

THE MOON IS DOWN:
THE JEDBURGHS AND SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH RESISTANCE

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The Allied World War Two leaders faced a difficult dilemma: with Germany dominating continental Europe and few Allied options, could the occupied populations contribute to the defeat of Germany? To facilitate the effort, the British founded the Special Operations Executive to organize, train, and equip resistance groups. In occupied France, the problem increased due to many political groups trying to influence what kind of resistance should dominate. Joined by the American Office of Strategic Services, the British formed a Special Forces Headquarters and trained a force to organize, arm, train, and equip the French resistance. Ideally the force, known as Jedburghs, would parachute behind enemy lines with sufficient time to accomplish building the resistance into a viable combat force before the Allies invaded France.

Unfortunately, political disagreements between American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on one side and the Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle on the other, delayed the Jedburgh deployments. Also the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower held back the Jedburghs due to the fear that men behind enemy lines could compromise invasion plans.

Once deployed, the four teams detailed below faced the challenge of organizing,

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arming, and training a viable force while evading the German army. They built upon Special Operations Executive spy circuits and benefited from many of its men and resources devoted to supplying the resistance. Trained for a military mission, the Jedburghs' greatest success lay in their ability to galvanize the local French resistance politically into an effective fighting force.

THE MOON IS DOWN:
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by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Introduction	page 1
Chapter One - Solving a Political Dilemma	page 5
Chapter Two - Getting Everything in Place	page 23
Chapter Three - The Jedburghs Go Into Action	page 47
Conclusion	page 91
Appendix A - Post-War Personal Information on Teams	page 94
Appendix B - Complete List of Jedburgh Teams	page 96
Bibliography	page 102

ABBREVIATIONS

AS - Armée Secrète
AEAF - Allied Expeditionary Air Forces
BBC - British Broadcasting Company
BCRA - Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action
CFLN - Comité Français de Libération Nationale
COSSAC - Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
DF - SOE Escape Section
DMR - Délégué Militaire Régional
EMFFI - Etat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur
F - SOE independent French section
FFI - Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur
FTP - Francs-Tireurs et Partisans
FN - Front Nationale
Gestapo - Geheime Staatspolizei or German Secret Police
MLN - Mouvement de Libération Nationale
MUR - Mouvements Unis de la Résistance
OG - Operational Group
OSS - Office of Strategic Services
OSS/SO - Office of Strategic Services/Special Operations Branch
ORA - Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée
RF - SOE Gaullist Section
SACMED - Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
SAS - Special Air Service
SFHQ - Special Forces Headquarters
SHAEF - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
SIS - Special Intelligence Service
SOE - Special Operations Executive
SPOC - Special Projects Operation Center
STO - Service du Travail Obligatoire
SS - Schutzstaffel
W/T - Wireless Telegraphy

Introduction

Fascinated by the stories from Europeans fleeing their occupied homes, the famous novelist John Steinbeck, decided to write about their plight. Carrying on daily life under the control of a foreign power brought tales of intrigue, spies, sabotage, black-markets, and hardship. Working with the support of the Office of Strategic Services, Steinbeck's The Moon is Down hit American and British bookstores in March 1942. The short work, which tells of a small mining town in an unnamed country under occupation, was read widely and despite great risk, translated, and secretly distributed in Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. The characters portrayed the trials of those in occupied countries as well as the humanity of the occupying army. The narrative rang so true to underground leaders that soon movements took it to heart as a story of great inspiration. Toward the end of the novel, the occupied town's mayor asks two escaping young men to tell Britain to send "simple, secret weapons, weapons of stealth, explosives, dynamite to blow up rails, grenades if possible, even poison."¹

Reading Steinbeck's novel, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked his advisors if such action could be taken. They advised him that if done prematurely, it might lead to German reprisals, killing civilians, and gaining no military advantage.² The idea was shelved, but as the British discovered no other way to fight Germany, the

¹ John Steinbeck, The Moon is Down (New York: Penguin Books, 1942) 83.

² David Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service (New York: Overlook Press, 1997) 239-40.

newly created sabotage unit Special Operations Executive (SOE), started sending agents into France to assess resistance capabilities and show the occupied populations that Great Britain would support them. Churchill's lifelong fascination with spies, guerrilla war, and intelligence made him an energetic advocate for arming resistance organizations. Churchill and the British also followed up on the idea because they had no choice. What other weapon did they have? In early 1942, what could Britain realistically achieve with the few resources available? Since not enough aircraft, men, or material existed to fight a conventional war on the continent, SOE controlled resistance cells offered a fighting option.

Unfortunately, the British and Americans initially failed to appreciate the French political situation and were ignorant about the nature of the resistance. Nevertheless, the allies clumsily found the solution - Jedburgh teams. The concept of parachuting commandos behind the lines was attractive for sabotage, but would the local resistance approve? For example, destroying a power station might be as unpopular with the civilians as with the enemy. A solution had to be found demonstrating to occupied nations that certain targets were militarily necessary and *politically* legitimate. If the allies ran operations in conjunction with a nation's political authority, no conflict between the allies and the resistance would exist. Inserting teams with at least one member from the occupied country would serve as a powerful symbol their nation was active in its own liberation, and just as importantly, acted with the approval of the nation. But how could the allies achieve political coordination with a nation bereft of its government?

Jedburgh teams were an idea derived by the SOE. If done correctly, the teams could coordinate military operations, and because they would be multi-national, have the right political representation. If run well, they could harness the resistance and contribute to the overall European invasion, while demonstrating to the local resistance that the chain of command included their political authority. Composed of two officers and an enlisted radio operator, the Jedburghs would parachute into an area to rally and train the resistance under Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) orders. One of the officers would be from the nation the team was operating in, the other would be British or American. The radio operator would be from any of the three nations. Therefore, teams that parachuted into France had at least one French officer demonstrating to the local resisters that Free France exercised influence and they were getting their orders from a legitimate source.

However, with no clear French political leader to support, the Americans and British were in an extremely difficult position. The French political scene was a cloud of military leaders with no clear mandate to rule, despite what they purported to the Allies. The efforts of one apparent French leader to gain the upper hand among his rivals constantly exasperated President Franklin Roosevelt. The former Assistant War Minister, General Charles de Gaulle became the central focus of Roosevelt's ire. De Gaulle repeatedly claimed he had the mandate of the French people, but Roosevelt did not agree and thought de Gaulle an arrogant non-entity. On the other hand, Churchill, having no other way to influence the course of events in occupied France, supported de Gaulle with training facilities in England, funds, and a section of the SOE dedicated to French operations. Britain backed the only means available to inflict pain

on the Nazis, but Roosevelt hoped for another option and was reluctant to commit large stores of weapons and materiel to de Gaulle.

However, Roosevelt's chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) disagreed with the President. As William J. Donovan stated to the President, arming resistance groups in large numbers "would give large masses of the French people their long desired opportunity of national self-expression."³ Donovan believed de Gualle offered the best means available, and during the war the Anglo-American alliance slowly stepped up the effort to arm, train, and equip the French resistance. For the Jedburghs to succeed at the moment of invasion, the resistance would need to prepare to receive them, reliable communications would have to be available, and a robust air fleet capable of transporting the teams and dropping supplies must be operating. A great deal of time, effort, and thought would go into building up the required resources. Finding and training the Jedburghs would also take time.

Nevertheless, by D-Day 100 teams existed, underground circuits waited for their arrival, and SHAEF made aircraft, arms, money, and other supplies available and created a Special Forces Headquarters, commanded by French General Pierre Koenig, to lead the effort. The fictional mayor of Steinbeck's novel could not have imagined the complexity and infrastructure needed to succeed in delivering his "secret weapons."

³ Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero, Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982) 562.

Chapter One

Solving a Political Dilemma

All Germany's enemies were on the run or defeated. In the summer of 1940, the government of France fought in vain to keep the German Army from overrunning its nation. But by the middle of June, the weary and beaten government members packed up their offices and fled Paris, leaving it to the invader. What to do now? Who had the stature to set up a legitimate government and deal with Adolph Hitler while keeping order in France and its colonies? Amid all the chaos, the nation needed to find someone who commanded the instant respect and possessed legitimacy with the French people.

One possibility was Marshal Henri-Phillipe Pétain, the hero of Verdun, advocate of the Maginot Line, and recently named Paul Reynaud's vice-premier. As the Wehrmacht moved into Paris, and Reynaud's government collapsed, Pétain became Prime Minister and signed an armistice. Next, the Marshal and his ministers sought a collaborative course with Germany and established a government agreeing to maintain neutrality. However, France paid the price by being split, as Germany occupied the northern half and France's entire Atlantic coast, giving the German navy vital ports. Not allowed in Paris, Pétain set up his government in the small spa town of Vichy and attempted to restore order in unoccupied France, maintain control of French colonies,

and keep the French Fleet out of German hands.¹

Another candidate was Pierre Laval, a man in and out of government many times in the 1930s, who engineered Pétain's election by the National Assembly. In the Vichy regime, Laval became Pétain's government leader and met with Adolph Hitler to offer conciliation and cooperation. Convinced Germany would win the war, Laval sought the best possible relations, and hoped to place France well in postwar Europe. Later he was maneuvered out, but Germany forced his reinstatement and Laval made Vichy seek elimination of French Communism and all other German resistance.²

Charles de Gaulle, a junior General in the French Army, and newly appointed Assistant Minister of War, offered another option. Fleeing to London, he attempted to carry on the fight against Germany with any remaining resources willing to rally around him. In a famous broadcast on the June 18, 1940, de Gaulle declared France was not beaten and would carry on the war from its colonies with British fighting support and America's industrial help. Arrogant, demanding, and stubborn General de Gaulle exasperated Churchill and Roosevelt but would eventually gain their support. Offering to the French a compelling choice to the Vichy government, de Gaulle would become the central leader of the resistance, and more importantly, the only one deft enough to survive the intrigue and come out on top.

Admiral of the only fighting force France possessed after its fall, Jean-Francois Darlan, exercised influence riding the tides of his surviving fleet. Temporarily

¹ Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 1996) 6-67.

² John Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944 (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976) 5.

replacing Laval, Darlan came in as Pétain's vice-president of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister, Information Minister, and of course Naval Minister. He also sought cooperation with Hitler but wished to remain militarily neutral. After creating Vichy's aggressive economic program, exacting hardship on the French, Pétain replaced Darlan when bargaining failed to achieve German concessions. Always covering his bases, Darlan also dealt with the United States, and when the Allies invaded North Africa he ordered French forces to cease-fire. When Pétain heard this, he fired Darlan, re-hired Laval, who personally discussed matters with Hitler. Before Darlan could issue naval orders, the crews scuttled their ships, rather than let them fall into Allied or German possession.

Straining to sort out what was actually happening in North Africa, Laval and Hitler bargained, both seeking to repel the American invasion. Hitler, in one of his furious tirades, brow beat Laval into granting German landing rights in Tunisia and capitulating totally on his desire to keep L'Etat Français unoccupied. With the Wehrmacht due to occupy all of France as well as be the only force capable of repelling the United States from French colonies, Laval acquiesced saying, "Those Jews on the Cote d'Azur are in for a nasty surprise!" Darlan provided his services to the Americans and ordered his troops to cooperate with the Allies. But with his fleet gone, the Admiral's usefulness waned and an assassin shot him on Christmas Eve, 1942.³

In an effort to recover influence, America hoped to advance General Henri Giraud as the Free French leader. An escapee from a German Prisoner of War camp,

³ Burrin, 140-146.

Giraud appealed to many in France who began to distrust Pétain's collaboration policies. He became a member of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN) and after an assassin shot Darlan, he became the commander of the pro-allied French forces in North Africa. However, de Gaulle, maneuvered Giraud out of the CFLN by November 1943. A superior politician to all his rivals, Charles de Gaulle became the undisputed leader of the Free French.⁴

After the fall of France, British actions centered around survival. Attacked daily, the Royal Air Force attempted to keep bombs from raining on its homeland. The government worked to solidify an American alliance and endeavored to equip the King's forces. Therefore, the newly created British organization called the Special Operations Executive would develop the only continental support. As the British government contemplated the fall of France in early June 1940, the military Chiefs of Staff submitted options to the war cabinet. One of the weapons proposed was to create an organization to spread revolt and conduct sabotage. The Chiefs also noted that British involvement would give them a say in shaping Europe after the war. Churchill loved the idea and thought it should operate outside the Army, War Ministry, and the Secret Intelligence Service. After working out some more details, the SOE was born on July 22, 1940, and led by the energetic Hugh Dalton.⁵

The United States; not yet involved in the war took measures supporting Britain's defense. In March 1941, President Roosevelt pushed through Congress the Lend-

⁴ Bertram M. Gordon, ed. Historical Dictionary of World War II France (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998) 166.

⁵ M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France, An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1966) 8-9.

Lease Act. American material would be fighting the war against Germany while Britain promised to pay later. Meanwhile, the American military planned for the possibility of war against Germany.⁶

American notions of what to do about the French government were less clear. FDR wished to maintain Vichy neutrality due to the French Fleet, but as the United States entered the war, he worked to gain open support for North African operations.⁷ But certainly, no obvious American path existed and with Darlan assassinated, FDR received some confusing advice from his former French ambassador: “go on trying to stiffen Pétain, energize Weygand [a pro American, anti-de Gaulle French General] and support de Gaulle. And it is not beyond the wit of man to do all three without breaking relations with Vichy.”⁸ The desire to keep Vichy neutral sank with the French fleet and FDR worked to marginalize de Gaulle and make Giraud the head of the CFLN. Meeting de Gaulle at the Casablanca Conference, in January 1943, the self-assured Frenchman exasperated FDR by comparing himself to Georges Clemenceau and Joan of Arc. When FDR asked de Gaulle which person he was, de Gaulle replied, “I am both.”⁹

The French resistance mirrored France’s pre-war politics; divisive and fractured, the groups were unable to compromise and bring unity of purpose against Germany. The communist, socialist, and fascist ideologies survived the defeat only to morph into

⁶ Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1994) 418.

⁷ Burrin, 108-09.

⁸ Orville H. Bullitt, ed. For the President Personal and Secret: Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1972) 523.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 568.

various forms, supporting or opposing Pétain's policies. There would be no clear, singular resistance leader until General de Gaulle solidified all the groups immediately before D-Day.

By cooperating with Germany, Vichy hoped to ensure a French nation survived. In 1940, the French believed Pétain brought a great deal of legitimacy. The people could look upon him as a national hero and thought his actions were the best thing for France. But as time wore on, Laval's government initiated two unpopular policies in an effort to strengthen German relations. The first was the *Relève*. Laval sought to bring home French prisoners of war but exchanged *three* workers for one prisoner. Public support quickly melted away, especially among the population comprised of skilled workers and craftsmen. Unoccupied French workers believed it to be a form of deportation and many tried to take advantage of vague guidelines and various waivers. The remaining responded by striking, failing to appear, or if arrested and forcibly put on the train shouted "Hang Laval!" as the train left the platform.¹⁰

In February 1943, Vichy instituted an even less popular program in an effort to curry favor with labor-starved Germany. The Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) no longer traded workers for prisoners. Instead, all men ages twenty-one to sixty-five and single women from twenty-one to thirty-five were enrolled by birth year and liable for call up as the government determined. Rather than being forced to Germany, many of them fled for the woods and mountains hoping to avoid service. To enforce the law, Vichy created the Milice and gave them the mission of rounding up the resisters or *réfractaires*. The reaction to the STO provided the resistance with its base

¹⁰ John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation, (New York: Oxford UP, 1986) 24-25.

manpower.¹¹ In one clever move, a resistance group broke into the Paris STO office and burned the census forms. Informed of the incident by intelligence sources, a SHAEF document gleefully expected “that this will prevent the drafting of 100,000 young men for work in Germany.”¹²

Beneath the governmental level, groups began to emerge whose desire for liberation exceeded their belief in Pétain and the collaboration’s usefulness. Vichy’s introduction and enforcement of the Relève and the STO fueled public discontent with collaboration and made resistance more popular. The groups took on the mold of French pre-war political groups, but with a different edge in that the twin goals of overthrowing Pétain as well as removing the invader, became uniting goals.

The Franc-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) grew from the communist Front Nationale. Once Germany went to war with the Soviet Union, the communist resistance evolved from its wait-and-see attitude toward an attitude of active, violent resistance. By overstating the effects STO imposed, FTP underground newspapers and overt posters exhorted men not to allow themselves to be taken to Germany, but join combat groups and fight.¹³ The FTP became the strongest, most violent, and largest single resistance group prior to D-Day. Many FTP were not necessarily communists, but joined it as the best or only local option.

Other politically left leaning groups, such as Combat, Liberation, and Franc-Tireur

¹¹ John F. Sweets, The Politics of Resistance 26-7.

¹² Microfilm SHAEF, Office of the Chief of Staff, Secretary General Staff, Reel 12, Frame 613, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

¹³ H. R. Kedward. In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942-1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 37.

began to form. Opposing Pétain's reactionaries and the political right, the *résistants* first endeavored to recruit liberal middle-class members. Newspaper editors, university professors, students, writers, and journalists formed the nucleus. At first, their goals were to spread their ideas and provide an opposing political view. Few members were army officers, but a key exception, was Henri Frenay. A German prison camp escapee, and an anti-Communist, he openly broke with the Vichy government in early 1942. Frenay then worked to merge resistance groups into the Mouvement de Libération Nationale and later supported General de Gaulle.¹⁴ As the non-communist groups worked together, they formed the Mouvements Unis de la Résistance under the direction of the Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée (ORA). And the ORA, brought in the communist FTP in a tenuous effort to solidify all Vichy and anti-German resistance.

As the groups merged and matured together, neither de Gaulle nor any other person exercised firm control. Local leaders were very independent and conducted themselves in ways garnering stronger local assistance. Shelter, food, fuel, and much other support were necessary for local resistance survival. Moreover, the local inhabitants required the resistance demonstrate its usefulness by carrying out local aims, not necessarily those desired by de Gaulle or the British government. Toward this goal, *résistants* attacked targets supplying the group with clothes, arms, or other equipment or vandalized property symbolizing Vichy or Germany. Additionally, other targets were destroyed or stolen and resistance groups attacked food and plant equipment en route to Germany. Efforts such as these demonstrated how the

¹⁴ Sweets, The Politics of Resistance 14-15.

resistance supported local desires and played on local resentment against Germany.¹⁵

Knowledge about the resistance groups outside France was next to nothing. Britain confronted the challenge of supporting them, but how and who should do it, and should the cooperation of General de Gaulle, Admiral Darlan, General Giraud, or any other French personality be sought? Could putting British efforts behind one man who failed be too much of a setback to overcome? France was not the only country with an active resistance and the British were definitely learning a lesson from supporting the wrong Yugoslav group. Initially, Churchill backed the Yugoslav Royalists, but when they were found collaborating with Germany, Britain shifted and backed the communists. The British were not above siding with their ideological enemies in order to combat the Germans.¹⁶ While carrying on such policy in the Balkans, contemporaneous French activities portray the British navigating among the sea of resistance groups and backing those fighting Germany.

The SOE sent the first agent into France on May 5, 1941. A radio operator, Georges Begué, parachuted into the Indre region with the hope of communicating information concerning the resistance. The leader of what became the first circuit followed him into France five days later. Peter de Vomécourt parachuted “blind” near Chateauroux. Meeting up with his brother Philippe, he related the beginning of the SOE, its small office on Baker Street, and how he was an “F Section” employee. “We’ve done a bit of training already, but no one’s very sure what sort of training we ought to be doing. Still we’ve made a start. There’s not much else I can tell you. But you’ll join us?” he asked his brother. And with that, a small network of *résistants*

¹⁵ Kedward, 73-115.

¹⁶ Stafford, 300-302.

started working the area between Indre and Bordeaux.¹⁷

Concerned about being let down by de Gaulle, the British set up a double network. The F Section ran operations independent of de Gaulle's knowledge and the RF Section ran operations with the knowledge and active participation of de Gaulle's supporters. F Section conducted operations secretly from de Gaulle, while running RF Section operations with the F Section's knowledge. SOE created a third section to spirit downed airmen back to England. The DF Section developed escape routes, made medical support available, provided phony identification cards, and communicated back to London an aircrew member's whereabouts and progress. Through all sections, the British SOE and later the American OSS/Special Operations Branch London, endeavored to place resistance networks in occupied Europe. As the Americans joined the effort, the SOE and the London office of the OSS merged forming the SOE/SO, led by British Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman and American Colonel Joseph Haskell. The Americans received initial information, training, and support from the more experienced British. In an effort to make the organization more unified, rather than a patched together allied effort, the clumsy title SOE/SO was traded in for Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) effective 1 May 1944.¹⁸

Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, walked through the political minefield as best he could. The vague answers from Churchill and Roosevelt on how to handle General de Gaulle drove him to great frustration. After months of careful and tireless planning for OVERLORD, the decision to bring the

¹⁷ Philippe de Vomécourt, *An Army of Amateurs* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1961) 35.

¹⁸ Foot, 34-35.

French in on it was not disputed. But Roosevelt distrusted de Gaulle and feared the arrogant Frenchman would set up a post-war French dictatorship. After de Gaulle visited Stalin and brought the communist resistance under his umbrella, the former American Ambassador to France, William Bullitt, told FDR that de Gaulle was in the pockets of the Communists. Furthermore, Bullitt theorized that Stalin and de Gaulle had an agreement on post-war France. The Ambassador feared an alliance of the political right and the Communists would team up and “crush democratic elements.”¹⁹

In messages to Churchill, Roosevelt communicated his impatience, distrust, and exasperation with de Gaulle. Roosevelt pointed to the Giraud-de Gaulle squabble in the French National Committee, and exclaimed on May 8, 1943, that de Gaulle had a “messianic complex” and is “well nigh intolerable.” Roosevelt wanted the United States and Britain to administer France jointly during the occupation until elections were held. De Gaulle viscerally opposed an American and British government of France. The Allies administered Italy, but the French did not want such an arrangement and were suspicious of American motives. Roosevelt exhorted Churchill for a meeting and hoped to “thrash out this disagreeable problem” and establish a common policy. He also joked and asked if Churchill would make de Gaulle “Governor of Madagascar!”²⁰

The result was a meeting between Churchill, de Gaulle, and the rest of the French National Committee. According to Churchill, the make up of the French

¹⁹ Bullitt, 581.

²⁰ Warren F. Kimball, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol II. (Princeton, NJ: PU Press, 1984) 209-10.

National Committee marginalized de Gaulle because only two votes out of seven were Gaullist. He told FDR the matter was resolved and de Gaulle's influence and obstinate manner would only be minor annoyances.²¹ However, issues still remained and de Gaulle's influence on the committee strengthened. The Allies argued with the French concerning currency and whether the French citizens should accept Allied notes or only French-printed notes. Also, and more importantly, the Allies required resistance cooperation and needed to decide which French leader would unify the various groups and cooperate against Germany. All the parties remembered how close the matter had nearly come to disaster in North Africa and wished to have clear and concise plans for cooperation. The SFHQ F Section circuits gave the Allies a measure of independent control, but if the resistance groups took their cue from de Gaulle, and he refused to cooperate, they could be fighting the French as well as the Germans.

Fortunately, in 1942 the SOE anticipated the invasion of the continent and on the July 6th, the head of SOE-London wrote, "A project is under consideration for the dropping behind the enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication." The staff used the term "JEDBURGHs" the next day, probably inspired by the Scottish border town of the same name and used as a base of operations by 15th century Scot guerrillas harassing the English. Detailed planning did not take place until early 1943.²²

²¹ Ibid., 231.

²² John Mendelsohn, ed. Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era. Vol. III, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989). i.

Published on December 20, 1943, the Basic Directive on Jedburghs defined objectives, roles, team composition, tasks, and other details. The teams were to support the invasion of Europe and consist of “three men, of whom at least one will be a native of the country in which the team is to operate. Teams will consist of a leader, a second-in-command, both of whom will normally be officers, and one wireless operator.” Functioning as a liaison with any resistance group in their area, Jedburghs were not to command the resistance, “but it is felt that the arrival of Allied soldiers, in uniform, behind the enemy lines, will have a marked effect on patriotic morale and that these teams, representing as they do the Allied High Command, will act as a focus for local resistance.” Only sent to areas with known resistance fighters, the teams would communicate the Allied Command’s orders to the local groups. The team would then train the *résistants* on sabotage, organize guerrilla operations, arrange for arms to be delivered via night air drop, and lead the group in operations. Specifically mentioned in the directive is this: “It is not intended that Jedburghs will act as intelligence agents.” Surprisingly, nowhere in the directive is guidance on how to coordinate Jedburgh operations with conventional units.²³ After D-Day, conventional units often underutilized or misused resistance resources due to little communication with Jedburgh teams.

A March 23, 1944 SHAEF Operations Directive ordered SOE/SO London to have seventy teams trained for D-Day. Eisenhower gave SOE/SO total control of

²³ OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries (microfilm; Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), Vol. 12 - Basic Documents 36-47. Hereafter cited as OSS/SO London microfilm.

resistance groups, who were as yet not clearly united behind any one person, and directed the resistance concentrate efforts against German air forces, lower the morale of German forces by sabotage, inflict damage on the German war effort in general, and prepare for the return of Allied Forces to the continent. Moreover, the document directed the equipping resistance groups by air drop. Jedburghs and Operational Groups (American teams of men deployed for the specific purpose of destroying a certain target or other such objective) were to be held ready by April 1, 1944. SHAEF clearly stated no invasion plan details should be conveyed to any resistance group, *especially* the date.²⁴

If the resistance was to act, what targets did SHAEF want it to attack? In a dispatch sent to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, General Maitland Wilson, Eisenhower stated his priorities. The railroad from Montauban-Limoges-Vierzon on D + 1 through D + 3 was first. Second, the railroads from Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours on D + 4 to D + 7. The cable listed other railroads as well as roads, indicating Germans moving north should be impeded as much as possible. Furthermore, Jedburghs were not to enter France sooner than 10 days before D-Day. Eisenhower thought it too risky and a security hazard to have anyone in France with OVERLORD plans.²⁵ As D-Day neared, SHAEF passed even more restrictive orders to Special Forces Headquarters. The Jedburghs could not deploy to France prior to the night of D-Day - 1. The SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell

²⁴ Supreme Headquarters: Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff. Records, 1943-45. Depository - Modern Military Records Division, National Archives. Microfilm. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Reel 5, Frames 1093 - 1101. Hereafter cited as SHAEF, SGS, microfilm.

Special Air Service Teams were also held in reserve by the British for similar use.

²⁵ SHAEF, SGS. Microfilm Reel 52, frames 847-850.

Smith, warned of the need to do everything possible to safeguard OVERLORD, and feared that dropping Jedburghs into enemy territory risked compromise, with doubtful gain.²⁶ Eisenhower began working with General Marie-Pierre Koenig, de Gaulle's appointed commander of all French resistance, growing to trust him. Eisenhower wanted to give him some general outline of the OVERLORD landings, and believed Koenig could be trusted with the invasion month; however he did not want the information leaked to the French commanders in Algeria.²⁷

Unfortunately for Eisenhower, SHAEF, SFHQ, and the resistance, Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle failed to agree about currency, and occupational civil affairs as D-Day neared. The political leaders' inability to work out details of occupation policies and currency caused Eisenhower great embarrassment. On May 11, Eisenhower cabled Washington asking Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall for further guidance. "The limitations under which we are operating in dealing with the French are becoming very embarrassing and are producing a situation which is potentially dangerous."²⁸ Until the leaders reached an agreement, Roosevelt would not sanction de Gaulle as the legitimate French leader. With no one for Eisenhower to communicate an active resistance plan to, a valuable asset would be squandered. De Gaulle would never authorize the action messages while Eisenhower worked with other resistance groups, and if he would not, who would?

Exasperated, Eisenhower wrote in his private journal on March 22nd, saying the

²⁶ Smith, Walter Bedell: Collection of WWII Documents, 1941-1945, Box 24, Cable Log-Out (May 1944), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

²⁷ Ibid., May 9, 1944.

²⁸ Ibid., May 11, 1944.

President “has thrown back in my lap” the resistance issue telling him to work with anyone “capable of assisting us.” He desired to work with de Gaulle, but not singularly, and de Gaulle would not work with SHAEF unless the Allies recognized him as the sole political authority. Only three days prior to D-Day, Eisenhower wrote “We have direct means of communication with the resistance groups of France but all our information leads us to believe that the only authority these resistance groups desire to recognize is that of de Gaulle and his committee. However, since de Gaulle is apparently willing to cooperate only on the basis of our dealing with him exclusively, the whole thing falls into a rather sorry mess.” Interestingly, with all the other details of OVERLORD pressing down on Eisenhower, the politics of French resistance was the first thing on his mind.²⁹

Indeed, the last message SHAEF sent Washington, prior to the Normandy landings concerned de Gaulle. On the evening of June 4th, in what must have been a relief to Eisenhower, de Gaulle agreed to broadcast a message to the resistance “on the lines suggested by us” immediately following Eisenhower’s own message.³⁰ On June 7th Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt and seconded much of what Eisenhower related three days earlier, saying that de Gaulle remained adamant about not discussing the currency issue as well as refusing to allow liaison officers in Allied units. However, he had a different interpretation of the broadcast agreement than Eisenhower, and the benefit of hearing it. Churchill related to FDR his astonishment since the French

²⁹ Robert H. Ferrell, ed. The Eisenhower Dairies (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1981) 113-118.

³⁰ Smith, Walter Bedell: Collection of WWII Documents, 1941-1945 Box 24 Cable log-Out (June 1944).

leader “has not a single soldier in the great battle now developing.” Churchill personally took de Gaulle to see Eisenhower and Bedell Smith and the two generals made assurances “that in practice events would probably mean that the Committee [CFLN] would be the natural authority with whom the Supreme Commander would deal.”³¹ Finally, de Gaulle won the recognition he desired and agreed to support the effort. General de Gaulle returned to London from the Eisenhower meeting and made his radio broadcast informing the resistance to support Allied efforts. The British Prime Minister and the Supreme Allied Commander finally dealt with him as the sole authority, just as he demanded all along.

Working along two different tracks, the SFHQ groomed Jedburghs in an effort to gain a decisive military advantage by using the resistance, while the Allied political leadership floundered for a way to agree on the political legitimacy and control of the French resistance. Agreement came only on the eve of the landings and due to SOE/OSS planning, a means existed to implement both military and political goals.

Eisenhower feared the Germans would repel Allied forces back into the sea. All the planning, training, and equipping of history’s largest invasion would prove a monumental disaster. Every possible advantage had to be used and the resistance was one more way to gain advantage. In the swirl of resistance politics, the desire to defeat Nazism, and the personal communications among Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, and Eisenhower, the Jedburghs appeared, almost by accident as a solution to the *political* problem. Their military role was carefully crafted and honed to a keen

³¹ Kimball, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt, Vol III 171. Churchill’s reference to the “liaison officers” may be the French Jedburgh team members.

edge. But, their political role would later prove more important and the pay-off better than expected.

Chapter Two Getting Everything in Place

The Jedburgh teams could not appear from thin air into France. Hollywood often portrays soldiers running around the countryside with no base of support, no training, no air link, no communications and apparently getting along fine. Reality is far different and the Jedburghs required unique logistics. Operating behind enemy lines required local support for food, shelter, transport, and many other tangible items. It also required loyalty and local tacit approval, for if a farmer could not provide a meal, he could at least not inform the enemy. Communications were required, along with practical codes and techniques to keep the information out of the wrong hands. Squadrons of uniquely capable aircraft were necessary to take the teams into France, fly resupply missions, and keep the resistance viably equipped. World War Two airpower concentrated on strategic bombing and air force generals grudgingly gave aircraft for other duties. Moreover, few aircraft were designed to drop men and material while flying, requiring modified bombers, appropriate tactics, and skilled crews. Finally, the men must be sought out, recruited, and trained for a unique and unpredictable mission.

The SOE and later the OSS sent single agents to France who tried to set up resistance networks. Desperate and unsure of themselves, SOE and OSS recruited

various types of people and deployed them into the field. Numerous spies, such as Georges Begué and Pierre de Vomécourt described above, operated inside France by the spring of 1944. These men and women came from all kinds of professions, but all had French connections and volunteered for extremely dangerous work. If they could operate a radio, they were extremely valuable. As Georges Begué began operations in Chateauroux with Philippe de Vomécourt, they contacted trusted friends and relatives, found places to store weapons and ammunition, and began expanding their operations. To honor M. Begué, SOE code named all radio operators George with a number correlating to their deployment sequence. George I and the de Vomécourts started with a friend's mail box, and gave SOE a literal address in France.¹

In 1942, Special Operations Executive saw little progress as their sabotage efforts came to nothing. SOE initiated two new operations, and both proved to be wasted efforts. The first, an effort to insert an Australian, only succeeded in parachuting into a hot drop zone, escaping, and then making it back to England. Whatever his mission was, he never gave it a serious attempt. The second mission for the year, *BOOKMAKER*, went comically awry. Upon jumping out of the aircraft, the two agents became hopelessly separated. Not able to find each other in the dark, and missing each other at the local meeting point, they made for Paris separately. With one agent having the explosives and the other the details on the target, they were unable to accomplish anything alone. Finally finding each other at a Paris safe house, the two rookie agents quarreled fiercely while making their way back to England via a DR route through Spain. Back home, with nothing to show for their efforts, SOE

¹ Marcel Ruby, *F Section, SOE: The Buckmaster Networks* (London: Lee Cooper Ltd, 1988) 59.

released them.²

But during 1943, as SOE matured and merged efforts with the London office of the Office of Strategic Services, operations began to pay off. The intelligence networks and the agents built up a cadre of radio operators and weapons caches. The F and RF sections shifted their emphasis from sabotage to finding specific resistance groups to arm, train, and equip. The Allies sent in more agents, and circuits developed giving London a viable and continued presence. Agents such as Maurice Southgate, developed large circuits extending many miles and the agents became extremely influential in French underground society. Soon the agents determined which resistance group had serious combat potential and which groups were never going to be effective.³

Amédée Maingard de la Ville-ès Offrans, code named *Samuel*, parachuted into southern France with another agent in April, 1943. SOE recruited the Mauritian London accounting student from the 60th Rifles.⁴ Harry Rée parachuted with Maingard from a Royal Air Force Whitley, dropping near Lourdes. Their working area was Indre in central France; however due to so many cells being “burned” by the Gestapo, they were to meet Maurice Southgate near the Spanish border. After missing the drop zone and nearly getting captured in a safe house recently procured by the German Army garrison, Maingard met up with Southgate and sent north to Chateauroux. Over the next year, he aided Southgate in the development of the circuit, organizing reception committees, developing plans, and picking sabotage

² Foot, 90.

³ Ibid., 283.

⁴ Max Hastings, Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France, June, 1944 (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1981) 195.

targets, especially those that complemented the overall invasion.⁵

By August, 1943 twenty-three circuits operated, gathered information, noted possible targets, sent intelligence to London, and collected weapons from *parachutages*, or drop zones, throughout France. They waited impatiently, attempting to fight off their frustration and dodging German counter-intelligence efforts. On May 1, 1944 the Gestapo captured Maurice Southgate and Maingard took command of part of the circuit. The new *SHIPWRIGHT* circuit's responsibility was the area from south of Chateauroux into northern Haute Creuse and west into Vienne. As fate would have it, Maingard prepared the area of operations for Jedburgh Teams HUGH and IAN.⁶

The Americans, late-comers to the war, made the effort to catch up and established their own circuits. But not having the experience, agents, or resources the British did, they were at an extreme disadvantage. Fortunately for the Americans, they found in the British an ally willing to share their expertise. "OSS owed everything to the British services," remarked Henry Hyde, who was in OSS Special Operations, "Training curriculas, communication systems, operating methods, everything-even such technical maters as suitcase wireless sets, one-time pad ciphers, and all manner of devices used by secret services came to us through Menzies' (Chief of British Intelligence) generosity."⁷ OSS-controlled circuits started with Ernest Floge, or *Alfred*, who started SACRISTAN in June, 1943. Parachuting near LeMans,

⁵ E. H. Cookridge, *They Came from the Sky* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co, 1965) 2-20.

⁶ Foot, 381.

⁷ Interview with Henry B. Hyde, Washington D. C. March 11, 1982 as quoted in Brown, 317.

Floge found his way back to the Angers area and his former home. Using trusted friends and his son, he established a viable operation within a few weeks. By January, 1944 the OSS controlled five agents in northern and eastern France, but unfortunately the Gestapo captured two.⁸ Due to their longer running effort, the British retained a dominance, never matched by the United States.

For the French, organized resistance was a vital effort. National pride and fear the British and American intelligence agencies were plotting to control post-war France drove them to make their own missions. Jean Moulin, *Rex*, proved de Gaulle's most politically effective agent. A former Prefect of Chartres who made his way to London and impressed de Gaulle, he became RF section's first agent. He personally carried de Gaulle's orders from London to Paris to rally and unify as much of the resistance as possible. He separated the ones who were merely talkers from those who were able to act. Organizing them into cells of 7 men, he made significant progress and appeared to have unified all non-communist organizations under de Gaulle. Despite operating in France for just three months, he made a significant unifying impact by the time the Gestapo arrested and tortured him to death in June, 1943.⁹

As D-Day approached, de Gaulle feared a general uprising would result in needless bloodshed, accomplishing nothing. De Gaulle demanded one of his agents, Lazare Racheline go to France bearing his orders telling resistance cells they not rise without receiving express orders to do so. However, SOE would not allow it as the Gestapo knew Racheline and would easily recognize him. Moreover, sending him risked D-

⁸ Nigel West, Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization (London: Houghton and Stoughton Ltd, 1992) 218-19.

⁹ Foot, 180-82.

Day information and Britain prohibited him transport. Demonstrating great skill, Racheline managed to go along on a ship with other agents being infiltrated into France. From the coast he made his way to Paris, acquired written acknowledgment of de Gaulle's orders from all the groups, and returned to England just as the Normandy invasion began. When it discovered that Racheline completely outmaneuvered its security, traveled to Paris, and returned, SOE was livid. The British doubted Racheline made the dangerous trip without disclosing D-Day details. But with the various resistance groups now firmly cooperating and the invasion proceeding, they dropped the matter.¹⁰

As for the Maquis, the actions of Germany and Vichy were more unifying than anything the spymasters in London achieved. The obligatory labor service, as described above, filled Maquis ranks and created a heightened resentment. The term "Maquis" first began to refer to resistance groups between January and June of 1943. An Italian-derived word describing the woods and scrubland on Corsica, it apparently caught on as it conveyed a sense of a rural force able to blend in with the terrain.¹¹

Virtually running the rural areas of the country, the Maquis began to collect arms and prepare for the liberation. But large groups of men hiding out for extended periods required support from local inhabitants. For food, shelter, and silence the Maquis repaid local villagers by attacking targets and ingratiating themselves to local concerns. M. P. Lafargue, a Maquis leader in the Lot region stated, "In the absence of organized requisition, the Maquisards had to be fed without alienating the local

¹⁰ Brown, Bodyguard of Lies. 574.

¹¹ Kedward, 29-30.

population on whom we depended for support. We therefore began to ambush lorries of corn, flour, and livestock, particularly if they were part of German convoys-and in that way we could recover some of the French goods exacted as tribute by the occupying forces. . . .”¹²

The resistance destabilized Vichy and demonstrated to the local population Maquis control and Vichy’s impotence. Maquis made Vichy unable to govern by its inability to enforce the STO, control trade, and keep order. After all, keeping order was Pétain’s greatest priority and if he could not accomplish his primary task, what good was he? Even the Germans doubted the validity of Vichy and often fought with local police. On one occasion, the Germans settled what began as a verbal argument with machine guns. The Maquis often pointed to such examples in a further effort to discredit Vichy.¹³

1943 proved a turning point year, with the Allied circuits maturing and the growth of the Maquis, Vichy’s control waned. As German supreme commander in France, Gerd von Rundstedt, remarked after the war, “Not only the murders and acts of sabotage against members of the Wehrmacht, against Wehrmacht installations, railways, and supply lines were on the increase, but in certain districts, organized raids of gangs in uniform and civilian clothes on transports and military units multiplied . . . By the [end of 1943] it was already impossible to dispatch single members of the Wehrmacht, ambulances, couriers, or supply columns without armed protection to the 1st or 99th Army in the south of France.”¹⁴

¹² Georges Cazard, Capitaine Philippe (Coueslant: Cahors, 1950) 90. As quoted in Kedward, 47.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁴ Foot, 233.

From March 1941 to September 1944, SOE started 89 circuits and even though the Germans captured many men and women, the Allies achieved their ultimate goal. In June 1944, 47 circuits existed ready to provide a forum of operations, men, and logistical support for the Jedburghs. Success came at a price as the Germans killed 46 of the circuit leaders. During the entire war the Germans captured dozens of other spies, many meeting their fate in German concentration camps.¹⁵ 480 agents in all were secreted into France by SOE, OSS, and de Gaulle's intelligence organization Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (BCRA).¹⁶ As M. R. D. Foot writes, by D-Day "SOE's tentacles reached into practically every part of France, and only along the eastern border, from Sedan through Metz to Strasbourg and Mulhouse, were SOE's forces weak or non-existent. . . ."¹⁷ Without the Allies' expressed intention of doing so, they created the foundation for the Jedburghs.

With agents going in and out of France, aircraft dropping supplies, and intelligence to send London, reliable communications had to be established. The technology was limited, but the Allies found two different communications means to overcome the challenge. The first being the radio or wireless transmitter (W/T), and the second method was the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). The key person in any circuit was the radio operator and his or her ability to communicate meant the difference between life and death. News of a circuit being discovered, a traitor agent, or an

¹⁵ Ibid., 518-19. Foot lists 53 SOE women agents. For more information see Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS by Elizabeth P. Macintosh and Sisters in the Resistance: How Women Fought to Free France, 1940-1945 by Margaret Collins Weitz.

¹⁶ Cookridge, 3. Nigel West disputes the Foot and Cookridge figures as they did not include agents recruited in France but only those sent into France from the United Kingdom. West, 105-06.

¹⁷ Foot, 389.

incoming *parachutages*, were key and if the agents were incommunicado, things went terribly wrong. Secure communications were more critical for the Jedburgh teams as they had direct military responsibilities regarding OVERLORD.

Unfortunately, the Germans quickly realized they could triangulate the signal and locate the radio. Directional Finding vans would appear in a neighborhood and with soldiers ready to arrest whoever sent the signal. In large cities finding the exact room radio signals emanated from was more difficult. To help them home in, they would switch the power off in the city section by section and when the signal stopped they knew where the radio was. Radio operators soon learned broadcasting short messages meant better security and made it more difficult for the Germans to discover their location.¹⁸

However, even short messages sooner or later gave away their location and they stayed on the move. But moving required more and more secure locations to broadcast, a process taking hours with a large amounts of data to encode and decode. To alleviate the amount of messages to send or receive, Georges Begué came up with the idea of *messages personnels* over the BBC. The Allies broadcast Pre-arranged phrases, poems, or sentences meaning something only to the person receiving the message. Thus began the nightly broadcast by BBC announcers with their seemingly endless nonsense, but to resistance cells they became orders or news of friends and comrades. To the circuit leaders it could be confirmation of an incoming flight or a parachuted weapons delivery.¹⁹

To further aid aircraft in getting to their drop zones, the Allies developed and

¹⁸ Ruby, 63.

¹⁹ Foot, 162.

parachuted S-phones to the resistance. An S-phone could transmit voice radio signals in a secure way from the operator to the airplane. But with a range of only eight to ten miles, and special training required, the Maquis rarely used the device. The French resistance had little interest in such an odd contraption and went for the rifles, ammunition, and money instead, leaving the strange radio idle. If the Maquis were properly trained, the device may have prevented many agents and materials from being parachuted miles off target.²⁰

Instead, guiding aircraft to a drop zone was more primitive. Four men using electric torches, formed a large "L" and signaled when they heard the sound of the aircraft. The reception party signaled a previously agreed upon morse letter, and the aircraft dropped the load over the "L" and flew on to another location, dropping leaflets in an effort to make the Germans believe propaganda was the plane's only mission.²¹

The Jedburghs deployed with a suitcase sized radio, if it survived the parachute drop. Powered by a six volt battery and British made, the radio's range reached London. All the team members trained in morse code, in case the W/T operator was killed or captured. However, the W/T required a high level of skill when operating under combat conditions. Not only did one need to be an expert at morse code, but also be deft with coding and decoding. To quickly code morse messages the Jedburghs used such things "one time pads." A "one time pad" had a set of letters five across and five down so the operator could overlay the normal alphabet on the pad,

²⁰ Ibid., 84-86.

²¹ Foot, 83.

giving him a new order of letters. Discarded after one use, the operator would then use the next code sheet. A simple code for the Germans to break, but only if used twice.²² By June 6, 1944 over 150 wireless transmitters operated inside France carrying the vital circuit communications and most Jedburgh teams deployed with two W/T sets.

Modern war brought a new tool for Special Operations - the airplane. But airpower thinkers' focused on strategic bombing, not sneaking behind enemy lines and parachuting men and supplies. Initial efforts to convert bombers for special operations ran up against many challenges, not the least of which was the unwillingness of the Royal Air Force to provide aircraft. In August 1941, SOE operated only sixteen aircraft from Newmarket Racecourse. The British used Halifaxes, Whitleys, and single engine Lysanders, with the Lysander being the only aircraft truly designed for SOE. A high-wing monoplane, stripped of arms and equipped with an auxiliary fuel tank, the plane could fly 450 miles and carry four passengers. It proved extremely valuable due to its ability to land in short, unimproved fields, and provided the required flexibility but could not be used for parachute operations. Lysanders flew to pick up and drop off passengers and equipment, and with the engine running, take on passengers and cargo for the trip home.²³

Flying special operations missions required very different tactics and procedures from massed strategic bombing. Flying high daylight massed formations would not suffice when clandestinely parachuting people and equipment. A single night time

²² William Thompson, interview with author, January 14, 1999; and Foot, 102.

²³ Foot, 75-89.

flying low altitude mission was necessary, requiring re-fitting aircraft and different training for air crews. Initial mission success rate was a disappointing 45%. The problems stemmed from poor navigation, weather, low fog, and/or no reception committee near the drop zone.²⁴ Of course the air crews contended with Luftwaffe night fighters as well, and endeavored to fool German radar by flying with bombing formations until required to break off to their target area. And according to one SOE officer, the “moon was a goddess,” as the moon’s phases directed air operations. Aircraft could not land without some moon and parachuting operations were best when the moon was at half or better, so with the moon down, the resistance could not expect any *parachutages*.²⁵

Despite the obstacles, the RAF pressed ahead and developed its capabilities. By November 1942, SOE operated twenty-seven aircraft and accomplished ninety-three sorties. Delivered to France were agents or “Joes,” and twenty-three tons of weapons and supplies. Operations stepped up considerably during 1943 and by flying 615 sorties they delivered 214 “Joes” and 578 tons of weapons and supplies. American efforts from the United Kingdom were still nil. However, from the Mediterranean theater, the United States flew ten sorties delivering nine “Joes” and eight tons.²⁶

The Americans decided to get their air power involved in late 1943. Colonel C. S. Vanderblue, commander of the European Theater, Office of Strategic Services sent a letter proposing the creation of two squadrons to supply European resistance groups. Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the United States Army, European

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 87.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 473.

Theater of Operations, approved the concept within a week, but it took more than two months before the 8th Air Force's commanding officer General Ira C. Eaker, designated two squadrons and created the "Carpetbagger" project. A memo dated 30 December, 1943 gave OSS operational control of the aircraft, but 8th Air Force retained a measure of administrative control. SOE set out missions each moon period and 8th Bomber Command detailed a liaison officer to approve them.²⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Clifford Heflin commanded the 801st Bomb Group or "Carpetbaggers." Relieved from flying anti-submarine missions, Heflin and other officers were reassigned to fly modified B-24 bombers. Heflin joined the Army immediately after graduating from Fresno State in 1939 and received his commission the same year. With the onset of war he won quick promotions and at Twenty-nine, he took command of two squadrons each maintaining 16 aircraft.²⁸

However, all was not ready for operations. The crews, unfamiliar with the correct flying procedures had to spend a month flying with British crews. Moreover, the required facilities were not ready at Alconbury, nor did Alconbury possess adequate room so the Carpetbaggers moved to Harrington in Northamptonshire.²⁹ Also the B-24s required several changes to make them OSS mission ready. The two waist gun positions were eliminated saving weight, and the aircraft painted black to elude search lights. Mechanics removed the bottom machine gun turret and the space converted to a "Joe hole" covered by a round plywood center hinged door. They

²⁷ Ben Parnell, Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1987) 2; and OSS/SO London microfilm Vol. 12, 137-8.

²⁸ OSS/SO London microfilm Vol. 11, 9.

²⁹ Parnell, 12.

placed reinforced static line points above the "Joe hole" with a static line long enough for eight parachutists. The bombardier and navigator required more room to work, so they removed all unnecessary equipment. Next, the Carpetbaggers installed green and red jump signal lights, and static lines in the bomb bay for dropping cargo. To aid navigation crews trained in celestial, dead-reckoning, pilotage, and radio navigation. The bombardier became a second navigator, a waist gunner became the "Joe" dispatcher, and the pilot, co-pilot, engineer, radio operator, and tail gunner filled out the rest, for a total of eight. Crews trained to drop "joes" at an altitude of 600 feet traveling 125 to 135 miles per hour. Any higher and the person would land off target, any lower and the chute would not have time to deploy.³⁰

Rigging and packing all the weapons, fuel, ammunition, leaflets, radios, and personnel chutes required a special facility close to Harrington. Approximately one hundred men worked at the facility and during the first quarter of 1944 they packed 2,348 containers and the second quarter they packed 13,071 containers and 8,323 personnel chutes. By D-Day, French resistance received 7,404 containers filled with explosives, light machine guns, pistols, carbines, anti-tank weapons, and grenades.³¹ The standard drop consisted of twelve containers with the following supplies: six Brens with 1,000 rounds, 36 rifles with 150 rounds, twenty-seven stens with 300 rounds per gun, five pistols with 50 rounds per weapon, fifty-two grenades with eighteen pounds of plastic explosives, 156 field dressings, 6,600 9mm rounds, 3,168 .303 rounds, and 40 empty magazines. If more containers were dropped to the same drop zone, they contained more ammunition, not weapons.³²

³⁰ Parnell, 15-28.

³¹ OSS/SO London microfilm, Vol. 6, 84.

Not satisfied with merely a two squadron effort, SHAEF sought more aircraft. In January 1944, the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF) received a strongly worded letter complaining about the lack of support.³³ Both Churchill and Roosevelt became concerned about the possible poor perception caused by lagging arms deliveries. Anxious, General Donovan believed if the French resistance regarded the United States and Britain poorly, the Jedburghs' viability would suffer.³⁴ On February 11, 1944 Eisenhower signed a Donovan drafted cable to Eaker saying, "Believe it extremely important from viewpoint our government that United States participate as fully as possible this program and that anything you can do to expedite delivery of modified planes necessary for this purpose will be of great assistance."³⁵ A phone call between Major General Bull, Director of Operations for SHAEF, and General Spaatz, 8th Air Force Commander, resulted in no more American aircraft devoted to SOE/SO. General Spaatz refused to degrade the strategic bombing effort so the two discussed the possibility of having planes perform conventional bombing missions during the non-moon period and then make them available for special operations sorties. However, the time and effort required to convert the bombers to special operations and back to bombing, made it impractical.³⁶ The OSS received no more than their already assigned two squadrons.

But while the higher headquarters tried to solve a problem of too little support to the resistance, the Carpetbaggers and their British counterparts apparently delivered

³² Foot, 475.

³³ SHAEF SGS microfilm reel 12, frame 645.

³⁴ Brown, 525.

³⁵ SHAEF, SGS microfilm reel 52, frame 1030.

³⁶ SHAEF, SGS microfilm reel 52, frame 1063.

more than current circuits could hide. The SOE/SO March report to SHAEF related if deliveries increased, the Allied French resistance groups had to absorb most of the additional supplies. Up to March, the *parachutages* concentrated on areas under the control of F section and the British controlled resistance. However by the May report, little difference exists as the F and RF sections appear to be receiving supplies based on the health of their circuit, not political alignment. The next month, the airdrop reports no longer distinguish tonnage by their SOE affiliation.³⁷ It no longer mattered. By June, 1944 the British and American efforts delivered 1,895 tons of weapons and supplies on 1,269 sorties. More than half of the total sorties flown were between April and June, 1944.³⁸ Now up to the task, the air forces could deploy and re-supply the Jedburgh led resistance.

SFHQ dropped over 10,000 sten machine guns into France during June. It also dropped nearly 65,000 grenades, over 5600 rifles, 932 bazookas, and delivered over sixty tons of explosives to the resistance. Delivering these weapons took 918 night sorties, 667 SFHQ considered successful. And for the first time, daylight drops occurred, flown by 180 B-17s on June 25, 1944. The daylight missions scored a ninety-eight percent success rate, while the nighttime drops were considered seventy-two percent successful.³⁹ Costs were high however, and by the end of 1944 the Carpetbaggers lost eighteen aircraft with one hundred and thirteen officers and men missing in action, one officer held prisoner and nineteen killed in action.⁴⁰

³⁷ SHAEF, SGS microfilm reel 12, frames 588-616.

³⁸ Foot, 473.

³⁹ SHAEF, SGS microfilm, reel 12, frames 571-72.

⁴⁰ OSS/SO London microfilm, Vol. 6, 86.

Bombing French railways, canals, and factories had an unexpected, but natural effect upon the resistance. A SHAEF intelligence summary related how resistance sabotage could be more effective than allied bombing and had the added bonus of reducing or eliminating bomb damage on unintended targets. Known as "blackmail" targets, circuits passed the word to plant management for example, which specific piece of equipment should be sabotaged. If the local French manager did not wish to comply, French labor unions would pass the word through their organization what to do. If still nothing happened, the plant would be bombed. Many times, it worked the other way, with the resistance offering to sabotage machinery in order to keep the bombers away. Of one hundred and one French targets such as aircraft plants, refineries, and railroads, eleven of them were "Blackmailed" into destruction.⁴¹

Brimming with air dropped weapons, what was the Maquis to do? A SHAEF directive to SFHQ dated March 23, 1944 delineated assignments for the resistance. The first objective was to bring "about the conditions in Europe considered essential to the success of invasion operations." Specifically mentioned were German air forces and harassment of German units to decrease morale. Next, they were to inflict damage on communication lines and finally to prepare for action in concert with OVERLORD. SFHQ took SHAEF's targeting directive and developed more detailed plans. Plan Violet concerned communications and Plan Green concentrated on railroads. London conveyed many creative ideas to the Maquis, including such things as switching or tearing down road signs, pushing thumbtacks into signal cables, pouring sugar into fuel tanks, and having railway workers fail to switch and properly

⁴¹ SHAEF, SGS microfilm, reel 21, frame 1305; and OSS/SO London microfilm, Vol. 1, 47-52.

direct traffic. SFHQ specifically targeted major city communications hoping to paralyze enemy message traffic from the invasion's first moment. Choosing 1,153 railway targets, SFHQ prepared attack plans and considered which groups might be available to carry out the mission. However, in a March report to SHAEF, 248 of the targets were considered "doubtful" due to arrests and fear the information was compromised. The Allies constantly weighed the benefits of including the resistance in advance planning vice losing the information to the Gestapo.⁴²

As explained in the previous chapter, Eisenhower highlighted railroads and roads he wanted to attack. The 2nd SS Panzer Division's route north from Montauban was first, followed by the way north from Bordeaux where the 11th Panzer Division was refitting. SHAEF wanted traffic on adjoining roads attacked next impeding, harassing, and delaying the tanks, as their introduction into Normandy could quickly turn momentum back to the Germans. Orders were to be given via the BBC action messages making the attack a coordinated series of events rather than a melee. The directive also mentioned attacking enemy telecommunications, forcing the Germans to use compromised radio communications. Guerrilla action supporting these aims "is requested, at all times, to develop maximum guerilla [sic] activity in SOUTH FRANCE consistent with this priority." SHAEF guidance reinforced the security importance of invasion plans, "particularly so far as any pre-D day operations of Jedburghs are concerned,"⁴³ emphasizing as mentioned above that no Jedburghs would deploy sooner than one day before D-Day.

⁴² SHAEF, SGS microfilm, reel 5, frames 1096-98; Brown, 567, 648; and SHAEF, SGS microfilm, reel 12, frame 614.

⁴³ SHAEF, SGS microfilm, reel 52, frames 847-850.

The best way to prevent an armed but useless Maquis was to have a solid corps of well trained Jedburghs. First, the men must be found who could operate behind enemy lines, speak French, parachute, and show the ability to operate independently. Every team needed a parachute qualified W/T operator showing great skill at morse code. A September 1st, 1943 OSS London memo asked OSS Washington for forty-four staff officers, fifty officers fluent in French, and fifty enlisted W/T operators. Washington viewed recruiting Jedburghs more important than any other requirement and refrained from recruiting for other units until they filled all Jedburgh positions. OSS believed French speaking junior officers the most difficult qualification, so they focused their search on New York, New Orleans, and the Fort Benning paratrooper school where they believed more qualified officers existed. The OSS communications branch searched for the W/T operators and the Operational Groups assisted in finding and training the officers. The OSS posted signs at Fort Benning asking for French speaking officers willing to operate behind enemy lines and by the end of November, OSS filled the requirement.⁴⁴

Jedburgh candidates received orders to Washington, D. C. with the guidance to leave the train station and find a cab. The recruits then told the driver to drop them at a certain corner, then wait to be picked up by an OSS car. The OSS recruiter stressed how secret their assignment was and to tell no one the nature of their reporting instructions. Evidently the procedure was not subtle enough for one cab driver. When a few recruits asked the driver to drop them off at the right corner he said, "Oh,

⁴⁴ United States War Department, Strategic Services Unit, History Project, Vol. 1, The War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), with a new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York: Walker and Co., 1976) 210, hereafter cited as WDSSUHP.

you're those OSS guys!"⁴⁵ Much to the Jedburgh recruit's delight, the training area was The Congressional Country Club in the Maryland hills near the present day Camp David. The Jedburghs trained in small arms, and self-defense, took psychological tests, and trained in room-by-room combat with human like targets. The golf course became their running track, the woods served as survival training areas, while they lived in the best quarters any had ever seen. Later, the W/T operators trained at another OSS camp in the nearby Pennsylvanian woods before rejoining the officers overseas.⁴⁶

Fifty-five Jedburgh candidates left New York and arrived in Glasgow, Scotland on December 23, 1943. From there they traveled to Arisaig, Scotland for further training and evaluation. The instructors took trainees on cross-country hikes in the rugged Scottish hills, small arms training, hand-to-hand combat as well as going down to Stodham Park, England in three, one week cycles for more psychological testing. After the mental tests determined how the subject handled stress and emotional strain, the instructors told him he failed. By observing how the man handled rejection, and the other aspects of the test, examiners measured his strength of character and will power.⁴⁷

Those who made it past the evaluations proceeded to Milton Hall for final training and team selection. The large Milton Hall estate, four miles north of Peterborough, England, became the main Jedburgh training and holding area. A large

⁴⁵ Thompson, interview.

⁴⁶ Thompson interview; and William B. Dreux, No Bridges Blown, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971) 11-19.

⁴⁷ Wyman W. Irwin, "A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of Operation OVERLORD," MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991, 119-121; and West, 268.

country manor with many rooms for billets and offices, Her Majesty's government acquired the estate and scheduled it for use by January 1, 1944. The W/T operators joined the officers after three weeks radio training at Henley-on-Thames, west of London. Almost all the Jedburghs were at Milton Hall by February 1, and started more training in demolition, map reading and field craft, German and Allied small arms, guerrilla tactics, German tactics, reception committee work, anti-tank mines, street fighting, motor cycle and car driving, German Army vehicle and equipment recognition, and more physical training. Jedburgh commanders and seconds-in-command received a general history of resistance movements in north-west Europe, ways to utilize the resistance, functions of Jedburghs, first-aid, practical wireless training, French geography, and observation and memory training. SFHQ scheduled training to be completed by April 1st.⁴⁸

Unfortunately, Milton Hall was not ready for the officers so temporary training sites were found at Fairford, Gumley Hall, and Walsingham. All Jedburghs visited one final training school prior going to their designated home, parachute school at Altrincham, Manchester. Even the men already parachute qualified attended the training as jumping out of the B-24 "Joe hole" varied enough to require familiarization. The school scheduled three jumps; the first two would be daylight jumps from a balloon at 700 feet and the third jump would be a night jump from 500 feet. For the seventeen-year-old Prince Michel de Bourbon de Parme, parachute training proved trying. While waiting for the proper command before parachuting from the balloon American W/T operator Bill Thompson, de Bourbon, and the British

⁴⁸ OSS/SO London microfilm, Vol. 12, 42-3.

instructor lost their balance from unexpected winds causing the Prince to fall out. Descending toward the earth, the Prince yelled to his instructor, "I'm sorry!" and the British officer calmly replied, "That's all right chap, don't bother to come back."⁴⁹

Milton Hall finally became available for Jedburgh use the first week in February, 1944. The British modified the old mansion for classrooms, offices, billets and set up temporary buildings for NCO housing. Beginning in late January the French soldiers arrived, but they were not all there until March. OSS and SOE recruiters made a concerted recruiting effort through North Africa, the Middle East, the United States; and one French Jedburgh even came from Guatemala. The 70 French Jeds began to mix with the rest, and curiously politics were rarely discussed. The factions gripping French society and crippling French unified action failed to have any impact on these soldiers. One French Jedburgh remarked, "they were professional soldiers and didn't think much about politics." Apparently, de Gaulle knew about the French Jeds but never visited Milton Hall, nor did any of his generals.⁵⁰

However, an Washington OSS civilian did visit Milton Hall late on a Friday afternoon forcing delay of their weekend pass. The British commandant of Milton Hall, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Spooner, was an unpopular man and was about to be embarrassed in front of the distinguished visitor. Prior to the visit the American Jeds started a tradition showing when they believed superiors ordered them to do something stupid. An officer arrived late to a formation and the British NCO asked the officer to drop and do fifty pushups. The officer counted them off in front of the

⁴⁹ Irwin, 124; and Thompson interview.

⁵⁰ Irwin, 124; and Joseph de Francesco, telephone conversation with author, 3 March, 1999.

formation and getting to punishment's end counted, "48, 49, 50," got on his feet and said, "some shit!" The group laughed and in short order it became a sign of Jedburgh indignation where one in a group would yell, "48!" another chimed in "49!" a third "50!" and all yelled, "Some Shit!" The innocent and surprised Washington visitor heard such a cheer and dropped his speech on the platform. Lieutenant Colonel Spooner let out a characteristic snort in shock and disappointment. He was replaced shortly afterward by British Lieutenant Colonel G. Richard Musgrave.⁵¹ The Jedburghs were an unconventional unit, not afraid to speak their minds.

SFHQ trained the teams under conditions as realistic as possible. The commandant and staff conducted field exercises simulating working behind enemy lines. Exercise SPARTAN, conducted in March 1943 with SOE and elements of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers acting as partisans, demonstrated the need for further thinking on how the conventional forces could communicate and use resistance forces. SHAEF and SFHQ made plans to have a Special Forces Detachment assigned to each numbered army and army group headquarters and also have the Jedburghs parachute at least forty miles behind enemy lines. Now with the Jedburghs training at Milton Hall, they conducted similar exercises, but on a smaller scale and always trying to achieve realism.⁵²

One more thing remained prior to deployment, creating the teams. SFHQ allowed them to "get married," in other words they would chose their own team mates. Over the remaining time before D-Day, the Jedburgh officers paired up and then selected their W/T operator. Training together since January, many of them had

⁵¹ Dreux, 58-59; and Thompson interview.

⁵² S. J. Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991) 5-6.

the opportunity to form friendships and learn who they could trust.⁵³ Soon they would be in combat, and despite the rigorous training, none knew what to expect. "Jedburgh teams are in no sense suicide squads, but valuable units whose recovery is an integral part of the S.O.E./S.O. plan," stated a SFHQ Jedburgh directive. However, one Jed, Bernard Knox deployed with an ominous feeling. As he went by the supply checkout to sign for his equipment and weapons, the supply officer did not believe it mattered if he signed the form showing receipt for the supplies. He believed Knox would not return, so his signature was irrelevant. Captain Knox did not agree, nor appreciate the negative assessment.⁵⁴

⁵³ Thompson interview; de Francesco telephone conversation; Daphne Friele, telephone conversation with author, 2 March, 1999; and Mamie Gauthier, telephone conversation with author, 6 March, 1999.

⁵⁴ OSS/SO London microfilm. Vol. 12, 40; and Brown, 612.

Chapter Three

The Jedburghs Deploy to France

As Allied forces invaded Normandy, Milton Hall became the holding place for seventy-five trained Jedburgh teams while an additional fifteen teams departed for Algeria. The teams positioned in Algeria were detailed to Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC), SFHQ's counter-part in Mediterranean Command. SPOC supported Operation ANVIL in its invasion of southern France set to commence in August, 1944. Surprised, most Jedburghs heard of the D-Day invasion while on an exercise in Leicestershire, England and were tremendously disappointed they had not deployed prior to the invasion. They all possessed a great desire to get into the fight but orders came slowly, far too slowly for these men. Milton Hall Jedburghs were "near mutiny" as the warning and deployment orders for each team arrived sluggishly. By the end of June, only thirteen Jedburgh teams operated in France. During July there were twenty-five teams operating in France and seventy-nine teams by the end of August.

Alerted teams received their warning orders, traveled to London for their mission brief, and proceeded either to Harrington or Tempsford Airfields for their parachute drop. While at the airfield, the team remained sequestered after donning their gear and parachutes. When the time came, they waddled out to the aircraft as anonymous "Joes" over loaded with parachute, pistol, carbine, rations, ammunition, binoculars, maps, and other required gear. Strapped into the aircraft, they flew across the English

Channel, often encountering flak while the aircrew attempted to find the drop zone and receive the reception party's authentication signal.¹

The following are short histories of the four teams: HUGH, IAN, GEORGE, and GILES. Studying these teams brings out different aspects of the Jedburgh's political role in their military missions. Also, the teams interacted with various resistance groups and confronted distinct military situations. HUGH and IAN operated in the former unoccupied zone while GEORGE and GILES operated in regions of France occupied since 1940. Comparing the first two teams with the last two demonstrates the difference in the political environment depending on whether an area was under Vichy or German control.

Team HUGH Goes into Action

When Churchill told FDR, that de Gaulle had "not a single soldier in the great battle now developing" the Prime Minister was right, de Gaulle had not one French soldier but *two*. Alerted and deployed first, Team HUGH parachuted north of Chateauroux the night of 6/7 June, 1944. Captain William Crawshay, a 24 year-old British Army officer with North African SOE experience, led the team. Captain Louis L'Helgouach, using the nom-de-guerre Louis Legrand, a regular Colonial Army officer served as the French team officer and French Army Lieutenant Rene Meyer, using the nom-de-guerre Rene Mersioul, served as the team's W/T operator. A former cavalry officer found during the North African OSS/SOE recruiting drive, L'Helgouach served

¹ Lewis, 1, 12-13; de Francesco telephone conversation; and A. L. Funk, Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the Landing in Southern France, 1944 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992) 32. Determining such matters as what team to deploy, when, and where was done by SFHQ whose archives unfortunately remain classified by the British Defense Ministry.

in the Spahi, but now found himself parachuting into the Indre night representing the French high command. Also on the British Halifax parachuting into the area was the Special Air Services (SAS) mission BULLBASKET. Ordered to operate independently of team HUGH, the SAS team regrouped and made toward Poitiers while team HUGH set out to find the local resistance leader code named *Ellipse*. Immediately upon landing, SFHQ received the message "All arrived safely with all containers and equipment. One rucksack destroyed. Send another immediately."² Finally, the Jedburghs were in the war.

SFHQ ordered team HUGH to work through Amédée Maingard or *SAMUEL*, and use his *SHIPWRIGHT* circuit to help organize a base of operations for the SAS mission, report the state of regional resistance forces, and consult with local resistance concerning the possibilities of working with other Maquis groups. Briefed on the priority railroad lines, it was to concentrate efforts on the Bordeaux - Tours and the Limoges - Chateauroux lines. Two W/T sets dropped with the Jedburghs, along with their standard kit of equipment, and 250,000 French Francs and \$150 spread among the team. Prior to departure, intelligence briefed the team on the enemy order of battle, location and defense of an enemy airdrome, police and Gestapo locations, local curfew and travel restrictions, area topography, and a list of Allied agents operating in Indre. Team HUGH narrowly missed landing in a wooded area and they found its equipment scattered over a distance of two kilometers. However, with only one rucksack destroyed, it quickly gathered its gear and held a meeting with

² Elizabeth Crawshay, letter to author, July 29, 1998; de Francesco telephone conversation; Mendelsohn, 17-21; Hastings, 192-4.

SAMUEL, and the local Armée Secrète leader “Surcouf.”³


The SAS commander, Captain John Tonkin, Maingard, Surcouf, and Team HUGH decided the most effective division of tasks was for the SAS team to move off toward Poitiers where it could keep the Bordeaux - Tours railroad line cut and the Maquis would try and keep the railway around Chateauroux inoperative. On D-Day, the Jedburghs helped Maingard receive an airdrop and the next day inspected several resistance groups in the region. HUGH met more Maquis leaders “Robert,” “Achille,” “Duplix,” and saw hundreds of men turn out to greet their arrival. On June 7th HUGH Radioed to London, “toured 100 kilometers without sight of enemy. Population enthusiastic. Whole area practically controlled by resistance group. . . Maquis groups have doubled in 48 hours.” HUGH asked for three more Jedburgh teams to train and control the Maquis’ swelling ranks and stated they could, “ensure permanent cut Toulouse railway.” SFHQ joyfully replied, “number one excellent work” but warned of being overwhelmed by Maquis “undesirables” and feared too many resistance members congregating in one locale might give the Germans an easy target. HUGH replied that limiting recruits was impossible and reiterated its immediate requirement for more Jedburgh teams and weapons. Such requests, continuing throughout HUGH’s mission, met only with frustration. SFHQ sent only one, deploying Team HAMISH on the night of 12/13 June, but by then the Wehrmacht stepped up “counter-terrorist” activities and reinforced the area, as well as Chateauroux making HUGH’s efforts much more difficult.⁴

Staying on minor roads, the team moved to La Chatre on the 7th and by the 9th


³ Mendelsohn, 18-21 and 84-85.

⁴ Ibid., 22 and 85-86.

it surveyed the area around Le Blanc. Having covered a large area south of Chateauroux, Maingard decided to leave the region to Team HUGH and move west to Vienne. Exhausted and getting only six hours sleep in the first five days, the team now settled into its role of working with the local Armée Secrète (AS). HUGH received HAMISH on the 13th of June 50 miles southwest of Chateauroux and decided to let HAMISH take the area around Le Chatre and the upper Indre river valley southeast of Chateauroux due to its reliable resistance. HUGH decided to train and equip the Maquis in other parts of Indre.⁵



Team HUGH's Area of Operations June 6 - September 22, 1944



By mid-June HUGH found itself embroiled in resistance politics. F Section armed only the FTP in the region before HUGH's arrival and now the AS wished to

⁵ Ibid., 87-88.

organize and be armed in order to get at the Germans. With approximately 1400 men in the region, the AS was inadequately armed, but growing and anxious to fight. The ORA leader, Colonel Martel, did not consider his men ready for combat, nor the situation right even if they were. Already, Maquis with more courage than intelligence were killed foolishly attacking well-armed, well-trained Germans. A German attack defeating in detail a Maquis group would severely lower morale and the growth of other groups in the area, so HUGH worked to prevent such occurrences. They also needed to define clearly their role in the eyes of the local resistance.⁶

Team HUGH, and the various leaders of the resistance held a meeting at Mézières-en-Brenne, 35 miles west of Chateauroux, to iron out command and mission issues. After failing to achieve agreement a few days before, they all came to a mutual understanding. The ORA relinquished its demand to command all Indre resistance and instead placed themselves under the AS chief and agreed to organize into mobile battalions. So called, "static elements" would be commanded by sector chiefs and a third category organized as individuals having arms in their homes but remained in their normal jobs. All agreed that if necessary they would fall back into the Creuse area south-east of Indre where the terrain offered more protection. Five days later, two more days of talks including the FTP and *Ellipse* at HUGH's headquarters solidified the command lines but *Ellipse* wanted to carry out guerrilla action immediately in order to instill spirit in his men. L'Helgouach and Crawshay thought the time was not good for such action. London agreed and HUGH's status in the eyes of all the Maquis rose. Telegraphed to SFHQ on June 26th, HUGH reported that the

⁶ Ibid., 88-89.

successful conferences, "Plan of action decided. Training centre for cadres agreed. Pupils from F.F.I., F.T.P., arriving tomorrow. All keen on Jedburgh teams," but added warily, "F.T.P. rather sticky." Three weeks after parachuting into France the team finally defined their mission with the local Maquis.⁷

Radio messages during June reveal HUGH's frustration with SFHQ for many things, such as not receiving requested supplies, unrealistic SFHQ requests regarding HUGH's control of resistance, and the general belief HUGH arrived in the field too late to positively impact events. HUGH also reported various intelligence such as the presence of enemy aircraft, numbers of Germans, presence of milice, finding a handful of Allied airmen and escaped Allied prisoners, and small fire-fights with the casualty numbers. But overall, no major offensive actions took place due to HUGH's effective use of its position as the link to SHAEF, and therefore no needless loss of life occurred. HUGH realized the waste of impetuous action and maintained effective control in order to train and fight when ready. Successes were limited to approximately 600 railroad cuts and minor harassing of enemy convoys.⁸

Unfortunately, the Germans did not allow much time. In Vienne, west of Indre, the uncontrolled Maquis quickly liberated towns only to flee hours later pursued by elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Das Reich Division. The SAS mission BULLBASKET operated in uniform, independently of Maquis and went from place to place in their jeeps. As a result of their less than subtle methods they were ambushed and many killed. Unhinged, many Maquis retreated into Indre bringing the Germans immediately behind.⁹

⁷ Ibid., 25 and 89-91.

⁸ Ibid., 21-25 and 64.

While HUGH trained the Maquis they also received a great deal of weapons and ammunition via air drops so by 10 July when, according to HUGH, "2000 SS and several hundred Miliciens" entered Indre from the southwest and attacked, they were ready. The battle raged from mid-morning until into the afternoon when the French made an orderly withdrawal after "killing at least 20 Germans and Miliciens" including the Poitiers militia commander. Another two Maquis companies retreated under heavy pressure from the enemy, bringing the Germans right into HUGH's headquarters and giving HUGH the unfortunate duty of conducting an orderly retreat. Summing up the action for a headquarters message HUGH stated that the enemy, "Having occupied Belabre yesterday, ordered Mayor to line up 150 men on square to be shot but refrained at last moment." Threatening to return, they looted the town and left. The battle resulted in 30 Maquis and 44 enemy dead. HUGH believed Indre resistance proved much better than those from Vienne and stated in its final report, "The repression column was brought upon us by the carelessness of the Maquis from the Vienne, who had withdrawn on to us without due attention to security, and concealment."¹⁰

A long awaited Jedburgh team deployed on July 11, 1944 to Haute Vienne region, landing five miles south of HUGH's headquarters. SFHQ did not inform HUGH of its intended deployment and ANDY parachuted into the middle of a "Boche operation." Both team ANDY's officers broke bones during the drop and according to HUGH's message, only nearly averted a "catastrophe." Exasperated, HUGH asked SFHQ why they were not informed of ANDY's impending arrival and drop zone.

⁹ Hastings, 180-209; and Mendelsohn, 91-93.

¹⁰ Mendelsohn, 66 and 93.

“Negus [the village] is most unsafe, well known for miles around,” and continued to convey their disgust by saying, “This unsatisfactory drop need not have occurred. Team now great liability.” There is no record of a SFHQ reply.¹¹

The necessity to travel extensively required the team to be always on its guard. On July 20th, for example, they were in a cafe south of Mézières meeting with resistance leader Lieutenant Prince Joachim Murat. As Murat stepped out of the cafe, shots erupted from a German armored vehicle killing him. Crawshay, and L’Helgouach escaped out the back. The final report stated “numerous hairbreadth escapes” occurred but were not included in their daily communications. Radio reports to SFHQ briefly told of enemy troop movements, casualty reports, rumors of activities regarding other Jedburgh teams, suggested air force targets, and requested airdrops and supplies. HUGH sent two to six messages a day, with SFHQ usually broadcasting once or less per day.¹²

HUGH dealt with three major political resistance organizations, the Communist FTP, the Gaullist AS, and Délégué Militaire backed by de Gaulle and the British. Their varied interests proved a constant hindrance to unified action. However, according to HUGH, the team deftly handled the situation: “Wherever there was political trouble HUGH made a point of taking the bull by the horns.” The FTP resented regular French army officers participating in operations, the French Army thought it unwise to arm the FTP, and the AS proved suspicious of British Intelligence gaining influence. HUGH maintained its status by placing itself “on a pedestal

¹¹ Ibid., 66.

¹² Ibid., 94 and 64 - 70.

as direct representatives of General Eisenhower and General Koenig.” Next it added, “In this connection orders were usually thrust into London’s mouth” and won over the three leaders by appealing to everyone’s desire to defeat Germany.¹³

Confidence with the Jedburghs was so high that by the first week in August, the resistance agreed to recognize HUGH as their overall commander for Indre, Cher, and Indre et Loire. All the factions realized their effectiveness increased when they acted united and in SHAEF’s and General Koenig’s name. HUGH symbolized such an arrangement and despite Crawshay’s mere twenty-four years, he and Captain L’Helgouach now commanded four to five thousand active French combatants. On August 12th, SFHQ sent the highly anticipated order, “Time now come for increased guerrilla effort as enemy shows signs pulling out your region.” Ordered to preserve as much as possible all bridges, viaducts, and power plants, the Maquis could now ambush and attack German columns on a greater scale. Within the next few days, the Maquis conducted numerous large scale attacks and on August 15 HUGH radioed London, “we have killed or captured over 124 Boches including 12 deserters. At least 30 have been wounded or escaped. Our losses have been 16. . . . engaged enemy 25 times and have burned or captured 37 vehicles.” The French were not about to allow Germany an unmolested retreat.¹⁴

Crawshay also brought a greater sophistication and knowledge of European politics to the effort. Captain Crawshay spent much of his childhood in France as his step-grandfather served as the British Ambassador. In 1943 he served as a liaison officer with the North African Free French, and later in the SOE Cairo office, Yugoslav

¹³ Ibid., 95.

¹⁴ Ibid., 71 - 75 and 97.

section. Oddly, even the Balkan experience served him well in France due to the large numbers of eastern Europeans and Russians in the Wehrmacht. Seizing the initiative, Crawshay told SFHQ to drop Russian leaflets to the enemy. SFHQ agreed and furthering the idea, wondered if HUGH would like Russian liaison officers. HUGH radioed back, "Will be delighted receive Russian officers," also adding, "Why don't you send us a mission from Tito." Crawshay and L'Helgouach probably thought it would raise their stock with the FTP; however no further mention of Yugoslav officers appears and it is unclear if the Russian liaison officers appeared.¹⁵

By the end of August, the tide turned in the Jedburgh team's favor. The Germans surrendered Paris and attempted an orderly retreat but with the advantage on the Allied side, they could not leave intact. HUGH aggressively harassed the enemy, radioed SFHQ bombing targets, received continued air dropped supplies, and engaged the Wehrmacht in larger and larger battles. Newly promoted to Major, Crawshay flew back to London to coordinate a broader plan with SFHQ and SHAEF. With Chateauroux briefly empty of German forces, the Maquis occupied the city despite HUGH's warning not to do so. Moreover, HUGH advised London not to broadcast Chateauroux's liberation, but their advice went unheeded and the Germans quickly returned. The German return was a natural occurrence as it proved the best route from southern France to Germany. HUGH anticipated more enemy troops traveling through Indre and hoped not to attract their attention, but due to Maquis jubilation and London's desire to broadcast one more liberated city, Chateauroux became a German city once again.¹⁶

¹⁵ Crawshay letter; West, 54; Mendelsohn, 69-71.

Indre now had 9,000 men under arms and HUGH organized their force into larger conventional battalions guarding Indre from all directions. Placing the FTP units toward the south where they expected little action, HUGH soon shifted more of its men to aid that sector as the Germans were pushing through. Fighting proved intense and as the Wehrmacht evacuated Tours, HUGH “brought down all our strength” on the German forces. On September 4, the Free French captured Poitiers forcing a further 20,000 enemy soldiers to retreat through Indre. Jedburgh team JULIAN, deployed to assist HUGH, led the Maquis against the “lame” column and captured many Germans as the 83rd American Infantry Division arrived and “claimed and obtained much credit.”¹⁷

Overrun by Allied conventional forces, HUGH arranged its return to England via an American Dakota aircraft. HUGH operated behind enemy lines from June 6 to September 22, 1944 and by the end of their operation, commanded over nine thousand men, successfully cut key railroads, harassed enemy columns, identified air targets (including V-1 launch sites), and arranged the return of over thirty downed airmen. However, HUGH’s greatest achievement received little attention in their final report. Remarking at the end of their official report, “Fighting was over, politics began, HUGH left,” the three Jedburghs should have realized that while a military mission, their greatest success was *political*. HUGH succeeded at uniting a fractious resistance into an effective force locally reflecting France’s national desire of united action against Germany.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid., 99-103.

¹⁷ Ibid., 104-105.

¹⁸ Ibid., 105.


Team IAN Deploys to Vienne and Charente

As *Samuel* left Team HUGH in Indre, he arrived in Vienne and asked for a Jedburgh team. On June 18, 1944 the Carpetbaggers attempted to take Team IAN to France; however the aircrew could not find the drop zone and refused to parachute IAN blind. The team returned to Britain and tried again two days later, finally parachuting on the night of 20/21 June. The drop went poorly, with the W/T operator American First Sergeant Lucien Bourgoin's parachute opening late. Fortunately, Bourgoin landed safely; however he found his radios severely damaged. Team leader American Major John Gildee and second-in-command French Captain Alex Desfarges, using the nom-de-guerre Yves Delormes, arrived safely. *Samuel's* reception team met IAN, collected its equipment, and drove the team to a farm serving as *Samuel's* headquarters. The team got off to a very slow start organizing the local Maquis as their damaged radios hindered the effort. Bourgoin did partially fix one of the W/T sets, but for nearly ten days the only communication was via *Samuel's* radio.¹⁹


SFHQ dropped ninety containers of arms prior to IAN's arrival, and *Samuel* related to SFHQ information concerning the area's Maquis. SFHQ briefed IAN prior to departure of three groups numbering "150 highly disciplined men," another 1500 man group in the former unoccupied zone, and a third 2000 man group in the former occupied zone. IAN was to train and organize these men into an effective force while also keeping the Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours and the Bordeaux-Niort-Saumur railroads cut. IAN deployed with a modified Jedburgh kit with fewer Brens and carbines and took more special rail charges. *Samuel* hoped to send them toward Chatellerault

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 54, 299, 306-307.

in northern Vienne giving them an area adjacent to HUGH, but unfortunately, heavy German activity caused *Samuel* to change his mind, and instead he sent IAN to southern Vienne and northern Charente.²⁰



**Team IAN's Area of Operations
June 20 - September 17, 1944**



On June 22, SFHQ sent a message to IAN warning them, "German Infantry Division moving north Toulouse - Normandy. Keep us posted movement. Attack wherever possible." Unfortunately, IAN's damaged radios failed to receive the message and IAN spent the next week attempting to get a strong reception from its W/T. However, IAN organized the sabotage of the Bordeaux - Paris railroad and kept it cut until June 26th. IAN also arranged to sabotage charcoal factories vital for

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 307.

German vehicles and attacked locomotive supply pumps along the railroad to Paris. When the Germans quickly repaired the railway damage, IAN asked SFHQ to bomb it.²¹

While pursuing minor operations, IAN conducted a great deal of reconnaissance and attempted to arm and train the swelling Maquis ranks. As they traveled from village to village they found groups and leaders willing to rally and recognize IAN's role as a command link to SHAEF and de Gaulle. Working an approximately one hundred square mile area south of Poitiers, IAN placed a nucleus of Maquis in villages encircling the area. Using seven villages on cross roads, IAN created what they hoped would be a safe perimeter where they could train more Maquis and run drop zones. Another group of Maquis specialized in demolition and sabotage, called "Sape" they ran their own drop zone keeping them supplied. American Major Gildee, possessed great organizational skills and set training schedules, controlled supplies, and managed the drop zones. French Captain Desfarges made a point to show the French people his presence and "spoke to the assembled populations to encourage them and request their aid for future actions."²²

As Maquis units received arms and trained and the sabotage unit became ready, they struck out to attack. From July 20 on, they turned their perimeter into a "fortified bastion" with tree barricades, masonry, and mined bridges. IAN also put officers and NCOs from the French regular and reserve army into their four battalions, which swelled to six thousand men, freeing IAN to oversee the entire effort. IAN soon

²¹ Ibid., 308.

²² Mendelsohn, 308-310; and Gauthier, telephone conversation.

became a “regimental commander,” directing operations while leaving supply, discipline, and administration up to the separate Maquis “battalions.” IAN arranged communications with telephone lines, motorcycle couriers, and carrier pigeons. Short of money required to carry on operations, IAN arranged a no-interest twelve million Franc loan through the Free French from the Bank of Algiers. Also, some of the local gendarmeries worked with the Maquis to set up police in their communities. Moreover, IAN recruited four doctors, set up two hospitals, and arranged for SFHQ to send medical supplies. All these events eliminated Vichy influence as well as Germany’s.²³

On July 20th, an estimated eight hundred Germans broke through the defenses and lodged themselves in Champagne-Mouton, a village formerly Maquis held. The enemy set up barbed-wire, ditches, and fortified their positions. Taking numerous hostages, the Germans threatened to shoot hostages and burn the town if attacked. From Champagne-Mouton, they sent out patrols for five days and attempted to reconnoiter Maquis positions. Enemy columns probed the perimeter at other locations, but when met with strong organized resistance, the Germans disengaged. However, the Germans managed to cut IAN’s telephone network, causing other sectors to lose communications and slowing reinforcements, making a Maquis counterattack impossible. On July 26th, Germany launched a 400 soldier attack near Ambernac, but as local Maquis were not yet fully armed they withdrew several kilometers leaving the village to the enemy. The Germans pillaged the town and shot civilians, but soon IAN arrived with reinforcements and forced the enemy back to Confolens. Over the next

²³ Mendelsohn, 302 and 311-312.

few days, more forceful attacks continued and IAN considered a withdrawal to Dordogne as its entire position “was at stake.” Nevertheless, the enthused and spirited young Maquis fought extremely hard and despite little training and only small arms, managed to use the blown bridges over the Vienne, woods, and other natural defenses to bog down the enemy offensive.²⁴

On August 1st, IAN reported “four days fighting near Champagne routed Germans,” and at the cost of “30 Germans killed and 3 prisoners. 2 Maquis killed and 10 wounded.” News of a larger battle followed the next day and IAN requested more weapons, ammunition, and “shoes and socks.” The Germans finally retreated toward the south, but the attack killed an estimated 100 Maquis and an estimated 200 Germans. However, the determined Wehrmacht tried again on the August 3 to penetrate the French perimeter. IAN hoped to spring a trap near the village of Champagne-Mouton but instead, IAN drove into an ambush.²⁵

Captain Desfarges drove the team along with their driver Mondinaud, and information agent Verry on a hot day into Pleuville in the hope of finding food, and then pressing on toward Champagne-Mouton. Desfarges chose to drive as he knew the area. As they arrived in town, they heard a woman yell, “L’Allemagnes!” and as they rounded a curve in the center of the village a German column opened fire with small arms and mortars. Desfarges, wounded in the cheek, put the truck in a maneuver protecting the passengers and IAN returned fire. With the truck immobilized and Mondinaud severely wounded, IAN left the vehicle darting into available cover behind a house and in alleys. Desfarges, Gildee, and Verry made an

²⁴ Ibid., 313-315.

²⁵ Ibid., 315-316.

escape through a barn adjacent to the street. Captain Desfarges found a window at the other end of the barn and went through. Major Gildee, a bigger man, needed to be pulled from one side and pushed from the other to squeeze through. Sergeant Bourgoïn realized the codes, money, radio, and radio crystals remained in the truck and returned to get them. The Germans killed him before he escaped a second time. The three survivors made it to a farm outside the village and found twenty Maquis, then made their way back to the truck to retrieve their equipment and find out where their comrades were. "10 meters from the car we were again spotted by the Germans" and IAN retreated into a wooded area, covering themselves with dirt and debris. For approximately twenty hours the enemy encircled their hideout, but fortunately the Germans had no dogs and IAN came out of hiding after the enemy left.²⁶

Bourgoïn's body remained near the trees he attempted to enter for cover, while the Germans looked for the others. Unable to run Mondinaud, could not get away fast enough and a German soldier struck him in the head delivering a fatal blow. After the German troops left to look for the others, a Pleuville woman walked over to Bourgoïn's body and covered his face with a handkerchief and other local men came and moved the bodies into the church. The two were buried the next day in the church cemetery. Gildee and Desfarges, failing to retrieve their radio and other equipment, attempted to pull their operation back together, but were bereft of their comrade and vital equipment. Years later, Desfarges remarked, "I never saw Gildee show any emotion, but when the Sergeant was killed I thought he'd never stop crying." Unable to radio London for six days, the team finally found their wireless set at a farm of a

²⁶ Mendelsohn, 315-317; and Gautheir, telephone conversation.

former French Mercantile Marine radio officer and sent, "Our automobile attacked by column of 400 Germans at Poeuville [sic]. Bourgoin and chauffeur killed." The message also explained the loss of all their gear, requested an air drop to replace the missing equipment, money, and gasoline and an additional arms for one thousand men.²⁶

Despite the set back, IAN managed to organize more ambushes and still control a large enough area to ensure the security of its drop zones. IAN noticed many enemy soldiers were Russians, Italians, and "Hindus" and would easily desert when properly encouraged by leaflets. Pressing ahead with ambushes, the Maquis brought IAN a large intelligence discovery. A pouch of Vichy diplomatic Papers enroute to Spain revealed Prime Minister Laval meant to reconvene the National Assembly "before the arrival of the English and Americans." IAN passed this information to SFHQ who radioed back delighted, "Congratulations splendid work" and gave instructions on how to get the materials back to England. SFHQ sent the information to de Gaulle, according to Team IAN's final report, and as the allies were only a week away from re-capturing Paris, de Gaulle most likely found such information vital.²⁷

By August 19th, despite still begging SFHQ to send "toilet articles" lost in the ambush on August 3rd, the Maquis and IAN ambushed the enemy, blew rail lines and bridges, and kept up harassment. "Many minor skirmishes with German patrols. 1 colonel and 1 major and over 100 other Germans killed. Believe about 200 wounded." Unable to carry on set piece offensives, IAN aggressively kept the Maquis

²⁶ Gauthier, telephone conversation; and Mendelsohn, 302, 316 -317. The Pleuville church stone floor still retains Bourgoin's and Mondinaud's blood stains.

²⁷ Mendelsohn, 318 and 303.

attacking the Germans in small scale raids, and of course blowing rail lines. IAN arranged to attack the Germans one way or another. If they traveled in small groups the Maquis ambushed them, and if they congregated, IAN arranged air strikes.²⁸

By the second week of September, with the Germans nearly gone or made prisoner, Team IAN wrapped up their work. Evidently, conventional French forces were in the area relieving the Maquis. IAN's last act involved surrender negotiations with a German colonel. The enemy commander would not discuss terms with the Maquis "terrorists" so Gildee and Desfarges drove into the German held area displaying American and French flags. Unfortunately, after an hour and a half of calm negotiations, the German colonel informed IAN strict orders from his Fuehrer demanded he defend the region "and that he was solidly installed there and that he would on no account surrender."²⁹

SOE agent *Samuel* departed France and returned to London, on or about September 15th and IAN radioed, "Nothing here for us. We are leaving Limoges aerodrome for London. . . . Will wait 24 hours for confirmation." London instead ordered them to Paris and ended their mission. Summing up accomplishments Gildee and Desfarges wrote, "For three months we harassed German convoys on the roads, destroying materials, killing their men, blowing up railways, derauling trains, holding up transport causing German columns to become targets for aerial bombardment and liberating during our periods of activity and [sic] area equal to one third of the department of the Charente, finally freeing the whole of the Charente, all its large

²⁸ Ibid., 305.

²⁹ Ibid., 320.

towns and a large portion of the coast. A large part of the merit is due to the chiefs of the Maquis and to those who helped us to create our organization.” Just as HUGH succeeded in Indre, IAN became a political rallying point for the Maquis by providing arms, training, and direction, and by demonstrating to the French that their government actively participated in liberation efforts.

Team GEORGE Operations

Central France's railroads were only one of many SHAEF concerns during the initial invasion effort. The Normandy invasion beaches could quickly be enveloped and in an effort to secure the invasion's right flank, SFHQ deployed Jedburghs hoping Maquis could help. Special Air Services (SAS) units deployed as well and like Team HUGH, Team GEORGE received orders to deploy with an SAS team into the Redan area in Brittany. But, unlike Team HUGH, the SAS Team commanded GEORGE while in the field. Reporting to the SAS party "Dingson" on June 7, 1944 was French Captain Philippe Ragueneau as team leader, the second-in-command was American Captain Paul Cyr and the W/T operator was French Sergeant Pierre Gay. Ragueneau came from North Africa and was active in the forces there, although not a regular army officer. Cyr grew up in Vermont and learned French in the St. Johnsbury Catholic schools and came to the OSS after Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning. OSS recruited Cyr in September, 1943 and he trained at the Congressional Country

Club area and arrived in Europe on December 20, 1943. Promoted to Captain April 1, 1944, he celebrated his twenty-third birthday the day he parachuted into France. SFHQ recruited Sergeant Gay from the colonial army while on the SOE/OSS recruiting drive.³⁰

Unfortunately for GEORGE, Gestapo arrests and infiltration left it with no known regional contact. Also, the SAS did not know Jedburgh roles and missions and was suspicious. Captain Cyr failed to understand who SAS reported to, for it appeared to him they were their own private army. Fortunately, Ragueneau had worked with the SAS commander previously enabling him to gain support and tensions eased. Despite the different command arrangement, SFHQ ordered GEORGE to keep it up to date on all resistance matters. GEORGE did not take the standard Jedburgh containers; instead it parachuted with one rucksack and was to use SAS supplies. Boarding the aircraft around 2330 hours June 8th, they jammed on board with sixteen others and jumped differently than their Milton Hall training. GEORGE complained upon returning to England, "We all stood up and ran down towards the tail of the plane, jumping out in a very unorthodox manner." Fifteen to twenty French met them and immediately "pounced" with joy at their arrival. They pulled them up, gathered the gear and made such a noise, Cyr thought they would certainly attract too much attention. Confirming his fear the Maquis told him the

³⁰ Mendelsohn, 39, 157-158; OSS London microfilm, Vol. 11, 589; de Francesco telephone conversation; Donna Cyr, telephone conversation with author, March 29th, 1999. De Francesco relates Philippe Ragueneau was rare among the French Jedburghs in his open support of General de Gaulle and he was one of five men drawing straws to see who would assassinate Admiral Darlan. Ragueneau did not get the short straw.

Germans were only two kilometers away. The Maquis brought Team GEORGE and the SAS soldiers to a farm, which then became the SAS base "Dingson."³¹


The welcome given to GEORGE and the SAS party was a grand one. Cyr, Ragueneau, and Gay wrote when they returned England, "Women, children and men were laughing and crying with joy. At 3:00 in the morning girls came running out kissing us and giving us flowers and wine. The men between the ages of 12 to 75 were ready that night to march on the German garrison. . . ." In the morning, all went out to assemble and organize their gear. The Jedburghs discovered their W/T sets were not among the rest of the equipment. Later that afternoon, a farmer arrived with them in his cart. According to the farmer, the equipment parachuted into his field about 9 a.m. approximately 2 to 3 kilometers from the drop zone. But to make matters worse, the Germans immediately jammed the W/T frequency forcing Sergeant Gay to broadcast on their secondary frequency. Soon the Germans jammed the secondary frequency, forcing GEORGE to broadcast sparingly on their emergency frequency and ask SFHQ for a new primary channel. Estimating the need to arm 4000 men, GEORGE asked for arms, and related which reception ground should be used. They also asked for one million francs adding, "Please we beg you send equipment immediately."³²

Rather than building and maturing an SOE circuit as HUGH and IAN did, GEORGE worked with the SAS to destroy bridges, cut railroads, and arm the French. Camp Dingson became a base of operations for SAS nightly patrols out to

³¹ Mendelsohn, 157-158.

³² Ibid., 43 and 158-160.

a target and a rallying point for Maquisards. For the first few days, while the communications to SFHQ was intermittent, five to ten planes came each night dropping arms, fuel, and supplies. The SAS and GEORGE began organizing and arming the Maquis, made contacts with resistance groups, re-established contacts between the resistance groups, and tried to keep London informed. Initially, a great deal of confusion clouded the situation concerning who was who in the Maquis. Thick with recriminations, some pointed to others as spies and double agents forcing GEORGE to question almost every piece of information until verified by others it trusted or until it grew to respect the man or woman through its own experiences.³³



**Team GEORGE's Area of Operations
June 8 - August 28, 1944**

- Road
- + + + Railroad
- River

³³ Ibid., 161-162.

Communications became worse as GEORGE continued pressing SFHQ for a new frequency and new W/T sets. SFHQ never granted their request because they grew dubious about GEORGE's security and suspected the Gestapo sent the messages. Using poor security practices, GEORGE repeatedly failed to authenticate its messages properly, causing SFHQ to grow more and more suspicious. Headquarters' fears were unknown to the Jedburgh team and they continued their mission but lamented in their final report, "Our radio communications were very, very poor and we sweat blood on them."³⁴

As more and more arms and men came into the camp, Dingson attracted considerable attention from the Wehrmacht and it was only a matter of time before Germany attacked. Maquis, poorly controlled and amateurishly led, made several attacks on German garrisons and depots attracting attention. Moreover, Frenchmen came from as far as one hundred kilometers to receive weapons, then returned to their homes and farms spreading the word to others. With 5000 men armed and another 5000 men soon to be armed, GEORGE discussed its role with the SAS Commander who decided to detail them to the Loire Inférieure area, southeast of their present position. GEORGE considered the resistance in the Loire Inférieure region "the worst department in Brittany" and also concluded along with the SAS commander that the region was too vital to ignore. GEORGE made preparations to leave and selected local men to guide them.³⁵

Unfortunately, GEORGE stayed too long. Awakened by exploding grenades and machine gun fire on June 18th, the team began a desperate fight along with the

³⁴ Ibid., 164.

³⁵ Ibid., 164-165.

remaining SAS and approximately 600 to 1000 Maquis. The team burned documents, hid their code books, and made arrangements on rendezvous points in case they became separated. Captains Cyr and Ragueneau went to the SAS headquarters to receive orders, but the commander was checking the perimeter at his forward posts. When the German attack met more resistance than expected, it ceased for about an hour, but restarted after more enemy troops came into the fray. The SAS radioed for air support and it arrived around 4 p.m. The air support was ineffective however, as the Germans found cover in nearby trees nevertheless it did increase the Maquis' morale. Under the cover of darkness, Cyr and Ragueneau took command of two Maquis companies and led counter attacks hoping to stifle German momentum and force the enemy further away from the camp's headquarters. Meanwhile, the SAS unit sustained several casualties and the commander ordered all wounded loaded on trucks and the supplies not transportable destroyed. A great deal of arms meant for the resistance went up in flames.³⁶

Ordered to break through the German lines and carry on guerrilla operations, team GEORGE found each other and decided to take six British airmen with them. The airman parachuted out of crippled aircraft and found their way to the SAS camp days before. Forcing their way through the lines with a Maquis group, GEORGE soon found itself slowed down by the airmen unfamiliar with small unit tactics. After getting through the lines and dodging numerous patrols, GEORGE and the airmen traveled approximately ten miles when nearly thrown to the ground by an explosion lighting up the night sky. The SAS and Maquis arms depot finally blew up in a

³⁶ Ibid., 169-170.

tremendous explosion. Laden with their packs, radios, and the airmen GEORGE avoided combat and spent the rest of the night evading fire fights. Getting a few hours sleep in a wheat field, the team found its way to the rendezvous point meeting the SAS Commander, the remainder of his SAS team, and the Maquis leaders. French women and girls cared for the wounded doing the best they could with inadequate supplies. GEORGE then teamed up with two Maquis leaders Hauteur and Fonction, and split off from SAS toward its area of Loire Inférieure.³⁷

Starting from a point twenty-five miles from base Dingson, GEORGE made its way using local men and women as guides. Taking nearly a week to make their way carefully past enemy patrols, they traveled through several small villages on back roads and finally to the Maquis camp near the village Saffre. Now nearly 35 miles north of Nantes, Gay radioed London, "Arrived safely 'Alarme' ground, Loire Inférieure. Begin tomorrow 28 dropping for 2,000 in slices of 500. Reception committee standing by every night from 28th." Hoping to impress the local Maquis with the team's ability to make arms appear from the sky, the team lost a great deal of respect night after night when no planes appeared. On June 30th, SFHQ informed GEORGE to "pass to Hauteur and Fonction, 'Go to safe place and lie low for a few days. Keep in contact and await any instructions.'" Evidently, London wanted to see if it could salvage their Maquis agents from what it assumed was a Gestapo penetrated Jedburgh team. They gave no instructions, causing Ragueneau, Cyr, and Gay great concern and undercutting their validity with the Maquis.³⁸

³⁷ Ibid., 171-173.

³⁸ Ibid., 45 and 177.

To add to the terrible luck, a double agent betrayed the Maquis camp's defensive positions to the enemy. When GEORGE arrived, it found the defenses inadequate, fired the camp commander, and rearranged the defenses just in time. As Sergeant Gay decoded messages on the morning of the 28th, the Germans attacked and the W/T set had to be packed up "while the Jerries could be heard only 100 to 200 yards away." Miraculously making its way past two machine gun positions, GEORGE hid with Hauteur in a clump of thick bushes so thick that the Germans could not find them and grenades tossed into them exploded harmlessly. The Germans used dogs, but they proved useless as so many people tracked around the area and the dogs could not pinpoint any particular person. Escaping from the bushes during the night, GEORGE survived numerous close calls and accidentally met up with Fonction and other Maquis leaders. While resting in a wheat field, the group decided to split, not telling others their destination. Team GEORGE lamented its sorry state and later described its condition bereft of nearly all equipment and possessing only "one radio, one battery, a few weapons and our clothes" as it made its way toward Ancenis.³⁹

After numerous brushes with the enemy, GEORGE made its way to Ancenis and its safe house turned out to be a castle. Owned by the Comte de Landemont who used the large place for orphans and refugees, the castle was home for a few days. For the first time since entering France the team slept in beds and had a decent meal. After discussing options with the local Maquis, Captain Rageuneau reluctantly agreed to become the Délégué Militaire Régional (DMR) or the head of the region's Maquis. With every local Maquis leader hated or mistrusted by every other Maquis leader, no

³⁹ Ibid., 179-183.

one else had the instant trust and respect from all the groups.⁴⁰

So on July 4th, GEORGE attempted to command the local Maquis and instantly ran headlong into several challenges. New to the area, the Jedburghs had to learn the hard way who they could trust, who would fight the Germans, and where to get resources and supplies. Quickly they attempted to sort out who among the resistance would be capable of actually contributing to the effort. GEORGE divided the groups into four categories. The first was “political groups interested in resistance;” the second “resistance groups interested in politics;” the third “political groups pretending to be interested in the resistance but only really interested in politics;” and the last, “resistance groups not interested in politics (these being the angels).” Each category could be made up of many groups with leaders issuing orders to kill the “traitors” of the other groups. GEORGE faced a great challenge instilling unity among the groups. Moreover, actual numbers of “patriots” were inflated and when the Jedburgh team wished to muster a battalion, barely enough men for a company arrived. And to complicate matters further, groups would recruit among those men already in other units. In all the confusion and cross-efforts, no one knew who was in charge or who to follow. Back in England, Captains Cyr and Ragueneau joked the only thing people clearly understood was that the Gestapo was “really running the show.”⁴¹

GEORGE, determined to rally the Maquis and conduct operations, rapidly developed a plan, organized a headquarters, appointed trainers, selected men to run the dropping grounds, and decided how to distribute supplies. Next the Jedburghs vetted the units and set up a selection process for recruiting, trying to retain only men

⁴⁰ Ibid., 183-185.

⁴¹ Ibid., 187-188.

who would fight. Of course fighting required arms, and due to continued poor communications, the arms never arrived. Additionally, inadequate security, and continued organizational problems hampered their efforts. The Gestapo and German Army actively searched the area forcing GEORGE to shift safe houses constantly. GEORGE stayed one step ahead of the enemy but it began to lose credibility in the eyes of the local Maquis. As the BBC broadcast the action message "*Le chapeau de Napoleon est toujours a Perros-Guirec*" signifying the general uprising, GEORGE failed to get arms to its Maquis and realizing the lost potential, "we cried like kids considering our useless set, our useless work and all the dangers the patriots of Loire Inférieure had gone through to get to that point."⁴²

As Allied forces neared GEORGE's area, the Jeds took it upon themselves to shift to performing liaison duties with the approaching United States Third Army. The team also came into the possession of U-boat basing plans for St. Nazaire and the coastal defense plans for the Loire Inférieure and desperately worked to get them to the right people. During the first week of August, Captain Cyr found his way through the lines, sniper fire, and no-man's-land to the VIII Corps headquarters' intelligence section or G-2. The Colonel commanding G-2 showed great interest not only in the plans but also in Captain Cyr, a French speaking American who knew details about the terrain, German troop strength, and French resistance. Cyr left VIII Corps for Third Army and entirely by chance met the Special Forces Detachment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Powell. At last someone could verify to London that indeed Cyr, Ragueneau, and Gay were all right and able to press on with operations.

⁴² Ibid., 190 - 209.

Powell wanted to attach Cyr to XX Corps to act as a guide, but Cyr advocated using local French for that and set up the volunteers for such duty. Cyr believed he could be better used going back across the lines and guarding Third Army's right flank with the Maquis. SFHQ agreed and promised twenty-four plane loads of arms over the next few days.⁴³

At last GEORGE had what it required to perform its mission. Cyr returned to the Chateaubriant region and found Ragueneau and Gay safe (German troops briefly captured Ragueneau but he convinced them he belonged to the Milice) and together they attempted to carry out their orders. Third Army and SFHQ directed GEORGE to aid in the advance, attempt to maintain bridges, provide information on the shifting battle lines back to Third Army, and protect the advancing force's lines of communication. Staying approximately fifty miles ahead of the front, the Jedburgh team made sure the Third Army received continuous and accurate information. As the American forces slowly overcame German opposition and progressed through the area, the stiffest resistance came from the nearly 18,000 enemy troops in the St. Nazaire area. Now equipped with captured German weapons and parachuted arms, the French Maquis kept the St. Nazaire forces hemmed in and unable to move, allowing Third Army to press on toward Paris. Training camps continued their work as Maquis units swelled with new recruits. Not strong enough to launch a full offensive against St. Nazaire, they succeeded with the strategy of constant harassment and pressing weaknesses in German lines. GEORGE also worked with the civil authorities to govern the towns in the region, but all functions and offices were held by

⁴³ Ibid., 214-217.

the French.⁴⁴

When GEORGE left France on August 23rd, 2500 men were under arms due to their efforts. Captain Cyr estimated 4000 more men were soon to be armed from the reliable system GEORGE established. Acting more like a SOE circuit chief, GEORGE succeeded building a network of reliable men and women able to resist the German Army, but did it just in time; any later and GEORGE would have been irrelevant. Third Army found itself the beneficiary of GEORGE's presence, knowledge, trained Maquis, and connections but SHAEF's and SFHQ's desires to exploit resistance capabilities were clearly not met. Blame should not be placed on Team GEORGE's shoulders alone. SFHQ's theory that the Gestapo sent GEORGE's messages had some validity, but it did little to discover the truth. Secure communication procedures, such as code words, numbering messages, and strict procedure soon became muddled while the team constantly ran as GEORGE described, "all the time along a precipice" to stay a step ahead of capture. London's performance also failed to follow strict procedure further degrading the whole operation.⁴⁵

Evidently, London proved satisfied with the overall performance of GEORGE and immediately sent them back into the field. GEORGE II deployed on September 3rd north of Bordeaux. Writing their report's last paragraph GEORGE attempted to find a positive aspect from the harrowing seven week ordeal by noting, "if this experience resolves a tricky point and helps to build a more perfect checking system of Jedburgh's authenticity for the next war and even this one, we'll think that this was a useful

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 217-233.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 233-239.

confusion and our only regret will be that team GEORGE had to be the one to bring the question out.”⁴⁶

Examining GEORGE’s situation is illustrative of what a team brought to the Maquis when it could not provide weapons. Without the air dropped supplies, local Maquis questioned the team’s validity as well as Allied commitment. GEORGE’s inability to bring weapons led to its significantly reduced power to influence events and unite the local leaders into a cohesive fighting force. Without the arms, the mission reduced to a mere French junior officer and NCO accompanied by an American junior officer who were able combat leaders but unable to symbolize their legitimate role speaking for SHAEF.

Team GILES Deploys

American Captain Bernard M. Knox, French Captain Paul Grall using the nom-de-guerre Paul Lebel, and British Sergeant Gordon H. Tack comprised the seventh team dispatched from Britain to France. On June 16th, SFHQ alerted and briefed GILES its mission to deploy to the Finistère region of eastern Brittany and organize and arm resistance forces. SFHQ knew very little about the region’s Maquis and prior to departing General Koenig himself briefed the team and emphasized the region’s importance and how vital it was to learn more about the Maquis’ potential for combat. Also, Koenig sternly warned Knox to act like a gentleman and behave himself as a good guest of France should. Evidently, he thought Americans chased women too much and would be parachuting into France with stockings and chocolates.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 240-241.

Immediately prior to the team's departure, Captain Grall went back to London to agree on the BBC signal for the Brittany large scale attack. Grall suggested and SFHQ agreed the signal would be "*Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec*" ("Napoleon's hat is always at Perros-Guirec"). After an unsuccessful attempt on July 4, GILES finally parachuted into the French night on July 8/9 from a Carpetbagger B-24.⁴⁷

Captain Knox parachuted first out the "Joe hole." Born in England and educated in languages at St. John's College, Cambridge, Knox married an American and became a naturalized citizen in 1943. He also joined the OSS in 1943 where he served as an French language instructor. Selected for Jedburgh duty, he returned to England by March, 1944. Twenty-nine years old and a former member of the Spanish Republican Army's International Brigade, Knox acted as GILES' team commander. Captain Paul Grall joined the Jedburghs from the North Africa recruiting drive. The Germans captured Grall in 1940 and held him as a POW in Poland. He escaped and somehow got to Morocco. A member of the French Colonial Army, Grall was a well-built man with a large scar down his cheek from an automobile accident. Sergeant Tack served as W/T operator and Captain Knox considered him a first class radio operator. Tack followed Knox down the "Joe hole" with Grall exiting last.⁴⁸

The drop went well with Knox and Tack landing close together and they found Captain Grall within two or three minutes. Very excited young Frenchmen welcomed them almost immediately, greeting them with kisses. The reception party gathered up

⁴⁷ Ibid., 338-9 and Knox, letter. Perros-Guirec is a town on the north Brittany coast.


⁴⁸ Ibid., 339; de Francesco telephone conversation; Bernard Knox to author, April 2, 1999; OSS/London microfilm, Vol. 11, 623.

the gear and much to the Jedburgh's delight, had vehicles to transport them to a safe area. Riding in cars and a truck carrying their equipment, GILES hoped to make it to its base before dawn. But due to the distance the team did not make it to the Maquis base until daylight. There it found not quite fifty men whose leader was in Cotes-du-Nord, attempting to acquire weapons. Captain Grall organized the defenses and distributed the weapons giving instruction as he went along. Later that afternoon, the team heard the BBC message informing them of another drop on the same ground as the previous night. Leery of making the trip back to the drop zone, GILES decided to risk it in order to get the weapons. GILES also sent word to London relating the different resistance situation than they expected since Gestapo and Milice recently arrested and shot many local leaders. GILES lamented, "situation at Finistère is not as informed," requested three more Jedburgh teams to work other parts of the region, and an additional one million francs.⁴⁹

GILES retrieved their supplies from the drop zone just in time. They discovered the next afternoon, that the German 2nd Parachute Infantry Division had 300 troops going through farms searching for resistance forces. The suspicious Germans heard the aircraft and arrived on the drop zone just five minutes after team GILES' and its reception team left. After the near miss, GILES distributed the arms to another Maquis group and met the returning Maquis leader, Yves Legal, who led the most active Brittany group, the communist FTP. Team GILES and Legal quickly came to an agreement on dropping grounds and the strategy that GILES should remain in Brittany's center while letting the follow-on Jedburgh teams work the coastal areas.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Mendelsohn, 327 and 340-41.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 341-42.



Team GILES' Area of Operations July 8 - September 9, 1944

- Road
- + + + Railroad
- River/Canal

The night of July 9/10, two more Jedburgh teams parachuted onto one of GILES' drop zones without its knowledge and the next day SFHQ radioed GILES informing it of Teams FRANCIS and GILBERT's arrival. These two teams proceeded to the villages Quimper and Quimperle and by the time the ground received a drop of weapons for GILES' Maquis four days later, the ground was "blown." Hearing the noise four nights previously, the Germans suspected something was going on in the area and attacked the Maquis as they finished their work at the drop zone. However, the Maquis put up stiff resistance surprising the Wehrmacht and Captain Knox

thought the casualties the Germans sustained were not worth their effort.⁵¹

The FTP sent many Brittany men to GILES' camp to receive training, weapons, and organized resistance activities for the region. GILES worked to coordinate every supply drop in an effort to control the Maquis and keep the materials out of German hands. GILES and the FTP selected seven drop zones and informed London of their location while training numerous Maquis on reception ground procedures. On July 12, the Free French (FFI) chief, Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud visited GILES' command post and discussed resistance operations. GILES and Berthaud established a professional relationship and related their respective goals agreeing to stay in contact with each other via Legal. Unfortunately, Berthaud brought along a spy and the GILES report coldly stated, "we had to shoot one of the men in his car, who was a known Gestapo agent." Due to fears Berthaud's organization had been compromised, GILES avoided working with him.⁵²

The fears proved true when the next day the Maire of the nearby village told GILES that "large German forces were in the area looking for us," using a map with "red marks against the name of the farm where we were taking our meals." GILES packed up camp and moved that night with its 100 man company. Traveling by foot for the next two nights, it arrived at a high plateau near St. Thors. GILES set up operations and managed to stay for a week. While at St. Thors, it met with more FTP departmental chiefs anxious to begin offensive actions. Ordered by Koenig to avoid open warfare until directed, GILES worked to convince them the Maquis fell under the orders of SHAEF and their orders were to wait until the correct time. After

⁵¹ Ibid., 327 and 342.

⁵² Ibid., 342-43.

a long discussion the FTP chiefs agreed they would follow the Allied orders. Unfortunately, Colonel Berthaud became jealous and complained to London concerning the FTP's influence with GILES. Radioing London in response GILES stated the assertions were, "true enough because in our region resistance is mostly Maquis FTP." The message went on to remind London that the "arrangement was made at an interview between us and Berthaud." GILES appeared tired of Berthaud's complaining and London agreed with GILES and its arrangements with the region's FTP.⁵³

Meanwhile, GILES received Jedburgh teams HORACE and HILARY and three other French parachutists at one of its drop zones. GILES arranged for them to take up positions on the north Brittany coast and sent them off to their areas. To add to the confusion one of the suspected milice prisoners escaped forcing GILES to relocate again. The Jedburgh team crossed the Aulne canal and set up camp in a valley three kilometers from the village of Lennon. GILES increased their number by one with Canadian Flight Lieutenant Brown. Shot down over Brest, Brown wandered into the team's area and remained with them as the normal escape routes ceased when the Allies invaded Normandy. Brown spent nearly three weeks with the team helping Sergeant Tack handle the radio traffic. At this point, five teams worked in Finistère but the German 2nd Parachute Infantry Division still controlled major roads and aggressively sought to ferret out the Maquis.⁵⁴

Two doctors offered their services to the Maquis and GILES worked getting

⁵³ Ibid., 328-29 and 343-44.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 344-45.

wounded to them. GILES credited the doctors with tremendous courage as they worked tirelessly for over a month saving lives in an area "thick with German troops." GILES also met with Major Colin Ogden-Smith and Captain Guy le Zachmuer of team FRANCIS and clarified each team's operating area. They also discussed policy regarding the resistance and Brittany's political groups. Unfortunately the details of the discussion are not noted but the Jedburghs presumably delineated each team's operating area and drop zones and exchanged information on the FTP and Berthaud. Agreeing on every point, they parted and Knox lamented, "This was the last time I ever saw Colin." The Germans killed Major Colin Ogden-Smith in a fire fight on July 29th, 1944.⁵⁵

Under the threat of being found, the team moved again. Striking out north across the Pleyben-Chateauneuf road, GILES marched until 4 a.m. The team hoped to settle there, but by the next day it learned the Germans captured one of Sergeant Tack's former radio assistants. Knowing they must keep moving, they decided to go back across the canal toward Kernoux that night. While on the move, they saw German signal flares and sent part of their company ahead to investigate. They failed to return and GILES decided to strike out on its own, but the remaining men and boys were now without their own cadre and simply could not sustain a long forced march. Compelled to take to roads, rather than going across country due to the weary men, GILES reconnoitered a small village and could not believe its luck when it found an unguarded canal bridge. Just as they were all across machine gun fire inspired GILES' men to keep going as long as possible, but by 7:30 the next morning only eight men

⁵⁵ Ibid., 345.

remained with the team.⁵⁶

Further compounding their poor morale, the team heard the sounds of an ambush laid by a nearby Maquis band and discovered it went badly due to poor discipline. The Maquis lost several men and the Germans shot the local villagers. However, GILES discovered the German main position in the region and hoped to capitalize on the information. The Germans commandeered the Chateauneuf chateau situated on the area's predominant hill. With such a position they could view a great deal of the surrounding area, but GILES informed London of the position and asked for the RAF to strike. On July 30th, three dive-bombers rolled in on the target filled with hung over German soldiers still groggy from a party the previous evening. GILES radioed SFHQ and gleefully exclaimed the air strike "Couldn't have been better."⁵⁷

By late July, the Maquis and especially the FTP sought to take the fight to the Germans, but the direction to do so still had not arrived. GILES informed London of some uncontrollable groups and complained, "FTP getting very hard to control and we may not be able to do it much longer. . . .FTP are reaching boiling point and explosion may occur if Boche continues to hunt them." But apparently GILES, and perhaps other Jedburgh teams, mis-understood a key aspect of their orders. SFHQ wanted the Maquis to refrain from general open activity, but not systematic and persistent guerrilla activity. GILES worked hard to convince the Maquis to refrain from any type of engagement however London wished only to stop open warfare. London radioed GILES on July 30th saying, "We quite agree about action by small groups against field gendarmerie. Only mistake in interpretation made you interrupt all

⁵⁶ Ibid., 346-348.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 346-350.

operations. Must keep enemy in danger everywhere ceaselessly by guerilla [sic] action, that is to say, generalized mobile offensive action by surprise and refusing large scale battle.” Aggressively continuing the weapon supply drops, GILES kept warning London they needed the message about Napoleon’s hat, otherwise they would not be able to control the FTP. Now, London gave them a way to relieve the pressure caused by the misunderstanding.⁵⁸

Moving for the last time on July 31st, GILES found its last headquarters in its first headquarters, the village of Plessis. They carried out reconnaissance on the chateau recently attacked by the RAF. Piles of rubble and the odor of decaying bodies greeted them and they reported killing 17 more Germans. The Germans evacuated the ruins the next day and GILES intensified the drop zone activity hoping the wait would not be long until given the order. On August 2 team FRANCIS radioed GILES with the news of Ogden-Smith’s death and GILES radioed London that all FRANCIS’ drop zones were blown as Ogden-Smith had the locations on him when he died.⁵⁹

At long last, the BBC transmitted the desired message “*Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec,*” and team GILES quickly set up an attack on columns of Germans moving east. As the 2nd Parachute Infantry Division moved toward the Allied front, GILES brought the guerrillas to bear while sending London the message, “Lack arms and ammo. Going over to offensive tonight.” GILES and the Maquis could press the fighting, but they continued to require more arms. The next day London obliged and the Maquis received four loads on one drop zone and

⁵⁸ Ibid., 330.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 350.

one load on another. GILES succeeded at getting the order and arms to the northern part of their sector and also succeeded at penning in the Germans by blowing up a bridge on the main east bound road. The Germans, now forced to travel cross country rather than by road, slowed down considerably and took out their frustration on the French villages and farms by burning, looting, and other vicious actions. The German units that remained on the roads created perfect air targets and GILES rapidly reported their locations to London. In all the chaos, GILES and the Maquis captured many enemy prisoners and Captain Knox questioned them and reported, "all of them were Hitlerites to a man. They admitted to the atrocities they had committed, refused to believe that the Americans had taken Rennes, refused to discuss the Hitler regime and refused to explain why they had French jewelry, money, and identity cards on them." Knox added, "they were all subsequently shot by the FFI." GILES could not stop the resistance forces from killing the POWs even had it tried, due to the tremendous pent up hostility over the four year occupation.⁶⁰

On the same night the action messages went out SFHQ and the French command hastily organized an inter-allied mission, code named *Aloes*. *Aloes'* mission departed England on August 4th acting as the leading elements of General Koenig's command. Twenty four men commanded by a French Colonel parachuted into Brittany to set up their headquarters. With them was a Jedburgh liaison officer who hoped to build a healthy liaison between *Aloes* and the area's Jedburgh teams. On August 6th, SFHQ notified GILES about *Aloes*, and directed GILES to contact it and placed GILES under its command. Since GILES' had more time in Brittany than the other Jedburgh

⁶⁰ Ibid., 333 and 351-52.

teams and because GILES was in a central position, *Aloes* appointed them to be their main liaison to the Maquis throughout Brittany. Captain Grall concentrated on this new mission putting him in a key position regarding Brittany's resistance. Captain Knox also made reconnaissance trips with the *Aloes* commander and organized mopping up operations as the German army clung to scattered positions. Knox also met up with American commanders entering the area, advised them on local conditions, and assigned French scouts to their headquarters.⁶¹

M. R. D. Foot, writing the official history of SOE activities in France considered the *Aloes* mission to be a "striking success." However, GILES believed differently and thought their presence irrelevant. The U. S. Army nearly overran Brittany before *Aloes* arrived and was preparing to attack Brest. Also, the *Aloes* leader told Captain Knox, "me fail mal au couer," or as he interpreted, "the sight of my uniform made him feel awkward." By arriving so late and creating such strained relations with the region's main Jedburgh team the *Aloes* mission became superfluous. According to Knox, GILES "left him, and his useless staff alone." Indeed, it is difficult to say the mission succeeded when it packed up and went back to London without ever enjoying the physical presence of General Koenig.⁶²

With the arrival of American conventional troops, GILES' role shifted to liaison work assisting the U. S. Army forward. Crozon, a town on the end of the Brittany peninsula, served as the last German hold out in GILES' area. GILES aided the 17th and 15th Cavalry Squadrons attack the approaches to Crozon by coordinating actions

⁶¹ Ibid., 336 and 353; Claude E. Boillot, U. S. Representative, Suez Canal Company (Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez), 1952-78. Papers, 1924 - 1984, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 4; and Foot, 407-408.

⁶² Knox letter; and Foot, 403.

with the FFI and in the words of the Team GILES report, the Americans and French “cooperated magnificently.” SFHQ brought GILES back to England by sea prior to the final reduction of Crozon.⁶³

Due to a single resistance group in Finistère, GILES did not have to mediate between factions nor contemplate political ramifications of supporting one group over the other. Unlike team HUGH and GEORGE who constantly worked to smooth over political hatreds, GILES worked with a single group who, in turn respected their authority simply because GILES armed them. If the FTP refused to cooperate with GILES it would lose its weapons and with no weapons, the FTP would be irrelevant. Bernard Knox believed the communist philosophy had very little hold on such a rural and religious area and with the FTP filled with non-idealistic young men who simply wanted to fight the Germans, Knox believed politics was “unimportant.”⁶⁴

⁶³ Ibid., 356.

⁶⁴ Knox, letter.

Conclusion

The Jedburgh's success or failure, like many military operations, depended upon proper planning, excellent training, and sufficient resources. Jedburgh teams operating in areas with active and mature resistance circuits proved much more effective. Teams HUGH and IAN took advantage of the *SHIPWRIGHT* circuit's foundations to build battalions of capable soldiers. Parachuting into the region with the oldest SOE presence, these two teams scored great successes. GEORGE however, never seemed to find refuge or the time to organize effective resistance until nearly overrun by the American Third Army. With a defunct SOE circuit and the confusing command issue of being detailed to the SAS, SFHQ placed GEORGE with immature resistance, while working for a unit not familiar with Jedburgh capabilities. GEORGE's superb training in field craft, languages, and the team members' flexibility and determination saved them time and time again. GILES also found themselves with no active circuit, but with only the FTP filled by non-political members who merely desired to fight Germans, matters were simplified and led directly to success.

Determining if the four teams are typical is unclear, but by choosing two teams that operated in Vichy and two teams that operated in occupied France perhaps the difference is illustrative. The greater success of the circuits to remain intact up to D-Day was in part due to Vichy's decreased ability for internal control. In occupied France, Germany's unhindered and focused forces succeeded by arresting circuit

building efforts. When GEORGE arrived in Brittany with no viable circuit and no hard intelligence on the resistance, and the additional difficulty of working for the SAS, it found its work much more difficult than Teams HUGH or IAN. Despite the loss of the Brittany circuit, but fortunate to find only one politically affiliated resistance group, Team GILES and the other teams working in eastern Brittany avoided a great deal of GEORGE's difficulties.

Another aspect of Vichy's poor control compared with Germany's is while Vichy's influence waned, many more resistance groups rushed to fill the vacuum. HUGH and IAN worked with the various resistance groups FTP, AS, Combat, and the original DMR all contending to influence their mission and gain weapons. Such circumstances increased HUGH's and IAN's difficulties. In Brittany, GILES' greatest challenge was building up an immature FTP in the face of an ensconced Gestapo and Wehrmacht who continued to move at will right up until the arrival of conventional forces. Unable to supply arms and give the Maquis what General Donovan called their "national self-expression," GEORGE's poor communications invalidated its role and failed to bring the area political unity.

In evaluating the overall invasion, General Eisenhower credited the deception effort as the greatest Allied asset. Second, he believed the effective resistance against German units making their way toward Normandy contributed to success. He ranked the Allied bombing effort third. Eisenhower realized a successful deception campaign coupled with full cooperation from within the enemy's lines created such havoc and confusion the enemy simply could not overcome them and bring Germany's full power

to bear. Later, the resistance formed an effective protection for the Third Army's sweep toward Paris allowing the conventional forces to press aggressively across France. Once into Germany, with no organic resistance to organize, Jedburghs were not deployed and the advance slowed considerably.¹

To the Allies, combat through France was a means to defeat Germany. However, the French fought a war inside the greater conflict of World War Two. Like all wars, political arguments served as the war's central conflict and France's pre-war politics factions continued to seek their goals as the war ended. Complications beset Jedburgh Teams operating in areas not politically united and Jedburghs not ready for such conditions contended with the political differences as much or more than combating the Germans. SHAEF and SFHQ deployed Jedburghs to organize guerrilla action and supply the Maquis, in other words to conduct military operations. However, their political role was the decisive factor in their success. Seen by local French combatants as the voice of SHAEF, de Gaulle, and Koenig the three uniformed parachutists appeared to give the French the political and unified validation required for effective military action. The French officer on the team represented France's unified choice to eject the invader. SHAEF, via the Jedburgh organized Maquis, cut railroads, destroyed bridges, harassed German troop columns, interfered with communications, sabotaged key industrial targets, and forced the Germans to delay their Normandy arrival. But acting in concert in the Allied effort against Germany provided the French locality the political unity required for Allied victory. To this end, the Jedburghs were a military unit with direct political successes.

¹ SHAEF, SGS microfilm, reel 21, frame 1275.

APPENDIX A

Team HUGH

William Crawshay: Used the code name CROWN. The British Army promoted him to Major while on Team HUGH. Crawshay became a Knight and resided in Wales. He passed away in 1997.

Louis L'Helgouach: Operated using the nom-de-guerre Captain Louis Legrand and the code name FRANC. Deceased.

Rene Meyer: Operated using the non-de-guerre Robert Mersioli and the code name YONNE. Also participated in Jedburgh Team JULIAN II.

Team IAN

John J. Gildee: Used the code name OKLAHOMA. Major Gildee also deployed to China after operations in France ceased. He currently resides in a Quincy, MA nursing home.

Alex Desfarges: Used the code name MAINE and the nom-de-guerre Yves Deslorme. He currently resides in Enghien, France.

Lucien J. Bourgoin: Used the code name MAYO. Sergeant Bourgoin's family in Lawrence, Massachusetts received news of his death but due to the secret nature of the Jedburghs, the Army related no details. They only knew he was a paratrooper stationed in England. Not until the 1990s did his sister, Mamie Gauthier read about the Jedburghs in a newspaper article and thought perhaps her brother may have been involved with them. In 1997, she discovered he was indeed a Jedburgh and traveled to France visiting Pleuville along with Alex Desfarges. The U. S. Army moved Bourgoin's body from the Pleuville cemetery and buried his remains in the American cemetery in Dragaillon, France.

Team GEORGE

Philippe Ragueneau: Used the nom-de-guerre Philippe Erhard and the code name SAVE. An avid Gaullist, Ragueneau became the head of French television. He is currently retired and lives in Paris.

Paul Cyr: Used the code name WIGTON. Captain Cyr deployed to China after operations in France ceased. He is credited with blowing up the Yellow River bridge while a troop train passed transporting 5000 Japanese soldiers. He died in 1996 and his wife and sons reside in South Carolina.


Pierre Gay: Used the nom-de-guerre Christien Lejeune and the code name RUPEE. Deployed to Indochina, he died in combat in 1946.

Team GILES

Bernard M. W. Knox: Used the code name KENTUCKY. Following the war, Knox became a Greek Literature professor and classicist. He wrote and edited many works including Essays: Ancient and Modern, The Oldest Dead White European Males and other Reflections on the Classics, and Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles' Tragic Hero of His Time. He is currently the Director Emeritus of Harvard's Center of Hellenic Studies in Washington, D. C. and resides in Darnestown, MD.

Paul Grall: Used the nom-de-guerre Paul Lebel and the code name LOIRE. After the war he resided in Nice, France. Deceased.

Gordan H. Tack: Used the code name TICKIE. Reportedly lives in Hampshire, England.



Taken from M.R.D. Foot, The SOE in France. Insert Map #4.

Team HUGH *

Team IAN #

Team GEORGE +

Team GILES @

TEAM NAME	Last	First	Rank	Nationality	Nom de Guerre	Code Name	Area of Operations	Mission Dates	Remarks
ALAN	Toussaint	Robert	Lt	French	Andre Gairaud	ARIEGE	Saone et Loire	8/12/44	
	Camrictott	Stanley M.	Capt	British		PENBROKE			
ALASTAIR	Clause	Robert	S/Lt	French	Francis de Haysen	KRONER	Epinal	8/27/44	WIA - 25 September, 1944 at Magny-D'Anjou east of Lune
	Brown	Oliver H.	Major	British		KENT			
ALEC	Karriere	Bene	Lt	French	R. Maître	DONEGALL			
	Smith	G. N.	Sgt	British		LINCOLN	Loire et Cher	8/9/44	
ALEX	Thomson	George C.	Lt	American		CROMARTY			
	Bordes	A.	Lt	French	B. Aillet	OXFORD			KIA - died from wounds received 4 September, 1944 Les Air Augillon
ALEXANDER	White	John A.	SSgt	American		COLORADO	Creuse	8/12/44	
	de la Toesche	Rene	Lt	French	Richard Thouville	LEIX			Cousin of FDR, journalist and author of "Sub Rosa" and "Stay of Execution"
ALFRED	Alcop	Stewart J. O.	Lt	American		ROMA			
	Franklin	Norman R.	1st Sgt	American		CORK	Besancon-Doubs	8/24/44	
AMMONIA	MacDougall	L. D.	Capt	British	G. de Wavrant	ARGYL			
	Hiersnigel	Jean-Pierre	Lt	French		AUDE			
ANDREW	Key	A. W.	Sgt	British		WAMPIUM	Sarlat-Dordogne	6/10/44	Deployed from Algeria
	Austin	Bertram McDonald	Capt	American		GASPARD			
ANDREW	Lecompte	Raymond	Capt	French	R. Compte	LUDOVIC			
	Berlin	Jacob B.	Sgt	American		MARCIAL	Southern Ardennes/Belgian border	8/15/44-9/8/44	
ANDY	Coombe-Tenant	A. H. S. "Henry"	Major	British		RUIPEL			Comte, Descendant of one of Napoleon's generals
	d'Oultremont	Edouard	Lt	Belgian		DEMER			
ANTHONY	Harrison	Frank	Sgt	British		NETHE	Haute Vienne	7/31/44	
	Parkinson	R. A.	Major	British		FIFE			WIA - Fractured leg during parachute drop 11 July, 1944
ANTHONY	Vermeulen	G.	Major	French	J. Vermeulen	CARLOW			WIA - 11 July, 1944 broken ankle from parachute drop
	Loomore	R.	Sgt	British		LINDY	Saone et Loire	8/14/44	
ARCHIBALD	Starrig	Mason	Lt	American		NEBRASKA			
	Stasse	Maurice	Capt	French	C. Deprez	PERTH			
ARCHIBALD	Bradner	John L.	TSgt	American		PENNIG			
	du P Demming	Arthur	Major	British		CUMBERLAND	Moselle	8/25/44	
ARNOLD	Costas	Franks	Lt	French	A. Montlic	MONTGOMERY			WIA - 3 September, 1944 at Charnes, Meurthe et Moselle, carried on
	Pierre	Roger L.	MSgt	American		SEN			WIA - 3 September, 1944 at Charnes, Meurthe et Moselle
ARTHUR	de Canville	M.	Capt	French	M. Condray	SUISSE	Marne	8/24/44	
	Monahan	J. F. H.	Lt	British		LONDONDERRY			
ARTHUR	de Ville	A.	Sgt	British		ESCLUDO	Cotes D'Or	8/18/44	
	Wynatt	Cecil F. J.	Capt	American	Louis Hache	CONNECTICUT			WIA - 18/19 Aug. 1944 fractured spine during parachute drop
ALIBREY	Humblet	Xavier	S/Lt	French		SMABRERE			
	Back	Albert V.	TSgt	American		MILLIEME	Seine et Marne	8/11/44	
ALIBREY	Marchant	Godfrey	Capt	British		RUTLAND			KIA - 1 March, 1945 in Aircraft crash Dum Dim airport, India
	Chaigneau	A.	Lt	French	J. Talmon	KILDARE			KIA - Between Forry and Oissey near Paris 27 Aug. 1944
ALIBREY	Hooker	Ivar	Sgt	British		THALER			
	Bonall	John H.	Major	American		ARIZONA	Alme	8/15/44-8/30/44	
ALIBREY	Delviche	J.	Capt	French	J. Dechville	HERAULT			KIA - at Barenton-Sur-Serre 30 Aug. 1944
	Cote	Roger E.	TSgt	American		INDIANA			KIA - at Barenton-Sur-Serre 30 Aug. 1944
BASIL	Riviere	R.	Capt	French	R. Raincourt	AMBLEVE	Jura/Doubs	8/25/44	
	Carew	T. A.	Capt	British		SUTHERLAND			
BENJAMIN	Stoyka	John L.	TSgt	American		ORE			
	Forrest	A. J.	Major	British	A. Forrest	STIRLING	Ardun	8/20/44-10/2/44	WIA - ambushed 1 Sept. 1944, Clermont-Et-Argonne able to carry on
BERNARD	Moniz	Paul	Lt	French	P. Marchand	WULSTER			
	Kaminski	H.	S/Lt	French	J. Camoulin	SERRE			WIA - ambushed 1 Sept. 1944, Clermont-Et-Argonne able to carry on
BRIAN	de W. Waller	J.	Capt	British	E. Prato	TIPPERARY			
	Nusica	Etienne	Capt	French		ARGENS			WIA - 31 Aug. 1944 at Fuzaud in Blaine Valley
BRIAN	Bissett	C. M.	Sgt	British		LANCASHIRE	Nancy	8/28/44	WIA - Ambushed 1 September, 1944 near Clermont-Argonne

Jedburgh Teams

Maniere, J du Rocher	Orma E L. T.	Major Sgt	American Canadian	RUPERT OSWALD	Morbihan, Brittany	8/5/44-	POW 5 Aug. 1944 near Valencis. Liberated and return UK 25/5/45
DOUGLAS	Richard Robert Kaven	Capt Lt Sgt	British British British	AUGURE ANACHORERE HALF CROWN	J. Romgrou	9/15/44-	
DOUGLAS II	Richard A. Robert Van Hart	Capt Capt TSgt	British French American	AUGURE ANACHORERE HALF CROWN	Rongrou	9/15/44-	KIA
DUDLEY	Henk Olmasd Austin	Major Major Sgt	Dutch American British			9/11/44	KIA - 5 March, 1945 between Lotter and Gronau, Overysel, Holland WIA Shot while a POW, 4 April, 1944, near Zwolle, Holland
EDWARD	Jaap Sollenberger Mills Willmet Billingsley	Capt Capt Capt 2Lt Sgt	Dutch American British British American			9/17/44	
EPHEDRINE	Swank Donnat Desplachin	1Lt LT LT	American French French	GANTOR JULIEN LEON		8/12/44	Deployed from Algeria KIA - died in an accident 14 August, 1944 near St Paul (Savoie)
FELIX	Souquet Marchant Calvin	Maj Capt Sgt	French British British	CARNAVON SOMERSET MIDDLESEX		8/7/44 to 23/8/44	
FRANCIS	Ogden-Smith Lebozyne Dallow	Major Lt Sgt	British French British	DORSET DURANCE GRONT		9/7/44 to 9/9/44	KIA - wounded and KIA Quimper(Quimper) 29 July, 1944
FRANK	Isaac Martelli Henny	Capt Lt Sgt	British French British	WESTMORELAND DUMBARITON CHESHIRE		9/26/44	
FREDERICK	Wise Bloch-Auroch Kchoe	Major S/Lt M/Sgt	French French American	KINROS VIRE PESETA		9/6/44 to 20/8/44	
GAMBLING	Clutton Kroetzembelt Menzies	Major Capt CQMS	British Dutch British		Area near Malmedy	4/9/45	
GAVIN	Carbuca Dreux Valentini	Major Capt S/Lt	French American French	SHILLING SIRPENCE HALFPENNEY		7/11/44	Author of 'No Bridges Blown'
GEORGE	Ragnarau Cyr Gay	Capt Capt Sgt	French American French	SAVE WIGTON RUPPE		9/6/44 to 23/8/44	not reg Army 1 of 5 drawing straws to shoot Dardain(Gaullist and French TV head)
GEORGE II	Philippe Cyr Gay	Capt Capt Sgt	French American French	SAVE WIGTON RUPPE		9/3/44	Reg Colonial Army KIA-1946 in IndoChina
GERALD	Philippe Cyr Gay	Capt Capt Sgt	French American French	SAVE WIGTON RUPPE		7/18/44-	WIA this mission broken leg during drop, carried on Reg Colonial Army KIA-1946 in IndoChina
GILBERT	Kerby Therette Friede, Jr	Capt Lt 1Sgt	American French American	NORFOLK SUFFOLK SELKIRK		7/9/44	
GILES	Blathwayt Charron de la Carriere P. Wood	Capt Lt Sgt	British French British	Surrey Ardèche Doublon		8/7/44 to 9/9/44	Invasion by Carpathagogen Fought with Spanish Republicans-After WWII Taught Greek Literature Colonial Army Inf
GODFREY	Knox Grall Teck Eobes Leval	Capt Capt Sgt 1LT Lt	British (later US cit) French British American French	KENTUCKY LOIRE TICKE RHODE ISLAND ROSCOMMON		9/11/44	

Jedburgh Teams

GRAHAM	Hanson	Frank A.	Sgt	American	ROMBOURGH	Basses Alpes	8/8/44	Deployed from Algeria
	Crosby	M. C. M.	Major	British	HUGE			
	Gavet	Pierre	Capt	French	CRISPIN			
	Adams	William	1Sgt	American	DESTRE			
GREGORY						Jura/Doubs	9/4/44	Did not Deploy
	Bennett	K. D.	Capt	British	APOTRE			
	de Schonen	Albert	Capt	French	ARGENTIER			WIA - Ambushed 6 September, 1944 near Baume-Les-Dames
	Brenny	Ron	Sgt	British	FLORIN			WIA - Ambushed 6 September, 1944 near Baume-Les-Dames
GUILY						Southern part of Ile et Villaine	7/11/44	
	Duron	Andre	Capt	French	DROUPE			
	Trofimov	A. A.	Capt	French	GIRONDE			
	Groult	Roger	S/Lt	French	DORDOGNE			
HAMISH						Chateaufort area of Indre	6/12/44 - 9/12/44	
	Anstett	Robert M.	1Lt	American	ALABAMA			
	Schmitt	Rene	Lt	French	LOUISIANA			
	Watters	Les J.	Sgt	American	KANSAS			
HAROLD						Vendee	7/15/44	
	Whitty	V. E.	Major	British	ROSS			
	Joliet	Pierre	Lt	French	TYRONE			
	Verlander	Harry	Sgt	British	SILGO			
HARRY						NW of Auton/Morvan Mts	6/6/44-9/21/44	
	Guthrie	D. D.	Capt	British	DENBY			
	Rousset	Pierre	Lt	French	GAPPAI			
	Couture	Rene	2CL	French	CINTIME			
HENRY						Jura/Doubs	9/9/44	
	Moore	Raymond E.	1Lt	American	NEW MEXICO			
	Jean-Monder	Stéphane	Capt	French	ANGLESSEY			
	Rocca	Vincent M.	1Sgt	American	WEST VIRGINIA			Arthur Brown lists his name as J. Montcler
HILARY						Finistere	7/17/44	
	Maubaint	Edgar	Lt	French	CHARENTE			
	Chelbourne, Jr.	Philip H.	1Lt	American	NEVADA			
	Hervouet	Roger	S/Lt	French	KOPEK			
IBORACE						Finistere	7/17/44	
	Summers	John W.	Major	American	WYOMING			
	Ledroq	Georges	Lt	French	SOMME			
	Zielski, Jr.	William F.	T/3	American	DIHE			
HUGH						Chateaufort area of Indre	6/5/44-9/22/44	
	L'Hedgouch	Louis	Capt	French	FRANC			Reg Colonial Army Cav Spahi-deceased
	Crawley	William R. (Sgt)	Capt	British	GROWN			deceased, 1997
	Meyer	Rene	CC	French	YONNE			deceased
IAN						South of Pontiers, Vienne	6/20/44-9/17/44	
	Gilize, Jr.	John J.	Major	American	OKLAHOMA			
	Destanges	Alex	Lt	French	MAINE			
	Bourgoin	Lucien J.	Sgt	American	MAYO			
ISMAC						Cotes D'Or	8/10/44??	
	Hutchison	J. R. H.	Lt Col	British				
	Viat	F. G.	Lt Col	French				
	Sharpe	J.	Sgt	British				
IVOR						St. Amand, Cher	8/6/44	
	Cox	L. H.	Capt	British	MONMOUTH			
	Collin	Robert	Lt	French	SELJUNE			
	Goddard	Lewis F.	1Sgt	American	OREGON			
JACOB						Voges	8/12/44	
	Gough	Victor A.	Capt	British	ABRAM			KIA-7/8/44. Chute did not open completely-died near Beddes
	Boissarie	Maurice	Lt	French	CONNAUGHT			KIA - POW Oct. 1944 killed on or about 25 Nov. 1944
	Seymour	Ken	Sgt	British	SKYE			KIA - 4 September 1944 near Boun L'Étape, Vosges
JAMES						Correze	8/10/44	POW - 17 Aug. 1944 near St. Die, Vosges returned UK 4 April, 1945
	Singlaub	John K.	1Lt	American	MISSISSIPPI			made Major General
	le Bel de Pergully	Jacques	Lt	French	MICHIGAN			
	Denneau	Anthony J.	1Sgt	American	MASSACHUSETTS			
JEREMY						Haute Loire	8/28/44	Deployed from Algeria
	Hallowes	George M.	Capt	British	ALMALE			
	Giese	Henri	Capt	French	FONTROISE			
	Lensy	R. A.	Sgt	British	FERNE			
JIM						Jura	9/10/44	
	Donovan	Philip W.	Capt	American	PENNSYLVANIA			
	de Francesco	Jose A.	Lt	French	LETRICH			
	Hendy	Michael F.	1Sgt	American	WENFORD			
JOHN						Tarn et Garonne	8/13/44	Deployed from Algeria
	Stern	D. L.	Capt	British	BEAU			

Jedburgh Teams

NAME	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	GRADUATION	UNIT	STATUS	DATE	LOCATION	REMARKS
ALDE	de Gilbert	Maurice D.	ASP	French	J. le Rocher			
	Gibbs		Sgt	British				
	Evans	W. L. O.	Capt	British		8/14/44	Loire	
	Larrieu	Jean	Capt	French	J. Lavigne			
	Holdham	A. E.	Sgt	British				
BILLIAN	Clutton	A. H.	Major	South African?		8/10/44	Indre et Loire	
	Vernot	Marc	Lt	French	Joseph Brouillard			
	Menzies	T. S.	CGMS	British				
JULIAN II	Souquet	C. M.	Capt	French	J. Kennel	8/11/44	Northern Indre and Cher Valley	
	Scherrer		S/Lt	French	Sainvoise			
	Meyer	René	S/Lt	French	Robert Meniol			
LEE	Brown III	Charles E.	Capt	American		8/9/44	Haute Vienne	
	Argouvent	Paul	Lt	French	M. Vigier			KIA circumstances unknown
	Pirat	Maurice	S/Lt	French	Andre Chevalier			
MARK	Thevenet	Jeanne	Lt	French	F. G. de Thevenet	8/15/44	Tart et Garonne	Deployed from Algeria
	Conin	Lucien E.	Lt	American				Later with CIA
	Carpenter	James J.	Sgt	American				
MARTIN	Mellows	T. A.	Capt	British		8/15/44	Haute Garonne	Deployed from Algeria
	Redonnet	Georges	Lt	French	G. Remond			
	Carry	N. E. S.	Sgt	British				
MASQUE	Guillot	Nelson E.	Capt	American		8/25/44??	Isere	Deployed from Algeria
	Bouvery	Jacques	Lt	French	J. Gramont			
	Poché, Jr	Francis M.	Sgt	American				
MAURICE	Carrain, Jr	Charles M.	Capt	American		8/3/44	Ardennes	
	Dumesnil	Hubert	Lt	French	H. Reveilhac			
	Cole	Francis J.	TSgt	American				
MILES	Allen	Everett T.	Capt	American		8/16/44	Gers	Deployed from Algeria
	Ertwe	René	ASP	French	Pierre Fourcade			
	Gruen	Arthur	Sgt	American				
MIMARET	Hartley-Sharp	L. C. M.	Major	British		7/9/44	Gard	Deployed from Algeria
	Cros	P.	Capt	French	Mutin			Did not deploy with Team
	Ellis	John W.	Sgt	British				
MONOCLE	Fiano	J.	Capt	French	J. Tozel	8/13/44	Drome	Deployed from Algeria
	Foster	Ray H.	Lt	American				
	Anderson	Robert J.	Sgt	American				
NICOLAS	Mauje	L. C. C.	Capt	British		9/10/44	Beaumont	
	Penin	Henri	Lt	French	H. Puget			
	Whittle	M. A.	Sgt	British				
NORMAN	Dillow	Konrad C.	Lt	American		9/4/44	Haute Saone	
	Laubier	Marc	Lt	French	Frederic Battaille			
	Lagenesse	Lucien E.	TSG	American				
NOVOCAINE	Gemmerich	Charles J.	Lt	American		8/6/44	Haute Alps	Deployed from Algeria
	Thompson	Jean Yves	Lt	French	Jean Yves LaLann			
	Thompson	William T.	Sgt	American				
PACKARD	Bank	Aaron	Capt	American		7/31/44	Lozere	Deployed from Algeria
	Denis	Henri	Capt	French	C. Boineau			Widely credited with starting U. S. Special Forces
	Montfort	F.	Lt	British				
PAUL	Hood	E. H. M.	Major	British		8/18/44	Jura	
	Valles	Michael	Lt	French				
	Brown	K. J. W.	Sgt	British	F. Cormier			
PHILLIP(RUPERT)	Liberos	C. J.	Capt	French	J. G. de Rouen	8/31/44	Meurthe et Moselle	
	Lucas	R. A.	Lt	American				
	Gergat	G.	Sgt	American				
QUENTIN						9/27/44	Finistere	

Jedburgh Teams

Fenton	R. S.	Capt	American	J. Lasserte	CORNWALL			
Raux	Jean	Lt	French		WICKLOW			
Rawson	D.	Sgt	British		MERIONETH			
QUININE								
MacPherson	R. Tommy	Major	British		ANSELME			Deployed from Algeria
de Bourbon de Palme	Michel	ASP	French	Maurice Bourdon	ARISTIDE	Lot	6/8/44	French Prisoner in the Bourbon line/17 years old during mission
Brown	O. A.	Sgt	British		FELICIAN			
RAYMOND								
Deffosse	R.	Capt	French	R. Waguet	WATERFORD	Vendee	8/27/44	
Cailliac	H.	Lt	French	H. Chaulais	GLoucester			
Adams	W.	Sgt	British		KINGCAROLINE			
RODERICK								
Preziosi	Jean	Capt	French	A. Paoli	NAIRN	Doubs	8/31/44	
Boggs	William C.	Lt	American		NEW HAMPSHIRE			
Menezes	Charles	Sgt	American		STRONSAY			
RONALD								
Trapp	Shirly Ray	1Lt	American		BOURSIER	Finistere	8/5/44	WIA
Desselligny	Georges	Lt	French	J. Darrigues	BOULTON			
Esch	Elmer B.	TSgt	American		POUND			
LIBERTOS	J.	Capt	French	J. G. de Rouen	KINTRE		8/31/44	
Lucas	Robert A.	1Lt	American		CATHNESS			
Geryat	Joseph M.	S3C	American		LEINSTER			USNavy/last name spelled incorrectly in official records
Hanna, Jr.	Walter C.	1Lt	American	Tevenac	VAILLANT	Alpes Maritimes	6/13/44	Deployed from Algeria
Franceschi	Francis	Lt	French		IRTIENSE			
Palmer	Howard V.	M3Ct	American		DEVOUX			
SEIGN								
Grenfell	O. P.	Major	British		SCIMITTLATING	Sere	8/30/44	
Grappo	Roger	Lt	French	G. Revard	VIF			
Cain	T.	Sgt	British		VIBRANT			
SIMON								
Coomber	A. W. C.	Capt	British		COUSTARD	Deux Sevres	9/27/44	
Fouere	Maurice	Capt	French	M. Fontaine	FERNARD			KIA - Circumstances Unknown
Somers	C.	Sgt	British		STEPHANE			
STANLEY								
Crazer	Oswin E.	Capt	British		YORKSHIRE	Haute Marne	8/31/44	
Carbis	Robert	Lt	French	Robert Carriere	MEATH			
Grimham	E. Jack	Sgt	British		WORCHESTERSHIRE			
STANLEY II								
Beatebreurtje	Anie Dirk	Capt	Dutch	Whitfield		Holland north of Deventer	10/9/44	
Vickery	P.	Capt	British					
Beryon	Willard W.	TSgt	American					
TIMOTHY								
Moutte	L.	Capt	French	L. Ambel	NESQUE	Aine/Jura	9/10/44	
Mundinger	Robert G.	1Lt	American		MARCELIN			Served in Indochina taken POW
Heys	Robert E.	1Lt	American		DYLE			WIA - Fractured both ankles during parachute drop 10/11 Sept 44
Spears	Donald	1Sgt	American		ESCAUT			
TONY								
Montgomery	Robert K.	Major	American		DOLLAR	Finistere	8/17/44	
Paris	Luclen	Lt	French	Mark de Vailly	ECY			
McGowan	John E.	TSgt	American		QUARTER	Sere	6/9/44	Deployed from Algeria
VEGANIN								
Marten	H. Neil	Major	British		CUTHBERT			KIA - Circumstances Unknown
Vuchot	Gaston	Capt	French	C. L. Noir	DEREK			KIA - Parachute failed 8/9 June, 1944.
Gardner	D.	Sgt	British		ERNEST			Deployed from Algeria
WILLYS								
Montague	John C.	Capt	British		HONAN	Ardeche	6/28/44	
Marshall	G.	Capt	French	P. J. Granier	SIMON			
Cornick	T.	Sgt	British		CHANSI			

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