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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FORMAT

Title: THE PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN OF MADAGASCAR, 1896-1905

Author: Major Marc CONRUYT, Troupes de Marine, (France).

Thesis: The Madagascar campaign witnessed the implementation of an original method of pacification by General Galliéni. The main part of that method is still relevant in dealing with contemporary Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Discussion:

General Galliéni succeeded in pacifying Madagascar because of a specific method that was mainly based on three pillars:

- a military “ tâche d’huile” strategy, defined as the progressive occupation and security of the country.
- the implementation of a comprehensive policy grouping together coordinated military, political, economic, and social actions under the control of a single commander.
- the political and administrative restructuring of the country based on the “politique de races”, a method of setting up a confederation of autonomous ethnic regions.

Contemporary crises of the early 21st century have many similar characteristics to the global situation with which General Galliéni had to deal at the end of the 19th century. During recent decades, most of the military operations other than war were not totally successful in imposing a long-standing peace because they did not embrace the entire complexity of such crises.

However, in Kosovo, NATO and the United Nations have implemented a broader and more comprehensive policy which seems to be quite successful. That “new” policy appears to be similar to General Galliéni’s method. It proves that the lessons of the military history which are lost cost too many lives, efforts, and money- and some of what worked in the past may indeed be relevant to the present and future.

PREFACE

In the late 19th century, General Joseph Simon Galliéni was chosen to conduct the Madagascar pacification campaign. Despite several previous operations that gave them a footprint in this island, French officials and military in charge of the theater had not succeeded in suppressing the local unrest and in imposing their laws. The challenge that faced General Galliéni was very complex and difficult. He was a colonial officer that had spent most of his career in Asia and Africa. His extraordinary experience had given him the opportunity to develop an original pacification method. The Madagascar campaign enabled him to implement completely and successfully his concept. In nine years, he totally pacified the island and significantly changed almost every sector of daily life. His method rested on three pillars: the “tâche d’huile” strategy which was a progressive military occupation of the ground perfectly adapted to his limited resources and the Malagasy terrain, the implementation of a “politique de races” aiming at destroying the hegemony of the former dominant ethnic group and at involving all the minorities in the direct administration of their territory, and the combination of simultaneous diverse actions in political, social, administrative, economic, commercial, religious, and military fields.

After reading the after action reports concerning Kosovo campaign, it appeared to me that the international community used there a method which was surprisingly similar to General Galliéni’s. It raised a key question: had the “lessons learned” in the 19th century been lost, and do the colonization and pacification campaigns of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did deserve to be thoroughly studied again? In the contemporary world in which low-intensity ethnic conflicts and collapsed states proliferate, these campaigns can provide many interesting “takeaways” for military forces engaged in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Most of the sources of the Madagascar campaign are primary ones composed of after action reviews written by the military and civilian leaders of this time. They are located in the French national archives or the libraries of the French military schools. Unfortunately, English translations do not exist. Hence, all translations used in this paper were made by the author.

For Kosovo campaign, most of the after action reviews are still classified. However, some magazines and websites can provide interviews and articles of different persons who were in charge of the operations from 1999 to 2001. They are sufficient to provide the comparative context.

The research was not really difficult thanks to the kindness of several of my friends who are currently attending the French War College in Paris. I would like to thank all of them for their help. Additionally, to conclude this short prologue, I would like to thank my mentor, Professor Donald F. BITTNER, for his help and his patience.

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PROLOGUE

PAST RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT

In 2001, the international community wonders how it can help the Afghans rebuild their country. During the 1990s, such questions were also raised for Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor, and many African countries. Most of the efforts were not successful. The exclusive use of military operations was not enough to provide the basis for a return to the normal life for states that suffered economic and social underdevelopment, dictatorship, war, and collapse. In Kosovo, for the first time, the United Nations has tried to give a new and broader answer to such a problem. However, every new crisis seems to surprise the international community and the organizations in charge of such crisis management. Thus, too often, it seems that the necessary measures are not taken or are tried too late.

Admittedly, it is difficult to compare different situations, epochs, or countries. Therefore, the 19th century might appear inappropriate to provide lessons for avoiding the 21st century's hesitations on the understanding that the goal of current military operations is not to recolonize territories. Besides, each conflict is distinct; hence there are no universal and timeless recipes to solve them.

However, more than a hundred years ago during the operations leading to the pacification of Madagascar, General Joseph Galliéni implemented a comprehensive method that could offer some relevant and suitable ideas in dealing successfully with current Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) situations. A more thorough study of his methods would have permitted the western countries to rediscover solutions that had been tested and

that had given total satisfaction. His method was based on a series of simple tenets: a progressive military occupation, the concentration of power in the hands of a single and well-defined leader, the necessity of an all-embracing action, and the smart commitment of the local population according to ethnic divisions. Altogether, this would seem to be fully applicable and suited to many contemporary situations and crises.

Today, the goal of many current operations is to help poor and devastated countries and societies acquire a basis for resuming normal life. This means providing security, promoting democracy, reorganizing a collapsed state, and participating in economic development. Most of the states likely to intervene in a crisis situation and provide military assets do not do it to defend their national interests. They usually try to contain and to stop these crises for humanitarian reasons, with the least possible casualties if military action is necessary. To solve such complex crisis requires long-term efforts and depends more on political, economic, social, cultural, and religious approaches rather than a reliance on only military operations. General Galliéni faced that kind of complex situation in 1896 in Madagascar and resolved it.

The first part of this essay will present the geographical, historical, political and military context of those operations of pacification in Madagascar. This is necessary to understand the approach General Galliéni followed. The second will examine General Galliéni's method. Finally, the third will show the relevance of his concepts within the context of current Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) situations.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE OPERATIONS OF PACIFICATION

Madagascar: the Eighth Continent.

Located 250 miles off the eastern coast of Africa and just south of the equator, Madagascar is the world's fourth largest island. Over 1,600 kilometers long and 550 kilometers wide, it is twice the size of Great Britain. Because of its great diversity in animal and plant life, and in geography, Madagascar has been called the "eight continent".¹

The island can be divided into five geographical regions: the eastern coast, the Tsaratannana Massif, the central highlands, the western coast, and the southwest. The eastern coast consists of a fifty kilometer wide plain and of an intermediate zone composed of rain forests, steep bluffs, and ravines, which gives access to the central highland, and it offers few natural harbors. The Tsaratanana Massif region at the northern end of the island contains the highest point on the island and has two excellent natural harbors at Diégo-Suarez (Antsirana) and Nossi Bé. The central highlands, which range from 800 to 1,800 meters in altitude, contain a diverse variety of topographies: eroded hills, massive granite outcrops, extinct volcanoes, and marshes...That plateau is clearly defined by the escarpments along the eastern coast of the island, and it slopes gently to the western coast. The vegetation of the area is for the most part savanna or steppe, and coarse prairie dominates it. The western coast is a plain particularly significant for the natural harbors and the mouths of long and slow rivers flowing

¹ It is the title of one of the most recent book concerning Madagascar. Peter Tyson, *The Eight Continent. Life, death and discovery in the lost world of Madagascar* (William Morrow, 2000).

from the central plateau to the Mozambique Channel. Savanna grassland and a desert cover most of the southwest. The climate is tropical with two seasons: the hot and rainy season from November to April, and a cooler and dry season from May to October. There are, however, great variations due to elevations. The eastern coast has the heaviest rainfall, receiving three meters annually; it is also notorious for its hot and humid climate, in which insects and tropical fevers proliferate, and for its cyclones. By contrast, the central area is drier and cooler.

The island has been described as a “world apart” because of the unparalleled combination of diversity and uniqueness of its flora and fauna. Best known for its lemurs (primitive relatives of monkeys, apes, and humans), colorful chameleons, 12,000 plant species, 900 species of orchids, and towering baobab trees, Madagascar is home to some of the world's most unique “life forms.” Almost all of Madagascar's reptiles and amphibian species, half of its birds, and all of its lemurs are endemic to the island. The isle is unusual not only for its endemic species, but also for the species that are conspicuously absent. Because of Madagascar's geographic isolation, many groups of plants and animals are entirely absent from it. Many of the most characteristic African species, particularly larger mammals as the elephant, rhinoceros, giraffe, zebra, or lion do not exist in Madagascar. The only large African mammal that was living in Madagascar prior to the arrival of humans several thousand years ago was the hippopotamus. Other kinds of organisms have evolved to form diverse species, such as the lemur or the Malagasy hippopotamus.²

The Malagasy people resulted from a series of migrations by different groups over time.

Migrants from Indonesia are believed to have arrived first, followed by various African

² Library of Congress country studies. Federal Research Division, *INDIAN OCEAN – Madagascar* (Helen Chapin Metz, 1994).

peoples. They divided into about twenty ethnic groups, each with its own territory. The division between groups living in coastal areas and those living in the central plateau was particularly important. However, they all eventually spoke the same language and they shared a feudal social organization with three rigid states: nobles, commoners, and slaves. In the late 19th century, the population totaled three million inhabitants including one million Hova. At this time, the island had a very weak infrastructure. In the coastal area, the sea communications were quite unsafe because of the limited number of reliable ports, and the mouths of wide rivers hampered ground movements. In the rest of the island, there were not solid bridges that could resist the floods and the torrential rains of the monsoon. The only ground lines of communications consisted of a few mule tracks, which had to wind across the severely restricted terrain of the impenetrable Malagasy forest. Nossi-Bé and Majunga were the two main ports of the western coast. The former was an important commercial place where the French Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes liners called twice a month. The latter permitted the use of the Betsiboka River up to 200 kilometers inland with small steamboats. On the eastern coast, Diégo-Suarez was an existing formidable strategic naval base, and Tamatave was the most significant commercial center of Madagascar. Fort-Dauphin was a port-of-call for German and British liners.³ Most of the rivers were not navigable because of numerous and rapid waterfalls.

The French Presence in Madagascar before 1895: an Incomplete Protectorate

From the 16th to the 19th centuries, several European countries tried unsuccessfully to establish colonies in Madagascar. Ideally located on the sea routes to India and the Far East, it attracted successively the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French. In the

³ Général Joseph S. Galliéni, *Rapport du gouverneur général de Madagascar sur le commerce et l'industrie dans cette colonie* (Paris: Journal Officiel de la République Française du 13 Novembre 1897), p. 6394

17th century, the occupation of Sainte Luce and Fort Dauphin in the south of Madagascar was used as an excuse by Louis XIV for proclaiming French sovereignty over the whole island, at the time called “l’Ile Dauphine”. However, in 1674, after a 30 year presence, the last French colonist left because of the intensive economic competition of “l’Ile Bourbon” (La Réunion) and of the natives’ growing opposition to slavery. Practically abandoned by the European countries, the coast then became a hideout for British and French pirates that fought each other on the routes to India.

The ensuing isolation permitted the Hova tribe to establish its supremacy over the other tribes. Native from Indonesia, that tribe had established a kingdom called Emyrne (Imerina) in the middle of the island in the 16th century. In the 17th century, that kingdom developed a remarkable urban civilization. In the late 18th century, the Hova king Andrianampoinimerina established the first political unity in Madagascar, and the city of Tananarive (Antananarivo) became the capital.⁴ The next century, it experienced a quick modernization due to the influence of protestant missionary groups, European businessmen, and the British crown. In a few years, the Hova monarchy superficially changed from a medieval type into the Victorian era. The government was restructured following the European model and its central power was strengthened. That evolution resulted in the Hova feeling superior to the other races and made them believe that they could fight with success against the European powers, which would eventually attempt to invade the island. Nevertheless, the country retained its feudal structures. In the late 19th century, the kingdom was about to collapse under the combined influences of economic foreign domination, a parasitic local bureaucracy, and the lack of financial resources. In fact, it was ruled by a Hova oligarchy led by the Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony who reinforced his legitimacy by

⁴ Centre Militaire d’Information sur l’Outre-Mer (CMIDOM), *Madagascar*. 01/2001, p. 21

marrying the queen of the Malagasy kingdom. Thus, when the first French expedition associated with the 19th century empire building arrived⁵, it faced a weakened country.

Rainilaiarivony made the mistake of underestimating French power. Indeed, for many different reasons, France was looking for new territories to conquer. The first aim was to restore its great power position after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The second was to find new export outlets, raw material, and new markets for surplus capital, in particular in the context of the 1870-1880 economic depression and of growing European protectionism. The need for demographic resources was the third one. Last, but not least, the humanitarian arguments aiming at bringing civilization to inferior races became an important factor in acquiring public support.

Territorial, financial, and commercial disputes occurred in the 1870s between France and the Hovas. The two governments argued over Malagasy coastal principalities, which sometimes claimed to be under French and at other times Hova sovereignty. In addition, the Hova government refused to restore the estate to the legal heirs of a French businessman who had made a large fortune in Madagascar. Pushed by notables of La Réunion and by some Catholic circles, the French government embarked upon a new colonial adventure by invoking historical rights going back to the French occupation of Sainte-Luce and Fort-Dauphin in the 17th century. It culminated with the first French-Hova War of 1883. The French forces seized Majunga, Tamatave, Diego-Suarez, and Vohémar, by 1885, Rainilaiarivony did not have any other choice but to negotiate. France did not really exploit her victory. The Jules Ferry government had just fallen because of the temporary failure of a Tonkin expedition in Southeast Asia, and everybody in Paris wanted to quickly solve the Malagasy issue.

⁵ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), pp. 91-92

Thus, in December 1885, an ambiguous treaty temporarily solved the financial and territorial disputes. Under it, the French government recognized the sovereignty of the Hova Queen on Madagascar. However, it granted France the right to occupy Diégo-Suarez for 99 years and to establish a “Résident Général”⁶ with a military escort in Tananarive. This French official would be in charge of the Malagasy foreign policy but could not interfere in domestic issues. In addition, Madagascar had to pay a huge war indemnity. Although the French government considered that the treaty confirmed its protectorate over the island, the word *protectorate* was not explicitly written into the treaty. Conversely, the Hova government thought that it was a simple friendship agreement. The Hova queen was determined to resist the French overlordship, and she did her best to restrict the actions of the “Résident Général”.

The worsening of the economic and social problems in the Hova kingdom provided an excuse for a second French military intervention. The Hova government was not in position to pay the war indemnity to which it had agreed in 1885. At that time, ten million Francs was a huge amount of money for the exhausted kingdom. Indeed, the Malagasy economic system, based on slavery and duty, could not replenish the depleted Treasury coffers. That situation caused the decline of the monarchal power, and chaos reigned in the country as bands of outlaws spread terror and violence. Several Europeans were massacred in 1893 and 1894, and the Hova government refused to grant French requests for compensation. In addition, some relatives of the queen apparently participated in those assassinations.⁷

In 1894, Rainilaiarivony refused to yield to a French President ultimatum aiming at definitively establishing a protectorate. He then ended the diplomatic relations with France, and the second Hova-French War soon commenced.

⁶ The “ Résident Général” represented the government in the territories placed under French protectorate. That function was implemented in Annam, Cambodia, Djibouti, and Madagascar in the late 19th century, and in Morocco, Tunisia, and in the Middle East in the 20th.

⁷ Gabriel Hanoteaux, *L'affaire de Madagascar* (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1896), p. 34.

New Domestic and International Opportunities in the 1890s.

The 1890s witnessed a further wave of European colonial expansion because of more favorable conditions. In ten years, the international situation of France had significantly changed.⁸ After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck had succeeded in isolating France through a complex network of alliances within and while Europe respecting the traditional balance of power. In 1890, the new German Emperor Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck and started to pursue a new policy of Reich “Weltpolitik”. This eventually caused an extraordinary reversal of France’s isolation in Europe. In 1891, taking advantage of the change in the German foreign policy when Berlin chose Austria-Hungary over Russia by not renewing the Reinsurance Treaty with the latter, France thus escaped the isolation to which Bismarck had consigned it by signing with Russia the Entente Cordiale, which provided for mutual diplomatic support. In 1894, the Entente Cordiale was reinforced by a military convention.

With Britain, the relations remained tense because of rivalries in territorial competition in Africa and Asia. However, though Southeastern Africa was a traditional area of friction, the two countries reached an agreement about that region in 1890. After two hundred years of intense competition, France ceded its rights on Zanzibar, while in compensation Britain recognized French authority on Madagascar. The same year Germany joined the agreement in return for recognition of its sovereignty in the German Eastern Africa (now primarily Tanganyika). In fact, at that time, France’s relations with Italy and Germany were very good, and several treaties were signed with the latter between 1893 and 1897 concerning the sharing of Central Africa. In addition, in 1895-1896, as part of a general European recovery, France regained its economic health. The bad memories of the recent recession were forgotten, and the future seemed to promise significant economic expansion.

⁸ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 131

France was no longer isolated. It felt much stronger, healthier, and more confident. Now that the painful Tonkin campaign was finished,⁹ its attention could turn to Africa. This situation now caused the loss of influence of the opponents to colonial expansion in France. From 1890, most of the political parties subscribed to the belief that a greater colonial empire would reinforce France's influence in Europe and in the world. In addition, colonialism was considered the best remedy for containing the mounting concern of the domestic class war. In that context, the "parti colonial" (colonial party) was created. This was not a traditional political organization; rather, it was a lobby consisting of politicians, businessmen, and journalists which cut across traditional party lines. Close to the industrial, commercial, and political elite, the "parti colonial" disposed of important financial resources and organized many expeditions to Africa aiming at anticipating and preparing future commercial affairs. It owned its own newspapers and could organize propaganda campaigns in the country.¹⁰ In 1892, that lobby was strong enough to spawn a colonial group in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. It was composed of representatives from all the traditional political parties. This occurred for two basic reasons: the expansion of the empire in order to "insure the strength and the greatness of France," and because huge economic and personal interests were at stake. At the beginning, they numbered about 15% of the Chamber. However, it increased in strength eventually reaching 33% of it in 1902. The members of the group were present in all the ministries, and provided five of the seven Ministers of the colonies between 1894 and 1899. Contrary to the other political parties, the colonial group was a much more disciplined and influential lobby. Generally supporting the expeditions in Africa, it demanded a major military involvement in Madagascar.

⁹ For details on that campaign, see Colonel Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899)* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1933). Jean-Michel Gaillard, *Jules Ferry* (Paris: Fayard, 1993).

¹⁰ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 141

In 1894, due to considerable efforts of the “parti colonial”, the two chambers authorized the government to prepare and conduct a campaign in order to “maintain the French rights and restore the order.”¹¹ The preparation of the campaign took place in an environment of popular enthusiasm that was fueled by a systematic anti-Hova propaganda. In the public’s general opinion, the French Republic was going to war to reconquer a land that had been French since Louis XIV and to liberate the indigenous populations from Hova tyranny.

The Disastrous 1895 Campaign.

However, in 1894 the government was reluctant to launch a major campaign. According the Minister of War, the military occupation of the whole island required 15,000 troops and a huge credit of 65 millions of Francs. In addition, the government at this time was fragile and feared a political crisis in case of further difficulties. It thus tried to exhaust all the peaceful solutions before using force. The first measures it took were to reinforce the Diégo-Suarez and La Réunion garrisons, and the naval units in the Indian Ocean. The Foreign Minister also tried a last diplomatic step by sending a former “Résident Général”, Le Myrne de Vilers, to Madagascar to negotiate. The latter brought an actual protectorate treaty which, if signed, would avoid a costly conflict.

In October, the Hova government refused the French ultimatum. France then decided to wage war against the Hova kingdom. In December 1894, the two chambers voted a budget providing funding to deploy troops to Madagascar under the command of General Charles Duchesne. This experienced officer, who had served in Algeria and Tonkin, was at that time in command of the 14th Infantry Division. However, the first intelligence reports predicted many difficulties for the forthcoming campaign: a weak transportation infrastructure except

¹¹ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 174

for a few barely marked tracks, significant natural obstacles very difficult to cross, an unhealthy climate especially in the littoral areas, and a general shortage of resources. Though the Hova armed forces seemed unable able to pose any serious resistance, they actually were capable of engaging 30,000 well-armed troops with about fifty modern artillery guns. In addition, they were trained and commanded by foreign advisors.¹²

The expeditionary corps numbered 18,340 troops. It was composed of 8,000 young conscripts chosen from lot in all the garrisons in France, and several colonial (Haoussa, Malagasy and Senegalese), Algerian, and Foreign Legion units. It was divided into approximately 10,000 infantry men (thirteen battalions, each of 800 troops), one cavalry company of 150 horse, five mountain artillery batteries and two mounted artillery batteries, four engineer companies, seven transportation companies, and some combat service support units. Because of the unhealthy climate and the lack of resources in Madagascar, the Ministry of War tried to form a very robust logistic support with an abundance of assets. Its medical assets were particularly important, with four field hospitals, one evacuation hospital, one sanatorium, sixteen ambulances, and two hospital ships. The latter vessels would be pre-positioned in Majunga on the northwestern coast. More than 70 doctors could care for an estimates 2,500 casualties, or one sixth of the expeditionary corps.¹³

The campaign plan specified that the Majunga roads, and the Betsiboka and Ikopa valleys, provided the least of difficulties for the landing and the advance of the expeditionary corps towards Tananarive. In addition, it postulated that the Betsiboka River could be used up to the Ikopa River for the transport of equipment and troops. Consequently, the Navy decided to form a river fleet composed of 12 gunboats, 50 barges that could be assembled and disassembled, six steamboats, and four docking pontoons. The main fleet was composed of

¹² Général Charles Duchesne, *Rapport d'ensemble sur l'expédition de Madagascar (1895-1896)*. (Paris: Journal Officiel de la République Française. Rapport fait au Ministre de la Guerre le 25 Avril 1896), p. 5106

¹³ Général Charles Duchesne, *Rapport d'ensemble sur l'expédition de Madagascar (1895-1896)*, p. 5107

two cruisers, two Aviso patrol boats, three gunboats, two transportation avisos, one hospital transportation ship, and one pontoon. The Army ordered 5,000 Lefebvre animal-towered cars as its main transportation means. Those metal cars had been successfully used by the colonial troops during the previous Dahomey, Soudan, and Tonkin campaigns. The theater of war consisted of an area stretching from Majunga to the junction of the Betsiboka River with the Ikopa River. It would go as far as the Emyrne plateau through the sector between the two rivers. In the first part, the Betsiboka River was supposed to allow the transportation of the equipment and possibly of the troops. In the second area only one means of communication existed: a thin trail starting from sea level and rising to 1500 meters in Tananarive.

The campaign was to commence in January 1895 with the dispatch of an advanced party composed of one brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions supported by one mountain artillery battery, and half of an engineer company. This advanced party would land at Majunga and organize the maritime base logistical command. Moreover, it was expected to extend the security zone around Majunga with the objective of seizing Marowoay. The main body of the expeditionary corps would then arrive between March and May and immediately move towards Tananarive. Previously, another landing on the eastern coast in December 1894 would permit the seizure of Tamatatave and organize its defense.¹⁴ The ultimate goal of the campaign was to conquer Tananarive by early September.

The campaign preparation seemed to have been well prepared. However, the results proved to be disastrous. Seizing Tananarive in August as planned was simply impossible. The Malagasy forest and diseases were responsible for a real slaughter: 40% of the expeditionary corps disappeared during the campaign. While only 25 soldiers were killed in combat, 5,756 died of diseases: 72% from malaria, 12% from typhoid fever, 8% from

¹⁴ Général Charles Duchesne, *Rapport d'ensemble sur l'expédition de Madagascar (1895-1896)*, p. 5111

dysentery, 4% from tuberculosis, and 3% by sunstroke.¹⁵ The young conscripts paid heavily for false assumptions, preparation shortcomings, and campaign execution. Neither the battle dress nor the equipment was adapted to the climate and the relief of the island. The soldiers had to carry heavy rifles, shovels, and a 35 kilo backpack. Because the engineer companies were busy building bridges and because it proved impossible to recruit local workers, the combat battalions had to build the road that would be suitable for the Lefebvre cars. Those battalions did not have the essential training and equipment to deal with the extremely difficult conditions of the Malagasy topography. In addition, the Lebevre cars, which had worked so well in the flat terrain of Western Africa, were unusable in the marshy valleys, steep mule tracks, and impenetrable jungles of Madagascar.

Fortunately, the Hova resistance was weak. Most of the times, its forces fled when fighting the French column. Its tactics were limited to ambushing the advanced detachment. However, the worsening sanitary conditions and the great difficulties in organizing the force's supply imposed lengthy delays. The column moved forward at a pace of only two kilometers per day, while its strength significantly melted away. An experienced non-commissioned officer described the situation:

Dysentery, sunstroke, abscesses - at the camp, every morning one comrade committed a suicide - a useless road to open up in the savannah, a march in the swamps, the poisoned water of the rivers, the friends that slipped out of the barges because of their nailshoes and that were devoured by crocodiles, the lack of quinine, the country invariable, bare, red, astounding your eyes, terrifying your mind...Tananarive everyday announced on the horizon.¹⁶

The austral summer with its rains, storms, fevers, and epidemics was about to start. Because of his original failures, General Duchesne concluded that he could not continue in that way any longer. On August 4, he decided to form a light column and direct it towards

¹⁵ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 175

Tananarive as the expeditionary corps approached Andriba. That decision saved the campaign. Using only mules for supply, the 4,000 designated troops marched about two hundred kilometers before reaching the Malagasy capital. They were composed of three infantry battalions, supported by twelve field guns and two cavalry platoons.¹⁷ After decisively defeating the Hova troops in Ambohima, the commanding officer of the light column attacked Tananarive on September 28. The next day, the Hova government surrendered.

The outcome was good for France but the price had been very high. The initial campaign plan had been set up by an European headquarters that had ignored the realities of colonial warfare. It thus proved inappropriate and inept. Indeed, the heavy columns which had been used successfully in Algeria and Western Africa were totally irrelevant in Madagascar. Still, in spite of the large number of casualties, General Duchesne had persisted in following the initial plan for several months. The final success was ultimately due to the non-organized Hova defense, and the adaptive and belated decision to use a much lighter column to seize the capital.

1896: Madagascar on the Brink of Explosion.

Not only had the price been too high, but the political outcome also became inappropriate. Indeed, despite a total military defeat, the Hova queen signed a mere protectorate treaty on October 1. Because of a lack of imagination and a now dwindling public support, the French government resigned itself to that easy solution.¹⁸ Actually, the relations between the two countries had not really changed since the first 1885 conflict. The former administrative organization based on the Hova hegemony remained in position. Thus,

¹⁶ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 176. All the citations and quotations in that essay have been translated by the author. .

¹⁷ Charles Lavauzelle, *Les Troupes de Marine*, (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1986), p. 215

¹⁸ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 176

after securing the communications between Tananarive and Tamatatave, General Duchesne's expedition ended. The repatriation of the expeditionary corps started on 23 November 1895. Only 6,000 troops stayed in a country larger than France, and these were based in four garrisons: Diégo-Suarez, Tananarive, Fianarantsoa and Majunga.

Then, in March 1896 occurred a revolt amongst the local population. The whole Emyrne and nearby areas rose. The Hova insurgents, armed with 10,000 rifles and a large number of spears and axes, conducted harassment operations. They attacked convoys, burned villages, and ordered the peasants to desert the paddy fields so as cause famine and force the French to leave the country. The occupation troops and the European settlements were quickly threatened by starvation. The rebels also attacked several isolated military posts close to Tananarive. The reactive French columns did not succeed in overcoming the insurgents who avoided fighting and scattered in the civilian population. In addition, the military actions were not followed by any administrative measures because most of the local Hova governors also opposed the French presence. Furthermore, the military commanders did not have the necessary political and administrative powers to reorganize the country.¹⁹ Encouraged by the "Résident Général's" indecision and the support of the queen and her ministers, xenophobia literally erupted on the island. Trade became totally paralyzed and several French citizens were killed.

In fact, that rebellion was merely the continuation of the previous war which had given birth to a spirit of resistance in the Hova population that had become increasingly conscious of its own particular historical background. In addition, the invaders appeared to lack the will and the means to impose their authority. As in 1885, the 1895 protectorate treaty recognized the Hova hegemony on the island. This amazed the other tribes, who had expected the French

¹⁹ Général Joseph S.Galliéni, *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899* (Paris: Journal Officiel de la République Française du 30 Mai 1899), p. 2089

to push the former ruling group. To be successful, that treaty needed to be accepted by the Hova without any reservation. However, in the Hova opinion, it did not establish the French authority. Thus, the Hova believed that France lacked the strength to demand the respect of the agreement. The insurgent leaders then persuaded the people that it would be easy to oust the French from Madagascar. They thus succeeded in awakening the feeling of resistance to the invaders.

On 20 June 1896, the Parliament voted Madagascar to be a French colony. In September, after it abolished slavery in Madagascar, the government appointed General Joseph S. Galliéni as “Résident Général” with full the military and civilian powers. He was now in charge of suppressing the rebellion and developing the new colony.

Two Visionary Military Commanders: Galliéni and Lyautey.

In 1896, in the realm of colonial warfare, General Galliéni was a most experienced marine officer. He had spent the greater part of his career in colonial service and knew Africa very well. In 1879, as a captain he had participated in the Sudan campaign during which he succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Sultan of Ségou which permitted France to control the trade in Niger. In France, he had attracted attention by protesting against the recourse to brute force during that campaign. After serving in Senegal, he had been assigned to Tonkin with the mission of pacifying the north of the country which was then infested with Chinese pirates. There, he implemented methods of pacification with which he had experimented in Sudan. The goal was not to destroy the enemy forces, but to rally the native populations and to control the administration of the conquered territories.²⁰

²⁰ General Galliéni stayed in Madagascar from 1896 to 1905. He had a decisive role in 1914 with the famous episode of the Marne taxis. He was minister of the war in 1915 and was promoted Marshall of France after his death in 1921. See appendices.

Galliéni was soon joined by his most famous protégé. In 1894, after having served in Algeria, Hubert G. Lyautey was assigned to Indochina. There, he met General Galliéni who would become his mentor. In 1897, he again joined Galliéni in Madagascar. His intellectual and doctrinal work had much influence in France. In his opinion, a colonial soldier was not only a warrior, but also a diplomat, engineer, administrator, and farmer - in short, he had to possess all the skills essential to develop the region which he commanded.²¹ Galliéni and Lyautey would have the opportunity to apply their theories in Madagascar.

²¹ He was nicknamed “Lyautey, the African.” In 1912, he was the first Résident Général in Morocco. During World War I, in 1916, he became minister of the war and in 1921 was promoted marshal of France. Benoist-Méchin Jacques, *Lyautey l’africain ou le rêve immolé* (Paris, Perrin 1979). See appendices.

CHAPTER 2

1896-1905: A SUCCESSFUL NEW COLONIAL WARFARE

Facing a general insurrection, General Galliéni immediately upon his arrival took vigorous measures. He abolished the monarchy, the feudal system, and exiled the queen initially to La Réunion Island then to Algiers. He also executed two Malagasy ministers that were members of the aristocracy – this to intimidate the Hova oligarchy that was supporting the revolt.

The Military “Tâche d’huile” Strategy

The first task of General Galliéni was to pacify the island. He was a strong supporter of totally occupying the country. In his opinion, it was a mistake not to penetrate all the territory, for not to do so would provide a sanctuary for eventual pockets of hostile resistance. Such a situation would require another later conquest, which Algeria and Tonkin had proved. It was also necessary to move quickly when troops, money, assets, and public support were available in France. However, in regard of the size of Madagascar, he did not have the resources to seize the whole island immediately. Thus, he focused on progressively pacifying it. Fully adapted to his limited resources in troops, he implemented his “tâche d’huile” (oil spot) method that he had used successfully in Tonkin. Because he could not deploy enough troops in each of the non-pacified regions, his idea was to initially limit his operation to a chosen area. In this one, he built a network of military posts alongside the natural lines of communication, each strong enough to ensure the security and the freedom of commerce, as

well as occupying the centers of influence. This network enabled his troops to quickly intervene in the area and to destroy the rebels. Upon pacification of that territory, military forces could be deployed in another area.

He especially opposed the use of military columns²² method that had been used for the pacification of Algeria or in the subduing of Western Africa. In his opinion, the use of these columns had often been synonymous with the systematic destruction of enemy villages and resources. In addition, they were inefficient: even if the military commander succeeded in suppressing the unrest and achieved the military objectives, he did not have the political and administrative powers necessary to reorganize the seized country. Consequently, the troops wore themselves out with endless military actions without obtaining decisive results. Occasionally, in some exceptional cases, he admitted that columns could be used: to destroy large enemy forces or hideouts.

Galliéni wanted to be careful with a country that was to be settled and economically exploited. He did not want to alienate the inhabitants, who were supposed to be the backbone of the future French administration of the territory. He had been given particularly clear orders in this regard by the foreign minister: “unless the military operations or special conditions require them, fire of villages and punishments of the population will be limited if we want to use our conquest. The development of the country must be started as soon as possible.”²³ General Galliéni stated that pacification meant less formal military operations and a more workable and flexible organization. The objective was to weaken militarily, politically, and, above all, economically the enemy in order to prevent him from resupplying himself. Simultaneously, military operations had to consider the future rebuilding of the country by minimizing its destruction.

²²The 1895 campaign of General Duchesne proved it. See Douglas Porch, “The Development of French Colonial Warfare”, chapter 14 of ed., Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ, 1986), pp. 378, 385, and 386.

²³Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire de la France Coloniale*, p. 179.

At the beginning, he set out to pacify the central area named Emyrne - the Hova hub of power. At that time, he faced three Hova rebel armies that surrounded Tananarive. He divided the area into seven “military circles”²⁴ each under the command of one officer.²⁵ This officer disposed of all the military assets in his circle²⁶ and was the only responsible for achieving assigned goals. Unity of action was respected and implemented in every circle. The circle commanders had to implement the “tâche d’huile” method aiming at progressively occupying the terrain. Before seeking to extend their area of control, each had to fully organize their rear zones. That meant resettlement of most of the population that had been displaced so as encourage the peasants to return to the fields. Most important, the villages had to be protected against any rebel attack. This was achieved by a network of fortified posts which made passing through them almost impossible. The commanders had to reassure the populations and show them that prosperity would follow cooperation with the French, while also convincing the rebels that they should submit. Two of general Galliéni’s favorite adages were: “Every time we have to fight in a village, the first mission will be to rebuild it, to create immediately a school and a market”, and “Make sure that the people you rule only fear for the thought of your departure.”²⁷

As soon as one zone was secured and normal life resumed, the commander of the military circle decentralized the administration of the pacified area by creating a “sector”²⁸ under the command of one subordinate officer. Then, he could devote himself to organizing patrols with the goal of extending his area of control. As soon as he established advanced posts, he could follow the same method to reestablish the conditions for a return to a normal

²⁴ Territorial subdivision : Ambohidrabiby, Ambatomanga, Arivonimano, Ambohidriatimo, Tananarive, Maroma Maromanga, Ambatondrazaka

²⁵ Usually a major.

²⁶ From two to six reinforced companies, depending on the size of the cercle.

²⁷ Général Joseph S.Galliéni *Rapport d’ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p .2092.

²⁸ Territorial subdivision.

life in the new zone. Progressively, the size of the rebel areas decreased, while the population recognized the advantages of colonialism and would rally to the French.

The first orders issued by General Galliéni to his commanders of the military circles were explicit:

- Missions:
- protection of the line Tananarive-Analamazaotra by a series of pillboxes along the road, which are close enough to support each other.
 - establishment of a first echelon network of posts forming a 20-kilometer radius circle of protection around Tananarive. Then, progressively and methodically occupation of the country by progressing through a series of thrusts in order to increase the radius of the circle and to constantly move the rebels towards the frontiers of Emyrne.
 - constantly ensure the linkage of military operations that are undertaken in one circle to the other ones in the neighboring ones.
 - in the rear zones, provision of weapons to the submitted villages in order to prevent any enemy infiltration's.²⁹

The French forces³⁰ started their operations at the end of 1896. The first objective was to secure the communications between Tananarive and Tamatave through the Mangoro valley. Thanks particularly to Major Lyautey's tenacity, they succeeded in totally pacifying the Emyrne area by July 1897 when the main rebel leader came to Tananarive to surrender. At the same time, naval operations permitted the French to hold the coast from Majunga to Fort Dauphin; this included the coastal ports of Analalava, Nossi-Bé, Diégo-Suarez, Vohémar, Tamatave, and Mananjary. On the western coast, the French seized Tuléar and Morondava. In addition, a light column reopened the communications between Tananarive and Majunga

²⁹ Général Joseph S. Galliéni. *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 2092.

³⁰ In October 1896, the French combat forces consisted of the following : two Algerian infantry battalions, one Foreign Legion infantry battalion, the 13th Marine Infantry Regiment of three battalions, the Colonial Regiment of twelve Senegalese and Haoussa companies, the Malagasy Infantry Regiment of three battalions, and three artillery batteries.

through the Ikopa River. This prevented the rebels from purchasing weapons from outside of the country.³¹ The success of that first stage was essentially due to the methodical program of pacification imposed by General Galliéni and to the sacrifice of many soldiers. Because of a harsh climate, swampy terrain, and strong enemy resistance, the casualties numbered about 1,200 troops. This caused the medical support structure to work to its maximum capability.

After totally reorganizing the Emyrne, the next objective was to prevent any incursion and looting from the neighboring tribes. Instead of immobilizing troops in posts defending Emyrne's borders, General Galliéni decided to give them an active role: he charged them with pacifying Menabe in the Sakalave region.³² In August 1897, operations started in the area of Miandrivazo along the Tsiribihina River, primarily with Senegalese troops who were more acclimated to the coastal climate much more. That campaign was particularly difficult and lasted several months, but by March 1898 the Second Military Region was created: it grouped the pacified Mianiranivo, Betafo, and Morondava' circles. In July 1898, the French controlled the right bank of the Tsiribihina River. The newly promoted Lieutenant-Colonel Lyautey who was in command of the Fourth Military Region grouping the Ankazobé, Maevatanana, Andriba and Maintirano' circles, pacified that region between the Ikopa River and the eastern coast in September 1898. By the end of 1898, the north of the island was totally controlled by the French. In the south, the "fâche d'huile" spread with the creation of the Tulear, Fort Dauphin, and Farafangana' circles.

However, the western region was only partly pacified, and the Androy region remained closed to any penetration. Still, in two years the methodical action of General Galliéni had permitted the pacification program to progress significantly. After a region had

³¹ Especially from Indian dealers in exchange for gold or slaves.

³² The Sakalave were wild, warlike, and rebellious to any form of authority. The Hova had tried several times to conquer their territory but without success. Every rainy season, the Sakalave raided Emyrne to steal herds and capture women and children who were reduced to slavery. They traded slaves and gold for weapons with Indian sailors.

been pacified, experience proved the necessity of maintaining the military administration for a while³³ because the submission of the natives was too recent to undergo important administrative changes. However, as soon as it was totally pacified, the military organization was turned over to the civilian administration and local militias became responsible for maintaining the order. Thus, regular forces could be shifted rapidly towards the insecure regions. In 1899, General Galliéni concentrated his efforts in Menabe, and by 1900 the Sakalave had submitted to the French. In January 1900, the last rebel leaders of the northern and northwestern regions surrendered. One last objective remained: to establish the French sovereignty in the south. On 12 September 1900, General Galliéni created the South Supreme Command grouping the Fianarantsoa, Farafongana, Tuléar, Bara, and Fort Dauphin circles. In twenty months, its commander, now Colonel Lyautey, succeeded in achieving the mission.

Hence, in six years General Galliéni succeeded in solving a difficult equation: how to restore the order and trust in the whole island on a permanent basis with very limited resources. Nevertheless, the “tâche d’huile” military method was not the only reason for his success.

Concentration of Powers, Decentralization and Comprehensive Action.

General Galliéni made sure he did not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of 1896, when French military and civilian leaders had not succeeded in suppressing the revolt for lack of cooperation. He ruled the country as a sovereign and did not hesitate to make tough decisions which sometimes caused a negative reaction in France. He demanded stability so as to thoroughly learn and know the country of which he was in charge. Galliéni stated that

³³ In October 1898, an insurrection erupted in the northern part of the island. In two months, order was reestablished but the uprising proved that the installation of the civilian regime was premature in an area where there still existed signs of agitation. It also showed that militias could not be totally relied upon.

he needed time to implement long-term projects instead of “hurrying over covering its province with hasty creations just in order to leave a trace of his passage.”³⁴ Because he was appointed as a “Résident Général” with all the attendant military and civilian powers, he considered that he did not have to ask permission of the French government when the local events required urgent actions. He claimed such essential autonomy and decentralization at the highest levels, and stated that, “We have to resist the French cultural tendency to be Cartesian, logical and systematic. A too rigid European administration imposed by the metropolitan bureaucracy will be premature, useless, and dangerous.”³⁵

He sought to avoid any kind of bureaucracy paralyzing the autonomy and the initiative of the local persons in charge. He also added that the administration could not be uniform in such a huge country with its very limited means of communications.³⁶ The administration had to be adapted to the different regions, tribes, and local customs. Thus, it could not be based on permanent and rigid regulations; rather local initiative, flexibility, and intelligence had to prevail. The question of the selection of the persons in charge of the various administrations – military and civilian- was crucial. The expression of “the right man in the right place” was especially appropriate. This was the reason General Galliéni encouraged the publication of historical and geographical studies, to include reports of missions of exploration.³⁷ He incited French military and civilian officials had to learn local languages and urged them to thoroughly study the tribes in their areas so as to understand them better.

A vast decentralization was essential for the success of this campaign. Most of the time, the local commanders had to evaluate the local situation and to decide by themselves which policy to implement. General Galliéni ordered the High Command to content itself

³⁴ Général Joseph S. Galliéni *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3297

³⁵ Général Joseph S. Galliéni *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3300

³⁶ In 1896, it took one month for a letter to go from Majunga to Tananarive. Général Joseph S. Galliéni. *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3290

³⁷ Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier. *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 213

with giving general directions, stating the goals to be achieved, and delegating the highest possible proportion of powers to its subordinates. In every province or military region,³⁸ various advisors were appointed in order to assist the persons in charge in their decision making. At the lowest level, the provinces were divided into sectors. The chief of the province delegated most of his powers to the chiefs of sector, who were then answerable to him for the smooth functioning of their areas of responsibility. General Galliéni specified,

Chiefs of circles are in charge of the tactical command of all the military troops stationed in their areas of responsibility. These troops continue to be under the administrative and disciplinary control of their respective original commanders, but these cannot interfere in their tactical tasks... The chiefs of circles are the only answerable persons for the results of pacification in their areas... One of the first task of the chiefs of circles is to decentralize the administration of their areas by dividing them into sectors. One officer must be appointed as sector commander and must dispose of the most significant initiative possible ... That organization based on circles and sectors that I used in Sudan (1887-1888) and in Tonkin (1893-1895) enabled the pacification of the Malagasy Highlands.³⁹

Thus, the whole organization was based on the principles of decentralization, close interdepartmental cooperation, and personal responsibility. At every level, the persons in charge had the powers necessary to implement an all-embracing action. They could use military forces to ensure the security of administrative employees administering their region. They were tasked to create and collect taxes, lead public works, develop sanitary and school infrastructure, recruit local militias.

Such broad action was another one of the main characteristics of the General Galliéni method. He intended to show that the French intended to stay in Madagascar for a long time. In his opinion, if the French proved their resolve to settle on a permanent basis, trust would return as if by magic, then trade would restart, and the rebels would surrender. He drew those

³⁸ A military region grouped together several military circles. It became a province when its pacification was over and the military turned governing control over to the civilian officials.

³⁹ Général Joseph S. Galliéni *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 2992

conclusions of his experience in Tonkin : “The creation of permanent posts, roads, and crops changed the mindset of the population. It is certainly more with roads and telegraphs than with troops that you conquer a colony.... The first investments in the colony should be as much important and fast as possible... because every waste of time results in a waste of money.”⁴⁰

Thus, simultaneously with military pacification, General Galliéni undertook to develop the economy of the island and to improve the condition of the people. Therefore, one of his first efforts was to definitively abolish slavery and many other customary privileges of the local elites. He particularly focused on two sectors: health and education.⁴¹ To favor the growth of the three million natives, he established a free medical aid with French military doctors and a couple of dozen Malagasy doctors and midwives. Every province was ordered to build a hospital, and medical posts were opened in the countryside.⁴² In 1887, General Galliéni decided to establish a bacteriological institute in Tananarive. He requested the Pasteur Institute of Paris to send colonial doctors to Madagascar so as to study tropical diseases.⁴³

In 1897, despite the opposition of numerous and concurrent religious missions,⁴⁴ General Galliéni developed a public school system. That organization started with the creation of three major schools in Tananarive: a medical school, a primary teacher training college, and a vocational school. Later, schools were built and functioned in every region,

⁴⁰ Général Joseph S. Galliéni *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3299

⁴¹ For example, there were 14 hospitals in 1901 and 129 in 1905; no public school in 1896 and 343 in 1905.

Général Joseph S. Galliéni. *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3357

⁴² Jacques Thobie / Gilbert Meynier. *Histoire de la France coloniale*, p. 215.

⁴³ www.pasteur.mg/pghisto.html. February 2002.

⁴⁴ Numerous religious missions had been established in Madagascar since the 17th century. They were very powerful and some of them were suspected to try to destabilize the island for foreign countries. In addition, they conducted a fierce competition with each other by trying to recruit the natives. Général Joseph S. Galliéni. *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3156

thanks to the help of French soldiers who compensated for the small number of native teachers by operating as instructors.⁴⁵

Concerning economic development, General Galliéni turned his attention towards different domains: infrastructure, commercial trade, agriculture, and the general economy. The main objective was obviously the success of the French colonists. Mainly through local taxes, the French built lighthouses for the harbors that were in the process of being developed (Majunga, Tamatave, and Diégo-Suarez), and roads between Tananarive and the coastal cities. Telegraph between the main cities and the telephone lines in the capital were rapidly connected. At the beginning of the 20th century, the first railroad on the island linked Tananarive to the sea. Consultative chambers were set up to gather information and to give advice about trade, agriculture, and industry. In every province, the military and civilian leaders created an economic information bureau with the mission to conduct studies about resources, production, and business possibilities. New methods and new agricultural products were introduced to local farmers. Measures were also taken to facilitate domestic and foreign trade, such as the use of common measurement and weight units or the imposition of uniform customs. General Galliéni thus contributed a lot to the modernization of the island.⁴⁶

In addition, he made great efforts to reform the former feudal judicial system. In his opinion, a newly conquered and not totally pacified country needed a special judicial organism whose mission was to assist in the administration of the pacification process. Thus, he reorganized legal administration to help restore and maintain the order. However, the new system was again based on decentralization and strove to show to all that fair justice was to the natives' advantage. Simultaneously, he organized the recruitment and the training of local militias. These forces had the police task of maintaining order and suppressing criminal

⁴⁵ Général Joseph S. Galliéni *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3254.

⁴⁶ Between 1895 and 1906 the value of the products sold by the island multiplied sevenfold. Between 1890 and 1898, the total trade increased from 9.3 to 26.6 millions Francs. Général Joseph S. Galliéni, p. 3552.

activity, although they remained strictly controlled by French cadres. In fact, while giving the French the possibility reducing their own forces, the new militias were considered by the natives as a sign of trust. Thus, they were more inclined to accept the new order. However, all these successes were not enough to definitively pacify the island. The last stage required a weakening of the Hova tribe's position in the Malagasy society.

“Politique de races” and Administrative Reform:

General Galliéni's main objective was to destroy the Hova hegemony that had been the major opponent of the French for over a century. The former conquerors had to be considered and treated as one of the numerous tribes of the island. He started with the abolition of the monarchy and the deportation of the queen. Those decisions ended the last rally points of the native masses that could have loyally supported the queen. Then, the former dominated tribes were to be diverted from their previous Hova masters. Firstly, the Hova governors and officials who used to rule those tribes were sent back to Emyrne. Secondly, those peoples were now organized into independent and autonomous confederations under the command of their own leaders who remained, of course, under the control to French “résidents.”⁴⁷ In summary, what the French did was to apply the “politique de races” (policy of races) that was so successful in Tonkin and in Sudan. In 1896, General Galliéni clarified his method by giving the following instructions to the “résidents”:

You have to explain to your employees that the final objective is to form as many separated political groups as the different Malagasy tribes. Each of those groups have to be under the command of their traditional leaders, who will be under the control of the “résidents”... Outside Emyrne, you have to get rid of the Hova officials... and you have to implement the “politique de races”, without limiting yourself to a uniform organization and administration for all the populations of the island. Above all, it is necessary to take into account customs, habits, and the characters of every tribe... You have to get in touch with all the tribes of your territory, study their customs and if necessary use their internal squabbling to oppose one against the other, and cleverly spread

⁴⁷ Military or civilian person in charge of a province or a military region.

our influence in the country. Concerning the administration, you are in charge of selecting leaders who will be answerable to you.⁴⁸

Such a policy aimed at making the French domination more acceptable because it rested on the emancipation of every tribe and was backed by their traditional leaders. It furthermore supported General Galliéni's policy of not directly running the whole country. The backbone of the system was the protectorate and this required using local manpower under French control. That task was not easy to accomplish and required time. The "résidents" had to study thoroughly the tribes placed under their control, understand their structures, look for the influential families and the links with other tribes, and determine the limits of the lands that every tribe controlled. Then, after having politically and administratively organized the tribes, they had to choose native notables to be in charge of the administrative functions. Schools were created to teach the latter how to handle their new role. In the first months of 1897, all the former Hova governors were sent back to Emyrne, and by July leaders of the various tribes, under French supervisors, ruled.

When the pacification made progress, General Galliéni lightly modified his method. Indeed, with the expansion of the lands to rule, the multiplication of local agents became a problem. It was harder to choose competent officials, and the whole organization started to suffer from a lack of unity and coordination. Thus, he rationalized the system as the British had done in India. He decided to create bigger provinces based on natural groupings of population, each under the control of one single French senior official. Assisted by a minimum number of French personnel, the main role of this person was to protect and control the native officials. The extremely small number of French agents ensured higher salaries for the native leaders, and consequently increased their prestige, means of action, and autonomy.

⁴⁸ Général Joseph S. Galliéni. *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3320.

For example, the circle of Arivonimano in Emyrne with about 17,000 inhabitants was ruled by only two French officers. General Galliéni stated:

As the pacification went on and new circles were established, decentralization appeared to be necessary, and I decided to join together several circles in a military territory under a single command. The number of subordinates decreased and it became easier to coordinate the different efforts... It became essential to appoint only one French official assisted by the strictly necessary number of Europeans. This supervisor was in charge of controlling and protecting the native employees. That method was implemented in the regions of the East Indies run by the British administration. The district counted about 4,000 km² and one million of inhabitants; one administrator was in charge of it with the help of two deputies and the chief of the police, and they were the only European officials. The natives took care of the administrative work. I tried to apply the same principles in Madagascar.⁴⁹

However, General Galliéni warned that such a “politique de races” required time, patience, and restraint. The results would be slow because of the various and numerous local difficulties. It was necessary to deal carefully with the natives, to treat them with firmness but benevolence, and above all with justice. They had habits and faults that had to be taken into account and it would have been dangerous to ignore that fact.

In conclusion, General Galliéni succeeded in conquering and pacifying Madagascar by combining political and military action. He used force with restraint, and employed it only when faced with threats to security. As soon as he achieved the restoration of order in a province, he implemented a basic organization of the country fully in connection with the nature of the island, of its inhabitants, and of the stated political and economic goals. As Lyautey wrote: “In the colonies, war was a constructive force, the prelude to the economic revival of lands torn by anarchy or suffering the heavy land of oriental despotism. The colonial army became an organization on the march which employed economic, political, and diplomatic weapons to minimize the violence of conquest.”⁵⁰ With hindsight, if Lyautey’s

⁴⁹ Général Joseph S. Galliéni. *Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar 1896-1899*, p. 3757

⁵⁰ Douglas Porch, “The development of French Colonial Warfare,” *Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 390

advice is compared with the current missions of the armed forces that are involved in operations other than war, such words appear fully relevant.

CHAPTER 3

LESSONS LEARNED FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

(MOOTW):

Characters of Contemporary Crise:

Many contemporary crises present similarities with the campaign in Madagascar. Very often, the terrain where they occur is very difficult with few usable lines of ground communication. That aspect is a major problem for deploying modern military forces and their supporting logistics. The last decade offers numerous examples of such difficulties: rare roads and bridges too weak to bear the weight of modern tanks in Kosovo, runways too short and too smooth for cargo aircraft in Rwanda, and impassable trails during the rainy season in East-Timor or Somalia. In addition, the local resources are generally rather limited and often a tough climate and poor sanitary conditions worsen the task.

The general context of these crises is usually an environment of extreme economic depression, profound poverty, and collapse of the state.⁵¹ Actually, they can be characterized as conflicts of survival. The situation divides the societies into entrenched camps. Everybody looks for security amongst his own people according to a logic of clans and tribes. The ethnic hatreds reappear and every group is scared for its survival and relies on violence for this. The cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of those societies is so exacerbated that the crises turn into conflicts of identity, and if someone is “different” by definition they become an enemy against one and all. Then, the traditional rules of war disappear and the worst crimes become commonplace.

⁵¹ François Thual, *Les conflits identitaires* (Op.Cité 1993), pp. 177-180.

Too often, the historically dominating ethnic group is then tempted to eliminate any group which threatens its position. The Kosovo account of General Jean-Claude Thomann⁵² fully summarizes that kind of situation:

When we arrived in Kosovo, we discovered a non-state. Nothing was there any more. There was no registry office any more, so no more proofs of identity. There was no land registry any more, so no more proofs of property – consequently the law of the strongest predominated. There was no local administration any more, even if some people, former UCK members tried to take it by force. There was no judicial and penal system any more. There was no law any more... The economy had collapsed. For the last ten years, no investments had been made. The Serbs had contented themselves to exploit what they could exploit...It would cost billions of dollars to restart the economy with competitive norms. Kosovo is the victim of an outdated socialist economy. It possessed also modest infrastructures that were in a very bad state: railroads and roads. You have to understand that two basins that are surrounded by mountains culminating at 2,000 meters form Kosovo. You can enter Kosovo only by few rare passes that become overloaded very rapidly. Those conditions were a problem when we had to establish priorities between the emergency humanitarian aid, the restarting of economy and the implementation of logistic flows that supported a 40,000 troops modern force. Kosovo and Albania have also sheltered Mafia from time immemorial. Those regions have always been a crossroad for traffic between the Middle East and Europe. When we entered Kosovo, there were no frontiers any more. Therefore, criminals came to Kosovo with the refugees. Their intention was to take control to the maximum of profitable businesses (black market, drug traffic, armament traffic...)... It was in that very complex environment that, in June 1999, the international community assumed the formidable challenge of rebuilding the country.’⁵³

Such reports could also apply to Cambodia, Somalia, Sierra-Leone, Colombia or Haiti. Admittedly, there are dissimilarities between the Madagascar campaign in the 1890s and the crises of today. The latter are certainly more complex than the former. Many new protagonists such as electronic media or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have appeared. Most of these actors refuse any form of control or restriction, but profoundly influence the decisions made in the theater of operations. They are now able to instantaneously inform the public anywhere in the world and can shape the public support.

⁵² General Thomann was KFOR Deputy Commander from June 1999 to January 2000

Today, most of these operations are also multinational. Every country has its own military culture that does not necessarily match the implementation of methods based on autonomy and initiative at the lowest level, or the involvement of soldiers in civil actions or police tasks.

In addition, the social structure of the population in certain crisis areas may be totally distinct from Madagascar in the 1890s.; at that time, each tribe possessed a clearly defined territory. Conversely, it is common today to be confronted to situations in which ethnic groups are mixed into regions or cities. Sometimes, they have lived together for so long that it is impossible to identify them. In the contemporary world, it appears unthinkable to peacefully convince them to move from the locality where they have lived for centuries, and not a politician in a western country would make the decision to force them to do it. The media outcry would be unbearable and the international opinion would not support such measures, especially if such were based on racial differences.

The nature of the conflicts have also changed. Most of them are civil rather than national wars. Usually, the developed country forces deployed in these crisis areas have to deal with the same banal scenario: after the centralized state's collapse, ethnic paramilitary units fight each other with the intent of seizing power and the wealth of the country. The civil population become a hostage in a struggle linked to a process of "criminalization" of the society. Very often, religion is used by ethnic group leaders to rally their troops, to cement a failed cohesion, or to attract international support.

To get around these difficulties, it may be necessary to be less ambitious by implementing a "politique de races" at a lower level. The village or the district of a city where an ethnic unity exists could be the level to start such a process. That would mean to help their

⁵³ General Thomann. "Témoignage du général Thomann, Le Kosovo", *Revue Défense Nationale*, octobre 2000 p.21

inhabitants peacefully and democratically rule themselves. Later, the process could lead to merge several villages or districts of the same ethnic group in a political organization. The final goal could be to establish a multi-ethnic confederation of these distinct ethnic political organizations. In many crisis areas, there may exist a social or political structure through which it is possible to operate: in Africa or Afghanistan, there were tribe and clan leaders or a monarch in exile, or in Kosovo the secret political organization of Mister Rugova and the Orthodox Church.

However, the framework of the contemporary Military Operations Other Than War does not look like so different than the one with which General Galliéni confronted. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the western democracies have had to learn again how to solve such “small” crises that threatened international stability.

Decades of Blunders and Misperceptions:

During recent years, both the United Nations and the other multinational or national Military Operations Other Than War commitments have experienced major difficulties and failures. Essential mistakes are today easily identified. The first type of misunderstanding was to believe that the military intervention of a group or a single great power would be enough to solve such a crisis. Usually, those military operations aimed at restoring a defeated government or overthrowing a discredited power. Most of the time, they were able to restore the order for only a short period, but because they did not solve the basic problems this only delayed a major explosion of violence with the attendant awful slaughters. The example of the French Operation Barracuda in the Central African Republic in 1979 showed the futility of relying only on the military option. Admittedly, it ousted the “Emperor” Bokassa from his selfnamed Central African Empire and stopped the excesses of his dictatorship. However, his successors were not much concerned about the people, and it only changed the power

relationship amongst the different tribes of the country. The formerly tormented tribes became the new executioners and took their revenge after years of fear. To rely on a single ethnic group to rule a country was another blunder. The history of the post-colonized Africa is rich in terrible events that can be explained by ethnic dictatorship over other different peoples.

The recent United Nations operations in Somalia and Bosnia taught many lessons. First, they proved the crucial necessity of having clear political objectives to achieve and giving clear missions to the committed forces. In May 1995, General Bernard Janvier⁵⁴ declared to the United Nations Security Council: “I posed the problematic situation where blue helmets were involved in a peace keeping operation where there was no peace. The FORPRONU was constantly in situations requiring the recourse of force without having either the needed means or the appropriate legal cover.”⁵⁵

They also showed the need for close cooperation between civilian and military authorities. The arguments between the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the military FORPRONU commander was one of the reasons for delay, misperception, and ineffectiveness. In addition, every national contingent had to report to its own authorities and to obey them. Such procedures increased reaction time. The mandatory need for an independent official political authority in the theater, which had the power to decide by itself the possible use of the force, was fully demonstrated. Furthermore, in Somalia, the international community made the blunder to focus excessively on the humanitarian aspect. Suddenly, the humanitarian was considered the miracle solution that would solve the whole problem. The events would prove dramatically that such a policy was unfounded. Far from resolving the crisis, it worsened the situation because the humanitarian supplies became the source of power, control, and criminality. In addition, it overloaded the

⁵⁴ General Bernard Janvier was the FORPRONU commander during the unfortunate events of Sebrenica.

⁵⁵ General Bernard Janvier. *Le Monde*, 21 Juin 2001.

armed forces who were supposed to protect the population. General Jean Quadri⁵⁶ declared in 1995, “By mutual agreement with the another national commanders, I asked that the following lessons be learned: -necessity to clarify the mandate and to ensure that the objectives and the means match... -need to set up a unified command-necessity to coordinate the actions of the armed forces and the Non Governmental Organizations...”⁵⁷

All these different commanders emphasized the lack of a comprehensive plan based on the cooperation of all the different actors in the theater. In his Program For Peace, the former Secretary General of the United Nations Mister Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated the need for this and clarified his vision: “...the will to coordinate the different components of an intervention, that is the diplomatic, military, humanitarian components of rebuilding to get them synchronized and efficient in the framework of a global project...”⁵⁸

Many other lessons could be drawn from the recent interventions. They proved how important it is to delegate authority at the lowest levels and avoid remote political micromanagement. Such a tendency was a huge constraint for the military commanders during the operations in Bosnia. They could not use close air support without the approval of the political leaders, who became increasingly tempted to manage the crisis from their office. Besides, themilitary commanders emphasized the essential necessity to establish clear, understandable, and achievable objectives. The UN operations in the Balkans in the early 1990s demonstrated that the mere fact of deploying peace keeping forces was not enough to stop a war.

Kosovo: a New Model for Dealing with Crises ?

⁵⁶ General Quadri was the commander of the French forces in Somalia from December 1992 to November 1993.

⁵⁷ General J.Quadri, “Somalie”, *Perspectives Stratégiques*, Mai 1995, p. 53

⁵⁸ UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General following the statement adopted by the Summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

The Kosovo campaign witnessed the implementation of an approach different than those used in the previous failed interventions. This approach borrowed the key tenets from General Galliéni's method.

As General Galliéni did in 1896, NATO started the campaign with strictly military operations. Thus, during the first stage of the campaign, NATO forced the Yugoslav army to leave Kosovo. As soon as that mission was fulfilled, the United Nations and NATO tried to eliminate the structural causes of a potential resumption of the hostilities by totally controlling the area. Like the comprehensive action of General Galliéni, it meant to consolidate the peace by improving the economic, social, political, administrative, and legal conditions. Such a management was based on the clear definition of the military and civilian objectives to be achieved, and of the responsibilities of all the different local and international actors involved in the process of reconstruction.⁵⁹ Thus, the Mission of United Nations for Kosovo (UNMIK) became the supervisor of operations. The Secretary-General then appointed a representative as the principal coordinator in Kosovo, who could be compared with the "Résident Général" of Madagascar. The general action which has been conducted in Kosovo has included instruments coming from foreign, security, development, financial, economic, cultural, and judicial policies. These have had to be coordinated at the national and international levels, and have been based on a close cooperation between various states' military and civilian assets, and on the association with the non-state actors (United Nations agencies, international financial organizations, NGOs, private companies, churches...).

After the air campaign and the Yugoslav withdrawal, NATO ground forces (KFOR) entered Kosovo and ensured the security of the territory. But like during the Madagascar campaign other missions appeared then, especially at the beginning when civilian

⁵⁹ Even if successful, there still are uncertainties about the future of Kosovo: will it remain a part of Yugoslavia or will it become independent?

organizations were not ready to perform theirs. These mainly comprised civil-military actions in various domains such as electrical power, garbage collection, water, repairing of the transportation infrastructure, resumption of rail traffic, control of borders, humanitarian aid, and rebuilding... Such a situation challenged the multi-skill capabilities of the officers.⁶⁰ Progressively, KFOR turned over these tasks to the civilian organizations but has remained in charge of the security.

Progressively, the international community implemented the comprehensive action General Gallieni was fond of. This was organized around four main pillars. The first was security, i.e., the deterring of any resumption in fighting, the demilitarization of the UCK (Army of liberation of Kosovo) and its transformation into a civilian security force, the support of the humanitarian effort, and the assurance that the cooperation between the military and the civilian organizations worked properly. General Georges Ladevèze⁶¹ in 2001 summarized the mission of KFOR:

The goal was to restart an economy to create that prosperity that is the basis of peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups. The challenges significantly did not only concern military and security missions. That underlines the necessity of a close cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR. That civil-military overlapping seems to prove the requirements of the missions, which are today carried out by our armed forces...the current crisis requires an enlarged and multidisciplinary vision, which is at the junction of military, political, and economic influences.⁶²

The United Nations have formed the second pillar. The UNMIK has been in charge of temporarily running the territory and of building new institutions for a civil society. That has meant a reorganization of the local administration to enable the population to run their lives by themselves. The main problem has been to find a means to involve the Kosovars. Despite the hatred between the different ethnic groups, the UNMIK has tried to include them in that

⁶⁰ General Thomann. *Revue Défense Nationale*, octobre 2000, p. 31

⁶¹ General Georges Ladevèze was the KFOR Deputy Commander from January to June 2001

⁶² General Georges Ladevèze. "Balkans vers la paix", *Armées d'aujourd'hui N°260*, p. 40

undertaking. It has developed the concept of co-administration, which has been accepted by all the ethnic groups. The UNMIK has created Kosovar departments, which has been coupled with its administrative organization. The goal has been to prepare those departments to eventually assume these responsibilities.⁶³

In addition, OCSE (Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe) has been in charge of the third pillar. This one has the mission to implement democracy and to reestablish the media. The European Union has been the fourth pillar, which consists of rebuilding and economic development. Finally, many other organizations have participated in close cooperation in that stage of rebuilding and of consolidation of peace.

How the international community dealt, and is still dealing, with the Kosovo crisis may be not perfect. Many problems are still unresolved. However, the way seems to be more effective and relevant than what used to happen in recent decades. Nevertheless, as General Galliéni did over a century, General Thomann insisted that to rebuild a country would be a difficult task, one requiring time, patience, and money. To solve a crisis is possible if a sufficient number of countries, which have the necessary political, military and economic means, share these assets and act together.⁶⁴

Takeaways from General Galliéni:

The comparison of General Galliéni's method and what it is still occurring in Kosovo emphasizes the necessity and the relevance of study military history. General Galliéni proved that his method was effective in a general context similar to contemporary crises. Because too often the experiences of such people are forgotten or considered obsolete, the western democracies that have supported recent Military Operations Other Than War have wasted

⁶³ General Thomann. *Revue Défense Nationale*, octobre 2000, p. 31

⁶⁴ General Thomann. *Revue Défense Nationale*, octobre 2000, p. 27

time, money and lives. Today, most of the principles of General Galliéni are still relevant, applicable, and easy to implement. Still, they are not a guarantee of certain and total success. However, if they are not taken into consideration, the successful management of complex crises that break out almost everywhere in the contemporary world will be different. The updated tenets of this method could be:

To define a clear, understandable, common, and **mutually accepted political objective** is the first requirement. All the different partners have to work with the same final end-state goal. That political objective will be the guiding principle of the military commander. Thus, it will be possible to give clear and achievable military missions to his subordinate units.

The second principle to apply is **unity of effort**. First, this means that a single “leader” is essential. Because of the complexity of contemporary theaters, it may be difficult to concentrate all the daily responsibilities in a single person. However, it is crucial to have an ultimate authority who is authorized to make the most important, urgent, and sensitive decisions. He or she must be able to supervise and coordinate all of the efforts after consulting the appropriate advisors. This individual will have to deal at the local, regional, and international levels with an increasing number of different organizations with divergent objectives. The purpose is to implement a comprehensive action in every sector of daily life. Only this will provide a divided country the opportunity to rebuild itself. It is also why the international community has to be heavily involved in such an operation. The more quickly it intervenes, the more it will be effective. The longer it waits, the more it will cost in lives, time, money, and efforts.

The third principle is the **continuity** between the military and the civilian actions. The armed forces bring the capabilities to enter a country and to secure it. During this initial stage, they must be able to execute a whole spectrum of possible missions. However, as soon as the

situation allows the civilian organizations to enter a part or the entire theater, they must turn over various responsibilities and concentrate on the security missions. This may mean the expansion of the perimeter of security by securing a neighboring area as described in the General Galliéni's "tâche d'huile" method.

The fourth principle is to **involve** the local populations as much as possible. The goal of a contemporary operation can not be to place a country indefinitely under an international trusteeship. It is vital to educate and train the local populations so that they are able to handle their own affairs as quickly as possible. Because it is not easy to manage ethnic conflicts, the solution could be to set up the "politique de races", that is to reorganize divided countries in a confederation of ethnic administrative regions. That solution gives the possibility to every ethnic group to be represented and avoids the often-bloody hegemony of the numerical superior group. Because democracy is not something innate and obvious everywhere in the world, it might give time to these people to learn about this and the tolerance for diversity that is part of such a system.

The last principle is to **avoid the temptation of the micromanagement**. Because of technological improvements, political leaders or military commanders have increasingly the capabilities to manage remote crises from their office. The current crises require **personal and direct involvement**. Local populations need to trust faces that they know and that they can meet when necessary, and who have the autonomy to take appropriate action. The environment is so complex that only the persons in the field can have an accurate knowledge and insight into a situation. Decentralization and autonomy at the lowest levels are essential for the success of such missions.

CONCLUSION:

In conclusion, most of the tenets of General Galliéni's method in Madagascar in the 1890s are still relevant in contemporary Military Operations Other Than War situations. Admittedly, it is necessary to adjust these principles to a current crisis. New actors, constraints, and political objectives that did not exist in the past now have to be taken into consideration. The international community, especially the western powers that try to promote and secure global stability, must understand that such crises require political will, long-term efforts, significant means, and strong resolve. The time where one infantry battalion could manage and resolve an internal crisis of international dimensions is over. These same western countries must also realize that successful management of crises demands the implementation of a comprehensive policy. All the components of the national power, albeit on an international scale, must be involved to guarantee a good outcome.

A thorough study of the Madagascar campaign, where General Galliéni proved the validity of his method, might provide the general framework and bases of such an action. The tenets of "tache d'huile" strategy, "politique de race" administrative and political restructuring, decentralization and autonomy at the lowest levels, participation and education of the natives, and economic, social, legal and cultural development deserve to be updated to the 21st century and utilized.

However, the purpose now is not to recolonize or to place non-developed countries under a permanent western protectorate. Rather, it will be to help them cope with structural, cultural, and ethnic problems that prevent them from achieving full economic development and becoming truly independent. Between imperialism and isolationism, General Galliéni's method might play a significant part.

Without sinking into a blissful and naive optimism, if the main powers, the regional powers, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations could subscribe to such a policy, it might contribute to further peace, ensure sustainable development, and end many of the human tragedies which currently plague the world. However, the issue remains: is everyone ready for such efforts ?

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MADAGASCAR : historical interest

The Indian Ocean has a long maritime history. Since approximately 2,500 B.C., traders, adventurers, and explorers from Egypt, China, India, Indonesia, Persia (Iran), and Ceylon conducted oceangoing commerce and at times maintained maritime empires in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, many peoples who lived in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf regions relied on the Indian Ocean for their livelihoods. The most notable local power was Oman. In 1841 the sultan of Oman moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar and established a trading empire along the East African coast based largely on ivory and slaves. In the wake of these activities, there was a migration of Asians into the western Indian Ocean. As early as 500 B.C., Dravidians and Sinhalese from India and Ceylon had settled in the Maldivian Islands. By A.D. 1000, Malayo-Indonesians had established communities in Madagascar.

The emergence of the great European maritime empires marked an historical watershed in the Indian Ocean. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British quickly gained control over much of the region. To reach this goal, they used sophisticated ships and maritime strategies and exploited local rivalries to gain allies and territory. These activities signaled the beginning of the use of the Indian Ocean as a theater where European maritime nations competed with one another for power and influence in the area. This rivalry spawned many extraregional wars and alliances, many of which caused instability in the region's islands. One of the most important personalities during the early European period was Alfonso d'Albuquerque, governor of Portugal's Indian Ocean possessions from 1508 to 1515. Rather than devoting his energies to territorial conquest, he used naval power to control trade routes. To achieve this goal, d'Albuquerque established a network of bases in the Indian Ocean; constructed forts at the entrances to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca; and concluded alliances with economically powerful rulers on the African and Asian coasts. These tactics enabled Portugal to dominate commercial activity in the Indian Ocean from 1511 to 1641.

From the seventeenth century until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, European and North American shipping relied on the western Indian Ocean and its islands for the transport of eastern goods and spices. As this shorter route quickly supplanted the longer Cape of Good Hope route and steam gradually replaced sail, the region's strategic importance diminished. The islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and, to a lesser extent, Maldives, all of which had been important way stations for international shipping, became remote colonial outposts. Although it enabled the British to consolidate their hegemony over the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal also facilitated the entry of other European nations into the area. The latter development not only challenged British mastery over the Indian Ocean but also caused a scramble for

colonies among the stronger European powers. The French established a presence in the Horn of Africa and Madagascar, both of which protected the route to their Southeast Asia empire. Additionally, the Italians, Germans, and Portuguese created colonies along the East African coast. Russia viewed the Suez Canal as a vehicle to achieve its goal of creating a network of warm water ports. However, Japan's 1904 victory over the Russian fleet ended this dream. Over the next several years, Japan and the United States posed a growing naval challenge to Britain's dominance in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, British seapower remained preeminent throughout the region.

During World War I, the Indian Ocean aroused international interest, as the British and the Germans battled one another for control of various colonies. Also, these nations sought to protect shipping routes that carried petroleum from the Persian Gulf, via the Suez Canal, to Europe. Despite the area's importance, Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and Maldives managed to escape the ravages of World War I.

World War II played a more significant role in the western Indian Ocean, especially as far as Madagascar was concerned. On May 5, 1942, the British 121 Force defeated pro-Vichy French troops and then occupied Diego Suarez. This action denied an important naval base to Japan, which undoubtedly would have used the facility to threaten British maritime communications along East Africa with the Middle East. After occupying Majunga, Tamatave, and Tananarive (now Antananarivo), the British established a military administration over Madagascar, which functioned until mid-1943. Apart from these activities, German submarines harassed Allied shipping throughout the western Indian Ocean.

The most notable wartime event occurred at the 1942 Battle of the Java Sea, when the Japanese destroyed the British Royal Navy. This event marked the end of British hegemony over the Indian Ocean. During the postwar period, the British government lacked the ability and resources to reassert its maritime dominance over the region. However, in the absence of strong contending naval power, the British remained in nominal control of sizable portions of the Indian Ocean. France confined its activities mainly to the western Indian Ocean. Politically, World War II weakened British and French holds over their respective colonial empires. The rising tide of nationalism that swept through Africa and Asia accelerated demands for independence on the part of all the western Indian Ocean islands.

During the postwar period, several factors affected the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. The onset of the Cold War increased superpower activity throughout the region. By 1964 the United States had developed ballistic missile submarines that could hit industrial targets in the Soviet Union from the Arabian Sea. Moscow also feared that Washington's announcement that it intended to deploy some ballistic missile submarines to the Pacific Ocean and to build a very low frequency communications station (designed for submarine contact) in western Australia signaled a military build-up in the Indian Ocean.

The changing nature of British power in the region caused London and Washington to devise a strategy to uphold the interests of both nations. In 1965, during talks with a Mauritian delegation, the British government made it clear that the island's independence was contingent on the sale of the Chagos Archipelago and the transfer of sovereignty to Britain. On November 8, 1965, the British government then created the Crown Colony of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The BIOT consisted of the Chagos Archipelago, earlier administered from the British Crown Colony of Mauritius; and the Aldabra and Farquhar islands and Île Desroches, previously administered from the British Crown Colony of Seychelles. In 1966 Britain leased the approximately eighteen-kilometer island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago to the United States for a fifty-year period until the year 2016, with a twenty-year extension available if

neither London nor Washington opposed continuation. For political and security reasons, the indigenous population of 1,200 who lived on Diego Garcia were resettled in Mauritius and Seychelles, and received US\$8 million in compensation from the British government. The controversy surrounding these actions never has disappeared; even in 1993, the Mauritian government periodically attempted to reassert its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, especially Diego Garcia.

When the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War between Israel and Egypt caused the closure of the Suez Canal, shippers had to transport their goods around the Cape of Good Hope. This increased the importance of Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, and, to a lesser extent, Mauritius, all of which had the potential to command the Cape route. After the Suez Canal reopened in 1975, these islands retained their significance because, to carry petroleum more economically over the longer route, many shippers had built supertankers that were too large to pass through the canal. In early 1968, the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean changed again when the British government announced its intention to withdraw all its military forces from east of the Suez Canal by 1971. Two months after this declaration, the Soviet Union deployed four warships to the Indian Ocean, and arranged for them to call at ports on the Indian subcontinent, the Persian Gulf, and the East Africa coast. After 1969 Soviet naval units regularly visited the region. Throughout the 1970s, Moscow also succeeded in gaining access to several naval bases around the littoral and increasing the number of Soviet intelligence, research, and fishing vessels operating in the Indian Ocean. As a result, the number of Soviet naval craft in the area often exceeded those of the United States.

The British pullback from east of Suez also led to an increased United States military presence in the Indian Ocean. In 1972 a new agreement allowed the United States to build a naval communications facility on Diego Garcia for British and United States use. Also, in 1972 the United States naval element, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) extended its operational area to cover most of the Indian Ocean. In 1976 the United States transformed Diego Garcia into a naval support facility with deep-water docks and an expanded runway.

For the next several decades, the United States and the Soviet Union competed with one another for strategic superiority in the Indian Ocean. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Jimmy Carter announced his intention to use military force to prevent any foreign power (i.e., the Soviet Union) from gaining control of the Persian Gulf region. To buttress this policy, the United States increased its military presence in the Indian Ocean to enhance its ability to respond quickly to any military contingency. After the downfall of Iran's imperial government in 1979, the United States deployed a second carrier task force to the area to join the one already on station. Additionally, the United States government concluded a series of military access agreements with Egypt, Kenya, Oman, and Somalia, and arranged to conduct joint military exercises with these countries. On March 1, 1980, President Carter also authorized the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, later reorganized as the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), whose area of responsibility includes Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

During the 1980s, the Indian Ocean continued to provoke competition between Washington and Moscow. The United States increased its presence on Diego Garcia by building new airfield facilities and an air force satellite detection and tracking station, initiating Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations, improving navigational aids, and increasing anchorages and moorings for pre-positioned warehouse ships stationed permanently at the island.

From Moscow's perspective, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron performed a defensive mission against the United States, and promoted Soviet foreign policy in the region. Apart from access to naval facilities in Seychelles, Mauritius, and Reunion, the Soviet Union also conducted long-range maritime surveillance flights over much of the Indian Ocean. Despite this activity, Moscow avoided a military confrontation with Washington in the Indian Ocean, largely because it lacked modern, high-performance aircraft carriers and the ability to defend long sea and air lines of communications to and from the region.

Throughout the Cold War years, France also remained active in the Indian Ocean. Until 1973, the headquarters of the French forces was in Madagascar. After Antananarivo severed military relations with Paris, French forces operated from Reunion, Comoros, and Djibouti. Throughout much of the 1980s and the early 1990s, France maintained the second largest naval fleet in the Indian Ocean. French naval forces normally consisted of a marine contingent attached to a carrier, two Polaris-type attack submarines, two or three destroyers, two or three frigates, minesweepers, and ten to fifteen landing craft and auxiliaries. Additionally, France maintained 5,000 troops and a small number of fighter aircraft in Djibouti.

HISTORICAL SETTING

THE REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR, formerly known as the Malagasy Republic and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, has undergone significant socioeconomic and political changes during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Occupying a strategic location off the southeast coast of Africa, the island historically became the target of British and French imperial ambitions. Ultimately, the competition resulted in French colonization at the end of the nineteenth century. The country gained full independence from colonial rule on June 26, 1960. Philibert Tsiranana headed the conservative regime of the First Republic, which was superseded in 1975 by a Marxist-oriented military regime under Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka. In the face of rising political dissent and socioeconomic decline that reached its height at the beginning of the 1990s, the Second Republic succumbed to the wave of democratization spreading throughout the African continent. On March 27, 1993, the inauguration of Albert Zafy as the third elected president of Madagascar since independence marked the beginning of the Third Republic.

Precolonial Era, Prior to 1894

The ruins of fortifications built by Arab traders as far back as the ninth century underscore Madagascar's historical role as a destination for travelers from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Not until the beginning of the sixteenth century, however, did European ships flying Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French flags explore Madagascar's shoreline. Beginning in 1643, several French settlements emerged; the best known of these, Tolagnaro (formerly Faradofay) on the southeast coast, lasted for more than thirty years. The settlement survived in part because the colonists had taken pains to establish cordial relations with the Antanosy, the ethnic group inhabiting the area. Relations deteriorated later, however, and in 1674 a massacre of nearly all the inhabitants ended French colonization endeavors for more than a century; survivors fled by sea to the neighboring territory of Reunion.

This early checking of French imperial designs coincided with the spread of piracy into the Indian Ocean. In the absence of a significant naval power in waters remote from Europe,

privateer vessels attacked ships of many nations for nearly forty years. The favorite hunting grounds were in the north in the Arabian Sea and Red Sea areas, but Madagascar was a popular hiding place where crews could recuperate and replenish supplies for another attack. By this time, the institution of slavery also had been implanted on the island. Madagascar became a source of slaves, not only for the neighboring islands of Mauritius and Rodrigues, but also for more distant points, including the Western Hemisphere.

Madagascar's social and political structure facilitated the slave trade. Within several small coastal kingdoms, stratified societies of nobles, commoners, and slaves gave allegiance to a single king or queen. For example, the Sakalava ethnic group dominated the western and northern portions of Madagascar in two separate kingdoms. Menabe, on the barren western grasslands, had its first capital at Toliara; Boina, in the northwest, included the port of Mahajanga. The towns became centers of trade where cattle and slaves, taken in war, were exchanged with European merchants for guns and other manufactured goods. These political domains were complemented by the Betsimisaraka kingdom along the east coast, and the southern coastal kingdoms dominated by the Mahafaly and the Antandroy ethnic groups.

The most powerful of Madagascar's kingdoms--the one that eventually established hegemony over a great portion of the island--was that developed by the Merina ethnic group. Before the Merina emerged as the dominant political power on the island in the nineteenth century, they alternated between periods of political unity and periods in which the kingdom separated into smaller political units. The location of the Merina in the central highlands afforded them some protection from the ravages of warfare that recurred among the coastal kingdoms. The distinction, recognized both locally and internationally, between the central highlanders (the Merina) and the *côtiers* (inhabitants of the coastal areas) would soon exert a major impact on Madagascar's political system. Organized like the coastal kingdoms in a hierarchy of nobles, commoners, and slaves, the Merina developed a unique political institution known as the *fokonolona* (village council). Through the *fokonolona*, village elders and other local notables were able to enact regulations and exert a measure of local control in such matters as public works and security.

Two monarchs played key roles in establishing Merina political dominance over Madagascar. The first, who ruled under the name of Andrianampoinimerina (r. 1797-1810), seized the throne of one of the Merina kingdoms in 1787. By 1806 he had conquered the remaining three kingdoms and united them within the former boundaries of Imerina, the capital established at the fortified city of Antananarivo. Radama I (r. 1816-28), an able and forward-looking monarch, succeeded to the throne in 1810 upon the death of his father. By adroitly playing off competing British and French interests in the island, he was able to extend Merina authority over nearly the entire island of Madagascar. Radama I first conquered the Betsileo ethnic group in the southern part of the central highlands and subsequently overpowered the Sakalava, an ethnic group that also sought at times to assert its hegemony over other groups. With the help of the British, who wanted a strong kingdom to offset French influence, Radama I modernized the armed forces. In 1817 the peoples of the east coast, facing an army of 35,000 soldiers, submitted with little or no protest; Radama then conquered the entire southeast as far as Tolagnaro. Particularly barren or impenetrable parts of the island escaped conquest, especially in the extreme south, but before his death Radama I succeeded in bringing the major and more hospitable portions of the country under Merina rule.

Radama I's interest in modernization along Western lines extended to social and political matters. He organized a cabinet and encouraged the Protestant London Missionary Society to establish schools and churches and to introduce the printing press--a move that was to have far-

reaching implications for the country. The society made nearly half a million converts, and its teachers devised a written form of the local language, Malagasy, using the Latin alphabet. By 1828 several thousand persons, primarily Merina, had become literate, and a few young persons were being sent to Britain for schooling. Later the Merina dialect of Malagasy became the official language. Malagasy language publications were established and circulated among the Merina-educated elite; by 1896 some 164,000 children, mainly Merina and Betsileo, another ethnic group, attended the mission's primary schools. Along with new ideas came some development of local manufacturing. Much productive time was spent, however, in military campaigns to expand territory and acquire slaves for trade.

The reign of Radama I's wife and successor, Queen Ranavalona I (r. 1828-61), was essentially reactionary, reflecting her distrust of foreign influence. Under the oligarchy that ruled in her name, rivals were slain, numerous Protestant converts were persecuted and killed, and many Europeans fled the island. The ruling elite held all the land and monopolized commerce, except for the handful of Europeans allowed to deal in cattle, rice, and other commodities. Remunerations to the queen provided the French traders a supply of slaves and a monopoly in the slave trade. Enjoying particular favor owing to his remarkable accomplishments was French artisan Jean Laborde, who established at Mantasoa, near Antananarivo, a manufacturing complex and agricultural research station where he manufactured commodities ranging from silk and soap to guns, tools, and cement.

During the reign of Radama II (r. 1861-63), the pendulum once again swung toward modernization and cordial relations with Western nations, particularly France. Radama II made a treaty of perpetual friendship with France, but his brief rule ended with his assassination by a group of nobles alarmed by his pro-French stance. He was succeeded by his widow, who ruled until 1868, during which time she annulled the treaty with France and the charter of Laborde's company.

After 1868 a Merina leader, Rainilaiarivony, ruled the monarchy. To avoid giving either the French or the British a pretext for intervention, Rainilaiarivony emphasized modernization of the society and tried to curry British favor without giving offense to the French. He made concessions to both countries, signing a commercial treaty with France in 1868 and with Britain in 1877. Important social developments under his leadership included the outlawing of polygamy and the slave trade; promulgation of new legal codes; the spread of education, especially among the Merina; and the conversion of the monarchy in 1869 to Protestantism

Colonial Era, 1894-1960

The French largely ended the attempts of Malagasy rulers to stymie foreign influence by declaring a protectorate over the entire island in 1894. A protectorate over northwest Madagascar, based on treaties signed with the Sakalava during the 1840s, had existed since 1882. But Queen Ranavalona III refused to recognize the 1894 effort to subordinate her kingdom to French rule. As a result, a French expeditionary force occupied Antananarivo in September 1895. A wave of antiforeign, anti-Christian rioting ensued. In 1896 France declared Madagascar a French colony and deported the queen and the prime minister--first to Reunion, then to Algeria.

Nationalist sentiment against French colonial rule eventually emerged among a small group of Merina intellectuals who had been educated by Europeans and exposed to Western intellectual thought. The group, based in Antananarivo, was led by a Malagasy Protestant clergyman, Pastor Ravelojoana, who was especially inspired by the Japanese model of

modernization. A secret society dedicated to affirming Malagasy cultural identity was formed in 1913, calling itself Iron and Stone Ramification (Vy Vato Sakelika--VVS). Although the VVS was brutally suppressed, its actions eventually led French authorities to provide the Malagasy with their first representative voice in government.

Malagasy veterans of military service in France during World War I bolstered the embryonic nationalist movement. Throughout the 1920s, the nationalists stressed labor reform and equality of civil and political status for the Malagasy, stopping short of advocating independence. For example, the French League for Madagascar under the leadership of Anatole France demanded French citizenship for all Malagasy people in recognition of their country's wartime contribution of soldiers and resources. A number of veterans who remained in France were exposed to French political thought, most notably the anticolonial and proindependence platforms of French socialist parties. Jean Ralaimongo, for example, returned to Madagascar in 1924 and became embroiled in labor questions that were causing considerable tension throughout the island.

Among the first concessions to Malagasy equality was the formation in 1924 of two economic and financial delegations. One was composed of French settlers, the other of twenty-four Malagasy representatives elected by the Council of Notables in each of twenty-four districts. The two sections never met together, and neither had real decision-making authority.

Only in the aftermath of World War II was France willing to accept a form of Malagasy self-rule under French tutelage. In the fall of 1945, separate French and Malagasy electoral colleges voted to elect representatives from Madagascar to the Constituent Assembly of the Fourth Republic in Paris. The two delegates chosen by the Malagasy, Joseph Raseta and Joseph Ravoahangy, both campaigned to implement the ideal of the self-determination of peoples affirmed by the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and by the historic Brazzaville Conference of 1944.

Raseta and Ravoahangy, together with Jacques Rabemananjara, a writer long resident in Paris, had organized the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Restoration (Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache--MDRM), the foremost among several political parties formed in Madagascar by early 1946. Although Protestant Merina were well represented in MDRM's higher echelons, the party's 300,000 members were drawn from a broad political base reaching across the entire island and crosscutting ethnic and social divisions. Several smaller MDRM rivals included the Party of the Malagasy Disinherited (Parti des Déshérités Malgaches), whose members were mainly *côtiers* or descendants of slaves from the central highlands.

The 1946 constitution of the French Fourth Republic made Madagascar a *territoire d'outre-mer* (overseas territory) within the French Union. It accorded full citizenship to all Malagasy parallel with that enjoyed by citizens in France. But the assimilationist policy inherent in its framework was incongruent with the MDRM goal of full independence for Madagascar, so Ravoahangy and Raseta abstained from voting. The two delegates also objected to the separate French and Malagasy electoral colleges, even though Madagascar was represented in the French National Assembly. The constitution divided Madagascar administratively into a number of provinces, each of which was to have a locally elected provincial assembly. Not long after, a National Representative Assembly was constituted at Antananarivo. In the first elections for the provincial assemblies, the MDRM won all seats or a majority of seats, except in Mahajanga Province.

Despite these reforms, the political scene in Madagascar remained unstable. Economic and social concerns, including food shortages, black-market scandals, labor conscription, renewed ethnic tensions, and the return of soldiers from France, strained an already volatile situation. Many of the veterans felt they had been less well treated by France than had veterans

from metropolitan France; others had been politically radicalized by their wartime experiences. The blend of fear, respect, and emulation on which Franco-Malagasy relations had been based seemed at an end.

On March 29, 1947, Malagasy nationalists revolted against the French. Although the uprising eventually spread over one-third of the island, the French were able to restore order after reinforcements arrived from France. Casualties among the Malagasy were estimated in the 60,000 to 80,000 range (later reports estimated 11,000 casualties, of whom 180 were non-Malagasy). The group of leaders responsible for the uprising, which came to be referred to as the Revolt of 1947, never has been identified conclusively. Although the MDRM leadership consistently maintained its innocence, the French outlawed the party. French military courts tried the military leaders of the revolt and executed twenty of them. Other trials produced, by one report, some 5,000 to 6,000 convictions, and penalties ranged from brief imprisonment to death. In 1956 France's socialist government renewed the French commitment to greater autonomy in Madagascar and other colonial possessions by enacting the *loi-cadre* (enabling law). The *loi-cadre* provided for universal suffrage and was the basis for parliamentary government in each colony. In the case of Madagascar, the law established executive councils to function alongside provincial and national assemblies, and dissolved the separate electoral colleges for the French and Malagasy groups. The provision for universal suffrage had significant implications in Madagascar because of the basic ethnopolitical split between the Merina and the *côtiers*, reinforced by the divisions between Protestants and Roman Catholics. Superior armed strength and educational and cultural advantages had given the Merina a dominant influence on the political process during much of the country's history. The Merina were heavily represented in the Malagasy component of the small elite to whom suffrage had been restricted in the earlier years of French rule. Now the *côtiers*, who outnumbered the Merina, would be a majority. The end of the 1950s was marked by growing debate over the future of Madagascar's relationship with France. Two major political parties emerged. The newly created Democratic Social Party of Madagascar (Parti Social Démocrate de Madagascar--PSD) favored self-rule while maintaining close ties with France. The PSD was led by Philibert Tsiranana, a well-educated Tsimihety from the northern coastal region who was one of three Malagasy deputies elected in 1956 to the National Assembly in Paris. The PSD built upon Tsiranana's traditional political stronghold of Mahajanga in northwest Madagascar and rapidly extended its sources of support by absorbing most of the smaller parties that had been organized by the *côtiers*. In sharp contrast, those advocating complete independence from France came together under the auspices of the Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar (Antokon'ny Kongresy Fanafahana an'i Madagasikara-- AKFM). Primarily based in Antananarivo and Antsiranana, party support centered among the Merina under the leadership of Richard Andriamanjato, himself a Merina and a member of the Protestant clergy. To the consternation of French policy makers, the AKFM platform called for nationalization of foreign-owned industries, collectivization of land, the "Malagachization" of society away from French values and customs (most notably use of the French language), international nonalignment, and exit from the Franc Zone

Independence, the First Republic, and the Military Transition, 1960-75

After France adopted the Constitution of the Fifth Republic under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, on September 28, 1958, Madagascar held a referendum to determine whether the country should become a self-governing republic within the French community. The

AKFM and other nationalists opposed to the concept of limited self-rule mustered about 25 percent of votes cast. The vast majority of the population at the urging of the PSD leadership voted in favor of the referendum. The vote led to the election of Tsiranana as the country's first president on April 27, 1959. After a year of negotiations between Tsiranana and his French counterparts, Madagascar's status as a self-governing republic officially was altered on June 26, 1960, to that of a fully independent and sovereign state. The cornerstone of Tsiranana's government was the signing with France of fourteen agreements and conventions designed to maintain and strengthen Franco-Malagasy ties. These agreements were to provide the basis for increasing opposition from Tsiranana's critics.

A spirit of political reconciliation prevailed in the early 1960s. By achieving independence and obtaining the release of the MDRM leaders detained since the Revolt of 1947, Tsiranana had coopted the chief issues on which the more aggressively nationalist elements had built much of their support. Consistent with Tsiranana's firm commitment to remain attached to Western civilization, the new regime made plain its intent to maintain strong ties to France and the West in the economic, defense, and cultural spheres. Not entirely sanguine about this prospect, the opposition initially concurred in the interest of consolidating the gains of the previous decade, and most ethnic and regional interests supported Tsiranana.

Similar to other African leaders during the immediate independence era, Tsiranana oversaw the consolidation of his own party's power at the expense of other parties. A political system that strongly favored the incumbent complemented these actions. For example, although the political process allowed minority parties to participate, the constitution mandated a winner-take-all system that effectively denied the opposition a voice in governance. Tsiranana's position was further strengthened by the broad, multiethnic popular base of the PSD among the *côtiers*, whereas the opposition was severely disorganized. The AKFM continued to experience intraparty rifts between leftist and ultranationalist, more orthodox Marxist factions; it was unable to capitalize on increasingly active but relatively less privileged Malagasy youth because the party's base was the Merina middle class.

A new force on the political scene provided the first serious challenge to the Tsiranana government in April 1971. The National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar--Monima) led a peasant uprising in Toliara Province. The creator and leader of Monima was Monja Jaona, a *côtier* from the south who also participated in the Revolt of 1947. The main issue was government pressure for tax collection at a time when local cattle herds were being ravaged by disease. The protesters attacked military and administrative centers in the area, apparently hoping for support in the form of weapons and reinforcements from China. Such help never arrived, and the revolt was harshly and quickly suppressed. An estimated fifty to 1,000 persons died, Monima was dissolved, and Monima leaders, including Jaona and several hundred protesters, were arrested and deported to the island of Nosy Lava.

Another movement came on the scene in early 1972, in the form of student protests in Antananarivo. A general strike involving the nation's roughly 100,000 secondary-level students focused on three principal issues: ending the cultural cooperation agreements with France; replacing educational programs designed for schools in France and taught by French teachers with programs emphasizing Malagasy life and culture and taught by Malagasy instructors; and increasing access for economically underprivileged youth to secondary-level institutions. By early May, the PSD sought to end the student strike at any cost; on May 12 and 13, the government arrested several hundred student leaders and sent them to Nosy-Lava. Authorities also closed the schools and banned demonstrations.

Mounting economic stagnation--as revealed in scarcities of investment capital, a general decline in living standards, and the failure to meet even modest development goals--further undermined the government's position. Forces unleashed by the growing economic crisis combined with student unrest to create an opposition alliance. Workers, public servants, peasants, and many unemployed urban youth of Antananarivo joined the student strike, which spread to the provinces. Protesters set fire to the town hall and to the offices of a French-language newspaper in the capital.

The turning point occurred on May 13 when the Republican Security Force (Force Républicaine de Sécurité--FRS) opened fire on the rioters; in the ensuing melee between fifteen and forty persons were killed and about 150 injured. Tsiranana declared a state of national emergency and on May 18 dissolved his government, effectively ending the First Republic. He then turned over full power to the National Army under the command of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, a politically conservative Merina and former career officer in the French army. The National Army had maintained strict political neutrality in the crisis, and its intervention to restore order was welcomed by protesters and opposition elements.

The Ramanantsoa military regime could not resolve rising economic and ethnic problems, and narrowly survived an attempted coup d'état on December 31, 1974. The fact that the coup was led by several *côtier* officers against a Merina military leader underscored the growing Merina/*côtier* polarization in the military. In an attempt at restoring unity, Ramanantsoa, on February 5, 1975, turned over power to Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava (a Merina with a less "aristocratic" background). Five days later, Ratsimandrava was assassinated, and a National Military Directorate was formed to restore order by declaring martial law, strictly censoring political expression, and suspending all political parties.

The political transition crisis was resolved on June 15, 1975, when the National Military Directorate selected Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka as head of state and president of a new ruling body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). The choice of Ratsiraka allayed ethnic concerns because he was a *côtier* belonging to the Betsimisaraka ethnic group. In addition, Ratsiraka--a dedicated socialist--was perceived by his military peers as a consensus candidate capable of forging unity among the various leftist political parties (such as AKFM and Monima), students, urban workers, the peasantry, and the armed forces.

The Second Republic, 1975-92

Ratsiraka was elected to a seven-year term as president in a national referendum on December 21, 1975, confirming the mandate for consensus and inaugurating Madagascar's Second Republic. The guiding principle of Ratsiraka's administration was the need for a socialist "revolution from above." Specifically, he sought to radically change Malagasy society in accordance with programs and principles incorporated into the *Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution*, popularly referred to as the "Red Book" (Boky Mena). According to this document, the primary goal of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Madagascar was to build a "new society" founded on socialist principles and guided by the actions of the "five pillars of the revolution": the SRC, peasants and workers, young intellectuals, women, and the Popular Armed Forces. "The socialist revolution," explains the Red Book, "is the only choice possible for us in order to achieve rapid economic and cultural development in an autonomous, humane, and harmonious manner." The Red Book advocated a new foreign policy based on the principle of nonalignment, and domestic policies focused on renovating the *fokonolona*, decentralizing the

administration, and fomenting economic development through rigorous planning and popular input.

Several early policies collectively decided by Ratsiraka and other members of the SRC set the tone of the revolution from above. The first major SRC decision was to bring the French-held sectors of the economy under government control. This "economic decolonization" was welcomed by nationalists, who long had clamored for economic and cultural independence from France. The government also lifted martial law but retained rigid press censorship. Finally, the SRC ordered the closure of an earth satellite tracking station operated by the United States as part of its commitment to nonaligned foreign relations.

Political consolidation proceeded apace following the addition of ten civilians to the SRC in January 1976. This act constituted the beginning of a civil-military partnership in that the SRC became more representative of the country's major political tendencies and ethnic communities. In March the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Antokin'ny Revolisiona Malagasy--Arema) was founded as the government party, and Ratsiraka became its secretary general. In sharp contrast to the single-party states created by other African Marxist leaders, Arema served as simply one (albeit the most powerful) member of a coalition of six parties united under the umbrella of the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution (Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution--FNDR). Membership in the FNDR, necessary for participation in the electoral process, was preconditioned on party endorsement of the revolutionary principles and programs contained in the Red Book.

Ratsiraka and Arema clearly dominated the political system. In the *fokonolona* elections held in March 1977, for example, Arema captured 90 percent of 73,000 contested seats in 11,400 assemblies. In June 1977, Arema won 220 out of a total of 232 seats in elections for six provincial general assemblies, and 112 out of a total of 137 seats in the Popular National Assembly. This trend toward consolidation was most vividly demonstrated by Ratsiraka's announcement of his 1977 cabinet in which Arema members held sixteen of eighteen ministerial posts.

Yet, less than three years after taking power, Ratsiraka's regime was confronted with growing popular disenchantment. As early as September 1977, antigovernment demonstrations erupted in Antananarivo because of severe shortages in foodstuffs and essential commodities. This trend intensified as the economy worsened under the weight of ill-conceived economic policies that gradually centralized government control over the key sectors of the economy, including banking and agriculture. Ratsiraka defiantly adopted authoritarian tactics in response to the evolving opposition, sending in the armed forces to stifle dissent and maintain order during student riots in May 1978. In the economic realm, however, Ratsiraka accepted the free-market reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund in order to ensure an infusion of foreign assistance vital to keeping the economy functioning. Whereas Ratsiraka's drift toward authoritarianism provided his enemies with political cannon fodder, his economic reforms led them to charge him with abandoning "scientific socialism" and alienated his traditional base of political supporters, as well.

The results of presidential elections within the de facto single-party framework that prevailed throughout the Second Republic clearly demonstrated Ratsiraka's declining political fortunes. Widespread initial enthusiasm for his socialist revolution from above secured him nearly 95 percent of the popular vote in the 1975 presidential elections, but support declined to 80 percent in 1982 and to only 63 percent in 1989. The year of 1989 marked a special turning point in that the fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the intellectual death of singleparty rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and similarly transformed electoral politics in Africa. In the

case of Madagascar, increasingly vocal opposition parties denounced what they and international observers considered massive fraud in the 1989 presidential election, including Ratsiraka's refusal to update outdated voting lists that excluded the anti-Ratsiraka youth vote and the stuffing of ballot boxes at unmonitored rural polling stations. Massive demonstrations against Ratsiraka's inauguration led to violent clashes in Antananarivo that, according to official figures, left seventy-five dead and wounded.

Popular discontent with the Ratsiraka regime heightened on August 10, 1991, when more than 400,000 citizens marched peacefully on the President's Palace in order to oust the Ratsiraka government and create a new multiparty political system. Ratsiraka already faced an economy crippled by a general strike that had begun in May, as well as a divided and restless military whose loyalty no longer could be assumed. When the Presidential Guard opened fire on the marchers and killed and wounded hundreds, a crisis of leadership occurred.

The net result of these events was Ratsiraka's agreement on October 31, 1991 to support a process of democratic transition, complete with the formulation of a new constitution and the holding of free and fair multiparty elections. Albert Zafy, the central leader of the opposition forces and a *côtier* of the Tsimihety ethnic group, played a critical role in this transition process and ultimately emerged as the first president of Madagascar's Third Republic. The leader of the Comité des Forces Vives (Vital Forces Committee, known as Forces Vives), an umbrella opposition group composed of sixteen political parties that spearheaded the 1991 demonstrations, Zafy also emerged as the head of what became known as the High State Authority, a transitional government that shared power with the Ratsiraka regime during the democratization process.

A new draft constitution was approved by 75 percent of those voting in a national referendum on August 19, 1992. The first round of presidential elections followed on November 25. Frontrunner Zafy won 46 percent of the popular vote as the Forces Vives candidate, and Ratsiraka, as leader of his own newly created progovernment front, the Militant Movement for Malagasy Socialism (Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache--MMSM), won approximately 29 percent of the vote. The remaining votes were split among a variety of other candidates. Because neither candidate obtained a majority of the votes cast, a second round of elections between the two frontrunners was held on February 10, 1993. Zafy emerged victorious with nearly 67 percent of the popular vote.

The Third Republic, 1993-

The Third Republic officially was inaugurated on March 27, 1993, when Zafy was sworn in as president. The victory of the Forces Vives was further consolidated in elections held on June 13, 1993, for 138 seats in the newly created National Assembly. Voters turned out in low numbers (roughly 30 to 40 percent abstained) because they were being called upon to vote for the fourth time in less than a year. The Forces Vives and other allied parties won seventy-five seats. This coalition gave Zafy a clear majority and enabled him to chose Francisque Ravony of the Forces Vives as prime minister.

By the latter half of 1994, the heady optimism that accompanied this dramatic transition process had declined somewhat as the newly elected democratic government found itself confronted with numerous economic and political obstacles. Adding to these woes was the relatively minor but nonetheless embarrassing political problem of Ratsiraka's refusal to vacate the President's Palace. The Zafy regime has found itself under increasing economic pressure from the IMF and foreign donors to implement market reforms, such as cutting budget deficits and a

bloated civil service, that do little to respond to the economic problems facing the majority of Madagascar's population. Zafy also confronts growing divisions within his ruling coalition, as well as opposition groups commonly referred to as "federalists" seeking greater power for the provinces (known as "faritany") under a more decentralized government. Although recently spurred by the desire of anti-Zafy forces to gain greater control over local affairs, historically Madagascar has witnessed a tension between domination by the central highlanders and pressures from residents of outlying areas to manage their own affairs. In short, the Zafy regime faces the dilemma of using relatively untested political structures and "rules of the game" to resolve numerous issues of governance.

MADAGASCAR : population and ethnicity

Madagascar has experienced steady population growth throughout the twentieth century. Since the first systematic census was undertaken by colonial authorities at the turn of the twentieth century, the population has grown from 2.2 million in 1900 to 7.6 million in 1975 (the last year that a census was undertaken) and to a population estimated by the IMF in mid-1993 at 11.86 million. It is expected that the population will approach 17 million by the end of the twentieth century, underscoring a more than fivefold increase in less than a hundred years. Moreover, the average rate of population growth itself has increased from 2.3 percent in 1975 to 3.1 percent over the 1980 to 1990 decade. This rate has made Madagascar one of the most rapidly growing countries in Africa, with a large youthful population--in 1992 nearly 55 percent of the population was under twenty years of age.

The increase in population is significantly influenced by Madagascar's increasingly healthy and youthful population. As a result of more extensive and accessible health care services, for example, Madagascar has witnessed a 36 percent decline in infant mortality from 177 per 1,000 live births in 1981 to 114 per 1,000 in 1991--the average for sub-Saharan Africa was 103. Moreover, as of 1991 a significant portion of the population (estimates range from 40 to 50 percent) was below fourteen years of age, and population density (per square kilometer) had risen to twenty (from roughly fourteen in 1981).

The urban population percentage has doubled since 1975, rising from 13 percent of the population to 26 percent in 1992. The annual urban population growth rate in the 1980s was 6.4 percent. Figures for Madagascar's foreign population in the early 1990s are lacking, but in 1988, such persons were estimated to include 25,000 Comorans, 18,000 French, 17,000 Indians, and 9,000 Chinese.

A unique blend of African and Asian landscapes and cultures is usually one of the first things recognized by first-time travelers to Madagascar. In the zebu cattle-raising regions of the south and west, for example, the savannas resemble those of East Africa. In the central highlands, however, irrigated and terraced rice fields evoke images of Southeast Asia. These contrasting images lie at the heart of an ongoing debate over the origins of the Malagasy people. According to one theory, peoples from the Indonesian archipelago migrated along the coast of south Asia, across the Arabian Peninsula into the east coast of Africa and, finally, across the Mozambique Channel into present-day Madagascar. This movement occurred over several generations and, because of the gradual interaction between Asian and African populations, led to the arrival and eventual implantation of a distinct Malagasy people and culture. A second theory emphasizes the diversity of the peoples inhabiting Madagascar. Simply put, proponents argue that the Malagasy resulted from a series of migrations by different peoples over time. According to this theory, migrants from the Indonesian archipelago arrived first and eventually settled in the central highlands, followed by the arrival of African peoples as a result of normal migrational trends and the rise of the slave trade. Recent scholarship has suggested that perhaps the theories are complementary, with greater emphasis being placed on the first.

Scholars traditionally have described Madagascar as being divided into eighteen or twenty ethnic groups, each with its own distinct territory; political developments in the contemporary period are often described in terms of ethnic conflict. Yet ethnicity is potentially misleading in the Malagasy context because it connotes a more or less self-sufficient and unique cultural, socioeconomic, and historically united group that perceives itself as being different from other groups.

The population of Madagascar, however, is remarkably homogeneous in terms of language. Unlike most African countries, the vast majority speak the indigenous national Malagasy language. Moreover, despite significant variations, important cultural elements unify the Malagasy people and give them a "panislandic " identity. These include a system of kinship in which descent can be traced through either the paternal or the maternal line. The same kinship terms are used by all Malagasy. A second important element is the centrality of respect for the dead (*razana*) to the social, moral, and religious life of the people. Tombs and the ceremonies related to them are prominent features of both the Malagasy landscape and the way of life of the people. A third important feature is the division of Malagasy societies into three relatively rigid strata: nobles, commoners, and slaves (or descendants of slaves). Other common elements include the circumcision of children, the practice of astrology and divination, and certain concepts associated with authority, such as *hasina* (sacred, or life-giving, power), which legitimates the position of political and familial authorities.

Another potentially valuable method of analyzing Malagasy society is to differentiate between the so-called *côtiers*, or peoples living in coastal areas, and those who live in the central highlands. Indeed, scholars have noted in recent years that the salience of ethnic group identity has declined, while the division between the central highlands peoples and the *côtiers* continues to be of great importance in understanding social and political competition. Although many observers equate the term central highlander with the Merina ethnic group (once again suggesting the importance of ethnicity), it is important to note that the Betsileo people also live within this region, and the Merina themselves have settled in other regions of the country. Equally important, many *côtiers* do not live anywhere near the coast. In this sense, the central highlands/*côtier* split is best understood as the historical outcome of the domination of the Merina empire, the original center of which was Imerina (around the city of Antananarivo) and was located in the central highlands.

A true understanding of the character of Madagascar's population and historical development requires an appreciation of the inhabitants' shared characteristics, including language and kinship structure, as well as the central highlands/*côtier* split and other divisions based on geographical regions. These latter divisions coincide with the major geographical divisions of the island: east coast, west coast, central highlands, southwest, and the Tsaratamana Massif. Within these regions, the people have certain cultural similarities accentuated by the natural environment.

Kosovo chronology:

Most of the information come from: Lord Robertson *An Account For The Kosovo Crisis*, British Ministry of Defence.

The seeds of confrontation in Kosovo were sown long ago. In 1389, Serb forces were defeated by the Ottomans at the battle of Kosovo Polje and the area has a special place in Serb history and thinking. But Kosovo also has a particular significance to ethnic Albanians, who believe they are the “original” inhabitants and who have long been the majority population. In 1913, after the Balkan Wars, Kosovo became part of Serbia, despite the ethnic Albanian majority, and later became part of Yugoslavia. In the late 1960s, Yugoslav policy towards Kosovo changed from being repressive (which it had been for some time) to become more liberal. Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo became an autonomous province within Serbia. But from the late 1980s Kosovo was increasingly affected by a rise in Serb nationalist sentiment. Slobodan Milosevic gained power in Serbia in 1987 and in 1990 the autonomy given to Kosovo in 1974 was revoked, the Kosovo Provincial Assembly and Government were dissolved, Kosovo Albanians were removed from important state posts and a state of emergency was declared.

During the 1990s, Kosovo Albanian resistance to rule from Belgrade grew. By and large, this was passive. However, a new organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), emerged. It pursued a more radical agenda and used force to achieve its objectives. It began a campaign of attacks against Serbian security forces, who responded with military repression of the population as a whole. From late 1997 the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Contact Group, comprising France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US, focused regularly on the developing situation in Kosovo. In December 1997, NATO Foreign Ministers confirmed that NATO’s interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region, and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo. This was re-emphasized in a statement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in March 1998, following the killings by Serbian forces of some 30 Kosovo Albanians in response to a KLA attack near Drenica. Throughout 1998 diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution were taken forward by the Contact Group. But the international community became aware that this might not be enough. NATO Defense Ministers therefore decided in June 1998 to task NATO military planners to produce a range of options, both ground and air, for military support to the diplomatic process, and by early August the results had been reviewed by the NAC. NATO also undertook a series of air and ground exercises to demonstrate the Alliance’s ability to project power rapidly into the region. Four RAF strike aircraft participated.

By mid September 1998 an estimated 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes and some 50,000 were still in the open as the winter approached. It was clear many might die. On 23 September the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1199, which highlighted the impending human catastrophe in Kosovo, and demanded a cease-fire and the start of real political dialogue. The following day NATO Defense Ministers, meeting in Vilamoura in Portugal, affirmed their resolve and determination to take action if required. NATO also agreed to begin the formal build-up and readying of forces to conduct air strikes. On 8 October a Contact Group meeting in London gave US envoy Richard Holbrooke a mandate for his mission to Belgrade to secure agreement to the requirements of SCR 1199. On 13 October NATO agreed Activation Orders for air strikes. The same day Holbrooke reported to NATO that Milosevic had agreed to the deployment of an unarmed OSCE verification mission to Kosovo and to the

establishment of a NATO aerial verification mission. Following negotiations with senior NATO military representatives, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) authorities also agreed to reduce the numbers of security forces personnel in Kosovo to pre-crisis levels. On 27 October, NATO agreed to keep compliance of the agreements, which were underpinned by UN Security Council resolution 1203, under continuous review and to remain prepared to carry out air strikes should they be required, given the continuing threat of a humanitarian crisis. Despite some doubts as to whether the Holbrooke agreements would deliver a lasting settlement, the international community recognized the opportunity they provided to allow those who had been forced from their homes to return, and was thus determined to try to make them work. The UK played a leading role in both the OSCE and NATO missions. The majority of the UK contribution to the OSCE was armed forces personnel deployed at short notice, including Major General John Drewienkiewicz, who filled the key post of Chief of Operations. They were joined by an increasing number of civilians as the mission continued. NATO also deployed an Extraction Force in Macedonia in case it was necessary to conduct a limited evacuation short of full withdrawal. The Extraction Force, under French command, was NATO's first deployment of combat troops to the area. The UK contribution was an armored infantry company group, equipped with Warrior vehicles. But despite an initial stabilization of the situation, the violence continued. Following a massacre in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999, NATO increased its state of readiness for action. On the same day, I announced the deployment of a further 4 RAF Harrier GR7s and a Tristar tanker to Italy, bringing the total number of UK strike aircraft in the region to 8. On 28 January, NATO issued a "solemn warning" to Milosevic and the Kosovo Albanian leadership. This increased military pressure was paralleled by accelerated activity on the diplomatic front. On 29 January, the FRY/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaderships were summoned to talks at Rambouillet in France.

This summons was given added emphasis the next day when NATO issued a statement reaffirming its demands, and delegating to the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, authority to commence air strikes against targets on FRY territory. The negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999, co-chaired by the UK and France, presented the FRY/Serbian governments and the Kosovo Albanian delegation with proposals for an equitable and balanced agreement on interim self-administration for Kosovo. The proposals, which reflected previous rounds of consultations with the parties, would have protected the rights of all sides. They recalled the international community's commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, provided for democratic self-government in Kosovo and specified that amendments would require the consent of all parties. The first round of talks was suspended on 23 February, with both sides expressing broad agreement to the principle of substantial autonomy for Kosovo. In the light of this progress a second round of talks was convened in Paris on 15 March to discuss implementation. We had made clear at Rambouillet that this would involve a NATO-led military force on the ground. But while the Kosovo Albanians were able to accept the documents negotiated at Rambouillet, it became clear that the FRY/Serbian side was under instructions not to agree. Indeed, they reneged on the commitment they had made. The talks were suspended on 19 March against a background of intensifying violence on the ground, clearly instigated by the FRY security forces, and evidence of a massive build up of FRY/Serbian forces in and around Kosovo. While the talks in France were going on, the UK was leading the way in preparing for a possible ground force to implement any peace agreement which might emerge. On 11 February, I announced the deployment to the region of the first elements of the UK contribution to a NATO peace implementation force, which became the Kosovo Force or KFOR. These included personnel from the Headquarters of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ

ARRC) under Lt Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the headquarters nominated to run the peace implementation operation in Kosovo, and for which the UK is the framework nation. By this stage, a number of our Allies were deploying ground forces to the region, or had declared their intention to do so. This was the basis of the force which was eventually to enter Kosovo after Milosevic accepted an agreement on 3 June – on terms far less favorable to him than those on offer earlier in the year. On 19 March, the same day as the Paris talks were suspended because of the FRY/Serbian sides refusal to negotiate, and with a massive FRY security force offensive already under way and posing a danger to his personnel, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebaek, announced the immediate withdrawal of the OSCE verifiers. The verifiers withdrew from Kosovo during the night of 19/20 March. At the instigation of the Allies, US Envoy Richard Holbrooke flew to Belgrade on 22 March in a last-ditch effort to persuade Milosevic to back down and prevent further suffering on the part of the Kosovar population and to avoid the risk of military confrontation. But Milosevic remained intransigent. His failure to honor the terms of the Holbrooke agreement, the FRY/Serbian dismissal of the Rambouillet Accords – which gave Belgrade a continuing role in Kosovo – and, above all, the increasing level of repression by Milosevic's security forces made action by the international community necessary. A new Serbian offensive was already under way and there were good reasons to believe that he would embark on a further onslaught that would cause yet more civilian casualties, destruction and displacement. On 23 March, the Prime Minister confirmed to the House that the UK stood ready with the rest of NATO to take military action. On the same day, following final consultations with Allies, Javier Solana directed NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to initiate air operations in the FRY.

It was known that a spring offensive against the KLA had been planned, and experience from Summer 1998 – when a quarter of a million Kosovo Albanians were driven from their homes – indicated the likelihood of it being accompanied by civilian casualties, destruction and displacement. It was for this reason that NATO had to act without delay. We were conscious that military action might be seized upon by Milosevic as an excuse to accelerate the offensive already underway. But while we had anticipated that the offensive could involve operations against the KLA and violent repression of the civilian population, we could not have predicted the full horror and extent of the brutality, which was to include scenes reminiscent of the 1930s and 1940s. This was no improvised brutality. My German colleague, Rudolf Scharping revealed on 9 April details of a covert Serbian plan, code-named Operation Horseshoe, to expel Kosovo Albanians from their homeland. The plan had been drawn up months before and showed that while Milosevic was pretending to negotiate, his forces had been preparing to annihilate. Had we not been prepared to launch the air strikes and continue them for as long as was necessary, the atrocities could still be continuing.

NATO strikes: it was clear that the military action taken was justified in international law as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe and was the minimum necessary to do so. The strikes, began at 1900 GMT on 24 March, and continued for 78 days. Overall, 38,004 sorties were flown, of which 10,484 were strike sorties. The United States contributed the major part of the effort. A statistical summary of the UK's contribution to the air campaign is shown. As the operation continued, greater numbers of Allied aircraft were committed, until by the end 829 aircraft from 14 countries were available for tasking. Milosevic could have caused the action to stop at any time by acceding to the reasonable demands of the international community.

The air campaign began with strikes on air defenses across the FRY and a limited range of military targets in Kosovo and elsewhere in southern Serbia. In late March, when Milosevic

showed no sign of responding to the opening phase, the range of attacks was widened to cover carefully selected targets of high military value across the FRY. Targeting policy was under political control both in NATO and nationally. Within NATO, SACEUR consulted the Secretary General closely throughout the campaign to ensure that the target selection process took proper account of the political direction given by the NAC. NATO was successful in a way unprecedented in previous campaigns in keeping to a minimum collateral damage or civilian casualties. In contrast to Milosevic's forces' operations in Kosovo, we were not out to attack the people of Serbia. Sadly, there were tragic incidents. The mistaken strike on the Chinese Embassy, the destruction of a train which crossed a bridge during an aerial attack, and the death of some Kosovar civilians in NATO air strikes against Korisa are three examples – but the noteworthy thing is that there were so few in relation to the size of the campaign. In each case NATO investigated the cause and made public as much of the detail as possible and as soon as possible. This open approach contrasted starkly with Milosevic's propaganda and distortion.

Some have criticized the fact that the majority of offensive missions were flown at medium level. It is true that offensive aircraft were initially restricted to operating above 15,000 feet (and some continued to do so throughout the campaign). Given the multitude of small arms, anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder launched missile systems, the decision not to fly at low level was entirely correct. However, as the Serbian air defense systems were degraded, operating height restrictions were eased and, for the latter half of the campaign, some aircraft operated down to 6,000 feet when target identification or weapons delivery profile required it. The near invulnerability of NATO aircraft operating at medium level was a major pressure point on Milosevic and any opportunity to exploit propaganda from capturing NATO aircrew was minimized. Overall, the air campaign was singularly effective. Well over 400 static targets were attacked. More than three-quarters suffered moderate to severe damage. There is also clear evidence that air strikes against Milosevic's field forces in Kosovo were successful in restricting their operations. The Supreme Allied Commander has published his battle damage assessment. Figures however cannot show the extent to which Yugoslav tanks and other assets had to remain immobile to avoid the onslaught. As they were immobile, they couldn't be used. If they broke cover, they could be attacked. And in the final analysis a successful military campaign is not just about material destruction or a numbers game. It is about the impact on the psychology of an aggressor. How much damage did we do? The answer has to be "enough".

Milosevic ultimately signed up to the international community's conditions for ending the bombing. The conflict ended on NATO's terms. The air campaign contributed materially to the achievement of the international community's objectives. It was a success.

An humanitarian disaster: FRY and Serbian security forces had been making heavy and sustained attacks on Kosovo Albanian civilians for a considerable time. We intervened to disrupt and degrade the military machine causing the violence with the aim of bringing their operations to an end and preventing a humanitarian crisis. We were of course aware that violence was likely to continue until the Serbian operations could be halted. But the world was shocked by the savage and highly-orchestrated ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the FRY and Serbian security forces.

Milosevic's barbarity was underlined by the way in which he cynically drove well over a million people from their homes in an attempt to break the will of the international community to resist him. This not only failed, but it helped to strengthen the unity against him. The refugees were not afraid of NATO; it was clear from talking to them afterwards that fear of the Serbs was the reason why they fled. The various aid agencies and humanitarian organizations in the region responded quickly to the huge flows of refugees caused by the actions of Serbian security forces in Kosovo. The NATO force pre-positioned in the region in readiness for a peace implementation

mission helped the Macedonian authorities and organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to cope with the very large number of refugees crossing the borders in the region. The UK's military contribution, in co-operation with the Department for International Development, included the erection of 2,660 tents, distribution of 129,000 meals, movement of 120,000 pallets of aid, and the provision of medical treatment to 7,000 individuals. NATO also established a force in Albania (the Albania Force or AFOR) to help cope with the even larger numbers entering Albania. Great efforts were made to alleviate the plight of those Milosevic had driven from their country.

In June 1999, following the end of NATO's armed conflict with FR Yugoslavia and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and security forces, the UN Security Council's Resolution 1244 placed Kosovo under the authority of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK has overall responsibility for civilian affairs in Kosovo, including the courts. The early decision to adopt the Deutschmark (euro) as legal tender has ensured overall price stability. The main macroeconomic issue presently faced by UNMIK is the financing of current public expenditure. Since June 1999 Kosovo has been subject to international rule under the UN's Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), headed by Bernard Kouchner. Mr Kouchner has set up an interim administrative council with four UN and four local representatives, one of whom is supposed to be a Serb. The Serbs boycotted the council for the first six months in protest at the attacks on their community. But they agreed in April to take part for a three-month trial period as observers. Parallel structures, or so-called governments set up by Kosovo Albanians under Serb rule, were dismantled on 1 February 2000. The settlement which ended the war required the disarming of the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA officially disbanded in September, and was transformed into a 3,000-strong civilian defense body called the Kosovo Protection Corps, or TMK. Its duties are restricted to emergency and humanitarian work.

In 2000, the Kosovo consolidated budget was financed significantly with external grants (almost 50 per cent). The budget for 2001 totals about DM 750 million. Some 70 per cent of this is expected to be financed by domestic revenues (primarily import duties, excises and sales tax), with donor contributions making up the balance.

In November 2001, tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians and Serbs voted in Kosovo's first parliamentary elections since NATO troops drove Slobodan Milosevic's forces out of the province.

In January 2002 Kosovo's new U.N. administrator arrived to begin attempts to transfer authority to local institutions and to work to improve security and boost the economy. Steiner, a former top adviser to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, said he would encourage deputies in the assembly to create a government, something that has proved difficult. However, he said he will not impose a solution. A 120-seat assembly elected in November 2001 has failed in three votes to pick a president and form a government. The top candidate, Ibrahim Rugova, whose moderate Democratic League of Kosovo won the assembly election but failed to win enough support to govern alone, has refused rival parties' demands for a power-sharing deal in return for support. The president and the provincial government would rule alongside the United Nations and NATO, which took control of Kosovo in 1999 after an alliance air war forced an end to

former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's crackdown on ethnic Albanians in the province. Steiner also said he would focus on creating jobs in the province, which suffers from a soaring unemployment rate after the war shattered the economy, and improving security in all parts of the province.

For the first time in modern history, a head of state is on trial for alleged crimes committed during his tenure. Slobodan Milosevic, who was president of both Serbia and the Yugoslav Federations, stands accused in a courtroom in The Hague of 66 criminal acts against the peoples of Bosnia, Croatia and the Serbian province of Kosovo. His trial, which began on 12 February 2002, may last as long as two years and could establish precedents that may guide the international community for years to come.

UNMIK¹: In Kosovo, the United Nations took on a sweeping undertaking that was unprecedented in both its scope and structural complexity. No other mission had ever been designed in a way that other multilateral organizations were full partners under United Nations leadership.

Mandate: UNMIK was born on 10 June 1999 when the Security Council in resolution 1244 authorized the Secretary-General to establish in the war-ravaged province of Kosovo an interim civilian administration led by the United Nations under which its people could progressively enjoy substantial autonomy. In particular, resolution 1244 has called upon UNMIK to: perform basic civilian administrative functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status; coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; support the reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo. Working closely with Kosovo's leaders and people, the mission performs the whole spectrum of essential administrative functions and services covering such areas as health and education, banking and finance, post and telecommunications, and law and order. In January 2000, Joint Interim Administrative Departments were created; in October 2000, local elections took place in Kosovo's 30 Municipalities; in May 2001, the new Constitutional Framework of Kosovo was adopted. Province-wide elections will take place in November 2001.

Operational Framework: To implement its mandate, UNMIK initially brought together four "pillars" under its leadership. At the end of the emergency stage, Pillar I (humanitarian assistance), led by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was phased out in June 2000. In May 2001, a new Pillar I was established. Currently, the pillars are:

Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations.

Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations.

Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU).

The head of UNMIK is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo. As the most senior international civilian official in Kosovo, he presides over the work of the pillars and facilitates the political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status.

Dr. Bernard Kouchner (France) served as head of UNMIK from July 1999 to January 2001. The current head of UNMIK is Mr. Hans Haekkerup (Denmark).

¹ for more information: www.unmikonline.org

Operation Allied Force: Kosovo

NGOs/PVOs

- Church World Service
- Episcopal Migration Ministries
- Hebrew Immigrant Aid Services
- Iowa Department of Human Services
- International Rescue Committee
- Immigration and Refugee Services of America
- UNICEF
- World relief
- U.S. Catholic Conference
- Doctors without borders
- Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- Doctors of the world
- Interaction
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
- Catholic Relief Services
- Kosovo Relief
- The Jewish Agency for Israel
- Mercy International
- UNHCR

This brief overview of Marshall Lyautey is based on Alain Decaux and André Castelot, *Dictionnaire d'Histoire de France*. (Librairie Académique Perrin, 1981) and on the websites: www.academie-francaise.fr; www.greatwar.org.

MARSHAL LYAUTEY

Louis-Hubert G. Lyautey was born in Nancy in 1854. His great-grandfather had risen to the position of Inspector General of Artillery under Napoleon. His grand-father and great-uncles had also served the Emperor. Despite a serious spine operation due to an accident, he did well in his studies and passed as a cadet into Saint-Cyr.

Lyautey was a complex character. The enlightened principles he applied to the care of soldiers as a cavalry officer were regarded as eccentric. This view continued in his partnership as a disciple of Galliéni (whom he thought was a man in the mould of Cecil Rhodes) in Indochina, Madagascar, and later in Morocco. Lyautey was an ardent and imaginative young man. Most unusual were the circles in which he moved and felt most at home: literary ones, where it was rare indeed to meet an army officer. He went not simply to listen but also to contribute.

Lyautey's conception of colonial administration was his own. However, it drew extensively on the ideas of General Galliéni in Indochina and Madagascar, and what he had read of British administration in Egypt and Africa. By working through the established elites, General Galliéni hoped to make colonial rule more acceptable locally and to disarm opposition to it. Pacification was still necessary, however, and Lyautey soon discovered that it was sometimes not easy to distinguish between rebels and loyal opposition. The methods used by Galliéni and Lyautey, who quickly rose to become his Chief of Staff in Tonkin, were similar to those used

with success by Sir Gerald Templar during the Malay emergency in the 1950s, though there were important differences in the two situations.

Lyautey was drawing on other influences. As a young man he had come under the influence of Christian Socialism similar to that of Charles Péguy. The conscript was not to be seen as an inferior species, but rather as a member of the society from which he was drawn. The Army, its officers in particular, therefore had a social role to discharge as well as a military one. Morale became a great preoccupation after the Franco-Prussian War. Lyautey had high praise for all that he saw in Europe and the East Indies of the administration of the men of the British Army, which he considered humane and enlightened.

He was invited in 1891 to publish his views in the *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, the leading intellectual periodical of its time. He was to use the magazine again in 1900 to set out his ideas on colonial reform. The principles underlying his approach to both military and colonial reform were essentially the same: consent and participation were the keys to success, even if both had to be sacrificed on occasions when the national interest demanded.

Lyautey arrived in Algeria for his third tour of duty towards the end of 1903 to assume command of the South Oranais district. His task was to ensure that the process of spreading French settlement was not imperiled by the incursions of hostile tribes operating from sanctuaries across the border inside Morocco. He instituted a policy of pursuit that soon brought him into conflict with the Quai d'Orsay. In fact, he went further and occupied important places inside Morocco. However, he was inevitably drawn after uncooperative tribes towards the heart of Morocco. Throughout the period of his command, Lyautey appears to have ignored the international constraints under which his government was operating under the terms of the Paris and Algeiras treaties of 1904 and 1906. French policy was seeking to strengthen France's position through building up and gradually consolidating the authority of the Sultan, while

leaving Moroccan institutions intact. By seeking to establish a buffer zone under French military control on the Eastern border, Lyautey appeared to subordinate France's Moroccan interests to her Algerian ones. In a series of uprisings which followed, a number of Europeans were killed. The French military presence in central Morocco then increased in consequence of this. In April, Lyautey was appointed "Résident Général." The abdication of the Sultan in 1908 was followed by that of his successor in 1912 on terms dictated by Lyautey. He was always insistent that military and political action should be linked. But such a policy was difficult in Morocco with its long tradition of independence and local autonomy where the authority of local leaders rested in the divine attribution.

At the outbreak of the war in 1914 Lyautey remained in Morocco until his recall to Paris in December 1916 for appointment as War Minister in Aristide Briand's government. His term was brief, however. In fundamental disagreement with newly-appointed Commander in Chief Robert Nivelle's plan for an ultra-aggressive offensive in mid-April 1917, Lyautey felt obliged to resign on March 1917 rather than remain in office. His resignation brought down Briand's government two days later and Nivelle was replaced by Henri-Philippe Pétain, the hero of Verdun.

Lyautey returned to his post in Morocco, where he remained until 1925. He then left Morocco in a better shape than the one in which he found it. Morocco was provided with a modern economic infrastructure and communications network; the armed forces were properly organized, and a start was made in the establishment of a comprehensive education system.

Of Lyautey's active life, thirteen years were spent as Résident Général in Morocco, a career interrupted by nine months of unhappy experience as Minister of War in 1917. Appointed to the French Academy in 1912 and made a Marshal of France in 1921, he died on 21 July 1934 at the age of 79 and was buried in Rabat. In 1961, his remains were carried to France and placed within

Les Invalides in Paris, in the same former royal chapel in which Napoleon is buried. He is considered France's premiere colonial soldier.

This brief overview of Marshall Galliéni is based on Charles Lavauzelle, *Les Troupes de Marine 1622-1984*, (Charles Lavauzelle, 1986); and Alain Decaux and André Castelot, *Dictionnaire d'Histoire de France*, (Librairie Académique Perrin, 1981).

MARSHAL GALLIENI

Joseph Simon Galliéni was born in April 1849 in Saint-Béat (Haute-Garonne). He attended the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr between 1868 and 1870. After the course, he joined the Troupes de la Marine (French Marine Corps) as an infantry officer. As a second lieutenant, he participated in the 1870 French-Prussian War. He took part in the famous defense of the “maison de la dernière cartouche” (house of the last cartridge) that is commemorated every year at the festival of the French Marine Corps. He sustained head injuries, was captured, and then sent to Germany as a Prisoner of War. After the armistice, in 1871, he spent three years in La Reunion Island. Then he was assigned to Senegal, where he succeeded in imposing a French protectorate. Promoted Captain in 1878 and Major in 1882, Galliéni had numerous opportunities to develop his ideas and methods while also experiencing combat. Promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in 1886, he was appointed as the Senegal High River area commander before returning to France. He commanded the 6th Infanterie de Marine Regiment and then attended the “Ecole de Guerre” (War College). After his graduation in 1893, he left for Asia. In Tonkin, he was in charge of the garrison of Lang Son. Methodically, he pacified the region and organized the border with the Chinese Empire. There, he met Hubert Lyautey for the first time. The latter described in his book “Les lettres du Tonkin” (Letters from Tonkin) how Galliéni successfully performed his mission without being constrained by the “tyranny of regulations”.

However, his main work then really commenced: the pacification of Madagascar. It took nine years and required intelligence, experience, and courage. Promoted Brigadier General in 1896, he suppressed the uprising and subdued the different tribes. In the first stage, in a show of

force he overthrew the Malagasy Queen. Then, when peace was established, he started developing the country. Galliéni knew how to select his assistants: Lyautey once again, and Joseph Joffre, who improved the fortifications of Diégo-Suarez. Numerous young officers were taught by Galliéni and when he left the island in 1905, he had totally succeeded.

Then, he was successively appointed as Marine General Inspection Commander, Commander of the 13th and then 14th Corps, and finally Military Governor of Lyon. He retired in April, 1914, but was recalled to command the fortified camp of Paris, constructing entrenchments and helping General Michel Maunoury to organize a new 6th Army. Selected as deputy and possible successor to the Commander in Chief, he became Military Governor of Paris in August 1914 and was promoted Major General. In charge of the defense of Paris, he signed his famous order in 3 September: ‘j’ai reçu le mandat de défendre Paris contre l’envahisseur, je le remplirai jusqu’au bout’ (I was tasked to defend Paris against the invader, I will fight to the last drop of blood).¹ Nevertheless, the French forces retreated when an aerial reconnaissance reported that the enemy right wing (Von Kluck’s 1st Army) shifted its direction from Paris towards Meaux. General Galliéni immediately realized the opportunity the enemy maneuver had given him to counterattack. General Joffre, the Commander in Chief, agreed and adopted Galliéni’s plan. On 5 September, the 6th Army started the Battle of the Marne that stopped the German offensive. That counteroffensive witnessed the famous episode of the “Taxis de Paris”, which enabled the French reserves to be quickly engaged. Although credit for the victory went to General Joffre, General Galliéni was considered the savior of Paris.

In October 1915, he was appointed Minister of War. He experienced very difficult

¹ Author’s translation.

relationships with the political elite and resigned in March 1916. Tired and ill, he died on 27 May 1916, after a surgery in Versailles.

Despite his service in the colonies and his expertise in colonial warfare, his greatest fame still remains his actions in 1914 which led to the victory on the Marne. In 1921, he was posthumously made a Marshal of France.

CHRONOLOGY

Most scholars believe that Madagascar was inhabited about the **1st century AD** by Indonesian seafarers. Subsequently, Arab traders arrived and established trading posts in coastal areas.

10 August 1500: Madagascar is officially discovered when Diego-Diaz , a Portuguese navigator, looking for a port of call along the "Spice Route" to India, lands on its coast.

1642: Le Cardinal Richelieu creates a military outpost in the south east of the island, at Fort-Dauphin, and founds the "Compagnie de l'Orient" to exploit the newly-conquered land.

16th century: the Hova kingdom is founded, with its capital at Antananarivo. The Merina rule the island, with fluctuating degrees of European influence, until the end of the **19th century**.

1883: 1st French-Hova War.

1885: Madagascar becomes a French protectorate.

1895: 2^d French-Hova War.

1896: Madagascar becomes a French colony. General Galliéni is appointed as "Résident Général"

1942: Occupation by British and South African forces.

1947: A nationalist revolt is harshly suppressed by the French.

1958: Largely supported referendum on the question of independence.

1960: The Malagasy Republic becomes independent.

For more information, See Historical Settings in Appendices.

KOSOVO: A timeline of tensions

1389: Serbs fight and lose an epic battle to Ottoman Turks in Kosovo, which the Serbs consider their ancestral homeland. Despite the loss, "Kosovo Polje," as it is known, is celebrated in Serbian folklore and remains a symbol for ethnic pride.

1918: After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, Kosovo becomes part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

1929: The country becomes an absolute monarchy, its regions divided without regard to racial composition and its name is changed to Yugoslavia.

1941: German army invades in April, and the country is later occupied by Italians, Hungarians and Bulgarians.

1945: At end of World War II, Yugoslavia becomes a communist republic.

1974: A revised Yugoslav constitution grants autonomy to Kosovo, a Serbian province largely occupied by ethnic Albanians. The Albanians, most of whom are Muslim, institute Albanian-language schools and observe Islamic holidays.

1981: Demonstrations by Albanian students against the working and living conditions in Kosovo - only 12 percent of the Albanians in Kosovo are employed; they also have the highest birthrate in Europe - turn bloody, escalating the exit of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province.

1987: Slobodan Milosevic rises to power in Yugoslavia, fanning the flames of Serbian nationalism while Albanian civil rights continue to erode.

1989: Escalating tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians and fear of secession prompt Milosevic to strip the province - now 90 percent Albanian - of its autonomy. The army and police are sent in battle strength to keep order.

1991: Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declare independence from Yugoslavia, triggering ethnic fighting between Croats, Muslims and Serbs. A year later, all-out war breaks out in Bosnia.

1992: Kosovo's Albanian majority votes to secede from Serbia and Yugoslavia, and indicates a desire to merge with Albania. Serb forces massacre thousands of Bosnian Muslims and carry out "ethnic cleansing" by expelling Muslims and other non-Serbs from areas under Bosnian Serb control. Late that year, U.S. President George Bush warns the Serbs that the United States will use force if the Serbs attack Kosovo.

1995: A peace agreement to end the Bosnian War is signed late in the year by leaders of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.

1997: The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a small militant group, begins killing Serb policemen and others who collaborate with the Serbs. They also establish areas from which the Serbs are driven entirely.

1998:

February: Milosevic sends troops into the areas controlled by the KLA, killing 80 Kosovars. The killing provokes riots in Pristina and turns the conflict into a guerrilla war.

May: Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova, an advocate of a peaceful path to independence for Kosovo, hold talks for first time, but the Albanian side boycotts further meetings.

August: KLA seizes control of 40 % of Kosovo before being defeated in a Serb offensive.

September: Serb forces attack central Kosovo. U.N. Security Council calls for immediate cease-fire and political dialogue.

October : NATO allies authorize airstrikes against Serb military targets, Milosevic agrees to withdraw troops, facilitate the return of refugees and accepts unarmed international monitors.

October-December: Scattered daily violence undermines fragile truce.

1999:

January 15: 45 ethnic Albanians slain outside Racak. International officials demand a war crimes investigation.

January 29: NATO demand warring sides attend Kosovo peace conference or face airstrikes.

February 6-17: First round of talks between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Rambouillet, France. Serbs refuse to consider NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo; Albanians agree to sign when talks resume.

March 18: Talks resume in Paris. Kosovo Albanians sign peace deal calling for interim broad autonomy and for 28,000 NATO troops to implement it. Serb delegation refuses to sign accord.

March 19: Talks suspended.

March 23: Serb reject NATO demands .The failure of diplomacy opens the way for airstrikes.

March 24 : first NATO airstrikes.

May 27: The U.N International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia announces indictment of Milosevic as a war criminal.

June 9: Yugoslav and NATO sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo.

June10: Yugoslavia withdraws its security forces from Kosovo. The U.N. Security Council formally ratifies the negotiated peace proposal.

Since June 1999: Kosovo has been subject to international rule under the UN's Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

GLOSSARY

ANNAM: French protectorate corresponding to the central part of current Vietnam.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES: Lower chamber of the Third French Republic (1870-1940) while the **SENATE** was the upper chamber of the Parliament..

COCHINCHINE: French colony corresponding to the southern part of current Vietnam.

FORPRONU: Force Protection of the United Nations from February 1992 to March 1995.

HAOUSSA: Tribe of Niger. Famous for their warlike qualities, the Haoussas provided a large number of troops to the French Colonial forces in the 19th and 20th centuries.

HOVA (also called **MERINA**): Malagasy tribe who lived essentially in the central highlands of Madagascar. This was the dominant tribe in the island and was strongly opposed to the French colonization.

INDOCHINA: was composed of the protectorates of Annam, Tonkin, Laos, and Cambodia, and the colony of Cochinchine.

KFOR: NATO-led international force responsible for establishing a security presence in Kosovo. This peace-enforcement force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 under a UN mandate, two days after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244).

MOOTW: Military Operations Other Than War; a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. (Joint Pub 3-07). Focus is deterring war and promoting peace.

OCSE : Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

PROTECTORATE: Contrary to the colony which had a system of direct administration, a protectorate was under the control of France but kept its internal autonomy. In the French Colonial Empire, Tunisia, Morocco, Annam, Laos, and Cambodia had such a system.

SUDAN: African territory corresponding roughly to current Mali. Not to be confused with the modern state of Sudan.

TIRAILLEUR: Soldier of some infantry units composed of natives and French cadres. Actually, the Senegalese Tirailleurs came from all the different French African colonies.

TONKIN: French protectorate corresponding to the northern part of current Vietnam.

UCK: Kosovo Liberation Army. Kosovar guerilla movement.

UNMIK: Established on 10 June 1999 when the Security Council in resolution 1244 authorized the Secretary-General to create in the war-ravaged province of Kosovo an interim civilian administration led by the United Nations under which its people could progressively enjoy substantial autonomy.

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