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FIELD MARSHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN AND THE OPERATIONAL ART AT THE BATTLE OF KHARKOV

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Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and the Operational Art at the Battle of Kharkov

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ABSTRACT

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Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was one of Hitler's most competent generals. He was a master of maneuver warfare who orchestrated the counterattacks of Germany's Army Group South during the Winter Campaign of 1942-43. His bold decisive offensive operation led to the destruction of 52 Soviet divisions. His brilliant maneuver recaptured the key city of Kharkov and restored the German positions on the Eastern Front from a year earlier.
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I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Col (Ret) Brian Moore for his help in this project. Col Moore proved to be an invaluable resource in the compilation of this project. Without his advice and patience, I could not have done this.
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There have been many great military leaders throughout history. It is to be expected in a world filled with conflict where military power has become the premier method of resolving disputes. One of the finest military leaders in recent history was Germany's Erich von Manstein. Though not the father of the Blitzkrieg, he was undoubtedly the most able in its execution. One of the best examples of military operations conducted at the operational level of war was that of Field Marshal von Manstein's Army Group South (formerly Army Group Don) on the Russian Front from November 1942 through March 1943. With limited resources, a large front and facing vastly superior enemy force, Manstein was able to regain hundreds of miles of territory and inflict tremendous losses to the Soviets. His most brilliant operation was during the battle for the city of Kharkov in late February and early March 1943.

The general verdict among the German generals I interrogated in 1945 was that Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in their Army, and the man they had most desired to become its Commander-in-Chief. It is very clear that he had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of
mechanised forces than any of the other commanders who had not been trained in the tank arm. In sum, he had military genius.\textsuperscript{1}

The Early Years of Field Marshal von Manstein

Erich von Manstein was born Erich von Lewinski in Berlin on 24 November 1885. He was the tenth child of a professional Army officer, Eduard von Lewinski, who himself attained the rank of general. His mother’s sister who married Georg von Manstein later adopted him. Interestingly enough, his adopted father Georg von Manstien was also a professional Army officer who attained the rank of general.

He became a member of the Cadet Corps at Plon and Berlin and entered the Army on April 6, 1906 as an Ensign in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Foot Guards. He remained in the Foot Guards until August 1914 when he became the Adjutant of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Guards Reserve Regiment as First Lieutenant. Manstein participated in several campaigns during World War I. In November 1914 he was severely wounded while on the Eastern Front. In June of 1915, he was a Staff Officer with Army Group Gallwitz in Poland and Serbia. From 1915 to 1918, now a Captain, Manstein was assigned to numerous staff positions on the Western Front. In 1919, Manstein was a Staff Officer to General von Lossberg in Berlin and Kassel drawing up plans for 100,000-man army allowed under the Treaty of Versailles.

Von Manstein married Jutta Sybille von Loesch in 1920 and together they had two sons. The eldest was later killed in Russia in 1942. Von Manstein finally commanded a company with the 5\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment in Pomerania from 1920 to 1923. In February 1927, he was promoted to major and served in numerous staff positions until his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in April 1932. Soon after he took command of the Jaeger Battalion of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment in Kobler. Manstein was promoted to Colonel on 1 December 1933 and was assigned as the Chief of Staff to General von Witzleben in Berlin. In July 1935, he was made the Head of Operations Branch of the Army General Staff. In October 1936, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and assigned as the Oberquartiermeister I (deputy to the Chief of Staff), the second highest position on the German General Staff. After dismissal by Hitler of General von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Manstein and many of his colleagues were removed from the Army High Command. He was made commander of the 18\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division in Liegnitz until he was assigned as Chief of Staff to General von Leeb during the Munich Crisis. In 1939, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. At the beginning of World War II, Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein was the Chief of Staff of the Southern Army Group commanded by General von Rundstedt.\textsuperscript{2}

After the campaign in Poland, Manstein developed the operational concept for the movement of the German main armored effort through the Ardennes that was instrumental in defeating the French Army. He led a Panzer Corps in the initial stages of the invasion of Russia and was promoted to Field Marshal during operations in the Crimea. On 20 November 1942, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein received orders to assume command of the sector on both sides of Stalingrad, the newly created Army Group Don.\textsuperscript{3} Von Manstein now found himself, for the first time, directly under the command of Hitler.\textsuperscript{4}
Background

In the summer of 1942, Hitler launched a summer campaign to seize Stalingrad and the oil rich Caucasus region of the southern Soviet Union. During these operations, the Russians withdrew with many casualties. The opportunity to complete the capture of Stalingrad was missed, as the city was lightly defended. The operation briefly culminated in October of 1942 due to extremely low infantry strength. After receiving five new infantry battalions, the Germans renewed their attack with the Sixth Army on 14 October of 1942. This time, the Russians were well dug in and better prepared and the Sixth Army did not have much success. Both Soviet and German forces occupied Stalingrad and both sides became locked in a bloody battle over control of the city. The battle developed into a contest of attrition. The Germans sought to interdict Russian supplies and troop movements along the Volga River and the Russians sought to inflict as many casualties on the Germans as possible in the confined house-to-house fighting.

The Soviets launched their Winter Offensive of 1942-43 with the goal of total collapse of the German forces in Russia. They complete this by cutting off and destroying the southern wing of Germany’s armies. The first priority was to recapture Stalingrad. This offensive succeeded in not only recapturing Stalingrad but also in destroying the Sixth Army. This was a serious blow to Hitler’s offensive plans. This was the first major Soviet victory of the war and they now believed that the German Army was crumbling. Based on their success, the Soviets planned two very ambitious operations (GALLOP and STAR).

Operation GALLOP was to be conducted by the Southern Front. The Southern Front was commanded by General Vatutin and consisted of four Armies: the 6th Army, the 1st Guards Army, the 3rd Guards Army, the 5th Tank Army, and Mobile Reserve Popov. The Southern Front’s combat strength was approximately 325,000 men and 500 tanks (the majority of tanks were located in Mobile Reserve Popov). The operation would consist of a main attack southwest towards Starabelsk and then turn south towards Stalin, Mariupol, and the Sea of Azov with the mission of cutting off the withdrawing Germans trying to cross the Dnepr River, then seize the crossing sites along the river to recapture the resource-rich Donbas area. (See Map 1).

Operation STAR would be conducted by the Voronezh Front, commanded by General Golikov, with the goal of relieving Kharkov and driving the German forces as far west as possible. Additionally, they were given the mission of recapturing Kursk. This mission added an additional 100 kilometers to the front and would force Golikov’s effort to diverge to the west and southwest. There were five Armies consisting of approximately 200,000 men and over 300 tanks: the Thirty-eighth Army, the Sixtieth Army, the Fortieth Army, the Sixty-fourth Army, and the Third Tank Army. General Golikov planned to attack west towards Kursk with two armies and southwest towards Kharkov with three. This plan left him with virtually no operational reserves nor a second echelon.
Manstein Takes Command

Manstein took command of the Army Group Don, which consisted of the Fourth Panzer Army, the Sixth Army, and the Third Rumanian Army, and the Fourth Rumanian Army. His mission as defined by the Army High Command (O.K.H.) order was “to bring the enemy’s attacks to a standstill and recapture the positions previously occupied by us [Axis],” in essence, he was to free the encircled Sixth Army, recapture Stalingrad, and protect Army Group A’s supply lines in order for it to continue attacking in the Caucasus.

The Manstein Army Group was stretched over a frontage of roughly 435 miles in length. He had Army Group B on his left flank and Army Group A on his right. Manstein was outnumbered approximately 7 to 1 and his enemy had vastly shorter interior supply lines. Manstein’s first task was to relieve the beleaguered Sixth Army. He was unable to save the Sixth Army and, in the face of a tremendously superior attacking force that enjoyed relative freedom of action, he was also unable to protect the supply lines of Army Group A. Manstein wanted to shorten the lines between his Army Group and that of Army Group A to his south by giving some ground in the east. This would allow forces to be withdrawn and consolidated into operational panzer reserves, which would be used to stop further Soviet attacks. Hitler was unwilling to give up any ground and therefore disapproved the plan.

The actions of the Don Army Group during the winter campaign of 1942-43 can be broken down into 4 successive phases:

The *first* was the struggle for the relief of the Sixth Army, on which the Army Group staked everything it could possibly afford.

The *second phase* was the Army Group’s struggle to keep the rear of Army Group A free while it was being disengaged from the Caucasus front.

The *third phase* consisted in the actual battle to keep open the lines of communication of the German armies’ southern wing and to prevent it from being “tied off”.

This led to the final, *fourth phase* in which the Army Group succeeded — if on a smaller scale than it would have liked — in dealing the counterblow culminating in the battle of Kharkov.

Operation STAR
The Voronezh Front

Hitler had told Manstein in January that he was assembling a newly equipped SS Panzer Corps (SS Panzer Corps Hauser, later II SS Panzer Corps) in the vicinity of Kharkov under Army Detachment Lanz of Army Group B, which would conduct an offensive counterstroke against the Soviets. Manstein did not believe that this SS Panzer Corps would be capable of conducting operations until mid-February and even then, they would be unable to accomplish their mission. In late January and early February, the Soviets launched Operations GALLOP and STAR. To counter this, Hitler ordered Manstein to
assume control of the II SS Panzer Corps consisting of two divisions and attack to strike at the Soviets flank. Manstein replied to the High Command that he was not in a position to take control of the SS Panzer Corps based on distance, that it did not have enough combat power to succeed, and that he required the operational freedom to pull back Army Detachment Hollidt (formerly of Army Group B) to the Mius River and withdraw the 4th Panzer Army to a position to act as an operational reserve before they were completely encircled. Because of these issues, Manstein flew to Hitler's headquarters in order to resolve these issues. After intense debate, Hitler conceded and gave in to Manstein's operational intentions. Both Army Detachment Hollidt and the 4th Panzer Army were able to withdraw to the Mius River though Manstein was not sure that they would be able to hold.

Manstein realized that Army Detachment Lanz (approximately 50,000 men) was not capable of holding Kharkov or of conducting a major attack to the south with the II SS Panzer Corps. Manstein suggested to Hitler that Army Detachment Lanz temporarily give up Kharkov and focus its energy on stopping the Soviet penetrations to the south. This would eliminate the immediate danger of the armies in the south being cut off. Manstein believed that once the Soviet attacks were stopped, Kharkov could be retaken. Unfortunately, Hitler viewed Kharkov as a matter of prestige as it was the fourth largest city in Russia, thus Hitler reaffirmed his order to hold Kharkov at all costs. Lanz attacked on 11 February to the southwest towards Manstein's left flank. The attack failed and the SS Panzer Army was driven back to Kharkov three days later.

The Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South on the 13th of February and it absorbed the remaining forces of the battered Army Group B (which was removed from the German order of battle). Manstein moved his headquarters to the town of Zaporozhye on the Dnepr River in order to better command and control its forces. During this time the situation was serious for the German Army. There existed the possibility that the entire southern armies of Germany might be encircled and thereby cut-off. Additionally, the Kharkov sector to the north, previously under command of Army Group B, was ordered to revert to the control of Manstein's Southern Army Group. The removal of Army Group B did cause some command and control problems as units struggled to regain communications with Manstein's headquarters.

But although the removal of H.Q. Army Group B complicated the handling of operations at the most delicate spot on the Eastern Front, it still served one useful purpose. By bringing Army Detachment Lanz under Southern Army Group, it enabled our headquarters to exercise exclusive command at the decisive place and the decisive time. In effect, this contributed substantially to the final success of the winter campaign of 1942-3.

Holding Kharkov was the II SS Panzer Corps commanded by General Hauser. The II SS Panzer corps was subordinate to Army Detachment Lanz commanded by General Lanz. Army Detachment Lanz had been ordered by Hitler to hold Kharkov at all costs, and in order to relieve pressure on Southern Army Group's left flank, it was to attack south in the direction of Losovaya with a Panzer Corps [II SS Panzer Corps] as its nucleus. There was much confusion about this order, which had originally been
Manstein believed that this order was no longer valid as he now had commanded the forces and this order would not allow him to conduct a proper defense. The Soviet Voronezh Front experienced tremendous success and on 15 February, against the orders of General Lanz, the II SS Panzer Corps withdrew from Kharkov under heavy pressure. On 20 February General Kempf, a tank general, replaced Lanz, who was a mountain warfare specialist.

**Operation GALLOP**  
**The Southwest Front**

On 29 January the Southwest Front launched their attack against the Germans. They quickly fought to the Donetz River and by the 5th of February had succeeded in capturing the town of Izyum. The Soviet First Guards Army was pushing into the town of Slavyansk on the western side of the Donetz River. Here they ran into two German divisions of the redeploying German First Panzer Army (3rd and 7th Panzer Divisions) that defended tenaciously in and around the town. Slavyansk became a major problem for the Soviets and they now began to divert forces to its capture. The Soviet High Command believed that the German’s were in a full-scale retreat and the forces at Slavyansk were only a delaying rear guard. It therefore pressured the Front commander to take the town and resume the attack against the fleeing Germans. This would work against the Soviets by overextending their lines of supply.

The Russian Mobile Group Popov attacked south of Slavyansk and succeeded in capturing one of Army Group South’s critical railway lines at Krasnoarmeyskoye. This attack forced action on the part of the First Panzer Army, which would have to counterattack to recapture the railway lines. The railroad lines became a key method of supplying the forces as snowdrifts had closed many of the roads to trucks. The most significant aspect of these counterattacks was that the Germans realized that Mobile Group Popov was overextended and that his line of communications was vulnerable.

The Soviet's First Guard Army had managed, with support from the Sixth Army on its right, to push to 15 miles from the Dnepropetrovsk, a critical crossing across the Dnieper River and had severed another crucial railway line. The First Panzer Army withdrew from Slavyansk in order to concentrate its forces in order to counterattack Mobile Group Popov and recapture Krasnoarmeyskoye and reopen the railway line between Dnepropetrovsk and Stalino. This counterattack went unnoticed by the Soviet High Command.

**The Battle to Retake Kharkov**

On the 17th of February, Hitler visited Manstein’s headquarters and received the following update from Manstein:

*Army Detachment Hollidt* had reached the Mius positions that same day, closely pursued by the enemy.
First Panzer Army had halted the enemy at Grishino, but not yet finished him off. In the Kramatorskaya area, likewise, the battle against the enemy forces on the Lisichansk-Slaviansk line was still undecided.

Army Detachment Lanz, having evacuated Kharkov, had withdrawn south-west towards the Mosh sector. 19

Over the next three days, Manstein also took this opportunity to describe the entire situation facing the German Armies. He told Hitler of his plans to have II SS Panzer Corps to attack south out of Kharkov in order to link up with the repositioned Fourth Panzer Army and then conduct a coordinated attack to destroy the Soviet forces now attacking between the Army Detachment and the First Panzer Army. Manstein believed that this move would prevent his Army Detachment Hollidt and the First Panzer Army from being cut off. 20 Once this was achieved, he could focus his attention on Kharkov. Hitler did not believe that the Soviet forces were as strong as Manstein was indicating nor did he believe that Manstein’s attacks would succeed. Hitler was of the opinion that Manstein’s attacks would bog down as winter changed to spring and the ground thawed. Hitler demanded an attack on Kharkov for political reasons, and with the impending thaw the ability to retake Kharkov would never be achieved. On the second day of Hitler’s visit, 18 February, the situation changed. The Soviets had continued to advance between the First Panzer Army and Army Detachment Lanz and one its divisions had become bogged down in the mud along the northern approach to Kharkov. Manstein pressed Hitler with the plan that the only remaining thing to do was to conduct the attack as planned to destroy the advancing Soviets that were rapidly advancing between Manstein’s Army Detachment Lanz and the First Panzer Army. Time was of the essence as the ground was sure to thaw in that area soon also. Hitler reluctantly agreed and on the 19th of February instructions were issued that ordered the Fourth Panzer Army to deploy for its counterattack and the SS Panzer Corps to began its attack to the south to provide operational cover for Fourth Panzer Army’s attack. As Hitler left Manstein’s headquarters, Soviet combat units were only 35-40 miles away with no intervening German units. 21 The closest the Soviet formation got to Manstein’s Headquarters in Zaporozhye was 12 miles where they ran out of fuel and were eventually destroyed. 22

Manstein believed he had two different things that his Army Group must accomplish. First it must hold the eastern front on the Mius River, and secondly it must counterattack with the Fourth Panzer Army to quickly defeat the enemy between the First Panzer Army and Army Detachment Lanz.

Soon after Hitler’s departure from Manstein’s headquarters at Zaporozhye, General Hoth commander of the Fourth Panzer Army arrived and received Manstein’s intent. Manstein placed control of the SS Panzer Corps, located south of Kharkov at Krasnograd, under Hoth as well as control of the XLVIII and LVII Panzer Corps. Manstein ordered Army Detachment Hollidt into an economy of force mission with instructions to defend from the town of Voroshilovgrad to the Sea of Azov.

The First Panzer Army and the Fourth Panzer Army were to attack into the rear and flanks of the overextended Soviet Sixth Army, Mobile Group Popov, and the First Guards Army.
By the 21st of February, Manstein knew that Army Detachment Kempf (Kempf had replaced Lanz) held along the Mius River. In so doing, it had forced the surrender of a Soviet Cavalry Corps encircled at Debaltsevo and it had also encircled and defeated a Soviet Tank Corps at Matveyevkurgan. The pressure on the First Panzer Army at Grishino and the surrounding area was easing. The supply lines that supported the Mobile Group Popov had broken down.
The Fourth Panzer Army succeeded in taking Pavlograd and was able to consolidate its force before the roads softened up. The Soviets were now attempting to make a strong move to the north of Army Detachment Kempf from Belgorod in the direction of Akhtyrka with the notion of flanking the army detachment.

Over the next four days, the Fourth Army Group had tremendous success. In Manstein’s view, the initiative of the campaign had at last moved back to the German side. The Fourth Army destroyed the Soviet forces advancing toward the crucial Dnieper River crossings in around Pavlograd.

On the 1st of March, Manstein knew that the First Panzer Army would regain the original lines along the Donetz River.

One felt a strong temptation to chase the enemy across the still frozen river and take him in the rear in and west of Kharkov. To have our hands free to advance across the Middle Donetz, however, it was first necessary to knock out the southern wing of the enemy’s Kharkov group, which was present in force on the Berestovaya, south-west of the city. Whether this could be done in view of the imminent thaw was more than doubtful. Consequently the Army Group had to content itself initially with seeking out and defeating the Kharkov enemy west of the Donetz.

It had started to thaw along the southern portion of Army Group South’s front. The Soviets halted all attacks by mechanized forces but continued to try to establish some bridgeheads across the river by attacking with rifle divisions. The Soviet attack in the Donetz-Dnieper battlefield had culminated and only ineffective localized attacks continued.

By 2nd March the Army Group was able to survey the results of its first counterblow, delivered by Fourth Panzer Army and the left wing of First Panzer Army against the enemy between the Donetz and Dnieper. In the course of this attack and Army Detachment Hollidt’s successful defense on the Mius, the enemy’s ‘Southwest Front’ had received such a beating that they were temporarily incapable of further offensive action...The enemy’s 25 Tank Corps and three rifle divisions could be written off completely, while 3 and 10 Tank Corps and 4 Guards Tank Corps, one independent armoured brigade, one mechanized brigade, one rifle division and one ski brigade were known to have had a severe battering. In addition, heavy losses had been suffered by 1 Guards Tank Corps and 18 Tank Corps, as well as by six rifle divisions and two ski brigades...Apart from enemy losses already mentioned, 4 Guards Mechanized Corps, which had been encircled behind the Mius front, and 7 Guards Cavalry Corps were also wiped out.

Having now succeeded in his original intent, Manstein ordered the attack to continue to Kharkov. As previously stated, he decided to concentrate his attack to the west of the city in order to maintain contact with Army Detachment Kempf. The intent was to attack the Soviet Voronezh Front’s southern flank in order to turn them or drive into their rear from the east. Manstein’s objective was not Kharkov itself but rather the defeat, and if possible, the destruction of all enemy forces in the area. By the 5th of March, the Fourth Panzer Army smashed into and destroyed the bulk of the Soviet Third Tank Army’s southern flank.
Due to bad weather, the Army Group was unable to move against the Soviet forces fighting in the rear of Army Detachment Kempf. This would have forced the Soviets to fight a two front action. But in order to do this, the Fourth Panzer Army would have had to cross the Donetz River downstream of Kharkov, and Manstein decided the operation was too risky as the ice on the river was beginning to break up. He chose instead to roll up the enemy's flank and force them away from Kharkov.

With the easing of pressure on Army Detachment Kempf, the detachment now joined in the attack with the Fourth Panzer Army. The Soviets realized that the entire Voronezh Front was now endangered and attempted to move several tank and mechanized corps from the Voroshilovgrad area to Isyulm. This failed because the units were already degraded from sustained combat and the ground was rapidly thawing and impeding mechanized movement. Manstein knew that he would be unable to continue to attack north and cut off the Soviet forces which had penetrated deeply to the west around the city of Akhtyrka which were now withdrawing back to the east. Instead, Manstein elected to force the remaining enemy facing Army Detachment Kempf south away from Kharkov or to cut him off from the Donetz River crossings. "At all costs the Army Group wishes to avoid Kharkov's becoming a second Stalingrad in which our assault forces might become irretrievably committed."27

Kharkov fell to the II SS Panzer Corps on the 14th of March.28 Additionally, Army Detachment Kempf captured Belgorod. This marked the end of Manstein's second counterblow. Manstein wanted to continue to clear out the Soviet salient in the vicinity of Kursk but had to abandon its plans due to the lack of support from the German Central Army Group to the north.

Nevertheless, the Army Group was now securely in possession of the entire Donetz front from Belgorod down to where the Mius positions branched off from it. These Donetz and Mius fronts together formed the very same line as had been held by German troops in the winter of 1941-2.23

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s brilliant use of operational maneuver, economy of force, and unity of command dealt a severe blow to the Soviet Army. He managed to accomplish this despite the fact that he had to deal with an intrusive and ruthless superior, Hitler. Manstein's ability to clearly see the battlefield and look into the future was evident throughout the campaign. Manstein was a charismatic leader who clearly understood maneuver warfare. Von Manstein is a true master of the operational art and clearly understands its linkage to theater strategy. Even though Stalingrad became a severe setback for the German Army, Manstein's winter offensive proved to be a tremendous morale booster to an Army that was not accustomed to defeat. At the conclusion of the battle for Kharkov, Germany did possess the wherewithal for potentially decisive offensive actions. This would not be the case after the failure of the Kursk offensive in the summer of 1943.

The battle for Kharkov was undoubtedly one of the most success examples of operational art in modern history. Manstein's bold use of maneuver succeeded in destroying 52 Soviet
Divisions and successfully restoring captured territory from a year earlier. This battle brought an end to a major Soviet offensive action. Unfortunately, it is sandwiched between the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk and does not receive the credit it deserves.

Word count: 4,566
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid., 273.


8 Ibid., 29.

9 Ibid., 28.

10 Ibid., 28.


12 Ibid., 375.


14 Ibid., 33.


16 Ibid., 421.

17 Ibid., 421.


20 Ibid., 424.

21 Ibid., 428.

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