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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AMERICA'S GRAND STRATEGY CHOICES

BY

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America's Grand Strategy Choices

by

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ii

ABSTRACT

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The demise of the Soviet Union brought an end to the Cold War, the bipolar structure of the international system, and to America's grand strategy of containment. Over the past decade, America has struggled to define its role in the post-Cold War era. The purpose of this paper is to research America's grand strategy choices. Grand strategies are executed within a strategic construct so the research begins with an overview of the strategic environment. Additionally, grand strategies are developed to focus America's instruments of national power to accomplish national objectives. Therefore, the next section evaluates different methods to manage world power, including the concepts of balance of power, collective security, and world government. The next section discusses four grand strategy options, primacy, neo-isolationism, cooperative security, and selective engagement. The final section analyzes the nature of the international system, how to manage power in the international system, and which grand strategy is right for America in the post-Cold War era. The conclusion is that the international system remains an anarchic collection of states and balance of power dynamics will tend to dominate international affairs and that selective engagement is best grand strategy for America in this new era.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	II
AMERICA'S GRAND STRATEGY CHOICES	1
THE REALIST – IDEALIST DILEMMA	1
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	2
ACTORS	2
FORCES AND TRENDS	3
MANAGING WORLD POWER	4
BALANCE OF POWER	5
COLLECTIVE SECURITY	6
WORLD GOVERNMENT	8
GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS	9
PRIMACY	9
Description	9
Interests	10
NEO-ISOLATIONISM	12
Description	12
Interests	13
COOPERATIVE SECURITY	15
Description	15
Interests	15
SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT	20
Description	20
Interests	21

ANALYSIS	25
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE NOT-SO NEW WORLD ORDER	
MANAGING WORLD POWER	
GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS	
Primacy	
Neo-Isolationism	
Cooperative Security	29
Selective Engagement	29
CONCLUSION	30
ENDNOTES	35
BIBLIOGRAPHY	41

vii

viii

AMERICA'S GRAND STRATEGY CHOICES

The demise of the Soviet Union brought an end to the Cold War, the bipolar structure of the international system, and America's grand strategy of containment. Over the past decade, America has struggled to define its role in the post-Cold War era. Many analysts saw in these developments the promise of a period of global peace and prosperity including the "endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Such predictions notwithstanding, the post-Cold War era has succumbed to severe security, economic, humanitarian, and environmental problems. Forces unleashed by the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Cold War structure have unleashed ethnic and nationalistic wars throughout the globe that had been constrained for more than half a century. The information and telecommunications revolutions are changing the face of the globe by increasing the pace of politics, economics, and the interaction of peoples from different civilizations. Poverty still permeates the underdeveloped world. Nations continue to consume limited resources at voracious rates while depleting the ozone and warming the globe. The promise of a new world order based on collective security and multilateral action failed to answer the global security problems in the post-Cold War era. What grand strategy will America develop to ensure America's security and prosperity in this complex new era?

The purpose of this study is to examine America's grand strategy options in the new era. The initial task is to analyze the international environment in terms of actors, and the forces and trends that are influencing that environment. And since U.S. grand strategies are developed to organize the application of America's elements of national power, the next step is to review the different methods that have evolved for managing power. Closely associated with the management of power are the different grand strategic options that have been suggested for the U.S. since the end of the Cold War. Although each of these options has its own particular nuances, they all are variations of strategies that for the purposes of this study fall into four general categories: primacy, neo-isolationism, cooperative security, and selective engagement. The study concludes with an analysis of these options and a recommendation outlining the optimum grand strategic approach for the United States at the beginning of the new millennium.

THE REALIST - IDEALIST DILEMMA

Grand strategy is simply a method of matching national ends to national means. Grand strategies are developed in a strategic setting or context. As a result, if the strategic environment changes, grand strategies must change as well or become ineffective. During the Cold War, the bipolar international system remained unchanged for more that 40 years. Consequently, containment remained America's grand strategy throughout that period. During the Cold War the bipolar nature of the international system was the prism through which the majority of the world conducted international affairs. The demise of the Soviet Union shattered the bipolar structure of the international system and America's grand strategy of containment along with it. The structure of the international system is in a state of transition, but America

has been slow to articulate a new grand strategy for the post-Cold War era. This can be a dangerous development in a period in which America's grand strategy may have to change more frequently.

One of the reasons it has been difficult to select a grand strategy after the end of the Cold War is the divergence of two historic themes of American foreign policy which were uniquely convergent during the Cold War: realism and idealism. Realists seek national peace and prosperity based on national self-interests and power. Idealists seek world peace and prosperity based on common international interests and principles. During the Cold War, realists and idealists came together with common ideologies under the strategy of containment. Realists focused on maintaining national security and prosperity by developing a strong Western military alliance to achieve a military imbalance of power in the West's favor against the Soviet threat. Idealists focused on upholding the principles of freedom, democracy, and free markets in opposition to the authoritarian rule of communism. With the demise of the Soviet Union realists and idealists developed divergent courses for American grand strategy. Shades of realism and idealism are riddled throughout America's grand strategy options for the post-Cold War era. The problem is to create a grand strategy that effectively uses the best of both approaches to international relations.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

What is the nature of the international system? The new international environment in the post-Cold War era is in a state of transition. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, five main categories of actors and at least four primary trends emerged on the world scene.²

ACTORS

Market Democracies are the dominant actor on the international scene. More than half of the countries in the world are currently democratic. The market democracies share a common ideology toward democratic governments, free market economies, and the rule of law. Market democracies can be subdivided into two groups, the core western industrialized democracies primarily in North America, Europe, and Asia and the outer core of new democratic states. Most mature democracies in the core are prosperous and have a history of strong interdependence and cooperation developed during the Cold War; however, recently there have been some differences regarding security. The maturity of democracy in the outer core varies from state to state as do the levels of cooperation and conflict with the core democracies.

<u>Transition States</u> are states in some stage of evolution to democratic governments and/or market economies. The most important of these transition states are Russia, China, and India. Russia is in the process of transitioning from an authoritarian government and a centrally controlled economy to a democratic government and a market economy. China is in the dichotomous position of combining a market economy with an authoritarian political system. America has an interest in persuading these transition states to join the ranks of the world's market democracies. The final disposition of these states will have a major effect on the structure of the international system as it matures.

Rogue States are states that are resistant to the new international order, democratic reform, and free markets. They include states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, the Sudan, Cuba, and now Serbia. America has an interest in containing these states as long as they are opposed to the international order. America's military strategy includes the capability to defeat two of these rouge states simultaneously.

<u>Failed States</u> include states such as: Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia. These types of states collapse due to the inability of the government to provide a structure for a stable economy and to provide life's basic necessities for their people. Failed states have dominated the attention of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in recent years.

<u>Non-State Actors</u> include organizations that are supportive of the market democracies such as trans-national companies and international institutions, as well as organizations that prey on the international community such as transnational crime, drug cartels, and terrorists (transnational outlaws).

FORCES AND TRENDS

Four dominant trends have emerged during this transition period. These four trends have forces of attraction that are pulling some actors together and forces of repulsion that are pushing others apart. These forces of integration and disintegration among the five categories of actors account for much of the complexity and ambiguity as the new international system evolves.

The Global Economy. The information revolution has dramatically affected the pace of politics, economics, and social interaction. One result has been the globalization of the economy, which has strengthened the interdependencies that developed among the market democracies during the Cold War, causing, in turn, integrating and disintegrating effects. This interdependence has brought wealth to the democratic core and attracts the transition states. However, interdependence also creates vulnerabilities as problems in one region of the world affect the entire global economy. The recent Asian economic crisis is one example. In a similar manner, the globalization of the economy allows for the most efficient transfer of goods and services when no shortages exist. And yet, when critical strategic resources are scarce, those interdependencies become the cause for conflict as nations attempt to maintain access to those critical resources.

<u>Democratization</u>. This trend has been spurred on by the de-colonization of Africa and the demise of the Soviet Union. Since democratic governments are responsible to their people, they are historically more cooperative and are more likely to solve problems pacifically and to respect basic human rights. Democratization has enabled peaceful transitions of governments in the mature democracies. But democratization has seen problems in fledgling states and failing states where poor economies and social conditions generate the conditions ripe for nationalistic, ethnic, or religious manipulation by radical groups. Additionally, states transitioning to democracy have a higher proclivity for violence than states that are not transitioning to a new form of government. While the democracie peace may hold true for the mature democracies, it is not necessarily the case for transitioning democracies.³

Fragmentation of Power. This trend has had positive integrative effects in mature democracies. Power is shared in a variety of different agencies in a democracy, providing a balance that allows power to be exercised at the local level. Unconstrained by the bipolar setting however, the fragmentation of power has had disintegrating effects on other actors. Transition states assert their power to gain regional hegemony. Rouge states maintain a strong centralized power base, sometimes using brutal means. Fledgling democracies, with generally weak democratic institutions, compete for power with militant leaders who take advantage of poor economic and social conditions to foment ethnic or nationalistic revolts for personal gain. Additionally, the fragmentation of power makes power available on the periphery and is leveraged by criminal organizations and terrorists.

The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This type of proliferation threatens all that is civil about modern society. The large number of weapons and missile technology experts in the former Soviet Union coupled with poor economic and social conditions are a volatile mix. Weapons and technology are available to rogue states and transnational outlaws making the world a more dangerous place.

MANAGING WORLD POWER

The international system, bipolar for more that 40 years, is making a dramatic change. Some have categorized the new system as a unique unipolar American moment. Others analysts believe the unipolar American moment has passed and the international system is entering a dangerous multipolar stage. Still others see the signs of a new bipolar confrontation beginning to crystallize out of multipolarity. The structure of the international system will affect how power is used and managed in the post-Cold War era.

Since the time of Cane and Able, men have had the power to kill each other. In today's anarchic world, power rests primarily in the hands of nation-states. In the competitive struggle for freedom and survival, some states may use their power to conduct violence against other states. Although there is considerable change in the states that possess military power, military technology, and the destructiveness of military power, the continuity of power remains. The challenge is to learn how to manage the power that is distributed among the various actors in order to maintain world peace and prosperity.

International relations theorists describe three methods to manage world power: balance of power, collective security, and world government. Inis Claude, for instance, explains that these methods are

successive points along a continuum, differing most fundamentally in the degree of centralization of power and authority which they imply. In this view, balance of power represents the extreme of decentralization, a kind of laissez-faire arrangement in the sphere of power politics. Collective security, next in line, represents an effort to solve the power problem by superimposing a scheme of partially centralized management of power under a situation in which the possession of power remains diffused among national units. World government, at the opposite end of the spectrum from balance of power, rests upon the concept that an institutional system involving a 'monopoly of power,' comparable to that alleged to exist in a well-ordered national state, is essential to the successful management of the power problem in international relations.⁴

The underlying concepts in these ideas are interwoven throughout America's grand strategy options.

BALANCE OF POWER

The realist paradigm and the balance of power concept developed with the rise of the modern nation-state. Power exists in nation-states, and power is the coin of the realm in the realist paradigm. Realists emphasize that the balance of power system developed primarily due to the decentralized and anarchic nature of the state system. The state system is decentralized in that the world's power is distributed between independent nation-states and is anarchic in that no world government or authority exists above the state level. As states interact and compete for economic and military power, they rely on themselves to ensure the independence, survival, and prosperity of their state (self-help). When security issues are at stake, it is difficult for states to cooperate because they mistrust each other and are concerned with relative verses absolute gains. Realists believe unchecked power is dangerous. They point out that one state's security is another's insecurity. In order to deter states from conducting actions against their interest, states attempt to balance the hard power (economic and military power) of their adversaries with at least an equal amount of their own. Realists explain that most states actually prefer an imbalance of power in their favor (favorable balance). States balance power in two ways: by mobilizing their domestic resources to develop military power (self help or internal balancing), and by forming temporary alliances with other states that have congruent interests (external balancing). Realists explain that, "even though states cannot escape the Hobbesian world, balancing behavior, at least in theory, allows states to keep pace with each other, thereby maintaining a balance of power that deters aggression." Peace and stability is maintained through deterrence and by maintaining a relatively equal balance of power between adversaries. The balance of power system is quite decentralized and ad hoc. As states interact with each other they often change alliances and military posture based on the perceived threat to their interests. States are concerned with their own self-interests and have little concern for shared interests among the community of states.⁶

While peace and stability are desired, the objectives of the balance of power system are to preserve the independence of the great powers, preserve the state system, and to prevent a global hegemon. Thus war, is both a means to maintain the equilibrium and to avoid further war. Theorists describe three ways to maintain the equilibrium or balance of power. First, equilibrium can be maintained automatically as a byproduct of the interactions of all the states. Second, equilibrium can be maintained manually, through manipulating alliances. This was Bismarck's strategy in the late 19th century. The German chancellor manipulated a series of "entangling fetters and counteracting commitments which would make hostile coalitions – indeed, war itself – impossible." Third, equilibrium can be maintained semi-automatically with one of the great powers acting in the role of a balancer. This was Britain's strategy for four hundred years, as Winston Churchill once explained:

For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent....Faced by Philip II of Spain,

against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against William II of Germany, it would have been easy....to join with the strongest and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led....It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant.⁹

While maintaining equilibrium is the objective in the balance of power system, this concept poses several problems. First, the deterrent value of a balance vice a preponderance of power is weak. As a result, states normally seek an imbalance of power in their favor. Hans Morgenthau explains: "...all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance – that is, equality – of power, but at superiority of power in their own behalf. And since no nation can foresee how large its miscalculations will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstances." Second, this imbalance of power increases the security concerns of neighboring states, prompting them to increase their power in response. The resulting security dilemma is an ever-increasing arms race between adversaries. Additionally, if the rate of change of these arms races accelerates (security spiral), miscalculation, or opportunism may lead to war. Third, sometimes a balance of power can increase the chance of war. When one power is preponderant, there is normally peace. No state can match the power of the preponderant state; deterrence is strong. However, as challenger states close the power gap with the preponderant state they will feel emboldened as their power equals the preponderant state to attack with a reasonable chance of success. Thus, equilibrium, in some cases, may increase the chance of war.

The balance of power system, then, is a decentralized, ad hoc, method of managing the world's power that conforms to the realities of a decentralized, anarchic world. Balance of power has been successful in preserving the independence of the great powers and preventing the development of a global hegemon. The system has not been successful in preventing wars or maintaining the independence of small states. Although not a pillar for global peace, it has provided some stability and moderated the violence in the state-centered world. ¹¹

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Collective security was an idea championed by Woodrow Wilson after World War I. While Wilson understood the importance of power in an anarchic world, he rejected balance of power as a method to manage world power. He envisioned a more idealistic and centralized method of managing world power to promote peace and to avoid war. Wilson desired political moralism where states considered not just their national self-interests, but interests for the collective good of all nations as well. Wilson warned the world's leaders against returning, "to those bad days of selfish contest, when every nation thought first and always of itself and not of its neighbor, thought of its rights and forgot its duties, thought of its power and overlooked its responsibility." Additionally, Wilson believed without a more centralized method of managing the world's power, America would become a garrison state and have to maintain high levels of

military power to ensure national security. Alternatively, by gathering collective power from all nations, the amount of power residing in each of the individual nations could be reduced.

Collective security is based on the concept that peace is indivisible and that states are deterred by a preponderance of power vice a balance of power. "Collective security rests on the notion of all against one. While states retain considerable autonomy over the conduct of their foreign policy, participation in a collective security organization entails a commitment by each member to join a coalition to confront any aggressor with opposing preponderant strength." In Wilson's collective security system, states would join a collective security organization. All states in the organization would agree to respect the territorial borders of all its members and not to conduct aggression against any of its members. It was, as one expert in the field concludes,

the creation of an international system in which the danger of aggressive warfare by any state is met by the avowed determination of virtually all other states to exert pressure of every necessary variety – moral, diplomatic, economic, and military – to frustrate attack upon any state. The expectation of collective resistance to aggression is conceived as a deterrent threat to states which might be tempted to misuse their power and as a promise of security to all states which might be subject to attack. ¹⁴

Collective security in this form requires an inward looking organization that is focused on interstate violence between member states of the organization. In a collective security organization, states would retain some offensive forces for collective action, but maintain primarily defensive forces. In this way, all states would feel secure in that no state, individually, would have a preponderance of offensive forces while all states would be vulnerable to collective action. Ideally, the organization would be global in nature with a membership that would include every state in the world linked in a legally binding commitment to automatically apply collective action against states that commit aggression anywhere in the world. This ideal type would be:

collective in the fullest sense; it purports to provide security *for* all states, *by* the action of all states, *against* all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power. ... Ideal collective security ... offer[s] the certainty, backed by legal obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with collective sanctions. ¹⁵

Advocates believe collective security is more effective in managing the world's power than a balance of power system for three reasons. First, it would provide a more robust form of deterrence in that it threatens a preponderance of power instead of just a balance of power. Second, due to the binding natured of the collective security agreement, rogue states could be sure that collective action would be taken against them if they conducted aggression against any state. Third, the institutions developed to run the organization would promote cooperation for the common good vice competition and reduce the negative repercussions of the security dilemma. In this regard, proponents generally believe that the collective security institutions would reduce conflict, misinformation, the chance for miscalculation, and the necessity to show resolve, while promoting cooperation and improving transparency. Additionally, maintaining predominately defensive forces would reduce threats to neighboring states and decrease the

chances of dangerous spirals leading to war. In short, "collective security mitigates the rivalry and hostility of a self-help world." ¹⁶

Although collective security has some appealing attributes, there are a number of reasons why implementing ideal collective security on a regional or global basis would be quite difficult. First, the inclusive nature of the agreement, including all states, would make it difficult to manage and hard to reach consensus on when to take collective action. A related issue is that few conflicts throughout the world are simple situations. Many contain ambiguous aspects making it difficult to determine when aggression has taken place and whom the aggressor is. Additionally, small states may have a different view of the status quo, than the major powers. Second, since all aggression will be confronted with collective action by all states, some states may be reluctant to carry their share, content to let other states carry the burden while enjoying the stability brought by the system. Third, while collective security rests on deterrence with a preponderance of power, that power is not actually brought together until after the aggression has occurred, leaving would-be aggressors to wonder if a balancing coalition will really materialize against them and states to wonder if a coalition would actually form to come to their defense. Finally, and perhaps most important, the binding nature of the agreement gives rise to the possibility of states being dragged into wars where their interests are small. Regarding this issue, Hans Morgenthau explains that "by the very logic of its assumptions ... the diplomacy of collective security must aim at the transformation of all local conflicts into world conflicts ... since peace is supposed to be indivisible. ... Thus a device intent on making war impossible ends by making war universal."17

WORLD GOVERNMENT

World government represents the most centralized form of managing the world's power. Advocates of world government argue that the only way to mitigate the violence in the anarchic, state-centered, world is to change the state system into a global republic. The federation of states in America is often used as an example of how a global government could be built. In a global republic, an international institution would be given the legal authority to make the rules and the coercive power to enforce them. The world government would be the supreme institution that had authority over all the states. States would be non-sovereign members of a federal zone that ideally would cover the globe. A world government would stress the rule of law and the disarmament of all the states, which in turn would relinquish their sovereignty to a world government in exchange for their security. States would be disarmed and all military power would be devolved to an international enforcement agency. Proponents of world government believe that this is the only way to escape the violence of the anarchic world. The theory of world government, a noted authority on the management of power concludes, "envisages the erection of authoritative and powerful central institutions for the management of relations among states, specifically for the purpose of preventing international war."

Since developing a world government requires states to relinquish sovereignty to an international institution, this method currently has few supporters. Additionally, a strong world government with a

monopoly of military power is not a panacea for peace. Governments are continuously threatened by civil wars, organized crime, drug trafficking, and a host of other domestic problems. For governments to avoid civil violence they must accommodate the social and economic needs of their people. For governments to be successful, they require more than a monopoly of power, but a political process that provides for the accommodation between the classes of people within the state. A successful world government would have to accommodate the variety of social and economic inequalities that exist throughout the globe. If all states were to concede their sovereignty and disarm, if an international institution had a monopoly of world military power, without the social and economic accommodation of all the world's people, civil unrest is all but assured. While theoretically a solution for managing world power in the far distant future, world government requires a shift away from the concept of state sovereignty that today statesman simply do not accept. ¹⁹

GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS

Many different grand strategy options have been suggested for America since the end of the Cold War. These options include the strategies of: primacy, hegemony, preponderance, global leadership, neo-isolationism, restraint, collective security, cooperative security, off-shore balancing, containment, and selective engagement. Although each of these strategies has its own particular nuances, they generally fall into four categories, three from the realist school, and one from the idealist approach. Primacy and neo-isolationism demonstrate the two divergent themes in realist thought. Cooperative security represents the idealist school. And selective engagement is a hybrid grand strategy that attempts to strike a balance between the two realist grand strategies of primacy and neo-isolationism, and includes idealist goals as well.

PRIMACY

Description

Primacy – hegemony – preponderance – global leadership are all similar variations describing a U.S. grand strategy the objective of which is to maintain American dominance in world affairs. Primacy is a power-centric grand strategy that strives to create a unipolar world order with America as the most powerful nation. American strength must dominate the international system to ensure peace and stability in America. This grand strategy attempts to prevent the return to a multipolar world order and the development of a global competitor. Proponents of primacy look to theories based on offensive realism and hegemonic stability, both of which hold that states aspire to maximize their control over the international system and that stability in that system is achieved when one great power imposes order. Additionally, some primacy advocates subscribe to *defensive* realism, the idea that states balance *threat* not power. Defensive realists believe most states perceive American leadership as benign and not threatening; therefore, American primacy can succeed where other attempts at primacy have failed. All proponents of primacy, however, believe the greatest threat to U.S. security is war among any of the great powers and that the chance of war among the great powers increases with the rise of a peer

competitor. Primacy, in short, seeks to create a unipolar world order and to maintain America's hegemony in world affairs by, maximizing America's relative economic and military power, maintaining world stability through active U.S. leadership, and by strengthening and increasing the democratic zone of peace.

A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.²⁰

Interests

Primacy takes a broad view of American national interests. For America to succeed as the benevolent hegemon, America must account for its own interests as well as the interests of its allies in critical regions of the world. Under primacy, America would seek to remain the preeminent power in world affairs by maintaining military preeminence, preventing the rise of global competitors, preventing the rise of hostile regional hegemons, maintaining economic strength, and by expanding the zone of democratic peace. Due to the interconnectedness of the global economy and the interdependence between peace, democratic governments, economic prosperity, free markets, and respect for human rights, proponents of primacy see the three core interests as intertwined.

<u>Security</u>. Advocates of primacy believe that U.S. security interest rests on America remaining the preeminent power in the world. They propose maintaining this position by maintaining military preeminence, preventing the rise of global competitors, and preventing the rise of hostile regional hegemons.

Currently, America's military is the most powerful in the world. Maintaining military preeminence is a critical requirement to ensure regional and global stability in the future. By maintaining the strongest, most capable military in the world, America deters potential adversaries from resorting to force and reassures its allies that the U.S. will protect common interests. In order to accomplish all this, America must maintain capable military forces forward deployed in critical regions of the world. Primacy advocates believe that to preserve this military preeminence, the U.S. must retain and develop a number of capabilities. First, the nation must retain a robust nuclear deterrent capability and improve its ability to defend against weapons of mass destruction. Second, it must maintain combat forces capable of conducting operations throughout a broad spectrum of operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to major theater wars. These forces must be capable of rapidly projecting power throughout the globe in response to regional crisis in support of American and allied interests. Third, America must invest in research and development efforts to maximize the advantages from the current revolution in military affairs in order to remain at the leading edge of military technology and organization. Finally, the U.S. must maintain a strong industrial mobilization base to *ramp up* military production should the need arise. ²²

With primacy, America has a vital security interest in preventing the rise of a global peer competitor. Under this grand strategy, a global competitor creates instability by increasing international competition for hegemony over the international system, driving world order away from unipolarity and increasing the chance of great power war. Currently, America has no global competitors; therefore, the future trajectories of the world's great powers are of prime interest to the United States. Preventing the development of a global competitor is the prism in this approach that America uses in determining regional diplomatic, economic, and military strategies. ²³

Primacy advocates believe America can prevent the rise of a global competitor by preventing the rise of hostile hegemons in critical regions of the world. This is vital to the U.S. because "a global rival could emerge if a hostile power or coalition gained hegemony over a critical region," defined as "one that contains economic, technical, and human resources such that a power that controlled it would possess a military potential roughly equal to, or greater than, that of the United States." Europe and East Asia meet these criteria and are considered critical regions. The Middle East, although not meeting these criteria, is also considered a critical region because the world economy is dependant on the oil resources from that region.

<u>Economic Prosperity</u>. Primacy advocates are receptive to offensive economic realism and believe a competitive, strong, American economy is essential to maintaining America's well-being and influence throughout the world. Economic activity, Samuel Huntington points out.

is a source of power as well as well-being. It is indeed, probably the most important source of power in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states. Precisely for this reason Americans have every reason to be concerned by the current challenge to American economic primacy posed by Japan and the possible future challenge that could come from Europe.²⁵

Under this core interest, regaining economic primacy is essential for the future well-being of America and to ensure that the U.S. remains the most influential nation in world affairs. From this perspective, throughout the Cold War, America forsook economic competitive advantage to ensure the recovery of both Europe and Japan. Primacy advocates argue that today Europe and Japan are both prosperous and compete for economic advantage, and that in order to regain economic primacy; America must develop policies aimed in two broad areas. First, the U.S. must take a more competitive approach to maximize relative gains (offensive realism applied to the economy) in the international system.

Second, America must take measures to improve its internal economic health including: paying off the national debt, increasing the national savings rate, improving productivity, encouraging technical innovation, and improving education. Restoring American economic primacy is the foundation for America's power and influence in world affairs.

<u>Promotion of Values</u>. Primacy advocates recognize the benefits of promoting democracy. They believe America has an interest in strengthening and enlarging the democratic zone of peace and that this should be the central theme in America's post-Cold War grand strategy. No nation or alliance

currently has the power to threaten the American-led zone of peace if unity can be maintained between the major powers in that zone, which include America, Germany, France, Britain and Japan. Therefore, it is in America's interest to strengthen the bond between these powers. Moreover, the U.S. should selectively expand the zone of peace by accepting nations that have stable democratic governments and free market economies. In this manner, the zone of peace could come to theoretically encompass the entire world. Primacy advocates caution, however, that nations would not be added to the zone of peace, with all the benefits in trade and security that go along with it, until they established stable democratic governments and free market economies, and subscribed to the rule of law.²⁷

NEO-ISOLATIONISM

Description

Neo-isolationism – restraint – off-shore balancing – are all similar variations of a grand strategy that rejects internationalism and seeks to disentangle the U.S. from conflicts of other nations and to focus instead on providing security and prosperity for the nation. The turning point for neo-isolationists was the end of the Cold War. The new world order for them is an unaligned collection of regional powers capable of independent action making U.S. involvement in extra-regional conflicts undesirable and unnecessary. During the Cold War, the American and Soviet hegemons constrained the independent actions of regional powers. Absent the Soviet threat, America's ability to constrain such actions has diminished. The result is the fragmentation and regionalization of power. Furthermore, neo-isolationists generally see power in the post-Cold War era being dispersed between large numbers of regional powers capable of conducting significant action independently. In such a generally unaligned world order, a multipolar, balance of power approach among great powers on a global scale, will not be effective, despite the fact that such an approach will reemerge in the regions. The result is that great powers will have little influence beyond their own region. From this perspective, U.S. involvement in extra-regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era are not only undesirable but also, unnecessary. Extra-regional conflicts can be contained without U.S. military intervention; American security doesn't rely on world stability.

More conflict and less determinacy within other regions of the world would not – contrary to prevalent perceptions – create more danger and less stability in the entire international system, or in the immediate precincts of the United States. Quite the contrary, isolation of conflicts within other regions – regardless of how those conflicts were resolved, or not resolved – would contribute to a kind of 'metastability' of the entire international system, that is, a situation where even extreme political fluidity and violent and abrupt change could occur within regions, yet the structure of the entire system would not be undermined. Nations such as the United States could remain neutral and substantially unaffected by disturbances in other regions.

The fact is, neo-isolationists conclude, that since the demise of the Soviet Union no state, or group of states, has the power to threaten the physical security of the United States. America is geographically blessed with peaceful neighbors north and south and vast oceans east and west. Nuclear weapons negate any nation's ability to successfully conquer the American homeland. Additionally, regional

balances of power exist in every major region of the world, except the Middle East as a consequence, the security of most U.S. allies is no longer at stake. Therefore, the American overseas military presence should be withdrawn because it provides security that U.S. allies should provide for themselves, ensures America's involvement in other state's conflicts in areas of less than vital interest, potentially threatens the balance of power in those regions, and drains U.S. resources, thereby reducing America's economic competitive advantage. ²⁹

Interests

Neo-isolationists believe America has only one vital interest: the security of the citizens and territory of the U.S. with its values and institutions intact. Generally they resist tying other interests to security to gain a wider appeal such as spreading democracy, promoting human rights, or providing world stability for the global economy. The only current threat to U.S. security, they argue, is to become involved in the conflicts of other states. U.S. security is not dependant on world stability; conflicts in other areas of the world are likely to remain regional and can be contained without U.S. military intervention. Moreover, these types of conflict, while affecting the regional balances of power, will not have a significant effect on the international system. Efforts to tie economic interdependence, world order, and the promotion of values to national security interests cause America to go on ill-founded, universalistic crusades that have little chance of success, are expensive, and are despised by those whom the intervention is intended to help.³⁰

<u>Security</u>. Neo-isolationists argue that currently, there are no discernable security threats to the United States. Geography enhances America's security. There are pacific neighbors north and south, and large oceans east and west. The result of these geographical realities is that the conventional threat to the U.S. homeland is quite small. Additionally, nuclear weapons add a significant deterrent to any state that desires to conquer American territory. Nuclear weapons do not make war obsolete; however, neo-isolationists believe that no state can conquer the U.S. because of America's nuclear retaliatory power. The U.S. in short, is more secure that at any time in history.³¹

As a consequence, neo-isolationists believe that the requirement for America to provide security for Europe and Asia is past. They propose maintaining complete U.S. political freedom of action by disengaging from all current U.S. security alliances in Europe and Asia and by bringing U.S. military forces home, thus allowing the nations in the regions to do their own geo-political work, and provide for their own defense. "America's alliances reduce the strategic risk that its allies face and, therefore, eliminate their need to engage in internal balancing." In the Middle East, on the other hand, most isolationists see a need to remain engaged.

The strategic environment in the Middle East is significantly different than in either Asia or Europe. America's allies elsewhere are more than capable of defending themselves, guaranteeing the continued division of global industrial might. But many of the countries in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, are incapable of developing a robust defense capability. Without American military power to defend them, a regional

aggressor could consolidate Persian Gulf oil, threatening one of America's core interests, prosperity. The strategic realities of the Middle East, therefore, require a different policy than is appropriate for Asia or Europe. The United States should maintain sufficient forces in the Persian Gulf to prevent any country from monopolizing control over significant amounts of the region's oil. 33

The consequences of all this is a general neo-isolationistic perception that the U.S. military should be a small but strong, inexpensive, non-interventionist force focused on protecting America. This applies also to nuclear forces. The isolationists view of deterrence has been termed "finite essential deterrence" meaning to deter "attacks or pressures against U.S. territory, society, political process, property, and military forces," as opposed to extended deterrence which commits U.S forces to deter aggression against allies overseas. From this perspective, there is also the need to develop a missile defense system to protect the American homeland from the threat of terrorist attacks using ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, while neo-isolationists do not wish to see nuclear proliferation, they believe an active role will not prevent the spread of these weapons. The answer lies in promoting a greater role for research and development to maintain a technological edge, and enhancing the capability to mobilize military power when the threat conditions change in the future. 35

Economic Prosperity. Economic prosperity is ranked second, to security, as America's most important national interest for neo-isolationists, who emphasize the need to balance security and economic prosperity. Neo-isolationists believe the U.S. is currently spending too much on security, which diverts resources that could be used to improve America's economic competitive advantage. Savings from the defense budget could be used to reduce taxes, and the national debt, improve savings rates, and encourage industries to invest in value added product improvements, thus improving America's competitive advantage internationally. Additionally, America's funding of other nations security has the net result of decreasing the nation's competitive advantage. Neo-isolationists argue that despite the demise of the Soviet Union America continues to spend a quarter of a trillion dollars annually on defense, which is three times larger than her closest competitor, Russia. America can afford to make large cuts in defense spending and still enjoy substantial security. There is a point of diminishing returns in such spending, the neo-isolationists conclude, where large increases bring only small improvements in security.

This outlook leads to a rejection of a U.S. role in maintaining global stability to ensure stability in the global economy. For neo-isolationists, the dynamics of the global economy work relative to the forces of supply and demand. The best way to ensure economic prosperity in America is therefore, to produce internationally competitive products and services.

<u>Promotion of Values</u>. While neo-isolationists would like to see democracy, global peace, and human rights flourish, they do not believe the U.S. should use the military to promote these values abroad. Instead, states open to U.S. values should be encouraged with trade opportunities while, those that attack their citizens or neighbors should be sanctioned. Neo-isolationists are also careful to differentiate peripheral interests from vital interests, rejecting any linkage of interests to national security

in order to gain a broader appeal. "America's freedom from physical attack or coercion does not depend on peace in Africa, democracy in Latin America, or human rights in Cambodia." U.S. desires for democracy, global-peace, and respect for human rights to flourish are real; but they are not tied to the physical security of America. "Wars on distant continents only threaten U.S. security if the United States travels overseas to join in." 38

COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Description

Cooperative security is a modern and robust version of *collective* security. It rests on the same notion as collective security that peace is indivisible and that states are deterred by a preponderance of power vice a balance of power. Cooperative security is similar to collective security in that states agree to respect the territorial borders of member states. Additionally, the cooperative security agreement stipulates that any aggression conducted by any member, against another member, will be met by collective diplomatic, economic, and military action by all other members. Thus, states would be deterred from committing aggression by the threat of preponderant, collective action by all the other members of the agreement. Advocates of cooperative security note, however, that in collective security, the collective action against member states forms only after the aggression has occurred. Cooperative security is more aggressive in that it attempts to prevent interstate war by "preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled, thus obviating the need for states so threatened to make their own counterpreparations." Methods range from arms control agreements to confidence-building actions.

Interests

Advocates of cooperative security have a broad view of U.S. national interests. They recognize that an interdependent global economy is developing and that the ability of the leaders of any nation to influence their economy independent of the global economy is rapidly diminishing. Thus, protecting U.S. traditional interests requires protecting the interests of U.S. allies and trading partners as well. Additionally, America has some level of responsibility for maintaining global stability. In short, globalization and interdependence requires America to take an increasingly global perspective, regarding U.S. interests. Cooperative security advocates also recognize the strong ties between traditional security interests and peripheral interests. They note, for example, the "powerful and growing linkages between our moral interest in the expansion of democracy and our 'real' interests in a safe, secure, free, and prosperous America." Due to the strong interdependencies among nations and the strong linkages between security interests and the promotion of democracy, free market economies, and respect for human rights, all these objectives must be sought collectively to maintain global stability.

<u>Security</u>. Advocates of cooperative security believe America has an interest in maintaining both U.S. and global security. Although the spectra of global war has been dramatically reduced in the post-Cold War era, the threat of escalating regional conflicts that could have an impact on U.S. interests has

increased. At the same time, they perceive the great powers as having less influence on regional actors than in the previous bipolar period. For these advocates, the primary security interest of ensuring America's territorial defense is well in hand. However, the threats to global security are many and include a variety of issues ranging from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a host of ethnic, nationalistic, and religious based civil wars. The appropriate grand strategic option for dealing with these new security problems is cooperative engagement, "in essence a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit," leaving "the only legitimate purpose of national military forces is [as] the defense of national territory or the participation in multinational forces that enforce U.N. sanctions or maintain peace."

It is preventative in nature in that the agreement requires that the means of conducting a ground assault could not even be assembled without the international community's knowledge providing the opportunity for collective international action to prevent such an attack.

National ground forces would be structured for defense of national territory and their territory-taking capabilities would be minimized. National capabilities for deep strike at rear and homeland targets inside the territory of others by missile or long-range aircraft would be constrained. Some of the ground and air forces that are in excess of national requirements could be configured for use in a multinational military force that could enforce U.N. sanctions when necessary. As an egregious form of offensive capability, nuclear weapons would be relegated to background deterrent role only, and their spread stemmed. Chemical and biological weapons would be banned entirely. Mutual restraint would be verified and reassurances given among cooperating parties through extensive transparency in force deployment and operations and in production, sale, and purchase of weapons.

International and regional institutions play a major role for cooperative security enthusiasts. They advocate developing a "global system of law and order" based on the principle that "governments, authorities, and peoples of the world are subject to common laws and constraints, that these are enforceable by international institutions, and that violators will be subject to harsh punishment." In this perspective, the U.N. is the focal point for cooperative action against states that commit aggression throughout the world. U.N. Security Council authorization and the cooperation of multilateral organizations lend a level of legitimacy and moral authority to cooperative actions that would not be evident in unilateral actions. Under collective security, the U.N. would have the ability to organize multinational, expeditionary, military forces to thwart aggression throughout the world. Some proponents envision the United Nation's maintaining a large standing military force, in excess of 100,000 troops and capable of rapid deployment to maintain stability. Most believe, however, that this arrangement would be difficult to support and envision maintaining only a small number of permanent forces, primarily for peacekeeping duties. Assembling lager scale multinational military forces would be done on an ad hoc basis as required. 44

As for the United States, there would have to be "a major restructuring and downsizing of its defense forces under a cooperative security regime." First, U.S. ground and naval forces could be dramatically reduced to provide for the territorial defense of America as well as an ability to reconstitute in

the event that a major challenger developed or the cooperative security agreement collapsed. Additionally, America would maintain some level of ground and naval forces in excess of the requirement for defense to be available for use by the U.N. for offensive cooperative action. Second, U.S. forces would continue to provide the primary source of strategic intelligence to assess new threats to the cooperative security regime and to assess the measures developed to maintain global transparency. Finally, America would retain the ability to "provide key elements of the reconnaissance strike military forces that would be used in multinational military actions whenever diplomacy and economic sanctions proved to be insufficient." Those key elements include systems such as: command, control, communications, and intelligence assets such as satellites, AWACS, JSTARS, GPS, and night vision devices; defense suppression assets such as stealth aircraft, anti-radiation missiles, and cruise missiles; and a variety of precision guided missiles. Advocates of cooperative security believe that this concept will reduce the U.S. defense budget while still maintaining America's security and lead in advanced military technology. At the same time, they acknowledge that the "global diffusion of advanced technology" could allow other nations to close the gap on U.S. military superiority unless that superiority is seen as serving the "general international interest."

A cooperative security agreement would also require other nations to restructure and downsize their military forces as well. Advocates point out that the restructuring and downsizing would be conceptually similar to the approach used by America; however, the size and structure of each nation's ground, naval, and air forces would depend on its particular defensive requirements. First, each nation would restructure and downsize its ground, naval, and air forces to provide for its territorial defense, leaving some excess assets for use in multinational operations. These defensive requirements would be different for each country. For example, states such as Germany and Russia would require larger ground forces and would be expected to provide a good share of the ground forces for multinational operations. States such as Italy of Japan would not require a large ground force, but would require larger navies and would be expected to provide a good share of the naval forces for multinational operations. Second, advocates of cooperative security note that only a few nations besides the United States have global strategic intelligence capabilities that permit them to contribute significantly to world wide threat evaluation and verification assessment. Those nations would be expected to provide those assets when required to conduct U.N. authorized multinational operations. Finally, some nations have the strategic sealift, strategic airlift, air superiority, and strike aircraft assets required to round out what would become a reconnaissance strike force. Those nations along with America would provide the assets required for any U.N. authorized multinational operation. 48

Cooperative security not only attempts to limit the size and composition of national military establishments to primarily defensive forces, but also to develop a variety of methods to increase the visibility of those forces so that any attempt by any nation to mass its military for an attack will be noticed before the attack occurs, providing the international community the time to apply diplomatic, economic, and if necessary military force to prevent the attack from occurring. Transparency programs would

include limits on activities ranging from military force size and equipment to sales and purchases of military-related activities. Limits would be imposed on the location and movement of ground and air forces. Intelligence assets would be used to report violations and to detect the massing of ground forces. Since massing air forces requires coordination of air traffic control (ATC), cooperative security advocates also recommend developing an international surveillance system that would maintain a current world-wide order of battle of military aircraft and pin point any state that was attempting to mass aircraft for an attack. Additionally, they propose developing intrusive systems that could be placed inside each state's territory to detect the military activity, whether it is tanks, missile launches, or underground nuclear detonations. All these methods to develop transparency would be mutually agreed upon by all members of the cooperative security agreement. If violations occurred, diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions would be applied depending on the severity of the violation. All members of the cooperative security agreement would have the benefit of full disclosure of all this information. All states would be able to join as long as they followed the rules of the agreement. States who were not members of the agreement would not have access to the information and would stand outside the norms of the international community.⁴⁹

Ideally, cooperative security would be a global organization and all states would become members of the agreement. Cooperative security advocates recognize, however, that this is an aspiration that will only partially be fulfilled. However, they argue that cooperative security agreements can begin by being implemented on a regional basis and increase in scope and size in time. For instance, a cooperative security agreement need not initially be an all-encompassing treaty, but can begin with several mutually reinforcing and overlapping arms control agreements that could be merged in time. Proponents point to Europe as an example of a region where the structure for a cooperative security agreement already exists in the form of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Additionally, basic cooperative security principles are reflected in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Stockholm Agreements on Confidence and Security Building Measures. Recognizing the initial limits of such agreements outside Europe, proponents recommend strengthening the agreements in Europe and expanding the scope to include Asia and the Middle East over time. ⁵⁰

In short, advocates believe cooperative security makes sense in terms of furthering U.S. security interests in the new era. It reduces defense costs and the size of national military establishments, provides a stronger form of security, encourages integration and cooperation, and effectively controls the forces of disintegration. However, to be successful, the proponents of this grand strategy option acknowledge, would require a major shift in international thinking.

The major military establishments will have to contain their military investments and subordinate the projection of their power to matters of international interest rather that national prerogative. Moreover, they will have to establish reasonable equity, in substance and procedure, in determining what international interest means. For their part states with lesser military establishments will have to align their aspirations with standards of equity that can command international consensus and that exclude nationalist or divisive ideological assertions. They will have to relinquish the

obstructionist policies and clandestine conspiracies that have frequently been used to seek some marginal shift in national advantage against the inherently stronger states. ⁵¹

Nevertheless, cooperative security enthusiasts believe these changes in international thinking can evolve over time and become the international norm.

Economic Prosperity. Proponents of cooperative security believe the increasing globalization of the economy has created a situation in which the ability of individual governments to control their national economies has been dramatically diminished. As a result, American prosperity is more and more dependant on the economic prosperity of trading partners and the global economy in general. Their economies in turn will only prosper in a stable political and security environment. Therefore, cooperative security enthusiasts link economic prosperity directly to U.S. security interests in maintaining world order as well as to the promotion of democratic governments, market economies, and human rights. ⁵²

<u>Promotion of Values</u>. Cooperative security advocates recognize the strong linkages between traditional security interests and peripheral interests, acknowledging ties, for instance, "between our moral interest in the expansion of democracy and our 'real' interests in a safe, secure, free, and prosperous America," while asserting that "economic development, human rights, good governance, and peace are intertwined and mutually reinforcing." As a result, cooperative security enthusiasts believe the traditionally peripheral interests of promoting democracy, free market economies, and human rights are inextricably linked, and must be sought simultaneously, with America's traditional vital interests.

Proponents of cooperative security are strong believers in the idea of the democratic peace. Advocates note that democratic governments are statistically far less likely to go to war with neighboring states, use weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism, or achieve their objectives through the use of force. Additionally, they note that democratic governments are more reliable trading partners, provide stable investment opportunities, and are environmentally responsible. Due to these strong correlations between democracy and peace, "democracies are the only reliable foundation of which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built." 54

For these advocates, there is also the strong link between democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Proponents argue that it is precisely because democracies are responsible to their citizens, that they are less likely to violate basic human rights and have a propensity to promote freedom, equality, tolerance, and respect for life. All this, they conclude, brings the goals full circle back to world order as a basis for democracy, free market economies, and respect for human rights.

Peace is a necessary condition for development; equitable development eradicates many of the socio-political conditions that threaten peace. It is no accident that those countries whose economies are declining, whose institutions are failing, and where human rights are not respected should also be the ones experiencing the greatest amounts of violence and turmoil.⁵⁵

The concept of human rights is particularly important to the strategic option of cooperative security. Proponents note that international sentiment is developing based on a broader notion of basic human rights focused on *intrastate* as well as interstate violations of such rights. Some have promoted the idea

of "human security" and explain that; "security ... is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defense of the territorial integrity of states." Others cite more pragmatic measures to include intrastate violence as a concern to the international community. First, such violence could escalate beyond its borders into a broader regional conflict causing a variety of security, economic, and humanitarian problems. Second, intrastate conflict could produce thousands of refugees causing serious humanitarian and economic repercussions for neighboring states. Finally, ethnic conflicts in various states could provoke repercussions in other multiethnic countries. In all this, cooperative security advocates recognize there are limits to what the international community can accomplish; however, "the impossibility of intervening everywhere should not bar the U.N. from acting anywhere."

SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

Description

Selective engagement is a grand strategy that seeks to appeal to both realists and idealists. It strives to strike a balance between doing too much or too little. Like primacy, selective engagement is based on the realist assumptions that the state will remain the primary player in an anarchic, self-help international system, competing for security and economic gains. National power is essential to provide security for the state, and there will be inevitable conflicts as states interact in the international system. Added to this is the hegemonic stability theory, which assumes that stability in the international system is enhanced when one great state or alliance of states provides political and military stability. Selective engagers believe America is uniquely qualified to fulfill this role due the combination of power and purpose. Unlike advocates of primacy, however, selective engagers believe attempts to achieve global hegemony can't be attained and will result in the decline of U.S. power due to over commitment. Therefore, the strategy of selective engagement is more selective in the application of U.S. resources than primacy.⁵⁸

On the other hand, selective engagement proponents generally reject the realist tenets of neo-isolationism, because they believe a world with America isolated would be more dangerous and less prosperous. U.S. retrenchment from Europe and Asia, for instance, would cause a security vacuum and precipitate German and Japanese development of nuclear weapons. This, in turn, would cause regional arms races and the proliferation of WMD to other states in these regions causing instability and increasing the chance of great power war. Additionally, these races for power and security could precipitate economic nationalism and the end of the open international economic system, thus reducing America's economic prosperity. ⁵⁹

At the same time, selective engagement embraces idealist or liberal goals that include promoting free market economies, democracy, human rights, and protecting the environment. For proponents of this option, there is a strong indication that economic interdependence can promote cooperation among states. They believe economic nationalism was one of the causes of World War II and therefore, should be avoided. The best way to maintain a strong U.S. economy is to ensure that a stable security

environment exists among the great powers to promote a stable political environment in order to maintain the open international economy. In this regard, they are generally proponents of the democratic peace, believing that stable democracies are less likely to go to war and more likely to respect human rights than other forms of government. Nevertheless, selective engagers generally do not believe America should use military power to promote democracy or to intervene in intrastate conflicts in the name of human rights. Instead, international cooperative methods must be developed to address those issues as well as to protect the global environment. ⁶⁰

Interests

Selective engagement takes a broad view of national interests and includes both realist interests that are vital to U.S. security and prosperity, and idealist interests that are desirable but will not significantly detract from U.S. security or prosperity if not attained. Vital interests include: defending the homeland, maintaining Eurasian great power peace, and preserving the free flow of Persian Gulf oil. Desired interests include: maintaining an open international economy, promoting democracy and human rights, and protecting the global environment. Selective engagers use American resources selectively to accomplish America's vital interests first, then America's desirable interests in such a way as not to overcommit national resources. They support using military force to accomplish America's vital objectives, but not its desired objectives. Nevertheless, they believe other forms of national power are more effective than military power in promoting democracy, supporting human rights, enhancing free market economies, and protecting the global environment.

<u>Security</u>. Proponents of selective engagement aim to provide security for America by: preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and preventing Eurasian great power wars. In order to accomplish these goals, they recommend maintaining all current alliances in Europe and Asia, maintaining the nuclear umbrella over Germany and Japan, and adding reassurance to extended nuclear deterrence by maintaining U.S. military forces deployed in both Europe and Asia.

Selective engagers argue that nuclear weapons have made traditional geo-politics obsolete. They note that in the post-Cold War era, no state has the conventional capability to attack the territory of the United States and succeed. Additionally, nuclear states would not attack the United States with nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation in kind and total destruction. Nuclear deterrence has been effective in preventing war between traditional nuclear states in the past and will continue to do so in the future. The only threat to the physical security of the United States, then, is from rogue states and terrorists using nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. ⁶²

Given this premise there are a number of reasons why WMD proliferation is inimical to U.S. security interests. First, as the number of states who possess weapons of mass destruction increases, the chances of those weapons proliferating into the hands of rogue states and terrorists increase as well. Second, the greater the chance that WMD are in the hands of rogue states and terrorists the greater the chance they will be used for war or a terrorist act. Third, deterrence is more problematic with rogue states

and terrorists because they are characterized as being more motivated to accomplish their objectives by force, are indifferent to the suffering of their people consequently more willing to take greater risks, and are poor calculators who easily misperceive signals. Fourth, there has been a recent trend of terrorist groups whose objectives include revenge vice political gain. And finally, rogue states or terrorists may feel more emboldened to strike at U.S. interests using conventional means once they possess weapons of mass destruction. While it is not clear that terrorists or rogue states will attack America using weapons of mass destruction, selective engagers believe the consequences for not being prepared are too large to ignore. ⁶³

As a consequence, selective engagement advocates recommend a variety of methods to reduce the chance of proliferation including: strengthening international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency; supporting treaties that prohibit the proliferation or acquisition of these weapons; and providing enticing political and economic carrots for states that do not acquire these weapons and sanctions against those states that do. In addition, they propose using U.S. military forces in four ways to help prevent proliferation: First, by maintaining America's nuclear umbrella over Germany and Japan. If America were to withdraw the nuclear umbrella from Germany and Japan, there is a reasonable chance these states would seek their own nuclear capability which could precipitate regional arms races. Second, by continuing to station U.S. forces in both Germany and Japan. American military forces stationed in countries granted extended nuclear deterrence provide a symbol of U.S. commitment to their security and influence those countries to remain non-nuclear. Third, to conduct preventative strikes to prevent states from developing and producing weapons of mass destruction. Finally, by making a declaratory statement that states that use these weapons can expect strong military retaliation. 64

Selective engagers argue America's second most vital interest in terms of security is to maintain peace among Eurasia's great powers. They define peace as the absence of "major wars (ones that involve at least two great powers) nor [or] intense, sustained security competitions." They point out that the U.S. need not be concerned with wars among the lesser powers in either region (support for South Korea and Israel excepted). "Such wars may be tragic for the peoples involved, but their stakes for the United States are small, unless they would cause a great power war."

From this perspective, peace among the great powers is absolutely vital to the United States. To begin with, intense security competitions will increase the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, either war or intense security competitions between the great powers will have a propensity to draw the U.S. into the crisis. While neo-isolationists argue that America could remain distant from great power war, selective engagers believe that no power has ever lived operating only on the dictates of balance of power and that the U.S. could easily be drawn in based on alliance commitments, cultural factors, historical ties, or economic reasons. Finally, either major wars or security competitions could inhibit U.S. trade. Currently, America's exports and imports amount to approximately 20% of America's GDP.

Selective engagers believe that the primary reasons for the current peace among the Eurasian great powers is due to the combination of democracy and nuclear deterrence. War is less likely between stable democracies, and Germany, France, Britain, and Japan are currently stable democracies. Russia is in a turbulent transition to democracy. And China is combining a command political system with a free market economy. Additionally, each of the Eurasian great powers either posses or is protected by nuclear weapons. States have a proclivity to be more careful in their competitions when the risk of nuclear war is present. All of this notwithstanding, selective engagement calls for the added insurance of positioning U.S. military power at both ends of Eurasia. America's presence in Europe and Asia reassures German and Japanese neighbors that the former axis powers will help maintain political stability. Selective engagers believe that the chance of great power war in either Europe or Asia is slight; therefore, the size of U.S. forces deployed in these regions could be relatively small. ⁶⁸

<u>Economic Prosperity</u>. Selective engagers promote two interests to maintain American economic prosperity - - one vital: to maintain the free flow of Persian Gulf oil, and, one desirable: to maintain an open international economic order.

The proponents of this option argue that oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf are critical to the economies of the industrialized world, including the United States. Disruptions in oil supply or price can have cascading effects throughout the international economy. America, and more so, the other industrialized nations of the world are dependent on imported oil to fuel their economies. American dependence on imported oil has steadily increased and is currently estimated to reach 70%. Moreover, the majority of the world's oil and natural gas reserves reside in the Persian Gulf. Even if America purchased all her oil elsewhere, the Gulf would still have an overwhelming impact on oil prices and supplies, because states with large reserves such as Saudi Arabia, can affect supply and prices by acting as swing producers. In addition, although America imports most of its oil from Venezuela and Canada, selective engagers note, "the world oil market is highly competitive and integrated. What happens in the Gulf will affect the world price and supply should a major disruption occur there. It is therefore fallacious to argue that Gulf production and reserves are of little concern to the United States because it imports little from the region." 69

Maintaining access to the region and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon are the primary ways to ensure a stable supply and prices. In this regard, selective engagement recommends a divide but not conquer strategy in the Gulf. The objective is to keep the oil resources in the region divided among at least four states and for the American military to maintain the balance of power in the region. They propose maintaining current political-military ties to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other GCC states, utilizing international institutions to provide legitimacy for military operations and to organize military coalitions of the willing to help share the burden. Oil prices selective engagers conclude, "have never been determined solely by market factors, but have also been heavily influenced by political and military considerations. The Gulf's oil reserves are too important to be left to the market alone and too valuable to allow one or two regional hegemons to control."

Selective engagers believe maintaining an open international economic order is an important (desired) interest for America because it will improve U.S. prosperity and the prosperity of other states. Furthermore, they explain that "openness per se does not create wealth, but it does facilitate the most efficient allocation of the world's factors of production if markets are operating efficiently." Thus, maintaining an open international economic order benefits the U.S. in a variety of ways. It makes America more prosperous because of the economic benefits from trade due to both static and dynamic gains, which include "the continual increases in productivity, and hence real income, that global competition produces." Added to this, other states participating in the international economy become more prosperous as well, although each state's relative gains are dependant on the efficiencies of production in the industry that state trades in. While the relative gain is different for each state, since the global market is more efficient, all states reap an absolute gain and become more prosperous. Prosperous states throughout the world provide a potential market for U.S. goods and services.

Key to all this is America's selective participation in the international economic order, particularly important because of trends toward the regionalization of trade. Selective engagers believe that fear of Germany and Japan may grow with their increasing economic dominance in their regions. This development will only gain strength if the U.S. were to withdraw economic and military involvement in these regions. The consequent return to economic nationalism and the collapse of the open international system would create intense economic competitions possible leading to security competitions or, worst case, to war. Selective engagers argue that an American economic and military presence in Europe and Asia may provide the security and reassurance to maintain the political stability required to maintain the open international system which benefits all parties that participate. ⁷³

Promotion of Values. Selective engagers believe that promoting democracy and human rights and preventing mass murder are desired U.S. interests that have a global appeal and benefit America in three ways. First, democratic states are generally more pacific in settling disputes than non-democratic ones. This creates a more peaceful world. Second, democratic states, historically, have a smaller propensity to violate the human rights of their people. Therefore, more democratic states produce a more peaceful world with a smaller number of places where intervention is required. Finally, the increase of such states also improves the growth of the global economy. Democratic governments are more open to free market economies, which are more efficient than command economies. Moreover, promoting democracy and human rights indirectly increases the zone of peace, reduces the number of places intervention is required, and increases the prosperity of the global economy. ⁷⁴

Added to these are the arguments that protecting the global environment, specifically, preventing depletion of the ozone layer and global warming, are transnational problems that threaten all nations. The potential problems associated with ozone depletion and global warming are well known, America will not be insulated from their effects. Therefore, it is in America's interest as well as the rest of the world's to understand the effects of global environmental problems and take cooperative efforts to prevent those that will cause catastrophic effects. ⁷⁵

While interested in promoting all these values, selective engagers believe they are best pursued indirectly through non-military means. Generally, America should not intervene militarily to force the establishment of a democracy or become involved in intrastate conflicts in the name of human rights. These types of operations are both risky and costly, and require a long-term commitment for success, as the reconstruction of Germany and Japan demonstrated. Additionally, they point out, forcing American values on other states by military means is both morally wrong and beyond America's power. The best way to promote democracy is to encourage free market economies that help develop a strong middle class, which in turn provides impetus for democratic reform. In the end, however, selective engagers conclude that promotion of values will ultimately depend on fulfilling U.S. vital security and economic interests. ⁷⁶

If the line against the spread of weapons of mass destruction can be held, if the worlds access to Gulf oil is assured, and if the deep peace among the great powers can be maintained, then what results is an international system more peaceful, more prosperous, and more benign than would otherwise be the case. A more peaceful world is an important means for preserving international openness, in turn helps generate the wealth that facilitates democratic transitions and that will be necessary to deal with what is likely to prove to be humankind's biggest challenge yet: averting global climatic disaster. A more warlike world, to the contrary, is likely to be less prosperous, more contentious, and less cooperative, and none of these things benefits the United States. In sum, by advancing its vital interests through its military power, the United States can indirectly contribute to realizing its desired interests and in the process do some good for others.

ANALYSIS

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE NOT-SO NEW WORLD ORDER

The end of the Cold War ushered in many hopes for a new peaceful world based on the values of democracy, free markets, and the rule of law - - the so called *democratic peace*. Declarations of a "new world order" and "the end of history" attributable to "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government," were undermined by the violence that erupted throughout the globe ranging from Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, to Chechnya, East Timor, and Kosovo. One method for understanding the clashes has been articulated by Samuel Huntington in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* It is also possible, however, to view the violence from the realist perspective as resulting from the fragmentation of power as the international system shifts from the bipolarity of the Cold War, through a unipolar American moment, to a multipolar world order.

While time's arrow holds the promise of a global democratic peace, time's cycle reminds us of the potential danger that remains in the anarchic state based international system. Some geopolitical theorists note the cyclical nature of the international system, identifying five distinct forms of the system since the American revolutionary war, which can be characterized by fluidity and multipolarity in its early stages, transitioning to rigid bipolarity as it matures, and resulting at maturity in great power war (or the

collapse of a Cold War) that shatters the system, giving way to multipolarity and a new international system. ⁷⁹

From this cyclic perspective, the international system in the decade since the end of the Cold War has moved through a brief U.S. unipolar moment into a period of multipolarity that has already demonstrated tendencies to crystallize back into a bipolar arrangement. At the core of these tendencies is rapid globalization spawned by the combination of the information, technological, and communications revolutions. The result is a two-edged sword for the various actors in the international arena. On the one hand, globalization has generally been a positive economic and political force for most market democracies and some transition states. On the other, a trend toward fragmentation has been stimulated by globalization as actors ranging from ethnic groups to separatists seek to maximize power at the local levels in failed and failing states, transition states such as Russia and India, and even such democracies as Canada and Spain. Added to the adverse aspects of globalization is the information-based trend of WMD proliferation that had drastically altered the potential power of rogue states and terrorist groups.

Against this backdrop, there is a growing cooperative movement between Russia and China that could form a core for other actors disaffected with the West, to form a new and dangerous type of bipolarity.

The attraction of globalization that draws both states to the West risks being overwhelmed by policy differences with the West. Strengthened Sino-Russian ties are based on growing suspicions of the West, increasingly common interests, a natural arms sale relationship, and resolution of most of their Cold War ideological and border differences. Former Russian Prime Minister Primakov even conceived of a somewhat fanciful Russian – Chinese – Indian alliance directed against Western dominance. At the same time, rogues states like Iraq, Serbia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating with each other through technology transfers that try to thwart market democracies. There are also indications of increased Russian and Chinese cooperation with the rogue states. 80

Although this transformation to bipolarity is not complete and not necessarily predestined, the idea of an international life cycle has some interesting implications when considering America's grand strategy choices. At the end of the Cold War, some political thinkers, enticed by idealistic visions of a global democratic peace, believed the international community had entered a new era of geopolitical thinking in which the old view of national self-interest would give way to a cooperative new world order. Unable to constrain or explain the violence that came in the wake of the Cold War, however, idealists continue to search for a new paradigm to define the new order. Yet this search has proven fruitless; the international system remains an anarchic collection of states. While complex global interdependence, has to some degree eroded the power of the state in the post-Cold War era, the state remains the primary actor on the world scene. Although states must increasingly cooperate with each other to control the forces of integration and disintegration that have been unleashed by rapid globalization, that cooperation must take place within the realist paradigm. While the arrow of time promises a new world order, based on a paradigm of collective international interests and cooperation, the cycle of time is a reminder of the recurring nature of the international system. The underlying nature of the state-based system has not

changed, a paradigm shift has not developed, and states continue to interact in the international arena based on national self-interests. Although small-scale contingencies will dominate the strategic landscape during this multipolar period, the U.S. must resist the temptation to focus solely on these threats in order to maintain a capability to fight and win the next great power war which may develop from the bipolar trends in the current multipolar world. America's grand strategy may aspire to idealistic goals, but it must recognize the limits of power and be grounded in realistic national self-interests in this *not-so* new world order.

MANAGING WORLD POWER

What is the most effective way to manage world power in the current international environment? Idealistically, the arrow of time promises the possibility of a world government with a monopoly of power making interstate war irrelevant at some point in the far distant future. For the near term, however, the cycle of time is a realistic reminder that the international system remains an anarchic collection of states and that states are simply not ready to surrender their sovereignty to an international institution in return for security.

A pure form of collective security is improbable in today's world as well. States are not willing to gamble on a paradigm shift away from the realist paradigm of national self-interest to the idealist paradigm of collective international interests. Two attempts at a global form of collective security have been attempted in the past, the League of Nations and the United Nations. Neither organization was successful in developing a shift away from the realist paradigm. Both organizations recognized the primacy of power, and neither required the automatic application of military power in response to aggression. In the League of Nations, the League "Council was to decide when the use of force was warranted and to recommend how much military capability each member should contribute to uphold the Covenant (Article 16 [2]). The Covenant also stipulated that the Council's recommendations would be authoritative only when reached unanimously."81 Therefore, any League Council member could block League collective military action. Like the League, the United Nations agreement did not require the automatic application of collective military action. The U.N. charter "granted veto power to the permanent members of the Security Council. The veto ensured that the UN's provisions for collective action could not be directed against any of the major powers, and they prevented the UN from being able to address the most serious threats to peace, disputes between the great powers."82 The drafters of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, while aspiring to higher idealism, could not break from the realist paradigm. Consequently, they provided safety valves in the agreements that did not require automatic collective military action on the part of its members. The nature of the international system remains essentially the same as it was after both World Wars. An ideal form of collective security is no more possible to develop today than it was after those two conflicts. States are not willing to supplant international collective interests for national self-interests.

If world government is unacceptable, and collective security not possible because states will not accept a full shift from the realist paradigm, then balance of power dynamics will remain the primary way for states to manage power in the international system. While the arrow of time promises the cooperation of all states, tolerance for all cultures, and world peace, the cycle of time reminds of the reality of the anarchic state-based international system. America's grand strategy must be founded on the realist structure of power dynamics and national interests.

GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS

Primacy

Primacy is the most aggressive grand strategy choice derived from the realist school. It is a power centric grand strategy that strives to create a unipolar world with America as the most powerful nation. Despite the allure of such a strategy that promises so many benefits for the United Sates in this current transition period, there are a number of important disadvantages. First, the cost to fund the large military required to support a policy of primacy could be prohibitive. Moreover, providing protection for allies throughout the world allows those allies to focus on improving their economies while the U.S. pays for their security. This reduces America's ability to achieve economic primacy. Without economic primacy, military primacy can't be sustained. This is even more critical today, since the world is more multipolar from an economic standpoint than it is unipolar. 83 Second, indiscriminate American security commitments throughout the world, all but guarantee that America would become involved in a variety of regional crises where true U.S. interests are questionable. American military power would be stretched to the limit. A concomitant to imperial overstretch is the question of spilling American blood for other nations wars. Third, there is the problem of whether extended deterrence will work in areas where there is really little U.S. interest. Deterrence is a function of both capability and will. Finally, while the idea of a benign hegemon is unique, states can't assume America will remain benign forever. States must balance power not threat, and they will eventually attempt to balance American hegemony. 84 "Balance-of-power theory suggests further that efforts to preserve unipolarity are bound to be futile and likely to be counterproductive. Instead, the rational strategy for the dominant state is to accept the inevitability of multipolarity and maneuver to take advantage of it."85

Neo-Isolationism

Neo-isolationism is the least aggressive of America's grand strategy choices derived from the realist school of thought. It takes a narrow view of national interests and focuses on providing peace and prosperity for Americans. The basic problem with this option is that it is simply not possible. Powerful nations are inevitably drawn into great power wars, and America will be no exception. Moreover, withdrawing U.S. security guarantees from Europe and Asia would probably precipitate regional arms races (including nuclear weapons) due to balance of power considerations inherent in the security dilemma, causing regional instability or possibly great power war. Equally important in an interconnected

world a regional strategy is questionable. "Today it is neither an exaggeration nor an affront to logic to include the Atlantic community (and thus much of Europe), as well as the so-called Pacific Basin or Pacific Rim countries, within the conceptual hemisphere." In addition, savings created by a neo-isolationist defense budget would only be between 70 – 100 billion dollars or 1 to 1.5% of America's gross domestic product. This is a small price to pay for the influence it buys. In this regard, while neo-isolationism maintains complete strategic freedom of action, it also means that when America does go to war, it will do so without the benefits of alliances that the U.S. enjoys today. These alliances "provide the United States with valuable bases, staging areas, intelligence-gathering facilities, in-theatre training facilities, and most important, close allies with whom it continuously trains and exercises." In short, the narrow view of American national interests will not serve America well in the long term.

Cooperative Security

Cooperative security is an aggressive grand strategy from the idealist school of thought that offers cooperation rather than competition, emphasizes international rather than national interests, and maintains U.S. security at less cost. There are, however, a host of disadvantages with this option. First, cooperative security requires states "to rise above narrow conceptions of national interest in response to appeals for action on behalf of the collective good, and to engage in what will seem to them as armed altruism."89 Thus, it incorporates residual aspects of collective security with all of the same problems associated with that concept. Some states could benefit without change from the stability brought by the system, and some states could defect from the agreement in order to pursue purely national interests. Interstate conflict would still exist. Nations would evaluate the risks and benefits of aggressive behavior and might attack other states if they believe the level of international interest was low or the method of aggression would not trigger an international response. Second, deterrence in cooperative security has the same problems as deterrence in collective security. Although, deterrence in cooperative security should be stronger due to a preponderance of power, in reality, states will wonder if that preponderance would actually form to respond to aggression that they are contemplating or, in a different situation, if a multinational force would come to their defense. Third, the arms control agreements inherent in cooperative security are so comprehensive and intrusive that it would be quite difficult to obtain agreement by all members of the international community. Finally, the nature of the international system has not changed significantly. States today are simply not willing to accept a fully idealist structure. Although it would not be feasible to implement this strategy, some of the arms control measures and confidence-building measures could be incorporated into any selected grand strategy.

Selective Engagement

Selective engagement is a hybrid grand strategy that attempts to find a balance between the two poles of the realist school of thought, primacy and neo-isolationism, while still incorporating some aspects

of idealism. It is a mixture that is bound to lead to a variety of disadvantages. First, it lacks an intrinsic nationalistic appeal and has little idealism as well. While selective engagers support the promotion of US values, they arguably apply few resources directly to attaining them and focus on attaining what they view as America's vital self-interests. Second, by focusing on the prevention of great power war, this option selectively avoids most of the conflicts that will take place throughout the world. U.S. apathy in such conflicts may erode America's ability to influence the international community on other issues of greater importance. Third, selective engagement will be difficult to implement. It gives little advice on how to prioritize resources applied to desired interests. Additionally, media, cultural, and alliance pressures may force the U.S. to intervene in conflicts in the periphery. Loss of selectivity will increase the cost and the risks of selective engagement. Fourth, other nations may resent the application of U.S. power if common interests are not considered and form anti-U.S. coalitions to challenge American power. Finally, as neo-isolationists would argue, by being engaged militarily throughout the world, while seeking to prevent war, the chance of America becoming involved in other nations wars increases. From that perspective, the best way to ensure America is not involved in a war is to stay out of other nations conflicts.

CONCLUSION

Selective engagement is the best grand strategy for the U.S. in the current transition period. To begin with, it is a preventative strategy. It seeks to shape the international environment by strengthening and enlarging the democratic core, by enticing transition states into joining the international community, by containing rogue states and transnational outlaws, by assisting failed states within the limits of American power, and by encouraging and assisting international institutions. Equally important, selective engagement recognizes the enduring nature of the realist paradigm – that in effect the primary system for managing power will remain the balancing structure among states. At the same time, there is recognition inherent in the option that a move toward either end of the realist spectrum, primacy or neo-isolationism, is destabilizing and that some cooperative aspects of the lone strategic option in the idealist camp can also play a role in selective engagement.

Selective engagement is like primacy in that both strategies are based in the realist paradigm that recognizes the primacy of power. Both subscribe to hegemonic stability theory, although selective engager's lean toward the balance of threat rather than the balance of power dynamic. Both recognize the importance of great power leadership and the importance of American leadership in the world. Together they also focus on the importance of American values and the idea the U.S. is uniquely able to lead the world due to the particular combination of power and principle. But selective engagers recognize the limits of America's power. America does not have the resources to implement the grand strategy of primacy, to act as the world's policeman. For selective engagers implementing primacy would lead to economic and military decline and hasten the rise of what primacy advocates hope to prevent, a peer competitor.

Selective engagement is similar to neo-isolationism in that both seek to provide peace and prosperity for America and both recognize the importance of power. Both also perceive the use of military

power to promote America's values abroad as morally wrong. But there the similarities end. Neo-isolationists recommend withdrawing the majority of America's military forces and abandoning security commitments throughout the world. They believe America is more secure today than at any other time in history. While that is true today, American security would gradually erode over time in such a scenario. An American withdrawal would severely reduce U.S. influence throughout the world just at a time when the world is becoming more interdependent. It is the type of action that could also precipitate security competitions throughout Europe and Asia, making the world a more militarized and dangerous place. The need for access to strategic resources and global markets ensures that America will need to maintain some form of a global presence. Selective engagement attempts to balance the desire to control everything as in primacy and the urge to let the rest of the world manage itself as in neo-isolationism. Maintaining American security commitments selectively in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will moderate the security dilemma, maintain American influence and access to strategic resources, and protect American economic interests in those regions.

Selective engagement, like cooperative security, postulates that America has some level of responsibility for global stability and for protecting interests shared with other states. But in this regard, cooperative security goes too far by blurring U.S. interests with international interests and vital interests with peripheral interests. Additionally, cooperative security sounds like cooperative *primacy*. Advocates of cooperative security recommend that America maintain the core elements of the reconnaissance strike complex, in essence, to maintain U.S. primacy in the military dimension. By maintaining the core capabilities of the U.S. reconnaissance strike complex, cooperative security ensures that America will become involved in other state conflicts throughout the world where traditional U.S. interests are questionable and would quickly over commit U.S. resources, thereby leading to America's decline. Selective engagement recognizes the limits of America's power and seeks to balance the desire to serve the collective good with the requirement to serve America's interests first.

It is this pragmatic focus on the art of the possible that enables selective engagement to mitigate many of its disadvantages. It is true, for instance, that by focusing on great power peace, this strategy option discounts many of the conflicts that will erupt throughout the world and that U.S. ambivalence toward this violence may erode America's influence on more important issues. But, what are the alternatives? The U.S. simply does not have the power or resources to stop all violence throughout the world. By maintaining great power peace, America is providing a level of stability for the international community. Although the nation's influence may erode in areas that are not in its vital interests, selective engagement is designed to ensure that the U.S. has the power and resources available to influence the international community in areas that are vital.

In a similar manner, there is always the problem of a loss of selectivity despite the title of the strategic option. This can be mitigated, however, through skilled statesmanship and sound leadership. In some respects, selective engagement is a rheostat between neo-isolationism and primacy. An overactive selective engagement foreign policy can turn into primacy and U.S. global over-commitment,

resulting in a relative decline of America's position in the world. On the other hand, an under-active selective engagement foreign policy can turn into neo-isolationism and a loss of U.S. influence on issues that effect America's vital interests. Finding the proper balance will be easier for selective engagers than for advocates of primacy or cooperative security, both of which tend to blur the difference between vital, important, and peripheral interests. In any event, it will still be a difficult task. A variety of foreign policy, alliance, and domestic factors will determine when America should selectively engage. The acknowledgement that it will be difficult does not invalidate the strategy. The pressure to do too much or too little is always present.

Allied to this is the danger that many nations may resent the selective application of American power if common interests are not considered and as a consequence form anti-American coalitions. This is a real threat that goes to the heart of a balance between realism and idealism, self-interest and collective interest. Fortunately, in Europe and East Asia, and to some extent in the Middle East, many of America's regional allies share interests that the U.S. defines as vital. It will continue to be important to demonstrate how American interests are congruent with those of its allies. This is a valid problem that enlightened statesman will have to consider as they exercise American power using this selective strategy.

Finally, two implications for the U.S. military are also relevant. First, while selective engagement can be characterized as a rheostat between neo-isolationism (the most selective of selective engagers) and primacy (the most active selective engagers), there are dangers in maintaining this view. The military spigot can't be turned on and off quickly to react to radically different foreign policy approaches. While statesman may desire to suddenly take a more active military role throughout the world, it takes time to organize, train, and equip effective armed forces. The challenge is to organize, train, equip, and size the military to the level of activity anticipated.

The second implication for the U.S. military is that while small-scale contingencies will dominate the strategic landscape during this multipolar period of the new international system, the U.S. must resist the temptation to focus solely on these threats. Selectivity must also include having the capability to fight and win a great power war that may develop from the bipolarization of this multipolar world. America's vital interest is to maintain great power peace, or to reverse the dynamic, to prevent great power war. Great powers will not be deterred by small, mobile, armed forces tailored for peacekeeping and military operations other than war. They will, however, take notice of strong, powerful, military forces capable of winning great power wars. In this era of small scale conflicts, it is instructive to remember the cyclical nature of the international system by remaining true to America's vital interests, and preparing for the next great power conflict.

Selective engagement is the right grand strategy for America during this complex, ambiguous, multipolar phase in the evolution of the international system. Unlike the stable bipolar phase of the international system during the Cold War when America's grand strategic option remained unchanged for more than 40 years, the current option may require frequent changes or adjustments in the future. For

the time being, however, selective engagement is a feasible grand strategy that will protect America's interests, maintain American prosperity, maintain American influence in world affairs, and manage the forces of integration and disintegration that are prevalent in the world today.

WORD COUNT = 16, 800

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," <u>The National Interest</u>, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 4.
- ² The discussion of the five categories of actors and four trends is based on Hans Binnendijk, Richard L. Kugler, Charles B. Shotwell, and Kori Schake, eds., <u>Strategic Assessment 1999, Priorities for a Turbulent World</u>, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999), xi-20.
- ³ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," <u>International Security</u> 20 (Summer 1995), 6.
 - ⁴ Inis L. Claude, Jr., <u>Power and International Relations</u>, (New York: Random House, 1962), 9.
- ⁵ Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," <u>International Security</u> 16 (Summer 1991) 117.
- ⁶ For a detailed explanation of the balance of power system, see Claude, 11-93. Additionally, see John Spanier, <u>Games Nations Play</u>, 8th ed., (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993), 110-121.
 - ⁷ Claude, 50.
- ⁸ Josef Joffe, "Bismarck or Britain? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," In <u>America's Strategic Choices</u>, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1998), 112.
- ⁹ Winston S. Churchill, <u>The Gathering Storm, Vol. I of The Second World War</u>, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 207-208; quoted in Joffe, 107. See also, Claude, 50.
- ¹⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, <u>Politics Among Nations</u>, 3rd ed., (New York: Knopf, 1960), 210; quoted in Claude, 31.
 - ¹¹ Claude, 57-58, 67, and 91.
- ¹² Ray S. Baker and William E. Doss, eds., <u>The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace</u>, (New York: Harper, 1927), I, 523, 505, 512; quoted in Claude, 82.
 - ¹³ Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security," 118.
 - ¹⁴ Claude, 110.
- ¹⁵ Original emphasis, ibid., 110 and 168. Another shortcoming of the ideal collective security model is that it deters *inter*state violence between members of the organization. It does not address either *intra*state violence within a state or aggression from states that are *not* members of the collective security organization.
 - ¹⁶ Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security," 118. See also 118-125.
- ¹⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, <u>Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for power and Peace</u>, 4th ed., (New York: Knopf, 1967), 412; quoted in David Jablonsky, <u>Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a</u>

New World Order, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993), 18. See also Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security," 138-139.

- ²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," <u>International Security</u> 17 (Spring 1993), 83. See also: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," In <u>America's Strategic Choices</u>, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1998), 28; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War." <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 18 (Spring 1995), 94; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds. <u>America's Strategic Choices</u>, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1998), xxiii; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment, Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," <u>International Security</u> 21 (Spring 1997), 59-60; Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones and Miller, xii.
- ²¹ Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring no Rivals Develop," <u>The New York Times</u>, (8 March 1992, Late Edition Final), sec. 1, part 1, column 6. See also Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?," 95.

¹⁸ Claude, 206. See also 205-210.

¹⁹ Ibid., 205-271 and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security," 118.

²² Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?," 101-103.

²³ Ibid., 94-95.

²⁴ Ibid., 97.

²⁵ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 72.

²⁶ Ibid., 81. See also Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?," 103-104.

²⁷ Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?," 95-97.

²⁸ Earl C. Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," <u>Foreign Policy</u>, no. 81 (Winter 1990-91), 9. See also Ibid., 5-13.

²⁹ Posen and Ross, 8-9. See also Patrick J. Buchanan, "America First – and Second, and Third," <u>The National Interest</u>, no. 19 (Spring 1990), 79-80. And Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," <u>International Security</u> 21 (Spring 1997), 32.

³⁰ Buchanan, 81. Additionally see Christopher Layne, "Rethinking American Grand Strategy, Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?," <u>World Policy Journal</u>, (Summer 1998), 14. And Ravenal, 3-4.

³¹ Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 8-14.

³² Ibid., 16. Additionally, these authors point out "when the United States is going to come and 'fix' any predicament that its allies get into – there is little incentive to avoid trouble. It is easy to gamble with someone else's money." Ibid., 16. Maintaining these alliance ties only ensures America will become involved in other states conflicts. See also Buchanan, 78-81.

- ³³ Ibid., 25.
- ³⁴ Ravenal, 16.
- ³⁵ Ibid. Also see Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 39 and Buchanan, 80.
- ³⁶ Gholz, Press and Sopolsky, 8-12.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 40.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 39-40.
- , ³⁹ Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, <u>A New Concept of Cooperative Security</u>, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 7 and 8-24.
- ⁴⁰ Larry Diamond, "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order," <u>Current History</u> 93 (January 1994), 2. See also Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," <u>Foreign Policy</u>, no. 96 (Fall 1994), 11, who points out that "economic development, human rights, good governance, and peace are intertwined and mutually reinforcing." Ibid., 11.
 - ⁴¹ Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 6 and 11.
 - ⁴² Ibid.
 - ⁴³ Diamond, 4.
 - ⁴⁴ Ibid., 6 and Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 28.
 - ⁴⁵ Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 26.
 - ⁴⁶ Ibid., 26-27.
 - ⁴⁷ Ibid., 5.
 - ⁴⁸ Proposals primarily based on these are found in ibid., 27.
 - ⁴⁹ For more specific examples of visibility proposals, see ibid., 21-24 and 38-41.
 - ⁵⁰ Ibid., 8-9 and 64-65.
 - ⁵¹ Ibid., 58-59.
 - ⁵² Ibid., 42 and Diamond, 2.
 - ⁵³ Diamond, 2 and Evans, 11.
 - ⁵⁴ Ibid., 3.
 - ⁵⁵ Evans, 11.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 18. See also ibid., 3-10.

⁵⁸ Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated, The Strategy of Selective Engagement," <u>International Security</u> 23 (Winter 1998/99), 79-80, 82 and 101 and Joffe, 95.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 104-106.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 75-88.

⁶¹ Ibid., 83.

⁶² Ibid., 84-85 and Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense, America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War," In <u>America's Strategic Choices</u>, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, 50-98, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1998), 68.

⁶³ Ibid., 85-88.

⁶⁴ Art, "Defensible Defense," 74 and Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 88-89.

⁶⁵ Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 89-90. Additionally, Art defines peace as the absence of "severe political conflicts that manifest themselves in the form of competitive military efforts short of war and that increases the chances of intense crisis and war." Ibid., 90.

⁶⁶ Art, "A Defensible Defense," 90.

⁶⁷ Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 90-91.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 91-92 and Art, "Defensible Defense," 92.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 94. See also 93-95.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 94. See also 93-95.

⁷¹ Ibid., 95.

⁷² Ibid., 96.

⁷³ Art, "A Defensible Defense," 84-86.

⁷⁴ Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 97.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 98-99.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 99-101.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 100-101.

- ⁷⁸ George Bush, "America The Last Best Hope for Man on Earth," <u>Vital Speeches of the Day</u> 59 (15 January 1993), 195; and George Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order, Unlocking the Promise of Freedom," <u>Vital Speeches of the Day</u> 57 (15 May 1991), 450-452; and Fukuyama, 4.
 - ⁷⁹ Binnendijk, Kugler, Shotwell and Schake, 8-9.
 - ⁸⁰ Ibid., 9.
 - ⁸¹ Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security," 121.
 - ⁸² Ibid., 122.
- ⁸³ Posen and Ross, 38 and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," <u>Foreign Affairs</u> (July/August 1999), 24.
 - ⁸⁴ Ibid., 38-39.
- ⁸⁵ Mastanduno, 55. "The historical lesson is pretty clear: states that bid for hegemony invariable fail." From Christopher Layne, "Rethinking American Grand Strategy, Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?," <u>World Policy Journal</u> (Summer 1998), 13.
- ⁸⁶ Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies Before Containment, Patterns for the Future," In <u>America's Strategy in a Changing World</u>, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, 1993), 50. See also Gholz, Press and Sopolsky, 45 and Posen and Ross, 11-12.
 - ⁸⁷ Posen and Ross, 11-12.
 - ⁸⁸ Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 105.
 - ⁸⁹ Posen and Ross, 26.
 - ⁹⁰ For a critique of selective engagement see ibid., 18-19 and Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 109-111.

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