


SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY

A CONCERT FOR
PRESERVING SECURITY AND
PROMOTING FREEDOM



THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

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
**The Phase II Report on a
U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century**

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

April 15, 2000

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
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
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Introduction

“We must disenthral ourselves,” said Abraham Lincoln, at a time of much greater peril to the Republic than we face today. As the times are new, said Lincoln, “so we must think anew.” At the dawn of this new century, the nation faces a similar necessity. No concern of American society is more in need of creative thinking than the future security of this country, but in no domain is such thinking more resistant to change. The very term “security” suggests caution and guardedness, not innovation. We know that major countries rarely engage in serious rethinking and reform absent a major defeat, but this is a path the United States cannot take. Americans are less secure than they believe themselves to be. The time for reexamination is now, before the American people find themselves shocked by events they never anticipated.

During the last half century, the national security strategy of the United States was derived largely from, focused on, and committed to the containment of Soviet Communism. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the dramatic transformation of world politics resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later, our leaders have been searching for a unifying theme to provide a strategic framework appropriate to current and future circumstances. That search has not been easy.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century has been tasked with thinking anew about America’s national security for the next 25 years.¹ In this report, we suggest the strategic precepts that should guide the formulation of U.S. strategy, and then take a fresh look at U.S. national interests and priority objectives. On that basis, we propose the framework of a new national security strategy.² This report is intended to contribute to a new consensus on national security strategy to carry the United States forward into a challenging future.³

Thinking about Strategy

This Commission’s Phase I report pointed to two contradictory trends ahead: a tide of economic, technological, and intellectual forces that is integrating a global community, amid powerful forces of social and political fragmentation.⁴ While no one knows what the mix of these trends will produce, the new world coming will be dramatically different in significant respects. Governments are under pressure from below, by forces of ethnic separatism and violence, and from above, by economic, technological, and cultural forces beyond any government’s full control. We are witnessing a transformation of human society on the magnitude of that between the agricultural and industrial epochs—and in a far more compressed period of time.

Such circumstances put a special premium on strategic wisdom, particularly for a country of the size and character of the United States. In this Commission’s view, the essence of American strategy must compose a

¹ This Commission, established to examine comprehensively how this nation will ensure its security in the next 25 years, has a threefold task. Phase I, completed on September 15, 1999, described the transformations emerging over the next quarter-century in the global and domestic U.S. security environment. Phase II, concerning U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy, is contained in this document. Phase III, which will examine the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus for 21st century relevancy, will be delivered on or before February 15, 2001.

² In the interest of brevity, this Commission has compressed considerable discussion and detail into this document. Further discussion of the implications of several main themes in this report will be presented in the Commission’s Phase III findings.

³ This report is built upon a consensus involving all members of the Commission, but not every Commissioner subscribes with equal enthusiasm to every statement contained herein.

⁴ See *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999).

balance between two key aims. The first is to *reap the benefits of a more integrated world in order to expand freedom, security, and prosperity for Americans and for others*. But, second, American strategy must also strive to *dampen the forces of global instability so that those benefits can endure*. Freedom is the quintessential American value, but without security, and the relative stability that results therefrom, it can be evanescent. American strategy should seek both security and freedom, and it must seek them increasingly in concert with others. Hence our title: *A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*.

Our assessment of the new world emerging, and the core interests and values of the American people, lead us to offer the following precepts as a guide to the formulation of national strategy:

Strategy and policy must be grounded in the national interest. The national interest has many strands—political, economic, security, and humanitarian. National interests are nevertheless the most durable basis for assuring policy consistency. Gaining and sustaining public support for U.S. policy is best achieved, too, when American principles are coupled with clearly visible national interests. Moreover, a strategy based on national interest, properly conceived, engenders respect for the interests of others.

The maintenance of America's strength is a long-term commitment and cannot be assured without conscious, dedicated effort. If America does not make wise investments in preserving its own strength, well within 25 years it will find its power reduced, its interests challenged even more than they are today, and its influence eroded. Many nations already seek to balance America's relative power, and the sinews of

American strength—social, military, economic, and technological—will not sustain themselves without conscious national commitment. Assuring American prosperity is particularly critical; without it, the United States will be hobbled in all its efforts to play a leading role internationally.

The United States faces unprecedented opportunities as well as dangers in the new era. American strategy must rise to positive challenges as well as to negative ones. Working toward constructive relations among the major powers, preserving the dynamism of the new global economy and spreading its benefits, sharing responsibility with others in grappling with new transnational problems—this is a diplomatic agenda that tests American statesmanship and creativity. As in the late 1940s, the United States should help build a new international system in which other nations, freely pursuing their own interests, find it advantageous to do so in ways that coincide with American interests.

Since it cannot bear every burden, **the United States must find new ways to join with other capable and like-minded nations.** Where America would not act itself, it retains a responsibility as the leading power to help build effective *systems* of international collaboration. America must therefore overcome its ambivalence about international institutions and about the strength of its partners, questioning them less and encouraging them more.

This nation must set priorities and apply them consistently. To sustain public support and to discipline policy, America must not exhaust itself by limitless commitments. Especially with respect to military intervention abroad, a finer calculus of

benefits and burdens must govern. Resisting the “CNN effect” may be one of the most important requirements of U.S. policymaking in the coming period.

Finally, **America must never forget that it stands for certain principles, most importantly freedom under the rule of law.** Freedom is today a powerful tide in the affairs of mankind, and, while the means chosen to serve it must be tempered by a realistic appreciation of limits, it is not “realism” to ignore its power. At the same time, if America is to retain its leadership role, it must live up to its principles consistently, in its own conduct and in its relations with other nations.

The National Interest in a New Century

The first of these precepts is the most crucial of all: American national security strategy must find its anchor in U.S. national interests, interests that must be both protected *and advanced* for the fundamental well being of American society. We define these interests at three levels: **survival** interests, without which America would cease to exist as we know it; **critical** interests, which are causally one step removed from survival interests; and **significant** interests, which importantly affect the global environment in which the United States must act. There are, of course, other national interests, though of lesser importance than those in the above three categories.

U.S. **survival** interests include America’s safety from direct attack, especially involving weapons of mass destruction, by either states or terrorists. Of the same order of importance is the preservation of America’s Constitutional order and of those core strengths—educational,

industrial, scientific-technological—that underlie America’s political, economic, and military position in the world.

Critical U.S. national interests include the continuity and security of those key international *systems*—energy, economic, communications, transportation, and public health (including food and water supplies)—on which the lives and well being of Americans have come to depend. It is a critical national interest of the United States that no hostile power establish itself on U.S. borders, or in control of critical land, air, and sea lines of communication, or—in today’s new world—in control of access to outer space or cyberspace. It is a critical national interest of the United States that no hostile hegemon arise in any of the globe’s major regions, nor a hostile global peer rival or a hostile coalition comparable to a peer rival. The security of allies and friends is a critical national interest of the United States, as is the ability to avert, or check, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of actors hostile or potentially hostile to the United States.

Significant U.S. national interests include the deepening and institutionalization abroad of constitutional democracy under the rule of law, market-based economics, and universal recognition of basic human rights. The United States also has a significant interest in the responsible expansion of an international order based on agreed rules among major powers to manage common global problems, not least those involving the physical environment. It is a significant national interest of the United States that there be economic growth abroad, to raise the living standards of the poorest and to mitigate economic and political conflict. It is a significant national interest of the United States that international terrorism and criminality (including illicit drug trade) be minimized, but without jeopardizing the openness of international eco-

conomic and cultural exchanges. It is a significant national interest of the United States that neither mass murder nor gross violations of human rights be acceptable in the world's political life. It is a significant national interest of the United States that immigration across American boundaries not be uncontrolled. Finally, the free and safe movement of American citizens abroad is a significant national interest of the United States.

Key Objectives

The United States seeks to assure its own freedom under law, its safety, and its prosperity. But Americans recognize that these goals are best assured in a world where others achieve them, too. American strategy, therefore, must engage in new ways—and in concert with others—to consolidate and advance the peace, prosperity, democracy, and cooperative order of a world now happily free from global totalitarian threats. At the same time, however—also in concert with others—American strategy must strive to stabilize those parts of the world still beset by acute political conflict. To fulfill these strategic goals in a new age, America's priority objectives—and key policy aims—must be these:

FIRST, TO DEFEND THE UNITED STATES AND ENSURE THAT IT IS SAFE FROM THE DANGERS OF A NEW ERA.

In light of the new dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, the United States must focus anew on how to maintain a robust and powerful deterrent to all forms of attack on its territory and its critical assets. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of the highest priority in U.S. national security policy in the next quarter century. A higher priority, too, should be given to preventing, through diplomatic and other means, unconventional

attacks on all states. But should prevention and deterrence fail, the United States must have means of active defense against both mortal danger and blackmail. U.S. military, law enforcement, intelligence, economic, financial, and diplomatic means must be effectively integrated for this purpose.

The United States should seek enhanced international cooperation to combat the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This should include an effective and enforceable international ban on the creation, transfer, trade, and weaponization of biological pathogens, whether by states or non-state actors. Also, when available and implemented with rigor, cooperative programs to deal with existing stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are cost-effective and politically attractive ways to reduce the dangers of weapons and weapons matériel proliferation.

The United States should also strive to deepen the international normative consensus against terrorism and state support of terrorism. It should work with others to strengthen cooperation among law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and military forces to foil terrorist plots and deny sanctuary to terrorists by attacking their financial and logistical centers.

The United States should build comprehensive theater missile defense capabilities. It should also build national defenses against a limited ballistic missile attack to the extent technically feasible, fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. As cruise missile and other sophisticated atmospheric technologies spread, the United States must address the problem of devising defenses against such capabilities. The United States must also develop methods to defend against other, covert means of attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction and disruption.

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The United States must also have specialized forces capable of combating threats and blackmail from those possessing weapons of mass destruction and from terrorism. The magnitude of the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction compels this nation, as well, to consider carefully the means and circumstances of preemption.

The protection of U.S. and international access to outer space and cyberspace must become a high priority of U.S. security planning. Outer space and cyberspace are the main arteries of the world's evolving information and economic systems, and the ability to move ideas and information through them freely is a prerequisite for expanding global freedom and prosperity. Secure access to outer space and cyberspace is also now the *sine qua non* of the U.S. military's ability to function effectively. Through both technological and diplomatic means, the United States needs to guard against the possibility of "breakout" capabilities in space or cyberspace that would endanger U.S. survival or critical interests.

Despite the political obstacles, the United States should redouble its efforts to deal multilaterally with the diffusion of dangerous dual-use technologies. It must improve its capability to track the destinations and final uses of its own high-technology exports, and it must be prepared to aid allies in similar efforts.

To deal medically and psychologically with potentially large losses of American lives in attacks against the American homeland, U.S. public health capabilities need to be augmented. In addition, programs to ensure the continuity of Constitutional government should be bolstered.

SECOND, TO MAINTAIN AMERICA'S SOCIAL COHESION, ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, TECHNOLOGICAL INGENUITY, AND MILITARY STRENGTH.

To ensure the vitality of all its core institutions, the United States must make it a priority of national policy to improve the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover, in an era when private research and development efforts far outstrip those of government, the United States must create more advanced and effective forms of public/private partnerships to promote public benefit from scientific-technological innovation.

The United States must strive to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of fossil fuel energy that leaves this country and its allies vulnerable to economic pressures and political blackmail. Steady development of alternative sources of energy production, and greater efficiencies in energy transmission and conservation, are thus national security as well as economic and environmental necessities.

The United States must strengthen the bonds between the American people and those of its members who serve in the armed forces. It must also strengthen government (civil and military) personnel systems in order to improve recruitment, retention and effectiveness at all levels. Executive-Legislative relations regarding national security policy need to foster effective collaboration.

THIRD, TO ASSIST THE INTEGRATION OF KEY MAJOR POWERS, ESPECIALLY CHINA, RUSSIA, AND INDIA, INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

The United States should engage China constructively and with a positive attitude, politically and economically. But it must recognize that the potential for competition between the United States and China may increase as China grows stronger. China's increasing adherence to global economic, legal,

and cultural institutions and norms will be a positive factor, and the United States should encourage and assist this process of integration. At the same time, the United States should maintain its deterrent strength and its alliance system in the Asia/Pacific region. It should remain committed to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, consistent with the terms of the three Sino-American Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.

The United States should support Russian economic reform and democratic political development on a realistic basis, recognizing that these goals are first and foremost for Russians themselves to accomplish. It is also in the U.S. interest to assist Russian integration into global economic institutions, no less than is the case with China.

Clearly, too, relations with Russia should be appropriate to its importance as a major power. It does not benefit the United States to pursue policies that weaken or humiliate Moscow. Still, the United States must assert its own interests when they are affected adversely by Russian policies—as they are, for example, by policies that encourage or allow the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and its allies should also support the continued political independence and territorial integrity of the newly independent former Soviet states.

In addition, arms control remains an important facet of U.S. national security policy. But the United States needs a new calculus for developing future strategic nuclear arms control strategy beyond START II. Such a calculus must include analysis of the implications of the increase in the number and prospective capabilities of nuclear weapons powers in the world. It must take account of new Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons capabilities. It must also take into account both the potential U.S. need to

respond to chemical and biological threats with nuclear weapons and the U.S. commitment to protect non-nuclear states from blackmail and attack by nuclear weapons states.

India is the world's largest democracy and soon will be the world's most populous country. Therefore, India is and must be dealt with as a major power. Pakistan, too, remains a pivotal country in its own right, and good U.S. relations with Pakistan are in the U.S. national interest. The United States should also encourage India and Pakistan to settle their differences short of violence, and should make its good offices available to that end.

It is unlikely that American policy can persuade any Indian or Pakistani government to abandon its nuclear capacity. But the United States, together with other major powers, can play a more active role in discouraging future testing and the further production of fissile materials not under safeguards. The United States should also encourage mutual adoption of measures to ensure the safety and security of both countries' nuclear capabilities.

Beyond its efforts to bring these three major states into the mainstream of a new cooperative international order, the United States has a strong interest in limiting the further proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons around the world. It should therefore seek support for a multilateral approach to devising limitations on such proliferation first with its closest allies and friends, and thereafter with Russia, China, India, and other significant arms producing countries.

FOURTH, TO PROMOTE, WITH OTHERS, THE DYNAMISM OF THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The United States, in concert with the G-7, must strive to manage the elements of turbulence that accompany economic globalization in order to spread its benefits, while minimizing social and political dislocations and the system's vulnerability to financial crisis. This must include building political legitimacy as well as an economic architecture.

Continuing trade liberalization remains a key to global economic advance, particularly for those regions, countries, and selected economic sectors in advanced countries—including the United States—whose trade remains shackled by protectionist policies. Bilateral and regional approaches (in addition to the global system represented by the WTO) should be encouraged. Environmental concerns and labor rights must be addressed, although not in a manner that blocks or reverses trade liberalization.

Similarly, economic sanctions should not unduly inhibit trade. But, while this Commission is skeptical of the efficacy of broad and especially unilateral U.S. economic sanctions, specifically targeted financial sanctions, particularly when employed multilaterally, have a better chance of working. As the United States and its closest allies erect a new financial architecture, the capability to impose financial sanctions should be built into the system.

The United States, in cooperation with others, must continue to ensure that the price and supply of Persian Gulf and other major energy supplies are not wielded as political weapons directed against the United States or its allies and friends.

Because this Commission believes that public diplomacy is an important part of American diplomacy, the United States should help spread information technology worldwide, to bring the benefits of globalization and democracy to those

parts of the world now cut off from them. The United States should also employ new technologies creatively to improve its public diplomacy in the new Information Age.

The United States should continue to promote strong international efforts against state corruption and transnational criminality, and should help the international community respond more effectively to humanitarian relief crises. To do this will require not only working in new ways with other governments but also with the burgeoning community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly in areas where U.S. official representation is sparse.

The United States should, as it has traditionally, support the growth of international law and remain willing to subscribe to international agreements where they promote overall U.S. interests. But the United States must always reserve the right to define its own interests, even if it requires withdrawing from—but not violating—selected treaty obligations. U.S. policy coherence and democratic accountability under the Constitution must be preserved.

The United States has a strong stake in a reformed and more effective United Nations system, and should engage constructively to that end. The UN, when properly supported, can be an effective instrument for the enhancement of international stability and humanitarian ends. In addition, the United States must be willing to lead in assembling ad hoc coalitions outside UN auspices if necessary.

FIFTH, TO ADAPT U.S. ALLIANCES AND OTHER REGIONAL MECHANISMS TO A NEW ERA IN WHICH AMERICA'S PARTNERS SEEK GREATER AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

The cornerstone of America's regional policies must be the maintenance and

enhancement of existing U.S. alliances and friendships. By strengthening relations with allies and friends, the United States extends both its influence and the zone of peace and stability.

In Europe, the United States should be prepared to support the evolution of an independent European Union defense policy in a manner consistent with the unity of the Atlantic Alliance. Forward-stationed forces, as the embodiment of overall U.S. capabilities and commitments in Europe, should remain an essential ingredient in that regional security alliance. The United States should also promote the concept of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), as well as encourage the integration of East and Central European democracies into Atlantic and European economic institutions based on free trade.

The United States should expand the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to all the democracies of the Western Hemisphere. It should deepen its ties within this hemisphere and seek to strengthen the Organization of American States (OAS). Whatever the merits of "exporting" democracy, there can be little doubt that helping to bolster democracies where they have come to exist of their own exertions should be high on the list of U.S. priorities. Nowhere is such an effort more important than in the Western Hemisphere.

In the Asia/Pacific area, the U.S.-Japan alliance should remain the keystone of U.S. policy. The United States should seek a more equal strategic partnership and a free trade agreement with Japan. In a region where old rivalries persist and reconciliation and integration have not advanced as far as they have in Europe, U.S. alliance and security ties with Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and others remain critical. Such ties

compose a regional security community resting solidly on the assurance provided by U.S. engagement and power. The United States should also support the growth of multilateral institutions for regional security and prosperity, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The United States should plan now for the possibility of Korean reunification. Some American troops should remain in a unified Korea as a factor of reassurance and stability in the region, including for the purpose of ensuring that a unified Korea remains without nuclear weapons.

The United States has a continuing critical interest in keeping the Persian Gulf secure, and must accept its share of the burden for so doing. In that light, it must be a high priority to prevent either Iraq or Iran from deploying deliverable weapons of mass destruction. The United States should also support the emerging collaboration of friendly states—notably Israel, Turkey, and Jordan—and seek to broaden such a collaboration to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others. Assisting the diplomatic settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute will advance that prospect.

In collaboration with other OECD countries, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and international development institutions, the United States should assist sub-Saharan Africa to build stronger economies and strengthen institutional cohesion and democratic ideals. In the economic field, emphasis should be put on promoting private investment, helping to develop West Africa's offshore energy resources, and providing debt relief and humanitarian aid (including resources to combat the AIDS epidemic). The United States should promote the professionalization of African militaries within

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a framework of democratic values, and encourage African governments to engage their militaries in constructive tasks of infrastructure building. Major emerging democracies such as South Africa and Nigeria will be key players as partners with the United States and its allies.

SIXTH, TO HELP THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TAME THE DISINTEGRATIVE FORCES SPAWNED BY AN ERA OF CHANGE.

The disruptive new forces of globalization are subjecting many governments to extraordinary pressures. In many states, what used to be governmental monopolies on the use of force, on law making, and over the supply of money are now “privatized” in various ways. Even the spread of the idea of freedom, while positive in the long run, is often accompanied by destabilization. The disruption of the political and territorial status quo in much of the world will be one of the distinctive features of international affairs over the next quarter century.

To address these spreading phenomena of weak and failed states, ethnic separatism and violence, and the crises they breed, the United States needs first to establish priorities. Not every such problem must be primarily a U.S. responsibility, particularly in a world where other powers are amassing significant wealth and human resources. There are countries whose domestic stability is, for differing reasons, of major importance to U.S. interests (such as Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia). Without prejudging the likelihood of domestic upheaval, these countries should be a priority focus of U.S. planning in a manner appropriate to the respective cases.

For cases of lesser priority, the United States should help the international community develop innovative mechanisms to manage the

problem of failed states. One such mechanism should include standing procedures to facilitate organizing peacekeeping operations and UN “conservatorships.”

In all cases, the United States should resort first to preventive diplomacy: acting with political and economic tools, and in concert with others, to head off conflict *before* it reaches the threshold of mass violence.

Preventive diplomacy will not always work, however, and the United States should be prepared to act militarily in conjunction with other nations in situations characterized by the following criteria:

- when U.S. allies or friends are imperiled;
- when the prospect of weapons of mass destruction portends significant harm to civilian populations;
- when access to resources critical to the global economic system is imperiled;
- when a regime has demonstrated intent to do serious harm to U.S. interests;
- when genocide is occurring.

If all or most of these conditions are present, the case for multilateral military action is strong. If *any one* of these criteria is serious enough, however, the case for military action may also be strong.

Implications for National Security

The strategy outlined here bears important implications for the political, economic, and military components of U.S. national security policy. From the political perspective, American diplomacy must recognize that the increasingly integrated nature of global exchanges will render traditional analytical divisions of the world obsolete. While important relations will continue to take place on a

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bilateral basis, many more international phenomena will be increasingly regional in nature and more will be fully global. The proliferation of non-state actors will also strain the traditional categories within which American diplomacy is organized.

As this Commission emphasized in its Phase I report, the economic dimensions of statecraft are also becoming more important. Among the democracies in what is known as the “zone of democratic peace,” economic issues can rival the importance of military ones. But economic issues are also of critical importance to the prospect that other emerging or developing states will succeed or fail with fundamental political and social reform. American strategy must also recognize the importance of technology as the basic underpinning of economic health and military prowess the world over.

All this means that the integrating function of U.S. policymaking processes will be challenged as never before. Traditional national security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff) will need to work together in new ways, and economic agencies (Treasury, Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work more closely with the traditional national security community. In addition, other players—especially Justice and Transportation—will need to be integrated more fully into national security processes. Merely improving the inter-agency process around present structures may not suffice.

Moreover, the U.S. government must learn to build more effective partnerships with state and local governments, and government as a whole must develop new partnerships with non-governmental organizations—though without sacrificing its ultimate responsibility and accountability for determining national policy.

As to military implications, the world we see emerging, and the strategy appropriate to that environment suggest that the United States needs five kinds of military capabilities:

- *nuclear* capabilities to deter and protect the United States and its allies from attack;
- *homeland security* capabilities;
- *conventional* capabilities necessary to win major wars;
- rapidly employable *expeditionary/intervention* capabilities; and
- *humanitarian relief* and *constabulary* capabilities.

Fundamental to U.S. national security strategy is the need to project U.S. power globally with forces stationed in the United States, and those stationed abroad and afloat in the forward presence role. Owing to the proliferation of new defense technologies in the hands of other states, effective power projection will become more difficult for the U.S. armed forces in the 21st century. U.S. forces must therefore possess greater flexibility to operate in a range of environments, including those in which the enemy has the capability to employ weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces must be characterized by stealth, speed, range, accuracy, lethality, agility, sustainability, reliability—and be supported by superior intelligence—in order to deal effectively with the spectrum of symmetrical and asymmetrical threats we anticipate over the next quarter century.

This Commission believes that the “two major theater wars” yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead. These contingencies, often calling for expeditionary interventions or stability opera-

tions, require forces different from those designed for major theater war. We believe these contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and simultaneity as to oblige the United States to adapt portions of its force structure to meet these needs. The overall force would then have the ability to engage effectively in contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peace and expeditionary combat operations, to large-scale, high-intensity conventional warfare. Finally, we recommend that the force structure designed to address these needs be developed on the basis of real-world intelligence assessments rather than illustrative scenarios.

In short, the capabilities mandated by these requirements will result in forces able to deploy rapidly, be employed immediately, and prevail decisively in expeditionary roles, prolonged stability operations, and major theater wars; a force to **deter** wars, to **preclude** crises from evolving into major conflicts, and to **win** wars rapidly and decisively should it become necessary.

America must also enhance the civil (that is, non-military) aspects of homeland security. These functions must be adequately funded and organized along appropriate lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability. The National Guard—successor to the militia, and acknowledged in the Second Amendment as the historic defender of the Republic—must be trained and equipped to assume, among its other responsibilities, a significant role in defending the homeland in the 21st century.

It is imperative, too, that the United States develop and fund these five kinds of capabilities *consistent with the level of need* created by changing political and security realities. Given the demands now placed upon this nation's military, or those anticipated in the next quarter century, it is evident that modern forces equal

to these demands cannot be sustained by current levels of spending.

To Phase III—Building for Peace

The strategy articulated here requires that the United States *lead in the construction of a world balanced between the expansion of freedom, and the maintenance of underlying stability*. To do so it must concert its efforts with others and, to the extent possible, in a way consistent with the interests of others.

Having become a global power, the United States now holds a responsibility it will not abandon, both for the safeguarding of American interests and the broader interests of global peace and security. The United States is the first nation with fully global leadership responsibilities, but there are more and less effective ways to lead. Tone matters. Leadership is not the same as dominance; everyone else's business need not also be America's. Just as riches without integrity are unavailing, so power without wisdom is unworthy. As Shakespeare put it:

O, it is excellent
To have a giant's strength; but it is
tyrannous
To use it like a giant.⁵

The strategy outlined here for U.S. national security differs from the strategic habits of the past half-century. It puts new emphasis on the economic and other non-military components of national security; it focuses on opportunities as much as on threats; and it reminds us of the domestic foundations of U.S. international strength. It attempts to clarify U.S. strategy and purposes, and to match them to a prudent sense of limits. It is

⁵ Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 2.

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not clear to us that the U.S. government is now organized in such a way that it can execute this strategy, or any other strategic concept that departs significantly from past practices. The world is changing fast, and if the U.S. government does not change with it, it may find itself forced into one bewildered reaction after another. If the United States loses the capacity to respond to dynamic change, the day will come when we will regret it dearly.

In Phase III of its work, therefore, this Commission will examine current structures and processes to determine their relevance to the 21st century. We will apply the following criteria:

First, the U.S. government needs to be adept at anticipating national security challenges. This requires the best possible system of intelligence, from collection to analysis to dissemination to policy review.

Second, the U.S. government needs the ability to calculate the longer-term implications of intervention abroad. It is not enough to be selective; we must be wisely selective, which requires a better matching of the instruments of national power to the problems at hand.

Third, the U.S. government needs to integrate effectively all non-traditional elements of national security policy with traditional ones.

Fourth, the U.S. government needs the agility to adapt rapidly to changes in the global environment.

Fifth, the U.S. government needs new organizational mechanisms to manage the increased blurring of lines among military, police, and legal jurisdictions, and among new forms of warfare.

Sixth, the U.S. government needs effective means to assess critically its own performance, draw lessons from its experience, and adjust resources, as appropriate.

Seventh, the U.S. government needs coherence between domestic policies with core national security implications and national security policies directed outside U.S. borders.

Phase III of this Commission's work will offer recommendations for enhancing the U.S. government's ability to function effectively in a rapidly changing political and technological environment. As with any kind of travel, clarity with respect to destination and route will prove unavailing if one's vehicle is not up to the journey. It is to that vehicle—the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus—that this Commission now turns its attention.

PHASE I: NEW WORLD COMING
AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
SEPTEMBER 15, 1999

PHASE II: SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY
A CONCERT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY
AND PROMOTING FREEDOM
APRIL 15, 2000

PHASE III: BUILDING FOR PEACE
MARCH 15, 2001

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