

**DECISIVE, SHAPING, SUSTAINING OPERATIONS: AN  
OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE  
CONTEMPORARY MISSION ENVIRONMENT**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

DECISIVE, SHAPING AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS: AN OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MISSION ENVIRONMENT by MAJ David R. Moore, USA, 50 Pages

The United States Army is adapting to a changing mission environment defined by a new National Security Strategy, the perceived threats to national security, significant technological developments, and an updated National Military Strategy derived from this new environment. These dynamic changes have had dramatic effects on the Army's doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS). However, there is a lag in doctrinal progress, specifically related to the commander's tool for arranging forces and activities on the battlefield: the battlefield organization.

As defined by the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, the Army's current battlefield organization uses the terms *deep*, *close* and *rear* (DCR) operations to relate forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. Unfortunately, this organization is based upon the conditions that defined the previous, Cold War mission environment. A more comprehensive method suitable for today's mission environment uses *decisive*, *shaping*, and *sustaining* (DSS) operations to organize forces and activities across the breadth and depth of the area of operations.

The battlefield organization must be applicable to any military action the Army is assigned, whether offensive, defensive, stability or support. It must be useful to the commander for any friendly force array he elects to employ, whether his forces are arranged in a contiguous and linear manner or a non-contiguous and distributed manner. The construct must be effective against multiple threat arrays, from conventional, echeloned threats to unconventional and asymmetric activities. It must have applicability to commanders at all levels of war and all levels of command. Finally, it must be compatible with the battlefield organizations of its sister services, and with anticipated future concepts. The Army can ill-afford to use organizations with narrow applications within the wide range of expected missions, nor can it afford to maintain multiple models that apply only to discrete situations.

This monograph concludes that the operational organization and framework defined in terms of function instead of spatial orientation promotes thinking in broader perspectives by arranging assets by purpose and not by a geometric relationship. With the wide range of military operations the Army conducts worldwide, the Army's battlefield organization and framework must acknowledge the different military actions and have applicability to the full range of operations. The spatially defined battlefield organization of deep, close, and rear operations loses its validity during stability or support actions, within distributed areas of operations, and against unconventional or asymmetric threats. Furthermore, it is not applicable to all levels of command at all levels of war, and its compatibility to joint and future designs is limited. In contrast, the more comprehensive operational organization of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations, relating activities by their purpose instead of their geographic location, has more universal application to the various military actions, friendly force arrays, threats, levels of war, echelons of command, and joint and future designs.

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## CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

The United States Army is adapting to a changing mission environment defined by a new National Security Strategy, the perceived threats to national security, significant technological developments, and an updated National Military Strategy derived from this new environment. The President of the United States redefined the National Security Strategy from a concept of containment and deterrence to one of engagement. The threats to our nation's interests have shifted from a clearly defined, militarily strong Soviet peer competitor to regional and transnational threats operating across the spectrum of conflict. The proliferation of technological developments gives belligerent nations and groups the ability to pose asymmetric threats to the United States. As a result of these changes in the mission environment, the National Military Strategy changed significantly. It transformed a large, forward deployed force to stop the proliferation of communism into a power projection force based mostly within the Continental U.S. (CONUS) that shapes the environment, responds to crises, and prepares for an uncertain future.<sup>1</sup>

These dynamic changes have had dramatic effects on the Army's doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS). Although changes occur at different rates within DTLOMS, doctrine is often the last system to yield to even the most overwhelming changes. An example of such a lag in doctrinal progress is evident in the commander's tool for arranging forces and activities on the battlefield: the battlefield organization. As defined by the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, the Army's current battlefield organization uses the terms *deep*,

*close* and *rear* (DCR) operations to relate forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, this organization is based upon the conditions that defined the previous, Cold War mission environment. A more comprehensive method suitable for today's mission environment uses *decisive*, *shaping*, and *sustaining* (DSS) operations to organize forces and activities across the breadth and depth of the area of operations.<sup>3</sup> Through a comparative analysis, this monograph answers the question of whether the *operational organization* of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations has more utility than the *battlefield organization* of deep, close, and rear operations within the current mission environment?

Why is it significant to have a battlefield organization that reflects the changes of the current mission environment? First, a tool as fundamental as the battlefield organization must have comprehensive applicability. Because of the diverse and complex challenges in today's mission environment, doctrine must be flexible enough to be relevant in a variety of circumstances. The battlefield organization must be applicable to any military action the Army is assigned, whether offensive, defensive, stability or support. It must be useful to the commander for any friendly force array he elects to employ, whether his forces are arranged in a contiguous and linear manner or a non-contiguous and distributed manner. The construct must be effective against multiple threat arrays, from conventional, echeloned threats to unconventional and asymmetric activities. It must have applicability to commanders at all levels of war and all levels of command. Finally, it must be compatible with the battlefield organizations of its sister services, and with anticipated future concepts. The Army can ill-afford to use organizations with narrow applications within the wide range of expected missions,

nor can it afford to maintain multiple models that apply only to discrete situations. Therefore, the battlefield organization must be comprehensive and universally applicable.

Second, this argument is significant because of the effect semantics have on our cognition. How we label things is how we think about them. In his book *Inevitable Illusions*, Palmarini describes how a *mental model*, a spontaneous and unconscious picture of the solution to a problem, can be a powerful cognitive illusion that causes one to automatically apply preconceptions to similar problem sets.<sup>4</sup> The battlefield organization is an example of a mental model. The terms deep, close and rear cause commanders to naturally visualize forces arrayed in space, with elements forward of, in close proximity to and to the rear of the lines of contact. This spatial mental model makes using the organization for anything other than positioning of forces relative to their base of operations difficult. This is a significant limitation when the circumstances of an operation do not readily conform to deep, close, rear spatial relationships, as is the case in a distributed operation<sup>5</sup>. In contrast, a battlefield organization whose terms have broad utility will avoid the limitations of a narrow mental model. Now more than ever, the mission environment in which the Army operates demands open-minded solutions and tools with universal application, not limited mental models that unconsciously drive the commander to inappropriate solutions to the challenges of today's mission environment.

This monograph argues that the current battlefield organization, defined by deep, close and rear operations, is not broad enough to apply to today's mission environment, and that the operational organization of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations is a more



useful construct. The analysis begins with a description of the current mission environment and its recent evolution in terms of the National Security Strategy, the threats to national security, technological impacts on security, and the National Military Strategy. Next, the monograph outlines the current battlefield organization, deep, close and rear operations, as well as its overarching battlefield framework and the background behind its development. Then, the battlefield organization is assessed using the selected evaluation criteria.

The monograph proceeds with the operational organization of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations, defining its associated operational framework and the background leading up to its development. The operational organization is also assessed in terms of the evaluation criteria. Based upon the two assessments, the monograph draws conclusions about each organization's overall comprehensive applicability. Finally, the monograph identifies and discusses implications to adopting the proposed operational organization and framework, and encourages further analysis of these and other second and third order effects.

Because of the significance this monograph attaches to the comprehensive and broad applicable qualities of doctrine, the current and proposed battlefield organizations are assessed using evaluation criteria that emphasize universal utility. The evaluation criteria selected are defined as:

- "Supports All Military Actions" – Is the organization directly applicable and useful during offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions?
- "Useful for various Friendly Force Arrays" -- Is the organization useful to the commander regardless of whether his forces are operating in a contiguous, linear or non-contiguous, distributed areas of operation.

- “Effective against multiple Threat Arrays” – Is the organization effective against a variety of threat forces ranging from conventional to unconventional, with symmetric to asymmetric means, and using linear or non-linear methods of attack?
- “Suitable for all levels of war by all echelons of command” -- Can commanders, operating at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, regardless of the echelon of command, employ the organization to effectively array forces during an operation?
- “Compatible with other designs (joint and future)” -- Is the organization compatible with joint and sister service concepts? Can it be applied to the future mission environment and operational concepts envisioned by Force XXI and Army After Next (AAN)?

Through an objective assessment of the two organizations based upon the selected evaluation criteria, the conclusion that an operational organization and framework defined in terms of function instead of spatial orientation promotes thinking in broader perspectives by arranging assets by purpose and not by a geometric relationship. With the wide range of military operations the Army conducts worldwide, the Army’s battlefield organization and framework must acknowledge the different military actions and have applicability to the full range of operations. The spatially defined battlefield organization of deep, close, and rear operations loses its validity during stability or support actions, within distributed areas of operations, and against unconventional or asymmetric threats. Furthermore, it is not applicable to all levels of command at all levels of war, and its compatibility to joint and

future designs is limited. In contrast, the more comprehensive operational organization of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations, relating activities by their purpose instead of their geographic location, has more universal application to the various military actions, friendly force arrays, threats, levels of war, echelons of command, and joint and future designs.

To maintain relevance, everything must change to reflect the terms of the current environment. U.S. Army doctrine is no different. Chapter Two traces the evolution of the current mission environment as it has changed from Cold War parameters to the post-Cold War paradigm. Chapter Two provides the Army compelling reasons to change its doctrine accordingly.

## **CHAPTER TWO – THE MISSION ENVIRONMENT: THEN AND NOW**

Today's mission environment is far different from the environment within which military forces operated in the early 1980's. The sweeping changes of the current mission environment are defined by the National Security Strategy, the nature of threats to our national security, the technology impact on military operations, and the employment techniques used by military forces as reflected in the National Military Strategy. Simply stated, the mission environment determines why the Army is used, against whom, with what means, and in what way.

### **NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the United States' closest military peer competitor, the President of the United States made some dramatic changes to the National Security Strategy (NSS). The President's National Security Strategy for a New Century reflects his decision to provide leadership abroad. The strategy requires the United States to use appropriate instruments of national power to affect the actions of other state and non-state actors, and to maintain the peace and promote security by shaping the global strategic environment. The President intends for the Army to support the combatant commanders as they shape the evolving international security environment, respond promptly to deter our adversaries, support our allies, and win our wars.<sup>6</sup> This was, indeed, a dramatic shift from a policy of isolation and containment of communist ideology to one of engagement to shape the environment in favorable US terms. The former strategy had negative aims of preventing the proliferation of communism by

upholding capitalism and liberal ideals. The later strategy has positive aims of actively enforcing individual freedom and encouraging the process of democracy.

## **POSSIBLE THREAT ARRAYS**

In addition to redefining its strategy, the U.S. reassessed the threats to its national interests. Up until 1990, the Army's most likely and most dangerous adversary was the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The threat's land force was fully resourced, relatively modernized, predominately conventional, and echeloned in order to use its numerical advantage to destroy U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe. The U.S. Army faces a significantly different threat in today's mission environment. In addition to conventional opponents, threats to national interests include terrorists, warring factions, attacks on information systems, and natural disasters. Identifying the enemy is much more difficult and complex without a Cold War superpower adversary to help polarize global interests. Many states and transnational groups have the means and desire to threaten U.S. vital interests that could lead to armed conflict. States with values running counter to the U.S. are improving their conventional capabilities, seeking weapons of mass destruction, and developing asymmetrical capabilities. Transnational groups conducting terrorism, illegal drug trade, international organized crime, and deliberate environmental damage threaten U.S. interests and citizens at home and abroad. Other situations such as environmental and population pressures, resource competition, and national, tribal, and ethnic divisions may directly challenge U.S. interests and could lead to U.S. military involvement.<sup>7</sup> In general, the significantly reduced likelihood of a large, echeloned threat and the

correspondingly increased likelihood of more unconventional and asymmetric threats requires agility by the U.S. Army to defeat such a diverse threat array in today's mission environment.

## **TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT**

Advancements in technology have also had a major impact on the mission environment. The Army's weapons shoot farther, more accurately and with more efficacy. Vehicles travel faster, across greater distances, over more rugged terrain, and carry more and heavier cargo. Aircraft fly faster, farther and deliver larger, more accurate and more lethal payloads. Command and control systems communicate more information, quicker, more reliably and over greater distances. As a result of their increased agility and lethality, today's Army units have become smaller and more technology reliant. As force modernization programs continue to exploit the enhanced capabilities that current technology provides, this trend of smaller, faster, more lethal forces will likely continue. These developments in technology allow the commander to disperse his forces, to cover larger areas of operation, to mass the effects of the weapons without massing the systems themselves, and to rapidly reposition forces in any direction to achieve decisive outcomes. Such agility in materiel systems demands a corresponding doctrinal agility to achieve the desired results: quick, decisive victory in today's ambiguous and fluid mission environment.

## **A DERIVED NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

Because of the National Security Strategy's shift from containment and deterrence to engagement, the reassessment of potential threats, and the advances in technology, the role the military plays as an instrument of national power has changed. Consequently, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, adjusted the National Military Strategy (NMS) to reflect these changes. The NMS adopted a new policy of shaping the strategic environment, responding to crises threatening national interests, and preparing now for an uncertain future through training, readiness and modernization programs. Consistent with this NMS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that while our Armed Forces maintain their core competence to defend the United States and overcome any nation that imperils U.S. security, the military has an important role in peacetime engagement.<sup>8</sup> In recognition of the military's role in advancing the National Security Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan now provides guidance to the Unified Commands and Services for planning peacetime engagement.<sup>9</sup> Because of these policy changes and its global leadership position, the United States faces constant international pressure to stem sources of potential conflict and to ease human suffering. As a result, the Army finds itself participating in a broad spectrum of operations including offense, defense, stability, and support actions on a more frequent basis.

The changes in the NMS are manifested in other areas. Tighter fiscal constraints and smaller force structure throughout the military have reinforced the benefits of joint cooperation, thereby benefiting from the unique capabilities of each service. Similarly,

the military's limited but worldwide forward presence requires a joint effort to project power from a CONUS-based military when needed. Furthermore, U.S. forces can expect to operate in coalition environments to forge international consensus and achieve more lasting global solutions. Such joint and coalition environments benefit from comprehensive doctrinal constructs.

Clearly, the mission environment has changed significantly between the early 1980's and today. In fact, the nature and rate of global change does not appear to be dampening. FM 100-1 *The Army* asserts that

"the only certainty of the future is that it will be different from the past. Many nations and non-state actors are developing capabilities that may give them the ability to disrupt regional alignments or eventually to, threaten the national interests of the United States or its allies."<sup>10</sup>

The Army's Senior Leadership has recognized the changes within the mission environment and acknowledge a compelling need to provide the force a more comprehensive doctrine that is useful throughout the spectrum of military actions required of today's Army.<sup>11</sup> One area in need of change is the commander's current tool for arranging the battlefield activities within the breadth and depth of the area of operations: the battlefield organization.

Chapter Three describes the Army's current battlefield organization, deep, close and rear operations, as well as its overarching battlefield. It also explains the evolution of its development within the context of the previous mission environment. The assessment at the end of the chapter proves that the current mission environment as described in Chapter Two has outgrown the utility of the discretely applicable battlefield organization.



## CHAPTER THREE – THE BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION

The *battlefield organization* is the arrangement of battlefield activities within the breadth, depth, and space of the battlefield in accordance with the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC)<sup>12</sup>. It is a tool for the commander to relate forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. Before assessing its comprehensive applicability, it is important to understand where the tool came from and what context it was designed to support. This chapter describes the evolution of the battlefield organization, defines the organization and its corresponding framework, and assesses its utility to the previously described mission environment.

### 1982 FM 100-5: CONCEIVING “DEEP BATTLE”

In the early 1980s, the U.S. Army faced a formidable Warsaw Pact conventional threat in Europe. Units were forward deployed to help defend allied countries. To avoid the unacceptable consequences of relinquishing friendly territory to effect a defense in depth against an overwhelmingly numerical superior Soviet threat, the Army sought ways to extend the battlefield into enemy territory, while disrupting the momentum of advancing forces. To that end, the 1982 version of FM 100-5 introduced a new overarching concept called *AirLand Battle*, an approach to fighting future battles and campaigns that had the potential of extending over great distances and continuing longer than any military operations of the past. By applying the imperatives of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization, a fully synchronized small force could defeat a

much larger enemy force that is poorly coordinated.<sup>13</sup> AirLand Battle was the conception of battlefield organization and framework.

Although the 1982 version of FM 100-5 did not formally create a battlefield organization and framework, it did introduce some of the elements of the future construct. The manual described the concept of *deep battle*, a key component of the AirLand Battle doctrine that supported the commander's basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. By employing air and artillery interdiction, as well as conventional and unconventional military forces, deep battle prevents the enemy from massing and creates windows of opportunity for offensive actions that allow defeat of the enemy in detail.<sup>14</sup>

The 1982 manual also introduced other concepts that would later form the basis for the battlefield organization and framework. It defined the terms *area of interest* and *area of influence* to describe significant geographic areas within the commanders battlefield. Additionally, the manual outlined a defensive framework that unified AirLand defense with the five complementary elements of continuous deep battle, covering force operations, main battle area, rear area protection, and reserve operations. These ideas formed the backbone of the battlefield framework formally described in the 1993 version of FM 100-5.<sup>15</sup>

#### **1986 FM 100-5: INTRODUCING "DEEP, CLOSE, REAR"**

In 1986, the Army released another version of FM 100-5 that further refined the concepts introduced in the 1982. This manual described three areas where corps and divisions conducted mutually supporting operations: close, deep, and rear. These areas

were defined within the context of planning and conducting battles and engagements to support tactical operations. Close operations involved the fight between the committed forces and the readily available tactical reserves of both combatants. Deep operations limited the enemy's freedom of action, altered the tempo of operations in favor of the friendly force, and isolated the close fight on advantageous terms. Rear operations preserved the commander's freedom of action and assured uninterrupted support of the battle.<sup>16</sup>

The 1986 version also continued to develop the geographic areas that commander's use to organize activities. Retaining the term and definition of the area of interest, the manual replaced area of influence with *area of operation (AO)*, that specific zone or sector assigned to the commander where he fights the enemy. AO essentially replaced the 1982 term area of influence.

The concepts introduced in 1982 and refined in 1986 had one significant thing in common: they were primarily designed to defeat a large, conventional force in Europe. Within this context, the deep, close, rear organization served to effectively arrange forces on the battlefield. However, as Chapter Two outlined, the mission environment was significantly altered with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet despite this monolithic change, the 1993 version of FM 100-5 did not adapt the battlefield organization and framework in a manner consistent with the new environment.

### **1993 FM 100-5: FORMALIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK**


Consistent with the evolutionary pattern of previous versions, the 1993 version of

FM 100-5, *Operations* aggregated the organizational concepts of 1982 and 1986 into a formal construct known as the *battlefield framework*. The battlefield framework is defined as an area of geographical and operational responsibility established by the commander that provides a way to visualize how he will employ his forces. The battlefield framework helps the commander relate his forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, and purpose. As a result of the battlefield visualization process, the commander can translate his vision into this framework. The battlefield framework consists of three interrelated components: the area of operations, battle space, and the battlefield organization.<sup>17</sup> First, the *area of operations* is the geographic area assigned to an Army commander by a higher headquarters, in which the commander has responsibility and authority over military operations. The AO has lateral, rear, and forward boundaries (including airspace) which usually define it within a larger joint geographical area.

The second element of the battlefield framework is *battlespace*, the conceptual, physical volume in which the commander seeks to dominate the enemy. It expands and contracts in relation to the commander's ability to acquire and engage the enemy with organic and supporting fires, including joint and multi-national means. It includes the breadth, depth, and height in which the commander positions and moves assets over time. Battlespace is influenced by time, tempo, depth and synchronization, and may change as the commander's vision of the battlefield changes. Although not depicted on a map, it usually extends beyond the commander's area of operations and could reach his area of interest, depending upon the fidelity of intelligence support and the commander's concept for employing his weapons.

## THE BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION: DEEP, CLOSE, REAR

The last element of the battlefield framework is the *battlefield organization*, the arrangement of battlefield activities within the breadth, depth, and space of the battlefield in accordance with the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations.<sup>18</sup> It is a tool for the commander to relate forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. According to the 1993 FM 100-5, Army commanders fight deep, close, and rear actions simultaneously in a manner that appears to the enemy as one continuous operation against him.



Because assets from the joint team are used to accomplish these simultaneous attacks throughout the theater, fighting within this framework thus requires constant synchronization. They seek to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of the battlefield and mass both effects and forces when and where necessary to accomplish the mission.

Three closely related sets of activities characterize operations within an AO: deep, close, and rear operations.

Figure One graphically depicts the spatial relationships of the deep, close, and rear organization.<sup>19</sup> Each echelon's battlefield organization is nested within the next higher echelon's organization.

*Deep Operations* are those operations directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle. The purpose of deep operations is to shape the battlefield in order to set the conditions for decisive close operations. They are designed in depth to ensure advantages in later engagements, protect the current close fight, and defeat the enemy more rapidly by denying freedom of action and disrupting or destroying the coherence and tempo of its operations. Deep operations prevent the enemy from using his resources where and when he wants to on the battlefield. Deep operations affect the enemy through either attack or threat of attack.

*Close Operations* involves friendly forces in immediately contact with the enemy. It is the fighting between the committed forces and the readily available tactical reserve of both combatants. Characterized by engagements fought by brigades and battalions, close operations are usually the corps' and division's current battle. Traditionally, the close operation is the decisive operation that achieves the purpose of the mission.


*Rear Operations* are those operations that assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics, and battle command. The purpose of rear operations is to sustain the current close and deep fights, and to posture the force for future operations. They are, in effect, the defense against the enemy's deep operations. Rear operations provide protection to key units, facilities, and installations to ensure uninterrupted support to the commander's operation. At the operational level, rear

operations support current operations and posture the force for the next phase of the major operation or campaign. At the tactical level, they enhance the commander's ability to influence the tempo of combat.

## **ASSESSING THE BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION**

Such an organization is well suited for the context within which it evolved: offensive and defensive operations against an echeloned, conventional threat. However, is this battlefield organization, originally conceived in 1982 to defeat the Warsaw Pact within a European theater of war, still as useful to the commander in today's mission environment? The answer is clearly "No." As explained in Chapter Two, today's mission environment is significantly different than the one within which the battlefield organization was designed to function. Consequently, as a tool for arranging activities across the full range of military actions, the 1993 battlefield organization is not comprehensive enough for the commander in today's mission environment. Granted, it still has utility during offensive and defensive actions upon a linear battlefield against a conventional, echeloned threat. However, based upon the evaluation criteria selected, this battlefield organization presents the commander significant limitations.

First, the battlefield organization does not support all military actions, including offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions. Specifically, the deep, close, rear battlefield organization does not readily apply to the unique considerations of stability and support operations. Consider a stability operation such as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia (see Figure Two)<sup>20</sup>. In addition to separating armed factions, Army forces conducted a myriad of distributed tasks ranging from patrolling the zone of separation to



establishing conditions for the successful implementation of civil agreement provisions. Also consider support actions like those conducted by Army forces in Florida after Hurricane Andrew. What are deep, close and rear operations within these types of mission environments? Not only does a commander need a framework that applies to every

military action, he needs a framework that can facilitate transitions between actions. By providing a tool to organize forces and activities across the full range of operations, the commander can, if directed, transition from one military action to another without changing his method of organizing the battlefield.

Second, the battlefield organization is not useful to the commander whose forces are conducting distributed operations. A distributed operation is a coherent, near-simultaneous set of actions related to one another in time, space and purpose, and directed against the enemy throughout the commander's area of operations in order to cause rapid disintegration of the enemy's resistance. The goal of distributed operations is to achieve a decision in a single operation by inflicting concurrent enemy defeats throughout the breadth and depth of the area of operations, thereby avoiding protracted, attrition-based operations.<sup>21</sup> When forces operate simultaneously from multiple




locations in multiple directions as U.S. forces did during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, the terms deep, close and rear lose spatial relativity (see Figure Three)<sup>22</sup>.

Third, the battlefield organization of deep, close, and rear operations has limited application against some threats within today's

mission environment, specifically against asymmetrical and unconventional forces. The battlefield organization was suitably designed to counter the large, conventional military threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. However, such a threat no longer exists. Furthermore, the creation of an effective force for the conduct of echeloned conventional operations requires tremendous resources. The Soviet Union fielded such a force at the height of its industrial capabilities. Recently, the Gulf War proved that a major regional threat that lacks the resources for such a force could not mount a credible conventional threat against the conventional strengths of U.S. forces. The Iraqi Army attempted to do so against the coalition forces with disastrous results.

After observing U.S. conventional successes in *Operations JUST CAUSE*, *UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, and *DESERT SHIELD/STORM* and its challenges during



*Operation RESTORE HOPE*, an adaptive threat may likely choose to employ less expensive and more promising means to attempt the defeat of U.S. land forces. Examples of these potentially successful means include unconventional forces such as special operations forces or terrorists, asymmetric attacks using weapons of mass destruction, and offensive information operations. Because the countermeasures to such threats are spatially independent, the geographic relationships of deep, close, and rear do not help the commander organize his forces to defeat them.

Fourth, the battlefield organization is not suitable for all levels of war by all echelons of command. The concept was designed specifically for tactical commanders. Operational and strategic level commanders arrange joint, interagency and multinational forces in broad functional measures and cannot benefit from the spatial terms of deep, close and rear. Furthermore, the echelons at brigade and below do not have the assets to conduct deep operations per the definition in FM 100-5. Therefore, the battlefield organization does not have utility to these levels of command. Because of the current mission environment, where levels of war are often indistinguishable and minor tactical actions can have significant strategic implications, it is essential to have tools with multi-echelon nesting properties and application regardless of the level of war or echelon of command.

Finally, the battlefield organization of deep, close and rear operations has become less compatible with other joint and sister service organizations. Joint force commands most often organize activities and force by functional component. Although assigned areas of operation, these forces are not associated by their location, but by their purpose. Similarly, the Air Force and Navy organize their forces and activities by their function, not their location within their area of operations.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the U.S. Marine

Corps, a fellow joint force land component, is adopting a *single battle concept* where amphibious forces are organized by the commander's intent and the mission, not necessarily by their location on the battlefield, i.e. deep, close and rear.<sup>24</sup> This disparity between the spatial Army battlefield organization and functional joint and sister service constructs is counterproductive to the goal of unity of effort and seamless cooperation among joint forces.

Additionally, the battlefield organization is divergent from the future mission environment as envisioned by Force XXI and Army After Next concepts. The future concept of land force operations is characterized by small, distributed, integrated, lethal, agile, multi-functional forces that are projected from the continental United States for short decisive operations to conduct a variety of missions against a multitude of threats to protect the nation's interests. Within this future area of operation, improved weapons technology and reduced force structure will promote increased distribution of highly mobile and lethal forces. The current battlefield organization's spatial tether has little utility in the versatile and dynamic environment of future operations.

Based upon the evaluation criteria selected, the battlefield organization of deep, close and rear operations framework imposes several significant limitations upon the commander operating in the current mission environment. Spatially oriented terminology narrows its applicability to the broad spectrum of military actions, friendly force arrays, and potential threats. Furthermore, it's utility is limited at some levels of war and echelons of command, and its compatibility to joint and future constructs is marginal. What the Army needs is a battlefield organization and framework that not only embodies the discrete utility of the current organization and extends its application

to the comprehensiveness of today's mission environment. That universal construct is the operational organization and framework described in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR – THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The operational organization and associated framework offers an alternative to the current battlefield organization and framework, emphasizing relationships of purpose instead of space. Significantly different from the terms deep, close and rear operations, decisive, shaping and sustaining reflects a more universal method of arranging and relating forces within an area of operations. What caused the Army to consider such a profound shift in defining its battlefield framework and how did the operational organization evolve?

### AGENTS OF CHANGE

First, senior Army leaders observed the significant changes in the mission environment described in Chapter Two and resolved to adjust doctrine to reflect the Army's comprehensive role in implementing the nation's security strategy. Throughout its history, the Army has proudly served across the spectrum of operations ranging from armed conflict with another nation to domestic disaster relief. And true to form, since 1990 the Army has participated in twenty-five major deployments, most of which fell remarkably within the "spectrum of peace" rather than the "spectrum of combat."<sup>25</sup> This participation in a broad range of military actions reflected our current role in supporting the National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement.

In order to capture the Army's roles in the current mission environment, the Commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed a review of the Army's keystone manual, FM 100-5 *Operations*. Consistent with the trends of the

Army's most recent deployments, the Commander, TRADOC emphasized that the manual take a comprehensive approach to military operations, and not treat "peace operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and other military activities short of general war ... as separate and special subsets."<sup>26</sup> Subsequent guidance from the Commander, TRADOC recognized the impracticality of maintaining multiple frameworks to meet a variety of unique circumstances.<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, the doctrinal concepts developed as a result of that initial guidance were comprehensive and applicable to the spectrum of military operations. The draft versions of FM 100-5 *Operations* assumed a focus much broader than previous versions of the manual, thus properly reflecting the mission environment within which today's Army operated. The 1998 draft version of FM 100-5 proposed an update to the battlefield organization and framework. Labeled the *framework for distributive operations*, this construct introduced to the field the association of military activities by purpose rather than their location in the battlespace.<sup>28</sup> The framework for distributive operations was consistent with the TRADOC Commander's guidance of developing a more universally applicable framework. Furthermore, it recognized the challenges associated with recent operations performed by Army units where the construct of deep, close, and rear had marginal utility, including Operation PROVIDE HOPE in Somalia and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. This framework served as the basic concept for proposed operational organization and framework described below.

## **THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK**

*Operational framework* is a construct that relates friendly forces to one another and to

the enemy in terms of time, space, purpose, and resources. It is a comprehensive framework with broad application to the current mission environment. The elements of the operational framework are area of operation (AO), area of interest (AI), battlespace, and the operational organization of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations. For the sake of brevity, the definitions and concepts of AO, AI, and battlespace are the same as those described with the current battlefield framework.

### **THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION: DECISIVE, SHAPING, SUSTAINING**

The definition of the *operational organization* is similar to the 1993 battlefield organization. The operational organization is the arrangement of military activities within the breadth, depth, and space of the battlefield to meet the considerations of METT-TC, and exists as one element of the battlefield framework.<sup>29</sup> The major distinction between the two concepts, DCR and DSS, is that the operational organization relates actions within a commander's AO to their purpose using decisive, shaping, and sustaining instead of to their position on the battlefield using deep, close and rear.

### **THE DECISIVE OPERATION**

The first element of the operational organization is the *decisive operation*, that operation designated by the commander that applies simultaneous, overwhelming military capabilities to directly achieve the purpose of the mission.<sup>30</sup> All other operations that facilitate success of the decisive operation are shaping or sustaining operations. The commander weights the decisive operation with military capabilities and priorities, and applies economy of force to shaping and sustaining operations.

Arguably, the concept of decisive and shaping operations could replace the terms main and supporting effort, respectively.

The commander designates only one decisive operation that achieves the purpose of his mission. One decisive operation ensures unity of effort and clarifies the priority for resourcing. Although the overwhelming force necessary to achieve the purpose may consist of several units employed in a distributed manner, they are all part of one decisive operation. Additionally, if the commander is assigned more than one mission, the commander designates a decisive operation to accomplish each mission.<sup>31</sup>

The decisive operation is not reserved for maneuver forces in close combat. The decisive operation can occur throughout the depth of the area of operations and can be performed by any force the commander designates. Within offense or defense actions, the commander may designate the decisive operation as seizing and retaining key terrain or closing with and destroying an enemy force by maneuver. Within stability or support actions, the commander may designate the decisive operation as disarming opposing factions in a conflict, opening lines of communication for humanitarian assistance, evacuating noncombatants, or implementing a peace agreement in support of a host nation rebuilding effort.

During the course of an operation, the commander may designate a new decisive operation in order to exploit an unexpected opportunity to rapidly achieve the objective caused by the results of a shaping operation. To do so, the commander redesignates the shaping operation being exploited as the decisive operation and resources it with capabilities to achieve the purpose of the mission.



## SHAPING OPERATIONS

The second element of the operational organization is a *shaping operation*. Shaping operations are those operations that apply military capabilities to set the conditions for decisive operations.<sup>32</sup> Shaping operations use the full range of military power to reduce the enemy's capability to resist in a coherent manner before or while the commander executes the decisive operation. The commander applies economy of force to shaping operations, resourcing them with the minimum essential military capabilities necessary for setting the conditions in order that the decisive operation receives overwhelming military capabilities.

Like the decisive operation, shaping operations can occur throughout the depth of the AO and can be performed by any force. However, the commander must clearly state how shaping operations assist the decisive operation. Within offensive or defensive actions, shaping operations could include denying the enemy the use of terrain or the electromagnetic spectrum, destroying or degrading his essential capabilities (especially his command and control, logistics, fire support, and air defense), or isolating key elements of his force. Within stability or support operations, shaping operations could include the use of engineers to repair infrastructure, psychological operations to prevent confrontation between opposing forces, or combat actions to prevent factions from upsetting the return to stability. Other examples of shaping operations include reconnaissance, security, the actions of the reserve prior to its commitment, and the movement of friendly forces to positions of advantage from which to launch decisive operations.<sup>33</sup>

Shaping operations are not designed or resourced to be decisive. However, the commander may achieve his objective if the enemy allows a shaping operation to be decisive. As a result, the designated decisive operation may not be required.

## **SUSTAINING OPERATIONS**

The third element of the operational organization are *sustaining operations*, all logistics and combat service support operations that support friendly forces, secure and maintain the sustainment base, and protect lines of communication.<sup>34</sup> They are as vital to the commander as decisive and shaping operations. Sustaining operations are not decisive by nature; however, failure of sustaining operations can cause the overall effort to fail.

Sustaining operations are conducted for the benefit of friendly forces only. However, the commander may decide to employ his combat service support (CSS) assets to support other government and non-government agencies, private organizations and host nations. In these instances, the tasks performed by CSS assets are shaping operations or, when such tasks directly accomplish the mission, the decisive operation.<sup>35</sup>

## **ASSESSING THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION**

Is the new organization suited for the current mission environment? Does it correct the deficiencies the battlefield organization created as a result of this new mission environment? In terms of the selected evaluation criteria, the answer to these questions is "Yes."

This broad application of DSS resolves the limitations that DCR imposed on the commander during stability or support actions. Because these military actions are less

oriented toward the spatial relationships with an enemy, relating stability or support actions to purpose is more useful. Commanders in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and HURRICANE ANDREW could have applied DSS to arrange forces, relating them to the decisive operation that achieves the unit's mission, instead of awkwardly associating forces by their distance from the line of contact. Equally important is having one organization applicable to all military actions, allowing the commander to smoothly transition between actions over the course of an operation or campaign should the circumstance require as it did so quickly during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.

The operational organization satisfies the inadequacy of DCR in distributed operations and non-contiguous areas of operation. By using DSS instead of DCR, forces operating in a distributed fashion within the AO, similar to Operation JUST CAUSE, would maintain a meaningful relationship to one another by purpose, regardless of their location. Consequently, commanders at all levels could exercise greater initiative without the spatial constraints imposed by DCR. Next, the operational organization helps the commander organize actions regardless of the enemy's spatial orientation. DSS focuses efforts upon those actions that achieve the purpose of the mission, regardless of the location of the enemy. This emphasis allows the commander to defeat not only geometrically arrayed opposing forces, but also spatially independent threats like unconventional forces or asymmetric attacks.

Another advantage to the operational organization is its application to all echelons of command. Every commander that is assigned a mission can organize his forces into decisive, shaping and sustaining operations, regardless of whether the mission issued from higher headquarters is a decisive, shaping or sustaining operation for accomplishing their

mission. Not only does DSS establish a unity of effort within the command, it allows for the clear nesting of decisive operations between echelons of command.

Finally, the operational organization and overarching framework complements other joint and future concepts. Consistent with Joint Publication 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, the operational organization and framework recognizes the same time and space relations of AO, AI, and emphasis of relating forces by purpose and function to attain assigned objectives. The operational organization is consistent with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force function-oriented arrangements, as well as the U.S. Marines emerging "single battle concept." This consistency contributes to the effective interaction between services during joint operations.

Similarly, the DSS organization is compatible with the future concepts of Force XXI and Army After Next. By decoupling the arrangement of forces from an arbitrary spatial relationship and instead emphasizing unity of purpose, commanders can visualize and arrange future forces at distributed distances, thereby promoting subordinate unit initiative and flexibility as they achieve the purpose. Relationships by purpose will also help harness the potential afforded by enhanced situational awareness, faster vehicles, and longer-range weapons. Because of the great speeds, extended distances and rapid tempo that developing technologies will afford future units, purpose may be one of the most reliable links between forces. DSS is appropriately postured to support such operations.

In summary, the *operational organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining* operations, provides the commander a comprehensive visualization tool with broad application to today's mission environment. It is useful during all military actions, within

all friendly force arrays, against all likely threats, at all levels of war and echelons of command, and in conjunction with joint and future concepts. It achieves its broad application by emphasizing the relationship of actions to purpose, independent of their time and space relationships. As a result, the commander can achieve unity of purpose without associating forces using arbitrary spatial relationships.

The underlying causes for changing the current battlefield organization is clear. The inadequacy of the battlefield organization is clear. The definition and description of the proposed operational organization is clear. The universal applicability of the operational organization is clear. However, what may not be clear is the practical application of the operational organization to a military action. Chapter Five provides clarification.

## CHAPTER FIVE – BATTLE COMMAND AND THE APPLICATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND FRAMEWORK

To properly apply the operational organization and framework to a military operation, it must be considered within the context of the art and science of battle command. The commander exercises battle command by visualizing the military operation through the framework, describing the vision through guidance and intent, directing military actions through orders, and leading units to achieve victory.<sup>36</sup> As described in the 1993 FM 100-5, battle command is more art than science and has two vital components—decision making and leadership.<sup>37</sup> This monograph focuses on decision making: the art of *visualizing* the operation, *describing* the visualization to subordinates, and then *directing* action to achieve results. The commander's battle command process begins with the art of visualizing the battlespace using the visualization tool of the operational framework.<sup>38</sup>

As stated before, the operational framework is a tool to relate friendly forces to one another and to the enemy in terms of time, space, purpose, and resources. These four dimensions help the commander visualize and describe each operation, decisive, shaping, and sustaining, using understandable terms.

When visualizing each operation in time, the commander considers when an operation occurs, how it is timed (simultaneous or sequential) and at what tempo it should be executed. In terms of space, he visualizes where an operation will occur relative to his assigned area of operation, the associated area of interest, and the area within which he seeks to dominate the enemy, his battlespace. Additionally, the commander considers whether the AO will be contiguous or distributed. The commander visualizes each

operation by its general purpose (decisive, shaping and sustaining) as it relates to accomplishing the mission. Relative to resources, the commander visualizes each operation in terms of unit capabilities, task organization, and priority of resources.

Consider the following hypothetical situation involving the application of the operational framework and organization. Corps A assigns Division One a shaping operation with the mission to destroy Enemy Division A in sector to protect the west flank of Division Two as it secures Town X, the Corps' decisive operation. The Division One Commander uses the operational framework to visualize his unit's actions, in this case predominately offensive and defensive in nature.

After assessing the mission environment using the factors of METT-TC, the commander first visualizes the decisive operation, that operation that directly accomplishes his unit's purpose. Despite being designated a shaping operation within the Corps' operational framework, Division One has been assigned a purpose, and must conduct a decisive operation to achieve that purpose. Thinking in terms of time, space, purpose, and resources, the Commander of Division One envisions his decisive operation as a simultaneous night attack (*time*) in Valley Y (*space*) to prevent Enemy Brigade T from penetrating Division Two's west flank (*purpose*) using Brigade B reinforced with attack aviation (*resources*).

To complement the decisive operation, the commander visualizes shaping and sustaining operations in similar time, space, purpose and resources terms. He sees a shaping operation in the form of a deliberate attack on a long range artillery unit occurring prior to the decisive operation (*time*) in vicinity Town Z (*space*) to deny the enemy any reinforcing fires during Brigade B's attack (*purpose*). The commander

envisions this shaping operation to be performed by attack aviation, artillery, and close air support (*resources*). The commander also visualizes a sustaining operation of protecting Brigade B's line of communication along Highway 10 (*space*) beginning when it crosses the line of departure until the division relocates its support area (*time*). This sustaining operation would prevent interdiction of resupply assets to Brigade B (*purpose*). The commander envisions using a task force of military police and mechanized infantry for this sustaining operation (*resources*).

The Commander, Division One then describes this vision in the form of guidance and intent during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) using the terms of the operational framework as a way of organizing his thoughts. By using the operational organization and framework to both visualize and describe the vision to his subordinates and staff, the commander eliminates the need to translate his vision within the context of one framework into a description using another framework.

The above scenario demonstrated a methodology of applying the decisive, shaping and sustaining operational organization in terms of time, space, purpose and resources to visualize and describe a military action. Although the particular was an offensive action, the organization and framework are equally effective for all military actions. Furthermore, this particular commander visualized and described the operation in remarkable detail. Many variables affect the level of detail the commander achieves during visualization and description, including the planning time available, the fidelity of situational awareness, and the individual leader's skill and confidence at visualizing and describing.



## CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The dramatic changes in the security environment and the broader spectrum of military actions the Army performs has narrowed the utility of the current *battlefield organization* of deep, close, and rear operations. The operational organization defined by decisive, shaping and sustaining operations provides the comprehensive solution to the changed environment. The operational organization clearly relates actions according to their purpose, notwithstanding their spatial relationships to the base of operations.

Additionally, the commander can relate forces within his area of operations by time via synchronization matrices and decision support templates, and by space using graphic control measures, overlays, and sketches. As a result of the new operational organization, land force commanders at all echelons have a universal means of arranging military forces and activities within the breadth and depth of their area of operations.

Figure Four summarizes the optimized applications of both the battlefield organization and operational organization in terms of the evaluation criteria. Clearly, the operational organization is more comprehensive in these terms.

	<b>Limitations of Deep, Close, Rear</b>	<b>Limitations of Decisive, Shaping, Sustaining</b>
<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>		
“Military Actions” (ODSS)	Offensive, Defensive	All
“Friendly Force Arrays” (Contiguous, Distributed)	Contiguous	All
“Levels of War and Echelons of Command”	Corps and Division Commanders	All
“Threat Arrays” (Conv,Unconv,Sym,Asy)	Conventional, symmetric	All
“Joint and Future Framework Designs”	None	All

Figure 4, Summary of Both Organizations’ Optimized Applications

The *operational framework* and its operational organization of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations recognize the contemporary security environment and provides Army commanders at all echelons a better means of relating military actions by time, space, and purpose in order to achieve the objectives of current and future operations.

## **IMPLICATIONS TO ADOPTING THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION**

As the Army considers adopting the operational organization, what implications does this construct have on the Army? Relatively simple changes in doctrine have unintended consequences that could negate the advantages of the original change. Furthermore, doctrinal changes may render some terms obsolete or redundant. Detailed analysis and academic wargaming can identify and assess the potentially impact of such second and third order effects. Recognizing this, the operational organization has a number of implications that this monograph identifies and to which provides a response.

First, do the specific terms deep, close and rear retain any utility to the commander in today's mission environment? Close and deep battle continue to effectively describe the character of engagements relative to a base of operations and an enemy. For example, deep operations still represent the complex and highly synchronized set of activities performed by a variety of task-organized assets at extraordinary distances from the base of operations. However, as a means of organizing the battlefield, the terms deep, close, and rear operations clearly pose too many limitations in today's mission environment.

Should the terms main and supporting effort be replaced with decisive and shaping operations, respectively? By definition, the decisive operation is the same as the main effort with respect to the way it is resourced and its decisive results. Similarly, shaping

operations set favorable conditions for the decisive operations just as the supporting effort does for the main effort. Therefore, main and supporting effort are redundant and can be replaced by the terms of the operational organization.

Should the definition of the decisive operation be linked to the achievement of a decisive point? The operational organization above does not define decisive operations in terms of a decisive point but by the action that accomplishes the mission. Simply achieving a marked advantage by seizing a decisive point does not, by itself, accomplish the mission. The decisive point must be exploited by an action that achieves the operations purpose. Additionally, by defining decisive operations with a decisive point, it dictates an indirect approach at an enemy's center of gravity, precluding an approach directly at the opposition's source of strength. Therefore, the decisive operation should not be defined using decisive points.

Can there be more than one decisive operation? While this operational organization recognizes that forces may direct simultaneous actions at multiple decisive points, this paper argues that these multiple actions are aimed at achieving one purpose within one decisive operation. The only scenario where a unit may have multiple decisive operations is when it is assigned multiple missions and has the military force necessary to accomplish each mission. Therefore, there is only one decisive operation for each assigned mission.

If the operational organization relates forces and actions by purpose, what are the commander's tools for relating them by space and time? The commander relates his forces in space by assigning areas of operation and developing a scheme of maneuver. He visualizes and portrays this space relationship using graphic control measures depicted on

overlays, sketches and digital displays.

Relating forces in time is an inherent attribute of complete mission type orders. The commander synchronize all assigned actions to achieve the desired effect at the decisive point in time using such tools as synchronization matrices, decision support templates and time-phased graphic control measures. Through these means, forces are related to one another in space and time.

How does a unit's task and purpose integrate into the operational organization? All properly issued tasks, whether specified or implied, are described in terms of task and purpose. The task is the action to be conducted, and the purpose its relationship to accomplishing the mission. DSS reinforces these relationships of by distinguishing the decisive operation and emphasizing the facilitative relationships of other actions. In this way, the operational organization of DSS complements and reinforces the tasks and purpose assigned to units.

By identifying the implications above, the monograph not only analyzes in detail the impact of the new operational organization on Army operations, but also reinforces the comprehensive nature of the proposed construct. Additionally, this analysis encourages leaders to challenge the utility of the operational organization in areas not considered by the author. In this way, doctrinal changes can be assessed and understood by field commanders before the concepts are integrated into future doctrine, thereby promoting a shared vision of the new construct and facilitating efficient change in the way the Army organizes forces in today's mission environment

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> School of Advanced Military Studies, *FM 100-5, Revised Draft: An Informational Brief to the Army's Operational Commanders* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army, 13 November 1995), 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army, *FM 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), 6-13.

<sup>3</sup> Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, "Proposal for Distributed Operations Framework" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, undated.), 1.

<sup>4</sup> For a complete explanation of mental models and other cognitive illusions, see Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, *Inevitable Illusions* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 17-29.

<sup>5</sup> *Distributed operations* are those activities and functions executed simultaneously throughout the depth, width, and height of the area of operations. They are targeted against multiple decisive points simultaneously, rather than concentrated against one decisive point or a series of decisive points in sequence. "Proposal for Distributed Operations", 2.

<sup>6</sup> Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, "Concept Paper #1, The Doctrinal Focus of FM 100-5, *Operations*." Concept Paper. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Secretary of Defense, *The National Military Strategy* (Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 1.

<sup>9</sup> "Concept Paper #1", 4.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Army, *FM 100-1, The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1976), 27.

<sup>11</sup> "Notes of GEN Hartzog's comments on FM 100-5 Briefing, 10 December 1996", (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, undated), 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Operations*, 1993, 6-13.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Army, *FM 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1982), 7-1.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 7-13.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 6-2, 7-5.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Army, *FM 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1986), 36-39.

<sup>17</sup> Notably missing in the 1993 version of FM 100-5 is the term "area of interest," a geographical area from which information and intelligence are required for the commander to execute successful tactical operations and to plan future operations. Activities within the area of interest are of concern to the commander, but may not require him to take military action. FM 100-5, 1986 included the area of interest in its battlefield framework. However, the 1993 version deleted it. Notwithstanding the deletions, the field manuals for Corps and Division operations include the area of interest as an element of the battlefield framework. In my opinion, it is a useful tool to help define the relationship of potentially applicable enemy activities to the area of operation.

<sup>18</sup> *Operations*, 1993, 6-13.

<sup>19</sup> Diagram created by LTC Victor Robertson, FM 100-5 Writing Team, School of Advanced Military Studies.

<sup>20</sup> Diagram created by LTC Victor Robertson, FM 100-5 Writing Team, School of Advanced Military Studies.

<sup>21</sup> "Proposal for Distributed Operations", 2.

<sup>22</sup> Diagram created by LTC Victor Robertson, FM 100-5 Writing Team, School of Advanced Military Studies.

<sup>23</sup> Derived from interviews with Lt Cdr Stewart Carter, USN and MAJ Scott Gorman, USAF, Students at the School of Advanced Military Studies. Also, U.S. Navy, *NDP5, Naval Planning* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 30 September 1997), 6, and U.S. Air Force, *AFDD2 Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 28 September 1998), 4.

<sup>24</sup> Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP) is promoting this concept in its training seminars. The single battle concept effectively focuses the efforts of all the elements of the force to accomplish the mission. A commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity, for operations or events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects on other areas and events. The single battle concept revolves around the MAGTF commander who is responsible for deep, close and rear operations that are part of the single battle. No longer will the MAGTF simply be the arbiter between the GCE, ACE and CSSE with the GCE

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developing the scheme of maneuver and the ACE and CSSE supporting it. While the battlespace may be conceptually divided into deep, close, and rear to facilitate planning and decentralized execution, the commander's intent ensures a single battle by providing unity of effort. Further information can be found on the MSTP website. Marine Corps Tactics Team, *Marine Corps Future Battlefields* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army, October 1998), 1.

<sup>25</sup> Chief of Staff of the Army, *Army Vision 2010* (Pentagon: Arlington, VA: Department of the Army, undated), 5.

<sup>26</sup> Commander, Combined Arms Command, "Program Directive for FM 100-5" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army, March 1996), 2.

<sup>27</sup> "Notes on GEN Abrams comments on FM 100-5 Strategy Session, 11 February 1999", (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, undated), 3.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Army. *FM 100-5, Operations: Revised Final Draft*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 19 June 1998), 2-51.

<sup>29</sup> "Proposal for Distributed Operations", 1.

<sup>30</sup> This definition was based upon the original definition: *decisive operations* are those actions applying military capabilities that directly attack decisive points. U.S. Army. *FM 100-40, Tactics: Offense and Defense (Final Draft)* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998), 2-4.

<sup>31</sup> From interviews with LTC Robin Swan, LTC Dale Eikmeier, and LTC Victor Robertson.

<sup>32</sup> This definition was based upon the original definition: *Shaping operations* consist of all actions applying military capabilities to set the conditions for decisive operations. U.S. Army. *FM 100-40, Tactics: Offense and Defense (Final Draft)* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998), 2-6.

<sup>33</sup> From interviews with LTC Robin Swan, LTC Dale Eikmeier, and LTC Victor Robertson.?

<sup>34</sup> This definition was based upon the original definition: *Sustainment operations* are all actions taken to protect and ensure the functioning of one's force and its capabilities and to ensure its freedom of action. U.S. Army. *FM 100-40, Tactics: Offense and Defense (Final Draft)* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998), 2-7.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 2-8.

<sup>36</sup> Director, School of Advanced Military Studies. "Concept Paper #3, The Operational

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<sup>37</sup> *Operations*, 1993, 2-14.

<sup>38</sup> "Concept Paper #3", 4.



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