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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this paper is to examine U.S-NATO policy and analyze NATO's new Strategic Concept. Founded in 1949, NATO was established to develop a common military defense system and to strengthen political and ideological ties among European nations and the US. A strong NATO is clearly in the best interest of the United States, as well as, our transatlantic allies and partners. Because of the emerging asymmetric threats and the new missions facing NATO, the strategic concept clearly needed to change. At the 1999 NATO Fiftieth Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., NATO's 19 heads of state adopted a common operational vision for the future. They agreed on a new "Strategic Concept" to guide the Alliance in the coming years. The document refines NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic security and provides a framework for both political and military planners. For fifty years, NATO has been the institution that tied the US interests to those of Europe. With the flexibility to adapt to global change, enlargement, and force structure modernization, NATO will continue to be a dynamic security organization, dealing effectively with the challenging strategic issues facing the Alliance for the next ten years. The new 1999 Security Concept, coupled with US leadership will implement the new vision, enabling NATO to continue to be the adhesive bond for the foreseeable future.

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NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

"The parties to this treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

-Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty 1949

"NATO's capability to undertake new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats...and to strengthen Alliance defense capabilities by ensuring forces are more mobile, sustainable and able to engage effectively on the full spectrum of NATO missions."

- The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1999

Introduction

Fifty years ago President Truman remarked that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) " had existed in 1914 and 1939, supported by the nations who are represented here today.... it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars." If we have learned one thing in the past century, it is that when Europe and the United States go their separate ways a terrible price is paid to restore and promote our national interests.

Today NATO is engaged and relevant. A strong NATO is clearly in the best interest of the United States, as well as, our transatlantic allies and partners. With the flexibility to adapt to global change, force structure modernization, and operating under a New Strategic Concept, NATO will continue to be a dynamic security organization dealing effectively with the challenging strategic issues facing the alliance for the next ten years.

So how will NATO remain current and relevant for the future? Although the principle of collective security remains unchanged, the transatlantic security environment is in constant change. You just have to pick up a newspaper or watch CNN to understand the region is in flux. Because of new threats and the vital importance of the region to the US vital interests, NATO's strategic vision needed change. With US leadership, NATO is attempting to adjust its strategy to meet these new challenges. At the 1999 NATO Fiftieth Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., NATO's 19 heads of state adopted a common strategic vision for the future NATO. They agreed on a new "Strategic Concept" to guide the Alliance in the coming years. The purpose of this paper is to examine U.S-NATO policy. It will provide background, explore how NATO supports the national security strategy, analyze NATO's new 1999 Strategic Concept, and explore future challenges for the Alliance.

Background

Today NATO is a security alliance consisting of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Canada, United States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. Founded in 1949, NATO was established to develop a common military defense system and to strengthen political and ideological ties among the original Western European American nations. With the new memberships of Greece, Turkey, and The

Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950's, NATO not only discourage communist aggression in the region, it helped keep the peace among these former enemies²

Often hailed as the greatest alliance in history, NATO maintained peace in Europe during the Cold War. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO attempted to resolve the uncertainty of its future by extending membership to former Warsaw Pact countries and creating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Under this council, 25 countries, including Russia, joined the Partnership for Peace Program to promote military partnerships and structured education programs.³ But more was needed. An Alliance structured for defense for all-out war had to be restructured.

During this period, General Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), noted that if NATO was to deal with future instabilities and uncertainties across the broad spectrum of threats and still receive support from the public and its member governments, it had to change. In short, NATO had to be seen as relevant to the security issues of the day.⁴

In November 1991, at the annual NATO summit conference, the Alliance published its Strategic Concept and a Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. In this document, NATO took bold steps forward where it broke with the past and its focus on forward defense and came up with a strategy for peacekeeping, out-of-area crisis action response, and war. And in June 1993, NATO leadership established another important milestone in transforming its strategy by expressing its readiness to support UN peacekeeping activities. NATO then showed its flexibility by reacting to strategic threats out of area by taking military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Although the Alliance has experienced many growing pains throughout its history, NATO has shown the unique ability to adapt its strategy and capabilities to the changing political and threat environment. Of all the existing international alliances, NATO continues to be the best equipped for the defense of its members, it has a proven political-military structure for crisis management. This was evident during the Bosnia crisis, Dayton peace accord implementation, and the Kosovo campaign. Through its North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Military Committee, and the military command structure, the Alliance achieved consensus and showed the world NATO's remarkable resolve.

US Interests

Before we explore the foundation of NATO's new Strategic Concept, we must first explore our own interest in the region and define the future threats to our security and the US-Euro transatlantic bond. Europe continues to be the most important region in the world in terms of US national interests.

According to the 1998, National Security Strategy, "European Stability is vital to our security." During the 1999 NATO summit, President Clinton told the heads of state that, "nowhere has our engagement been more vital than in Europe, where we have fought and won two world wars and the Cold War in this century."

America's economy is closely tied to Europe's stability and security. The following figures reveal the importance of Europe to our economy:

- --US/Europe trade is over \$250 billion annually and 30% of US exports
- --Over three million domestic jobs are tied to Europe
- -- US companies employ three million people in Europe
- --60% of all US investments are in Europe
- --90% of all humanitarian aide comes from the US and Europe⁷

In his book, <u>The Idea of National Interests</u>, Charles Beard best defines our grand strategy interests (ends) to be the protection of the US, economic well being, a favorable world order, and the promotion of our values.⁸ NATO policy and the institution continue to support these grand strategy ends.

The National Security Strategy states, "NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security." Our security strategy of shaping and engagement states that the U.S. has two goals in Europe. First, "... build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace" Second, work with our allies to support "peace efforts in troubled regions, to counter global threats such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)...and build a more open economy."

During the recent NATO 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., President Clinton and his advisors consistently communicated the U.S. vision for shaping a stable Europe. During her visit to the Brookings Institution, the Secretary of State echoed the importance of NATO and our transatlantic partnership:

Our destinies are linked. That is true now, as it was when NATO was founded fifty years ago...we must act together, as Allies when allied action is called for, and as friends in helping to shape a more stable, prosperous and lawful world. 12

Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor to President, stated his view of the U.S.-Europe vision:

...from the very beginning we have wanted the summit to make a clear statement of NATO's values and vision for Europe. I cannot imagine a more powerful statement of what our Alliance stands for than the actions it is taking in Kosovo...its unity and resolve...¹³

Our culture and peoples are integrally linked. According to the United States Information Agency, most polls in Europe and the United States indicate that the Alliance is in good standing with both Europeans and Americans. Even after the Cold War, Europeans understand that Americans are serious about their commitment to Europe and NATO.¹⁴

Future Environment-Threats/Risks

What are the future threats to our interests and does NATO policy support our strategy out to the year 2010? Since it is difficult to articulate the threat; we now speak in terms of risk. Future risks will be multi-faceted and multi-directional, making them hard to predict. Even though the Cold War is over, many areas in Europe and the surrounding region are unstable. The days of global confrontation are disappearing. Our concern today is the age-old ethnic and international rivalries that can become a

catalyst for crises. According to Secretary Cohen, the future risks to the stability and security of Europe and the United States are terrorism in all of its "manifestly evil forms...cyberterrorism, chemical, biological, indeed nuclear" and the challenges of regional ethnic instability.¹⁵

Advancing technology will only improve our adversaries' ability to build capable delivery systems for the use of chemical/ biological agents and advance ballistic missile systems. Such technology will also improve enemy capability to attack deploying US/Allied forces before they can arrive to support an operation. If DESERT SHIELD/STORM taught our enemies one thing it is to not spend their critical resources on tanks and aircraft for use in a symmetrical fight with the Alliance. Instead, with advancing technology on the cheap, our enemies can best attack NATO forces with WMD and other asymmetric capabilities.

In his book, <u>The Strategy of Technology</u>; <u>Winning the Decisive War</u>, Stefan Passony, a leading expert on technology warfare during the Cold War, states that technology cannot be halted by agreement and that only small advantages in technology are decisive to an adversary's military capability. ¹⁶ This is evident as we observe third world countries, rogue nations, and terrorist groups acquiring advance technological weapons that include quiet diesel submarines, smart mines, WMD, and cruise missiles.

For the next 10 years, it is unlikely that any regional power or coalition will threaten our military forces with conventional military strength. However, the threat of asymmetric attacks from "wild card" scenarios can seriously challenge our interests. Moreover, beyond 2015, there is the distinct possibility that a regional power such as Russia or China may either emerge or reemerge to challenge US superpower status.¹⁷

How likely is Russia to re-emerge as a threat to Europe and world stability? Russia's future will depend on its ability to develop economically to provide a stable political environment. Currently, they have made very little progress in building the institutions necessary to emerge as a democratic and economic partner in Europe. Russia's gross national product decreased 50 percent over the past decade, and almost half the population lives below the poverty level. After the loss of initial investments, Western financial institutions are questioning the logic of pouring additional loans into a country with a \$15 billion a year deficit. This scenario of instability increases the probability of Russia becoming a future "wild card" threat to European stability.

Because of these threats noted above and the importance of Europe to the US vital interests, the strategic concept clearly needed to change. With US leadership, NATO is attempting to adjust its strategy to meet these new challenges.

NATO's New Strategic Concept

At the 1999 NATO Fiftieth Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., NATO's 19 heads of state adopted a common operational vision for the future NATO. They agreed on a new "Strategic Concept" to guide the Alliance in the coming years. The new Strategic Concept document defines NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic security and provides a framework for military planners. The new Alliance's Strategic

Concept, the sixth such historical document to be approved by the NATO heads of state, focuses on the following elements:

- (1) New missions that call for improvements in the ability to respond to a broad spectrum of threats that include regional conflicts, such as Kosovo, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and transnational threats. The New Strategy maintains the enduring core mission under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty:
- (2) A Military Capabilities Concept that reaffirms the Allies' determination to strengthen capabilities with more mobile, sustainable, and survivable forces, able to engage the full spectrum of the new missions:
- (3) Development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO as a key element of NATO, enabling the European allies to make a more effective contribution to Euro-Atlantic security;
- (4) NATO's openness to new membership (enlargement) to enhance peace and stability in the region. Also, the concept reinforces efforts to build partnerships with an increasing transparency and mutual confidence in security matters, improving the capacity of both allies and its partners to act together.¹⁹

The Military Capabilities Concept

Within NATO's new Strategic Concept document, the most important resolution is the Military Capabilities Initiative, also known as the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). NATO leaders adopted this initiative in an effort to ensure the Alliance has the necessary conventional military forces and equipment for 21st century missions. NATO heads of state understood this best. With the Cold War over and shrinking national military budgets, the Allies needed a commitment to keep their forces relevant for future operations.

To understand the importance of the DCI, we must first review NATO capability to execute current strategy. The following are a few examples of NATO assets and capabilities:

- --Integrated and exercised command structure
- --Trained multinational staffs in planning and operations
- -- Logistics bases
- --NATO school system.
- --NATO infrastructure improvement program
- --Airborne early warning aircraft
- --Rapid ready deployment forces and headquarters

Often overshadowed by the military forces, NATO has an extensive international infrastructure. The US was especially reliant on this infrastructure during the Gulf War. For over 50 years, the nations pooled their resources and budgets, producing 203 modern airfields, 31,000 miles of communication cables, a satellite communications system, 6,300 miles of fuel pipelines, 2 million cubic meters of fuel and ammunition storage, and facilities at 73 naval bases in eight countries.²⁰

Although NATO is adapting its strategy for the future by modifying its "ways", the alliance and US strategy continues to fall short in capabilities (means). While the fundamental security principle endures and NATO continues to set the conditions for a stable Europe, the force structure and organization must be transformed to react to new risks. However, because the Allies are modernizing and restructuring their forces at different rates, and because of the growing technological gap between US and European forces, NATO is not as effective as it was during the Cold War. The current force structure shortfalls include mobility assets, an integrated communications architecture, survivability against terrorism and WMD, and flexible logistics.²¹

The Allies all agree that the most important issue today is the lack of an integrated command, control, and communications (C3) system The military force is only as effective as its flow of information for command and control. Current areas of regional instability indicate that NATO will be out-of-area and engaged in crisis management. Consequently, the Alliance must have a robust mobile C3 system and strategic mobility assets to support forces in austere areas of operation. A NATO force that is deployable with rapid response capability is the key to success in a time of crisis.²²

The DCI specifically identifies the following as key short falls in existing force capabilities: First, NATO's ability to deploy rapidly and engage with the appropriate assets in humanitarian assistance operations and high-intensity combat; second, operating in chemical, biological, nuclear, and information system attack environments; third, NATO's ability to sustain the force by delivering supplies and support equipment in a timely manner; forth, current structure does not support prolonged force rotational operations; and last, and most importantly, NATO's ability to establish and maintain effective interoperable command, control and communication links.²³

So how did these shortfalls develop, and how will they impact common military action in the future? In the past, the mechanisms for deploying joint-combined forces were transparent. From infrastructure to logistical support to intelligence sharing to field training exercises to a common communications system, NATO countries shared a sense of common capabilities and mission. However, as US capabilities become superior, tested in today's conflicts, while European forces fail to exploit technological advantages, the principle of burden sharing among the member states will be questioned.

NATO's Secretary-General Robertson is publicly pressing the Allies to do more to satisfy the need for interoperable communications and new weapon systems for the future. He commented that "Europeans spend two thirds of what the Americans spend, but get lesser results in terms of capabilities." Echoing this concern, Secretary of Defense Cohen recently stated that the US conducted

two-thirds of all combat sorties in NATO's Kosovo air operation and was the only country with precision guided munitions.²⁵

NATO's task to modernize the force structure will not be easy. The Allies will need to muster the political will and overcome current domestic spending trends. Since the collapse of the Wall, NATO allies significantly cut defense spending and essentially stopped modernizing their armed forces. A good example is Germany. Despite fielding one of the largest armies in Europe, Germany spends approximately 1.2 percent of its national budget on defense. The popular political trend for most European nations is to continue to run budget deficits by feeding their social welfare commitments at the expense of modernizing their force structure.²⁶

In a recently published "lessons learned from Kosovo", Secretary of Defense Cohen, explained his concern and the US's priority for the DCI. He stated that NATO must have an interoperable communications architecture by 2002 because during the Kosovo Air Campaign, NATO command, control, and communications systems were open to the Serbs, which may have compromised NATO's effectiveness. Clearly, the DCI priority is to fix NATO's command, control, and communications (C3) structure first.²⁷

Without a doubt, the new DCI strategy supports change for a more capable NATO force, but it is too early to detect any major changes by NATO countries to carry out this initiative. However, if the US is going to be the leader in NATO, it must make the first step in DCI policy. So what should the US do to help close this force structure and technology gap in US-Euro capabilities? The Commander-in-Chief, United States Joint Forces Command (CINC-USJFCOM) who is dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO Commander), supports the common thread of interoperability and modernization with in the US forces and NATO forces in Europe.

Another supporter of DCI, United States European Command (USEUCOM), remains the predominant force structure and anchor of engagement in NATO. As the forward deployed force structure in Europe, USEUCOM plays the lead role in the Partnership for Peace program, Allied and coalition exercises, Balkan force structure, NATO log base infrastructure, and Article 5 response operations. A solid commitment by USEUCOM is required if NATO is to be able to meet the goals of the DCI. Accordingly, solid NATO C3 system needs to be its top priority for funding. EUCOM's objective should be to assist NATO in constructing a seamless/secure dynamic C3 system supporting all patterns of operations in achieving full spectrum dominance. Also, it can assist in ensuring interoperability between different functional area systems. It can also assist in converting intelligence-specific communications systems to common communication systems as new hardware is fielded. It is in the best interests of the US for EUCOM to execute the DCI strategy starting with C3 systems. EUCOM is the ideal US organization to set the example and assist NATO countries in developing their own DCI strategy.

So how should NATO fund such an operation? The best NATO collective funding pool is the Burdenshare infrastructure program. Besides forward-stationed forces, infrastructure funding is the most visible sign of U.S. commitment to the Alliance. EUCOM is the lead agency that oversees NATO

infrastructure assets that include 31,000 miles of communications cables and satellite communication assets. The NATO Infrastructure program is one of the most visible and successful examples of collective burdensharing in the Alliance. Commonly funded by all NATO nations, the program provides operational facilities, bases, C3 systems, and equipment for all assigned forces. Historically, US forces have benefited significantly from total program expenditures, and the U.S. industries consistently win half of the program's high tech projects. In the past, the US Ambassador for Burdensharing has been successful in obtaining NATO support for new initiatives.²⁸

Shifting away from the C3 issue of the DCI, it is also important to note that NATO falls short in addressing the capabilities needed to combat emerging asymmetric threats. NATO has not come to grips with the force structure or policy to react to asymmetric risks and threats. If NATO is truly concerned about terrorism, both the US and NATO must structure, train, and legally empower multi-national, counter-terrorist special operation forces (SOF). The Alliance must establish a formal civil-military command structure to coordinate across national boundaries. No organization is better structured for counter-terrorism then SOF. However, the lack of a grand US and NATO asymmetric threat policy, coupled with current European focus on national domestic policies, and legal limitations inside of Europe all foreclose full development and use of an integrated NATO SOF capability.

In sum, the new Strategic Concept and DCI does a good job addressing the future vision for NATO. Now the US and its European Allies must break away from the current budget trends and make the commitment to DCI. Because of the important impact C3 had on the Kosovo campaign, NATO must first fix its C3 system and then develop the necessary capability to combat WMD. Also, NATO must emphasize common approaches in doctrine, training, equipment, and standardization. It must also address the challenges posed by the accelerating pace of technology and the different speeds at which Allies introduce advanced capabilities into their defense structures.

European Security and Defense Identity

Another focus of the new Strategic Concept is to develop a European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO to enable the European Allies to make a more effective contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security strategy. ESDI is an outgrowth of the 1994 NATO Summit. At this Summit, the Alliance fully supported the development of the ESDI, and it prepared to make available NATO assets and capabilities under the control of the Western European Union (WEU). NATO policy makers wanted ESDI to assist the European allies to act by themselves on a case by case basis by making assets available for operations when NATO is not engaged militarily.²⁹ With the New Strategic Concept, the Alliance reaffirms what was stated in the 1994 Rome Summit and the 1996 Berlin agreement. However, the new Strategy document expands ESDI and challenges the European Allies to develop and increase their military capabilities if they are to remain relevant in a crisis situation.³⁰

Because of the disparity of capabilities among the NATO members, ESDI is in its early stage.

Many of the shortcomings of military capability among the European nations were revealed during recent

actions in Bosnia and Kosovo. According to George Robertson, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, American aircraft conducted the majority of air attacks because Europeans lacked the precision weapons. "Too many European armed forces are still structured to meet the requirements of the cold war rather than of the next millennium." If it were not for the US and NATO command and control structure and political resolve, there would have been little hope, because everything else failed miserably in trying to put a non-NATO military structure together to deal with the problems.

In the US, Congress and the public embrace ESDI and support an equitable sharing of responsibilities within NATO. At the same time, Europeans are searching for a European security structure that will enable them to act more independently. During a 1998 European Union (EU) meeting in ST. Malo, France, European leaders considered strengthening the European structure of the Alliance. They encouraged a greater security role for the EU and the Western European Union (WEU). However, when it comes to security issues, these organizations and their agreements are paper tigers. According to the US NATO Ambassador, Alexander Vershbow, past ESDIs outside of NATO (WEU and EU) dealt with institutional architecture rather than the necessary capabilities and long term commitment needed in security arrangements. Once the ESDI infrastructure is supported by an improved European defense capability initiative, arrangements will be easier to work out.³²

It is in the best interests of the US that a robust ESDI working within the structure of NATO will best preserve the US and European bond. The US and many of the NATO nations agree that the debate must stay within the political structure of NATO. In 1996, the Allies agreed "that in return for NATO's right of first refusal over missions and committing to improve their forces, European allies would rely on NATO and United States assets needed for operations." ³³

If we accept that NATO is essential to US national interest, NATO and US policy makers must proceed with caution. If the US loosens its leadership role in the Alliance, we must understand the long-term impact on our strategy and interests in the region. The long-term goal of ESDI is to maintain an active US political and military presence in Europe, while at the same time shifting the Alliance balance toward Europe. The US must allow Europe to handle greater responsibility without harmful turf battles for leadership, and the US must assist the Allies in avoiding wasteful duplication of capabilities and structure. Where the US, as part of NATO, once focused on the defense of the NATO territory, we now use NATO policy as an institution for crisis management and new cooperation with the Eastern European countries. We may discover that as ESDI gains momentum, the pull of domestic affairs and the lure of cost savings in burdensharing dollars might cause the US Congress to advocate withdrawal from NATO. We must not allow this as it is in our best interest to stay engaged in Europe and NATO to stabilize the East.

The New Strategic Concept stresses that the ESDI must not put the Alliance at odds with other institutions and alliances. After the Cold War, there was debate on whether France and Britain would drift away from NATO. France continues to voice dissatisfaction with NATO and its integrated military command structure, and France has threatened to withdraw. But NATO has stayed the course and

adapted its strategy to accommodate the shift in European identity. A previous NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Worner said it best:

"NATO must avoid a situation in which NATO and the WEU are compelled always to act together, as if one fears losing out to the other. Notions of rivalry cannot fare but undermine both organizations and hamper Western military operations in a crisis situation."

This will be true of any air and ground operation where a clear command and control structure is essential for the success of the mission. The future of Europe will be based on close consultation and debate within the NATO political structure. Because NATO has a proven military and political command structure, and more importantly, the military capabilities, NATO must have the right of first refusal over any mission.³⁵

The New Security Strategy has not changed the focus of ESDI. Because of the right of "first refusal" over missions, NATO's concept of ESDI continues to support a strong US commitment. For Europe to proceed with ESDI, it must improve its military capabilities. Because of the complexity of the new world order, NATO, the US and the willing outside the Alliance will need to bring their combined assets to bear on any given problem.

Enlargement

The Alliance is the bedrock of stability behind which Europeans continue to build economic institutions, free market economies, and democratic systems. NATO continues to provide stability through its common position on arms control and arms negotiations. The Eastern half of Europe now looks to NATO for the same stability. This explains why so many countries in the East have expressed an interest in joining the Alliance.

Fortunately, NATO continues to support an enlargement policy in their new Strategic Concept. NATO has never been an exclusive club as evident by their expanding membership over the years. The Alliance remains open to all European democratic countries whose admission would serve the strategic interests of the Alliance and enhance the overall security structure. NATO expects to extend further invitations in the next few years to nations meeting the obligations of membership.³⁶

The new Strategic Concept also echoes past NATO enlargement agreements. The new Strategic Concept reinforces NATO's 1995 agreement and study regarding the criteria for NATO membership. NATO wants to reach out to new members that share common values and security concerns. NATO views enlargements as a means to enhance the alliances' capabilities and geographic strategic posture. New members must ideally meet the following criteria, "resolve ethnic and extraterritorial disputes by peaceful means, establish civilian control of the military, share roles and risks of a common defense, subscribe to the Alliance Strategy, and work toward interoperability of forces with other NATO members." With in the Alliance, NATO expansion no longer remains an open question. NATO believes a historical window of opportunity is open, and the Alliance must reach out to Central and Eastern Europe. Just as important as membership, the Alliance believes the process of developing democratic

institutions is key to the overall enlargement strategy. NATO believes the worst option is to fail in reaching out to former enemies because it will leave hostile regimes and embittered neighbors. It is in this context that NATO expansion is a positive force in promoting European stability through its active pursuit in building democratic institutions, increasing membership, and partnership with the East.³⁸

According to NATO, enlargement is more than just membership. It is a total engagement strategy for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. In the new Strategic Concept, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) remain the principle framework for cooperation and practical security links between the Alliance and its European partners in the East. The EAPC and PfP organizations work toward transparency among its members on security issues, civil/military emergency planning, enhancing interoperability, budgeting, and building democratic institutions.³⁹ The point is that NATO continues to reach out toward the East to help build the democratic institutions needed for a stable Europe and membership qualification.

What are the current costs to the US in "means" to support the Alliance's enlargement strategy? Under the NATO burdenshare agreements and our national policy, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) contributes most of our support. USEUCOM contributes forward-deployed forces and U.S. Naval force rotations in support of the National Security Strategy regional engagement plan. ⁴⁰ In the Secretary of Defense's, <u>Annual Report</u> and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's <u>National Military Strategy</u> documents, the Department of Defense allocates means and dictates operational "ways" in terms of USEUCOM's responsibility to reach out to the Central and Eastern European countries. USEUCOM is responsible for enhancing the transatlantic and Eastern Europe security bond through a variety of engagement activities, to include the Partnership for Peace Program, International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, and the Joint/Allied/Combined Exercise Program. ⁴¹ Also, "military-to-military contacts with countries that are neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes build constructive security relationships," to help promote stability and democratic values. ⁴²

NATO should be cautious to avoid expanding the Alliance into something that is too broad in much the same way as the UN. Before new members are admitted, NATO will need to examine their process of consensus building. In the Cold War, a period of a well defined threat, the 16 nations achieved consensus reasonably easy. However, in a multifaceted European security environment the national agendas of the 19 nations may come to bare and present difficulty in achieving consensus.⁴³ The problem of consensus was evident during the War in Kosovo. Secretary of Defense, Cohen cited, "you had to have consensus of all 19 countries and, therefore it was not possible to carry out the kind of classic type of air campaign that the professionals would have liked to have carried out."

A few US military and political leaders believe that if we provide most of the military effort in a campaign, then we need to have more than one of the 19 votes. This view is a short-term look at NATO. The US does not want the Allies to have in their memory that for the first time in history NATO went to war, the US dictated the fight. The Coalition that President Bush formed for the Gulf War was not the

same kind of coalition NATO formed for Kosovo. NATO had the problem of varying degrees of what was and what was not the national interests of the countries, and what was the proper amount of force to be used.⁴⁵

Even though achieving consensus has been difficult, it has been the bedrock of Alliance. NATO will loose its strength if a majority rule concept replaces consensus. The question of enlargement becomes "how big is big?" Were the Alliance to expand to the current membership of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that would create turmoil in the current military and political structure. If NATO continues to pursue enlargement, even with a small increase in membership, compromise will become the challenge and will require more diplomatic effort to ensure the Alliance remains solid.⁴⁶

In understanding NATO East-West security arrangement, it is important to know that many of the Eastern and Central European nations are already members of multiple security structures such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In essence, NATO is an evolving matrix of security arrangements, an interlinking of security structures, each of which brings unique strengths to the European security equation. Because of these overlapping security structures, Central and Eastern European nations have agreed to support and contribute, on a case by case basis, to NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. These initiatives by EAPC members only reinforce NATO interoperability and dialog within NATO political and military structures. Clearly, NATO can no longer be viewed solely as an alliance against an adversary, but rather as a leader for European and international security organizations in support of common interest operations.

While the breakup of the Soviet Union made NATO enlargement possible, the Russians have not welcomed expansion. In view of Russia's instability, the US should reassess and further debate current NATO strategy of enlargement. Our dilemma is how to achieve closer relationships with democratizing states in central Europe without antagonizing Moscow. NATO or the US policy makers have not done well in calming Russian fears. Under the new Strategic Concept, NATO fully intends to actively execute operations well beyond its normal region of influence. The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated in Brussels that NATO was force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa. Because of the radical departure from NATO's status quo, her statement triggered many diplomatic debates both in the East and West that could possible further alienate the Russian State against NATO and US interests in Europe. The challenge in US policy will be managing relationships with Russia while expanding both membership and partnership with Central and Eastern European nations. As NATO and the US are seduced by enlargement, Russia remains unenthusiastic about the new strategy concept.

This was evident by a recent media account in Russia. In response to Georgian President Shevardnadze remarks for his plan to apply for NATO membership by 2005, Russia's Foreign Ministry explained that, "every country had a right to find shelter wherever they thought fit...our line in relation to expansion of NATO remains negative...it only leads to the creation of new dividing lines in Europe."

Both the US and NATO, believe that European security depends on stability in the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. Therefore, the challenge is to ensure that we cooperate in meeting the risks to stability and prosperity of all European states, and that we encourage former Soviet and Central and Eastern European states to implement democratic reforms. In the US's view, NATO is the best institution to implement military cooperation and military reform. If nations can meet the strict democratic reform criteria for NATO membership, it is in the best interest of the US and the Allies to include these new found friends in our common values and security strategy. Although the policy of enlargement intrudes on Russia's vision of security strategy, NATO accepts the risks because it believes a united Europe under NATO political and military structure can best combat future threats to stability. In other words, NATO's goal under the new Strategic Concept supports enlargement because it is a "way" to strengthen its capabilities (means) and posture itself geographically for the future.

Conclusion

Founded in 1949, NATO was established to develop a common defense system and to strengthen political and ideological ties among the Western European and American nations. A strong NATO is clearly in the best interests of the United States and our transatlantic allies and partners. Today, NATO is engaged and relevant. With the flexibility to adapt to change and force structure modernization, NATO will continue to be a dynamic security organization, dealing effectively with challenging strategic issues facing the alliance. Because of emerging asymmetric threats and the importance of the region to the US, the strategic concept clearly needed to change. With US leadership, NATO is attempting to adjust its strategy to meet these new challenges.

At the 1999 NATO Fiftieth Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., NATO's 19 heads of state adopted a common operational vision for the future. They agreed on a new "Strategic Concept" to guide the Alliance in the coming years. The document defines NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic security and provides a framework for both political and military planners. The New Strategic Concept is focused on maintaining the core mission under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, accepting new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats demonstrating a commitment to DCI, an ESDI within NATO, and aggressively pursuing member enlargement.

DCI will strengthen the Alliance's defense capabilities by ensuring forces are more mobile, sustainable, and able to command, control and engage effectively over the full spectrum of missions. Because of the importance and impact C3 and US technology had on the Kosovo campaign, NATO saw that it needed to improve its capabilities. DCI will help close the technological gap between the US and its European allies. The US and its European Allies must break away from the current budget trends and make the required commitment to DCI. NATO must emphasize common approaches in doctrine, training, and equipment, and it must successfully address the challenges posed by the accelerating pace of technology and the different speeds at which Allies introduce advanced capabilities.

Because of the complexity of the new world order, NATO and the US will need to bring their combined assets both inside and outside of the Alliance, to bear on any given problem. An ESDI within NATO will enable the European allies to make a more effective contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security. With the right of "first refusal" over missions, NATO's concept of ESDI continues to support a strong US commitment in Europe.

If nations can meet the democratic reform criteria for NATO membership, it is in the best interest of the US and the Allies to include these new found friends in our common values and security strategy. In the new concept, NATO is committed to new membership and enlargement to enhance peace and stability in the region. However, NATO must be mindful of Russia's instability and the impact of NATO enlargement on that government (timing is everything).

Finally, the U.S. must maintain its leadership role in the Alliance. It is not in our national interest to disengage. History confirms this point. If we set in motion the events that lead to the atrophy of NATO, the outcome will be an unstable Europe where we will no longer have effective leverage or a voice at the table to engage or shape events. After 50 years, NATO continues to be the organization that ties the US to Europe. With the new 1999 Security Concept to implement the new vision, NATO will continue to be the cross-Atlantic bond for the foreseeable future.

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