

# **Striking a Balance: Force Protection and Military Presence, Beirut, October 1983**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
Major Michael P. Mahaney  
United States Marine Corps**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**First Term AY 00-01**

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>		
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 01-01-2001	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> monograph	<b>3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO)</b> XX-08-2000 to XX-01-2001
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Striking a Balance: Force Protection and Military Presence, Beirut, October 1983  Unclassified	<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
	<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
	<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Mahaney, Michael P. ;	<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
	<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
	<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</b> U.S. Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66027	<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS</b>  ,	<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
	<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> A PUBLIC RELEASE  ,		
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>		

**14. ABSTRACT**

The 1983 Beirut bombing marks a turning point for military commanders who must now continually assess force protection measures while involved in Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Since 1983, the United States military has participated in numerous SASO missions similar to the operation in Beirut, Lebanon. These operations have ranged from humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement operations, and have often included combat operations. The Beirut bombing continues to significantly affect the force protection measures that military commanders employ while on SASO missions. A military commander's force protection posture directly impacts local cultural integration, unit morale, and his ability to effectively accomplish the assigned mission. In Beirut the mission dictated the force protection posture, in Haiti the force protection posture influenced the mission. Over-emphasis of force protection by commanders continually generates dialog about the proper and reasonable application of force protection measures. Political leaders, military leaders and the American public cannot suffer the consequences of "another Beirut." By revisiting the 1982 deployment of Marines to Lebanon and assessing the internal and external factors facing the military commanders on the ground in Beirut, military commanders today can gain valuable insights on force protection issues. This case study analyzes a situation where a progression of external and internal factors provided terrorists with an unprecedented target amidst an extremely chaotic environment. A thorough assessment of the internal and external factors confronting the MAU and BLT commanders will demonstrate that force protection measures are the responsibility of both military and civilian leaders. Diplomats and military leaders (at all levels) determine conditions for force protection success. A brief comparative assessment with operations in Haiti and Bosnia establishes significant relevant trends with Beirut. This monograph will identify three factors that are critical to the success of SASO. They are; a continual monitoring and updating of the mission statement, a streamlined military chain of command with ready access and interface with civilian leaders, and an "escape hatch" or means of quickly and efficiently disengaging from a situation that no longer allows the accomplishment of military or political objectives. Ultimately this assessment provides today's military commanders with an enhanced understanding of force protection and the myriad of factors affecting force protection.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

force protection; Stability and Support Operations (SASO); Beirut; Lebanon; Haiti; Bosnia

<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Same as Report (SAR)	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 59	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> Burgess, Ed burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER</b> International Area Code  Area Code Telephone Number 913 758-3171 DSN 585-3171

## **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.

# Table of Contents

DISCLAIMER .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iv
ABSTRACT .....	v
INTRODUCTION .....	1
BACKGROUND .....	7
HISTORY .....	7
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY .....	10
USMC DEPLOYMENT .....	23
ANALYSIS .....	32
CONCLUSIONS .....	44
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	47
END NOTES .....	51

## **Acknowledgements**

This monograph is dedicated to the memory of those Soldiers, Sailors and Marines who gave their lives in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 to February 1984.

## Abstract

The 1983 Beirut bombing marks a turning point for military commanders who must now continually assess force protection measures while involved in Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Since 1983, the United States military has participated in numerous SASO missions similar to the operation in Beirut, Lebanon. These operations have ranged from humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement operations, and have often included combat operations. The Beirut bombing continues to significantly affect the force protection measures that military commanders employ while on SASO missions.

A military commander's force protection posture directly impacts local cultural integration, unit morale, and his ability to effectively accomplish the assigned mission. In Beirut the mission dictated the force protection posture, in Haiti the force protection posture influenced the mission. Over-emphasis of force protection by commanders continually generates dialog about the proper and reasonable application of force protection measures. Political leaders, military leaders and the American public cannot suffer the consequences of "another Beirut."

By revisiting the 1982 deployment of Marines to Lebanon and assessing the internal and external factors facing the military commanders on the ground in Beirut, military commanders today can gain valuable insights on force protection issues. This case study analyzes a situation where a progression of external and internal factors provided terrorists with an unprecedented target amidst an extremely chaotic environment. A thorough assessment of the internal and external factors confronting the MAU and BLT commanders will demonstrate that force protection measures are the responsibility of both military and civilian leaders. Diplomats and military leaders (at all levels) determine conditions for force protection success. A brief comparative assessment with operations in Haiti and Bosnia establishes significant relevant trends with Beirut.

This monograph will identify three factors that are critical to the success of SASO. They are; a continual monitoring and updating of the mission statement, a streamlined military chain of command with ready access and interface with civilian leaders, and an "escape hatch" or means of quickly and efficiently disengaging from a situation that no longer allows the accomplishment of military or political objectives. Ultimately this assessment provides today's military commanders with an enhanced understanding of force protection and the myriad of factors affecting force protection.

## Introduction

At 6:23 A.M., Sunday October 23, 1983, a Mercedes truck with a yellow railed bed and a gray cab entered the United States Marine compound at Beirut International Airport (BIA). The truck sped through the compound and headed toward the First Battalion Eighth Marines Battalion Landing Team (BLT 1/8) headquarters building. Carrying 2600 pounds of explosives, the truck crashed into the building and detonated killing 241 service members inside.<sup>i</sup> For the Marine Corps this loss of life would represent the highest loss of life in a single day since D-Day on Iwo Jima in 1945.<sup>ii</sup> The ensuing Department of Defense (DOD) independent commission investigation, the Long Commission, would raise questions about the adequacy of the Marine's security measures at BIA. Specifically, the Long Commission would find the MAU and BLT Commanders at fault for concentrating so many personnel in the BLT headquarters building.

In June of 1996 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, a sewage truck pulled into a public parking lot abutting the northern perimeter of the Khobar Towers complex. This complex housed members of the 4404<sup>th</sup> Wing (Provisional) participating in Operation Southern Watch and enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq. Two men got out of the truck and left the scene in a car. Four minutes later the truck exploded, killing 19 American service members and injuring over 500 others.<sup>iii</sup> As with the Beirut incident, the Secretary of Defense commissioned an investigation into the incident. The resulting report, known as the Downing Report, found that the commander of the 4404<sup>th</sup> Wing (Provisional) failed to adequately protect his forces from terrorist attack.<sup>iv</sup>

In both of these instances the Department of Defense investigation found the military commanders responsible for the force protection measures taken to safeguard their



service members. The commanders were ultimately held accountable for failing to predict and protect against imminent attack.

### FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection is a sub-element of combat power. Combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership creates combat power.<sup>v</sup> Force protection along with health and welfare, safety and fratricide avoidance make up the element of protection.<sup>vi</sup> Today the definition of force protection has evolved to include programs designed to not only protect service members but also civilians, family members, facilities and equipment, "in all locations and situations."<sup>vii</sup> Further, the definition of force protection today includes the notion of "combating terrorism." Military commanders today are not only responsible for employing these four elements of combat power, but also for ensuring that an all-encompassing force protection posture is implemented.

Is it reasonable to expect military commanders today to have the training, foresight, equipment and resources to protect essentially everyone and everything in their command? Based on the findings and recommendation of the 1983 Beirut bombing and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, it is evident that our civilian and military leadership think so.

The bombing in Beirut brought about a change in military force protection and is the genesis of what today is considered "appropriate" force protection employment. The purpose of this monograph is to revisit the 1983 Beirut bombing to determine if military commanders today can gain valuable insights on the evolution of force protection and force protection issues. Additionally, this monograph will consider whether the Marine

Amphibious Unit (MAU) and Battalion Landing Team (BLT) commanders acted reasonably given the situation and circumstances in Beirut in 1983. Both external and internal factors related to the operation in Beirut will be analyzed. External factors include: the political situation, the civilian leadership's interpretation of the mission, and the importance of the perception of neutrality. Additional external factors include: the effect of non-organic (to the MAU) military escalation, cultural integration, and the compelling reasons for continuing the U.S. "presence" mission in Beirut. Internal factors include: military interpretations of the mission (at all levels), service ethos, unit morale, and perceived endstate or mission accomplishment. These external and internal factors will be used to define the operating environment that confronted the military commanders on the ground in Beirut.

Following the assessment of external and internal factors, a review of force protection measures used in Haiti and Bosnia will provide insight to the difficulties encountered in establishing force protection policies. Additional analysis will consider whether any of the lessons learned from revisiting the Beirut bombing might apply to Haiti, Bosnia, and future operations. The rest of this chapter will be used to establish definitions that will be used throughout the monograph.

### PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace Operations are considered a type of Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). Peace Operations consist of peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. Peace operations are conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.<sup>viii</sup> The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and U.S. policy form the guidelines for military participation in peace operations.

## PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations are a sub-category of peace operations. Peacekeeping operations are defined as "military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."<sup>x</sup> This definition is consistent with the current (1994) Army definition found in FM 100-23 Peace Operations. The ultimate goal of peacekeeping operations is to achieve long-term diplomatic settlements and to restore peaceful relations among the parties. Examples of some of the objectives of this type of operation are to facilitate the implementation of an agreement or to reduce or eliminate violence among disputing parties. Peacekeeping operation fundamentals include "firmness, impartiality, clarity of intention, anticipation, consent, integration and freedom of movement."<sup>x</sup> Of particular interest for this monograph is the statement that "... **the peacekeepers main function is to establish a presence** which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process."<sup>xi</sup> An example of a peacekeeping operation might be the separation of belligerents along a demarcation line and the monitoring of the line.

## PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Peace enforcement operations are defined as "the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."<sup>xii</sup> This definition is also aligned with the current Army definition. These operations occur in environments where conflict, violence, disorder and even chaos reign supreme. Although

these operations may require combat (under restrictive Rules Of Engagement (ROE)) they are not considered wars.<sup>xiii</sup> This type of operation is distinguished from peacekeeping operations based on the fact that the consent of the parties is not required and the military enters the environment with full combat capabilities. Fundamentals unique to the peace enforcement mission include "impartiality, restraint in the use of force, a goal of settlement rather than victory, the use of methods of coercion, and the presence of civilians."<sup>xiv</sup> An example of a recent peace enforcement operation was Operation Endeavor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

The military may participate in operations in support of diplomatic efforts in addition to peace operations. The focus of operations in support of diplomatic efforts is on establishing order before, during and after hostilities. The three sub-elements of operations in support of diplomatic efforts are preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building. In all three of these situations the focus is on the diplomatic effort, with the military assisting by providing military expertise (military to military and security relations), or assuming government functions as required.<sup>xv</sup>

#### PRESENCE AND INTERPOSITION

Two final terms require clarification. The first of those terms is presence. Although repeatedly tied to the concept of peace operations, the word is never defined, and cannot be found in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The importance of this word in 1983 and today cannot be overstated. Presence is defined by the dictionary as "The state or fact of being present," and "The immediate proximity in time and space."<sup>xvi</sup>

The second term frequently associated with peace operations is interposition. Like presence, interposition is currently not defined by the Department of Defense. The most commonly used and generally accepted definition is to impose a physical presence between the hostile parties. Benis Frank, while writing the definitive history of the Marine operation in Lebanon, associated the term presence with the international law concept of interposition. He defined interposition as "...the commonly accepted tenet in international law of 'interposition' which results when a major power provides military assistance in the form of troops at the request of a legally constituted and established government unable to protect foreign citizens and property."<sup>xvii</sup>

With these definitions in mind, a picture of the external and internal operating environment is required to correctly assess the situation in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983.

# Background

## History

The roots of most of the current ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts in Lebanon can be traced back to the time of the First Crusade, shortly after the first millenium. Religion provided a powerful catalyst, capitalizing on differences between the Islamic and Christian religions. France had accepted the role of protectorate of the Maronite Christians during the mid-seventeenth century.<sup>xviii</sup> After the first World War, France obtained a mandate over Lebanon and Syria from the League of Nations.<sup>xix</sup> Like many Middle Eastern countries, Lebanon was created by colonial powers. Its borders reflected the desires of the French to carve out a Greater Lebanon from Greater Syria. Lebanon's borders reflected neither natural nor national boundaries.

Volatile problems in Lebanon have escalated within the last 50 years. In 1943, the Free French restored a Lebanese constitution that had been suspended by the Vichy French. Key to the restoration of the constitution was an unwritten supplement called the National Pact. Essentially the National Pact stipulated the national boundaries, language (Arabic), freedom from foreign ties (with an "Arab face" presented to the world), and formally distributed (by type and number of parliamentary seats) power among the different religious communities.<sup>xx</sup> The founding of Israel in 1948 impacted the tenuous National Pact. This led to an influx of Palestinian refugees who aligned themselves with the Muslim population of Lebanon.

During the late 1950's, Lebanon's leader became one of two Arab leaders to subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Eisenhower Doctrine promised economic and military aid for any country wishing to protect itself from communism.<sup>xxi</sup> These pro-western

sentiments (against the backdrop of a growing Arabic population) led to a civil war and intervention in Lebanon by the United States in 1958. At the conclusion of the Six-Day War, Lebanon received tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank region.<sup>xxii</sup> The Palestinians were organized under the administration of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and began to mount attacks into Israel from southern Lebanon.

In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the Palestinian/Israeli problems escalated, seriously impacting Lebanese politics. The Christian majority-led Lebanese Army frequently clashed with Palestinian commandos operating in Lebanon. This led to strong protests from Arabic countries and eventually led to an agreement negotiated by Egypt between Lebanon and the PLO. The agreement allowed the PLO to administer refugee camps, establish armed units and posts inside them and hold certain transit routes in south Lebanon.<sup>xxiii</sup> In return, the PLO would respect Lebanese sovereignty. PLO headquarters were transferred from Amman, Jordan to Beirut, Lebanon in late 1970, which escalated tensions and attacks in both Lebanon and Israel. As a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, the rift between Lebanese Christians and Lebanese Muslims continued to expand. Additionally during 1973, the Muslim population grew to represent a majority in the country (54%).<sup>xxiv</sup>

In 1974, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) penetrated 80 kilometers into Lebanon in order to establish a buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Israelis also bombed the Palestinian camps Sabra and Shatila located in Beirut. These events helped escalate the power crisis in Lebanon that ultimately led to the 1975 Civil War. This Civil War continued through 1990. The major factor that plunged the country into this civil war

was the perception by the Maronite Christian leadership that the presence in Lebanon of the Palestinian commandos was a significant threat to Lebanese sovereignty.<sup>xxv</sup> Syria intervened in the civil war believing that a politically stable Lebanon would aid Syrian political stability. Many Syrians also believed that Lebanon should be returned to Syria creating a return to a Greater Syria (which had been fractured by French colonialists). Throughout the 1970's up through 1982 Syrian forces remained in Lebanon in large numbers.<sup>xxvi</sup> Numerous outbreaks of violence occurred between Israel and Lebanon during this period. 6,000 United Nations forces (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, UNIFIL) were deployed to Lebanon to separate the combatants. This action did little to prevent continued escalation of violence between Syrian forces located in Lebanon and the IDF. During this time, as in the past, Israel openly and significantly supported the Maronite Christians in Lebanon.

On June 6, 1982, the IDF launched an attack into Lebanon, "Operation Peace for Galilee." Originally the Israeli Cabinet imposed strict limits on the operation. The IDF was to advance no more than 40 kilometers, the operation was to last only 24 hours, Beirut was not to be approached and Syrian forces were not to be engaged.<sup>xxvii</sup> Ultimately the IDF would violate all of these established conditions, causing the United States to get involved again.

It is important to recognize that many of the factors and conditions that affected the United States intervention in Beirut from 1982-1984 had direct links to Lebanon's past. Many of the religious groups and much of the same territory would again be involved in armed conflict.



## United States Foreign Policy

In order to avoid an Israeli-Syrian war, a cease-fire went into effect on 11 June 1982. The IDF had significantly weakened PLO forces and continued to locate and destroy PLO remnants. On July 16, 1982, Saudi Arabia and Syria approached the United States for help in arranging a PLO withdrawal from Beirut. The purpose of this move was to prevent the eradication of the PLO as a political and military force.<sup>xxviii</sup> During this time Saudi Arabia maintained a pro-western posture while the Syrians were aligned with the Soviet Union. These two separate Arab nations (supported by opposing superpowers) felt it necessary to join in a request to essentially save the PLO from extinction. Despite the PLO's controversial methods, many in the United States believed that the PLO's leader Chairman Arafat was essential in any future negotiations with the Palestinians.

President Reagan was concerned about the stability of the region and also about the spread of the Soviet influence in the Middle East. The possibility of an Israeli-Syrian conflict could create tension on an international level. Many felt that progress toward a peaceful solution in Lebanon would contribute to a broader Arab-Israeli peace process.<sup>xxix</sup> The President, Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) developed three reasons for the U.S. intervention in Lebanon. The first reason was that Lebanon fit into the overall framework of the Middle East, which in turn was a region of vital U.S. and international strategic and economic importance. The second reason was that the Middle East remained a region of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union. The final reason was the United States' strong commitment to Israeli security.<sup>xxx</sup>

The Reagan administration struggled to negotiate an agreement between the combatants throughout the summer of 1982. Special Envoy Philip Habib traveled extensively and worked hard to solidify terms and conditions between the parties. During the negotiations, however, both Israel and the PLO would escalate and disrupt the negotiations. Frustrated by the protracted negotiations, President Reagan forced an ultimatum on the parties in August of 1982, which resulted in two conditions. The first condition was the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon to eight independent states (Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, North and South Yemen, Syria, Sudan and Algeria). The second condition required the withdrawal of foreign forces and the establishment of a sovereign government in Lebanon.<sup>xxxix</sup> The rationale behind this ultimatum was that these conditions would encourage discussion on the issue of Palestinian autonomy and ultimately lead to successful dialogue on other Arab-Israeli issues.

To fulfil these conditions, a neutral multi-national peacekeeping force was established to oversee the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon. Satisfying the second condition hinged on the ability of the Lebanese to develop a stable and secure government. In "principle" both Syria and Israel agreed to withdraw their forces from Lebanon once the Lebanese had fulfilled the internal stability and security requirement.<sup>xxxix</sup> President Reagan was convinced that the United States could assist the Lebanese in establishing a secure, stable environment. The President also announced that the United States would contribute 800 U. S. Marines to the multi-national peacekeeping effort. While the details of the August agreement were hammered out, many significant internal issues confronted the Reagan administration. President Reagan was caught between opposing viewpoints from Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz.

Weinberger, along with General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) opposed putting the Marines in Lebanon.<sup>xxxiii</sup> They felt that the force was too small to fight if required, and that they were vulnerable to acts of terrorism and other provocations.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Shultz and Habib felt that the Marine presence would not only facilitate the safe escort of the PLO out of the country, but also bolster the authority of the government in Lebanon and ultimately lend stability to the region.<sup>xxxv</sup> The American public sided with Weinberger, and marginally disapproved of the Marine presence. President Reagan's compromise to the debate on the use of force in the region was that the Marines would only deploy to Lebanon for 30 days.

The composition of the peacekeeping force had to be determined. Neither the Lebanese, PLO nor Israelis would accept a UN force. The solution was a Multi-National Force (MNF) consisting of U.S., French and Italian forces. The MNF had no centralized commander, but instead would be linked together through the use of liaison officers.

The Marines were to deploy as part of the MNF. The goal of the operation was the successful evacuation of all PLO personnel from Beirut. This included PLO Chairman Arafat. Military commanders determined that the French would go into Beirut first, followed by the Marines, and finally the Italians. A force cap was established by Special Envoy Habib on the number of forces allowed to enter Beirut. Limits were set at 800 French, 800 Marines, and 400 Italians.<sup>xxxvi</sup> The French entered the city first, followed by the Marines on 25 August 1982 and the Italians. Although some tense moments did occur during the evacuation, the operation was considered a significant success. Over 8,000 personnel were evacuated by ship and over 6,000 evacuated by land.<sup>xxxvii</sup> The evacuation was essentially complete by September 3, 1982. The Marines began back

loading on amphibious shipping on September 9, and withdrew from the area on the 10<sup>th</sup>. The Marines had accomplished their mission in approximately two weeks, and based on the compromise by President Reagan were withdrawn well before their 30-day limit. This relatively quick withdrawal of the Marines came as a surprise to the French, Italians and Lebanese.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

Schultz and Habib wanted the Marines to stay in Beirut longer. Weinberger, however, made compelling arguments about why the Marines should be withdrawn immediately after the evacuation of the PLO. Weinberger based his argument on four points. The first was that the Marines had accomplished their mission of evacuating the PLO. Second, Weinberger felt that the solution to Lebanon's domestic problems was not something that the small Marine force was capable of, or trained to do. Third, Weinberger felt that the domestic unrest in Lebanon was endemic, and that unless the U. S. deployed a significant military force to the region, little could be done to mitigate risk for service members. Finally, Weinberger capitalized on the fact that President Reagan had explicitly told Congress that the Marines were not in Lebanon to fight and that they would be immediately withdrawn if the environment had turned hostile.<sup>xxxix</sup> Ultimately, Weinberger was more persuasive than Schultz and Habib. The administration turned away from the military option, and sought to resolve the conflict through diplomatic, political and economic means.

The stability sought by moving the PLO out of Lebanon failed to develop. The President of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated four days after the departure of the Marines. Speculation arose that the assassination had been conducted with Syrian collaboration. The Israelis, fearing renewed threats to their security as a result of the

assassination, moved immediately back into positions around Beirut. The Israelis also allowed Lebanese Phalangist forces to enter two Palestinian camps, Sabra and Shatila (both located in an area controlled by the Israelis in Beirut). Over the next several days, over 700 Palestinian men, women, and children were massacred in the camps.<sup>x1</sup> The U.S had previously guaranteed the Palestinians' protection and was diplomatically embarrassed by the incident.

With the U.S. and President Reagan's credibility on the line, the decision was made to re-deploy the Marines to Beirut. President Reagan had outlined four goals prior to the MNF 1 deployment. These four goals were reiterated again to Special Envoy Habib on September 8.<sup>xli</sup> Essentially the goals called for the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, restoration of a stable Lebanese government in charge of its own country, removal of all threats to Israel from Lebanon, and a call for all parties in Lebanon to maintain a cease fire so that diplomacy could succeed.<sup>xlii</sup> These goals served as the foundation for the MNF 2 deployment. Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the JCS protested against sending the Marines back to Beirut.

On September 20, 1982, President Reagan announced that U.S. Marines would again participate as members of a MNF in Lebanon.<sup>xliii</sup> There were negotiations about the size and disposition of the force. UN forces were again rejected and a force of 15,000 was rejected. The MNF consisting of U.S., French, and Italians was again agreed upon. The size of the MNF forces would increase slightly (the Marines would be allowed 1200 men ashore, based on an estimate of what President Reagan thought was in a MAU).<sup>xliv</sup> On September 25 1982, the U.S. formally responded to a request by the Lebanese government for participation of U.S. forces in a MNF.<sup>xlv</sup>

Coming up with a mission statement for the Marine forces that corresponded to the goals outlined by the President was difficult. The draft mission statement was closely coordinated between the JCS, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).<sup>xlvi</sup> The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral James D. Watkins told a congressional committee, "We are not a peacekeeping mission...Peacekeeping could well be a combat operation. This is not a combat operation."<sup>xlvii</sup> In fact, the term peacekeeping was never used in the Lebanese request for assistance, the MNF mandate or the JCS Alert Order.<sup>xlviii</sup> The mission statement was provided by JCS Alert Order to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) on September 23 1982. It stated:

To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to conduct retrograde operations as required.<sup>xlix</sup>

The Marines were not going into Beirut to engage in combat. If hostilities did occur the Marines were to be pulled from Beirut to amphibious shipping offshore. The Marines were not supposed to fight alongside or aid the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), nor were they to impose or police a cease-fire.<sup>l</sup> After disseminating the mission statement down the chain of command, USCINCEUR provided no amplification of the statement. As a result, perceptual differences arose about the precise meanings of key terminology.<sup>li</sup>

The administration also struggled over the duration of the Marine deployment. Congress was becoming extremely nervous over the prospect of a long-term presence in

Beirut, as well as the potential for military escalation of the situation. The U.S. intervention in Vietnam was still very fresh on many politicians' minds. This, combined with the ongoing concern expressed by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, led to careful scrutiny of the Beirut mission. The military chain of command estimated the time ashore to be 60 days.<sup>lii</sup> The military was focusing (and struggling) with the "presence" mission, while the politicians were focusing on the "environment" portion of the mission statement. The Deputy Commander in Chief (DCINC) of USEUCOM, General W.T. Smith, was concerned about the mission and felt that a mission of "presence" would not and could not prevent another situation like the massacres in Sabra and Shatila. If a massacre did occur, the Marines could not intervene under the guise of their mission.<sup>liii</sup>

Although politicians and military leaders believed that there might be interfactional Arab fighting or Arab-Israeli conflict, they did not foresee that the environment could be hostile to the MNF. This was partly based on the fact that all Lebanese factions had given assurances that they would refrain from hostilities and that they would not interfere with the MNF.<sup>liv</sup> The notion of neutrality and impartiality were very important to the success of the mission. These had been critical in the successful evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon. To accomplish the mission of presence, the military commanders knew that they could not show favoritism to organizations. Politicians understood this as well. This was reflected in the positioning and in the posture that the Marines would take during MNF 2. "... the military mission boiled down to a symbolic presence designed to alter the psychology of confrontation and fear then rampant in Beirut."<sup>lv</sup>

The positioning of the MNF in Beirut was a significant political event. The French had ties to Lebanon dating back hundreds of years and were associated with the Maronite

Christians. The French occupied the metropolitan area in northwestern Beirut. The Italians, sympathetic to the Palestinians, occupied the south central portion of Beirut. The U.S. was left with the southern, less built-up area of Beirut near the Beirut International Airport. This suited the U.S. politicians, as the Marines would be in a less densely populated area while also ensuring that the airport would remain open (an important symbolic international gesture). Additionally the airport was close to the shoreline which would allow easy ingress and egress for the Marines if required. Although the Marines' position had political appeal, it was tactically deficient. The Marines' position was very close to positions of the IDF, in low flat ground around the airport. This low terrain was not considered good military terrain, as it was difficult to defend against the surrounding high ground. The Marine position did have a positive effect on the Lebanese and the Moslem population because many saw the Marine position as a buffer between them and the IDF. <sup>lvi</sup>

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of September, President Reagan announced that the Marines would stay in Beirut until all Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces were out of not only Beirut, but also the country of Lebanon. On the 29<sup>th</sup> in an address to congress, the President announced that there was no expectation or intention to involve the Marines in hostilities. <sup>lvii</sup> After about a month ashore, the plans for an early withdrawal of the Marines were put on hold. Plans were being developed in Washington to replace the Marines with a 15,000 man MNF that would be positioned as soon as the Israelis and Syrians withdrew.

After 60 days of deployment, several significant issues were identified. Many politicians (and Lebanese governmental officials) felt that the Marines were an available untapped asset that could be used to do more than merely providing "presence."



Additionally, the MNF command structure had remained largely as it had during MNF 1. Essentially there was no single commander directing the MNF actions. Each participant provided liaison officers to the others and worked coordination through them. For the Marines, this meant that they only had to coordinate actions with other members of the MNF. The Marines actions in Beirut were directly linked to U.S. foreign policy goals. This link could potentially impact the portrayal of neutrality by the Marine forces. Finally, military and diplomatic efforts were conducted down parallel, independent lines. The military had very little input in the developing political situation in Lebanon.<sup>lviii</sup> This is not to say that the Marines should have had direct access to influence politics, but rather that the military should be employed in accordance with political goals. Integration between the diplomats and military leaders is required and this was not occurring in Lebanon in 1982.

As a consequence of the perception of the underutilization of the Marines in Beirut, a plan was developed to employ them. After the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, his brother Amin Gemayel became president. His strategy was to develop a 30,000-man force to help maintain control of the new government. Gemayel re-established the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in order to defend the central government, maintain law and order, and to provide a buffer force between the Israelis. A condition of Israeli withdrawal was a stable Lebanese government. The development and deployment of the LAF would satisfy that condition. Over the next several months the Marines would become involved in the training of the LAF.

Since the Marines' arrival in support of MNF 2, the U.S. ties with Israel had been strained. The U.S. was trying very hard to maintain a neutral presence in support of the

overall diplomatic process. The Israelis thought that the loyalty of the U.S. should be in support of Israeli military and political objectives in the region. As a result, there was tense contact between the Marines and the IDF. Contributing to this strain was the bombing of an Israeli military headquarters in November of 1982. The truck bomb left 89 dead and heightened tensions between the Israelis and the Arabs.<sup>lix</sup> The U.S. needed Israeli cooperation in order to facilitate peace in the region. The IDF would have a significant impact on whether the peace process would move forward in Lebanon or remain static. The Israelis did not want to give ground or lose face in the region. The U.S., on the other hand, wanted to move the process along as quickly as possible.

There were numerous contacts with the IDF designed to provoke retaliatory responses from the Marines. In January 1983, as a result of six flagrant harassment incidents of U.S. personnel and the perception that the Israelis were not contributing enough to move the peace process, the U.S. restricted the sale of F-16s to Israel.<sup>lx</sup> President Reagan's foreign policy plan in the region was beginning to unravel due to Israeli inflexibility.

The Arabs in the region were not contributing to the forward progress of the peace process either. The Lebanese engaged in secret negotiations with the Israelis without the knowledge of the U.S. The Syrians also maintained their military positions in Lebanon awaiting Israeli moves. The PLO, still represented in Lebanon, flatly rejected U.S. peace proposals in March and April, effectively halting the Reagan peace plan.

By the spring of 1983, it was clear that the U.S. foreign policy in the region had stalled. The U.S. public was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the deployment of the Marines. Although the Marines were still on the ground (extending their anticipated 60-day deployment), it was clear that although they only provided a visual

presence to the U.S. commitment. The Marines were in Beirut to promote a political outcome, however, they could not effect that outcome with traditional decisive military victory. "It was clear to most Americans that neither the Marines nor their MNF or LAF allies would be able to compel the reconciliation of Lebanese difference or the withdrawal of Israeli or Syrian forces."<sup>lxi</sup>

Despite the best intentions of President Reagan, the dynamics of personality and politics of the region did not allow an easy solution. Schultz and Weinberger never agreed to the same approach to a problem.<sup>lxii</sup> This lack of consensus had a significant impact and increased the disparities between the "parallel and independent" approaches by the diplomats and the military. "In the absence of consensus, the U.S. military was determined to be independent structurally and functionally from the Special Negotiator, from the Secretary of State, and from the scheme of diplomatic maneuver that Schultz was attempting to initiate."<sup>lxiii</sup>

After posturing by the U.S. and Israel, the U.S. decided to lift the sanctions (the sale of F-16's) imposed on the Israelis. This had an immediate impact on the progress of the negotiations. Syria, in demonstrations against the lifting of sanctions, stirred the Lebanese Moslems by firing on Israeli jets and barring future negotiations with Special Envoy Habib. Despite these efforts, the parties agree to an Accord on May 17, 1983. Both the Israelis and the Syrians were deliberately slow on fulfilling provisions of the Accord (which required them to withdraw from Lebanon), rendering the Accord essentially ineffective. Throughout July, numerous confrontations occurred between Syria and Israel in Lebanon, with little action to satisfy the Accord.

Once the Accord was signed, Secretary of State Schultz took a hands-off role in the region. During the same time, Secretary of Defense Weinberger continued to play an active role on strategic military issues with Israel and moderate Arabs in the region. In July, President Gemayel requested and received approval for increased military hardware and assistance. General Vessey traveled to Beirut to assess the progress being made on the training of the LAF and to assess the situation with the Marines in Beirut. As a result of his visit, General Vessey recommended that an artillery tracking radar be deployed to Beirut to support the Marines in their defensive positions.

Throughout the summer, the situation in Beirut was handled by independent and uncoordinated actions. The Special Negotiators (Robert MacFarlane had replaced Habib) participated in shuttle diplomacy. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut worked to foster Lebanese domestic and military recovery. The Marines participated in a "neutral" MNF, continuing their presence mission. No single U.S. military or political leader (or organization) was assigned the task of orchestrating the U.S. foreign policy and military effort in Beirut.<sup>lxiv</sup>

This lack of focused U.S. effort combined with heightened Arab-Israeli and internal Arab disputes led to increasing volatility. The new Special Envoy MacFarlane preferred a more active U.S. military presence in Beirut. He felt (as did Gemayel) that U.S. presence and neutrality would not be sufficiently demonstrative to lead to Lebanese stability. By September it was clear that the Marines had become a target of many of the factions in Beirut. By mid-September the newly trained (by U.S. Marines) LAF was engaged in a fight for its very existence. President Reagan was pressured by MacFarlane and others to sign National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 103. Essentially this

directive allowed the Marines to take a more active and aggressive military role in Beirut. The document also recognized the LAF defense of the Suq Al Gharb region as "vital" to the defense of the Marines, which in turn made it appropriate for military assets offshore (6<sup>th</sup> Fleet) to strike in support of the LAF.<sup>lxv</sup> NSDD 103 actually served to formally negate the neutral presence mission that the Marines had initially embarked upon. Secretary of State Schultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger continued to disagree on policy in Lebanon. Weinberger did recognize that the U.S. military escalation in the region could have dire consequences to the Marines on the ground, and began making plans for the withdrawal of the Marines.<sup>lxvi</sup> The U.S. actions also placed the other MNF forces in compromised positions. The British had joined the MNF with a force of about 100 personnel. The British and Italians had not joined the MNF to support the Gemayel government or to promote U.S. regional objectives.<sup>lxvii</sup>

Despite the negotiation of a cease-fire at the end of September 1983, the situation in Beirut remained tense. The U.S. had changed its position from that of neutral presence to one of direct military support for the Lebanese government. The mission for the Marines, however, remained unchanged. Both the military mission and foreign policy goals, however, would change as a result of the October bombing of the Marine barracks.

## USMC Deployment

Beginning in 1982, the Marines made three separate deployments to Beirut, Lebanon. The first deployment was June 24, 1982 to the port of Juniyah, five miles northeast of Beirut. This deployment was a result of the increase in intensity of the fighting in southern Beirut. The purpose of the deployment was to evacuate American civilians and foreign nationals from the hostile combat environment. The 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) successfully evacuated 580 civilians from the city.<sup>lxviii</sup>

The second deployment occurred approximately two months later, from 25 August to 10 September 1982. The purpose of this deployment for the Marines and the MNF was the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut and Lebanon. The 32d MAU, the same unit that had performed the evacuation of civilians in June was chosen to execute this mission. The 32d MAU was built around a ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team Second Battalion Eighth Marines (BLT 2/8), and an aviation combat element consisting of heavy, medium utility and attack helicopters. The MAU also contained a MAU Service Support Group (MSSG) to provide logistic support, a tank platoon, an artillery battery, and an Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV, amtrac) platoon. Colonel James M. Mead commanded the MAU and the BLT was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Johnston and consisted of 1,746 Marines and 78 naval personnel.<sup>lxix</sup>

In early August, Special Envoy Habib requested a military liaison team to advise him on military matters. This team was dispatched, and contained representatives from the 32d MAU. French, Italian, U.S. military liaison teams along with Special Envoy Habib established the conditions for MNF 1 to enter Beirut and evacuate members of the PLO.

The mission given the Marines was to support Habib and the MNF in evacuating PLO members from the Beirut area, as well as occupying and securing the port of Beirut in conjunction with the LAF. The Marines were to be prepared to withdraw on order, and did so on the 10<sup>th</sup> of September.<sup>lxx</sup>

After the departure of the Marines, the situation in Beirut turned violent. By the 29<sup>th</sup> of September the MNF had been reconstituted and Marines were again deploying to Beirut. The size of the MNF 2 was larger than that of MNF 1. The force initially consisted of 1200 Marines, 1600 French and 1400 Italians. Over the course of the deployment the numbers would increase and the British would send in a force of 100 to assist in the operation.<sup>lxxi</sup>

Colonel Mead and his 32d MAU led the Marines again in Beirut. Colonel Mead and his staff struggled with the assigned mission of "presence." The original mandate for the MNF was, "...to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area."<sup>lxxii</sup> It is clear that the theme of presence found in the JCS Alert Order had origins in the MNF mandate. From these sources, Colonel Mead and his staff developed a mission statement of their own. This mission statement guided the actions of the 32d MAU over the course of their deployment. The 32d MAU interpreted their mission as: "...to provide a presence in Beirut, that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese Government to regain control of their capital."<sup>lxxiii</sup> Colonel Mead established hasty defensive positions collocated with the LAF and began foot and motorized patrols in West Beirut.

Colonel Mead had little choice in positioning his Marines. Politicians and senior military officials at the Pentagon chose the terrain he would occupy. The airport was close to the shoreline, facilitating the ingress and egress of the Marines. BIA had symbolic appeal and demonstrated to the international community that the situation in Beirut was stabilizing. The Marines were not given a mission to defend the airport, however they could defend themselves if required. Militarily, BIA occupied low ground, making it vulnerable to attack. This positioning bothered many military leaders but some felt that this vulnerability would reinforce the fact that the Marines were not in Beirut to fight.<sup>lxxiv</sup> Colonel Mead submitted two requests to occupy the high ground 5 kilometers east of the airport where the terrain was more tactically sound. The politicians did not support his initial request, and Special Envoy Habib turned down the second request.<sup>lxxv</sup>

Consequently Colonel Mead located most of the MAU in the administrative portion of the airport. BAI was an active airport which two weeks prior to the October bombing serviced 35 flights and 2,400 passengers. Approximately 1,000 civilians were employed at the airport and over 3,000 civilian and military vehicles entered and departed the airport every day.<sup>lxxvi</sup> Colonel Mead concentrated his MAU, BLT and MSSG command posts in the airport. At the time, he felt "the threat of serious artillery or ground attack was not great." During this deployment the major threats confronting Colonel Mead were the threat of individual acts of terrorism and a significant number of unexploded munitions. The building designated BLT command post "particularly impressed Mead." This building had served PLO and Syrian forces and had also been an Israeli field hospital during Operation Peace for Galilee.<sup>lxxvii</sup>



Unlike MNF 1, there was no principal figure coordinating and providing direction for MNF 2. The MNF's ran their operations independently with coordination from their parent governments. The MNF forces did meet on a regular basis to exchange information and formulate combined policies.<sup>lxxviii</sup> The Marines received their instructions through long chain of command. Decisions on positioning, movements of rifle companies and use of force all had to be approved through the chain of command prior to execution. The chain was as follows:

- Battalion Landing Team CO
- Marine Amphibious Unit CO (CTF 62)
- Commander, Carrier Task Force, Lebanon (CTF 61)
- Commander, Carrier Battle Group
- Commander Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT)
- Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces in Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR)
- Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR)<sup>lxxix</sup>

This chain of command perpetuated delays through intermediate staff work and time delay. The British, French and Italians were controlled through their chains of command by direct radio link to their chief executives and defense ministries, which shortened response time during periods of rapidly changing conditions.<sup>lxxx</sup>

On 3 November 1982 the 32d MAU and Colonel Mead withdrew from Beirut, replaced by the 24<sup>th</sup> MAU under Colonel Stokes. During the first deployment as part of MNF 2 only one Marine was killed and three were wounded while clearing unexploded ordnance.<sup>lxxxii</sup> This first deployment was considered successful in terms of maintaining neutrality and impartiality. Interaction with the LAF was deliberately kept to a

minimum. The 24 MAU arrived under expanded mission orders (the third change to the original mission statement) which included providing limited support to the LAF and providing patrols to east Beirut (a Christian stronghold).<sup>lxxxii</sup>

On 1 November a car bomb exploded near Black Beach (an area controlled by the Marines). Little damage occurred and the 24 MAU intelligence officer rated the terrorist attack as "clumsy and amateurish."<sup>lxxxiii</sup> Under the guise of the expanded mission statement Colonel Stokes began foot patrols through Shiite and Amal controlled areas and jeep patrols through the Phalange-controlled areas of East Beirut. These patrols served to relax tensions in the area and were in keeping with the understood mission of "presence." Unlike Colonel Mead, Colonel Stokes brought his tank platoon and howitzer battery ashore.<sup>lxxxiv</sup>

The expanded mission of assisting the LAF had roots in the Bartlett Report. General Bartlett and a team of military specialists were ordered to go to Lebanon to assess the status of the Lebanese military. On 1 November they recommended that a major U.S. effort take place to rebuild the LAF. The LAF was an ineffective force composed primarily of Christians (and was perceived to be an instrument of Christian interests).<sup>lxxxv</sup> Despite the fact that most U.S. military commanders believed that contact with the LAF should be minimal, the U.S. publicly began military financial aid to the LAF. Although under the U.S. MNF mandate the Marines were to "operate in close coordination with the LAF," the interpreted mission of presence called for U.S. MNF neutrality and impartiality. Throughout December 1982 and January 1983, the Marines increased their interaction with the LAF, and established a formal training program with the LAF.

Military leaders at USEUCOM and the JCS opposed greater involvement with the LAF, but were overruled.<sup>lxxxvi</sup>

Military relations with most factions in Beirut in January were good. The Marines did, however, have numerous problems with the Israelis. The problems culminated in a highly publicized account in February when Captain Charles B. Johnson drew his pistol in a highly publicized account, to prevent Israeli tanks from penetrating MNF lines. This incident prompted Colonel Stokes to coordinate with Israeli commanders to prevent these volatile situations from happening again. In February, Colonel Mead (his third deployment to Beirut) and 22 MAU replaced Colonel Stokes and 24 MAU. Colonel Stokes and 24 MAU had not sustained any casualties during their deployment.<sup>lxxxvii</sup>

Throughout the months of March and April 1983, terrorist attacks on Marines increased, resulting in Marine casualties. Colonel Mead modified his security posture by placing snipers on rooftops, improving defenses and allowing Marines to chamber live ammunition while on patrol.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> On April 18, the U.S. Embassy was car-bombed killing 57 (17 of which were Americans)<sup>lxxxix</sup> This action forced Colonel Mead to deploy a reinforced rifle company to secure the new Embassy site. The attack on the Embassy changed the original mission for the forth and final time. The Marines were also to provide external security for the Embassy in Beirut. <sup>xc</sup>The Rules Of Engagement (ROE) at the new Embassy site differed from the ROE in place at BIA. On 28 April a car containing two drunks careened toward the new Embassy site and was fired upon by the Marines and halted.<sup>xc</sup> Despite the escalation, Colonel Mead felt that 22 MAU had the situation under control. In a Situation Report dated 24 April he stated "...we are

continuing to maintain a proper balance between our security and our presence/peacekeeping mission."<sup>xcii</sup>

The escalation of the situation through May (which included increased indirect fire on and near BIA) prompted senior military leaders to reassess the Marines' mission, disposition and operational requirements. This assessment was done through military channels without interface or knowledge of what the diplomats considered appropriate if the situation deteriorated further.<sup>xciii</sup> 22 MAU was replaced by 24 MAU under Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty at the end of May. Colonel Geraghty occupied the same buildings that 22 MAU had occupied. The threat assessment included heavy and light artillery, rocket fire, and sniper fire. The steel-reinforced concrete building was determined to provide the best protection from these threats.<sup>xciv</sup> Colonel Geraghty contributed to the mission of presence by maintaining an air of "normalcy" for his Marines. He organized movies, barbecues, and sporting events with other MNF forces.

Colonel Geraghty struggled to moderate presence with security throughout the summer as diplomatic actions stalled and the violence in Beirut escalated. He made numerous requests to increase the strength of his BLT to include at least one if not more (as the situation dictated) infantry companies. These requests were denied.<sup>xcv</sup> The Marines did receive Army Counter Mortar Radar (CMR) support to assist in locating threat indirect fire systems. On the 7<sup>th</sup> of August the French and Italians announced that they would bolster their MNF forces to 2,200 men.<sup>xcvi</sup> On the 28<sup>th</sup> of August Israeli forces departed (unexpectedly) areas they had occupied in Christian East Beirut and the Shouf Mountains. The resulting power vacuum resulted in an immediate escalation of hostilities between various factions. This escalation would involve the Marines.

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of August the Marines received numerous casualties and over 100 rounds of indirect fire beginning a month of involvement in combat operations. On the 31<sup>st</sup> of August Colonel Geraghty closed vulnerable security posts (two had come under intense fire on the 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of August), and suspended security patrols.<sup>xcvii</sup> In turn USEUCOM suspended the requirement for foot patrols as well. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of September Druze leader Jumblatt declared that the Marines were enemy forces. In September the Marines became directly involved in supporting the LAF in the Suq Al Gharb. The local Marine and Naval commanders felt that the fighting in support of the LAF at Suq Al Gharb would provoke retaliation on the Marines at BIA. They also felt that the Marines were not equipped or manned to defend against such attacks.<sup>xcviii</sup>

Throughout August and September Colonel Geraghty came under great pressure from General Stiner (military liaison to the Special Negotiator and LAF) to liberalize his policy on when to assist the LAF with Marine firepower. One of the conditions of NSDD 103 placed the responsibility of clearing fires on Colonel Geraghty. Colonel Geraghty knew that escalation by the Marines could potentially bring retaliation and therefore was reluctant to approve General Stiner's requests. General Stiner was in turn receiving direct pleas from the Lebanese government to increase the amount of U.S. Military participation. Colonel Geraghty reluctantly approved the use of Marine firepower and 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet firepower (naval gunfire and naval aviation) to support the LAF fight.<sup>xcix</sup>

A cease-fire was negotiated at the end of September. Tensions in the area, however, remained high. Violations of the cease-fire occurred regularly. Terrorist attacks also increased in regularity, prompting calls for the LAF to do more for MNF security.<sup>c</sup> The Marines responded to the attacks with a "sniping war" and had 4 kills by 15 October.<sup>ci</sup>

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of October Colonel Geraghty became the victim of a car bomb terrorist attack. While riding along with a routine supply convoy a remote -controlled car bomb exploded injuring 4 Marines.<sup>cii</sup> No special precautions were taken as a result of the car bomb. The perception was that the headquarters building was so well constructed that a car bomb would not be able to destroy the building.<sup>ciii</sup> The Marines of 24 MAU had begun preparations for their relief with 22 MAU in mid-November. Preparations were being made for the retrograde of equipment and vehicles for backload on amphibious shipping. In the days before the bombing, the situation around BIA was relatively quiet. On the 22d of October the Marines enjoyed an USO show at the BLT headquarters building, and on the 23d they were to have a barbecue with members of the French MNF. The barbecue would never take place. On the 23d both the Marines and the French would be subject to bombing attacks resulting in 296 killed and 87 wounded.<sup>civ</sup>

## **Analysis**

Extremely complex external and internal factors affected the Marine deployment to Beirut. Many of these external and internal factors have re-surfaced in the recent military missions to Haiti and Bosnia. Analysis of the factors, and comparison to the Haiti and Bosnia deployments will provide valuable insight for military commanders participating in SASO missions in the future.

The military commander on the ground in Beirut, Colonel Geraghty, directly shouldered the burden of numerous external factors. These were factors that were imposed upon him, forcing him to react and mitigate their effects. These external factors include: the political situation in the U.S. and Lebanon (including the compelling reasons for the continuation of the mission), the civilian leadership's interpretation of the mission, the importance of impartiality and neutrality, the effects of "non-organic" force escalation, and the aspect of cultural integration.

The political situation in the U.S. and in Lebanon was extremely complex. The Reagan administration struggled throughout the deployment to come up with a strategy for Lebanon. The effects of the Weinberger/Schultz disagreement on policy would directly impact the Marines on the ground. President Reagan knew that he wanted to act to show U.S. resolve in the region. The method of accomplishing that mission was open to interpretation. Instead of fully supporting Weinberger or Schultz, President Reagan mitigated the debate, compromising on each of their plans at key crossroads. Disparity in viewpoints meant that the Department of Defense and the military had a significantly

different approach to the problem relative to the diplomats working in the Department of State. Additionally, the different agencies involved had different approaches to the problem. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Special Envoy to Lebanon, Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) and Marines all had separate agendas and independent decision making channels.<sup>cv</sup> This had an impact on Colonel Geraghty in Beirut. Throughout the deployment, none of the Special Envoys ever met with the USEUCOM staff and likewise the USEUCOM staff never met with them.<sup>cvi</sup> The lack of shared DOD/DOS vision for success led Colonel Geraghty to conduct his own interpretation of higher intent. Colonel Geraghty had to meet with the MNF commanders, the U.S. Ambassador, the Special Envoy, the TF 61 commander, the OMC commander, and others. Additionally he had an emergency line to the Israelis and to General Tannous of the LAF.<sup>cvi</sup> Clearly Colonel Geraghty received conflicting information and guidance from these different sources.

Even the military chain of command was convoluted. The JCS would never establish a separate headquarters to work directly with the Special Envoy.<sup>cvi</sup> There was no doubt that Colonel Geraghty's chain of command ran through the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet and up through USEUCOM. Another military officer was assigned to the area as well. Brigadier General Stiner (USA) was appointed to work with the OMC, the LAF and the Special Envoy. "...General Stiner (not the MNF) was authorized and expected to keep General Vessey and Secretary of Defense Weinberger informed of the military situation as it evolved."<sup>cix</sup> Despite the fact that all fires had to be cleared by Colonel Geraghty, General Stiner would unrelentingly pressure Colonel Geraghty as to when and where he should deliver fires.<sup>cx</sup>



Although unified in purpose, the members of the MNF were also not unified by command. The issue of not having a central figure orchestrating the overall actions of the MNF would impact its effectiveness. This problem had roots all the way back to the MNF 1 deployment, when the French and Italians were "surprised" that the Marines departed the area after only two weeks. Participants in the MNF had their own agenda and objectives for the deployment. Better overall coordination and control within the MNF could have only made the situation on the ground in Lebanon better. Coordination did occur between military units, however a central figure coordinating the entire military operation on the ground would have provided an additional venue for analysis of and appropriate change to the mission.

Along with the lack of unified vision was the lack of unified understanding of the mission. The mission was interpreted differently by the diplomats and the military. The consensus among the diplomats was that the U.S. MNF deployed to Beirut to create an "environment" in which the LAF could operate to promote stability and order in Beirut and (ultimately) Lebanon. The military, on the other hand, felt that they were in Beirut only to provide a "presence," an impartial "showing of the flag" that would demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment in Beirut, Lebanon and the Middle East. The mission statement over-emphasized the capabilities of the LAF and Lebanese government. Additionally it never addressed what would take place if the situation escalated, and force was required.<sup>cxii</sup> The perceived differences in the words "environment" and "presence" became more and more significant as the operation progressed.

Although the mission statement was modified four times, amplification, clarification or guidance was never issued down through the chain of command. The ambiguity of the

mission statement led to individual commanders interpreting the mission differently as different MAU's rotated through Beirut. Colonel Geraghty would interpret the term presence differently from his predecessors. Colonel Geraghty believed that the Marines were in Beirut as an expeditionary force. As such, they were not there to build permanent structures and harden positions. He felt that the presence of naval assets offshore throughout the operation was an indication of the expeditionary mission.<sup>cxii</sup>

Additionally, as the environment in Beirut changed and the fighting escalated, the mission statement remained unchanged. By September of 1983 all of the original premises of the original mission statement were no longer valid (presence mission, withdrawal if situation escalates, LAF would provide security for the MNF, 60 day mission).<sup>cxiii</sup> For Colonel Geraghty, the mission of presence implied neutrality and impartiality, and these would become his defense. In essence, presence would become defense.<sup>cxiv</sup> For Colonel Geraghty, his interpretation would drive his force protection posture and impartiality and neutrality would reign supreme for him. The neutrality and impartiality of the Marines was largely a condition that they could not control. Despite the fact that the Marines recognized this importance and strove to maintain neutrality, conditions would continually change that would compromise that neutrality.

Initially the Marines maintained little contact with the LAF, however the contact would increase throughout the deployment, culminating in direct military support from the Marines to assist the LAF in their fight around Suq Al Gharb. This support to the LAF compromised Marine neutrality and impartiality. The U.S. and the Marines had taken a side. Most politicians saw the involvement with the LAF as part of the Marine mission, a way to create the "environment" in which the LAF could operate. Even some

of the Marine commanders encouraged the training of LAF soldiers by Marines as a way of relieving the routine and boredom of the deployed Marines.<sup>cxv</sup> The training of the LAF, the collocation of Marine forces and LAF at BIA (the LAF provided security at BIA), and the direct combat support of the LAF destroyed the perception of an impartial force to the combative factions.

The external escalation of force would also serve to compromise the Marines' position. General Stiner would play a critical role in this escalation. As the factional fighting increased during August 1983, the Marines increasingly became targets of attack. Concerned about the Marines and frustrated by the inability of the Marines to respond, senior military leaders began coordinating a supporting fight themselves. Although driven by the best intentions, this escalation would prove disastrous to the Marines. The support would come from an artillery weapon locating radar (Q-36), naval gunfire support and naval aviation support. From a U.S. perspective, the support from the naval vessels off shore was not considered part of the MNF.<sup>cxvi</sup>

The rationale for using the assets of the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet was based on the fact that if the Marines returned fire with their organic weapons, it would invite retaliatory response. If the assets of the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet were used it would be highly unlikely that any retaliatory fires could reach the ships off shore.<sup>cxvii</sup> Colonel Geraghty was concerned about the increased use of combat power and was reluctant to authorize the use of force. General Stiner, working closely with the Special Envoy and the LAF, increasingly pressured Colonel Geraghty to authorize the use of fires in support of the LAF. The Special Envoy and the military had disagreed as to who would authorize the use of fires and under which circumstances.<sup>cxviii</sup> The military was also disturbed about the purpose of the increased

engagements against Moslem forces.<sup>cxix</sup> What would retaliation and escalation mean for the Marine forces on the ground, and the rest of the MNF? Colonel Geraghty would remain sensitive to the fact that retaliation for the use of U.S. firepower would occur and that the Marines provided the target.

Cultural integration was another important external consideration during the deployment to Beirut. Part of the way that the Marines would accomplish their stated goal of impartiality and neutrality would be to culturally integrate with the society in Beirut. In this sense, cultural integration becomes the action taken by the Marines to appear impartial and non-threatening to the local population. During the MNF 1 mission and during the early part of the MNF 2 mission, the Marines were able to accomplish this well. At the beginning of the MNF 2 deployment the Marines were very concerned about the appearance of neutrality, specifically with regard to their interface with the Israelis and the LAF. Contact with the Israelis and the LAF was kept to a minimum. Foot patrols exposed the Marines to the population, and at the beginning of the MNF 2 deployment the Marines were well received.<sup>cxx</sup>

In accordance with their mission and the amount of time they were originally supposed to be in Beirut, the Marines felt that it was important not to show favoritism to one faction or another and as a result did not engage in large-scale medical assistance, construction or civic actions. The Italians (and later the British) would be well received by the Muslim population for their civic efforts and ability to truly maintain the appearance of neutrality.<sup>cxxi</sup>

The final external consideration is the perceived compelling need for the Marines to stay in Beirut. The initial condition that determined the deployment of the MNF centered

on restoring the Lebanese stability and sovereignty. This deployment (as perceived by the U.S.) was not to be lengthy. As time progressed, the actual intent and endstate of the deployment was unclear both to the diplomats and the military. The U.S. Marines are suited for expeditionary operations, however as the length of their stay increased, different military options should have been considered. The Marines were not augmented with civil affairs personnel, additional intelligence personnel and other assets that would assist them in conducting the presence mission. The force should have been tailored as time went on. By September 1983 the situation had drastically changed and the mission should have changed as well. Even after the bombing, when the mission of "presence" no longer applied, very little direction came from the diplomats or senior military leadership.<sup>cxxii</sup> Certainly some of the problem lay in the lack of unified political vision. Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger never would agree on how to conduct the U.S. mission to Beirut.

Internal factors that affected the Marine commander included his interpretation of the mission (addressed above), service ethos, unit morale, and perceived endstate/mission accomplishment. Service ethos for Marines plays a significant role in mission accomplishment. The history, traditions and pride that are instilled in both officers and enlisted personnel affects problem approach and solution. When assigned a mission or task, whether popular or not, Marines are expected to do everything in their power to achieve the desired result. Mission accomplishment is central, nothing is more important. Colonel Geraghty and his Marines felt the same way in Beirut. Colonel Geraghty had an assigned mission that he interpreted as a presence mission. He would do everything possible to successfully accomplish his assigned mission, and for Colonel Geraghty, the

mission drove his force protection posture. Marine service ethos also highlights the importance of unit morale. Unit morale is tied to mission accomplishment. If morale in a unit is high, Marines will contribute more effectively to accomplishing their assigned mission.

Unit morale is extremely important to the Marine Corps and to any military organization. Taking care of Marines is second in importance only to mission accomplishment. Colonel Geraghty, in his desire to take care of his Marines, chose to reduce the most significant threat to them. That threat was sniper and indirect fire. Prior to the bombing, the majority of the casualties received by the Marines were the result of sniper, artillery, mortar and rocket attack.<sup>cxxiii</sup> Casualties received by terrorist acts (including car bombs) prior to the bombing were 1 Killed in Action (KIA) and 4 Wounded in Action (WIA). "Throughout sniper attacks and indirect fires the Marines, were consistently well dug in against these conventional threats."<sup>cxxiv</sup> In an effort to bolster unit morale and in order to take care of his Marines, Colonel Geraghty chose to house the bulk of his support personnel in what was considered the safest structure in the Marine area. Based on his knowledge of the area and his extensive military experience Colonel Geraghty chose to consolidate a portion of his force not to endanger them but to protect them from the most significant threat. By deliberately billeting Marines in what was considered the safest building in the area, Colonel Geraghty sought to protect his Marines and enhance unit morale. By enhancing unit morale, Marines would be better able to accomplish their mission, ultimately preserving the high standards, traditions and ethos of the Marine Corps.

Finally, for the Marines in Beirut the endstate was relatively simple. Accomplish the assigned mission, uphold the ethos of the Marine Corps, and recover all equipment and personnel safely back to homeport. Colonel Geraghty had little ability to influence or change his assigned mission. The path for change lay through the chain of command structure to USEUCOM. General Stiner, on the other hand, had an immediate channel for change through the Special Negotiator. Colonel Geraghty understood his mission, and never received instructions modifying or changing the underlying mission of presence. As part of his mission, he understood that if the situation escalated, his Marines were to be withdrawn to shipping offshore. Throughout the summer and fall as the situation escalated, Colonel Geraghty made repeated requests to reembark his forces aboard naval shipping. These requests were repeatedly turned down.<sup>cxxv</sup> It is difficult to understand how Colonel Geraghty could be held accountable for military failure while continuing to operate under inflexible conditions imposed by higher authority.

Having examined the external and internal factors affecting the Marines, a comparison will be made with similar presence or peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Bosnia. The same framework of external and internal factors will be used.

Like Beirut, the political situation in Haiti and Bosnia was complex. Disparities between politicians as to what U.S. policy should "look" like affected military commanders planning for the Haiti and Bosnia operations. The same questions that confronted the Beirut civilian and military leadership would confront the Haiti and Bosnia planners. Questions as to what mission was to be accomplished, what size of force should be used and duration of stay were common to the three deployments.

Changes in diplomacy would frustrate military commanders' right up until U.S. soldiers occupied the ground in Haiti.<sup>cxxvi</sup>

The internal political situations in Haiti and Bosnia were similar to that in Beirut. Unstable governments in transition characterized both Haiti and Bosnia. When U.S. forces did intervene, the government holding power would be weak and largely ineffective, just as the Lebanese government was in Beirut. In terms of external factors, the political situation in the U.S., Haiti and Bosnia would have just as much effect on the interpretation of the assigned mission as it did in Beirut.

In Haiti, the military mission would change up until military forces were literally about to forcibly enter the country. The mission would become more of a peacekeeping mission than the peace enforcement mission that was originally considered.<sup>cxxvii</sup>

Although worded differently, the mission in Haiti was essentially the same as in Beirut. U.S. forces would provide protection for U. S. citizens, stability, security and assistance to the government in transition. For the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, it was not the mission statement that drove their force protection posture, but the force protection posture that drove their mission statement.<sup>cxxviii</sup>

In Haiti, the most controversial aspect of the mission overall would be how the Haitian people were engaged by the U.S. military.<sup>cxxix</sup> Based on the commanders' interpretation of the mission and past experience, force protection would drive the mission for the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. Overwhelming force and intimidation would be the method used to provide safety and security to the people of Haiti. The experience of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division in Somalia had a direct impact on how the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division chose to "engage" the Haitian population. Undoubtedly the U.S. Marine



experience in Beirut had an impact as well. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division leadership felt that "...the way to ensure force protection for them [U.S. soldiers] is through overwhelming combat force."<sup>cxv</sup> This would be exactly the posture that the Division would take throughout the operation.

In Bosnia, U.S. military commanders would take great pains to analyze the mission in order to identify the risks associated with the mission. The U.S. would participate as part of a NATO peace enforcement mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mission analysis would include an extensive study of the Marine operation and force protection posture in Beirut in 1983. The U.S. Army would also establish a Force Protection Working Group (FPWG) to assist forces in theatre in developing the appropriate force protection posture.<sup>cxvii</sup> Once again, as in Haiti, the U.S. forces postured for combat operations, taking an aggressive force protection posture. The participating NATO forces considered the assigned mission a peace operation and were not compelled to take aggressive force protection measures. This would create a disparity between U.S. forces and other NATO forces assigned as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR).<sup>cxviii</sup> While some IFOR forces "engaged" the population by shopping and dining on the local economy, these activities were forbidden to the majority of U.S. forces. They would wear helmets and body armor and would be confined to post during off-duty hours.<sup>cxviii</sup>

Neutrality and impartiality were important in all three deployments. Although less important in the Haiti operation, impartiality was still necessary to the healthy development of the new Haitian government. Creating a perceived "puppet" government was not an objective of the Haitian people or the U.S. government. To this end, U.S. forces could have presented a less militaristic presence to convey impartiality. For many,

"...the image of U.S. soldiers handing out food, visiting schools, and holding children-all while wearing Kevlar and body armor..." did not represent the strategic position of the U.S.<sup>cxxxiv</sup> Bosnia posed neutrality/impartiality concerns as well. As part of a larger mission, "...every action by outsiders in a civil war affects the local balance of power."<sup>cxxxv</sup> The actions taken by the U.S. forces in terms of force protection gave a confused appearance to our soldiers, allies and locals.

This confusion would impact and affect the morale of the deployed soldiers. In Haiti, many of the soldiers resented the fact that they had to continually wear their full "battle rattle" while Special Forces (SF) units operating throughout Haiti took a more relaxed military posture. Similarly in Bosnia, the fact that other IFOR units were able to enjoy themselves on the local economy (while the majority of the U.S. soldiers couldn't), affected morale. In both instances, despite morale problems, commanders' could point to records of success in preventing casualties.

## Conclusions

Both the MAU and BLT commanders would ultimately receive career-ending letters in their official files.<sup>cxxxvi</sup> Despite the fact that President Reagan would accept responsibility for the entire Beirut operation, the Marine commanders would shoulder the blame for the deaths that resulted on October 23, 1983. The Beirut bombing is a turning point for military commanders who must now continually assess their force protection posture. Since the bombing, military and civilian leaders have carefully sought to avoid disasters of this nature from happening again. Recent deployments to Haiti and Bosnia have demonstrated that the issue of force protection plays a significant role, often driving commanders' actions.

Many lessons can be learned and trends analyzed in these three operations. In each situation the U.S. political and national politics of the country in which we would intervene were confusing. Whether it was internal disputes in U.S. politics or the chaos born out of an ongoing crisis, the ability to develop and retain a specific mission statement was difficult. The mission analysis and resulting mission statement are a direct reflection of what is intended and expected to be accomplished by the military commander in a given situation. It is critical that civilian and military leaders recognize the importance of the mission statement and that the mission may change. The fact that every situation changed clearly demonstrates that the mission must continually be

analyzed and updated as well. Failure to recognize and implement this change could have catastrophic consequences for not only the military, but also the nation as a whole.

The chain of command and channels for communication are equally important. The military chain of command must be streamlined to ensure efficient, effective, and timely flow of information. The importance of assigning an overall commander to oversee and interface with the military and civilian/political leaders is critical. The military operates most efficiently in an environment where the guidance and instruction they receive comes from a single source rather than multiple sources. Additionally the information the military commander receives must not be contradictory. If two different sources are providing competing rather than complimentary guidance on an aspect of the mission, the commander's position and force protection posture could be compromised.

Impartiality and neutrality are essential for mission success in peace operations. These states are very difficult to accomplish and maintain. "Impartiality in humanitarian interventions is much easier to assert than it is to maintain in the minds of the local belligerents."<sup>cxvii</sup> Neutrality is linked back to the mission and what is expected to be accomplished. The situation will change, and as it changes the mission will change. This may result in the need to reassess the desire/ability to remain impartial or neutral. The overarching goal is not to confuse the situation but to continue to define the situation so that the military commander can effectively accomplish his mission, and the diplomats can achieve their desired affects. In fact, impartiality may be an illusion. Perhaps it is impossible for the U.S. to act impartial or neutral in world affairs today. If this is the case, then an "escape hatch" or alternative plan must be considered prior to engaging in

the operation. Perhaps this would be a plan to bolster military forces in country (or as did not happen in Beirut), pulling forces out to safe and secure areas.

The Long Commission Report would find a Marine Colonel at fault for failing to take the security measures necessary to preclude the catastrophic loss of life in the attack on 23 October 1983.<sup>cxxxviii</sup> This simplistic statement reflects an inexcusably incomplete understanding of the complexity of mission goals and force protection issues facing Colonel Geraghty in Beirut. Colonel Geraghty was set up for failure and blamed for the inevitable consequences.

The U.S. military continues to struggle with force protection issues. The recent bombing and loss of life aboard the USS Cole will undoubtedly raise questions about the issue of force protection.<sup>cxxxix</sup> History and the definition of force protection indicate that the Captain of the USS Cole should be held accountable for the loss of life aboard his ship. The relevant issue is actually what was done to set the Captain up for force protection success?

## Bibliography

### Books

Bolger, Daniel P. *Americans at War: An Era of Violent Peace*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1988.

Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace, Americans at War in the 1990's*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1995.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Durch, William J., ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990's*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Hallenbeck, Ralph A. *Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy Intervention In Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991.

Hammel, Eric. *The Root The Marines in Beirut August 1982-February 1984*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985.

Hiro, Dilip, *Lebanon Fire and Embers, A History of the Lebanese Civil War*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1992.

Kretchik, Walter E, Baumann, Robert F, Fishel, John T. *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998.

Petit, Michael. *Peacekeepers at War A Marines Account of the Beirut Catastrophe*. Winchester: Faber and Faber Publishers, 1986.

### Government Documents

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pub 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pub 3-07.3. *Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999.

Department of the Army. *FM 100-23 Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.

Department of The Army. *FM 3-0 Operations (DRAG Edition)*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.

Department of Defense Commission. *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1983.

Frank, Benis M. *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

Hoffman, Bruce. "The Siege Mentality in Beirut: An Historical Analogy Between the British in Palestine and the Americans in Lebanon." Paper written in support of the DOD Long Commission Report. 1984.

Jenkins, B.M. "Combatting Terrorism Becomes a War." Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1984.

Schmeidel, John C. *The Marine Barracks Bombing of 1983: Lessons from the American Participation in Multinational Force 2*. Rand Corporation Case Study, 1993.

Scott, Esther. *The U.S. Marines in Lebanon Case C16-91-1045.0*. Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, 1991.

Shulimson, Jack. *Marines in Lebanon 1958*. Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1966.

U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Armed Services. *Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for Improving that Security*. 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, 1983.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut*. 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, 1983.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut, Summary of Findings and Conclusions*. 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, 1983.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Full Committee Consideration of Investigations Subcommittee Report on Terrorist Bombing at Beirut International Airport*. 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, Second Session, 1984.

## **Research Papers and Monographs**

Bryant, Thomas E. "Personal Protection Against Terrorism: The Missing link in United States Army Force Protection" School of Advance Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Bryant, Thomas E. "Protection against Terrorism: Does the 1998 FM 100-5 Say Enough?" School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.

Burton, Paul S. "Urban Operations, Untrained on Terrain" Master of Military Arts and Science Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1998.

Cochran, Douglas R. "Force Protection Doctrine: An Operational Necessity." Newport: Naval War College, 1998.

Cowdry, Christian B. "Shoot? Don't Shoot? Rules of Engagement in Peacekeeping Operations." School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1994.

Grosso, Gina M. "The Real Cost of 'Engagement' ." Newport : Naval War College, 1999.

Khan, Asad. "JIHAD – The Invisible War: Are we Protecting Our Forces?" Newport: Naval War College, 1997.

Malone, Michael D, Miller, William H, Robben, Joseph W, "Lebanon: Lessons For Future Use of American Forces in Peacekeeping" Research Paper National War College, National Defense University, March 1985.

Schuster, Daniel J. "Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the Operational Art" School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.

Weimer, James R. "Antiterrorism Doctrine: A Recipe for Disaster?" Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1998.

Willis, Jeffery R. "The Employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.



## Periodicals and Articles

Covington, Richard. "Beirut Rises From the Ashes." *Smithsonian* (April 2000) : 45-54.

Drummond, Frederic A. "Force Protection Measures in Bosnia." *Engineer* (March 1999) : 12-16.

Dunlap, Charles J. "The Military Justice System and Command Accountability." *Military Review* 65 (February 1985) : 42-53.

Hammel, Eric. "Root Redux." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 119 (June 1993) : 77-81.

Hof, Frederick C. "The Beirut Bombing of October 1983: An act of Terrorism?" *Parameters* 15 (Summer 1985) : 69-74.

Kretchik, Walter E. "Force Protection Disparities." *Military Review* (July-August 1997) : 73-78.

Lattorre, A.V. "Peacekeeping as a Military Mission." *Marine Corps Gazette* 68 (December 1984) : 20-26.

Mead, James M. "Lebanon Revisited." *Marine Corps Gazette* 67 (September 1983) : 64-73.

Perkins, Andrew M. "Operation Urgent Fury An Engineer's View." *The Military Engineer* (March-April 1984) : 7-11.

Shugar, Scott. "What America Hasn't Learned from Its Greatest Peacekeeping Disaster." *The Washington Monthly* (October 1989) : 40-50.

Wright, Jeffery W. "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare." *Military Review* 64 (October 1984) : 35-45.

## Endnotes

- 
- <sup>i</sup> Esther Scott, *The U.S. Marines in Lebanon*, Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Case C16-91-1045.0 (Cambridge MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1991), 1.
- <sup>ii</sup> Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 3.
- <sup>iii</sup> Gina M. Grosso, "The Real Cost of 'Engagement'" February 5, 1999, Naval War College, Newport RI, 4.
- <sup>iv</sup> Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers, by Wayne A. Downing, General, USA (Retired), chairman (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), xviii.
- <sup>v</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5; *Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 2-9. The DRAG edition of FM 3-0 *Operations* adds "information" to the existing four elements of combat power.
- <sup>vi</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-11.
- <sup>vii</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02; *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), 34.
- <sup>viii</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), I-1.
- <sup>ix</sup> *Ibid.*, I-6.
- <sup>x</sup> *Ibid.*, ix.
- <sup>xi</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>xii</sup> *Ibid.*, I-7
- <sup>xiii</sup> *Ibid.*, x.
- <sup>xiv</sup> *Ibid.*, xi.
- <sup>xv</sup> *Ibid.*, I-4.
- <sup>xvi</sup> The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New College Edition (1978), s.v. "Presence."
- <sup>xvii</sup> Frank, 23.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Dilip Hiro, *Lebanon Fire and Embers, A History of the Lebanese Civil War*, (New York NY: St. Martins Press, 1992), 2.
- <sup>xix</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.
- <sup>xx</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.
- <sup>xxi</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.
- <sup>xxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.
- <sup>xxv</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Jeffery R. Willis, "The Employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984" (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1992), 31.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War: An Era of Violent Peace*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 194. Hereinafter Bolger, *Americans at War*.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Willis, 80.
- <sup>xxx</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Ralph A. Hallenbeck, *Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, Intervention in Lebanon August 1982-February 1984*, (New York NY: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 13.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Scott, 3.
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> Hallenbeck, 14.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> Scott, 3.
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> Frank, 12.
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> Bolger, *Americans at War*, 195.

- 
- xxxviii Hallenbeck, 17.  
xxxix Ibid.  
xi Scott, 4.  
xii Willis, 51.  
xiii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 196.  
xliii Ibid., 195.  
xliv Hallenbeck, 29.  
xlv Willis, 51.  
xlvi Hallenbeck, 30.  
xlvii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 197.  
xlviii Michael D. Malone, William H. Miller, Joseph W. Robben, "Lebanon: Lessons for Future Use of American Forces in Peacekeeping" March 1985, Research Report, National War College Washington D.C. 8.  
xlix U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 35. Hereinafter DOD, Long Commission Report.  
l Hallenbeck, 31.  
li DOD, Long Commission Report, 37.  
lii Hallenbeck, 30.  
liii Ibid., 32  
liv Ibid., 31.  
lv Ibid., 32.  
lvi Ibid., 35.  
lvii Ibid.  
lviii Ibid.  
lix Ibid., 44.  
lx Ibid., 50.  
lxi Ibid., 61.  
lxii Ibid., 63.  
lxiii Ibid., 64.  
lxiv Ibid., 73.  
lxv Ibid., 82.  
lxvi Ibid., 90.  
lxvii Ibid., 97.  
lxviii Frank, 9.  
lxix Ibid., 7.  
lxx Ibid., 12.  
lxxi Willis, 68.  
lxxii Ibid., 67.  
lxxiii Ibid., 69.  
lxxiv Scott, 4.  
lxxv Frank, 24.  
lxxvi Ibid., 28.  
lxxvii DOD, Long Commission Report, 72.  
lxxviii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 198.  
lxxix John C. Schmeidel, *The Marine Barracks Bombing of 1983: Lessons from the American Participation in Multinational Force 2, A Case Study* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation draft August 1993), 20.  
lxxx Ibid., 21.  
lxxxi Bolger, *Americans at War*, 225.  
lxxxii Hallenbeck, 41.  
lxxxiii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 199.  
lxxxiv Ibid., 200.  
lxxxv Hallenbeck, 37.  
lxxxvi Ibid., 43.

- 
- lxxxvii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 202.  
lxxxviii *Ibid.*, 204.  
lxxxix Hallenbeck, 53.  
xc DOD, Long Commission Report, 37.  
xci Frank, 64.  
xcii Willis, 71.  
xciii Hallenbeck, 59.  
xciv DOD, Long Commission Report, 74.  
xcv Christian B. Cowdry, "Shoot Don't Shoot? Rules of Engagement in Peacekeeping Operations" (School of Advance Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College May 1994), 28.  
xcvi Hallenbeck, 76.  
xcvii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 219.  
xcviii Hallenbeck, 83.  
xcix *Ibid.*, 85.  
c *Ibid.*, 92.  
ci Bolger, *Americans at War*, 225.  
cii Frank, 93.  
ciii Grosso, 7  
civ Hallenbeck, 164.  
cv *Ibid.*, 73.  
cvi *Ibid.*, 148.  
cvii *Ibid.*, 52.  
cviii *Ibid.*, 149.  
cix *Ibid.*, 79.  
cx Bolger, *Americans at War*, 222.  
cxii Schmeidel, 16.  
cxiii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 209.  
cxiiii Schmeidel, 19.  
cxv U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for Improving that Security*. 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, 1 November 1983, 260.  
cxvi Frank, 40.  
cxvii Hallenbeck, 60.  
cxviii Malone, 15.  
cxix Hallenbeck, 79.  
cix Scott, 6.  
cxi Frank, 32  
cxii Hallenbeck, 97.  
cxiii *Ibid.*, 111.  
cxiiii Bolger, *Americans at War*, 227.  
cxv Schmeidel, 9.  
cxvi *Ibid.*, 20.  
cxvii Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 78.  
cxviii *Ibid.*  
cxviiii *Ibid.*, 194.  
cxix *Ibid.*, 189.  
cxxx *Ibid.*, 194.  
cxxxii Walter E. Kretchik, "Force Protection Disparities," *Military Review* (July-August 1997) : 75.  
cxxxiii Kretchik, "Force Protection Disparities," 73.  
cxxxiiii *Ibid.*  
cxxxv Kretchik, "Invasion," 193.

- 
- <sup>cxxxv</sup> William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990's* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 253.
- <sup>cxxxvi</sup> Cowdry, 30.
- <sup>cxxxvii</sup> Durch, 253.
- <sup>cxxxviii</sup> DOD, Long Commission Report, 137.
- <sup>cxxxix</sup> Michael R. Borden, "A Superpower Target," *Union Tribune Publishing Company*, 15 October 2000.