



**STRATEGY
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PROJECT**

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**AN ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM
FOR A TRANSFORMED ARMY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM FOR A TRANSFORMED ARMY

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ABSTRACT

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The Army's enlisted assignment system has evolved over time to support an individual replacement system that focuses on career development and desires, rather than Army needs and readiness. Whether the Army should use an individual assignment or unit replacement system to meet Army readiness needs and support the National Military Strategy is not a new issue. The current system has become overly complicated, restricted by laws, regulations and policies, and is often perceived as biased and unfair. The Enlisted Distribution Policy, permanent overseas basing of the force, PERSTEMPO, turbulence, stabilization and deletion/deferment policies, No Shows, lack of compensation and retention impact the enlisted assignment system. To support a highly mobile, responsive, deployable, and transformed Army, Personnel Transformation must examine the assignment system. Personnel Transformation must also find ways to reduce noncompliance with assignment instructions, maintain ready and cohesive units and stabilize families to improve well-being. Ideas such as CONUS basing, short rotations, increased overseas compensation, reductions of overseas infrastructure and predictable deployment schedules should be studied as possible ways to support a power projection force.

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AN ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM FOR A TRANSFORMED ARMY

MANNING THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The Army is People...the soldier remains the centerpiece of our formation ...trained and ready to do anything the American People ask ... [we must] provide strategic responsiveness through forward-deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, engagement, and when called, through force projection from the CONUS or any other location where needed capabilities reside... develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff...[and] generate a war-fighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.¹

This vision depicts the Army as a highly mobile, ready and capable force that is "responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable."² Since the Army's mission accomplishment and the future Objective Force are based on people, then managing soldiers will be a key component of Army Transformation. Managing people is emphasized in the Army's Posture statement.

Implementing the Army's Vision has a significant personnel dimension. The Army will continue to train, equip, and care for its people and their families, and will fill its units to 100 percent of authorizations. The transformation of the Institutional Army, along with careful analysis of Army personnel requirements, will support the new distribution of personnel and identify any mismatch between requirements and congressionally mandated end strength.³

The Army's personnel community is directly involved in Transformation to "address the systems, organizations, and processes by which the Institutional Army supports training, leader development, infrastructure, management, sustainment, combat and materiel development and well being."⁴ This focus calls the Army to examine its requirements, force structure and distribution of soldiers to support the CSA's vision.

The Army's personnel community is embracing Transformation, acknowledging that current personnel systems are based on a "Cold War mentality and a paper laden Army," with the goal "to create a personnel system that is simple, accurate and accessible."⁵ Just as "transformation takes the organization beyond its current operating zone and moves missions, goals, objectives, expectations, culture and so on to uncharted territory,"⁶ the personnel systems created to support Army Transformation will not only require information technology, but also policy changes to support new business practices and culture.

The Army's enlisted assignment system has evolved over time to support an individual replacement system that focuses on personal career development and desires, rather than Army needs and readiness. The current system has become overly complicated, restricted by

laws, regulations and policies, and is often perceived as biased and unfair. The Army's challenge will be assessing whether the current enlisted assignment system will support requirements and readiness as the Army transforms, and identifying changes to support the CSA's vision, as needed. A critical aspect will be to ensure assignment policies and force structure provide the Army with an available force for power projection. The Army must identify what assignment policies will support a professional, highly mobile and deployable force in the 21st century.

This study reviews the evolution of the current enlisted assignment system, the challenges and factors impacting on the Total Army Personnel Command's (PERSCOM) ability to assign the enlisted force, and initiatives and recommendations to ensure availability of the enlisted force to support the CSA's guidance.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

An examination of past and current assignment systems reveals a constantly moving force in flux. While the goal of the assignment system is "to satisfy the personnel requirements of the Army,"⁷ four secondary goals are:

- 1) Equalize desirable and undesirable assignments by assigning the most eligible soldier" by MOS and grade, 2) equally spread the hardships of military service, 3) make assignments to provide the greatest opportunity for professional development and promotion, and 4) meet the soldier's personal desires.⁸

This conflict between filling requirements, ensuring soldiers' availability, and managing individuals' careers is documented and recognized in recent reports studying personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and deployment tempo (DEPTEMPO).⁹ Yet, Permanent Change of Station (PCS) policy states that moves are only authorized under two conditions: 1) To enhance national security (readiness) and 2) for compassionate or equitable treatment of individual members.¹⁰

Although the assignment system has become more sophisticated to support soldiers and families, the system is still based on "350 legacy personnel systems supporting business processes" which are over 20 years old, and are managed by a "hierarchal information flow" resulting in "data accuracy and timeliness problems, which are "not user friendly or responsive" to commanders and soldiers.¹¹ A goal of the transformed personnel system is to provide "more predictability, one corporate database, reduced personnel structure, smaller personnel footprint in the battle space, web-based applications, a virtual personnel center and more soldier to HQDA contact."¹²

Despite substantial automated improvements such as the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS), the assignment system is considerably labor intensive due to the multitude of force structure changes, assignment policies, and exceptions requested. The Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate's (EPMD) efforts to streamline the assignment system to make it more objective, less responsive to subjective criteria and more efficient were often without much success.¹³ Such efforts are needed since many historical studies of replacement and assignment systems conclude, "efficient use of military manpower can only be achieved when there is an effective replacement system."¹⁴

Historically, the Army has used both individual and unit replacement systems to accomplish its mission. From the nineteenth century's Regimental Depot system, the Army began every major conflict with a unit replacement system. In wartime, units have traditionally moved to a theater of operation and families remained safe in CONUS. Ultimately, due to increased manpower needs or force structure limits, by the end of every major conflict from the Civil War through Vietnam, the Army resorted to using an individual replacement system.¹⁵ Commanders have preferred and the Army has relied heavily on a unit replacement system for the combat effectiveness cohesive units brought to an operation. Yet, even during WWII the Army decided that rotating entire divisions from the front created too much structure, so to maintain combat effectiveness, it was necessary to "rotate units smaller than divisions or rotate individuals"¹⁶ every 30 days.

With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), professional development became paramount. Consequently, through the end of the Cold War to the present, (despite concerns about unit cohesion, combat effectiveness and predictability, and Army unit replacement tests such as Operation Gyroscope¹⁷ and the Cohesion Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT) Program¹⁸), the Army continues to rely on individuals to fill forward deployed units.¹⁹ Unfortunately, tests such as COHORT did not succeed due to conflicting personnel policies, lack of a predictable force structure, scheduling, funding, and simultaneously moving large numbers of families and personal belongings outside the continental United States (OCONUS).²⁰

Today, the assignment system is virtually synonymous with the replacement system, distinctions being only historical. A replacement system usually referred to the wartime support functions of moving tactical units and soldiers to a combatant theater of operations, while the assignment system encompasses the procedures and policies used to distribute and relocate individuals to fill requirements.

CURRENT ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

Even though the Army created its current assignment policies and regulations when it had a conscript force, the basis for assignment policy is Congress and DoD. For example, Congressional guidance for OCONUS assignments is contained in DoD Directive 1315.7 that standardized tour lengths for all services at 24 and 36 months tours in 1986.²¹ Assignment policy oversight is vested in the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)) and developed by the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).²² The Commanding General, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (CG, PERSCOM) is responsible for developing procedures and implementing programs to support assignment policies.²³

As "a group of interrelated components working toward the attainment of a common goal by accepting inputs and producing outputs in an organized transformation process,"²⁴ the assignment system is a process where soldiers (faces) are matched to documented personnel spaces to fill Army units. As such, the assignment system is a key component of the enlisted distribution management function impacted significantly by the Army's strength management functions.²⁵ EPMD assignment managers use many automated systems such as the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) and the Reenlistment, Reclassification and Assignment System (RETAIN), based on input from the Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB), Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and PERSCOM Enlisted Personnel Data Update System (PEPDUS) to assign soldiers in a timely manner.

Both manual and automated inputs impact on assignment managers' ability to make an assignment and many are constraints limiting soldiers' assignments. A major input to the assignment system is soldiers' information, such as Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), grade, Date Returned from Overseas (DROS), preferences and personal considerations input through SIDPERS-3.²⁶ Aside from soldier qualifications, unit locations and force structure changes, other constraints include statutory laws such as PERSTEMPO as well as DoD and HQDA assignment policies, to include the HQDA Enlisted Distribution Policy Guidance, Stabilization and Deletion/Deferment policies.

Also, within EPMD's divisions, an intricate "dance" of competing demands for personnel occurs. For example, Distribution Division (DD) is concerned with creating valid open requisitions for requirements or spaces. Retention Management Division (RMD) is concerned with having enough requisitions to encourage reenlistment and provide locations soldiers want.

The Career Management Divisions identify and assign qualified soldiers to the validated requisitions based on their professional development needs.

DD is ultimately the "honest broker," validating requisitions based on shortages reflected in EDAS and the personnel section of Unit Status Reports.²⁷ As the Army's enlisted strength manager, DD is constantly reconciling strength management information for over 200 Distribution Management Levels (DML) and hundreds more locations. DD also manages tens of thousands of requisitions per year, to support the PCS moves and reassignment of over 10,000 enlisted soldiers per month.²⁸

Since Army downsizing, congressionally authorized end strength has not met the Army's force structure requirements. The total shortages resulting from not having enough faces to fill the spaces is called the "operating strength deviation,"²⁹ which causes EPMD strength and assignment managers to work personnel shortages. The HQDA Enlisted Distribution Policy provides priority guidance to strength and assignment managers about what units and commands will receive what level of personnel fill, with the highest fill going to congressionally mandated requirements, Joint Commands and DoD agencies.

Overseas positions and structure drive the need for replacements from CONUS, as DoD established overseas tour lengths drive the assignment system. There is no requirement to serve a particular length of time in CONUS before being reassigned.³⁰ Thus, when soldiers leave CONUS, the personnel system assigns a tour length based on geographic location and establishes a DEROS (Date Eligible to Return from Overseas). PERSCOM tracks DEROS dates inputted and changed by the overseas commands. At the end of FY 2000, there were 99,006³¹ enlisted authorizations overseas, of which 46,624 were in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and 20,767 were in Korea.³² Compared to the total Army enlisted operating strength of 337,739, this means that over 30% of enlisted requirements are overseas. The next section examines some of the personnel policies and constraints impacting on EPMD's ability to assign and manage the enlisted force.

CHALLENGES AND POLICY IMPACTS ON THE ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

ENLISTED DISTRIBUTION POLICY

Maintaining personnel readiness drives the assignment system with priorities established by the CSA and input from the ODCSOPS, Combatant and Joint Commands and CJCS. EPMD relies on the yearly HQDA Enlisted Distribution Policy to provide guidance on how to distribute the enlisted force.

This policy is often referred to as “tiered readiness” because it creates a system of haves and have nots by prioritizing what units get filled and at what levels. Distribution Policy since the end of the Cold War had focused on support of the institutional Army rather than the war fighting Army, and priority of fill had gone first to TDA units and positions (with the exception of Special Operations Forces).³³ Priorities became a necessity since the Army has continuously had a negative Operating Strength Deviation (OpSD) since 1991; there were not and are not enough faces to fill the authorized spaces in units, combat or otherwise. Army leaders often briefed that filling a ten-division force, given the current distribution guidance, requires 518,000 soldiers. But since the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Congress has only authorized end strength for 480,000, which causes lower priority units to remain perpetually undermanned. The CSA’s 8 November 1999 announcement of a new Unit Manning Strategy to fill all units to 100% by MOS and grade was not just a policy change but also a major cultural change that publicly recognized the effect of distribution on readiness.³⁴

Distribution of personnel is compounded by force modernization changes, unit moves and inactivations, recruiting, retention and training base shortfalls, high demand MOS shortages, data accuracy of the TAPDB, deletion/deferment requests, retirements, special skills requirements such as Airborne, and unprogrammed losses due to disciplinary actions. In addition, special personnel programs which support family considerations such as the Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program, Married Army Couples Program, Exceptional Family Member Program, Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program (OTEIP), Early Out and separation programs, Compassionate Assignment Programs and special training and assignments, foreign service tour curtailments, and reclassifications contribute significantly to the increasing complexity of an individual assignment system.

PERMANENT OVERSEAS BASING OF THE FORCE

Since one third of the Army’s soldiers are permanently based OCONUS in varying degrees of readiness and deployability, achieving the CSA’s vision will be a challenge. Overseas force structure impacts profoundly on the assignment system. Blaker’s extensive study on U.S. overseas basing reveals that the Army’s dilemma regarding overseas basing will be the redundant and large overseas infrastructure whose costs have risen despite basing reductions in the last two decades, and assessing whether these increased costs support the National Security Strategy.³⁵ His analysis highlights that a “serious national assessment by the United States of its overseas basing needs has been overdue for several years,”³⁶ but in the 21st century systems could be available,

"that might bring about the kind of shift in basing requirements that would compensate for a continued loss of overseas base sites in the interim. A number of technologies would be involved, but together they could allow the United States to conduct military operations at greater distances more rapidly; operate from basing surrogates; and operate far more effectively because of better command and control."³⁷

He concludes that although it will be difficult to decide which bases to maintain over others, it will be necessary to decide.³⁸ Due to concerns about costs, productivity, efficiency and morale, DoD has studied rotation policies for years. A 1979 Rand study questioned service assumptions about permanently basing such a high proportion of their forces overseas.³⁹ It also found that most personnel considered overseas assignments "undesirable," that "imbalances between overseas and CONUS requirements create the major rotation base supply problem,"⁴⁰ and that the "distribution of assignments and assignment policies... cause constraints throughout the manpower system."⁴¹

Regarding overseas tour lengths and possible changes, a 1985 GAO study found that DoD had not conducted a major cost-benefits analysis of overseas tour lengths since 1957, despite the cost of moving families and maintaining 39 percent of its force overseas.⁴² Unfortunately, the study did not question the assumption that the services needed to locate such as large proportion of the military force with their families outside CONUS. Overseas priority of fill varies because the highest priority units and positions are in CONUS TDA units, which conflicts with the Army's need to fill valid positions in undesirable locations, such as Korea.

Since that time, Congress and DoD have continually asked the Army to study assignment policy, tour lengths and options for reducing PCS costs. Since 1986 when the Army studied the feasibility of rotating combat battalions to Europe and the Pacific for six-month unaccompanied tours, the Army has attempted to find ways, as well as justify to Congress, the costs of maintaining a permanent overseas presence. The Army's analyses generally concluded that unit rotational policies were more expensive than PCS moves of families because support costs are transferred to CONUS and the lack of available CONUS housing would adversely affect morale. When the Army looked at serving one-year tours in Europe in 1994, it decided that "shorter tours disrupt continuity and cohesiveness, create turbulence and have an effect on unit readiness; [and that] transferring families to Europe is viewed by our allies as a demonstrated U.S. commitment to that mission."⁴³ Despite these results, some still saw a need to move away from Cold War logic and "eliminate excess capacity, unused and unnecessary facilities that drain resources needed elsewhere,"⁴⁴ in order to project power "from the United States rather

than reinforcing forward-deployed units."⁴⁵ Although the FY2001 Army Posture statement does not specifically address overseas infrastructure, it does acknowledge "the Army has excess infrastructure that is inadequate for mission requirements."⁴⁶ Many critics see the maintenance of such a large and "cumbersome infrastructure"⁴⁷ as wasteful and obsolete.

In its Annual Report to Congress, DoD claimed it optimizes overseas presence and "continually assesses this posture to ensure it effectively and efficiently contributes to achieving U.S. national security objectives...this means defining the right mix of permanently stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily deployed forces and infrastructure in each region and globally to conduct the full range of military operations."⁴⁸ As early as 1982, researchers recognized that changes in military manpower policies, especially regarding compensation, rotation, reassignment and quality of life, affected soldiers' behavior such that individual soldiers "often define the limits of policy change."⁴⁹ Thus, during Transformation, the Army must assess whether it can afford to permanently base one third of its enlisted force overseas.

PERSTEMPO, PREDICTABILITY AND TURBULENCE

One of the goals of applying the Objective Force design throughout the Army is to "help alleviate OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO challenges," and "enhance the Nation's capacity to sustain long term commitments while responding to frequent contingencies."⁵⁰ DoD recognizes the affect of OPTEMPO on personnel and retention by reporting to Congress "the focus must now shift to adding predictability to the tempo of operations and the time away from home service members currently experience."⁵¹ Unfortunately, although the Army has maintained its force was "undermanned, overworked, and underpaid,"⁵² it was unable to produce data identifying who and what units were overworked and undermanned. Recent research shows that the concern with PERSTEMPO is "the frequency with which particular MOSs, soldiers and units are deployed [because] the burden of frequent deployments is not evenly distributed throughout" the Army.⁵³ Congressional enactment of the PERSTEMPO law appeared to penalize the Executive Branch and DoD for frequently deploying soldiers.

While the law forces the Army to track how much time soldiers are away from home, implementation has placed a huge administrative burden on personnel systems and commanders to track it.⁵⁴ On the other hand, tracking individual soldier deployments is an opportunity to gather data which could be used to determine exactly who and what soldiers and units are deploying and where. The Army began tracking PERSTEMPO on 1 October 2000.

STABILIZATION POLICIES

Personnel stability is not a new concern. A 1976 study highlighted stability as a primary consideration in the development of manpower policies,⁵⁵ even though assignment managers still had to contend with tour equity issues and career development considerations such as school attendance. While the Army has assumed that rotation of soldiers and families is a necessary part of leader development, this perspective blinds policy makers to other options.⁵⁶ Therefore, the Army still uses and creates stabilization policies to assist soldiers and families.

EPMD's stabilization categories apply to personnel who are "exempt by law, policy, or by long term non-changing situations making them ineligible for consideration for reassignment."⁵⁷ A September 2000 EPMD analysis revealed that of a total enlisted operating force of 341,459 soldiers, only 16% were reassignment eligible and 15% were already on assignment instructions and preparing to move.⁵⁸ This meant that fully 64% of the Army's enlisted operating strength was considered unavailable for assignment.

Stabilization policies prevent enlisted assignment managers from considering or placing certain categories of soldiers on orders. There are at least 27 stabilization categories established by policy. Examples of stabilized soldiers include those who: are in their initial term and limited to two PCS moves (35,629); are preparing for or just returning from deployment and/or a short or long tour overseas (17,123); are in "fenced" units, those undergoing force modernization, base realignment and closure, or for readiness reasons due to the unit's high priority (21,137); have reenlistment option commitments (6,298); are on special assignments such as recruiting duty, drill sergeant, ROTC and AC/RC positions (13,968); have medical conditions, bars to reenlistment, approved retirements, signed Declination of Continued Service Statements (DCSS) or reached their retention control point (RCP), and are ineligible to return to CONUS from OCONUS (7953).⁵⁹ These numbers do not include the approximately 60,000 soldiers who are in the Army's TTHS account (those who are in training, in transit, or hospitalized).

Soldiers already based overseas and not within an assignment window were a significant portion of those ineligible (34,139), as well as those in CONUS with less than 18 months on station (74,216).⁶⁰ Given that the Army has deployed soldiers to no less than 32 Small Scale Contingency (SSC) operations, such as Bosnia, Haiti, Kuwait and Somalia in the last twelve years, these are considerable numbers.⁶¹ The Army is currently studying the effects of stabilization policies on its ability to deploy soldiers. Efforts are underway to revise the personnel readiness portion of the monthly Unit Status Report (USR). One study recently found

that because of current stabilization policies, even though the personnel portion of the USR may show that only "3 or 4% [of its soldiers] are not available for deployment...units actually find 30 to 40% unable to deploy"⁶² once the unit is alerted to support a SSC.

There are 21 Assignment Eligibility and Availability (AEA) Codes to help assignment managers determine a soldier's availability for reassignment. EPMD just created four more specifically for soldiers preparing for or returning from participation in SSC operations.⁶³ It is easy to see how stabilization policies can tie up the Army's enlisted population and create difficulties in readiness, deployability and assignments, as well as impact on unit readiness.

DELETION/DEFERMENT POLICY

Since the mid-1990s draw down, installation strength managers often prided themselves on their ability to use deletion/deferment policies to prevent soldiers' reassignments without extensive negotiation with EPMD. Historically, assignment regulations assumed more soldiers would want to go overseas especially on long tours, than there were positions, so deletion/deferments were relatively easy to obtain. This was not an issue when the Army was largely a single force and the Cold War force structure was large enough that unaccompanied tours and undesirable assignments were the exception. Therefore, requests based on personal and family considerations came to be seen as valid justifications for being deleted or deferred from an assignment.

Deletion/deferment requests are meant to inform EPMD about soldiers' assignment eligibility and status, not to prevent soldiers from going on an assignment they do not want. The 1990 version of AR 600-8-11, Reassignment, contained procedures for processing operational and compassionate deletions and deferment requests and listed 87 reasons to preclude a soldier from being reassigned or going overseas. In 1995 PERSCOM created MILPER Memorandum 95-1 removing the deletion/deferment procedures from the regulation, yet, the memorandum still contains 94 categories. In order to reduce the number and determine request validity, EPMD is now the approval authority for operational deletions. In FY 2000, PERSCOM processed 60,000+ deletion and 45,000 deferment requests for soldiers, with a resulting 15% to 25% No Show rate.⁶⁴ Because of this, 50% of all enlisted requisitions are changed, aged and/or cancelled before they are filled with a soldier. Given that the Army needs to move approximately 10,000 soldiers per month on a PCS,⁶⁵ deletion/deferment requests add to the complexity of assigning soldiers.

In some ways, deletions and deferments legitimately allow soldiers to non-comply with assignment instructions, especially to undesirable locations. Therefore, many search for policy

and regulatory loopholes to renegotiate their assignments. In order to support soldiers, leaders endorse deletion/deferment requests, assuming another soldier can take their place. Such constant maneuvering is counterproductive to the assignment system and leads soldiers to believe that with enough effort, they will get the assignment they want rather than the one the Army needs.

Incongruity also exists between the assignment regulation and the deletion/deferment policy, since many deletions/deferments apply to soldiers with family considerations. Since almost 55% of the Army is married and 49% have children,⁶⁶ it may be time to examine such policy constraints on the assignment system. There is no research that considers whether single soldiers are self-selecting out of the Army due to a lack of assignment considerations.

NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS AND NO SHOWS

Readiness concerns for undesirable locations were an issue throughout the Cold War. The programs implemented such as the New Manning System (NMS) which rotated combat units every 18 months between CONUS and OCONUS in an attempt to "enhance combat effectiveness," recognized that the Army's management practices "focused on individuals and resulted in a high turnover in units" and inhibited "commanders from maintaining cohesive, well-trained units."⁶⁷ Such turnover has been especially troublesome for hardship locations such as Korea, with a one-year unaccompanied tour. Failures to arrive in Korea were so pronounced that EPMD created the No Show program in December 1995 to track the number of deletions/deferments and enforce compliance with the assignment system. EPMD painstakingly identifies personnel database discrepancies and tracks in detail why soldiers arrive late or not at all.

The number of soldiers who must rotate every year to maintain Korea's strength has not changed since the end of the Cold War. While Korea's requirements have remained roughly 20,000 soldiers per year, the Army's enlisted operating strength has been reduced by half. Consequently, a higher percentage of the force must rotate in and out of Korea more often to maintain readiness. EPMD generally must put 30K soldiers on orders to get 20K to arrive in Korea.⁶⁸ Monthly No Show rates have remained at about 20% for Korea, despite Army efforts to close the loopholes and move operational deletion/deferment approval authority to PERSCOM. Greater than 70% of the deletions and deferments processed for Korea are for career soldiers and noncommissioned officers.⁶⁹ This indicates that even experienced personnel consider Korea an undesirable assignment due to the lengthy family separation, compensation inequities compared to other hardship locations and quality of life differences.

Army policies do not encourage assignment to Korea. The Army must study ways to reduce the noncompliance of assignment orders, especially to undesirable locations.

A deeper issue concerns commanders' competition for limited personnel resources. Intense competition exists between commands when preparing for a major training exercise or a contingency operation, which invites senior leader involvement in what should be routine assignment decisions by EPMD. Personnel shortages make leaders reluctant to enforce compliance with assignment instructions due to uncertainty about when they will receive replacements.

MANPOWER INTENSIVE

Policies, laws and regulations impacting on the assignment system must be captured to be useful. Because there are many automated as well as manual systems used to make assignments such as EDAS, SIDPERS-3, E-mail, telephone calls, personal coordination and verbal approvals, obtaining accurate information about soldiers' status and ensuring automated systems capture such information is an issue for assignment managers. While EDAS is an on-line automated system, it is primarily accessible by EPMD personnel managers and certain trained personnel specialists throughout the Army. Soldiers can contact their assignment managers via E-mail or telephone, but currently no easily accessible automated system captures soldier's input for assignment managers.

COMPENSATION

Historically, the Army has granted extra compensation for undesirable and hazardous duty locations.⁷⁰ Current compensation initiatives are varied and impacted by reenlistment efforts and tax laws. While there is supposition concerning pay and benefits as well as indications that high OPTEMPO impacts retention, there is little hard data documenting what incentives impact soldiers' behavior.⁷¹ Compensation policies have changed little since WWII, with the focus being on basic pay and retention.⁷² Perhaps compensation policy should reflect "the needs and circumstances of the post-cold war national security environment."⁷³ Also, since the Army must compete with the private sector for manpower, unless it significantly changes its fringe benefits package then "the pay package may be less competitive than perceived...[and] the discrepancy may be sizable in certain occupational areas where private sector fringes have advanced rapidly."⁷⁴ It is imperative that the Army analyzes the current system to find ways to improve assignment compliance, increase readiness in undesirable locations, and provide extra incentives for those who sacrifice the most time away from home.

RETENTION

Reenlistment options guaranteeing specific locations for first term soldiers can constrain the assignment system when soldiers do not want to go where the Army wants them to go. While this option appears to be useful for retention, no direct link has been established between guaranteeing soldiers a specific location and reenlistment rates. During reenlistment negotiations, conflicts occur between what the Army needs and what soldiers want. When Retention Division and Distribution Division are at odds over where to assign a soldier, Retention usually wins, because it is considered more important to keep a soldier in the Army, than to fill every position.

CURRENT INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE THE ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

The Army must accept that human resources are limited. It must go to war, conduct peacekeeping operations and support civil authorities with the soldiers it has available. Many personnel regulations and assignment policies are reminiscent of a draft force, having changed little since WWII. Seeing soldiers as a limited resource to be carefully managed is a paradigm shift for the Army's leadership.

PERSCOM has recently been modifying the assignment system and testing ways to improve personnel management despite the system's constraints. While EPMD's extraordinary efforts to manage such complexity are often overlooked, the bottom line is that the more policies created and exceptions permitted, the more soldiers will use those exceptions. EPMD primarily adjusts and modifies implementing procedures but cannot legislate the laws and policies impacting on assignments.

Regardless, in order to support the CSA's goals of reducing turbulence and improving predictability, EPMD plans to implement the following policy changes regarding PCS moves in the near future. EPMD must consider PERSTEMPO in the assignment process, provide a one year advanced assignment notification, only move soldiers with school-aged children from June through August, and stabilize families with high school seniors. To support these goals, EPMD made the following assumptions: 1) HQDA will initiate policy changes to facilitate Transformation, 2) "support will be provided to move soldiers according to the new PCS pattern," and 3) HQDA will provide "funding for automation and process redesign."⁷⁵ These current initiatives will be dependent on future personnel information management technologies as a result of Personnel Transformation. Such technologies promise to provide more predictability, establish one corporate database, reduce the personnel structure, reduce the personnel footprint in the battle space, create a virtual personnel center, create web based

applications for personnel procedures and establish more soldier to HQDA contact.⁷⁶ It remains to be seen what effects such policies will have on the assignment system. Current estimates are that the policy for moving soldiers with school aged children in the summer, will double the number of families relocating between June and August.⁷⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

CONUS BASING OF SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES

Advocates for home basing in CONUS contend that it provides families stability in one location for longer periods of time.⁷⁸ However, it also necessitates a current review of the Army's force structure and suggests the Army have at least a "three-to-one, CONUS to OCONUS mix by type of unit"⁷⁹ to provide a stable and adequate CONUS sustaining base of units and personnel. This suggests that only 25% of personnel should be permanently based overseas, although today it is closer to 30%.⁸⁰ In addition, other studies are examining support programs and whether they "cost effectively sustain readiness."⁸¹ Some research suggests that "readiness is affected by the overall well-being of military members and their families,"⁸² and that those based in CONUS have higher well-being than those OCONUS.

Recent personnel turbulence studies suggest the "Army needs to understand the extent to which reducing overseas stationing can reduce turbulence and save money."⁸³ Given that the "return of half the overseas authorizations would save about 31,000 moves and enhance CONUS stability by about eight months, a complete return of all overseas troops would roughly double the extent of the effects...and save the Army \$444 million per year, more than half the entire enlisted PCS-move budget."⁸⁴ Therefore, "overseas stationing...still substantially inhibits stability and costs a significant amount of PCS move money,"⁸⁵ because costs to move to OCONUS accompanied areas cost more than those to unaccompanied areas.

"Rotational moves account for only about one-quarter of all PCS moves but more than half of their total cost. Rotational moves can be reduced through two policy actions: reducing the number of soldiers [permanently] stationed overseas or increasing the length of overseas tours. Return of even half the overseas authorizations could save the Army more than \$300 million a year. The return of all overseas authorizations would save more than \$600 million a year in PCS moves and would permit much larger saving in overseas infrastructure, offset to some extent by added infrastructure costs in CONUS."⁸⁶

This study also highlighted that "there is little empirical basis for assessing the extent to which a change in the frequency of PCS moves affects either retention or morale."⁸⁷ Even though "the

absolute number of PCS moves has declined and is about to stabilize as the Army reaches postdrawdown stability...the aggregate per-capita PCS-move rates will remain at about the Cold War level."⁸⁸ For the enlisted force, Hix found that rotational moves to and from overseas assignments generate the most moves per capita, since the "principal determinants of rotational moves are the size of the force stationed OCONUS and the length of such tours of duty."⁸⁹ Unfortunately, the study also assumed that "unit moves are a thing of the past, for now, and require no management attention."⁹⁰

Yet conversely, when measuring overall satisfaction, Marines, who typically deploy more often and for shorter time periods, had higher satisfaction than Army personnel. The study concluded that there was a "negligible difference between the satisfaction of military personnel who were at their permanent home duty location compared to those who were deployed or on temporary duty."⁹¹ The study did not address whether predictability of the PCS moves and/or deployments impacted on well-being.

The Army recognized a need to temporarily assign soldiers to deploying units during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, which required large numbers of troops to deploy, without creating a permanent overseas infrastructure. PERSCOM created TCS to deploy a soldier as "an individual augmentee or filler...reassigned in a temporary status to augment or bring a deploying/deployed unit to strength."⁹² The TCS concept was invaluable for supporting Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard in the Balkans because individuals with special skills filled requirements needed by deploying units, such as linguists, civil affairs, and psychological operations. This process had some difficulties due to a lack of predictability and last minute notification to soldiers as well as lack of interoperability between Army systems.⁹³ However, TCS enabled the Army to deploy soldiers from their home stations, even OCONUS, with the intent of returning them to their CONUS home base once their mission was complete.

Others also examined the Army's rotation policies and advocate returning soldiers with special skills to the same CONUS location after an OCONUS assignment in order to support the Army's readiness and training needs.⁹⁴ Vernez and Zellman reported that "surveys show that wives regard separations and moves as among the least appealing aspect of a husband's military career,"⁹⁵ and that "relocations and separation have become increasingly difficult as the percentage of working spouses has increased."⁹⁶ Their study also found that Army enlisted soldiers are more likely than those in other services to be assigned to undesirable locations both OCONUS and in CONUS, and spend more time than other enlisted personnel overseas.⁹⁷ They recommend "innovative ways should be sought to minimize the Army's interference with

spouses' work and professional aspirations," [and] "consider this in developing relocation, separation and duty assignment policies and procedures."⁹⁸ It is unlikely that turbulence and PERSTEMPO will be reduced until the Army can reduce the number of permanent geographic locations to which soldiers may be assigned.

While tour equity is often cited as a reason for assigning soldiers overseas, in FY 2001 39% of soldiers had not completed an overseas tour of duty.⁹⁹ And, of the nearly 80,000 recruits assigned every year, approximately 30% are assigned overseas for their first tour and 70% remain in CONUS, likely due to the DoD policy that first term soldiers without families will only serve a maximum of 24 months in an overseas long tour area.¹⁰⁰ When the Air Force studied tour equity as early as 1967, it found that a "multitude of personnel assignment policies" constrained the rotation process.¹⁰¹ In the 21st century, PCS moves overseas with families should be the exception rather than the rule to maintain readiness and forces available to deploy and meet the needs of the Objective Force.

SHORT ROTATIONS OVERSEAS

In the 21st Century, "the continental United States will probably be the principal base of operations," which is one reason why "the Army must develop faster, lighter, and more lethal troops."¹⁰² Even the 1995 Force XXI future analysis postulated, "the Army of 2010 will be based primarily" in CONUS...with "a minimal forward presence in some parts of the world," depending on "airlift and sealift to execute the Nation's military strategy."¹⁰³ Likewise, the Army's Posture statement highlighted that "the Army is pursuing a range of programs to better align its infrastructure with mission requirements. Elimination of excess and unusable infrastructure through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and the Facilities Reduction Program (FRP) are essential to reducing the Army's annual facilities maintenance requirement."¹⁰⁴

Rotation of CONUS based units overseas is not new to the Army. The Army's first expeditionary force, the 1st Expeditionary Division, was sent to France on 26 June 1917 to establish a training and support base for follow on combat forces and to support the French and British.¹⁰⁵ The Army used six-month rotations with project ROTAPLAN in the 1970s, with Brigade 75 and Brigade 76 from 1975 through 1979 in USAREUR and in the 1980s with COHORT.¹⁰⁶ However, the challenge was maintaining a permanent structure of 100,000 in Germany, 20,000 in Korea and then rotating some units and not others. As early as 1981, the GAO recognized that rotation policies were one of the quality of life factors that impacted on retention and the quality of soldiers needed to support the Army.¹⁰⁷ In recent years, others have

highlighted the number of CONUS units that are not ready for contingencies and deployments because of turbulence created by assignment policies and management decisions that create turbulence.¹⁰⁸ The Army has successfully rotated units on six-month rotations to the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers Mission for 20 years.¹⁰⁹ Short rotations were studied in 1990¹¹⁰ and as late as 1999¹¹¹ for Korea. The Army currently uses six-month rotations to support peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and plans to continue this practice until at least May 2005.¹¹² In 1998, the Air Force announced its organizational restructure and employment with a concept called the "Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF)" in order to "reduce the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) strain on the Air Force by substantially reducing the need for forward deployment of forces for deterrence and by rotating the responsibility for deployments across the Air Force's operational units in a planned schedule."¹¹³

Six-month unit rotations and home basing of the majority of the force for quality of life and stability of family members still provides support for commitments overseas and reduces OCONUS infrastructure. The literature highlights the benefits for families and the Army of conducting six-month rotations, even to Korea and Europe. Benefits the Army would realize are: reduced PCS costs due to moving families overseas; improved unit cohesion during a rotation; improved training opportunities for all combat units; more soldiers would have the opportunity to serve OCONUS totally focused on the mission; improved deployment training for all units; and reduced need for OCONUS family housing and other support infrastructure such as schools, day care centers, youth programs, hospitals and clinics, larger commissaries and exchanges.¹¹⁴ Families would benefit by increased stability at a CONUS installation, better community support in their home country, increased funding for CONUS infrastructure and a predictable rotation schedule.

Six-month unit rotations reduce the issue of considering family member status in the assignment and deployment process. Commanders and soldiers can also focus on their deployment mission rather than worrying about a family left overseas. Some may view the constant deployment and redeployment of units, increased demands on the transportation system, family separations and increased need of garrison infrastructure to support families in CONUS as disadvantages of conducting six-month rotations. However, in a power projection Army, the training benefit received from conducting deployments becomes a combat multiplier, especially since only deployable soldiers classified as ready by USR standards would go overseas (such as with the MFO and Balkans missions now), resulting in increased readiness of OCONUS units. Although a concern cited by commanders is that six-month rotations will give soldiers an end date focus and they will not understand last minute extensions in a crisis, the

literature does not support this contention. When soldiers and families receive predictable information about peacetime deployments, they are willing to sacrifice when a crisis occurs.

Some research is also beginning to study and measure "the importance of base cohesion for military life" as a result of demographic, diversity and privatization trends.¹¹⁵ Six-month rotations overseas with CONUS based families would reduce the number of PCS deletions and deferments. Also, if soldiers currently based permanently OCONUS were part of CONUS installations, the Army would be better able to augment and supplement units rotating for SSC operations.

In 1988, Straub strongly argued that unit cohesion is critical to the effectiveness of combat units. He pointed out that even though a unit centered manning system which "emphasized unit temporary duty moves as the best way to accomplish overseas missions,"¹¹⁶ would create family separations, these separations would establish their own "rhythm" similar to the Navy and Marines and therefore, merit careful consideration. He contends that the benefits of unit rotations clearly outweigh the gains for soldier development, unit cohesion and stability for soldiers, but concedes that it may be difficult to change the Army's core belief of the "primacy of the individual."¹¹⁷ The Army needs to reexamine and fully study the feasibility of six-month overseas assignments for the majority of its personnel. It should also assess what locations are desirable and undesirable as well as analyze the cost savings and stability provided to families who are permanently based in CONUS. Sentimentality about the past and a romantic notion of families traveling together in a foreign country should not be the primary motivation for overseas stationing. Overseas basing decisions should be based on cost savings, deployability and the Army's ability to support CINC requirements and National Security Strategy.

PREDICTABILITY AND TURBULENCE AS WELL-BEING CONCERNS

Reducing the number of family PCS moves is a way to reduce the turbulence and stress currently experienced by soldiers, even though soldier deployment tempo may remain high. Given the current assignment system, the Army is moving large numbers of families overseas, creating double turbulence for the soldier because often after arriving overseas, the soldier deploys to support an operation.

Soldiers and families identify predictability in Army life as an area of concern.¹¹⁸ Henderson's analysis found, "the deeper one goes into the structure of the US Army, the greater the personnel turbulence seems to become...[especially] at platoon and squad level."¹¹⁹ "Rotation plans at company and battalion levels would assist in the creation of cohesive units," [since] "cohesion occurs at the squad, platoon, and company level."¹²⁰ Likewise, the Army's

system of stabilizing the leaders at battalion and brigade levels does not improve cohesion or reduce turbulence experienced by soldiers.¹²¹ More recent studies show that in a power projection force, soldiers expect to deploy as part of their jobs and they report high job satisfaction after operational deployments.¹²² Deployment tempo only overwhelms soldiers when the "three types of tempo affect [them] sequentially or simultaneously."¹²³ For example, when a soldier returns to CONUS from an unaccompanied tour (PERSTEMPO), gets assigned to a new unit that is getting ready for a major exercise or deployment (OPTEMPO), and deploys to support a contingency operation (DEPTempo), tempo has the worst impact. Tillson also identified two areas adding to tempo related problems: 1) security or benefits, housing and pay and 2) satisfaction or assignment to jobs that did not use their skills.¹²⁴ Announcing the Bosnia unit rotation schedule through 2005 is a step in the right direction because it allows commanders and soldiers to plan.¹²⁵ Predictability is important to soldiers and families, especially given the CSA's directive to reduce turbulence.

INCENTIVES AND COMPENSATION FOR UNDESIRABLE LOCATIONS

One of the areas of force readiness addressed by the 1997 QDR was the quality of life of the AVF. The report says that, "an important element of our policy toward our people must be to provide them with a quality of life commensurate with the sacrifices we ask them to make...the Department remains committed to funding pay raises and other compensation."¹²⁶ Incentives and compensation should be equitable for all who serve in undesirable locations or are deployed regardless of marital or dependency status. The Army recognizes compensation as an incentive and has provided reenlistment bonuses and special pays for soldiers volunteering for hard to fill assignments such as Ft Riley, KS, Ft Drum, NY and Korea. These incentives may address short term retention needs, but they do not analyze the long term implications of maintaining large numbers of soldiers permanently based overseas or address the systems, laws, policies and programs which the Army may need to support a transformed force.

Recent research suggests that a comprehensive analysis of military compensation would determine what compensation and incentives motivate soldiers and thereby increase productivity.¹²⁷ Personnel management literature emphasizes that "pay-for-knowledge" based systems will become critical in the 21st century, as "high performers complain of inequities and having to carry low performers,"¹²⁸ but tying compensation and incentives to those who are more valuable encourages "employee flexibility in job assignments."¹²⁹

Likewise, a Rand study found "those in positions with disamenities...greater injury, death, or health risks, or in unpleasant locations, must generally receive higher pay."¹³⁰ The new monetary incentive of \$150 a month¹³¹ for those assigned on the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is a step in the right direction; however, it is not nearly as lucrative for soldiers as a six-month deployment to the Balkans or the MFO in the Sinai, which have an income tax zone exclusion provision.

Although some research shows retention is affected by the number of military operations overseas, the high OPTEMPO, past force reductions, and a robust economy, the key to maintaining retention in today's environment depends on pay and compensation now rather than promises of long term benefits.¹³² Even Representative Ike Skelton, (D-Missouri) recognized that the tax zone exclusion, hazardous duty pay and family separation allowances contributed to the high retention rates in the Balkans today.¹³³

If filling undesirable locations and deploying is critical to readiness, the Army should invest in incentives that encourage soldiers' acceptance of such assignments. The Army also needs to closely monitor the equity of newly enacted monetary incentives and measure their impact on volunteerism and compliance. Given a choice between a year-long Korea assignment with no significant monetary incentives versus a six-month deployment to the Balkans with substantial monetary benefits, it is not hard to decide for which location soldiers will volunteer.

OPTIMUM TOUR LENGTHS

In 1978, the GAO found that the Army had not done any analyses "to determine the most appropriate frequency between reassignments."¹³⁴ There also was no formal definition of optimal stability, and "OSD and the services lack adequate criteria and measures of turbulence."¹³⁵ DoD currently has a policy establishing tour lengths; however, the Army does not have information about optimum tour lengths.¹³⁶ The Army has not conducted a cost benefit analysis to determine optimum tour lengths and whether it is necessary to assign soldiers and families overseas for long periods of time.

A Rand study looked at tour lengths in relation to turbulence and identified that increasing long tour lengths to four years did not significantly improve stability, but changing long tours to short tours definitely increased turbulence, despite the cost savings that would accrue.¹³⁷ It also found that policies affecting overseas stationing impact on the turbulence of PCS moves the most.¹³⁸ Unfortunately, this study assumed that current tour length policies and family overseas rotations were givens. Future turbulence studies should examine the feasibility of other options

and their impact on family stability. It is also worthwhile to note that while Army policy prohibits considering marital status in making assignments, marital and dependency status determines overseas tour lengths in most overseas locations.

HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

Policy changes should not be made in a vacuum. Recent studies highlight that to support a quality force, the Army "must use substantive analyses for personnel management policy formulation...in recruiting, selection, assignment and retention, that are theoretically and empirically defensible."¹³⁹ Policy makers should consider the consequences and subsequent effects of contemplated policies before implementation to assess their impact on the availability and readiness of the enlisted force. This would assist in devising an assignment system that is fair and predictable, and compensates soldiers for personal sacrifices.

In addition, recent policy initiatives incrementally add changes to the assignment system to address a specific concern, such as stability. Such incremental variations continually add to policies that have their basis in the Cold War and assume that the current force structure, basing locations and prescribed tour lengths are givens. While many assignment policies are well intentioned, such policy proliferation applied to the total force limits soldier availability, hampers assignment managers, and often conflict with one another. Such policies require personal attention and create the perception of unfairness when they are inconsistently or discriminately applied based on soldiers' personal situations rather than qualifications. EPMD must continue efforts to increase soldier assignment availability by championing laws such as the enactment of the indefinite status for Staff Sergeants with greater than ten years service, which eliminated their station of choice reenlistment option.

Unfortunately, soldiers with the least encumbrances must pull more than their fair share of undesirable assignments and are provided less compensation for their sacrifices. For example, the regulatory rule governing all-others tours contains a provision supporting divorced service members paying child support. Single soldiers in this category assigned to a long tour area are only required to serve a two-year tour, whereas a bonified bachelor or single soldier must serve three years. So while the Army provides additional compensation to divorced soldiers who pay child support, it also only requires soldiers in this category to serve the unaccompanied tour length of two years. Discriminately applying assignment policies only serves to confuse and dishearten soldiers and families as EPMD intensively manages the multitude of special programs and policies created to manage the force. This is becoming a particularly difficult

challenge, serving as the buffer between policy makers, and commanders and soldiers when there are not enough people to go around.

CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, the Army was reluctant to significantly change assignment policies particularly in Western Europe. With a changing world order, the nature of asymmetric threats, and budget constraints, it is time to analyze enlisted assignment policies. Army Transformation plans for a highly mobile and fast moving force, but there is little discussion about whether current assignment policies will support this force. Given the shift to a power projection force, a future dominated by SSC operations and limited end strength, is it prudent to maintain such a large, permanently based force and infrastructure overseas? Will manning an Army capable of accomplishing missions across the full spectrum of operations require a different assignment system? Will Personnel Transformation critically examine how current assignment policies impact on the availability of soldiers and the ability to support a Transformed Force?

Personnel Transformation must find ways to reduce noncompliance with assignment instructions, maintain ready and cohesive units, and stabilize families to improve well-being. The Army should consider the effects of assignment policies on soldiers in developing a force able to go when and where needed. Human resource management emphasizes that "the success or failure of any organization in this period of rapid change depends directly on the way in which it manages...highly capable and talented people," [who will leave] "unless management insures [it] can find the work and the rewards which build satisfaction and commitment."¹⁴⁰ Ideas such as CONUS basing, short rotations, increased overseas compensation for all soldiers, reduction of overseas infrastructure, and predictable deployment schedules should be studied as possible ways to support a power projection force. Every soldier counts in "An Army of One," and policy makers must be willing to think beyond the Cold War to develop systems to support them and the Transformed Army.

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GLOSSARY

ACCESSION MOVE - Moves that bring soldiers to their first duty stations.

AC/RC Program - Active Component to Reserve Component Program - A congressionally mandated program that provides active component Army personnel for assignment with Army national Guard (ARNG) and/or the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units.

AEA Codes - Assignment eligibility and availability codes are a management tool used to identify a soldier's eligibility and availability for reassignment.

ASSIGNMENT - Personnel placement action to satisfy a valid military manpower requirement.

DEPTEMPO - Deployment Tempo - Tempo caused by the deployment of individuals and units to meet the demands of the National Security Strategy as in Bosnia and to meet routine forward presence missions such as Navy and Marine forward deployments; DoD usually calls this PERSTEMPO.

DEROS - Date Eligible to Return from Overseas - The date a soldier is eligible to return from overseas upon completion of the prescribed overseas tour for the country in which serving.

DISTRIBUTION - The function of assigning available soldiers to units based on Army requirements and priorities.

DML - Distribution Management Level - A grouping of Unit Identification Codes (UIC) within EDAS based on installation, geographic location or major subordinate command, used by EPMD managers for distribution and strength management.

EDAS - Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System - An on-line system that allows EPMD managers to review and update requisition and assignment data and provides reports for strength management of the force; subsystems include Management Information, Requisition, Policy, Nomination, Assignment and Personnel.

END STRENGTH - The total number of personnel authorized by the Congress to be in the Army on the last day of the Fiscal Year (30 September); normally provided in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

EPMD - Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, Total Army Personnel Command, located in Alexandria, VA.

EXCEPTIONAL FAMILY MEMBER PROGRAM - An assignment of soldier enrolled in the EFMP through a medical treatment facility to locations where family members can receive special education or medical attention as explained in AR 608-75.

FORCE STRUCTURE ALLOWANCE - The sum of authorized spaces contained in all MTOE units and TDA type organizations.

FOREIGN SERVICE TOUR EXTENSION/CURTAILMENT - An action requested by a soldier to extend their overseas tour of duty or shorten their prescribed overseas tour or duty.

HAAP - Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program - An enlisted personnel policy which guarantees an assignment location after serving a hardship and/or unaccompanied tour OCONUS.

MARRIED ARMY COUPLES PROGRAM - Provides regular Army service members married to other regular Army service members the opportunity to establish a joint domicile while fulfilling the Army's mission, once enrolled both soldiers will be considered for future joint-domicile assignments.

MTOE ASSIGNMENT - Modified Table of Organization and Equipment requirement documented in a tactical unit.

NO SHOW - Soldier who has not arrived at gaining duty station by their projected report date.

OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION - A measurement of how much the Operating Strength (faces) is deviating from the force structure allowance (spaces).

OPERATIONAL MOVE - Transfer of soldiers from one duty station to another within a given theater or within the CONUS.

OPTEMPO - Operating Tempo - Tempo that is work-related that service members face on a day-to-day basis even when they are not suffering from deployment tempo.

OTEIP - Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program - In existence since 1981, a monthly incentive of special pay, special rest and recuperative absences and travel entitlements offered to qualified enlisted soldiers in specific military occupational specialties (MOS) who extend their current overseas tour for at least one year that can be used as a distribution tool for either short or hard to fill OCONUS requirements.

PCS - Permanent Change of Station - Movement of a soldier and/or his/her family members to meet the needs of the Army.

PCS TURBULENCE - That degree of personnel movement which exceeds the minimum turnover required by terms of service and standard tour policy as defined by DoD Directive 1315.7.

PEPDUS - PERSCOM Enlisted Personnel Data Update System - One of the major systems used to update data on the TAPDB, which consists of two components, a batch and an on-line, interactive component that allows managers worldwide to query and update personnel data via TAPDB-AE to the SIDPERS personnel file.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING AND STRENGTH REPORTING - A wartime and peacetime military personnel function that accounts for soldiers and reports their duty status and support the Army's personnel life-cycle function of sustainment as explained in AR 600-8-6.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT - Actions take by PERSCOM enlisted career divisions to identify, select for training, assign, and manage soldiers in various programs.

PERSONNEL READINESS - One of three components of overall Army and a unit's readiness, the others being training readiness and equipment status explained in AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting.

PERSONNEL TURNOVER - The number of moves normally required to maintain authorized strength levels under a stable force structure as defined in the Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum and established assignment, rotation and career development policies.

PERSTEMPO - Personnel Tempo - Tempo caused by the personnel system, such as permanent change of station moves, termination of command tours and assignment to schools.

PMAD - Personnel Management Authorization Document built from annual updates of the force structure reflected in the HQDA ODCSOPS Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and The Army Authorization Document System files.

RECLASSIFICATION - An action by a reclassification authority designated by PERSCOM, with or without board action, that results in changing a soldier's Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).

RETAIN - Reenlistment, Reclassification and Assignment System - A real time automated system that identifies and reserves training spaces or assignment vacancies for potential reenlistees and determines MOS availability for soldier undergoing reclassification based upon the individual's qualifications and the needs of the Army; used to process enlisted soldiers for reenlistment or reclassification assignments; soldier preferences are considered only within the Army's priorities and needs.

ROTATIONAL MOVE - Moves of soldiers to and from outside continental United States (OCONUS) assignments.

SEPARATION MOVE - Moves made to return soldiers to civilian life when they leave active duty.

SIDPERS-3 - The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System 3.0 - A total personnel information management information system for use at all echelons of command containing electronic records on Army personnel and used for transmitting personnel data to the TAPDB.

SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System - The single automated reporting system with the DoD that functions as the central registry of all operational units of the Armed Forces which serves as an internal management tool for use by the CJCS, Services, and combatant commands providing current data on the select resource areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability and training.

TAPDB-AE - Total Army Personnel Database - Divided into TAPDB - AE - Active Enlisted and TAPDB - AO Active Officer - An automated, standardized database containing military personnel data for active duty Army personnel and used to determine the Army's readiness, strength, promotion eligibles, reassignable personnel and training requirements.

TDA ASSIGNMENT - Table of Distribution and Allowances requirement documented in non-tactical units.

TDY - Temporary Duty Status - Temporary duty performed by a soldier and/or unit at one or more locations other than the permanent duty station, where a soldier performs duty under orders either enroute to a new permanent station or return to the current station, usually for limited periods of time for operational and/or training requirements and usually for which special

monetary allowances are provided for costs incurred, normally in duration of less than 20 weeks.

TCS - Temporary Change of Station - The temporary reassignment of soldier(s) as augmentees or temporary fillers to a deployed or deploying unit in support of a named contingency operation.

TRAINING MOVE - Moves that bring soldiers to training courses of 20 weeks duration or greater and send them to their next duty assignments upon completion of training.

TTHS Account - Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Student Account - Often referred to as the Individuals Account, are those personnel unavailable to fill spaces in units.

UNIT MOVE - Movement of a unit as directed by an Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) movement directive, where soldiers moves as a part of the relocation of an entire unit.

ENDNOTES

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¹³ Robert Watt, Enlisted Personnel Assignment System Study: DCSPER Study No. 7502 (McLean, VA: General Research Corporation, Operations Analysis Division, October 1974), ix.

¹⁴ Leonard L. Lerwill, ed., The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1954, facsimile ed. 1988), 469.

¹⁵ Joseph W. Trez, Manning the Army in Peace and War, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 12 March 1990), 9.

¹⁶ Lerwill, 475.

¹⁷ Lane, David A., Robert Gumerove, Elizabeth W. Holtzworth, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army Europe (HQ United States Army, Europe: Historical Division, 1957). Operation Gyroscope was approved in October 1954. Its operating guidelines were contained in AR 220-20, dated 20 October 1954 with an implementation date of 1 July 1955. Operation Gyroscope rotated entire divisions, regiments and battalions of soldiers and families between overseas and CONUS locations in an attempt to create unit cohesion, improve combat effectiveness and morale, and provide family stability by maintaining unit integrity and providing advanced notification of assignments. The Army assumed that one-half of the rotating soldiers were careerists or regular Army while the other half was Selective Service Draftees. The Army encountered the most difficulties with relocating entire divisions and disadvantages had to do with the costs associated with the inability to achieve authorized personnel strength levels of units projected to rotate overseas, lack of timely notification for projected rotating units, logistical and transportation considerations concerning the timely movement of personnel belongings as well as the inability to accommodate all families with government quarters. Operation Gyroscope identified many advantages and benefits when rotating regiment/ battalion and smaller sized units and included assignment and family stability, commitment to the mission and greater sense of belonging and cohesiveness.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, COHORT Unit Expansion Program, Package Replacement System: An Information Guide for Personnel Managers (Washington, D.C.: DAPE-MPU, Unit Manning Division, 1987). In 1981 the Army developed the New Manning System in order to improve unit cohesion and combat effectiveness and reduce personnel turbulence. One component of the system was the Cohesion, Operational, Readiness and Training (COHORT) program designed to recruit, form, stabilize, retain and deploy cohesive units in an effort to reduce personnel and organizational turbulence. Its goal was to stabilize soldiers in the same company and battery units for three years. COHORT modeled three variations: 1) Europe rotations of 18 months CONUS and 18 months OCONUS, 2) nonrotating units spend three years in one location and 3) Korea rotations of two years in CONUS and one year in Korea. In 1986 the Army revised COHORT and tested the rotation of eight battalion level units between CONUS and Europe. This test was impacted by constantly changing policy guidance, untimely movement orders, transportation issues for moving large numbers of families at the same time and readiness and nondeployability issues such as exceptions to policy, concurrent travel and Exceptional Family Member requests. The Army used variations of COHORT until the 1990s downsizing and the personnel shortfall created by having more force structure than people to fill combat units.

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²⁰ James R. Stewart, Chief, Unit Manning Division, "Battalion After Action Report," memorandum for Director, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17013-5050, HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C., 13 August 1987.

²¹ Donald E. Weber, Assignment Policy, HQDA, ODCSPER, telephone interview by author, 21 February 2001.

²² Department of the Army, Overseas Service: Assignments, Details and Transfers, Army Regulation 614-30 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 25 September 1998), 1.

²³ Ibid., 2.

²⁴ James A. O'Brien, Managing Information Systems: Managing Information Technology in the Internetworked Enterprise, 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Irwin McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 1999), 67.

²⁵ U.S. Army War College Publication, How the Army Runs (Carlisle, PA, 1 April 1999), 13-16.

²⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, The Adjutant General, "SIDPERS -3 Procedural Guidance," August 2000; available from <<http://www.perscom.army.mil/tagd/sidpers3/page1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2001. The Standard Installation Division Personnel System 3-0 (SIDPERS 3) is the Army's personnel management information system and automates many key personnel processes such as Promotions, Strength Accounting/Management, Personnel Updates and Reassignments. SIDPERS-3 architecture consists of distributed databases or workcenters and servers resident at each echelon from field user level to MACOM level: separate unit/battalion, brigade, division, personnel unit and installation/MACOM. Units must update soldiers' personnel status to ensure HQDA databases such as TAPDB and EDAS have the most current information on which to base soldier management and assignment decisions. SIDPERS-3 requires daily data transmission and processing by all users to ensure soldiers' personnel status changes are input in a timely manner, and preclude poor data synchronization, high transaction error rates and poor system performance and data discrepancies.

²⁷ Department of the Army, Unit Status Reporting, Army Regulation 220-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 September 1997), 11.

²⁸ Jacobs, "Personnel Transformation: Enlisted Assignment Process: Concept Briefing."

²⁹ U.S. Army War College Publication, How the Army Runs, 13-10.

³⁰ Department of the Army, Permanent Change of Station Policy: Assignments, Details and Transfers, Army Regulation 614-6 Update, 4.

³¹ Rodney X. Sturdivant, <sturdivr@hoffman.army.mil>, "Enlisted Assignment Process - Request for Information," electronic mail message to Julie Manta <julie.manta@carlisle.army.mil>, 24 January 2001.

³² Helen Malloy, <malloyh@hoffman.army.mil>, "Enlisted Authorizations for Korea and Germany," electronic mail message to Julie Manta <julie.manta@carlisle.army.mil>, 20 February 2001.

³³ Arthur Dean, Director of Military Personnel Management, "FY 98-99 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Active Component, Enlisted Distribution Policy," memorandum for HQDA Staff and U.S. Army Major Subordinate Commands, Washington, D.C., 22 October 1997. Until the CSA's Unit Manning Campaign, announced on 8 November 1999, Enlisted Distribution

Policy defined three categories for priority of fill. Fill Priorities 1, 2, & 3. Fill Priority 1 units were designated as: units in Personnel Priority Group 1 and 2 filled at 100% by MOS and Grade (DoD, Joint and Department of the Army nominative agencies and activities); Special Management Commands filled at 100% (small, isolated, operationally-sensitive high priority commands); Excepted MOS/Positions/Units filled at 98-100% (Field Recruiting Force, Drill Sergeants, Service School Instructors, MEDCOM AMEDD Center and School, 3d U.S. Infantry Regiment [The Old Guard], Corrections Specialists for Disciplinary Barracks, Ft Leavenworth, National Training Center Operations Group, Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group, Battle Command Training Program Operations Group, Combined Military Training Center Operations Group and Active Component Support to Reserve Component); DMO (Directed Military Overstrength) filled at 100% by MOS and Grade. Fill Priority 2 units will be manned between 98 and 100% of PMAD authorizations in the aggregate and included the 82d Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), 101st Division (Air Assault), 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, select Force Support Package units, 2d Infantry Division, 1-509th Infantry Battalion, and other Personnel Priority Group 3 units.

³⁴ Shinseki, Eric K. "Unit Manning Campaign," 8 November 1999; available from <http://www.army.mil/armyvision/msg_unit_manning.htm; Internet; accessed 11 March 2001. The CSA's Unit Manning Campaign established a three-pronged approach to manning all units at 100% by grade and MOS in order to ensure the Army is a strategically responsive force. The three elements are: 1) Distribution, 2) Recruiting and 3) Matching Force Structure to Congressionally Authorized End Strength. A phased approach to distribution during Transformation requires HQDA to assess the impact of manning at 100% grade and skill. Fill Priority One units will be targeted to receive 100% of their key positions and manning floors will be established for all units. Grades and skills combinations that are Army-wide shortages will be fair-share distributed. This phased approach will take place from Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. In FY 00, the 10 active component divisions and the Armored Cavalry Regiments will be targeted to 100% fill within the three grade bands, E1-E4, E5-E6 and E7-E9. For FY 01, echelon above division units designated as early deploying units filled to 100% of authorizations by grade and skill. For FY 02, remaining TOE units will be filled to 100% of authorizations by grade and skill. For FY 03, HQDA approved TDA units will be filled to 100% of authorizations by grade and skill. The second element established recruiting as the number one priority on the CSA's Mission Essential Task List. The third element, force structure, directed MACOM functional area assessments to determine whether the Army has the personnel resources to perform its assigned missions. If the assessment determines the Army needs more resources, then the Army will ask the nation's leaders for what it needs and identify unresourced capabilities.

³⁵ James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 162.

³⁶ Ibid., 167

³⁷ Ibid., 145.

³⁸ Ibid., 3.

³⁹ Roberta J. Smith, A Description of the Enlisted Service Rotation System, prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Report No. N-1004-MRAL (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, December 1979), 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 35.

⁴¹ Ibid., 1.

⁴² General Accounting Office, Military Tour-Length and Tour-Curtailment Policies and Practices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 19 July 1985), 2.

⁴³ Weber.

⁴⁴ James M. Dubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure," Landpower Essay Series, No. 97-1 (Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, February 1997), 11.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁶ Caldera, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2001, 37.

⁴⁷ Sandra I. Meadows, "The Stage is Set for Intense Finger-Pointing on Shortage of Funds to Modernize Military," National Defense 82 (December 1997): 4. [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 228347531.

⁴⁸ William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000) 16.

⁴⁹ John P. White and James R. Hosek, "The Analysis of Military Manpower Issues," in Military Service in the United States, ed. LTG Brent Snowcroft (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), 67.

⁵⁰ Caldera, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2001, 17.

⁵¹ Ibid., F-2.

⁵² Gordon Sullivan, "Soldier Pay and Quality of Life," 1 September 1998; available from <<http://www.ausa.org.htm>>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2001.

⁵³ David R. Segal, "Implications for Army Personnel Quality from Contemporary Sociological Research," in Future Soldiers and the Quality Imperative: the Army 2010 Conference, ed. Robert L. Phillips and Maxwell B. Thurman (Cantigny, IL, 1994), 318.

⁵⁴ U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. "PERSTEMPO Law," December 2000; available from <<http://www.perscom.army.mil/perstempo/law/thelaw.htm>>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2000. Personnel Tempo or PERSTEMPO was enacted in NDAA (National Defense Authorization Action) 2000, Title 10 United States Code, Section 586, Members Under Burdensome Personnel Tempo, Chapter 50 - Miscellaneous Command Responsibilities, Section 991 requires the Armed Forces to track the rate at which military personnel are

deployed away from their home stations. Later amended in NDAA 2001 and requires payment of a \$100-a-day per diem for any service member deployed for more than 401 days within a 730 day rolling window as well as general officer management requirements such as approval of service members deployed more than 220 days within a 365 day rolling window.

⁵⁵ Emmett A. Faulk, Analysis of the U.S. Army Enlisted Personnel Distribution System, Student Research Report No. 027 (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1976), 18.

⁵⁶ Morris Janowitz, ed. The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization (New York, NY: Russell sage Foundation, 1964) 37.

⁵⁷ Patrick K. Sedlak, "Stabilizations," briefing slides, Alexandria, VA, Plans, Policies and Operations Branch, Operations Management Division, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, 9 February 2001.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Joseph A. Moore, Jr., Personnel Readiness in a Force Projection Army, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 1.

⁶² Ibid., 11.

⁶³ Sedlak. Periods of stabilization are reflected in EDAS with AEA codes (management tools identifying soldier's eligibility and availability for reassignment). Effective February 2001, EPMD created five new codes for the following SSC rotations: Kosovo Force Rotation (KFOR), Stabilization Force Rotation (SFOR), Deploy on Miscellaneous Rotation, Operation Desert Springs (ODS) and Multinational Force and Observers Mission (MFO).

⁶⁴ Jacobs.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Military Family Resource Center, prepared for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Profile of the Military Community: 1999 Demographics," available from <<http://mfrc.calib.com.htm>>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2001.

⁶⁷ Charles L. Frame, Unit Replacement System Analysis: Infantry/Field Artillery/Armor, prepared for the United States Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Agency, July 1986), B-1.

⁶⁸ D.S. Jacobs <jacobsd@hoffman.army.mil>, "Korea No Show Presentation," electronic mail message to Julie Manta <julie.manta@carlisle.army.mil>, 22 January 2001.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Sar A. Levitan and Karen Cleary Alderman, Warriors at Work: The Volunteer Armed Force, Sage Library of Social Research, vol. 58 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), 61.

⁷¹ Michelle Drumheller, "Troop Shortages Prompt Military Retention Drive," National Defense 83 (May/Jun 1999): 35 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 273110771.

⁷² Beth J. Asch and John T Warner, A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy, prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, Report no. MR-439-OSD, 1994), xiii.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ White, 73.

⁷⁵ D.S. Jacobs, "Personnel Transformation: Enlisted Assignment Process: Concept Briefing."

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Trez, 51.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 50.

⁸⁰ Sturdivant.

⁸¹ Richard Buddin, Building a Personnel Support Agenda: Goals, Analysis Framework and Data Requirements, prepared for the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1998), xiv.

⁸² Ibid., 30.

⁸³ W. Michael Hix, Herbert J. Shukiar, Janet M. Hanley, Richard J. Kaplan, Jennifer H. Kawata, Grant N. Marshall, and Peter J.E. Stan, Personnel Turbulence: The Policy Determinants of Permanent Change of Station Moves (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, Report No. MR-938-A, 1998), 39.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 50.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 14.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 23.

⁹¹ Buddin, 45.

⁹² U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, The Adjutant General, "SIDPERS-3 Procedural Guidance," August 2000; available from <<http://www.perscom.army.mil/tagd/sidpers3/page1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2001.

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⁹⁴ North, 14.

⁹⁵ Vernez, 31.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 36.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 32.

⁹⁸ Ibid., viii.

⁹⁹ Sturdivant.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ E.P. Durbin and Olivia Wright, A Model for Estimating Military Personnel Rotation Base Requirements (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation – 5398-PR, 1967), 1.

¹⁰² Paul J. Kern, "The Future Battlefield," Army, July 2000, 20.

¹⁰³ Togo D. West, Jr., and Gordon R. Sullivan, Force XXI: America's Army of the 21st Century (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Chief of Staff Army, Director Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, 15 January 1995), 31.

¹⁰⁴ Caldera, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2001, xix.

¹⁰⁵ Lerwill, 199.

¹⁰⁶ Trez, 19.

¹⁰⁷ General Accounting Office, Management and Compensation of Military and Civilian Federal Workforces: Issues for Planning (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 January 1981), 16.

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¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 29.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 53.

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¹¹⁴ Trez, 54.

¹¹⁵ Peggy McClure, "Measuring the Cohesion of Military Communities," Armed Forces and Society 26 (Spring 2000): [database on-line; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI Publication no. 273107736].

¹¹⁶ Christopher C. Straub, The Unit First: Keeping the Promise of Cohesion (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1988), 131.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 129.

¹¹⁸ Carolyn Becraft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel Support, Families and Education, A Compendium of Quality of Life Research, prepared for the United States Department of Defense Quality of Life Research Symposium at Georgetown University (Arlington, VA: Military Family Resource Center, 16 December 1996), 50.

¹¹⁹ Wm. Darryl Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat: Leadership and Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam and Israel (Washington, D.C. National Defense University Press, 1985), 47.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 48.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Tillson, S-2.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ "SFOR and KFOR Rotations Set." ARMY, 57.

¹²⁶ William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, May 1997) 37.

¹²⁷ Asch, A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy, 2.

¹²⁸ Joseph H. Boyett and Henry P. Conn, Workforce 2000: The Revolution Reshaping American Business (New York, NY: Dutton, Penguin Books, USA, Inc. 1991), 130.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 135

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¹³¹ Vince Crawley, "Tough Duty Brings New Rewards," Army Times (15 January 2001), 18.

¹³² Bradley Graham, "Military Pension: Maneuvers: Costly Push to Misjudgment?: Premise That Higher Rate Will Aid Retention Is Challenged," The Washington Post (11 February 1999): A-35 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 273112755.

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¹³⁸ Ibid., 32

¹³⁹ Curtis L. Gilroy and W.S. Sellman, "Recruiting and Sustaining a Quality Army: A Review of the Evidence," in Future Soldiers and the Quality Imperative: the Army 2010 Conference ed. Robert L. Phillips and Maxwell B. Thurman (Cantigny, IL, 1994), 69-70.

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