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FORMING THE AIR MOBILITY TEAM

A MIDCOURSE ADJUSTMENT

by

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On June 1, 1992, Air Mobility Command (AMC) was created from the resources of Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the majority of tankers from Strategic Air Command (SAC). After six years of consolidation, however, some distinct differences remain in the way the previous MAC community operates and the way the tanker community operates. This paper analyses these differences from a cultural perspective. Specifically, the argument presented states that to combine the MAC and SAC communities into a single command requires an examination of the separate cultures or subcultures. In addition, based on the definition and discussion of organizational culture used in this paper, leadership and programmatic guidance that accounts for the two subcultures or seeks to eliminate the two separate cultures in an effort to create a new culture may be needed. To determine what constitutes the MAC and SAC subcultures, the leadership of these two commands is examined based primarily on their founding leaders?General LeMay for SAC and General Tunner for MAC. AMC is then examined to see how the current system supports, or doesn?t support, the cultural basis of the SAC and MAC communities. In particular, a significant cultural difference is found in the way the two communities regard training and operational missions. Finally, assuming AMC should address this cultural difference and to stimulate discussion on areas that may help reconcile the two subcultures, some preliminary recommendations for action are made for the AMC staff, AMC command and control function, and AMC budgeting process.

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Contents

Page

Illustrations

Page

Tables

Page

Preface

Having flown the C-141 and KC-10, working in their respective communities, I often marveled at how the two communities operated so differently. If the differences were simply related to differences in cargo and tanker operations, obviously, that would be normal. But they were not simply in operations; the differences seemed to go much deeper. In this paper, I attempted to take an analytical look at the different communities based on their cultures. Although I didn't know much about organizational culture when I started, I resisted a comprehensive review of numerous scientists or analysts. Rather, my intent was to find one or two cultural scientists who had a model of culture as it applies to organizations and apply that model to the C-141 and KC-10 communities. With Dr. Edgar Schein, I found my model. Dr. Schein, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has written numerous books on organizational psychology. In *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, he uses real-world case studies to provide a definition of organizational culture and an in-depth method of analyzing cultures. I am grateful for what he has taught me.

I am also grateful to Major Bret Rider, my advisor. He was instrumental as I began this project, helping me focus in on the thesis and eliminate extraneous material. His leadership during the entire effort was outstanding and deeply appreciated.

Finally, to Darlys and Kristin, I could not have done this project without your love, support, patience, and understanding. Thank you!

Abstract

On June 1, 1992, Air Mobility Command (AMC) was created from the resources of Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the majority of tankers from Strategic Air Command (SAC). After six years of consolidation, however, some distinct differences remain in the way the previous MAC community operates and the way the tanker community operates. This paper analyses these differences from a cultural perspective. Specifically, the argument presented states that to combine the MAC and SAC communities into a single command requires an examination of the separate cultures or subcultures. In addition, based on the definition and discussion of organizational culture used in this paper, leadership and programmatic guidance that accounts for the two subcultures or seeks to eliminate the two separate cultures in an effort to create a new culture may be needed. To determine what constitutes the MAC and SAC subcultures, the leadership of these two commands is examined based primarily on their founding leaders—General LeMay for SAC and General Tunner for MAC. AMC is then examined to see how the current system supports, or doesn't support, the cultural basis of the SAC and MAC communities. In particular, a significant cultural difference is found in the way the two communities regard training and operational missions. Finally, assuming AMC should address this cultural difference and to stimulate discussion on areas that may help reconcile the two subcultures, some preliminary recommendations for action are made for the AMC staff, AMC command and control function, and AMC budgeting process.

Chapter 1

Perspectives in Forming Air Mobility Command

> *While I hope we will maintain a serious forward presence…, our security will rely on US-based forces configured for expeditionary use. Deploying and sustaining these forces will increase the demand for mobility. AMC, the combination of airlift and tankers, is the Air Force's answer to this requirement for enhanced mobility.*
>
> —General Merrill A. McPeak

In 1991 and 1992, the Air Force went through its largest reorganization since becoming a separate service in 1947. Led by Secretary of the Air Force, Donald Rice and Chief of Staff, US Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, the reorganization was driven by the end of the cold war, budgetary constraints, and artificial constraints on what constituted strategic and tactical air power.[1] As part of the reorganization, on June 1, 1992, the Air Force activated Air Mobility Command (AMC) and assigned it all strategic airlift assets and most of the C-130s and tanker assets.[2] This chapter informally examines the status of AMC and some of the perceived problems combining the communities from distinct backgrounds (tanker and airlift) and concludes with a guide for the rest of the paper. Before continuing, it should be noted that shortly after forming AMC, the C-130 force transferred to Air Combat Command (ACC),[3] but in what seems to be the back-and-forth trend for the C-130 force, they are coming back to AMC.

The juncture of airlift and tanker assets in the field is predominantly at one of two Air Mobility Wings in AMC, Travis AFB, CA and McGuire AFB, NJ. Here, strategic

airlift and KC-10 assets are co-assigned, and on a day-by-day basis, the interaction between the two communities is best viewed from an Operations Group (OG) perspective. From this view, the problems of consolidation occur on a daily basis and sometimes from unexpected sources. For example, in September 1996, AMC delegated to each AMC wing, the authority for approving touch-and-go landings without an instructor pilot.[4] This subject became an issue because some tanker units were allowed to do Aircraft Commander directed touch-and-go landings when they belonged to Strategic Air Command (SAC); under AMC, the touch-and-go landings were prohibited. So delegating the approval authority to each wing provided a reasonable solution—except to the mobility wing OGs. To obtain a clear and standardized policy, the OGs asked for input from the different squadrons and the Standardization and Evaluation section.[5] Opinions were split down the middle: the strategic airlift community did not want to do the touch-and-go landings, the KC-10 community did. Under Military Airlift Command (MAC), the strategic airlift community, had never done the touch-and-go landings, and had no reason to start now; the maneuver added more risk than necessary. For the KC-10 community, they never had problems with the touch-and-go landings, and they liked the increased flexibility. In short, each community wanted to do what they had done in the past, because "that's the way they always did it." After lengthy discussions, meetings, and proposals, the OG provided a policy, giving guidance for implementing, at the squadron level, the touch-and-go landings; the KC-10 community implemented the policy immediately, and the strategic airlift community did not implement the policy. And what started as a reasonable solution at the command level turned out to be a contentious, divisive issue on the mobility front lines.

Some additional front-line perspectives, those of the aircrew members, may help further frame the problem.[6] These perspectives are relatively unaltered from what they were when AMC first formed. For example, in SAC, KC-10 pilots came primarily from KC-135s, but for 5 years, that KC-135 pipeline was cut off, and a "crossflow" program for airlift pilots to cross-train into tanker aircraft was created. The airlift pilots are thus seen as eroding tanker experience and cutting off the opportunities in the tanker career field. Conversely, airlift pilots perceive their tanker counterparts as being unknowledgeable about worldwide operations, i.e., while MAC was flying their worldwide, war-time mission every day of the year, the tanker community was training on local sorties supporting SAC's nuclear deterrence mission. This is not to say that SAC crews flew only local training missions. Rather, they focused on the local training and did not fly outside the continental United States nearly as frequently as MAC crews, which helped create the stated perception.

Certainly, these observations are made from the author's experiences in the C-141 and KC-10 communities and may differ from individual to individual and weapon system to weapon system, i.e., the C-5 community, the KC-135 community, etc. The point though is that after any reasonable amount of time is spent observing the airlift and tanker communities, one will find distinct differences. Moreover, the differences stated above probably only scratch the surface of the misgivings throughout the two communities. However, the purpose of this paper is not to provide a litany of the misgivings, but to acknowledge and address them in a somewhat non-military manner: namely from a cultural perspective.

Specifically, the thesis postulated is that the perspectives or views from the airlift and tanker communities are founded in their respective cultures—cultures with very distinct and different backgrounds. As such, to combine the two communities into a single command requires an examination of the separate cultures or subcultures and leadership and programmatic guidance that accounts for the two subcultures or seeks to eliminate the two separate cultures in an effort to create a new culture.

Notes

[1] General Merrill A. McPeak, *Selected Works 1990-1994*, (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, August 1995), 61-63.

[2] Dr. John W. Leland, "A Brief History of the Air Mobility Command," in *Airlift/Tanker, History of U.S. Airlift and Tanker Forces*, ed. Office of the AMC Historian (Paducah, KT: Turner Publishing Company, 1993), 65.

[3] Ibid., 65.

[4] Message, 032230Zsep96, POC HQ/AMC/DOTA, September 3, 1996.

[5] Author's experience working in 305th Operations Group, McGuire Air Force Base, NJ, July, 1996-June, 1997.

[6] Author's experience as both a C-141 Instructor Aircraft Commander, Travis Air Force Base, CA and a KC-10 Instructor Aircraft Commander, McGuire Air Force Base, NJ.

Chapter 2

Organizational Culture

> *Organizational learning, development, and planned change cannot be understood without considering culture as a primary source of resistance to change.*
>
> —Dr Edgar H. Schein

Culture and subculture can mean many things to different people, including scholars. In his book, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Dr. Schein provides a review of 10 separate concepts that scholars have used to define and discuss culture, everything from established rules for getting along to articulation of values.[1] Dr. Schein goes on to define culture as:

> A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.[2]

Within this definition, some additional definitions or explanations are required. A basic assumption is something the people in an organization tend to not challenge, debate, or confront in any organized, or even conscience, manner. They are "extremely difficult to change."[3] These basic assumptions are then used to help define the organization's culture in the manner they deal with their customers (external adaptation) and the manner in which they interact with each other (internal integration). As one gets to the very core of an organization, these basic assumptions are what drives the attitudes,

mannerisms, and overall way-of-life. The question then becomes, how does a leader or newcomer to an organization determine what constitutes a basic assumption and how does that drive the external interaction with customers and, more importantly for this paper, the way people internal to the organization deal with one another.

To uncover the levels of culture, Dr. Schein contends that one has to determine what is an artifact, what is an espoused value and what is a basic assumption. The basic relationship is shown in Figure 1.[4]



Figure 1. Levels of Culture

At the highest level are artifacts; this is the easiest level of culture to observe. An artifact is something a person would observe when they walk into an organization and make judgements about what they see.[5] In other words, the artifacts of an organization are equivalent to the psychological phrase of "judging a book by its cover." Closer to the core of an organization are the espoused values.

Espoused values are the thoughts and judgements that an early leader or the founder of an organization states is the proper way to conduct operations. In other words, it is the

belief of what works and what doesn't work.[6] For example, Carl Builder argues that the U.S. Air Force was founded on the espoused value of air power theory, which was dominated by the supremacy of bombers. In addition, some of the problems in the Air Force today can be linked to a lack of advocates and leaders who lost the "air power bubble."[7] This level of cultural analysis, according to Schein, is acceptable, but may not decipher the full impact of organizational change if the analysis does not consider the basic assumptions.[8]

As stated earlier, basic assumptions are the things that have worked in an organization for so long that they are taken for granted; they are not challenged or debated and become very difficult to change. Based on the artifacts and espoused values, basic assumptions tend to point to the manner in which people in an organization deal with one another and with their external customers. Returning to the Air Force example, if the primacy of the bomber is an espoused value, a resultant basic assumption may be that the Air Force is best led by a bomber pilot. In fact, an argument can be made that this was true and was only changed by the war in Vietnam.[9]

To work with external customers and adapt to the environment outside an organization, a group typically develops a mission and strategy, goals, means to attain their goals, measures of success, and feedback and correction to their strategies.[10] Ideally and typically, these mechanisms of dealing with customers come from an organization's leaders. After developing them, the leader then passes them down to the organization's members and to new members to help define the proper way to conduct business or operations. Having embarked on a quality journey for several years, the Air Force and her major commands, i.e. AMC, certainly work to use all these mechanisms to define

themselves.[11] Problems, however, can arise if subcultures within a group work with the mechanisms in a different manner. For example, process feedback from two separate subcultures may be vastly different or even contradictory. This is not necessarily problematic for a group, but for an organization in its early stages, consensus on the external mechanisms is more critical.[12]

The external mechanisms used by an organization also affect the internal integration of that organization. In particular, an organization's leader will develop internal processes to allow the external mechanisms to be realized. Dr. Schein identifies six processes:[13]

1. Creating a common language and conceptual categories
2. Defining boundaries and criteria for including and excluding individuals
3. Distributing power and status
4. Developing rules for peer relationships
5. Defining and giving rewards and punishments
6. Explaining the unexplainable and managing the unmanageable

For the most part, these are commonsensical and self-explanatory; "explaining the unexplainable and managing the unmanageable," however, needs some further explanation. Basically, an organization's leader should lay out criteria for the members of the organization to use when confronted with situations they do not normally confront. The criteria usually take the form of a value system.[14] A good example is the Air Force stated values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do. This value system also provides a good demonstration of how to tie the levels of culture together.

The three Air Force core values, as stated, represent a cultural artifact. As they become engrained in the organization through stories of how they were applied and as they are taught to newcomers in an organization, they become espoused values. If the values are congruent and consistent with the way the organization operates and the

members of the organization begin taking the value system as unquestioned, basic truths, the value system becomes a basic assumption at the core of the organization's culture, affecting the way they deal with external customers and with each other internally.[15] Completing the cycle shown in Figure 1, when the value system becomes an ingrained basic assumption, the organization will develop additional espoused values and artifacts that further reflect this basic assumption.

Given the organization's culture is couched in basic assumptions, the question arises as to the origin of basic assumptions. According to Dr. Schein, the origin is primarily the purview of the organization's leadership, particularly, but not exclusively, the founding leadership.[16] In particular, Schein identifies six primary embedding mechanisms and six secondary mechanisms a leader may use to create an organization's culture.[17]

The first primary mechanism is what the leader pays attention to, measures, and controls. Most important in this category is what a leader consistently asks questions about, talks about, or even loses his temper about; this is what a leader systematically deals with on a regular basis.[18] The second mechanism that a leader uses is resource allocation.[19] Although in the Air Force, this is done primarily at a level above major commands, this will have an impact on the SAC and MAC culture, as will be seen in the next chapter. The third mechanism is deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching,[20] which in the Air Force probably has significance not at the major command level, but at the squadron, group, and wing level. The fourth and fifth mechanisms are somewhat similar. The fourth is how the leader provides rewards and status, and the fifth is how the leader provides recruitment, promotion, retirement, and separation.[21] Certainly, the Air Force as a whole handles some of these items, but the analysis in the next chapter will

show how SAC and MAC did in fact emphasize some of these areas differently, helping create the subcultures within AMC. The final primary mechanism is how a leader deals with crisis.[22] In the Air Force, one usually sees this handled in a systematic, often bureaucratic manner.

In addition to these primary mechanisms, Schein identifies secondary mechanisms of organizational structure, organizational processes, organizational rituals, building designs, stories about people and events, and formal organizational values and goals.[23] Note that these secondary mechanisms are primarily managerial mechanisms a leader uses to build and develop an organization; they are the artifacts and espoused values that point to basic assumptions. At the same time, the primary mechanisms go more to the personal activities of a leader, and thus point more directly to basic assumptions. This is particularly true for founding leaders, but is true for follow-on leadership as well.

Notes

[1] Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership,* 2nd Ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1992), 8-10.
[2] Ibid., 12.
[3] Ibid., 22.
[4] Ibid., 17.
[5] Ibid., 17.
[6] Ibid., 19.
[7] Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome*, (New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Publishers, 1994), xiii.
[8] Schein, 26.
[9] Builder, 186-188.
[10] Schein, 52.
[11] *1998 Air Mobility Master Plan*, October 24,1997, CD-ROM, or
1998 Air Mobility Master Plan, October 24, 1997, 398, on-line, Internet, February 18, 1998, available from http://www.safb.af.mil/hqamc/pa/aamp/98aamp.pdf.
[12] Schein, 68.
[13] Ibid., 70-71.
[14] Ibid., 90.
[15] Ibid., 90.
[16] Ibid., 230.

Notes

[17] Ibid., 231.
[18] Ibid., 231-237.
[19] Ibid., 239-240.
[20] Ibid., 240-242.
[21] Ibid., 242-245.
[22] Ibid., 237.
[23] Ibid., 231.

Chapter 3

The Cultural Formation and Basic Assumptions of SAC and MAC

If the basic assumptions that define an organization's culture are typically tied to the founding leaders as discussed in the last chapter, then the way to decipher the subcultures of AMC's air refueling and airlift forces must start with the founding leaders of SAC and MAC. Having existed in some form for roughly 50 years however, one also needs to examine some of the later changes, supported by subsequent leaders, which helped define or reinforce the subcultures. Consequently, this chapter will review some of the historical aspects of SAC and MAC that helped create the air refueling and airlift subcultures.

Starting with SAC, the unquestionable founding leader is General Curtis LeMay. Although SAC's original commander was General George Kenney, his approximately two years of command were occupied with experimentation with organization, moving SAC headquarters from Bolling Field to Andrews Field, and managing the massive post World War II demobilization process.[1] When Gen. LeMay took command in 1948, the newly formed SAC was in considerable disarray. In his words, "…we didn't have one crew, *not one crew* in the entire command who could do a professional job. No [sic] one of the outfits was up to strength—neither in airplanes nor in people nor anything else."[2] As Gen. LeMay set out to build SAC, he obviously concentrated on the bomber force, but

the items and issues he concentrated on that created the SAC culture translates to the tanker force as well.

Gen. LeMay initially concentrated on building up his groups with realistic training.[3] His vision was to make the training so realistic that the frame of mind of everyone in SAC was: "*We are at war now*."[4] Concentrating on realistic profiles, shaking up the flying schools a little, repetition, and building one group at a time, he was very successful.[5] In addition, an equal emphasis was placed on safety—to the point that if a wing suffered an aircraft accident, the standing order was for the wing commander to report almost immediately to Gen. LeMay and explain what happened.[6] Tied to these structured training and safety programs was an overall heavy emphasis on rules, regulations, and operating procedures.[7] With the emphasis straight from Gen. LeMay, the potential for creating some basic assumptions towards the SAC culture was good.

Several of the primary embedding mechanisms identified by Dr. Schein were definitely at work.[8] Specifically, the leader paid attention to training and standardization; if the dismal state of SAC can be considered a critical incident, the leader reacted by emphasizing safe, disciplined training functions; finally, the leader allocated resources by concentrating on one group (or wing) at a time. Based on this emphasis, the primacy of disciplined training becomes a basic assumption.

The primacy of disciplined training carried into the tanker force and into war. In 1967, a tanker crew led by Major John Casteel won the Mackay Trophy (an award given annually by the National Aeronautic Association for the outstanding flight of the year).[9] In accepting the award for the crew Maj. Casteel stated: "The command is an extremely disciplined organization,…[and] I firmly believe in operating by the book and in this

business, if you deviate from the book, you had better know exactly what you are doing and be prepared to answer for it."[10] This basic assumption continued right through the 1980s as an aircraft commander cites his lessons learned on his first alert tour exercise. His bottom line: "I also stress the importance of doing things correctly—not just fast. If we don't miss a thing and end up last, I can live with that. I don't want to be the first one done and have to go back to redo a checklist item or two."[11]

As stated earlier, Gen. LeMay had his wing commanders report to him anytime an aircraft accident occurred. In this and numerous other ways, Gen. LeMay and the rest of SAC's founding leaders emphasized the primacy of the wing commander. In *Insider at SAC,* Carroll Zimmerman provides an opportunity for people who worked with Gen. LeMay to describe some of their experiences. One, Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll, describes an occasion when Gen. Carroll investigated an aircraft accident where both civilian and military deaths occurred. Gen. Carroll reported that the aircraft accident was not due to pilot error and did not reflect poorly on the capability of the wing commander. Gen. LeMay responded: "This is the second serious accident in his command. Either he is incompetent or he is unlucky. In either event, I don't want him."[12] On another occasion described by Lieutenant General Edmundson, Gen. LeMay asked his senior staff to rate each wing commander and then compared the ratings to each wing commander's flying hours.[13] In this case, Gen. LeMay was attempting to show a correlation between a wing commander's effectiveness and his flying proficiency, but the point for this paper is that Gen. LeMay spent a considerable amount of time emphasizing the importance of his wing commanders. In terms of Schein's primary embedding mechanisms, the first example is a demonstration of how a leader reacts to critical

situations; in this case, the wing commander is responsible for all activity in his wing, good or bad. In the second example, Gen. LeMay is teaching his senior staff what he believes is important to be a successful wing commander, i.e., flying excellence.

This demand for excellence, and not just in flying, is perhaps the part of Gen. LeMay's reputation that is most renown. In the chapter of Zimmerman's book that he publishes the comments from many whom worked with Gen. LeMay, almost every writer discusses the demand for excellence—either in the way Gen. LeMay demanded it of himself or of others or how he was intolerant of lack of competency or completeness.[14] For the typical SAC member, this demand for excellence translates to a cultural basic assumption that perfection or near perfection is required in the performance of duty. In addition, based on the primacy of training discussed earlier, this perfection is attained through rigorous training and planning. For example, Byrd discusses how aircraft commanders could be fired for missing one question on an exam and how SAC, in general, had a very low tolerance for mistakes, even in times of war.[15] However, if someone passed the "perfection" test, i.e., they did their job right, SAC would take care of them.

Gen. LeMay spent a considerable amount of time trying to improve the working conditions for the people in SAC—over 50% of his time during some periods.[16] He worked to improve living conditions and build facilities for off-duty activities, e.g., hobby shops,[17] but what is quite revealing is how Gen. LeMay and SAC handled promotions—another one of Stein's primary embedding mechanisms. Starting in 1949, and expanded through 1951, SAC provided spot promotions for officers to captain, major, or lieutenant colonel and for enlisted members to technical sergeant and master

sergeant. These spot promotions typically were associated with combat crew duty and were usually provided for crews winning SAC bombing competitions. Of equal importance, the spot promotions were taken away just as easily as they were given if either a crew or members of a crew failed to maintain top performance levels.[18] This method of reward and promotion continued for over 15 years, terminating at the end of 1965.[19] Translating this into a basic assumption, the organization (SAC) will always take care of you, provided you don't make mistakes.

Several of Stein's secondary mechanisms help reinforce this basic assumption. The first is the adherence to a strict organizational structure. As a military organization, adherence to a strict structure is obviously not new or unique to Gen. LeMay. Of importance here is the level of strictness and how it differs from the structure developed in MAC (discussed later). The adherence to the military organization, i.e., the chain of command, went right down to the aircraft commander. Hunter provides an interesting example of a typical tanker mission and the level of authority recognized by tanker crew members toward the aircraft commander.[20] He includes an interesting photo in which an aircraft commander is briefing his crew on board the aircraft prior to takeoff. The crew is essentially at attention.[21] This operational authority was reinforced by the SAC "hard crew concept" in which crew members primarily flew as a team. As SAC developed the strategic alert system,[22] the "hard crews" were also living and eating together.[23] So the organization, beginning with the aircraft commander and proceeding to the wing commander, directly affected the life of the ordinary SAC crew member—from writing performance reports to help with personal problems.

In addition to the strict adherence to the chain of command or organizational structure, the second secondary mechanism supporting the basic assumption of SAC always taking care of her people is the command and control system.

The concept for a command and control system originating with Gen. LeMay was, to say the least, very aggressive. Based on the mission, it had to be that way. In Gen. LeMay's words: "we simply had to have a Headquarters and Control Center whereby we could be in instantaneous control of SAC bases scattered all over the United States and elsewhere in the world. And be in instantaneous touch with every plane we had in the air."[24] What resulted was "the most elaborate and reliable web of communications channels ever concentrated in on place."[25] In essence, this is the heart of SAC. This type of system was required to support a mission embodied in "Peace is our Profession."[26] To the members of SAC, it reinforces the concept that SAC is always available to make adjustments and solve problems.

The organizational structure and command and control system, as secondary embedding mechanisms, provided a strong reinforcement to the basic assumption that SAC will take care of and support her members. So strong, in fact, that before proceeding, the effect of these secondary mechanisms on typical SAC crew members needs further examination—focused on the level of care and support. For example, one can examine the expected actions of a SAC crew who experienced an in-flight emergency (engine problem, serious hydraulic or electrical failures, etc.). Fairly early in the sequence to handle the emergency and safely recover the aircraft, the crew needed to contact their wing commander through the command and control system. This contact with the commander and home unit expertise was not optional; it was mandatory. The

instructions that came with the contact typically were also not optional; they required compulsory action. In addition to this tight control of professional activity, personal problems for individual crew members received attention necessarily through the organization. Earlier, the strategic alert system with hard crews was mentioned, reinforcing the organizational structure that started with the aircraft commander. To a crew member, this translated into a paradigm that the aircraft commander needed to be aware of the activities affecting the personal lives of the crew—all activities, good and bad.[27] So, to the crew members, the basic assumption that SAC will care for and support its members became slightly altered. Specifically, the care and support of SAC's people was an obligation, both for the members to seek and the leaders to provide.

To summarize the basic assumptions of SAC that supports its cultural development as an organization:

1. The organization is obligated to take care of and support its members
2. Perfection is the accepted standard of performance
3. Training and planning are the keys to success

Although probably not complete, these are areas that will provide some contrast with the cultural development of MAC. To analyze SAC, Stein's model fit extremely well—begin with the founding leader. In Gen. LeMay, one finds a founding leader with a strong vision and an equally strong will to create an organization and embed these basic assumptions.

To analyze MAC, however, one does not find a leader that fits the model quite as well. In founding MAC, there was considerable debate among Air Force leaders as to the role of airlift in terms of a military organization, i.e., whether airlift should be conducted by a military organization in the first place. Lieutenant Colonel Miller, in *Airlift*

Doctrine, provides an excellent review of the debate and the leaders involved from before World War II through the official establishment of MAC, as the successor to Air Corps Ferrying Command in 1941, to the modern era.[28] So to find an early dominant, or even representative, leader is more of a challenge with MAC than SAC. Examining some of the early combat operations, however, one individual comes to the forefront more than others—Lieutenant General William H. Tunner. Gen. Tunner commanded the India China Division that executed the infamous "Hump" operation.[29] In addition, he commanded the task force created to execute the Berlin Airlift (as it turns out, under the direction of the USAFE Commander, Gen. LeMay).[30] Finally, Gen. Tunner commanded the provisional cargo command set up to support the airlift requirements for the Korean War.[31] So Gen. Tunner was in the field leading the airlift forces and creating philosophies on how best to employ airlift forces, and he was a staunch advocate for these philosophies. Gen. Tunner eventually took command of Military Air Transport Service (MATS), a predecessor to MAC, in 1958.[32]

Although he didn't command MATS until 1958, by 1947 Gen. Tunner was advocating a philosophy that the military airlift business must focus on the business end; "Tunner knew the way to control such a widespread operation [the Hump] was to use big business techniques."[33] To support such business-like operations, he recommended an airlift organization that in peacetime continued its primary role of air transportation, and the purpose of the organization was to have a force ready for rapid expansion in periods of war—in other words, fly in peace as in war.[34] In addition, he proposed operations that:[35]

1. Would go 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
2. Would be managed by types of cargo and standardized flow of cargo

3. Would continue in any weather

In essence, Gen. Tunner was advocating the type of system MAC sustained for years, which is an advocacy that continues today.[36] Based on this operating philosophy, the question now becomes, what did the airlift leaders (not just Gen. Tunner) begin to advocate and develop that helped form the airlift organization's basic assumptions and thus, cultural basis?

To institutionalize his operational concepts, Gen. Tunner helped develop and advocated an airlift system based on the Airlift Service Industrial Fund (ASIF), which later became known as the Defense Business Operating Fund—Transportation (DBOF-T) and is currently known as the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF).[37] The concept behind the ASIF fund was that airlift crews needed to remain ready for their war time mission, and to be ready, they needed to haul cargo. The cargo is then a by-product of MAC training needs. Imbedded in the ASIF concept is a system that allows for mission management by cargo and standardized flow of cargo as Gen. Tunner advocated. Mission management by cargo was set by a priority system and standardized flow was ensured by a system of mission types, e.g., Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) exercises, scheduled "channel" missions, etc.[38] To get the cargo for training, users or customers (primarily from the Department of Defense) would arrange for the airlift and then pay for the service from their unit funds.[39]

As mentioned, this system was established to accommodate MAC's training needs, but to the people planning and flying the missions, the emphasis is the other way around. Specifically, the mission comes first, and training becomes a by-product of the mission. This is a critical reversal and is demonstrated by the system used to train pilots who

eventually become aircraft commanders. MAC developed a series of four Pilot Training Guides that each pilot would carry on every mission.[40] To see how the training system supported MAC operations, the third training guide provides a useful example. This guide is perhaps the most critical of the four guides for upgrade to aircraft commander, and to complete it, a full 93% could be accomplished on an operational mission. The remaining 7% needed to be done on local missions devoted solely to training. The actual percentage of operational missions flown varied and was not as high as 93%. For example, for 6 months in 1980, the percentage of missions flown operationally, i.e., not local trainers, was between 75% and 85%,[41] but to the people executing MAC's mission, this emphasis on the mission creates the first basic assumption. Namely, that the mission comes first.

By no means is this meant to suggest other military organizations don't pay attention to their mission or base their training on their mission. It simply means that, according to Schein's primary embedding mechanisms, MAC's leaders paid attention to the business practices based on operations that mirrored their war time operations. In addition, MAC's founding leaders allocated scarce resources through the ASIF system. In war, MAC may expand operations, but the daily conduct of war operations was essentially the same as the peace-time operations. These embedding mechanisms worked. By the 1980s, the business like attitude dominated MAC thinking: "…peacetime airlift management is fundamental air doctrine…Aside from the economic issue, our users and national command authorities have come to rely on the quick reaction of airlift to each transportation requirement."[42]

Embedding the business like mechanisms worked so well in fact, that in one respect they contradicted a corollary to one of Gen. Tunner's central concepts. Specifically, to operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, Gen. Tunner believed in strict centralized control.[43] However, with the communication systems available, this strict centralized control was not possible. In *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Dr. Schein discusses this dilemma. If a founding leader has some inconsistencies in what they stress, the members of the group will develop accommodations to continue operations. People develop "work arounds."[44] Organizationally, MAC developed a system of theater airlift control centers under the command of two numbered air forces.[45] For example, 22nd Air Force (controlling the geographic area west of the Mississippi River basically to the Indian Ocean) utilized three Airlift Control Centers or ALCCs, based in Hawaii, Alaska, and Korea, to control airlift movement. However, the system could not handle the vast quantities of data needed to provide the strict control envisioned by Gen. Tunner. Whether the deficiencies in the system were from technology limitations or limited resources for MAC is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that going into the 1980s, centralized control was still not achievable. This is evident in an interview with General Paul Carlton, Commander in Chief of MAC until 1977, conducted by the Airlift Operations School in 1981.[46] In this interview, Gen. Carlton was asked what problems needed to be solved when he first took command. He responded: "Probably the most serious problem I sensed when coming to MAC was a lack of communications—it was perhaps the toughest also…[We] monitored airlift operations, not controlled them."[47] To try to solve the problem, Gen. Carlton brought in some expertise from SAC, and by the

time Gen. Carlton left, the system had improved some, but the emphasis was on major operations, not the day-to-day operations.[48]

To keep day-to-day operations moving, the system depended on the aircraft commanders and air crews. The air crews had to understand and apply a litany of functions and systems, both flying and non-flying related, to accomplish the mission, e.g., diplomatic clearance procedures, aerial port operations, getting support in countries with operating procedures that differ significantly from the U.S., etc. Focusing on aircraft commanders, "strong, aggressive, and decisive aircraft commanders, who can be counted on to exercise sound judgment and make valid decisions with little or no control guidance, are critical to system success."[49] So given Gen. Tunner's vision for continuous operations with strict centralized control, the system adapted and developed a second basic assumption; the aircraft commanders and air crews were critical to mission success.

As critical as the aircraft commanders were to mission success, when missions returned to home base, his or her authority over the rest of the air crew ended. Following the business practice theme, for decades MAC squadron organization was based on functional areas. In other words, pilots reported to a chief pilot, flight engineers reported to a chief flight engineer, etc.[50] This is the type of system typically adapted by commercial airlines, because it keeps costs down. The problem with the system, militarily, is that the span of control for one person is huge. For example, a chief pilot may be responsible for more than 70 pilots.[51] Some in MAC recognized the problems with the system and attempted at different times to introduce a more typical military structure. Gen. Carlton tried in the 1970s,[52] but was unsuccessful.[53] In the early 1990s, the system was finally changed and reinforced by Gen. McPeak's objective wing concept,

which included squadron organizations based on flights.[54] Even though changed, the decades of an organizational structure—a secondary embedding mechanism—based on functional specialties helped create a third basic assumption in MAC. Namely, the official organization structure did not provide the individual support typical of most military organizations. With a span of control of 70 or more, there is no way the official structure could provide the support. To adapt, unofficial structures developed. Both professional and personal support was obtained through help from a senior officer, enlisted member, or other mentors or even outside the military altogether, i.e., some would work in the squadron, but develop support networks in the community.[55]

In 1992, Gen. McPeak presided over ceremonies to create Air Mobility Command.[56] Under AMC, the airlift and tanker communities came together, and with them came their respective cultures. In this chapter, some of the basic assumptions that create the cultures have been postulated. These assumptions are summarized below.

Table 1. SAC and MAC Cultural Basic Assumptions

SAC Basic Assumptions	MAC Basic Assumptions
Training and planning are the keys to success	The mission comes first, and training is a by-product of the mission
The organization is obligated to take care of and support its members	The official organization is unable to care for and support its members in a traditional military manner; unofficial support structures fill the void
Perfection is the accepted standard of performance	Aircraft commanders and air crews are critical to operational success

The differences between the first two assumptions are fairly obvious. The intent of this chapter, however, was not to develop the contradictory assumptions seen in the first two, but to develop the assumptions based on the actions of each organization's founding leaders. The fact that contradictions exist simply mean that subcultures within AMC

exist and may be a source of friction to AMC's operations, i.e., how the units operate internally and how they respond to their external customers. And if not a source of friction, there will certainly be differences.

Notes

[1] History, The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1981, (A Chronological History), Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1 July 1982, 1-10.

[2] General Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, *Mission with LeMay* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 429-430.

[3] Ibid., 432.

[4] Ibid., 436.

[5] Ibid., 438.

[6] Ibid., 439-440.

[7] Ibid., 440.

[8] Schein, 231.

[9] History, 17.

[10] Major Vernon B. Byrd, USAF, Retired, *Passing Gas, The History of Inflight Refueling* (Chico, CA: Byrd Publishing Company, 1994), 248.

[11] Anonymous, "My First Alert Tour," *Combat Crew*, Volume XXXVIII, no.1 (January 1988): 4-5.

[12] Carroll L. Zimmerman, *Insider at SAC, Operations Analysis Under General LeMay* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1988), 136.

[13] Ibid., 130.

[14] Ibid., 126-143.

[15] Byrd, 253-254.

[16] Zimmerman, 129.

[17] Ibid., 129.

[18] History, 19.

[19] Ibid., 132.

[20] Mel Hunter, *Strategic Air Command* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 39.

[21] Ibid., 38.

[22] History, 63.

[23] Hunter, 176.

[24] LeMay and Kanter, 442.

[25] Hunter, 162.

[26] History, 78.

[27] Neither of the two examples are from documented sources. Rather, they come from folklore the author has heard from numerous people who came from SAC. In addition to supporting the point being made in the body of the text, they provide excellent examples of how basic assumptions, to the people of an organization, are not challenged,

debated, or confronted in any organized, or even conscience, manner as discussed in Chapter 2.

[28] Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Miller, USAF, *Airlift Doctrine* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 1-226.

[29] Office of the AMC Historian, "Making 'Anything, Anywhere, Anytime' a Reality," in *Airlift/Tanker, History of U.S.. Airlift & Tanker Forces*, ed. Office of the AMC Historian (Paducah, KT: Turner Publishing Co., 1993), 15.

[30] Miller, 177.

[31] Ibid., 197.

[32] Ibid., 263.

[33] AMC Office of History, 15.

[34] Miller, 169.

[35] Ibid., 169.

[36] The theme to use business practices is widespread in both AMC and U.S. Transportation Command. The author most recently heard this advocacy by:

Major General Charles H. Coolidge, Jr., Director of Operations and Logistics, USTRANSCOM, "The Role of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in Joint Operations Planning" lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 10 February 1998.

[37] The MAC Conptroller's Office, "The Airlift Service Industrial Fund," *Airlift*, XII, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 1-4.

[38] Ibid., 2.

[39] Ibid., 1.

[40] MAC Forms 653 through 655, *C-141 Pilot Training Guide, (Level I through Level IV)*, August, 1984.

[41] Major General Charles F.G. Kuyk, Jr., USAF (Ret.), "Peacetime Training Vs Wartime Role," *Airlift Operations Review*, 2, no. 3 (July-September, 1980): 11-12.

[42] Colonel Dean A. Hess, Jr., "Why We Can't Say No," *Airlift Operations Review*, 3, no. 1 (January-March, 1981): 22-24.

[43] Major Rick Pilling, "Airlift's Corporate Culture," *Airlift*, X, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 11.

[44] Schein, 230.

[45] Lieutenant Colonel Clem Wehner, "Airlift Command & Control," *Airlift*, Fall 1986, 4-5.

[46] Interview General Paul K. Carlton, as recorded in *Airlift*, VI, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 16-20.

[47] Ibid., 20.

[48] Ibid., 20.

[49] Major Richard F. Hay, "Centralized Control," *Airlift*, VII, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 20.

[50] Interview Gen. Carlton, 20.

[51] Lieutenant Colonel Randall J. Larsen, "Reorganizing MAC's C-5 Squadrons," *Airlift*, XIII, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 12.

[52] Interview Gen. Carlton, 20.

[53] Larsen, 12.

Notes

[54] McPeak, 61-114.
[55] Larsen, 11.
[56] McPeak, 147-148.

Chapter 4

Forming Air Mobility Command

> *Little is known or understood about the process of reorganization and rebirth…This process is traumatic and therefore not typically used as a deliberate strategy, but it may be relevant if economic survival is at stake.*
>
> —Dr Edgar H. Schein

Whether for economic, political, or philosophical reasons,[1] the Air Force reorganized in 1992 and created AMC out of MAC and the tanker assets of SAC. To this point, this paper concentrated on the cultural aspects of the airlift community (MAC) and the tanker community (SAC), and it now turns to an examination of how the airlift and tanker subcultures merged, or did not merge, under AMC. In particular, in the previous chapter, some basic assumptions that form the core of the two subcultures were developed; some of these were quite contradictory to one another. It stands to reason then that one of three actions will occur as these subcultures meet. Either changes will occur that favor one basic assumption over another, or changes will occur that support entirely new basic assumptions, or finally, no change will occur and friction will develop between the subcultures when they come together.

When stood up on 1 June, AMC's commander was General Hansford T. Johnson; however, he retired in August, and General Ronald R. Fogleman took command.[2] It is the author's contention that the concept of founding leader or leaders as developed in the last chapter can focus on Gen. Fogleman and AMC's current commander, General Walter

Kross. Both are visionaries with concepts and programs that go directly to the basic assumptions of the tanker and airlift communities.

Gen. Fogleman took command and immediately focused on what he called the mobility core mission. He backed up his focus by divesting the command of assets "not directly related to global reach."[3] Gen. Fogleman expanded on the global reach mission stating that: "While others train for the next battle, every day members of this command…provide services that save lives and relieve suffering. We are a total mobility team engaged in peacetime pursuits, yet ready if called to battle."[4] In effect, Gen. Fogleman is embracing the airlift-type of operations envisioned by Gen. Tunner. So one would expect that the basic assumption coming from the airlift style of operations would become a prevailing basic assumption in AMC. Specifically, the basic assumption was that 'the mission comes first, and training is a by-product of the mission.' In addition, one would expect the SAC basic assumption of 'planning and training are the key to success' would be de-emphasized. However, this is not the case.

To see the unchanged assumptions, one needs look no further than the "11" series regulations on operations. These have been standardized in terms of paragraph headings, and in many cases the verbiage used, throughout the command. However, the tanker regulation has extensive planning and briefing requirements.[5] In practice, these requirements translate into 2-day planning time required for each mission; 1-day planning is required for local missions. This is as it was under SAC when the tanker crews rarely flew operational missions. When they did fly an operational mission away from home station, in fact, tanker crews used extensive planning guides on flying in the international system and to foreign bases.[6] As further evidence that the basic assumptions haven't

changed, tanker crews still use the term 'Higher Headquarters Directed'[7] (HHD) to denote an operational mission. For comparison, or lack of it, there is no equivalent term in airlift regulations. For a tanker crew under SAC, a HHD was of critical importance; it came from "headquarters," and it was out of the ordinary. For an airlift crew, practically everything came from "headquarters," and it was ordinary. It is not the intent here to show the folly of one system over the other. Rather, it is to show that one of the founding leaders has articulated a concept of operations to the organization; a subculture within the organization has a basic assumption in conflict with the founding leader's concept of operations, and after six years of consolidation, the subculture's basic assumption remains—to the detriment of the mission. Some possible corrective actions are presented in the next chapter.

The differences in basic assumptions about training and operational missions is probably the most significant between the two subcultures. However, additional differences exist that need to be addressed. The second difference or contradiction between the two subcultures refers to the organization; in the case of the tanker subculture, 'the organization is obligated to take care of and support its members,' and in the case of the airlift subculture, 'the official organization is unable to care for and support its members in a traditional military manner; unofficial support structures fill the void.' The airlift subculture is based on a business-type operation, and as stated in the last chapter, the airlift community has, after several decades, transitioned to a more military structure that includes flights. This transition is appropriate; the flight system may not end up with the aircraft commander holding his/her crew at attention to give a briefing as in SAC. However, without it, one ends up with the difficulties enumerated by

Gen. Carlton[8] and Lt. Col. Larsen.[9] Specifically, the flight system helps alleviate concerns about morale and retention and provides a more reasonable span of control. Of importance here is that the old SAC and MAC systems appear to be fusing together in favor of the SAC system. However, SAC's reinforcing mechanisms of a tight organizational structure and strict command and control are not completely replicated in AMC. So the basic assumption for AMC would read something like 'the organization will take care of and support its people,' which removes the "obligation" term from the basic assumption. This is being helped considerably by Gen. Kross who is paying close attention to enlisted issues[10] and aircrew retention.[11] In addition, to help reinforce this AMC basic assumption, Gen. Kross should be able to rely on the AMC command and control system as a secondary embedding mechanism.

Before AMC formed, the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) stood up on 1 April 1992. The TACC was created to accommodate Gen. McPeak's vision of no air divisions[12] which were central to the MAC command and control system, but more importantly, the TACC supported Gen. Tunner's, and subsequently Gen. Fogleman's vision, of a strict control system in line with Gen. LeMay's concept for SAC. Today, the TACC "consists of nine divisions with the resources and talent to task, schedule, execute, and recover all TACC missions."[13] However, the folklore on TACC miscues is reasonably large and continues as one of Schein's secondary embedding mechanisms. So if AMC is to continue toward the basic assumption that 'the organization will take care of and support its members,' and if the TACC is used to solidify this basic assumption, some changes that eliminate the folklore are needed. Once again, some recommendations are included in the next chapter.

As TACC becomes better at centralized control, the final two basic assumptions identified in the last chapter will be affected as well. The last SAC basic assumption was 'perfection is the accepted standard of performance;' the last MAC basic assumption was 'aircraft commanders and air crews are critical to operational success.' The MAC basic assumption resulted from an inability to realize Gen. Tunner's vision for strict control, so it may be declining in importance for AMC. As TACC centralizes the control, there may be a tendency for crews to protect themselves from a sort of "wrath of higher command" and spend more time planning each mission—supporting the SAC basic assumption. Nothing more will be said about this here except to recommend caution in de-emphasizing the aircraft commander and air crews, which can create the climate discussed by Major Hay.[14] Specifically, the climate may be one of too much dependence on AMC, where decision-making abilities are eroded. The air crews are still the ones on the front line, operating at austere airfields throughout the world.

In conclusion, it appears that the majority of the basic assumptions from SAC and MAC are reconciling themselves. However, two have not. These two basic assumptions stem from the way SAC and MAC operated, and they have not reconciled to AMC operations—making the conflict between them pretty critical. The next chapter makes some initial, broad-based recommendations that could address the cultural conflict.

Notes

[1] McPeak, 68-69.
[2] Leland, 65.
[3] Ibid., 65.
[4] General Ronald R. Fogleman as quoted by Leland, 65.
[5] Multicommand Instruction (MCI) 11-210, *Flying Operations*, Volume 6, 1 March 1997, 6-8.
[6] Technical Sergeant David R. Mingus, "Task Force Cargo Loading, *Combat Crew*, XXXVIII, no. 3 (March 1988): 14-15.

Notes

Anonymous, "A Tale of two Crews—TDY," *Combat Crew,* XL, no. 2 (February 1990):14-15.

[7] MCI 11-210, Volume 1, 1 October 1996, 7.

[8] Interview Gen. Carlton 20.

[9] Larsen, 10-12.

[10] To review numerous initiatives, see "FY 98–Year of the Enlisted Force," n.p.; on-line, Internet, 5 March 1998, available from http://www.scott.af.mil/hqamc/pa/yotef/yotef.htm

[11] To review 32 messages addressing aircrew retention, see "Index to AMC/CC's Aircrew Initiatives Messages," n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 March 1998, available from http://www.scott.af.mil:81/hqamc/directorates/amcdo/dot/initiatives/init_ndx.htm.

[12] McPeak, 132.

[13] Office of Public Affairs, "TACC Fact Sheet," (April 1997): n.p.; on-line, Internet, 13 February 1998, available from http//www.scott.af.mil/hqamc/pa/facts/tacctact.htm.

[14] Hay, 19-21.

Chapter 5

Recommendations and Conclusion

In forming AMC, some strengthening of the organizational structure and command and control system resulted in a tendency to embrace some of the cultural basic assumptions that came with the tanker assets. However, the tanker basic assumption based predominantly on a training environment is in conflict with an airlift basic assumption based predominantly on operational flying. As mentioned in the last chapter, the mobility mission is quite similar to the MAC mission that drove the airlift basic assumption, so this chapter looks at actions that may be taken to de-emphasize this last tanker basic assumption and strengthen the airlift basic assumption.

Before proceeding, however, one may question whether any change is needed, i.e., let the two subcultures operate as they currently operate. This would have validity except for where the two subcultures meet. In the first chapter, examples of the conflicts that occur at AMC's mobility wings were provided. These examples are not unique; in fact, the mobility wing's leadership spends a considerable amount of time addressing these types of conflicts. It is the author's contention that after 6 years of consolidation, the subculture conflicts occurring at two of the showcase AMC wings should be addressed. In addition, as the Air Force as a whole moves to enhance expeditionary capabilities, mobility assets as a whole will be called on more and more to work together as one

complete unit, not two parts of one unit. The friction created by the tanker and airlift subcultures, therefore, needs to be reduced.

It is also the author's contention that Gen. Kross, as the leader and the one Schein puts considerable responsibility, cannot institute the changes alone. Given the size of AMC, considerable support is needed from commanders and leaders at each level as well as from the AMC staff. Indeed, several staff initiatives could begin immediately. First, if the statement "We operate around the world, around the clock, in support of America's national interests, every day…our mission never stops!"[1] is true, then operational instructions must reflect it. Instructions, like MCI 11-210, need to reflect AMC's operational image, not the SAC training image. This is not to say that the operational instructions should all use the same verbiage or a single instruction should be used by everyone, but that they should de-emphasize or eliminate some of the requirements that came with the predominantly training environment of SAC. In addition, the AMC training staff should move to take advantage of the operational nature of AMC flying, and adapt the airlift system of training guides which allows for continuity and a portion of upgrade training while flying away from home station. In addition to the AMC staff, the TACC can also help bring the tanker and airlift subcultures together.

The TACC should make the investment to incorporate more tanker expertise—planning expertise in particular. Under SAC, the various wings provided complete mission planning support for all missions; this included everything from making off-station support arrangements to individual flight plans for each sortie. Under this system, the aircrews could be more involved with planning (a SAC basic assumption). In addition, the planning system was an avenue for the wing to provide support to her

members (a SAC basic assumption). By way of contrast, under MAC, most of the mission planning support for the airlift system came from the ALCCs to enhance Gen. Tunner's vision of operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week. With the 1992 Air Force reorganization, creation of AMC, and elimination of the ALCCs, the TACC picked up the planning support previously provided by the ALCCs.

Moving tanker planning expertise to the TACC will not be positively received in the tanker community—it violates basic assumptions, going counter to their subculture. However, not moving the expertise hinders Gen. Fogleman's vision of global reach for AMC and makes command and control lines confusing. Today, if a tanker crew operates a cargo mission, the TACC is clearly the controlling authority. If a tanker crew operates an air refueling mission, however, the controlling authority, for practical purposes, is still the home unit planning office. The tanker crew coordinates with the TACC, but the true mission control comes from the planning unit. Another source of confusion or misunderstanding comes from the funding source of the mission.

This is a major, congressional-level change, but the author believes the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) should be expanded to include air refueling services. Much like the ASIF helped the airlift community operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, an expanded TWCF that includes air refueling would help the mobility community. Although the author is not an expert in budgeting, this change seems to make sense and would help ensure air refueling assets are allocated world wide based on requirements.

The above changes certainly are not the only ones that can occur. In any case, it is believed that after 6 years of existence, some change is needed to bring the airlift and

tanker subcultures closer together. This belief is based on the fact that the founding leaders of both MAC and SAC created some deep basic assumptions that supported two distinct cultures. In this paper, those two cultures were examined based on the cultural analysis techniques offered by Dr. Schein. Although a cultural analysis may not follow traditional military analysis, hopefully, it expands thought into looking at the cultures of units as major organizational changes occur. If useful, perhaps a similar analysis can be used as the C-130s come back to mobility.

Notes

[1] *1998 Air Mobility Master Plan*, 1-2.

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