agenda, the establishment of a demarcation line at present which would have to be changed later according to changes in the line of contact meant that this now established demarcation line had no meaning, legal relevance or any other significance. One could draw any number of random lines across Korea at the present time and they would have no more legal relevance than the line and demilitarized zone that the Communists wanted to establish now, if in fact their position was an honest position and had honest intentions. In the course of this statement I ripped apart the Communist attempts to justify their insistence on establishing a "provisional" line of demarcation. I further indicated that the motives underlying their attempts to do this were quite transparent and sketched very briefly an interpretation of the motives underlying their present position. The statement was quite strong and compared with most U.N. statements it was rather on the "devastating" side.

The effect of the statement was considerable. This was the statement that General Hsieh tried to undermine by telling General Hodes that he could not have prepared it himself. It was also released almost verbatim to the members of the press and was quoted in part on the South Korean radio. I had quoted Shakespeare in the course of this statement and this literary "elegance" apparently got a good deal of attention and led to requests for copies of Shakespeare from the members of the press and also to comments on the South Korean radio. It also led to a reference by General Hsieh to the effect that Shakespeare would turn over in his grave if he knew how his lines were being used by the U.N. for their own wicked purposes. Incidentally it is amusing to note that General Hsieh's reference to Shakespeare tended to suggest by its phraseology that he wanted the U.N. and the world to know that he and/or the Chinese in general were very cultivated people who appreciated the greatness of Shakespeare. This statement is of some particular interest because it

demonstrated that the Communists were not entirely immune from the effect of a devastating "logical" attack on their own statements. I have already indicated that the U.N. delegates were rather readily upset and tended to retreat when they were bested from a debating standpoint. It is worth noting that the Communists themselves were not able to take a vigorous and one might say vicious demolition of the logic of their position without themselves suffering some quite genuine psychological harm. This demonstrated itself by the fact that the statement was indeed extremely successful in accomplishing its end. The Communist attempt to defend their position without revealing their intention to get an immediate cessation of hostilities and thus a protection from military pressure throughout the remainder of the armistice talks was broken down by this attack that was launched against them. This led to a very interesting shift of content in the Communist discussion. They dropped or laid aside the arguments that they were using and dropped some of their double-talk and came out more explicitly with a sort of blustering admission that indeed they did want hostilities to cease and they did expect military action on the ground to be withdrawn upon the fixing of a provisional demarcation line. They more or less candidly admitted that they expected the U.N. not to attempt to change by military action the current line of contact incorporated in the so-called provisional line of demarcation.

This gave me the opportunity to prepare another moderately lengthy statement for General Hodes in which I pointed out that the two sides could have saved a good deal of time in discussion if the Communists had been more honest earlier and had been frank about what the real intention and meaning of their proposal was. I stated that the suspicion indicated in the statement of November 12th concerning the real intentions and meaning of their proposal was now perfectly evident from their own concessions and that it would have been possible to make more progress if they had been sensible enough to make these clear in the first instance. I then went on to point out that it was obvious that they were intending to use the establishment of a provisional military line to bring to an end the understanding by both parties that military action would continue until a final armistice agreement was signed. I then came to the important pressure points. The Communists when they finally were forced to admit that they were trying to put an end to the military action on the ground had blusteringly threatened to "expose" to the peoples of the world that it was the U.N. that insisted on continuing military action whereas the Communists were quite willing to stop military action immediately even though no armistice had as yet been agreed to. The Communists had also said that the provisional military demarcation line was necessary in order to expose this fact to the peoples of the world. I took the offensive on this issue by stating to the Communists the following: "If you are

anxious that the peoples of the world should know that the United Nations Command believes that military action should cease after an armistice agreement has been reached, and not after two-fifths of it have been reached, you need have no anxiety on this point. The United Nations Command has always made this principle fully clear. It was considerably publicized at the time our senior delegate and your senior delegate agreed on this matter. It has been made fully clear to the press of the world that this has been a proviso of all the U.N. proposals that we have discussed in these last weeks. We find that the peoples of the world have excellent memories. We will, however, be quite glad to cooperate with you in any way to help you 'expose' to the peoples of the world that the United Nations Command firmly believes that military action cannot be ended when only two-fifths of an armistice agreement has been reached. It will thus not be necessary for you to include the otherwise useless 'provisional' demarcation line in our discussions for this purpose." This blunt and aggressive indication that the U.N. was in no way intimidated by the Communist plan to put the U.N. on the spot by showing that it was the U.N. that wanted military action to continue to the end of the armistice had an excellent effect. The two Communist sub-delegates were the following day extraordinarily subdued and appeared extremely nervous and unhappy. They now changed their lines completely and said that they had never implied anything about wanting military action to cease or had never said anything that suggested that they thought the provisional line of demarcation should be the final line of demarcation. The U.N. sub-delegates and the staff members who attended the meeting of that day were all uniformly impressed by the subdued and uncomfortable behavior of the Communists. It was the interpretation of those present at the meeting that General Hsieh and General Lee had got themselves very badly slapped down by their superiors for having been trapped into acknowledging the underlying intentions of the Communist double-talk. Of course the nervous and apparently quite markedly unhappy behavior of the two Communist delegates may have been occasioned by the necessity of covering up what they had said the day before and agreeing to the explicit U.N. insistence on clarity with respect to revision of the line of contact according to military changes and the validity of the principle that military action must continue until the end of the armistice.

The Communists now ceased their endeavor to secure an actual, formal cessation of hostilities and contented themselves with trying to establish a state of affairs where the U.N. would on moral grounds (wastage of lives) have to refrain from any very active ground activity. To this purpose they continued their insistence on a provisional demarcation line. They were however now more fully required to acknowledge that the line was not the line of legal relevance for the armistice settlement. It was necessary now for them to fall back on some of their earlier

double-talk that they had used before they fell into the one-day period of more frank expressions of their intentions.

It was at this stage of affairs that the JCS intervened decisively into the negotiations. A few days earlier the JCS had already begun to exercise pressure toward a rapid settlement and concession to the Communist form of the proposal. The JCS position was utterly absurd if one took their message at its face value. On the one hand they indicated that it was of the utmost importance not to do or say anything that would free the Communists from the threat of military pressure or prevent the U.N. from continuing military action. At the same time the JCS was insisting on agreement with the Communist proposal that was designed specifically to accomplish this goal. General Ridgway sent a strong message to the JCS in which among other things he said that in his opinion what was required was "more iron and less silk" in the treatment of the Communists. I told the members of the delegation when we received General Ridgway's message to the JCS that undoubtedly the JCS would reply in effect that General Ridgway's point of view was very fine but he was concerned with the issue only out in the Far East whereas they had the "big picture" in mind. My prediction was amply fulfilled and the JCS reply was almost precisely in those terms. The delegation was thus faced with the JCS directive which stipulated the following. The U.N. delegation was to offer to the Communists a strict battle line demarcation line, this line was to be based on the currently existing battle line, and it would have validity for a period of 30 days. If from the time Item #2 of the Agenda was settled to the end of the armistice lay within the 30-day period, then the line of demarcation arrived at at the beginning of the 30-day period would be operative for the total final armistice settlement. If the armistice was not concluded at the end of the 30-day period, then the line of demarcation was to become the battle line as it existed at the beginning of the second 30-day period and so on ad infinitum.

This JCS directive created a tremendous furor and fury in the delegation (and in myself). The situation was ludicrous in that the JCS had now sent a directive which required the delegation to offer to the Communists more than in fact the Communists were themselves asking. The delegation could easily and with complete Communist satisfaction have secured (and was already moving in the direction of securing) a settlement whereby it would agree to draw a "provisional" demarcation now, based on the present battle lines, but with the clear and explicit understanding that hostilities would continue and that the final demarcation line was to be the battle line as it existed at the end of the armistice. In this way the delegation would at least be able to preserve for the U.N. the threat of military pressure even though this threat was to some extent

diminished by the hazards created by an actual existing "provisional" demarcation line. In place of such a settlement, which could have been secured from the Communists, the JCS was going beyond this by giving to the Communists a 30-day period during which they had absolutely nothing to fear from military action, or at least relatively little since any military action undertaken within the 30-day period would have no bearing, even if successful, on the location of the armistice line (provided that the armistice ended within the 30-day period). Since the U.N. would have to take into account the very real possibility that the armistice might conclude within 30 days, and indeed this was an expectation, the JCS directive made it morally impossible and rationally useless to engage in military action during this period. If the period expired the military demarcation line was to be the line of contact as it existed at the end of the old period or the beginning of the new period. This meant that the line of contact was bound to be the same during the second period of 30 days as during the first and so on ad infinitum. In effect then the JCS directive guaranteed the Communists a line of demarcation and thus would enable them to continue the armistice for an indefinite period without any fear of further loss of territory. The proper proposal that should have been made, which I have sketched above, would have given the Communists a provisional demarcation line which was subject to revision on the day to day basis if the U.N. saw fit to take military action. Thus military action would have some motive and consequently would exist more strongly as a threat to the Communists.

It is apparent that in offering the Communists much more than they were even asking the JCS exhibited not only a general intellectual confusion but probably more specifically a complete misunderstanding as to what the issues were that were currently being debated between the Communists and the U.N. Although such a confusion was not entirely the fault of the JCS but in part resulted from probably very inadequate accounts being transmitted to them from General Ridgway's headquarters, nonetheless this failure to understand a crucial matter in the negotiations represents an almost incredible state of affairs for so high a command having responsibility for such important decisions. The JCS directive and the whole spirit that surrounds it can be held directly responsible for the continuation of the negotiation into the new year two full months after the time the JCS issued this directive intended to provide a "quick" ending of the armistice talks.

The JCS directive created a tremendous emotional stir among the members of the delegation. Even Admiral Joy whose own tendency towards concessions might be anticipated to have led him to be sympathetic towards the JCS directive reacted very strongly against it. In part, of course, this was in line with a

prevailing rationalization of his that all the problems of the delegation were the consequence of the misunderstanding of other people, their lack of cooperation and support. I had the impression that the JCS directive gave Admiral Joy the opportunity to conceal in part from himself his own uneasy sense of responsibility for the position that the delegation and the U.N. were in. The remarks that he and other members of the delegation made about the JCS were so contemptuous and bitter that Admiral Joy became a little frightened about having spoken so freely about the JCS in my presence. He asked me to remember that such comments ought of course never to be repeated. This was, I believe, the only occasion on which Admiral Joy expressed any open concern about my access to the intimacies of the delegation's thinking and talking. Admiral Burke was tremendously disturbed and almost immediately indicated that he would ask to be relieved as a member of the delegation. He made additional comments to me privately and as in the case of Admiral Joy I felt that in his case too there were ulterior psychological motives which led the present situation to have some positive psychological value for him. This "crisis" enabled him to dramatize in his own mind his position in the delegation. He was able more fully now to picture himself as a strong man on the delegation who had held out and done the best he could but who now in the face of this last JCS directive could no longer be expected to carry on under such intolerable circumstances. General Hodes reacted very negatively too but with a somewhat less violent overt emotional outburst. General Hodes had generally been in favor of any settlement consistent with U.N. minimum demands which were quite consistent in their turn with Communist demands as far as the actual location of the line was concerned and consequently had felt himself in a false position. After having agreed to the Communists' location of a military demarcation line coincident with the battle line, General Hodes had felt himself to be for the first time on ground that he could defend and fight for with a perfectly good conscience and with a good will. He felt it to be quite important to secure a settlement by which the battle line was to be interpreted as the battle line at the end of the armistice and that there should not be any interim "provisional" demarcation line or neutral zone. Having retreated to what he considered to be at last a perfectly defensible stand he was disturbed by finding that this rock bottom position was now being undermined by the JCS directive which required a retreat beyond even what the Communists were asking.

I proposed that a full statement be sent to General Ridgway for transmission to the JCS in order to clarify for them what the true points of disagreement were between the Communists and the U.N., so that the JCS would be able quite clearly to see that their directive gave the Communists more than was necessary. This, however, was considered impossible, especially in view of the fact that

General Ridgway had a couple of days before, sent a message to the JCS suggesting that "more iron and less silk" was required and that General Ridgway's message had been politely rejected by the JCS. The problem now was rather different, namely one of an outright misunderstanding by the JCS, but nonetheless the delegation members were unanimous on the point that it was hopeless to try and argue any longer with the JCS or to attempt to clarify anything for them.

In this predicament I suggested that the JCS message be in part ignored as being obviously based on inadequate information and that one could within the proper limits of military requirements do so at least for a couple of days more since the JCS had not specified an exact time at which the JCS directive was to be executed. This was pretty much in line with the delegation's own feeling on the matter although they did not care so explicitly to acknowledge that they would engage for a moment in a temporary evasion of the JCS directive. Actually what General Hodes did offer to the Communists following the JCS directive was in fairly close conformity to it. He offered to the Communists the strict battle line solution, a provisional demarcation line and demilitarized zone which was to have validity for a period of 30 days if the armistice was signed within that period and was thereafter to be subject to daily revision as the battle line changed if the armistice was not signed within 30 days. This proposal deviated from the JCS directive in that it did not provide for a succession of 30-day periods after the expiration of the first 30-day period but simply provided that the battle line as it existed at the end of the armistice would be accepted as the demarcation line if the first 30-day period expired.

Even this offer was of course in excess of what the Communists were willing to accept. They seemed to have been so taken aback by the U.N. offer that although they expressed their appreciation of the offer they asked for a two-day recess in which to consider it. This I believe is quite unprecedented in the negotiations as the Communists had not on previous occasions when they received U.N. proposals asked for a recess longer than the rest of the day in which the proposal had been made. The U.N. proposal was probably so generous that the Communists were very suspicious as to what its motives were and were not prepared even to just play for time in the meetings themselves pending decision by higher levels.

It was during this two-day recess requested by the Communists that Admiral Joy decided to go to Tokyo. He invited me to go along and I accepted the invitation and also at this time told him that I had been contemplating leaving in any case at the end of Item #2 of the Agenda and that since it seemed fairly certain that the settlement of Item #2 would be reached shortly after the resumption of talks after

the two-day recess, I thought I might as well remain in Tokyo and take off directly from there for Washington. Admiral Joy and the others expressed their very sincere regrets at my departure and in Tokyo Admiral Joy invited me to his house for dinner with himself and his wife as a sort of farewell dinner prior to my departure.

This ended my association with the U.N. delegation and I shall not in this manuscript attempt to trace the course of the negotiations beyond the period with which I was associated with the delegation. Consequently this chronological account of the negotiations themselves ends pretty much with the settlement of Item #2 of the Agenda.

Part III
The Negotiations: Analysis

The Negotiations: Analysis

Introduction

The foregoing account of the negotiations in Part II of this manuscript was intended to be a relatively brief chronological account of the main stages of the armistice conference. However as I went along I found that it was virtually impossible to avoid introducing discussions about some of the shortcomings of the U.N. negotiatory strategy and tactics or to avoid some analysis of the principal assumptions, explicit or implicit, of U.N. negotiatory behavior. I had intended to reserve such discussion to the present Part III of the manuscript which was to be devoted to more systematic analysis without particular regard to chronological sequence. In writing Part III I will necessarily, then, have to repeat in part some things that I have already referred to. In these cases however I shall try to be brief and rely largely on references back to earlier portions of the manuscript. There are however other systematic points that require fuller treatment and these will be discussed somewhat more fully. It should be noted that the extensiveness of the treatment of different topics in this part will vary considerably and that brevity of treatment does not necessarily imply that the matter under discussion is of negligible significance. It may equally imply that this particular matter was discussed earlier.

The analyses that follow in this part of the manuscript are subject to the same reservations indicated for Part II. Proper analysis requires a much more intensive reading and studying of the documents of the conference and more thought than I shall currently use for the present hasty version of this manuscript.

Objectives and Policy

It seems self-evident that a first requirement for effective negotiations is clarity with respect to desired objectives. To the best of my knowledge the delegation did not receive any precise guidance on what they were expected to accomplish apart from the general prescription that a military armistice was to be reached which would provide adequate security to the military forces of the U.N. At the beginning of the armistice the JCS did send to the delegation or rather to General Ridgway guidance statements on a variety of individual problems of the Agenda.

These guidances, however, were not concerned as far as I could see with overall objectives or the relation of the armistice negotiations to national policy. I do not know, of course, whether the State Department was in communication with the JCS or what influence it may have had with the JCS. But there was no evidence in Korea that the delegation ever received any communication stemming from State Department analysis of the requirements that they might themselves have for the armistice. Indeed the impression I have, and I believe this is probably correct, is that the State Department very carefully avoided any attempt to influence the negotiations. This was presumably based on the consideration that the armistice was a military armistice and should be purely in military hands.

In addition to the early JCS guidance statements, which after the negotiations got well under way seemed to become of relatively little significance or value, the JCS had also given to General Ridgway and the delegation one or two general guidance principles of which the primary one in the minds of the delegation was that nothing should be done that would imperil the success of the armistice or more specifically cause the armistice talks to break off. Although this was intended to prevent the use by the delegation of any maneuver such as an ultimatum or an indignant walking out of the delegation it also tended to intimidate the delegation with respect to measures which more especially in the view of the delegation, but not in fact realistically, might lead to an ending of the armistice talks. As far as I know the JCS never really clarified what sort of action it had in mind when it said that nothing should be done that would endanger the armistice talks.

From time to time the statement was made by people at the camp that they were concerned with a military armistice and not a political settlement. Reproaches were cast at the Communists because they on the other hand were concerned with political issues. Thus, for example, their attempts to secure the 38th parallel as a line of demarcation was a "political" proposal instead of a "military" proposal.

The fact that the delegation was trying to overcome Communist attempts to impose a political settlement at the armistice tended to make the delegation more resistant to considerations of the political significance of the negotiations from a U.N. standpoint. Such political considerations on their part would subject them to the same criticism as they were making of the Communists. This criticism had, of course, to be feared only as coming from themselves since there was no way in which any politically motivated objective that the U.N. might try to secure could be interpreted outwardly as being political rather than "military." Consequently this dilemma of the delegation was one which involved only their own conscience rather than any difficulty in the negotiations themselves. Of

course there was always the danger from the standpoint of the delegation that any shaping of their objective by far-reaching political considerations would reveal itself through the fact that later analysis would show that the U.N. delegation was seeking in the settlement conditions that were not strictly prescribed from the standpoint of a military armistice which would ensure the security of U.N. troops.

After I had been with the delegation a little time I secured much more recognition of the possible political repercussions of different types of settlements. However it was only General Craigie and Admiral Burke who ever really became seriously interested in these political discussions and who felt that their duty to the nation required them to secure a settlement which would not only provide for military security but also would, if this could be obtained at a cost consistent with the cost of securing military security, secure political advantages.

Not only was there a lack of understanding in a broader sense of the political implication of the armistice talks, but on specific problems the political import of the problem was often badly understood or not understood at all. Here too there was a tremendous lack of guidance. This lack was all the more noticeable since with respect to some of these specific negotiatory problems one might have anticipated a keener interest in and a more definite requirement for technical consultation. Thus the significance of the Kaesong area for South Korea and for future political developments in South Korea was never investigated or brought to the attention of the delegation except to the extent that I was able to do this. Ambassador Muccio did visit the delegation camp on one occasion and he also spoke to Admiral Joy about the importance of the Kaesong area and confirmed to Admiral Joy the statements I had been making with regard to its significance not only for Korea but also for the position of Communism in the Far East. This visit however was a purely spontaneous one by the Ambassador himself and was not motivated by any request for aid from the delegation or any very great intention on Ambassador Muccio's part to bring his own special knowledge to bear on the situation.

A similar lack of guidance on a particular issue exhibited itself in our early planning and discussion on the prisoner of war problem, more particularly the politically important question as to the disposition of Chinese and North Korean POWs who did not want to be returned to Communist hands. I suspect that possibly after I left Korea and Item #4 of the Agenda was entered into that possibly more guidance on these political matters was given. But during the time that I was in Korea and Japan and planning was going on with respect to Item #4 of the Agenda there was no one who explained to the delegation some of

the long-range consequences of turning over to the Communists the POWs who were pathetically anxious to remain in U.N. hands. I carried on a good deal of discussion on this point and General Craigie was very much interested in it. The delegation as a whole considered this a very delicate problem because it ran into one of the firmest requirements that they themselves imposed on themselves and which they felt imposed on them by the outside world as well. This requirement was that no action should be undertaken with respect to POWs in our hands that would in any way whatsoever imperil the safety or treatment of our troops in Communist prison camps. Nonetheless despite this great fear that any action directed toward removing persons from Communist hands might lead to some sort of wicked retaliation by the Communists, one action was taken that was of potential value, although I do not know what its ultimate outcome was or will be. It was decided that the names of a great many North Korean civilians who had been interned in U.N. prison camps and who had been listed to the Red Cross in the general listing of POWs in U.N. hands, should be withdrawn from the rolls of POWs. The problem was one of setting up such a list and sending it to the Red Cross and telling them to remove the names of these people from their lists of POWs. The aim of this, of course, was to provide a proper administrative basis for not having this group of civilians treated in future negotiations as POWs subject to return to the Communists. As I recall this step was supported by Admiral Joy and was supported by him despite the fact that he was tremendously concerned about retaliatory measures that the Communists might take. It would scarcely be possible to get the International Red Cross to remove these names from these lists without the Communists knowing about it and it was a possible Communist reaction to this knowledge that was feared. The fact that these civilian refugees from North Korea had originally been placed on POW lists handed to the International Red Cross itself showed a certain inability to anticipate problems precipitated by such an action and probably would not have been done had there been an adequate political awareness earlier in the war. Of course many of the people who came from North Korea could not immediately be identified as civilians and it is understandable that these people were treated on many occasions in much the same way as POWs. However it seems that any proper analysis of the situation would have led the U.N. authorities to withhold the names of these persons until they had completed their winnowing out or investigation activities.

Although the U.N. delegation did not have too much clarity about objectives, over time there was an increasing appreciation of the political significance of the armistice settlement. Inadequate as this may have been it probably should nonetheless be emphasized that the delegation probably suffered far less from their lack of clearcut objectives and guidance on objectives than it did from a lack

of understanding about how to get what they were trying to get. Even had the delegation not had objectives that were the most desirable ones, this would probably have done relatively little damage had they at least been aware of how to carry on negotiations in order to maximize the chance of getting whatever it was that they set out to get. In this respect it is of considerable interest to note that the very great bulk of the paper work done by the staff of the delegation and the delegation itself was concerned with types of settlement on different Items on the Agenda. There was thus a great outpouring of papers on immediate objectives for the various Agenda Items but virtually nothing was written that devoted itself to the problem of how to get the various things that one was striving for. In talking with Victor Hunt about his experiences with State Department activities in conferences and negotiations it appears that a similar situation obtains among the professional diplomats. Victor Hunt told me that the great bulk of paper turned out in planning for conferences were "position papers" that provided information on various problems and possible types of settlement. It does not seem customary even in diplomatic circles, then, to devote any strenuous intellectual effort toward planning the tactics and strategy by which these objectives are to be gained. Victor Hunt suggests that in the case of the State Department people this is probably avoided because they feel that this part of their work they know thoroughly and explicit written planning is not required on tactics and strategy. To return to the Korean armistice I find it of some interest to compare my own written material with that which was prepared by the staff members and the delegation. The great majority of the pages that I wrote were devoted to the tactical and strategic problems of securing objectives whereas the pages of the other people were in inverse proportion. (I shall note here for the record since I probably have forgotten to mention it at a more appropriate place that I estimate that during my association with the delegation I wrote approximately 300 typewritten pages of material. Unfortunately I probably do not have more than about 100 or so of these with me although this is a very rough estimate and I have not gone very carefully over the material that I brought back.)

Moral Concern

For the U.N. negotiators, negotiation presupposed a certain moral compatibility between the parties to the negotiation. This view reflects itself in a variety of expressions such as "How can one possibly negotiate with people like that?" Of course it is true that a negotiation like a poker game does require adherence by both sides to certain minimal rules. However the U.N. personnel were not particularly thinking about such matters when they made comments such as the

one I have quoted above. On the other hand it should not be supposed that they literally meant statements of this sort. Negotiation was not absolutely impossible with people who were not their own moral equivalent, but certainly it was extremely difficult and hazardous.

An interesting aspect of this moral problem is that at least among some persons the Communists were assumed to have moral requirements of their own. When the Communists sent their very violently worded protest following the alleged U.N. bombing of Kaesong on August 22nd they called the U.N. "murderers." One of the U.N. persons, Colonel Kinney, a liaison officer, in speaking about the likelihood of a resumption of negotiations supported his belief that the Communists would not resume negotiations by saying "How can they continue to negotiate with us after calling us murderers?"

The prevailing opinion was that the Communists were sons of bitches and outside the pale of normal gentlemanly humanity. One might suppose on the basis of simple analogy that such a judgment about one's opponents would render the U.N. people free of feelings of guilt in their relations to the Communists. This however was far from being the case. Adverse judgment about the Communists and their moral qualities never seem to operate to give the U.N. personnel any sense of freedom from their own moral preoccupations.

It is possible that the conception of the moral inferiority of the Communists made the U.N. personnel more devoted than they otherwise might have been to their moral preoccupations. Possibly they were under an inner compulsion to assure themselves that they were not like others. The high ethical standards of U.N. behavior tended to exhibit themselves more in little matters than in larger issues except with one very major exception which I shall speak about in a moment. Here is one illustration of the type of trivial matter in which the U.N. conception of its obligations is well illustrated. In November, after the discussions had been resumed at Panmunjom, a flight of U.N. aircraft approached the neutral Panmunjom conference area. The lead plane apparently crossed into the area but saw the balloons over the area and veered off quickly. It is not even clear that he definitely crossed into the area. He veered with sufficient speed so that apparently none of the other planes could be said to have violated the area. The existence of a violation was so dubious that apparently even the Communists did not bring themselves to protest the matter until almost 24 hours. Colonel Murray, the U.N. liaison officer who handled the incident on behalf of the U.N., pointed out to the Communist liaison officer that according to agreements reached between the Communists and the U.N. it was incumbent upon the Communists to have laid their complaints immediately upon the occurrence of the alleged incident. The Communist liaison officer then replied in an uncertain

and hesitant fashion that he had thought that the liaison tent where such a complaint should have been lodged was closed at the time. Colonel Murray very correctly replied that this was not so and that he (the Communist liaison officer) must have known it was not so because the tent was open 24 hours per day. Colonel Murray having dealt up to this point very firmly with the Communist liaison officer then gratuitously added, that he did not want to take advantage of the failure of the Communists to file their complaint earlier and would take the matter under proper consideration. The Communist liaison officer was delighted thus to be taken out of his difficulty and very swiftly and explicitly repeated Colonel Murray's offer in order to formalize it and to make it a matter of explicit record. That evening I asked Colonel Murray why he had taken the incident under examination when he had already clearly shown to the Communists that under the regulations the U.N. was perfectly entitled to ignore the matter. Colonel Murray replied that that would have been taking advantage of a technicality. To this I raised the question "What's wrong with that?" To this Colonel Murray did not reply but simply shrugged his shoulders and smiled in a somewhat mildly embarrassed fashion. Colonel Murray's unwillingness "to take advantage of a technicality" is all the more astonishing in view of the fact that the violation alleged by the Communists could in itself have been readily called a technicality so dubious and trivial was its character. It is also interesting to note that this high level of ethical conduct came from Colonel Murray who was one of the people in the camp who had, in a rather misguided fashion, a "tough" attitude towards the Communists.

A similar indication of the curious U.N. moral involvement in matters where guilt was the last feeling that they should have is illustrated by another incident that was reported in the paper on January 23. Here the Communists alleged that a Communist delegation vehicle was attacked by U.N. aircraft. Now the U.N. had agreed to avoid attack of Communist delegation vehicles when they are properly marked and their route and time of passage has been transmitted to the U.N. in advance. According to a U.N. statement in the press the U.N. did receive notification of a Communist delegation vehicle which passed the point where it was supposed to pass 3 hours before the alleged incident. The vehicle that was attacked was attacked some 3 hours later and its passage had not been cleared with the U.N. Nonetheless the U.N. apparently expressed regrets for this "accidental" attack on the Communist vehicle. The U.N. thus seemed to be apologizing for an action which it was perfectly entitled to take. It is of psychological interest to note that in the U.N. camp the occurrence of actual U.N. violations was reacted to with an emotional intensity more fitting for persons who had deliberately created a violation and had been caught at it or had been bothered by their own conscience. In this respect the U.N. personnel tended to

behave as if they had incorporated the moral judgments made about their behavior by the Communists. The existence of the violation represented not a failure in technical and administrative details but rather a moral delinquency. I do not mean that the delegation consciously would acknowledge this; they would most certainly deny it. I mean only that the manner in which they behaved was as if in fact the violation did represent a moral delinquency. It is further worth noting that even when the U.N. did not commit a violation but was only charged with a violation which it had not committed some of this appearance of guilt occurred.

I do not know whether the Communists at the time they alleged the first major violation by the U.N. appreciated the extent to which such charges upset the delegation. I suspect that whether they realized this before or not they have become increasingly aware of it. The Communists seemed to appreciate that these accusations have a harassing effect on the U.N. Of course they could very well have been encouraged in multiplying such charges by such stupid newspaper statements as the ones that I believe appeared in a mid-western paper demanding that General Ridgway be recalled if he was not competent to prevent the U.N. from causing violations of agreements they had made with the Communists. If an American newspaper can get so aroused by this matter the Communists might very readily understand the extent of the psychological harm they are able to do by these accusations.

In part the U.N. reaction to their own violation is a consequence of their awareness of how they would react to and interpret Communist violations; unless very clearly of a trivial and "accidental" character they would be interpreted as the result of the wicked character of these people and their complete disregard for agreements into which they had entered. The U.N. people could not tolerate having themselves placed in this category.

I shall mention another little matter which illustrates the U.N. tendency to react to certain Communist actions by moral condemnation. During early November the U.N. submitted a prepared and written statement to the Communists probably containing as far as I can recall now some concession that the U.N. was making. The Communists received this statement and during the early part of the day apparently rewrote it and then issued it immediately to the press people at Panmunjom in their own press release version. Thus a U.N. action was immediately placed in the hands of the press well before the end of the day when normally General Nuckols would have briefed the press people. This tactic by the Communists, which was quite cleverly handled, was greeted by the delegation and the staff people with cries of indignant outrage.

In an earlier part of this manuscript I have already briefly discussed the U.N. delegation's feelings of guilt revolving around their demands on the Communists in July and August, and also their early tendency to feel that cooperative and agreeable behavior on their part would evoke similar behavior from the Communists. This latter sentiment declined, I believe, rather rapidly. I shall not elaborate on these points further in this section.

I shall now turn briefly to a matter of greater importance to which I have already alluded but which deserves more explicit comment. The problem here was the U.N. assumption that the aim of the armistice talks was to determine a "just and reasonable" settlement and that the nature of a just and reasonable settlement could be determined by a mutual confrontation of relevant arguments. Here again it is important to realize that if one were to interpret the U.N. delegates as holding this position literally or consciously it would become a mere caricature of their actual state of mind. Nonetheless there were innumerable actions and statements that tend to make sense only if one assumes that some such sentiment played an active role in the underlying preconceptions of the delegates. Throughout the greater part of the negotiations the Communists constantly spoke about their own proposal as being just, reasonable, etc. The U.N. proposals were characterized as having the opposite qualities. This language of moral commendation and condemnation was so frequent and so automatic in the Communist statements that it became virtually a common joke among the U.N. personnel in speaking about anything to praise it as being just and reasonable or to dispraise it as unjust and unreasonable, poking fun at this automatic type of language. The U.N. communications and the U.N. discussions in the negotiations also very freely used this language. But during most of the negotiations this language also became for the U.N. a type of cliché expression which did not particularly reflect any great moral preoccupation. However in the early stages of the negotiation I had the impression that when the U.N. personnel spoke about the aim of the conference as being to establish a just and reasonable armistice (as, for example, in the opening sessions of the conference) these words had a real moral sense to the persons who used them. I think they felt that here was a noble and important task to bring peace to Korea and to the armed forces that were in conflict and that in approaching this task they had to do so with the moral elevation of individuals dedicated to a noble service. The high moral value of peace and consequently the high moral value of the purpose of the armistice talks thus carried over into a sentiment that the actions and methods involved in such moral objectives must themselves be of equivalent moral value. I do not believe that the members of the delegation knew or thought they knew what a "just and reasonable" armistice settlement would be; nor do I believe that they thought they had criteria in terms of which one could

arrive at articles of agreement that could be shown to accord with justice and reason. I believe that at the same time as they experienced these sentiments they thought of their objectives in quite practical terms such as securing an adequately secure military line of defense. These more practical orientations, however, do not mean that more sentimental or ethical notions could not exist coincidentally with them. It would seem, however, that this ethical ambiance would have very little operational effect as long as the more practical orientations were kept firmly in mind. Perhaps this is so and perhaps the state of mind that I am describing cannot be shown to have had any very great effect on the progress of the armistice negotiations. However I do not really think that this is the case. I believe that this outlook did have consequences of some import for the actions of the U.N. delegations.

In the first place it tended in the initial stages to make the delegation less aware of the very different attitude of the Communists and of the implications of this very different attitude for the requirements of negotiations with them. It led the U.N. negotiators to take action indulgent to the Communists and indulgent to their own conception of their high moral purpose. A cynical and hard boiled attitude would not so readily have enabled the members of the delegation to feel themselves as participants in a high moral venture. Secondly this underlying attitude in the U.N. personnel tended to undermine U.N. attempts to secure maximum returns from the armistice. This was not so much due to any logical incompatibility between maximum returns and a moral preoccupation, but rather to the inability of the U.N. delegates to see the significance of the armistice conference in sufficiently broad political and historical terms to provide them with a sense of moral justification for exercising the maximum pressure against the Communists and securing the maximum gains. In discussing the moral preoccupation of American negotiators it does not seem to me particularly proper or necessary to deplore the moral justification that they may feel necessary for their behavior. Only if we speak of such negotiators as being pure technicians and being under the explicit orders of their governments to secure the maximum gains in a negotiation, might one say that such moral interest is superfluous or irrelevant. There seems, however, to be no particular reason why, especially at these moderately high levels, one should want negotiators to cultivate this pure spirit of the technician. It is surely no disadvantage or disgrace that American negotiators should feel that their activities serve moral values. On the contrary the existence of such moral demands, however unfortunate the form they took and the consequences they had, was one of the finest alleviating features of my experience with the delegation. The unfortunate aspect of the situation was not the presence of such moral impulses but rather the absence of a political and historical perspective which would have given to the

delegates a sense of the true meaning of their mission. Simply to think of the Communists as bastards and as tyrants imposing a wicked social system on others was not sufficient to provide the delegates with a sense of moral purpose that the issues revolving around the struggle of liberalism and Communism contain. In this respect I certainly cannot agree with the point of view expressed by Mr. Kennan in his University of Chicago lecture, that it is a failing of Americans to acknowledge "the validity and legitimacy of power realities and aspirations, to accept them without feeling the obligation of moral judgment, to take them as existing and inalterable human forces, neither good nor bad, and to seek their point of maximum equilibrium rather than their reform or their repression." To repeat a point that I made above, such a view may be all right for pure technicians who are simply obeying the orders of their superiors. But there is no reason why moral judgment and moral aspirations cannot coexist together with a fully rational and instrumental diplomatic and negotiatory practice. If the United States in its governmental policies and international objectives falls to a level of sheer acquisitiveness and domination it will be plenty of time to try to exclude moral considerations from the implementation of government policy. At present in the current state of world affairs and given the general objectives of U.S. policy there seems to be no reason why a quite fervent moral concern should not motivate diplomatic activity. The attempt to derogate moral aspirations represents a failure to appreciate and assimilate the profound human values which are at stake in the issues between East and West and which could provide a moral tonus to political action without in the slightest degree debilitating it.

Most discussions of the impact of moral consideration on American negotiators emphasize the restrictive consequences of these moral concerns. There is one aspect of negotiatory behavior, however, which one might describe as issuing in part from an insufficient devotion to a high moral level for conception of duty. I have reference here to the varying incapacities of people to subordinate their own personal needs to the requirements of their duty. Negotiatory situations can arise which may require participants to sacrifice their own security of mind and to hazard the success of their careers. Individuals may be unwilling in various degrees to assume responsibility for decisions the validity of which they are inwardly convinced but which would require them to risk attack if these decisions should nonetheless have unfortunate consequences. These problems are usually not thought of in terms of moral stamina. They are usually discussed in terms of "the personality" of negotiators or the pressures arising from administrative structures, etc. Nonetheless as long as negotiators do distinguish between different lines of action and do judge some of these to be more correct from a negotiatory standpoint than others and nonetheless avoid acting on these judgments, then questions of the moral strength of the negotiators do arise.

Admiral Joy's concern for his own future reputation, General Ridgway's probable attempt at one time to act in a manner which he may have conceived as adding to his reputation as a strong person, Admiral Burke's withdrawal from the delegation at the end of November, Colonel Kinney's ambitions illustrate the sort of self-oriented behavior that I have in mind. Their behavior was certainly not an explicit and conscious avoidance of actions which they understood to be more correct from the stand point of negotiatory success. Nonetheless it represents motives and actions in which a semi-conscious personal involvement and personal consideration prevented the fullest devotion to the requirements of the situation.

I shall now return to the discussion of areas in which U.N. moral concern and values tended to inhibit action desirable or necessary in the negotiatory situation. Of major importance here was the U.N. concern with loss of life. As I have already indicated the U.N. delegation was, during the later stages of the negotiation, desirous of having more military pressure exercised. They were disappointed by the failure of certain offensive actions to be realized. However during the earlier stages of the negotiation it is my impression that the delegates themselves had not yet reached the point where they were able to bring themselves to demand, at least inwardly, military action. During this earlier stage I sometimes found myself confronted in discussion with U.N. personnel by the explicit or implicit statement that it was all very easy to try and be tough with the Communists if one didn't care whether U.S. soldiers were getting killed every day up in the lines or would get killed if tougher measures were taken. In part the concern for human life was a fear of responsibility for additional losses rather than a moral inability to tolerate the prospective death of U.S. soldiers after the armistice began. Motives in these matters were, I believe, quite mixed but I think there is no reasonable doubt that elements other than a fear of later public investigation and reprisals played a part. These "sentimental" considerations while probably never entirely being lost were minimized as the delegation people began more clearly to realize that the exercise of military pressure was not only required by the negotiatory situation but also might very well in the long-run save more lives than it would immediately cost.

We do not know what headquarters was ultimately responsible for the U.N. failure to exert military pressure especially after October 25. In the earliest stages of the armistice talks it is likely that both Far Eastern Headquarters and the JCS were in agreement in diminishing military activity since none of these Headquarters probably anticipated either the difficulties or the length of the armistice. After October 25th, however, it seems probable that the decision to avoid military activity and to cancel various planned offensives was a JCS

decision. There is some indication, however, from comments made around the camp that there may have been a good deal of passing of the buck. The fear of public and possibly Congressional reprisals for "wasted lives" seems to have precipitated a situation in which various headquarters were interested in giving freedom without at the same time giving orders which would establish their own responsibility. I was told that General Ridgway, for instance, was insistent that if he were required to go back to Kaesong as a conference site he wanted to do so under explicit orders from the JCS so that should a resumption of talks at this site lead to renewed difficulties for the U.N. stemming from the fact that the conferences were being held in Communist-held territory, then at least the JCS would ultimately have to acknowledge its full responsibility. It is possible, then, that the JCS might have permitted fuller military action had General Ridgway taken full responsibility for initiating it. General Ridgway, however, may have been unwilling to do so without specific and clear permission from the JCS to exercise full military pressure. The JCS in its turn may not have been willing to go on record. This, of course, is pure speculation on my part, although the tendency to secure written commitments and statements that would absolve his quarters of responsibility seems to have been a real fact in the situation. But I do not know whether this applied to the particular issue of military pressure.

One interesting example of the impact of emotion on the attitudes of U.N. personnel is provided by Colonel Kinney. In October Colonel Kinney developed a cyst or some other medical difficulty on his spine. He was hospitalized in the military hospital in Tokyo for a period of observation and treatment. Here he had an opportunity to see battle casualties flown in from Korea and treated at this hospital. He saw the unpleasant physical fact of battlefield wounds and also saw persons who during the course of his stay in the hospital died of their wounds. I do not know what Colonel Kinney's past military experience has been but this seems to have been the first occasion on which he directly saw the consequences of war as they present themselves to battlefield or hospital personnel. He was quite shaken by this experience and when he returned to Korea from the hospital he talked a good deal about it in the manner of a person who for the first time in his life has suddenly realized what war is like.

Another example of the intrusion of human considerations in the discussion of negotiatory problems comes from the meetings we had in Tokyo, during the recess, on prisoner-of-war problems. This, I believe, was discussed earlier in the manuscript. Here I want to add a couple of comments. One of these arises from a column by Walter Lippmann that appeared two days ago in which he spoke of the U.N. failure to protect the position of the prisoners they had taken as one of the greatest blunders of the armistice. First it should be pointed out that the

delegation was not unaware of this problem and did at least take action to have the Red Cross remove the names of North Korean refugees who were in the POW camps from the roll of POWs. This was done, as I have indicated earlier, only with considerable fear that it might lead to Communist retaliation upon American POWs. But nonetheless it was done. Mr. Lippmann feels very annoyed that the U.N. did not take all its Chinese POWs and release them and ship them to Formosa immediately. He is further annoyed that a great number of North Korean POWs were not released from the camp and allowed to take up what residence they could find in South Korea. These two suggestions by Mr. Lippmann indicate a level of ignorance and thoughtlessness that is remarkable even for him. To suppose that North Korean prisoners could be released into the civil body of South Korea is as unrealistic as to suppose that the captured troops of Rommel in Africa could have been shipped to England and released as civilians in that country. While the North Korean POWs contained a great many persons who had been impressed into the military service, there were nonetheless a very considerable proportion of highly indoctrinated Communists among them. The harm that these people would have done in South Korea would have been very great. The same problem would arise in connection with Chinese POWs. Where the U.N. did fail to take a step that could more safely have been pursued was in not releasing North Korean POWs who were in fact South Korean soldiers captured by the Communists and then turned into North Korean soldiers. Even here a very considerable problem would have arisen but in these cases some action could, I believe, have been taken. While the U.N. people were always overly intimidated by the Communists nonetheless it is likely that had the U.N. shipped any considerable numbers of Chinese POWs to Formosa during the war the Communists would have been astute enough to utilize some form of pressure involving American POWs and it is this sort of consideration that Mr. Lippmann ignores.

Negotiation as a Process of Reasonable Discussion

There can be no doubt that during the earlier stages of the negotiations but to a lesser extent later the U.N. delegates conceived of their mission as a task of debating with the Communists and ensuring through a proper marshaling of arguments that a reasonable and just armistice would be secured. The conception of negotiation as a debating process manifested itself, in addition to other ways, by the U.N. delegates' preoccupation with getting together papers outlining arguments to be used in the discussions. These arguments were not looked upon as simply containing material necessary to carry on the amenities of the negotiation in which a considerable amount of talking about something had

to be done, but as representing the negotiatory armament [sic] in terms of which the validity of U.N. claims was to be established.

I have already in an earlier part of the manuscript illustrated this in connection with the U.N. argument that it ought to get compensation for its withdrawal of air and naval power during the armistice period. When the negotiations were resumed in October and the U.N. made its proposal of October 25th, the U.N. at the same time gave up its claim to compensation for air and naval superiority. The abandonment of this line of argument left the delegates in what for them was a very awkward position. Their chief debating weapon for any claim that gave them more than a strict battle-line settlement was now lost. With this loss the U.N. delegates, particularly General Hodes, no longer had any basis (in his opinion) in terms of which one could make out a reasonable case for demanding the Kaesong area. In order to make General Hodes feel more at ease and in order to provide him with the sort of material without which he could not with a good will argue for the Kaesong area, I developed a fairly full set of arguments bearing on the Kaesong area. These arguments had to be developed not only in terms of considerations relevant in internal discussion among ourselves, but also in terms of arguments that could be used in the negotiations themselves. The latter were important for General Hodes because with him it was not simply a matter of having internal conviction that the U.N. must try to get something but it was also important to him that he should be able to prove the validity of this contention to the Communists themselves. Fortunately the loss of the compensation argument was to some extent compensated for by the emergence into the discussions of U.N. claims for territory on the ground front in return for U.N. abandonment of North Korean islands which the U.N. was willing to give up after an armistice had been reached. The islands were of some real strategic value and one could of course make out an excellent case for compensation for them. However the delegation although it used the island arguments fairly vigorously never fully in their own minds felt that they could claim the Kaesong area in return for these island concessions. (I want to point out here that just as the discussions about the location of the battle-lines led to a Communist push into no-man's land and a narrowing of the distance between U.N. and Communist lines, so the emergence of the islands as an important topic of the negotiations led to Communist military actions against the islands. This shows that the Communists felt it necessary to alter the military situation respecting the islands in order to weaken U.N. demands based on the possession of these island territories. It is worth noting that the experience gained in discussions of the location of the ground battle-line led Admiral Burke to anticipate that the Communists might in this case too undertake military action designed to solve the negotiatory point at issue. He anticipated that the Communists would attempt to recapture some of these

islands and was instrumental in having warnings sent to the Naval commanders telling them to anticipate and be prepared for Communist attempts to seize the islands. This anticipation was amply fulfilled. The Communists compelled U.N. withdrawal from one island by means of a bombing attack and secured two other islands by direct amphibious attack and also, I believe, compelled thereby U.N. withdrawal from still another island or two which became untenable in the circumstances. Part of the difficulty, in fact probably the main difficulty, in holding these islands was that the complement of troops on them was extremely small and they were not really defensible against determined Communist attack without a much larger expenditure of Naval and military effort to hold them.)

Another indication of the U.N. conception of negotiation as a debating activity was the U.N. delegates and staff activity in analyzing the Communist statements during the preceding days in order to find weaknesses in their arguments. These of course were often not difficult to find and to the people on the staff more particularly who were trying to write papers that could be used in the negotiations, rebuttal of the Communists was always a major activity. They were generally delighted when they found some good point that they could rebut for the next day's discussion.

Although this conception of negotiations as a process of having the better debating point was certainly a misunderstanding of the negotiatory task, the content of what was said in the negotiations was nonetheless quite important. In very simple terms, it is true, the content of the talking one does in a negotiation is not the chief means of success as such, any more than the line of chatter that might accompany a poker game. Or rather it is not the arguments that one presents but rather the convictions and expectations about one's own behavior and intentions that are important. I had considerable difficulty in getting the delegates to see the distinction that was important for their work. What they said was not important in terms of the capacity of their statements to establish a valid and just case or to exercise a logical persuasion on the Communists. But this did not mean that it was entirely a matter of indifference what one said in the negotiations or how one expressed oneself. The essential requirement was to convey a conviction to the Communists about U.N. intentions and negotiatory strength. The task was to save time by convincing the Communists, and certainly not by means of sheer logic, that the U.N. would not retreat and that its requirements were so firmly established that no expectation of making headway against them would be feasible. Recourse to very deliberate logical argument had as a matter of fact, in some circumstances, the effect of suggesting that one's own mind was not conclusively made up. A person who has made up his mind and has an unalterable resolve is usually not particularly concerned to argue the

merits of his case. He is generally more anxious simply to make it perfectly clear to his opponent that his mind is made up and he is not interested in discussing the merits of the matter. While a certain amount of legitimation of U.N. demands was required in the negotiatory situation adequate attention was not paid to the problems of what might be called psychological warfare in the negotiation room. There were occasions when the U.N. had already said all that there was to be said on issues currently under discussion. In these circumstances I tried to get the delegates to take a less passionate interest in continuing the restatement of their case and criticism of the Communist case. I tried to get them to state to the Communists that they had told them all that there was to tell and simply to relax and show a complete disinterest in discussing the matter any further except by way of informal comment. The continued earnest endeavor to argue the Communists into submission was a very poor substitute for the more effective attitude of treating the matter as being beyond any further discussion.

Having indicated that a negotiation is not a debating society and that it is an error to attempt to win one's negotiatory objectives by seeking to convince the opponent of the merits of your claim, I wish now to emphasize nonetheless that there are occasions in the course of negotiations even with Communists in which a sheer debating contest does have relevance and value. In addition to its morale supporting effect on U.S. negotiators and its utility from the standpoint of public releases, it appears to me that during the negotiations in Korea there were occasions when a violent debating attack on the Communist position served a useful purpose in unsettling the Communists. I do not mean that this was accomplished by the violence of the debate since this would be quite another point and is taken care of by the previous discussion. What I mean is that when it was possible to attack the outright absurdity of key Communist contentions or proposals this was worth doing because of its apparent effect on the Communists themselves. On the whole the Communists had an excellent capacity to repeat logically impermissible arguments with complete imperturbability and to avoid answering questions that would be embarrassing. General Lee particularly could carry on admirably for hours saying very little more than that the Communist proposal was just, reasonable, equitable, logical, and the only solution that was permissible. Nonetheless the Communists too seemed to have some inner requirements on some crucial points to maintain a position by argument and success in demolishing their arguments precipitated a certain defensiveness and unease that was, of course, much more apparent in the case of the U.N. delegates when they were in a similar position. It is possible that being on the defensive from a logical or rhetorical standpoint tends to precipitate at least a mild sense of being on the defensive in a more general manner. Being defeated in debate may carry over and produce a psychological state which is experienced as being on

the defensive from a broader negotiatory standpoint. In short, then, one might suppose that the Communist negotiators were not themselves entirely immune from a certain inner requirement to be "right" in their debates. The psychological effect of being defeated in debate or on the defensive in debate presumably would touch less the higher level Communist authorities who are not immediately involved in the active struggle in the conference room. But it is possible even here that there is some of this carry-over that I refer to more particularly in connection with the Communist delegates themselves. I am afraid that I probably have not made too clear the point that I wanted to convey in this part of the discussion. In summary I shall simply add, then, that while negotiation is not a matter of logical persuasion, this aspect of negotiation deserves some further analysis to clarify what its precise role is. The "sophisticated" view that logical attack is a more or less insignificant aspect of negotiations with Communists is on the whole correct, but it is not quite "sophisticated" enough. A more subtle analysis would probably show that even with Communists this aspect of negotiation has some significance that in ordinary "sophisticated" analysis is overlooked.

U.N. Assumption of Communist Intransigence

One of the most misleading assumptions that the U.N. personnel tended to hold about the Communists is that every Communist demand if it is made at all vigorously is just as important to the Communists as any other demand or objective. The Communists were looked upon as if they had no hierarchy of objectives of which some were of greater importance than others. Phrased in other terms this view looked upon the Communists as being utterly inflexible. The Communists apparently never had the problem, according to the U.N. personnel, of choosing the lesser evil. Whatever the Communists said they would not do or would not agree to was considered as representing a Communist absolute necessity or an absolute requirement even though the attempt to secure this Communist goal could be shown to involve a sacrifice of some other goal that presumably was held with equal insistence. A Communist position was assumed to be taken "in advance" and not subject to alteration by U.N. action. If the Communists said that they insisted on a settlement of the 38th parallel then this was interpreted as meaning that the Communists would never get off the 38th parallel. If the Communists said that they would not change the conference site from Kaesong then this was interpreted as meaning that under no conditions would the Communists leave Kaesong. This type of interpretation of Communist behavior represented a failure to consider what the primary objectives of the Communists were and consequently to deduce what they would

be prepared to do or concede under appropriate pressure. The U.N. view of the Communists was very much as if the Communists were consumers all of whose consumption items were of equal value and consequently it was not to be expected that the Communists would give up certain "luxury" goods, in order to have sufficient funds to buy "necessities." It should not be supposed, of course, that the views I have sketched above were held in the form of an explicit judgment about the Communists. I simply mean that the U.N. actions and statements about the Communists were consistent with and made sense only on the basis of such a supposition. This did not prevent the U.N. personnel from holding quite contradictory views. A U.N. negotiator was perfectly capable of believing that the Communists were in a bad way and wanted an armistice and yet at the same time hold the view that the Communists would under no circumstances move out of Kaesong. It was characteristic of U.N. thinking that various impressionistic judgments about the Communists could exercise very considerable influence even though any moderately strict analysis and adherence to principled thinking would have shown immediately that these various fears, anxieties, and impressions could not possibly be consistently maintained.

Strength Leads to Failure, Weakness Leads to Success

The view of Communist intransigence sketched above is partly responsible or at least associated with another orientation that was equally troublesome. This was a tendency to assume, in considering any possible line of action, that if the action was a strong and aggressive one the outcome would probably be failure because of the pessimistic notions arising from Communist intransigence and a certain sense of U.N. impotence. On the other hand any action that was a sign of weakness, for instance a concession, was in some obscure way looked upon optimistically. Aggressive moves, for example General Ridgway's stand during the break-off of discussions, led only to gloomy predictions. On the other hand if a concession was to be made this was always greeted generally as something hopeful. To some extent it is not entirely accurate to say that concessions were greeted with expectations of considerable progress. It was perhaps more that concessions provided a psychological relief as indicative of positive action. Aggressive action was not viewed as positive or constructive because obviously aggressive action would lead to a fight with the Communists and to fierce resistance. Aggressive action was thus viewed as removing one from the objective of agreement rather than moving one closer toward it. On the other hand weak actions would obviously be agreeable to the Communists and would thus move the U.N. and the Communists closer together. Here again it should not be supposed that these sentiments were consciously and explicitly held by

U.N. personnel. Nonetheless I feel that this type of orientation underlay much of their thinking or perhaps it would be better to say their "feeling" about the negotiations.

The Need to Avoid Retreat and Consequently the Need to Be Weak

One of the major obstacles to successful negotiation was the existence of a minimum position. The minimum position, deriving from a JCS directive, was the maintenance of adequate military security for the U.N. troops and more particularly for the security of the Kansas line. As it happened, the Kansas line was secured first by means of military action in September before it was secured by negotiatory means. General Van Fleet is reported to have taken the position that once he had the Kansas line established he would be quite content to settle the armistice by simply agreeing with the Communists to stop the shooting where the soldiers were at the moment. The only additional proviso he added was that the Communists should not be in a position to build up their air power and air installations. Provided this was prohibited by the armistice he was otherwise disinterested in anything else in the negotiation. I assume, however, that this would not apply to the POW Item of the Agenda since my impression is that the Eighth Army people were all extremely loyal to the Americans who were in Communist hands and had no feeling of indifference on that matter. The difficulty that arose from the existence of this minimum position was that the U.N. staff people, and on the delegation more particularly General Hodes and General Turner, could not bring themselves to be enthusiastic about anything other than the minimum position itself. Their behavior suggests that were the negotiations being run by higher authorities with strong demands and objectives it would be desirable to withhold from such delegates knowledge of the minimum position that the higher authorities were in fact prepared to accept. In this case, however, the higher authorities seemed to be as weak or weaker than the delegates themselves and it probably never would have occurred to them to withhold their minimum position in order to strengthen the delegates in their negotiatory behavior.

The problem, however, was not simply that the existence of a minimum position tended to create a disinterest in any other type of gain. Even among the more aggressive members of the delegation such as General Craigie and Admiral Burke the existence of a minimum position tended to have inhibiting and crippling effects. This seemed to operate in much the following fashion. The existence of a minimum position created the obvious possibility that this is the position that the U.N. might retire to eventually. Since this is so it is not readily

possible to take an extremely strong or firm stand with respect to any position in advance of the minimum position. If a very strong stand is taken and later one must retreat to the minimum position then the bargaining capacity of the U.N. will suffer by virtue of this retreat from a position that was announced as more or less imperative or final. Consequently the U.N. tended to express its demands that were in excess of the minimum position in a weak and ambiguous form. The Communists were thus provided with incentives to continue holding out. The U.N. behaved in much the same way as a merchant would if he were willing to accept $800 for an object but wanted to try and get $1,000, but in the process of doing so felt that it would either undermine him or be humiliating for him if he asked $1,000 very firmly and then later had to retreat to $800. Such a merchant would ask for $1,000 in a rather timid way and without any firm attempt to convey to the purchaser that he really intended to get $1,000.

Of course there is a very real problem here as to how far one should go in expressing one's demand for a particular objective. It was apparent, for instance, that even the Communists chose their words very carefully in particular matters in order not to appear as if they were stating an ultimatum or a position from which there would be absolutely no retreat. However when they did this it was generally apparent what their motive was and as a matter of fact their caution in some of these instances was a very valuable clue to their underlying willingness to retreat and subsequently can be judged as an element of negotiatory weakness in their behavior. The Communists, however, on the whole were not anywhere near as afraid as the U.N. was to give an appearance of unalterable commitment to a given position. The U.N. people, particularly General Ridgway, were to some extent handicapped by the existence of JCS directives. The U.N. because of these directives were not in a position apparently to say that they would or would not do a certain thing even though the directive could be obeyed by later renouncing this position if necessity compelled it. The situation was thus one in which the U.N. had, as it were, to talk to the Communists as if they were talking to the JCS. They apparently could not tell the Communists one thing and also say to the JCS on the other hand that of course they really were not this intransigent and would adhere to the JCS directive if necessary and were only saying this to try and persuade the Communists that it was true. If the JCS said "Do not do X," then it became presumably impossible for the U.N. to tell the Communists that they were going to do X, even though this was intended only as a threat which they might hope to get away with.

The psychological structure of the U.N. fear of committing itself to a position from which it might have to retreat is considerably illuminated by another aspect of this problem. This particular aspect might on the surface seem completely

contradictory to what I have just discussed. Coincident with the feeling that it was very difficult if not impossible to take a firm stand on a matter from which one might have to retreat was some sentiment in favor of presenting the Communists with an ultimatum. This was more particularly discussed in Tokyo during the break-off of the negotiations in September and early October. General Craigie was more particularly interested in this measure and had already discussed it with me in Korea. I shall first say a few words about the problem of an ultimatum before linking this question with the topic that I am discussing in this sub-section.

The difficulty with an ultimatum, at least as it was discussed in connection with the Korean armistice with me, was that the method of an ultimatum was very appealing as a means of promising some quick and decisive resolution of a situation which was dragging on in a painful manner; but was not supported by any clear notions as to what the objectives of the ultimatum were. I pointed out to General Craigie that if the U.N. were to use an ultimatum it would have to specify very exact objectives to which the Communists were expected to conform and also to indicate clearly what the precise nature of the threat was if conformity was not forthcoming. I pointed out that in some situations an ultimatum is intended to forbid or require a particular action which is the only action that is of concern. That is, there is no series of gradations of objectives that are feasible. One wants, for instance, to prevent a country from being invaded and issues an ultimatum forbidding this action on penalty of war. In such an instance there is no question about what the content of the ultimatum should be or what its objective is. In the negotiatory situation, however, an ultimatum creates the difficulty that one must choose out of the whole range or gradations of possible objectives the one which will be incorporated in the ultimatum. Further, an ultimatum is a measure that is in its very essence the contrary of negotiation and one would have to realize that by issuing an ultimatum even though one did it in a negotiatory situation that one was in effect putting an end to the negotiations and proceeding by quite other means.

However a more major difficulty for an ultimatum in the situation in which it was proposed was that the only possible ultimatum that the JCS would permit the U.N. to make, if it were to be permitted at all, would be one which gave the U.N. only its minimum requirements. I pointed out to General Craigie that the objective of a negotiation was to get more than one's minimum demands. It requires no negotiatory skill to secure one's minimum position since in the end if the position really is minimum one simply rejects the proposals of the enemy which go beyond the minimum position. Skill in negotiation is required to get more than the minimum but not simply to get the minimum. An ultimatum thus

would preclude the U.N. getting by negotiation more than it would have to reconcile itself to were it to issue something in the nature of an ultimatum. In addition an ultimatum is only significant if it carries a threat in the event of non-conformity with it. Now the threat in this particular case would presumably be a continuation of the war if the Communists did not conform with it, that is the threat would be essentially a threat of military action against the Communists. I pointed out that this threat was precisely what the U.N. had available to it without the use of an ultimatum if it wished to employ it. Consequently the U.N. could make much more effective use of its threats by simply applying military pressure which was the crux of the ultimatum in any case and by this applying military pressure it would bring to bear the pressure of an ultimatum while at the same time avoiding the obvious disadvantages mentioned above and those which might arise with respect to the allies of the United States. Further I pointed out that some of the spirit and aggressiveness that was represented by this interest in an ultimatum ought to be used in expressing U.N. demands upon the Communists without going to the full extent of an ultimatum.

Now let me return from this discussion of the ultimatum as such to the link between the U.N. interest in an ultimatum and its equal interest in avoiding any action which would commit itself to a position from which it would be difficult or embarrassing to retreat. Obviously an ultimatum and a fear of committing oneself are two contrary impulses and it is interesting to try and clarify how such contrary impulses could exist in the same people. The interest in an ultimatum is, I believe, an attempt to avoid the difficulties of negotiation. It is an interest in desperate action which will relieve the negotiator of all the perplexing problems with which he is confronted. Just as General Turner sought relief from the perplexities of negotiation by feeling that the only sensible thing to do in a negotiation is to start with one's minimum position, so General Craigie, I believe, sought relief in the opposite direction by proposing an ultimatum. The two measures are at opposite poles but the motivation is I believe in part identical. Interest in an ultimatum represents also a loss of nerve, a need to drive towards desperate action in a situation of "frustration." The fear of committing oneself to a position from which one might have to retreat represents a sense of insecurity. One seeks some measure of security by leaving one's line of retreat open without loss of face. Similarly the use of an ultimatum is also a search for security by avoiding the difficulties of more intricate and complex maneuvers. In part the ultimatum also represents a drive for something definite, something that promises progress in a situation where progress requires a capacity to sit tight and to hold to one's position in a more inactive way. The U.N. personnel were always very intolerant of inactivity. They lacked the proper amount of *Sitzfleisch*.

Compromise Versus Concession

The U.N. delegates and also the liaison officers frequently made concessions to the Communists in the expectation of getting agreement with them, that is getting certain concessions in return from them. What in fact they were seeking to do was to get a compromise. But the art of securing a compromise was apparently too difficult for them. Essentially, as I see it, the difference between what I here call a concession and a compromise is that in a concession one gives way without a definite return from the Communists, whereas in a compromise each party simultaneously gives something to the other. The U.N. on the whole had adopted a sequential or consecutive mode of bargaining instead of a simultaneous mode. Once they had already made the concession then they had already lost the bargaining power of the object which had been conceded without any assurance of getting anything for it in return. Some of the U.N. staff people and probably General Hodes among the delegates and also probably Admiral Joy used to think of me as being extremely uncompromising in my negotiatory views. Actually this was not the case. Their opinion, if it really existed, arose from this failure to distinguish between compromise and concession. I opposed concessions precisely because I had "a compromising frame of mind."

The problem of how best to reach the compromise deserves some analysis. There are difficulties to be overcome in doing this astutely. Obviously if one indicates an interest in a compromise it provides some incentive for the opponent to believe that if you are ready to concede a point on a compromise basis you might be willing ultimately to concede it without a return concession from the other side. Effecting a compromise thus requires an extremely delicate operation so that the willingness to compromise is not interpreted as a sign of weakness. A proper balancing of the amount of initiative from each side is required. One of the major difficulties that the U.N. ran into in Korea was that even when it did try to effect compromises rather than giving outright concessions it took so much of the initiative in trying to reach the compromise that it adopted a begging and wheedling, plaintive tone. In such a situation the opponent is certainly not going to make his return concession since he is given every indication that the need for the compromise and the insistence on the compromise is much stronger from the U.N. side than from his own. The U.N. delegates were on the whole far from skillful in providing the sort of hints that the Communists provided when they wanted to indicate that a compromise was feasible. The U.N. delegates failed in this delicate play in two respects. They did not know how to make delicate hints and then simply leave them alone to fertilize the minds of the Communists, and secondly they did not know how to interpret the Communist hints or appreciate with full clarity that they were hints toward a compromise.

The Inability to Act According to the Results of Analysis

One of the most important requirements of successful negotiation is to make adequate analyses but then above all to act in accordance with the directives implied by these analyses. I have already indicated that the U.N. personnel were not able to carry through strict analyses, clarifying the assumptions about Communist capacities and intentions and to draw the relevant conclusions for tactics and strategy. This however is not the main point that I wish to emphasize here. In considerable measure I compensated by my work with the delegation for this deficiency on their part. What I want to emphasize is that agreement with these analyses and the conclusions to be derived from them did not mean that the lines of action so indicated would be agreed to or if agreed to held in mind and carried through with some continuity. The U.N. personnel tended to behave as if the matters about which they were required to make judgments and to take action were matters of purely individual preference of an almost aesthetic character. It was something like a situation in which a person might be convinced that after all Shakespeare is better than Kipling but after having agreed with all the arguments by which Shakespeare's superiority is "demonstrated" he turns around and then says that nonetheless he still prefers Kipling. In such matters this behavior is quite legitimate and understandable. But when it reveals itself in serious problems such as negotiation where lines of action cannot be properly developed if they are developed on a purely "mood" or emotional basis, disaster is apt to occur. Admiral Joy and other members of the delegation would agree with many of the statements I made and they would agree with the conclusion to be derived from them and with the lines of action that were implied. But at the same time they would act in a directly contrary way and then in excuse cite an argument which had already been taken care of in the earlier discussion which had led to quite different conclusions. Thus one tended to run around in a circle and it was impossible to pin any point down so that adherence to it would be maintained. Thinking and analysis thus became an exercise that had relatively little directive value. People did not seem to feel that they were "honor bound" to act according to the conclusions to which their logic led. If these conclusions ran against their emotional currents then the conclusions were helpless to mold action but were rather shattered by the emotional current and thus incapable of constricting action to the logically conceived goals. This, of course, is a prevalent weakness in a great deal of American activity. It demonstrates itself in purely intellectual life and in many different types of administrative circumstances. Partly it represents the power of emotion but in very considerable measure I think it represents also the complete

lack of intellectual discipline and confidence in the power of reason itself. It is perhaps the ultimate intellectual heresy or negation of intellectuality.

This failure to carry out and also to adhere to the conclusions of proper analysis is associated with and to some extent leads to a considerable U.N. sensitivity to all sorts of fragmentary matters and incidents. A casual remark that I might make, some reported statement from the interrogation of a single POW, a line in a newspaper editorial, a letter from a stranger in the United States, a Communist press statement, etc., etc. were all capable of producing complete reversals of mood. Nothing was too trivial or too fragmentary to be taken seriously or even if not taken seriously to be reacted to seriously on an emotional level.

Oscillations of Mood and Purpose

From the foregoing it will be clear that the U.N. personnel were subject to rapid oscillations in mood, although the prevailing tenor of sentiment was generally pessimistic. The oscillations of mood often represent really oscillations in the intensity of a prevailing mood which was not so much subject to change. Just as moods tended to oscillate so did possible lines of action. At the same time people would oscillate back and forth between proposals to give extremely favorable terms to the Communists more or less equivalent to U.N. minimum demands and at the same time propose issuing an ultimatum. Pessimism was particularly deep at the time I arrived at the camp shortly after the negotiations had been broken off. As I indicated earlier, part of the reaction of the delegation was based on their fear that they may have been responsible for what they considered was the forthcoming complete end of the negotiations. This was one particular period in which I worked very intensively in a direct and conscious attempt to increase the morale of the delegates. It is worthwhile recording the success of this because it suggests the feasibility and value of a quasi-psychiatric activity carried on in connection with the work of negotiators. After I had been at the camp for 3 or 4 days Lieutenant Colonel Vardas said to me, "You came at the right time. The camp has been in terribly low spirits and you have given them a terrific lift." The lift was secured by a variety of means. I intentionally made bets in public with extremely favorable odds to my betting opponent in order to back to the hilt the judgments that I had made and thereby to give my judgments a more favorable reception in the camp. I also gave badly needed praise to the delegates for what they had accomplished and showed them that many of the difficulties they had run into were not to be seen as arising from their deficiencies but as being intrinsic to negotiations with Communists. I also exuded confidence with respect to a resumption of the negotiations and treated any belief to the contrary as being absolutely misguided. My more sober analytic memos tended

to give a more reasoned intellectual cast to these other methods that were more related to "white psychological warfare."

One of the words that was most used by people describing their feelings during the negotiations was "frustrating."

Another phrase that Admiral Joy once used is basic to an understanding of the inability of the delegation to hold to a fixed course. This phrase, which he used on several occasions when the situation seemed relatively clear to me, was: "I don't know what to believe." Such a phrase could be used by Admiral Joy with the greatest ease only 5 minutes after he had agreed completely with an analysis that I had made for him or after he had agreed to a line of action or to a line of analysis which had been carried on jointly in a session with the other delegates and myself.

The desire to be liked by the Communists was not particularly evident during the period I was associated with the delegation. I think from what I have learned of the earlier stages that some of this probably was evident at that time but I only received remote overtones of it by the time I joined the delegation in August. I might record that General Craigie learned the Chinese expression for "Good Morning" so that he could greet the Communist delegates with it when the two parties entered the tent for their daily session. It used to please him to be able to say "Good Morning" in Chinese and to evoke a smile of recognition from the Chinese delegates.

The Need to Experience Progress

I believe that in earlier parts of the manuscript I have already indicated that one of the impulses to action by the U.N. was the need to feel that progress was being made. This need was felt almost on a daily basis. If no particular event of note occurred in the discussions of a day then the way in which this was generally summarized in briefest form was to say that there had been no progress. The demand for daily progress arose in part from a failure to understand the nature of negotiations at all and partly from the expectation that the U.N. delegates had that negotiation is a process of "reasonable discussion." Obviously when two parties sit together at a table to engage in reasonable discussion one ought to anticipate that progress will be made almost hourly. Lack of progress in the sense in which the U.N. people used the term also was feared because of the reaction of public opinion. This was in part directly represented by the press people who were attending the negotiations. The press people gave vigorous expression to their feeling that no progress was being made if there was no

startling development which they could report to their papers. This situation was aggravated by General Nuckols' failure to get the press people to understand that negotiatory progress is not a matter of a daily increment of increased agreement. Unfortunately General Nuckols himself tended to use the phrase "no progress" in reporting the events of the day to the press. Consequently each of these two groups reinforced the other.

One of the most disastrous consequences of this demand for progress was the drive toward tactical attempts to "create" progress by sheer action no matter how disastrous it would be from the standpoint of the U.N. negotiatory position.

Communists and Orientals Have to "Save Face" and Therefore Must Be Babied

The Communists appear to have built up, intentionally or otherwise, a reputation for being so concerned with problems of prestige in the public eye that persons who deal with them are easily led to make concessions to this child-like weakness that they possess. This tendency is reinforced in dealing with Oriental Communists because of the supposition that Orientals are tremendously preoccupied with the need to save face. Consequently Oriental Communists are in the position of children who are indulged because their child-like understanding does not permit them to see that certain matters are of trivial significance. We, the U.N., as mature persons are not so concerned to be stubborn for the sheer purpose of satisfying our sense of self-esteem. We are interested in getting our own way only in matters that are of substantive importance. Since our opponents are so childish in this respect there is no reason, for the sake of progress, why we should not indulge their child-like proclivities. This type of conception of the Communists and of Orientals thus reinforced tendencies that were supported by other motivations as well. The U.N. thus tended to behave towards the Communists the way people sometimes behave towards spoiled children whom they have no time to reform or correct and are much more concerned to get the child to do something rather than change his spoiled nature. This, of course, leads to indulgences on matters that are thought to be of secondary importance. It also reinforced the U.N. tendency, discussed above, to take the initiative in attempting to reach compromises. The spoiled child conception of the Communists implied that for the Communists it was much more difficult psychologically to initiate a compromise than it would be for the U.N. Consequently the psychologically more mature U.N. side felt that it was incumbent upon it to take the initiative even though such action was likely to lead the Communists to infer U.N. weakness.

One particular aspect of the U.N. view of Communist necessity to save face is also associated with the U.N. tendency, discussed above, to look upon Communist requirements as all being absolute in character; that is that everything that the Communists want is of equivalent importance to the Communists. This is illustrated by the following. I once discussed with General Craigie alternative strategies that the United States might have followed at the time that South Korea was invaded on 25 June 1950. I pointed out that had the United States at that time given an ultimatum to the Soviet Union requiring the Soviet Union to force the retirement of North Korean troops on the penalty of war, the Soviet Union would almost certainly have called off the invasion of South Korea. The merit of this strategy is not of importance here. What is of interest is General Craigie's reply. He exclaimed with an air of great disbelief: "How could the Soviet Union possibly accept an ultimatum that implied their responsibility for the North Korean invasion of South Korea?" In this statement is combined on the one hand the conception of the Communists as being concerned with their reputation and at the same time that this concern with public reputation is as absolute a requirement as let us say avoiding war. Or rather even that saving face or preserving their moral integrity in the public's mind is more important than avoiding war.

Communications Between Headquarters and the War with the JCS

There seems no doubt that the various headquarters involved in the negotiations did not adequately understand what was going on. In part this was due simply to an incapacity to analyze the materials available to them but in part it arose from a lack of proper communication between the delegation and General Ridgway's headquarters and more particularly between General Ridgway and the JCS. I have already mentioned that the daily summaries sent immediately after each day's meetings to General Ridgway were inadequate and often misleading. They tended to follow the pattern of using such phrases as "no progress" and also of emphasizing Communist statements to the effect that they would not accept such and such a proposal. As repeated in these messages such indications of Communist intransigence were made to appear as equivalent to virtually a Communist ultimatum and were given much more import than such statements deserved. These statements were often pro-forma statements which nonetheless were capable of being accompanied by Communist signs of weakness or hints towards compromise. The latter were never seen or communicated but it was always the obvious Communist statements that they

would not accept something that were taken as most significant and thus communicated.

I understand that in the earlier days of the negotiations the JCS received the verbatim account of the negotiations by wire every day. This was later dropped and the verbatim transcripts were sent by mail instead. I do not know who initiated this change. It is clearly significant that the JCS either itself initiated or else did not object to this change in the communication pattern. Of course even the receipt of the full transcript was no assurance of a correct interpretation of what was going on. I have the impression that the capacity to interpret the daily transcripts correctly was very much increased by being actually at the negotiation camp and having an opportunity to discuss what went on with the delegates themselves. Nonetheless a close study of the transcripts would have helped the JCS to appreciate the true state of affairs. The fact that they got their transcripts a week after the discussions contained in them indicates fairly clearly that they must have during this latter period relied much more on the daily messages they received from General Ridgway.

At the end of October and in November when the delegation's fear of pressure from the JCS was extremely great I took up with the delegation the desirability of ensuring a more adequate communication with the JCS. I particularly felt that what the JCS required was not simply a flat account of what had happened that day but also something more interpretive and analytical. I felt that at their distance and with their degree of unfamiliarity with all the intricacies of the day-to-day debates that they were bound to misinterpret what was going on. Everyone usually agreed with me as to the desirability of doing something like this but no action was ever taken. I feel somewhat responsible and delinquent in this matter, because I now have the impression that had I simply gone ahead and written up analytic and interpretive messages to be sent to the JCS that probably I could have gotten Admiral Joy to send them to General Ridgway with a view to their further transmission to the JCS. It is likely, however, that messages destined for such high authorities would have been very closely scrutinized and every interpretation that I made would have been added to by a variety of other interpretations to insure that so many different interpretations were present that there would be no danger of ever being totally wrong. There would also probably have been the difficulties arising from the usual desire to keep communications to highest headquarters extremely brief. Nonetheless had the various "essays" that I wrote for the delegation and also that I delivered orally to them been available every two or three days to the JCS it is possible that they might have acquired some of the education in strategy and tactics and in understanding what was going on that General Craigie and Admiral Burke

acquired during my stay with them. Although the statement will necessarily make me subject to accusations of immodesty I cannot quite rid myself of a troubled conscience for not having attempted more in trying to convey to the JCS the true state of affairs.

I was particularly anxious for some effort to be made to get the JCS to appreciate what was happening because there was a growing tendency not only to distrust the JCS but also to devise strategies of dealing with the Communists that were obviously not the best strategies but were predicated on the principle of choosing a strategy that would deal simultaneously both with the Communists and the JCS. The U.N. was thus in danger of carrying on a war on two fronts and choosing a strategy which would simultaneously fight the Communists and the JCS. This aspect of the negotiations in November is quite important and probably should have been mentioned earlier. I will now try to reconstruct here a line of strategy that was more particularly developed by Colonel Murray, one of the U.N. liaison officers.

Colonel Murray had the firm conviction that any attempt simply to "sit it out" with the Communists would fail because of JCS intervention which would require the U.N. to make concessions. In this he was undoubtedly correct and this was a view that most of us had to face during the critical November days. My own view was that because of this threat every effort should be made to get the JCS properly informed and persuaded. I felt that if there was a difference of opinion between the JCS, General Ridgway's Headquarters and the delegation that the only means by which this difference could be resolved was not to try and outsmart the JCS but to persuade the JCS concerning the correctness of other lines of action. Colonel Murray and generally most of the others took a very dim view of the possibility of getting the JCS to understand anything at all. This very conventional American attitude towards higher headquarters was bound to have fatal consequences, although it is entirely possible that strenuous efforts of the sort that I felt were necessary would not have been successful in persuading the JCS. Colonel Murray's strategy of indirection involved conceding the Kaesong area and proposing to the Communists acceptance of a strict battle-line line of demarcation with the provision that any change in the battle-line would be incorporated in the line of demarcation at the end of the armistice conference. Colonel Murray's motives for this strategy appear to have been as follows: in the first place it would take the heat off the delegation from the JCS by offering the Communists a concession. Secondly by offering the Communists a straight battle-line solution with an alteration of the line of demarcation according to military changes in the battle-line one would frighten the Communists to death because they would be afraid that the U.N. was making this proposal as a means

of securing more territory (to which the Communists would already have agreed in advance) through military action that the U.N. planned to undertake. Finally, if the Communists were not frightened into refusing this offer for a straight battle-line solution, then one would undertake military action to gain the territories that one was conceding by the proposal itself. This extraordinary form of "subtle" strategy seems to have assumed as almost a certainty that the Communists would be afraid to accept a U.N. proposal which offered them what they had been asking, because the Communists would be so worried by the motives of the U.N. in offering them their own proposal (virtually). In this way Colonel Murray thought one could circumvent JCS pressure and at the same time secure an adequate settlement for the U.N. Colonel Murray worked very hard selling this strategy and also asked me to present it to Admiral Joy since I had better access to him than did Colonel Murray. I did discuss the proposal with Admiral Joy and also with the other delegates but took very great exception to it. However, although the strategy of Colonel Murray was not accepted in the sense in which he intended it, it had nonetheless, I believe, some influence. Its influence operated in the following manner. Admiral Joy and General Hodes did not have the capacity during the first early days of November to stick to the U.N. proposal of 25 October. They wanted, especially apparently Admiral Joy, to concede the Kaesong area and took initial steps toward that only 3 days after the Communists had made their concessions of October 31. I suspect that their capacity to move in this direction of concession, despite my strong warnings against it and also the less vocal resistance of Admiral Burke, was facilitated by Colonel Murray's proposal. Colonel Murray was also proposing the concession of the Kaesong area but he was doing so on the basis of calculating it as a "strong" measure. Admiral Joy and General Hodes, however, were able to in a sense follow Colonel Murray's proposal by making the Kaesong concession, but not really believing in Colonel Murray's assumptions or the feasibility in any way of the consequences Colonel Murray hoped to achieve by his strategy. Thus in a vague way they were able to find in the discussions of Colonel Murray incentives for conceding the Kaesong area although their motives were entirely different from those of the Colonel. The unfortunate and curiously distorted strategy of Colonel Murray thus precipitated in part the discussion of the concession of the Kaesong area. I warned Colonel Murray that, although his heart was in the right place and he was trying to develop something that he thought would do the Communists in, nonetheless he was doing the U.N. a great disservice by suggesting strategies which involved concessions when the greatest necessity was to build up a sentiment in favor of maintaining a strong stand on the UN's proposal of 25 October. I told Colonel Murray, as I had told the delegation, that an imperative requirement was to try to brief the JCS adequately and convince them of the necessity of giving the delegation full authority to

stand by the proposal of October 25th apart from changes that were based on a proper compromise in which the Communists would give fully as much as the U.N. (for example at the most splitting the Kaesong area). But here again the view was held that it was quite hopeless to try and teach the JCS anything about the negotiations.

Later when the worst anticipations of JCS action were realized and the JCS issued its directive which required the U.N. to offer to the Communists more than they were asking, it was then apparently too late to do anything to get the JCS to understand the true situation. At any rate all proposals I made to send a desperate explanation to the JCS were rejected. At this point since there was no alternative I too became in favor of trying to get a settlement superior to the JCS directive and thus at this last point was fully willing to "circumvent" the JCS directive. As I have indicated earlier, the settlement of Agenda Item #2 that was finally reached was slightly superior to the JCS directive, although the failure of the U.N. to exploit this slight element of maneuverability that was still left open to them in the settlement of Agenda Item #2 really meant that it made very little difference which settlement was employed. However, if the U.N. should be willing to enter into the use of military pressure again, the settlement that was finally reached will at least enable the U.N. to profit by the military action that it employs. This would not have been feasible under the JCS directive.

U.N. Concern over Public Opinion

I have already referred to this a good deal during the earlier parts of the manuscript. Here I shall simply add a couple of anecdotes and the statement that the brevity of treatment at this point is not intended to suggest that this matter was of minor importance. One might say in fact that the U.N. seemed to spend much more time worrying about the public than it did about the Communists. If a small fraction of the mental activity concerned with the American public had gone into dealing with the Communists the negotiations would have gone very much better.

The Gallup Poll published under the date line of October 25th, a report on U.S. opinion concerning the negotiations in Korea. One of the statements made in this report was that 2/3 of the respondents considered that the U.N. stand was too weak. I received a copy of this about November 1st or 2nd and was overjoyed to get it because at this time Admiral Joy was feeling very deeply the need to make the fatal concession that came on November 3rd. I immediately showed the clipping to Admiral Joy, General Hodes and others as evidence that public opinion would in fact support a strong line. This was to substantiate my earlier

contentions that favorable public opinion rose with manifestations of U.N. determination and strength. This Gallup Poll report had a curious effect on Admiral Joy. Instead of encouraging him and making him feel better by virtue of the greater freedom that such public opinion conferred on him (given his worries and anxieties), his immediate reaction was that the Poll report represented a criticism of the delegation by stating that the U.N. stand was too weak. Consequently instead of being "supportive therapy" as I intended it, the report operated as an additional source of panic or anxiety for the Admiral by virtue of its implied criticism of the delegation.

Another means that I employed in order to free Admiral Joy from his anxiety over current public opinion was to point out to him that even if there was a sector of the public that was impatient and whose impatience seemed to the Admiral to require him to make concessions, he should keep in mind the long-range public opinion that would emerge later on and which would condemn the U.N. and the delegation for having been swindled by the Communists. I pointed out that, in connection with most conferences and negotiations with the Russians, the long-term public reaction had generally been that the U.S. representatives had allowed themselves to be outsmarted by the Communists and had been too generous to them. I tried, then, to get Admiral Joy to identify his own personal and U.N. public opinion interest with the long-term public and historical judgments rather than with immediate reactions.

One day in November the *Stars and Stripes* carried a photograph of a dead American soldier with a caption that tended to indicate that while the U.N. delegates were messing around in Panmunjom this soldier had died. The PIO for General Ridgway's Headquarters was in the camp on the day the newspaper reached the camp. The photograph or rather the caption had a quite bad effect on Admiral Joy and others. I heard this general officer, the PIO, phone Tokyo and shout over the phone to the party at the other end, "Don't you know you have upset everyone in the camp."

I also pointed out to Admiral Joy that the very papers that were most critical in their editorials about the U.N. haggling while U.S. soldiers were being killed, were in fact at the same time in a number of instances in favor of the U.N. going right on up to the Yalu. I therefore pointed out that the editorial accusation of haggling was associated with a sort of disgust at the weak position held or the weak line followed by the U.N. I further pointed out that from what I could see of the editorials to which I had access, most of them came from newspapers that were violently anti-Administration. I pointed out that their attitude was one of saying anything that would embarrass the Administration and that their editorials could not be taken as reflecting any major sector of public opinion.

Admiral Joy received a fair amount of mail, some from persons with whom he was acquainted but mostly from complete strangers. He read these letters with very great care and was very happy to receive them. He once made the following remark to me: "I get a lot of letters from various people. They are very encouraging. Mothers write to me whose sons are fighting in Korea. The way they write is very heartening. Only about one in ten is not favorable. It helps a lot to get letters like that." Admiral Joy showed me on two occasions (he tended to forget that he had shown letters previously) two letters that were written by students at the University of Chicago. One was from the president of the Christian Student's Society or Association. Both of these letters written within a day of each other or on the same day strongly urged Admiral Joy to give in to the Communist demand for a settlement on the 38th parallel. Admiral Joy was considerably worried by these letters because they implied that a heavy moral responsibility for further deaths and for continuation of war would rest on him if he did not do this.

In Negotiating with Communists It Is Easier to Get More Than to Get Less

Usually in life the more you want the greater risk or output you have to assume. I believe the course of the present negotiations with the Communists in Korea would show that here a rather different principle operates. The idea of making concessions is to secure earlier agreement. However this in fact tends to defer agreement and to make the Communists more intransigent. Of course outright concessions of everything that the Communists propose probably would secure a rapid agreement for any one particular negotiation, although it would then cause Communists to step up their requirements in later negotiations and this same self-defeating character of concessions would be revealed at a later time. Although it is not subject to proof I think a fair analysis of what happened in Korea would show that the attempt to secure more rather than less takes less time negotiatorily than the attempt to secure less rather than more. One might end up with the same settlement in either case. What I am emphasizing here is simply the matter of time consumption to secure a given level of agreement.

The Necessity of Making All Provisos Explicit Immediately

There was a tendency to reach certain agreements with the Communists (for example the movement of the conference site from Kaesong to Panmunjom) without making clear to the Communists the exact conditions under which this

agreement would be valid. This led to situations where the agreement was purely spurious and conflict broke out almost immediately as soon as the pretended agreement was put into operation. In these instances the U.N. would have gained considerable time and also better arrangements had they in the first instance made perfectly explicit all of the detailed provisos surrounding the agreement that was being made. This is pretty much in line with the general dictum that there is not too much value in having agreement with the Communists "in principle."

Part IV

Some Notes on Communist Behavior and Tactics

Some Notes on Communist Behavior and Tactics

The foregoing accounts of the negotiations in Korea have almost exclusively dealt with the behavior and views of the U.N. negotiators and related personnel. Only incidental reference has been made to the Chinese and North Korean negotiators. In the present brief section I shall put down a few scattered notes on the Communist negotiators. Much more can be said and should be said but this would require a closer study of the records of the armistice conference than is now possible.

I should add, before beginning, that everything that I have to say about the Communists is based on second hand materials. At no time was I present at any of the actual negotiation meetings either of the delegates, sub-delegates or liaison officers. Consequently my sources of information are confined to statements and observations from U.N. personnel and from a reading of the transcripts of the meetings of the delegates and liaison officers.

Relations Between the Chinese and North Korean Delegates

The chief delegate was General Nam Il, a North Korean. In the sub-delegate meetings as well as the full delegation meetings the North Korean delegate might be said to have been officially in charge, at least insofar as this is indicated by the fact that it was always he rather than the Chinese delegate who would make the opening remark for the Communist side on any particular meeting day. Possibly there were exceptions but a checking of the record would show that the North Korean either always or almost always made the first statement.

There were only two indications that I learned of which suggest a certain amount of stress between the Chinese and North Koreans. One of these was much clearer than the other and, as a matter of fact, at the time seemed to me to be rather important. I still think it was important but the importance lay rather in confirming the general analysis as to what the U.N. should be doing and consequently was only confirming of a policy that was supported by many other considerations as well. The particular incident is as follows. In mid-October, prior to the resumption of the armistice talks on October 25th, the liaison officers

of both sides were trying to reach an agreement on the various conditions covering the resumption of talks at Panmunjom. Agreement in "principles" had already been arrived at by General Ridgway and General Kim Il Sung very much earlier but once the liaison officers got together there were a whole host of unresolved problems which caused the resumption to be delayed several weeks after the resumption was thought to be about to take place. The North Korean liaison officer was one morning being particularly intransigent with respect to some of the issues under consideration. The U.N. liaison officers had with them a proposal covering about ten or twelve points to which they wanted to get agreement. The North Korean liaison officer refused to discuss these points on the grounds that the only thing that he would discuss and was authorized to discuss was the time and date for a resumption of the talks at Panmunjom. He would not discuss any of the conditions including the elimination of the old Kaesong neutral zone that the U.N. liaison officers were concerned with. Finally the U.N. liaison officers at the end of the abortive meeting handed the North Korean liaison officer their typewritten proposal and asked that it be transmitted to the Communist delegation. At this point both the U.N. liaison officers and the North Korean liaison officers were showing considerable temper. Particularly, apparently, the North Korean liaison officer. The U.N. liaison officers reported, when they got back to camp, that during this period when they were trying to get the North Korean liaison officer to take the typewritten proposal, the Chinese liaison officer appeared to be very nervous and tense about the behavior of his colleague. Finally when the North Korean liaison officer refused to accept the typewritten proposal from the hands of the U.N. liaison officers, the latter put the proposal on the table and stood up to leave, leaving the proposal on the table. The North Korean liaison officer was not going to allow the U.N. representatives to get away with this and he told them that they had better take their typewritten sheet along with them because if they left it on the table it would get lost. In this way he of course indicated that he had no intention of picking it up later after they had left or transmitting it to the Communist delegation. At this point the Chinese liaison officer who had been standing by, behaving, as the U.N. officers later remarked, nervously, stepped forward and sat down once more at the table and picked up the typewritten proposal and said quite firmly that he thought they ought to sit down and discuss it. This was so directly contradictory to the extremely intransigent stand of the North Korean liaison officer that it is, I believe, quite unparalleled in all the other reported behavior between representatives of the Chinese and of the North Koreans. The North Korean liaison officer simply stood by and looked rather grim but made no gesture positively or negatively about this "betrayal" by his colleague. The obvious interpretation of this incident is that the Chinese liaison officer was probably under instructions to give more ground to the U.N. than the North Korean

liaison officer was. This then would seem to represent the greater Chinese interest in getting the negotiations going again than was true of the North Koreans; or at least a difference in the conception of desirable tactics or strategy. Although this is the obvious interpretation I do not think that suggests it is not the correct one. The incident is obviously significant and it would be difficult to find a more satisfactory hypothesis in terms of which to interpret it.

The second major sign of stress between the North Koreans and the Chinese is a more diffuse matter. When the armistice talks were resumed on October 25th the Korean sub-delegate, General Lee, appeared to very definitely take the lead as he had already done in the last meetings of the sub-delegates in August before the talks were broken off. This went on for several days and then one had a very marked impression from the transcript which was also confirmed by the observations of General Hodes and Admiral Burke that General Hsieh, the Chinese sub-delegate, was beginning to "take over." The record and the statements more particularly of the U.N. observers strongly suggest an attempt on the part of General Hsieh to thrust General Lee into the background and to take over the leading role in the negotiations. This went on for several days and then suddenly General Hsieh relapsed into relative silence and General Lee again emerged as the dominating figure on the Communist side. These observations, of course, take on only interest and significance if the periods in which the different persons were dominant are analyzed in terms of the prevailing tone and content of the discussions which they contributed. It would require a fresh re-reading of the transcripts to be able to make a proper analysis of this sort. Tentatively I shall here simply call upon my recollection of the period when this was happening which was to the effect that when General Hsieh was dominating the discussion the discussion tended to be of the more placating or shall we say cooperative character and that when General Lee, the North Korean delegate, dominated the discussion it tended to be more of an intransigent character.

In addition to these two matters there were from time to time reports from the U.N. delegates that the Chinese delegate from time to time seemed to be interested in "calming down" his North Korean colleague. In general the descriptions of the Chinese delegates, particularly General Hsieh and of the North Korean delegate General Lee tended to picture General Hsieh as a much more "human" sort of person whereas General Lee emerged as a rather grim, sour and immobile, unresilient sort of person. General Hsieh, I was told, would sometimes even smile sort of knowingly at the U.N. delegates in the manner of persons sharing a private joke whenever General Lee tended to fly off the handle or show too much of his inflexible behavior. Of course a lot of General Lee's "flying off the handle" was not so much a violent outburst of emotion but rather

the use of strong language in what seems to have been emotionally fairly controlled manner. However he was reported at times to have shown more emotional reaction than he customarily did. I should mention that General Hsieh was not always the polite, smiling Chinese by any means. There were occasions, the context of which I cannot now be sure of, in which he behaved quite "viciously."

Within the sub-delegation meetings the North Korean and Communist delegates never in any way contradicted each other in the fashion of the liaison officers in the incident I described above. The extent to which there were differences represented in their discussions was on the whole sufficiently concealed, if it existed, to be visible only by a close analysis which it is not possible for me to make without the full records of the conference and a considerable expenditure of time.

The Communist War of Nerves

As one might expect the negotiations, for the Communists, were in large measure a procedure of engaging in "psychological warfare" with the really essential parts of the negotiatory activity thrown in either in the way of hints embedded in a great deal of other talk or by means of an explicit written proposal. Thus the greater part of all that they did was concerned more with "dramatics" than with negotiation in the U.N. discussion sense. The "dramatics" were not of course simply designed to consume time but were forms of creating pressure on the U.N.

One of the means of psychological warfare was to insult the U.N. delegates. These insults seem to be more violent and come more particularly at points of considerable tension in the negotiations when the Communists were also anxious to impress the U.N. with their aggressiveness and their strength. I shall mention three incidents in which this insulting behavior was employed. In August before the negotiations broke off and before the meetings had been transferred to the sub-delegates, that is while the full delegations were meeting, a situation arose in which the delegates on both sides refused to speak. Without elaborating how this developed it roughly took the form of each side saying they had nothing further to say and then firmly sitting and refusing to be the first side to break the silence. This silence continued unbroken for I believe 2 hours and 11 minutes. During this time General Nam Il, the senior North Korean delegate, wrote several notes to his colleagues. These notes were written in very large Chinese characters and were clearly written in this size and passed around in such a manner in order to ensure that they would be visible to General Paik, the South

Korean delegate who of course would be able to read them. One of these notes referred to the U.N. delegation as "the imperialist lackeys [who] are worse than a dog in a morgue." The point of this particular insult is apparently that there can be nothing really worse than a dog in a morgue since a dog in a morgue will eat a corpse and that is just about the lowest thing that can happen. The second insult that I shall note occurred about November 12th when the Communist delegate (my notes do not indicate whether it was the Chinese General Hsieh or the North Korean Lee, but I believe it was the former) addressed his colleague in an aside which was sufficiently loud (and probably intentionally so) for Mr. Wu, the U.N. Chinese interpreter, to overhear it. This insult was to the effect that the U.N. delegates were "turtle eggs." The point of this insult apparently is that impotent old turtles can only conceive by the aid of intercourse with a snake. Consequently the turtle eggs are the result of a biological mixture of parentage which makes the eggs bastards. Mr. Wu, the U.N. interpreter, told us that to call a person a turtle egg is in Chinese about the very worst insult that one can offer. The third insult was offered by General Hsieh who, in one of the November sub-delegation meetings (at which of course Admiral Joy was not present), in referring to Admiral Joy spoke of him as "your senior delegate whose name I forget." This of course was both intended and received as an insult to Admiral Joy.

U.N. reaction to these insults was variable and seemed to depend on the mood of the people and the period. I was told by the delegates that General Paik the South Korean delegate was very much upset by the first insulting incident that I described above and that when the U.N. delegates retired to their own quarters during a recess of the talks on that day General Paik was in quite a condition and the other delegates had to calm him down and try and get him to treat the matter with more good humor. General Hodes on occasion apparently would return the insulting talk by turning to Admiral Burke and whispering in a somewhat stagy whisper "The bastards" or "The sons of bitches." Undoubtedly I suppose the Communist interpreter who spoke English perfectly with a fine Oxonian accent informed his delegates that these were the worst insults in the English language, just as our interpreter so informed our delegates.

I should have included in the above description of insulting behavior another insulting tactic employed by the Communists. This was to show obvious inattention to the what the U.N. sub-delegates were saying. It involved appearance of boredom, talking among themselves, etc. I notice according to a newspaper report that this type of behavior flared up again some days ago after I had left Korea. As far as I could make out the U.N. delegates never reacted strongly toward this type of behavior and certainly do not appear to have done

anything about it in its more recent form as described in the press dispatch that I refer to. While one might consider it desirable to ignore insults which take the form of supposedly private conversations between members of the Communist delegation and which one might simply pretend not to have overheard or noticed, this type of flagrant insult which is very "public" seems to me to require immediate response. The U.N. delegates as far as I can make out seem simply to have tried to pass it off by ignoring it. Insulting behavior of the sort that the Communists were indulging in is apt to leave them very vulnerable if the insulted party wants to reply with sufficient vigor since ultimately such behavior is bound to prevent all appearance of discussion and negotiation. By proper response it would be possible to force the Communists into an outwardly more respectful behavior and this forcing of their behavior would have given the U.N. a certain moral triumph which would have been worth achieving. I imagine that there are certain types of people, particularly English people, who could have squelched such Communist behavior in a less overt fashion, but if this more subtle type of control was not open to the U.N. delegates they should at least have reacted with an abrupt warning to the Communist delegates to stop reading their magazines or to stop chattering. Their failure to do this on the initial occasions when the Communists indulged in this sort of behavior was undoubtedly responsible for its recurrence lately.

A more subtle form of pressure exercised on the U.N. delegates by the Communists was a very occasional assumption by the Communists during a particular day's meeting of an air of great self-satisfaction. The Communist delegates would apparently assume a very smug air like the proverbial cat that has swallowed the canary. If this was intended to make the U.N. delegates worry about what it was that the Communists found so satisfying in their situation it succeeded to some extent, but not too seriously, largely because the U.N. delegates were so capable of generating their own anxieties and required very little aid from the Communists in doing this.

Another and more serious form of bringing pressure on the U.N. was the manufacturing and exploitation of violations of the neutrality area. As I have indicated earlier the original violation which charged the bombing of Kaesong very likely was intended to show the U.N. that the Communists were willing to break off negotiations in order to compel the U.N. to "come to their senses" and not consider that the Communists were willing to accept anything. Later on I had the impression that other and more trivial incidents were intended for their harassing effect. There is no doubt whatsoever that in this the Communists succeeded very well. I almost got the impression at times as if one of the main values in getting the armistice conference over with was to put an end to the

possibility of more incidents. I am reminded at this point of a little matter that I should have referred to in either Part II or Part III. It illustrates the resistance of at least some of the U.N. persons toward assimilating the obvious lessons of their experiences with the Communists. In discussing some of the problems that might arise after the armistice if the then contemplated plans for Item #3 of the Agenda were effected, I pointed out that a joint Communist and U.N. commission for the supervision of the armistice would run into the following difficulty, namely that breaches of the armistice by the Communists would not necessarily be recognized by the Communist members of the commission and they would by virtue of their 50% representation on the commission be in a position to prevent the commission from taking the actions contemplated in such a case. At this point Colonel Kinney objected to my statement on the grounds that he could not see that there was any real possibility of this. If the Communists did commit an obvious infraction of the armistice and if the U.N. members of the commission brought it to the attention of the commission it was inconceivable to him that the Communists could find any means by which they could refuse to deal with the matter. After all, as Colonel Kinney put it, an infraction would have occurred, and as long as there was no doubt about that, how could the Communists refuse to discuss the matter?

One of the additional techniques in the war of nerves belongs more particularly to the period during which the negotiations were broken off. During this time there was a succession of messages from the commanders of each side. These messages alternated in coming from the U.N. and the Communists. The Communists would send a message, the U.N. would reply, the Communists would reply to the reply, the U.N. would reply, etc. The war of nerves here involved the spacing of one's replies relative to those of the opponent. In view of the fact that there was a great deal of doubt in the minds of most of the U.N. persons as to whether in fact the Communists would ever return to the conference table, any delay in the Communist replies when it was their turn to write a message led to considerable tension on the U.N. side. Were the Communists going to reply at all? It is not possible to interpret the amount of time taken by a reply as being due solely to considerations of psychological warfare. Clearly the writing of a reply, the making of the decisions involved in the reply and consultations with higher headquarters, etc. would in different cases probably consume varying amounts of time. However I have the impression that the amount of time that the Communists took to answer some of the messages was at least in part based on at attempt to demonstrate their own lack of anxiety to resume the negotiations and to frighten the U.N. On the U.N. side there is no question at all that the spacing of replies was in considerable measure motivated by notions of prestige and an unwillingness to show greater

speed in replies than the Communists did themselves. On this matter I have the evidence of direct observation but I assume similar considerations were in the minds of the Communists. As I indicated earlier General Ridgway took a quite strong line during the period of the break-off and on a couple of occasions if the Communists took 6 days to answer a message General Ridgway did not send out his reply until another 6 days or possibly 7 had elapsed even though the reply was ready 24 hours after the Communist message had been received. This practice was not uniformly followed and during the earlier stage of the break-off General Ridgway was more disposed to send his replies as soon as they were ready. But as the struggle between the two parties deepened the prestige considerations involved in delaying the replies became more important to him. In general it seems to me that in this particular form of "temporal struggle" the Communists showed their usual capacity to consume time freely even though they are anxious to have the talks resumed. Their anxiety to avoid signs of anxiety is generally stronger in such instances than the impulse to get things moving as soon as possible.

It seems to have been assumed that the longer one took to answer a message from the opponent the greater strength one thereby demonstrated. This assumption seems to have been made by both the Communists and the U.N. This assumption lacks subtlety. The timing of replies should be dependent at least in part upon the particular content of the reply itself. Thus it appears to me that if after the receipt of a message from the enemy one intends to make a completely intransigent reply without in any way attempting to compromise the issues, then it is preferable to send the reply as quickly as possible. A very strong reply gains in effectiveness by being made quickly as if the decision involved were one about which there was not the slightest doubt in the minds of the senders. On the other hand a message that suggests some sort of compromise or an attempt to compound differences should consume more time in order to suggest that this concession is made only reluctantly and not with any particular anxiety to secure a solution.

A minor aspect of the war of nerves is the Communist tactic in the negotiations of avoiding adjournment at lunch time and carrying the discussions on well into the afternoon period without a break. This occurred to some extent while I was in Korea but I note in the newspapers that it was apparently carried to such lengths after my departure that Admiral Libby who had taken Admiral Burke's place was compelled to try and get in a quick sandwich and a cup of coffee by slipping in momentarily to the U.N. tent next to the conference tent. It is a matter of continual amazement to me how readily the U.N. delegates permit the Communists to get away with this sort of thing. I tried to encourage General

Hodes to insist on a recess at the lunch hour unless of course he and Admiral Burke themselves preferred not to have it. But to continue the session without lunch when they would have preferred otherwise is a form of timidity and self-humiliation that is inconceivable in the behavior of a representative of a great power.

Communist Sensitivities

There were several themes that recurred in Communist discussions that suggest a strong sensitivity to particular forms of behavior or a tendency to see such behavior even where it might be said not to exist. The sensitivity that comes most readily to mind is the Communist preoccupation with what they call the U.N. attitude of being victors. This was especially prominent in their discussions during the first stage of the armistice talks, that is up to the break on August 23rd. It did occur again later in the talks but with diminished frequency as is to be expected in view of the general withdrawal of the U.N. position vis-à-vis the Communists.

The Communists were also quite sensitive to anything in the way of military threats and tended to anticipate such threats even when the U.N. delegates said nothing that could really be interpreted as a threat to use military pressure. At one point the Communist sub-delegate said quite violently, referring to a sector of the ground front where an enveloping move would have been possible for the U.N. and is suggested by the conformation of the line, "Don't think that we're afraid of any such military action," pointing to the area on the map. These are not the exact words but convey the general character of the Communist's remark. The Communists also reacted very violently to Admiral Joy's recent statement in an interview that he thought that military pressure was the only means which would make the Communists cooperative. It is difficult to avoid the interpretation that in these various incidents the Communists were expressing their anxiety that the event which they denied being concerned about was in fact one of very great anxiety to them. And yet it seems difficult to believe that the Communists would be so lacking in astuteness as to show by their preoccupation with these matters that they were of great concern to them. Probably this stems from a too high evaluation of the Communists' skill in negotiation or their capacity to conceal their thoughts and emotions. Of course in such situations it is always possible that one party is not really afraid of military action but is concerned that the other party underestimates the first party's strength and that this underestimation becomes a source of prolonging the armistice conference. One might in such circumstances conceive of a certain party as trying to "correct" the judgments of the other party. However in the situations which I have been

describing it is not likely that this is the case and the only conclusion I can come to is that in fact the Communists did from time to time express very clearly, if unintentionally, the sources of their anxieties.

I might as well include here a comment on General Hsieh and his capacity to control expression. General Lee, as I have already indicated, was usually inexpressive; but General Hsieh tended when things were going moderately well or at least no particular crisis had arisen to do what was described to me as "jiggling." This apparently amounted to a movement of the legs and to some extent the trunk of the body. One might suppose that this jiggling behavior would be more appropriate during times of tension but in General Hsieh's case it seems to have been the other way around. In the early period after the negotiations had been resumed in late October when things were not going so well for the Communists General Hsieh's jiggling disappeared entirely. General Hodes told me that it was not until the U.N. began to make its concessions and things began to break very well for the Communists that he suddenly became aware through General Hsieh's renewed jiggling that during the preceding week this jiggling had disappeared entirely.

The Communists seemed to have had different degrees of sensitivity of a negative type toward different U.N. persons. To my knowledge they never attacked General Craigie or General Burke in any of their press releases at least in a direct and personal fashion. Such attacks were however made against Admiral Joy, General Turner, and particularly Colonel Kinney. As I recall I believe General Hodes fell someplace in between these two groups. I have the impression that the Communists' verbal violence against Admiral Joy and Colonel Kinney was based on statements that these persons made to the press in which they made derogatory remarks about the Communists and in the case of Colonel Kinney a remark which I cannot quite exactly place now but which I recall at the time I read it thinking that it was rather misplaced. Hostility toward General Turner may have been based on his somewhat "brute-like" appearance, and as a matter of fact the Communist press statements about him suggest that his appearance was very much in their minds.

The Communist Calculated Strategy of Relinquishing the Initiative

Perhaps the foregoing phrase will be somewhat misleading. What I have reference to here is that throughout the armistice talks, at least during the earlier period and the period with which I was associated with them, the Communists followed the strategy of trying to get the U.N. to say things and to make

proposals. They did not take the position of saying "Here is what we are after" and trying to concentrate discussion on their objectives and their proposals. On the contrary the Communists discussed their own proposals very little but always focused discussion on what it is that you (the U.N.) have to offer. This strategy is neatly symbolized by the method that the Communists always adopted to open the meeting of the day. At almost every session General Lee would begin the session by saying, "If you have anything to say, say it." (I should add that questioning of Lieutenant Underwood, the Korean U.N. interpreter reveals that this question is not quite as brutal and rude in the Korean as it sounds in its literal English translation.)

Now one might suppose that the most aggressive strategy for any side in an armistice is to present its proposal and keep discussion centered on what it wants. One would expect that the party that considers itself to be the stronger party would not be particularly interested in learning what the enemy is willing to concede or to propose, but rather that it would force the issue by insisting on such and such a settlement. From this standpoint the U.N. procedure of doing precisely that during the earlier phases of the armistice and in a somewhat modified form later appears to be the procedure of the aggressive party or the party with the initiative and superior position.

It is true of course that the Communists did at the very beginning of the conference seize the initiative by placing their own proposals firmly before the delegates for discussion. They started very vigorously by trying, as a matter of fact within the Agenda itself, to get a settlement based on the 38th parallel. This then was behavior consistent with the conception of an aggressive Communist negotiatory strategy. However once the armistice talks got under way and Agenda Item #2 became the Item for discussion the Communists left their proposal of the 38th parallel as a matter of record and concentrated largely on trying to get the U.N. to make new statements modifying its proposals. The general strategy of the Communists was to repeat in a rather formal fashion from time to time that of course the 38th parallel was the only settlement they were interested in, but nonetheless they continued to press the U.N. on whether the U.N. had anything new to say or propose. They were equally insistent on trying to get the U.N. to clarify its rather vague and general proposals of July and August. Similarly when the negotiations resumed after the September recess it was the U.N. that jumped in immediately with a proposal and the Communists did not bring their first post-recess proposal up until the following day. They waited first to see what the U.N. had to say. In concentrating their efforts on breaking down the U.N. proposals and in arguing against them, the Communists would seem to have tacitly admitted that they really did not take seriously their

own 38th parallel proposal. One might argue that a party that is determined to get a particular settlement does not bother, especially if they are in a strong position or feel themselves to be in such a position, to spend most of their time arguing about the opponent's proposal. One would suppose that the proper strategy for those in a position of strength with a determination to get their own way, would be simply to concentrate on their own proposals and show considerable disinterest in discussing anything else. This raises the interesting question, then, as to why the Communists did not follow this strategy. First of all they may have correctly reasoned that the strategy they did follow would not be interpreted as a lack of determination to get their 38th parallel settlement and would not be interpreted as a sign of weakness. If they made this judgment they were in fact quite correct because apart from myself no one in the camp seemed to believe that this particular strategy of the Communists represented either weakness or a non-expectation of getting the 38th parallel. If the Communist strategy was incorrect in that it betrayed their essential negotiatory weakness, then it would also have to be said that they betrayed this weakness only to myself.

One motivation that the Communists may have had for following the strategy that I have outlined is that it permitted them in another sense to be the aggressive party. I have already indicated that from one standpoint the U.N. was permitted by the Communists to take the initiative and to make the proposals while the Communists were content to discuss the U.N. proposals. But this sort of initiative is a somewhat equivocal one. In the actual negotiations it meant that something that the U.N. had placed before the delegates for discussion became an object of ready attack on the part of the Communists. Thus in having the U.N. do most of the constructive talking or proposal-making, the Communists were provided with an object to attack and the U.N. with an object which they had to defend. This meant then that from this other standpoint the U.N. was constantly on the defensive, defending its proposals, whereas the Communists had assumed the attack. Indeed one could see how this worked out when the Communists did, especially later after the resumption of talks, make their proposals. The U.N. delegation then in their turn had something to attack and the Communists now had to defend or justify their proposals. This situation of being either the attacker or the defender had certain pervasive psychological consequences for the immediate periods during which some of the discussions took place. After the Communists made a proposal, in addition to the encouragement provided by the fact that the Communists had withdrawn somewhat from their earlier position, there was the additional encouragement to the U.N. of a more subtle sort stemming from the fact that the delegates now had something of the Communists' which they could pull apart and make objections to.

In addition to the type of advantage discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Communists had probably another rather obvious motive for preferring to let the U.N. do the talking and in concentrating attention on whether the U.N. had anything new to propose. It is generally understood that in a bargaining situation the less one talks often the better off one is. In general in a bargaining situation one is very anxious to get the opponent to disclose how far he is willing to go in meeting your own terms and in concealing from him how far you are willing to go in meeting his. From the standpoint of this problem of negotiation it is clear that the Communist strategy had its very great advantages. During July and August apart from their references to the 38th parallel the Communists made no explicit declaration which would reveal what their minimum requirements might be. The U.N. did all the talking and arguing from the standpoint of trying to sell a particular sort of proposal. However this was not any particular handicap in itself for the U.N. since the U.N. did not, by adopting this procedure, convey to the Communists the extent to which they were, if necessity so demanded, willing to retreat. Indeed as I have indicated in an earlier part of the manuscript the U.N. delegates if anything leaned over in the opposite direction and were so evasive that they gave the impression of trying to get much more than they seriously hoped to get.

The U.N. strategy of providing a proposal and keeping the discussion focused on its own proposal was it seems to me entirely adequate. I still think, as I thought while I was still in Korea, that it was desirable for the U.N. to take the initiative and insist on a particular settlement as the only desirable settlement, suggesting whatever compromise measures might then be needed, provided they were really compromises and not a succession of outright concessions. I was in favor of such a strategy because I felt that as the party with the superior strength in fact and with the intention of conveying such strength to the Communists it was incumbent upon the U.N. to demand a certain type of settlement and show its resolution both with respect to what it wanted and with respect to its intention of getting it. Where this strategy to some extent went wrong was in its tactical elaboration. For such a strategy to succeed and for it to convey the meaning that it was intended to convey it was necessary for the U.N. to make its proposals in very definite and firm ways. It was then necessary for the U.N., having laid its proposals firmly on the table, to show a disinclination to defend it in the defensive and plaintive way which in fact was employed. I tried to encourage the delegates to do less talking and less repetitious defending of the U.N. position. This would have undercut considerably the Communist strategy of always being in the attacking position and keeping the U.N. delegates on the run constantly explaining away and justifying the various elements of the U.N. proposal. Once the U.N. delegates had stated the arguments in favor of the U.N.

proposal which was largely a matter of maintaining the amenities of negotiation and also providing adequate material for public release, the best behavior for the U.N. delegates would have been to relax and show a complete disinclination to argue the Communists into agreement and understanding of their proposals. The difficulty was not so much the fact that the U.N. took the initiative in offering its proposal first, but rather that it constantly tried to argue the Communists into appreciating it and constantly defended it. This behavior effectively ruined the impression of determination and strength that the U.N. procedure and strategy would otherwise have conveyed.

Of course even this foregoing deficiency became a matter of trivial significance compared with the later tendency of the U.N. to make unwarranted concessions. From this point on, that is roughly November 3rd on, the Communist policy of simply waiting for the U.N. to speak and offer it something new is scarcely any intellectual problem. With the U.N. pursuing a rather frantic policy of trying something new every second day to get agreement with the Communists, it would have been folly for the Communists to have done anything other than to sit by and allow the U.N. to talk itself into an increasingly unfavorable position.

The Communists certainly have done extremely well in the negotiations given the military situation that obtained in Korea. They have done so by a fine show of "nerve" which enabled them to skate on somewhat thinner ice than the U.N. was willing to subject itself to. Nonetheless I think one might show that the Communists did make serious errors in their own negotiatory strategy. The only difficulty in trying to make out such a case is that in fact the errors were never exploited and consequently the Communists in fact had successes rather than defeats. It is difficult in such circumstances to know whether one is entitled to call these measures of the Communists' errors of judgment since they did ultimately show success. One could formulate the point I have in mind by saying that with an exercise of reasonable astuteness the U.N. could have taken advantage of some Communist steps and that it is from this standpoint that one might say that the Communists also committed errors. However if the Communists were able to calculate or at least to anticipate that the U.N. would not be able to exploit the deficiencies of some of their steps, a judgment which one would have to call correct, then it would not really be possible to say that the Communist negotiatory strategy had weaknesses in it. Probably the Communists were not unaware of the risks they ran by some of the things they did but they probably preferred as a general orientation toward such negotiations to assume those risks rather than to play a safer game. The sequel certainly justified them in taking these risks and from that standpoint one ought I

suppose not to point to Communist deficiency in strategy but rather to its excellence.

One example of the type of non-realized error (by non-realized I mean that the U.N. did not fully cash in on it) was the lengthy break-off of discussions at the end of August lasting into October. The Communists got into something much bigger than, I am sure, they realized when they created the incident that precipitated the suspension of talks. I am fairly confident that they expected nothing other than a short break of two or three days until the incident had been smoothed over. Once in it, however, as each side became more intransigent they could not bring themselves to go back under conditions which at least initially would have been humiliating to them in view of the messages they were receiving from General Ridgway. They probably figured that if they returned to the negotiations under such circumstances the U.N. would receive encouragement to be even tougher than it had already been in its demands upon the Communists in the discussions of Agenda Item #2. (Incidentally this illustrates the difference between "losing face" in the sense of simply being in an embarrassing position and suffering a loss of prestige which might have direct negotiatory consequences. I do not believe that "losing face" as it was generally understood and referred to by the U.N. delegates was of any great consequence to the Communists. What was, however, of considerable consequence was the effect that a particular defeat might have in giving the U.N. new objectives or confirmation in their attempt to secure present objectives.) I think the Communists over-estimated the effect that their return under such circumstances would have on U.N. behavior. While undoubtedly it would have been a great satisfaction to the U.N. and would have given them some sense of their own strength I doubt very much whether it would have changed radically their orientation toward the negotiations. By continuing the struggle in the attempt to return to the negotiations under less humiliating conditions both the Communists and the U.N. created a conflict that became increasingly significant to each side. When ultimately the Communists agreed to leave Kaesong and resume negotiations at Panmunjom they suffered a defeat that was probably greater and should have been more significant for U.N. behavior than would have been the case had they returned rather early in the period of the suspension of talks. In this six weeks' struggle the U.N. emerged, on the whole, victorious (although this was spoiled somewhat by the outcome of the later negotiations between the liaison officers concerning the precise conditions for the resumption of talks at Panmunjom). This victory should have been interpreted by the U.N. as a clear indication of their capacity to subordinate the Communists' will to their own even in a situation where the Communists had made a major investment of time and effort in order to vanquish the U.N. Had the lesson of this conflict

within the larger conflict of the negotiation been properly appreciated together with the other indications of what a correct U.N. strategy should be, the U.N. could have returned to the negotiations with a determination to act with equal vigor and persistence in the actual talks themselves. However the two months during which the talks had been suspended not only did not redound to U.N. advantage, but this great consumption of time placed such a sense of time pressure on the U.N. that in the end one must judge that this long period during which the talks were suspended was extremely effective in ultimately cracking the U.N. negotiatory front against the Communists.

HERBERT GOLDHAMER

Appendix

Report on Far Eastern Trip, April-November 1951

[Goldhamer's presentation to the RAND Board of Trustees, February 22, 1952]

I arrived in the FE Theatre at the end of April 1951. At that time Alex George, also of the [RAND] Social Science Division, was still in the Theatre completing work he had done on air weapons effects, interdiction problems, and the collection of material on the role of the political officers in the CCF and NKA. George had salvaged an excellent group of Korean interviewers and translators that had been brought together by ORO and was on the point of being disbanded. He arranged for this group to be taken over and administered by AUFERG (the FE HRRI office) with the understanding that it would be available for RAND research purposes.

When I left for the FE it was understood that my research efforts would necessarily be shaped in part by my appraisal of the opportunities and facilities available in the Theatre. I was interested in doing a fairly broad social-psychological study of the Communist armies (CCF, NKA) in Korea. The Social Science Division had just completed such a study of the Soviet Army and Air Force based on a small number of intensive interviews with Soviet military defectors. After working for a short time with the Korean interviewing staff, I decided that a worthwhile study of this nature could be made using the Chinese and North Korean POWs in the Pusan camps. The exclusive use of POWs as informants and my own inability to interview them directly, together with various administrative problems in the use of POWs, imposed limitations on what such a study could hope to accomplish.

Shortly after my arrival, I was joined by Ewald Schnitzer, who had just been added to the Social Science Division, with a view to providing assistance for the Division's Far Eastern venture. With this added help it was possible, in addition to the main study, to undertake a few special investigations of a more immediately operational or service character.

The materials for the main study were pretty well in hand by mid-August, and I prepared to leave the Theatre by the end of that month. About this time, however, I was invited through Major General Craigie, then Vice-Commander of HQ FEAF and a member of the U.N. armistice delegation, to visit the delegation

in their camp at Munsan-ni for a few days. The few days extended to several months. I remained with the U.N. delegation both in their camp at Munsan-ni and in Tokyo from the latter part of August until late in November. At this time I returned to Washington, only four months overdue.

My stay in the FE thus divides into two principal periods: about four months spent principally in Pusan, Korea, working on the Chinese and North Korean POWs and the last three months spent with the U.N. delegation. The first period divides into the work on the main study and the more incidental work of an operational character. I shall first speak a little about this latter activity.

In doing what is more or less long-term research in an active Theatre of war it is helpful if one can at the same time give some immediate assistance to the Theatre headquarters that provide the facilities and opportunities for research. In addition, the research worker is likely to become conscience-stricken if he does not contribute something to problems of immediate operational significance. It is not easy to dissociate oneself from a war in process. As a matter of fact this inner compulsion to do immediately useful work is probably more decisive than any externally imposed necessity. The principal headquarters with which I dealt showed no great insistence on some immediate return for the services they rendered. Provided the civilian research worker did not expect the war to be conducted in such a way as to facilitate his work, the military commands in the Far East were (as far as I could see) willing to support work from which they could expect little or no immediate benefit.

During my period in Korea, four reports of an operational character were produced. These were:

(1) A report on POW evaluations of air weapons based on material gathered by Alex George in the early spring 1951;

(2) A follow-up report that studied changes in POW evaluations between spring 1951 and late summer of the same year;

(3) A report on the psychological and physical effectiveness of MPQ2 attacks;

(4) A report on new AA tactics that were being introduced by the CCF and NKA against fighter planes.

To the best of my knowledge, the last report provided the first more or less solid information on new directives and tactics in the Communist armies that had led to a considerable increase in the number of U.N. fighter planes that were being shot down by small arms fire.

The first three reports on various aspects of weapons' effectiveness were, I believe, of some value. But the work in this field succeeded primarily in convincing me that much more thought needs to go into devising adequate means for evaluating in an actual war situation the physical and psychological effectiveness of weapons. Operations Analysis, Fifth Air Force, was also very much concerned with weapons' evaluation and it is my clear impression that they were as discontented with the results of their own investigations as I am with those that were secured by myself. It is not likely that pre-war tests and analytical methods can alone solve these problems. Investigations during war operations of achieved effects are certainly necessary. RAND's research interests and obgliations do not lie particularly in this operational field; but I believe it would be fully consistent with those interests and obligations for RAND to undertake some study of the best *methods* for securing trustworthy operational data on weapons' effectiveness. The multiplication of weapons and the consequent multiplication of choices that the military commander faces make this an increasingly urgent problem.

I shall now speak briefly about the overall study of the CCF and NKA to which most of my time in Korea (May to August) was devoted. The principal objective of this study was to get some clearer understanding of how the Chinese and North Korean Communist commands organized, indoctrinated, trained, and controlled the manpower at their disposal; how they altered and adapted their methods to the experiences of the Korean war; how the Communist troops responded to the Communist system of control on the one hand and the threats, deprivations, and enticements provided by U.N. military action and the hazards of war on the other hand; and why they responded in the way they did. Finally, from such materials one obviously hopes to acquire some capacity to predict how such troops (and even their higher commanders) are likely to behave in particular circumstances and what measures (more especially in the field of psychological warfare) will best exploit weaknesses in their psychological dispositions and in the military structure in which these are embedded and by which they are in part shaped.

The materials secured for the purposes of this investigation are approximately 1,000 interviews with Chinese and NK POWs. There is no need to elaborate here on the precautions required in arriving at descriptive and interpretive statements about an army based on materials drawn from so special a group. I should like to note, however, that the CCF and NKA prisoners are on the whole quite talkative. They have little of the western tradition of giving name and serial number and then shutting up. They receive no indoctrination on proper behavior as POWs, although their total indoctrination time is far in excess of

what any American soldier would tolerate. This illustrates a point of considerable importance in assessing Communist armies. The Chinese and NK soldiers received no indoctrination of this sort, first, because capture and surrender were not officially recognized except as treason or at least lack of military discipline and secondly, because it would have run counter to another element of indoctrination, namely, that the United Nations killed its prisoners. Few advantages in this world are secured without cost and the Communist attempt to secure one type of gain made the Communist soldier more vulnerable in other respects. (This, of course, does not imply that the gain may not have been worth the cost.) One of the aims of the present study is to learn not only how to counteract Communist measures but also how to identify and exploit new weaknesses that these very measures themselves create.

I should make clear that the 1,000 interviews to which I referred do not represent a general questioning of 1,000 POWs on all aspects of Communist army life. The great majority of these interviews were confined to one, two, or three main themes. An attempt was made to interview prisoners on aspects of army life to which their own background and military experience were of particular relevance.

These materials are now being more fully analyzed than was possible at the time when they were being gathered. At that time one could not do much more than study them with the aim of getting guidance for subsequent stages of the investigation. I could describe to you many aspects of Communist army life, but this would take more time than we have at our disposal. On the other hand, a compact statement of the key features of Communist military organization and their significance for military planning is something which I would rather not venture at this stage. If there are points of particular interest which you would like to hear about , perhaps these could be best dealt with by questions later on, if you so wish.

Before leaving the discussion of this study I should like to point out two bonus values that I hope it will have. The NKA was organized, trained, and supervised by the Soviet military. It is likely, therefore, that the study will throw light not only on Oriental Communist military organization but also on Soviet notions of military organization. Differences between and resemblances of the NKA and the military forces of the Soviet Union should help also in ferreting out compromises and changes in the Soviet system of military organizaton when it is applied to a satellite Oriental army. The second bonus is closely related to the last point. The CCF has a military history that is considerably more independent of Soviet control, and a comparison of the CCF and NKA may throw some light on the extent to which Chinese Communists feel that their own procedures or

requirements must differ from those of Elder Brother. For the time being, however, I must say that the CCF and NKA materials taken in conjunction with materials on the Soviet forces provide a much greater initial impression of homogeneity than heterogeneity.

I now come to the second major stage of my activity in the FE, namely my period of association with the U.N. armistice delegation. This had the following background.

The POW materials gathered during the mid-summer period provided me with an increasing conviction of the following points:

(1) That in early June (following the failure of their spring offensive, and the U.N. counter-offensive) the CCF had been in a far more critical position than appeared to be generally realized;

(2) That this critical condition was a partial collapse of the capacity of the CCF command to control its troops;

(3) That desertions and more particularly the desire to desert had increased considerably, not only among front line troops but also among new units crossing the Yalu;

(4) That the CCF could not possibly afford to mount another offensive at that time or in the immediate future;

(5) That this was so not because of the manpower and materiel losses sustained in the spring offensive but because adequate control could not be maintained over their troops during an offensive and such troops would have been particularly vulnerable to an aggressive PW program combined with supporting military measures to facilitate unit surrenders;

(6) That a more adequate program to facilitate surrender during the critical days of late May and early June would have led to a major military disaster for the CCF;

(7) That the or a primary motivation for Malik's ceasefire bid was the awareness of the Communist command that its troops could not be trusted on the offensive and that its system of military-political control had reached a point of perilous stress;

(8) That the Communist system of surveillance and control was much more adequate when their troops were on the defensive, that under the conditions of limited military action that existed in July and August the CCF was capable of effective defensive action, and that consequently the Communist negotiators

were not (in the existing circumstances) under any pressure to complete the armistice quickly;

(9) And that in fact they would prolong the armistice indefinitely, as long as they could improve their negotiatory position thereby without their military weakness being exposed;

(10) But that conditions could be specified that would help considerably in re-creating the bad morale conditions of late May and early June and thereby bring increased pressure upon the Communist negotiators.

During this period prevailing opinion (as far as I could determine from the sources available to me, mostly the press) was rather different. Speculation concerning Communist motives in initiating the armistice talks generally ascribed aggressive intentions to the Communist forces (trickery, preparation of a new offensive) or introduced gratuitous and far-fetched assumptions such as Stalin's impending death. It seems to be characteristic of the West to underestimate its strength and its impact on the Communist world, and I was perturbed by what appeared to me to be the absence of a correct understanding of the state of affairs—"correct," of course, meaning one which corresponded to my own views. You will understand that the views I enumerated above could not in the nature of the case be "proven" to others in any rigorous or completely convincing manner from the materials available to me from the POWs. And yet the continuing stream of evidence provided by the POW interviews made any other interpretation impossible to me. (I have subsequently not learned anything that has led me to alter these views; and I have learned some things that have given me even a stronger sense of conviction that they were true.)

The obvious relevance of these views for the armistice negotiations then in progress led me finally to ignore the possibility that a sudden Communist offensive might effectually undermine the reputation of social science, RAND, and myself. I presented these views both orally and in a memo to Major General Brentnall and Brigadier General Banfill of HQ FEAF and they were transmitted to General Ridgway.

I took the opportunity afforded by this discussion, and also in the memorandum that I prepared, to draw attention briefly to some points bearing on negotiatory strategy in dealing with Communists. While I felt that my work with the POWs in Pusan entitled me to express my conclusions on the state of the CCF, I would not have felt myself justified in offering what in effect was advice on the negotiatory problems of the armistice simply on the basis of my own personal convictions on these matters. The Social Science Division of RAND had, however, pursued inquiries highly relevant to them, and there existed papers by

Dr. Speier and others in the Division and also Leites' work on the Politburo that bore very directly on the problems of the Korean negotiations. I felt, therefore, that it was possible without presumption to apply some of these findings to the armistice negotiations at Kaesong.

About two weeks later, I had an opportunity to discuss this memorandum, and more particularly the Social Science Division's work bearing on negotiation with Communists, with General Craigie who was in Tokyo during a brief absence from the U.N. delegation camp in Korea. The outcome of this discussion was an invitation to visit the delegation camp for a few days, and I arrived there on 24 August. As I have already indicated, this period of association with the U.N. delegation continued until the end of November.

I should like to record here my great indebtedness to General Craigie for the opportunity he provided both to observe the work of the delegation and thus to add to the Division's knowledge and insight on negotiatory problems and also to participate in their deliberations. This is an indebtedness that I know is very strongly shared by the members of the Social Science Division and I am sure by you as well. The significance of his invitation to me extends, however, far beyond a compliment to RAND. I have it on the authority of my colleagues that this is one of the relatively rare occasions on which a scientist, purely in his capacity as a scientist, has been enabled to observe and participate in diplomatic or negotiatory activities at this level. Our indebtedness is certainly one that ought to be shared by scientists generally and social scientists in particular.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the negotiations in Korea is the time they have consumed. The negotiations are now in their eighth month.

One rather obvious reason for such a situation is the fact that both sides face military forces that are intact. A rough parity of strength precludes a rapid armistice based on the dictation of terms. It does not, however, necessarily abridge the opportunities for a quick settlement based on a mutual understanding that each side is in a position to resist any undue encroachments by the other party. The explanation based on military stalemate is thus certainly not a sufficient explanation. It is, in fact, not even in itself an entirely accurate description of the situation. The military stalemate that existed in Korea during the summer and early fall of 1951 was in considerable measure a choice and not a necessity. The United Nations had the capacity to exert considerable military pressure on the Communists. It had the capacity to secure at least limited gains on the ground front. In fact, during September, after the armistice talks had been suspended, the United Nations made significant advances on the eastern front. These advances were made despite the fact that the Communists had already had

several months to recover from the defeats of their spring offensive and despite the fact that the U.N. ground operations involved no major military effort.

The United Nations relied largely on air and naval action to bring continuing pressure on the Communists. Effective exploitation of the air interdiction program would, however, have required vigorous ground operations.

U.N. reluctance to utilize its military strength in support of the negotiations was obviously dictated by a desire to avoid any further loss of life that could be interpreted as "unnecessary" or "wasteful" or motivated by the insensitivity of military commanders to death. It seems reasonably clear that less hesitation in this direction would probably have produced no greater total increment of casualties than is being produced by the prolongation of the negotiations. The military problem was not one of driving the Communists to the Yalu but of exercising sufficient pressure to make the consumption of time by the Communists more costly to them. Not costly in terms of manpower losses, but territorial losses to which they were considerably more sensitive. The United Nations in large measure discarded its major bargaining weapon and eliminated from the scene the factor that had led the Communists to seek an armistice.

Relieved of any serious military threat, other factors now became decisive for the negotiations. Provided that the attempt to gain them involved no sacrifice of other objectives, every potential gain is sought by the Communists as long as there is any apparent possibility of achieving them. The need to push achievement to its uttermost possible limits is very strong. As Leites has noted in speaking about the Politburo Code, "No advance, however small, should be neglected." To serve this requirement the Communists had two major weapons: time and patience on the one hand and a well developed capacity to convey an impression of utter intransigency on the other hand.

In these same respects the United Nations were ill equipped. This was particularly true of the period beginning October 25, when the negotiations were resumed after a lapse of two months. On November 2 the United Nations were in a good negotiatory position. They had made definite gains in the period October 25–November 1. But a strong sense of time pressure, a belief in public impatience, a concern for continuing casualties even without any real military effort, a delusory conviction that concessions to the Communists would inspire the Communists likewise to make concessions, all conspired to provoke a major break in the U.N. negotiatory front on November 3. The Communists thus received very considerable encouragement to "sit it out." This they have done with no small rewards to themselves.

(I should like to add here that these events occurred following General Craigie's departure to assume his new duties in the United States. I mention this not simply to do justice to Air Force representation on the delegation which in any case was by no means the sole responsible agency in the situation I have described—but because the departure of General Craigie meant the loss of a relatively scarce commodity: the capacity to act consistently on the basis of the best analysis of the situation that one had been able to reach, that is, the capacity to accept the consequences of one's line of reasoning.)

In referring to United Nations willingness to make concessions, I do not mean to imply that in a negotiatory situation one can avoid relinquishing some objectives (unless, of course, one is in a position to dictate terms). But there is a difference between a concession and a compromise. The United Nations tended to make outright concessions in the expectation or hope of getting concessions in return, instead of seeking to effect compromises in which both parties simultaneously make concessions.

In part this U.N. tendency springs from certain moral conceptions or conceptions of what is "decent" negotiatory behavior. Some time after I left Korea, *The New York Times* reported in some detail a statement that General Turner had made to the Communists in which he cited successive concessions that the United Nations had made in order to try and secure agreement and clearly indicated that it was reprehensible of the Communists to keep taking these concessions and not to show a similar willingness to meet the United Nations part way. This statement pretty clearly reflects the judgment that "since we have made concessions, you ought to make concessions too"; whereas the Communist judgment undoubtedly was: "since they are making concessions it is unnecessary for us to make concessions." The early U.N. compliance with most of the Communist administrative requirements surrounding the selection of a conference site (Kaesong) also reflects a U.N. distaste for haggling over matters of nonsubstantive significance and a tendency to want to prove its good will and cooperative spirit, in the hope (I believe) of developing a favorable "atmosphere" for the talks. The United Nations rather rapidly learned that compliance with Communist demands on these apparently "trivial" matters was not expedient, and an increasing amount of "tough-mindedness" developed. I would, however, like to mention one completely trivial incident that occurred quite late in the negotiations and which demonstrates how difficult it is for U.N. personnel to divest themselves of the standards of behavior which they are accustomed to employ in dealing with associates or "friendly enemies." Sometime in November a flight of U.N. aircraft approached the Panmunjom neutral conference site area. The lead plane saw the warning balloons as he was about to fly over the area and

veered off apparently in time to prevent the flight from flying directly over the area, but not soon enough to avoid the area himself, although it was not entirely evident that he had actually flown over the area. As a matter of fact, the Communists themselves, who lose no opportunity to allege a violation of neutrality, seemed to be uncertain whether to make a formal charge or not. This, however, they finally did on the following day. The U.N. liaison officer who received the complaint correctly pointed out to the Communist liaison officer that the agreements subscribed to by both parties required that complaints of violations should be made immediately to the officer in charge of the liaison tent. The Communist representative tried to get out of this difficulty by stating that he supposed that at the time there was no one in the tent. The U.N. liaison officer, however, pointed out that he knew quite well that there was someone on duty there 24 hours per day. At this point the Communist liaison officer was clearly at a loss when his U.N. counterpart added that he did not wish to take advantage of a technicality and would take the complaint under advisement. This was a great relief to the Communist liaison officer who immediately repeated the U.N. liaison officer's words in very formal fashion as expressing an official commitment to ignore Communist noncompliance with procedures required to give a complaint official status. As I have indicated, the incident itself is inconsequential but it illustrates nicely the automatic assumption that to behave in a purely legalistic fashion, even with Communists, is morally disagreeable. It should be added that Communist interpretations of U.N. behavior in such circumstances probably impute to the United Nations not a high moral standard, but rather weakness and timidity. From this standpoint these "trivial" incidents take on a more general significance.

It might seem that U.N. negotiatory activity in this period should not be interpreted as "weakness" or "incorrect strategy," but rather as flexibility and a realization that the concessions granted the Communists were less important to the United Nations than the gain secured in time, lives, and money by meeting Communist demands. The United Nations also very much wanted an armistice and nothing in this world is free. If the Communists were strong enough to resist, then (so one might argue), one simply has to pay more for a settlement, and this is precisely what goes on in any bargaining situation. The difficulty with this argument, however, is as follows: Communist demands are not fixed. The more one indicates a willingness to pay, the higher the price becomes. While the following statement is grossly oversimplified, nonetheless there is an important truth in it: namely, in bargaining with Communists, it is cheaper (or at least as cheap) to get more than to get less. This maxim, of course, only applies to the broad middle region of the total scale of demands. If one is content with extremely little, one can probably get a rapid settlement; and if one insists on

much too much, the imposed demands become a greater evil than the nonresolution of the negotiatory issues. The evidence for this maxim is, of course, in part the fact that negotiations are still continuing today. The United Nations have repeatedly made concessions with a view to speeding the armistice settlement. This, however, has only led the Communists to wait for the next concession. It cannot be denied, of course, that the United Nations has in this way approached more closely to agreement with the Communists. The observation that I want to support here is that such agreement could have been secured probably more quickly, but at the very least as quickly, by a more aggressive strategy which at the same time would have procured for the United Nations more favorable settlement terms.

You will, I am sure, have noted that most of the ideas I have expressed did not require three months' association with the U.N. delegation for their development. They could just as well have been based on a moderately close reading of *The New York Times*. That I have not engaged in more intimate observations here is not due to any insensitivity to the experience I was privileged to have in Korea. But you will understand that there are obligations both to official security requirements and to the discretion owed to those who so unquestioningly accepted me in their midst.