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14. ABSTRACT Evidence from recent operations shows an increasing tendency of employing Special Operations Forces (SOF) with General Purpose Forces (GPF). The larger degree of cooperation and mutual support necessitates Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services change current planning and training framework to better reflect present and future operational employment expectations. Previously SOF and GPF planners primarily focused on deconfliction of operations when needed, but Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have demonstrated a need for greater cooperation and SOF/GPF integration at all levels. Integration of SOF and GPF is happening on the battlefield now. Recent changes to doctrine necessitate changes in military education and training to reinforce the successes and mitigate shortcomings and risks found in current SOF and GPF integration. JFCOM can drive this with initiatives in these areas with the support of the Services, USSOCOM, and the training proponents and centers. Implementation of this training and education will increase employment options for Combatant Commanders, JTF Commanders, and unit leaders at all levels. The changing nature of conflict under the Global War on Terror (GWOT), limited resources, broad operational scope, and increased operational tempo require all assets be employed to the greatest effect and as efficiently as possible. More effective integration of SOF and GPF is a step towards this end.					
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.



*Planning and Training Considerations for Emerging Trends in
Special Operations and General Purpose Force
Operational Integration*

by

WILLIAM J. CARTY
MAJ USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____
Faculty Advisor: Patrick C. Sweeney, JMO Professor

9 February 2004

ABSTRACT

Evidence from recent operations shows an increasing tendency of employing Special Operations Forces (SOF) with General Purpose Forces (GPF). The larger degree of cooperation and mutual support necessitates Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services change current planning and training framework to better reflect present and future operational employment expectations. Previously SOF and GPF planners primarily focused on deconfliction of operations when needed, but Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have demonstrated a need for greater cooperation and SOF/GPF integration at all levels.

Integration of SOF and GPF is happening on the battlefield now. Recent changes to doctrine necessitate changes in military education and training to reinforce the successes and mitigate shortcomings and risks found in current SOF and GPF integration. JFCOM can drive this with initiatives in these areas with the support of the Services, USSOCOM, and the training proponents and centers. Implementation of this training and education will increase employment options for Combatant Commanders, JTF Commanders, and unit leaders at all levels. The changing nature of conflict under the Global War on Terror (GWOT), limited resources, broad operational scope, and increased operational tempo require all assets be employed to the greatest effect and as efficiently as possible. More effective integration of SOF and GPF is a step towards this end.

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INTRODUCTION

During the planning for Operation Anaconda in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Alpha Company, 2-187 Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, received an attachment of six Special Forces soldiers. Unique to the mission, the Special Forces soldiers were to facilitate overwatch of infantry forces once in the objective area and to aid in liaison with host nation forces under the direction of US Army Special Forces. Other companies on the mission received similar attachments.

CPT Butler, the Alpha Company Commander, and the Special Forces Detachment laid out their maps and graphics and as CPT Butler relayed his concept to the detachment, a significant disconnect was identified. Alpha Company's primary route took them directly through a minefield. The General Purpose Force (GPF) headquarters had not plotted the minefield, the report of which had been lost in an ever-expanding sheaf of intelligence summaries at the Brigade Headquarters. The Special Forces element, with greater access to more efficient reporting and dissemination assets, did have it on their graphics. Once the problem was identified, the updated information was disseminated through the task force prior to insertion, resulting in modification of planned routes in the valley for the ground forces.

Alpha Company's actions were documented in a front page Army Times story. They arrived on the ground with the first indirect fire assets for the operation--their company mortars. With the information on the minefields updated, CPT Butler effectively maneuvered his company into position and began to inflict significant casualties on the enemy with his mortar section, facilitating the reorganization of friendly forces in the area

and allowing for more effective resupply and casualty evacuation to take place.¹ The units that had gone in on the first wave with their Special Forces attachments received the expected overwatch, as well as added individual and unit capabilities for casualty evacuation and Close Air Support.

CPT Butler received the Bronze Star for Valor for his actions, and Operation Anaconda succeeded in removing the last significant enemy elements from the Shah-I-Kot Valley. From CPT Butler's perspective, the Special Forces unit present for planning averted what could have been a near disaster--a fratricide incident from an untemplated minefield. The other Special Forces units also distinguished themselves as combat multipliers, staying with the GPF units for the duration of the fight. The presence of Special Forces integrated with GPF in Operation Anaconda facilitated the reduction of friendly casualties, allowed for more effective engagement of the enemy, and contributed to the overall success of the mission.² This unique employment method served to increase the overall effectiveness of the US Force.

Evidence from recent operations shows an increasing tendency of employing Special Operations Forces (SOF) with GPF. The larger degree of cooperation and mutual support necessitates Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services change current planning and training framework to better reflect present and future operational employment expectations. Previously SOF and GPF

¹ Sean Naylor, "Shells, Jeers Provoke 'Best Mortarmen' of Battalion," *ArmyTimes.com*, 18 March 2002, <<http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-800905.php> [9 February 2004].

² Captain Kevin Butler, Commander A-Co, 2-187 IN, 101st Infantry Division during Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001-2002, interview by author, 9 December 2003, Fort Benning, GA, annotated telephone interview, Infantry Hall, Fort Benning, GA.

planners primarily focused on deconfliction of operations when needed, but Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF have demonstrated a need for greater cooperation and SOF/GPF integration at all levels.

Through the examination of traditional employment methods, newly released doctrine, anecdotal evidence, and data, trends emerge that illustrate where shortfalls in planning and employment exist with regard to SOF and GPF integration. Built on these issues, evidence presented will indicate that a significant enough problem exists to merit changes in education and training of both SOF and GPF. The changes recommended, if implemented, will serve as a potential solution to overcome the challenges of SOF and GPF integration and increase joint interoperability and force effectiveness.

The capstone manual for employment of SOF is Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Special Operations Forces*. It serves as the overarching reference for the application of SOF capabilities, and provides detailed information on SOF command and control, employment, and support at the operational level. As such, Service and subordinate manuals refer to JP 3-05 when developing added guidance for SOF employment, as well as being the reference for Theater and JTF commanders and below for SOF implementation. The newest edition of JP 3-05, released 17 December 2003, has gone a long way in addressing doctrinal shortcomings in the previous version, however, areas in need of greater emphasis still remain, as well as means of implementation for the planning and training needed in the joint and Service communities.

Joint Pub 3-05 states that, among other things, SOF missions are conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of GPF. Also on this topic, JP 3-05 states Special

Operations can be conducted in support of a GPF unit's tactical objectives when doing so will be critical to the achievement of strategic or operational objectives by that GPF.

Another change to the role of SOF in conflicts is the direct result of September 11th. USSOCOM transformed from a supporting command to a supporting and supported command and now has full responsibility for the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Accordingly, Special Operations can be conducted as an independent campaign as an overarching strategy incorporating the geographical combatant commander's individual theater campaign plan. However, as seen in Afghanistan, existing doctrine for new increased integration of SOF with GPF is lacking or non-existent.

Throughout OEF, assets from GPF that SOF would have traditionally supported were used in support of SOF. Army forces were used to secure SOF bases³, and a US Navy aircraft carrier served in direct support of SOF operations.⁴ Special Forces and Air Force SOF employed strategic and operational-level air assets in tactical roles. Rangers parachuted onto objective Rhino long before the Marines occupied it as their base, and Army Special Forces seized the US Embassy and used an Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment attached from the Army 10th Mountain Division to clear it prior to turning it over to the Marines⁵.

Following the fall of the Taliban, SOF continued to be employed in non-traditional roles with regard to GPF integration. The Anaconda vignette that opened this paper shows how SOF attached to a rifle company better facilitated the operations of infantry units. On a

³ "Training." *Infantry Conference 2003 10th Mountain Division (LI) OEF Lessons Learned*. Lkd. Infantry Conference Page: September 2003. <www.infantry.army.mil/infantryconference.html> [10 January 2004].; Butler Interview.

⁴ Glenn W. Goodman. "Made to Order". *Armed Forces Journal International*. December 2001. <www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2001/December/SpecOps.htm> [13 January 2004].

⁵ Robin Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden* (New York: Random House, 2003), 28, 253.

larger scale in the same operation, it is worth noting that it was a US Infantry Brigade in charge of the mission, with two US Battalions in blocking positions, and closing under fire as the moving element, an indigenous force advised by SOF.⁶ (Of note is that the battle did not unfold as planned, but this was due to significant and unanticipated weather and enemy conditions). Although employment of US and Afghan forces in Operation Anaconda was at the tactical level, this integration represented a shift in planning and employment at the operational level.

Lessons learned from SOF actions in Afghanistan were applied in Iraq, parceling out large portions of the Area of Operations (AO) to SOF forces, but this time in support of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Western Iraq fell almost exclusively to SOF, with SOF in the north again working with indigenous forces to set conditions for introduction of GPF. In the north, SOF and Peshmerga fighters routed terrorists and Iraqi forces alike, and went on to secure an area sufficient for the airborne introduction of the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade.⁷

To facilitate these activities, SOF in theater is, by doctrine, placed under a Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC), or under a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) for command and control (C2). JP 3-05 details the various levels of liaison that SOF is responsible for to better employ SOF C2 at all levels of command within the JTF. These include a Special Operations Coordination (SOCOORD) Element to Army Corps and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCE) at the Division Level, and added liaison elements below these levels as

⁶ Michael Elliot, "The Valley of Death", *Time*, 18 March 2002, 32-45.

⁷ Karl Vick, "Kurdish-US Assault Takes Town," *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC), 29 March 2003, A-01. ; Ken Dilanian, "Airborne Jumps into Northern Iraq," *Knight Ridder Newspapers*, 26 March 2003, <<http://www.philly.com/mlid/philly/5488005.htm>> [8 February 2004]

necessary. All references to the role of these elements in the Joint Pub state that the purpose of these elements is to advise, deconflict and coordinate SOF activities with GPF command elements, and when necessary serve as a C2 element within the AO, exercising Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) of SOF. JP 3-05 addresses liaison between SOF and GPF as a SOF responsibility at all levels of the Joint Force, but has little information on reciprocal GPF liaison to SOF, which is needed when the supporting-supported roles are reversed as they were in OEF.

Current GPF Service doctrine on employment of SOF is limited. The most significant problem with current doctrine and recommend employment methods, at the joint and Service levels, both from SOF and GPF perspectives, is that the majority of doctrine and traditional planning has primarily focused on coordination and deconfliction of SOF and GPF assets. No official reference, traditional training, or formal planning framework exist that address true SOF and GPF integration within the theater in any significant detail. Following current published doctrine and training within a JTF, SOF and GPF operations are conducted primarily in parallel, but this is not how it is occurring today, and current doctrine and training needs to reinforce what has been learned on the battlefield.

Even beyond the role of major combat operations, there were many changes to SOF and GPF integration, again indicating a shift in thinking at the operational level. All over Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF and GPF Areas of Operation are overlapping, if not identical. SOF and GPF missions are regularly carried out in the same AOs. In cases where routine operations are occurring, a common operating picture of the presence of SOF and GPF in a single AO can prove very useful beyond just deconfliction and fratricide prevention. For instance, a SOF element confronted by an enemy threat that exceeds its capabilities to reduce

could call upon a local GPF unit rather than call for its present headquarters to launch a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for reinforcement. Correspondingly, a GPF unit that runs into problems as a result of a cultural or language barrier could call upon a local SOF element to help resolve the situation.

Augmentation for specific missions is also becoming more common in both directions. This augmentation has resulted in task organizations and command relationships not traditionally exercised in the past. Sensitive Site Exploitation and raids as special operations missions, and conventional raids and Cordon and Search Operations differ little in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Where they diverge is in the nature of the target and the level of associated risk. With the vast number of physical objectives, targets, and unique skill sets SOF and GPF possess, more of these missions are being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan by combined GPF and SOF, either in supporting roles or as a fully integrated force.⁸ Without a doubt, the very best example of this is the efforts to capture all three Husseins in Iraq. In the attempted capture of Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul (during which they fought to the death), the 101st Airborne provided the cordon force, while SOF initially served as the search force.⁹ In the capture of Saddam Hussein, the 4th ID provided the cordon force, and again the search force came from SOF.¹⁰

Doctrine, as previously discussed, reflects a traditional attitude of cultural separation and institutionalizes it. The premise that SOF liaison is for deconfliction and coordination, and not integration, indicates that regular or long-term integration of SOF and GPF below the JTF is not seriously considered an operational method. The lack of detailed discussion in

⁸ Doctrine and Tactics Division. "Afghanistan Lessons Learned Collection Team Visit with Task Force Panther, 3rd Bde, 82nd Airborne Division," *Afghanistan Lessons Learned Collection Team Visit with Task Force Panther, 3rd Bde, 82nd Airborne Division CD-ROM*, Fort Benning, GA: Doctrine and Tactics Division, CATD, United States Army Infantry Center, 29 March 2003, 26.

GPF manuals reinforces this shortfall, compounded by the assumption that SOF/GPF liaison is a SOF responsibility, based on SOF doctrine and a lack of it for GPF. A clear example of this disconnect is in the Army's newly published Stryker manuals where SOF liaison is specifically stated *not* to be for physical integration.¹¹

This mind-set, deeply rooted in cultural differences and reinforced in doctrine has at times led to command and operational friction among SOF and GPF units on the battlefield. The idea that a Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) is where SOF conducts activities and the GPF AO is the property of the GPF commander has led to issues of "Who owns the ground?"¹² Frustration of both SOF and GPF commanders is apparent in After Action Reports (AARs) regarding the ability for both forces to effectively carry out missions in the same geographical area. With the changing nature of conflict under the GWOT, simultaneous SOF and GPF operations are being executed sometimes on the same city block with missions assigned by capability and available resources. Liaison is designed to deconflict and coordinate this, but it is not always being effectively executed based on AARs.

Additionally, Operational Security (OPSEC) for SOF missions has a major impact. The nature of targets, intelligence collection techniques and sensitivity of employment methods requires a higher degree of security for SOF than traditionally associated with GPF.

However, one of the SOF imperatives in FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Forces*, states "Balance security and synchronization".¹³ With SOF and GPF missions and areas of

⁹ Evan Thomas and Rob Nordland, "See How They Ran," *Newsweek*, 4 August 2003, 26-27.

¹⁰ Evan Thomas and Rob Nordland, "How We got Saddam," *Newsweek*, 22 December 2003, 26-27.

¹¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 13 March 2003), E-18.

¹² Doctrine and Tactics, 29; Butler interview; Lieutenant Colonel (P) Charles Preysler, Commander 2-187 IN, 101st Infantry Division during Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001-2002, interview by author, 13 January 2004, Newport, RI, annotated interview, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

¹³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 12 December 1991), 2-18.

operations overlapping, the need to balance OPSEC against synchronization is vital. One of the purposes of the JSOA is to prevent fratricide. With SOF often in non-standard uniforms and working alongside indigenous forces in an area also containing GPF, the risk of fratricide is increased.

It is worth noting that on 19 June 2002 a memorial service was held at Fort Bragg, NC to honor the fallen to date in Operation Enduring Freedom. Seven soldiers assigned to Army Special Forces units were recognized among the dead. Four of them had died from US ordnance.¹⁴ Four may not seem like many, but fratricide, although always present in war, is never an acceptable loss. In a conflict dealing with casualties numbering in the hundreds, four by fratricide is too high. Viewed differently, four of seven represent fifty-seven percent. As the SOF Truths state, SOF cannot be mass produced, and SOF cannot be created after a conflict starts.¹⁵ Fifty-seven percent of losses as fratricide are devastating. Understanding capabilities and limitations, knowledge of other forces on the battlefield, and the integration of all units in the fight effectively are the best means of preventing fratricide. With more integration of SOF and GPF, this risk is increasing.

Recent examples of SOF and GPF integration have met with success, but at the same time have not been without problems. Issues of organizational culture, lack of understanding of roles and capabilities, doctrinal shortcomings, and training deficiencies have created friction between SOF and GPF resulting in failures to exploit potential, missed opportunities, and in some cases, fatal errors. Anyone who reads current news articles or popular accounts of SOF in history will quickly find that a gap, if not a chasm, can exist culturally between SOF and GPF. By their nature, the two are fundamentally different, with one primarily focused on

¹⁴ Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden*, 329.

unconventional warfare, and the other on conventional. As such, the communities of conventional and unconventional warriors view each other at times with unease, and in worst cases, disdain. Robin Moore's *The Hunt for Bin Laden*, about SOF in OEF echoes many of the prejudices heard in Douglas Waller's *Commandos* about the Gulf War, which echoed Moore's similar perspective in *The Green Berets*, his factually based fictional account of the Army Special Forces Units in Vietnam. With regard to how GPF view SOF, all one needs to do is observe the history of SOF units between conflicts. GPF leadership in the services eliminated or significantly cut back SOF following every conflict since WW II until USSOCOM was legislated into existence through the Nunn-Cohen amendment under the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1986.¹⁶ In a world of scarce resources, cultures must adapt.

Resourcing is significantly impacting how SOF and GPF work together. SOF's small numbers and high degree of specialization make it difficult to allocate internal resources for their own physical security. SOF elements find it necessary to locate within GPF bases or use GPF units in an attached or OPCON role for security purposes. This has created challenges for both elements when mission execution becomes necessary and many times informal relationships result in employment problems. A GPF platoon sent to secure the base of an Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) in Afghanistan was given under operational control (OPCON) to the ODA. The ODA instructed the platoon that as part of the defense of the location, the platoon was to conduct local security patrols outside the perimeter, a requirement of this role. This proved completely unacceptable to the GPF unit's headquarters and the patrols were discontinued. Another GPF unit was sent to serve as

¹⁵ United States Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM Pub1 : Special Operations in Peace and War* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996), 2-27.

¹⁶ U.S. Naval War College, "Special Operations Forces," *NWC 2002 CD-ROM*. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Maritime Operations Department, 2003, History slide.

the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for a SOF command element, but the release authority for the QRF was retained at the higher command of the GPF element, and not delegated to the SOF unit it supported.¹⁷ Also in these cases, giving OPCON of these GPF units to SOF took them away as an option for employment under the CFLCC, a burden not identified in prior planning.¹⁸

Additionally, there are times when SOF and GPF units just do not understand what the other does, and thus do not seek to communicate and subsequently integrate capabilities. After Action Reviews from both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan indicate that had the GPF units better understood SOF capabilities and employment considerations, they would have integrated them more and earlier.¹⁹ SOF also has seen more non-traditional integration of GPF, as indicated in efforts to capture the Husseins, and they should not disregard this employment option for future operations. The focus needs to be on capabilities that will contribute to unity of effort and act as force multipliers at all levels. Merely understanding what the other force can and will do can go a long way to improving effectiveness.

The first step to fixing problems and capitalizing on successes lies simply in awareness. Better communications between SOF and GPF on capabilities, limitations and employment options that are not only mutually supporting, but also integrated when the mission calls for it, will start a process for awareness and training that will better facilitate current and future operations. Joint Forces Command, USSOCOM, and the Services are aware of these issues and are seeking means to address them. However, traditional planning and employment for integration at the JTF level, with deconfliction and coordination at lower levels is no longer

¹⁷ Butler interview.

¹⁸ Preysler interview.

¹⁹ Ibid.; Doctrine and Tactics, 29.

the reality. Training driven by the old doctrine of assumed separation of operations below the JTF level is not meeting the realities and needs of current operations.

This issue of integration stems from one of the greatest challenges confronting SOF, as with any other high demand/low density organization--there just are not enough assets to meet all the demands. The SOCOORD at the MEF or Army Corps level has the capacity for C2 of SOF, but only when augmented. A SOCCE at a division is often comprised of an augmented Army Special Forces company command element Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB), or a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit or Group (NSWTU/NSWTG). Traditionally in a Geographic Theater of Operations, there may only be at most two NSWTU/NSWTGs, and in an entire theater only nine SF companies are allocated under a regionally oriented Special Forces Group. Each NSWTU/NSWTG or ODB assigned as a SOCCE with its augmentees takes these already scarce resources out of operational roles and places them in a coordination and deconfliction role to serve as C2 elements with Marine or Army divisions. Parceling out these elements as SOCCEs has a significant manning and operational impact--the assets are just not available to meet demand.

SOF and GPF integration of complementary capabilities is occurring in ways not seen before, yet is still not effectively addressed in doctrine. As such, with identified strengths and weaknesses and lessons learned from operations, this knowledge must be institutionalized. Situations where lack of knowledge resulted in less effective employment are not acceptable. On the job training and discovery learning while conducting operations is a worthy reflection of the US Armed Services' agility and flexibility, but other mechanisms exist to better prepare commanders at all levels for what they will confront on current and future battlefields.

Knowledge of capabilities and employment methods must be shared. All Services have professional military education systems that will support this. As most integration of SOF and GPF occurs within the land component, Marine, Army, and SOF training needs to incorporate instruction on this at all levels as it applies. Junior and mid-level Non-Commissioned Officer and Initial Officer Entry education courses should be teaching the basic capabilities and missions of SOF forces with whom they will interact on the battlefield. The Marine Amphibious Warfare School and Army Captains Career Courses, particularly in the combat arms, need to reinforce this instruction and further discuss how units at their level may be employed in an integrated role with SOF (to include Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units). This instruction could be as little as an hour, and reinforced with incorporation of SOF assets in practical planning exercises. The same holds true for instruction of SOF at this level at the Special Forces Course, Navy SEAL Course and AFSOC training of Special Tactics Squadron personnel. When a SOF element is placed under Tactical Control of a rifle company on the battlefield, or vice versa, it is late in the game to be figuring out how it should work.

Command and Staff Colleges should place greater emphasis on the role of integrated SOF employment not only at the JTF level, but examine employment options for integrated SOF and GPF units at lower echelons as well. Additionally, consideration in planning exercises for attaching GPF elements to the JSOTF should be included. This could be further reinforced in Pre-Command Course training of battalion and brigade command designees. GPF cultural beliefs that SOF do not understand employment of GPF in a combined arms role are hard to validate given SOF unit performance with indigenous ground forces in Afghanistan. With awareness and prior formal training, a GPF brigade commander could do

the same with an SFODA or SEAL platoon. As reorganized packaged forces within the Army are implemented, Stability and Support Operation deployments of GPF units may include SOF elements, while as Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations or other crisis intervention scenarios arise, a SOF command for these missions can be task organized with GPF elements for security and firepower. Integrated Security, Cordon and Search, and Sensitive Site Exploitation missions are already happening. All of these scenarios lend themselves to altered planning considerations in training institutions.

Beyond instruction, practical training must also take place. Brigade Combat Training Program exercises to train brigade staffs, and Division Warfighter exercises in the Army can incorporate aspects of these scenarios for planning purposes, as can Mission Readiness Exercises. Potential exists for full practical implementation of SOF and GPF at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Army's National Training Center (which is moving towards becoming the Joint National Training Center). The scenarios addressed throughout this paper can be trained in peacetime at these facilities, with SOF and GPF units still able to achieve individual training objectives during rotations, but with the opportunity for integrated operations. Challenges to manning Observer Controller (OC) positions can be mitigated through the use of existing JRTC OCs, joint augmentation by Air Force and Navy SOF personnel, as well as contracted retired SOF personnel for focused rotations on SOF integration as necessary, similar to those used for training the initial Stryker Brigade. Providing JSOTF and CFLCC forces to each other in theater, even at the tactical level, is still a joint, Service and SOF operational concern that must be addressed in doctrine and training.

Additionally, options exist to gain a second order effect through the use of role players for indigenous force personnel in these exercises. SOF can be employed to train these personnel

for integration and employment by the GPF rotational units. If support personnel who traditionally do not train on battlefield combat tasks were used as role players, the SOF personnel would have the comparable challenge of training non-combat forces for combat employment, while the GPF units would have this element as a planning and employment consideration. Drawing these role players based on rotational schedules from division, corps, and theater support units (similar to the 507th Maintenance Company), or even Reserve Officer Training Corps and Service Academy Cadets, would provide the added benefit of training these units in combat tasks and field craft to which they would not otherwise be exposed. This would be consistent with the Chief of Staff of the Army's (GEN Peter Schoomaker, former USSOCOM Commander) Warrior Ethos initiative and the Marine Corps principle that "Every Marine is a Rifleman".²⁰ Conceptually this has been going on for years, as these are the exact types of units currently used in this capacity as "guerilla" role players at Fort Bragg for Special Forces students training in unconventional warfare. It is an issue of scale.

With this greater knowledge of SOF units and procedures, GPF units could send liaisons to SOF command elements, lessening the burden on the already high demand SOF elements to provide liaisons "out of hide." This would give the added benefit to the GPF providing headquarters of having access to information and resources that they normally would not. When the idea of GPF units sending liaisons to Special Operations forward bases was raised recently at the JFK Special Warfare Center, despite Operational Security considerations, the

²⁰ US Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Warrior Ethos," *TRADOC News Service and Web Operations*, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_Specials/WarriorEthos/> [11 January 2004]. ; A search or discussion with Marines on the "Every Marine is a Rifleman" quote yields dozens of sources, of which determining the origin is difficult, as it is more a cultural concept. An authoritative and current source is General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, in a recent interview on the CNN

idea received wide acceptance.²¹ A possible solution to provide consolidated training for GPF personnel designated as potential SOF liaisons is to have a course on the topic offered at the Joint Special Operations University, or taught by mobile Joint Training Teams from SOC JFCOM. The target audience for these courses is the MEF and Corps headquarters and their subordinate operational planners. Another option is to use SOCOORD personnel in Army Corps to provide this training “in house.” Any steps taken to improve interoperability of SOF and GPF will pay dividends on the battlefield.

There are arguments to be made against the idea of increased SOF and GPF integration. First, when viewed from the perspective of an individual organization, the added requirement of becoming more interoperable with another unit can be seen as just another task in an already fast paced operational tempo environment of limited resources. However, this selfish and short-sighted approach fails to recognize the broader value-added gains addressed in this paper of resource sharing, force multipliers, and complimentary capabilities that will actually make resources more manageable and lessen the burden of operational tempo through burden sharing. Arguments made that GPF and SOF cultures will never be compatible ignore existing evidence of recent and ongoing battlefield successes, and only serve parochial organizational instincts rooted in fear of loss or failure, rather than what should be a desire to gain and succeed for a greater overall benefit.

As transformation continues, SOF and GPF must define their roles as they relate to each other, or risk having them defined for them. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has been clear in demanding transformation from Department of Defense organizations, and in his approach to those who refuse or are too slow to transform. The situation is best described by General

Saturday Morning News “Novak Zone”. Citation: “Transcripts,” 13 December 2003. *CNN Saturday Morning News: Novak Zone*. <<http://www.cnn.com/transcripts/0312/13/smn07.html>>, [8 February 2004].

Peter Schoomaker in saying the past was about joint deconfliction, in the present we have shown joint interoperability, but the future must be about joint interdependence.²²

Integration of SOF and GPF is happening on the battlefield now. Recent changes to doctrine necessitate changes in education and training to reinforce the successes and mitigate shortcomings and risks found in current SOF and GPF integration. JFCOM can drive this with initiatives in these areas with the support of the Services, USSOCOM, and the training proponents and centers. Implementation of this training and education will increase employment options for Combatant Commanders, JTF Commanders, and unit leaders at all levels. The changing nature of conflict under the GWOT, limited resources, broad operational scope, and increased operational tempo require all assets be employed to the greatest effect and as efficiently as possible. More effective integration of SOF and GPF is a step towards this end.

²¹ Doctrine and Tactics, 122.

²² General Schoomaker has made these comments in multiple addresses and discussions. Most recently cited as: General Peter J. Schoomaker, "Address to Concluding Luncheon," 15th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium and Exhibition, Washington, DC: 6 February 2004.

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